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This is dedicated to our
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Note from the Editor

At a time when universities all across California are cutting courses, dismissing adjunct faculty, and increasing class sizes, I was amazed that our history department still managed to support our student run journal *The Chico Historian*. I am both thankful and proud that despite all the adversity facing our university, our faculty and staff have fought to preserve this rewarding and enriching project.

I want to say that I could not have gotten this publication to press without the immense support of our amazing students, staff, and faculty here at CSU Chico's Department of History. I want to especially thank my editorial board for their hard work and honest opinions. It is not easy reviewing the work of your peers without bias. I must also thank our advising professors, Dr. Stephen Lewis, Dr. Jason Nice and Dr. Jessica Clark, who are always a source of guidance, energy and enthusiasm for me when I need it most. I would also be remiss if I did not thank Claudia Beaty, our amazing history department coordinator, who always greets me with a smile and knows exactly where to direct me when I have questions or concerns. And finally, I want to thank Professor Emeritus John Boyle for his wonderful financial contribution, which has sustained this publication for several years. Without Professor Boyle's amazing generosity, *The Chico Historian* would not be possible.

Ultimately I want to say, the collaboration and support of all these people have resulted in an exceptional assortment of both Undergraduate and Graduate papers ranging from German history and guilt, military strategy in World War II, to the plays of Plautus from Roman antiquity. Each paper demonstrates the immense dedication and skill of our students and professors, and I can say without hesitation, that the level of scholarship within these pages makes me proud to be a part of such a wonderful history program. Thank you.

Editor,
Meghan O'Donnell

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Bryce Havens

“The Guilt of the Past: The Historikerstreit and Germany’s Search for National Identity”

In the past four years, two relatively minor occurrences in Germany prompted a great deal of public debate and garnered international press coverage. These events were the 2006 World Cup, hosted in Germany for the first time since reunification, and the German premiere of Mel Brooks’ satirical Broadway play “The Producers” in May of 2008 at the Admiralspalast Theater in Berlin. While a soccer tournament and the premiere of a play might seem like relatively unimportant events, both proved to be newsworthy, for they aroused sentiments about many issues deeply rooted in postwar German history and Germany’s sense of national identity.¹

During the 2006 World Cup, in an almost unheard of show of patriotism and national pride, tens of thousands of Germans all across the country displayed and waved the national flag in support of their soccer team. Given the events of twentieth-century German history, specifically the twelve years of the Nazi dictatorship and its devastating consequences for Europe and the world at large, symbols of patriotism and national pride in the postwar era became taboo because of their association with the darker side of nationalism. The flag-waving and enthusiastic feelings of pride spurred by the 2006 World Cup represented a fundamental change of public opinion regarding patriotism in postwar Germany.²

The second and more controversial event was the opening of “The Producers” in Berlin. Mel Brooks’ famous musical, which includes Nazi storm-troopers who sing and dance, as well as a flamboyantly gay Hitler, has played to sold-out audiences in multiple countries, including Israel. However, concerns about its taboo nature preceded the Berlin premiere. Newspapers in Berlin and Germany posed questions such as “Can Berlin laugh about Hitler?” or “Should one be permitted to laugh about Hitler in Berlin?”³ Despite a successful premiere, and other recent German films designed to mock and satirize Hitler and the Third Reich, almost sixty-five years after the end of the Second World War, such subject matter remains a sensitive issue within Germany.

Concerns about patriotic displays of flag waving and the almost unthinkable idea of laughing about Hitler speak to a larger debate, one that has been brewing in Germany since the defeat of National Socialism. This debate, in a very broad context, is about guilt; specifically, German guilt for the atrocities committed during World War II. After forty years of quiet discussion between academic historians and philosophers, this debate erupted into a highly publicized and heated dispute among Germany’s leading scholars. The *Historikerstreit* (historians’ dispute) of 1986 captured the attention of Germans and scholars throughout the

¹ Although the issues discussed in this paper remain important for contemporary Germany, the historical setting of the events described here took place in, and were primarily influential in what used to be West Germany.

² Richard Bernstein, “In World Cup Surprise, Flags Fly With German Pride,” *The New York Times*, 18 June 2006.

³ Peter Beddies, “Kann Berlin über Hitler lachen?” *Berliner Morgenpost* 17 April 2009; Roland Keitsch, “Darf man in Berlin über Hitler lachen, Herr Friedman?” *Bild*, 17 April 2009.

western world. It quickly became a lively and intense discussion regarding the various elemental causes of National Socialism and the Holocaust, all of which took place in the public forum of newspapers, magazines, and speeches. Although numerous issues were debated, two factions developed. They were ultimately concerned with how National Socialism and the Holocaust should be studied within the context of German historical development and the likely impact that would have on Germany's sense of national identity. The three primary issues of contention—the singularity of the Holocaust, the historicization of National Socialism, and the impact of the Nazi period and the Holocaust on German national identity—were, and continue to be, of great importance to Germans. They represent the most important issues in the Germans' long struggle to come to terms with their past. Despite the significant nature of the debate, it quickly degenerated into a pedantic misadventure fraught with pessimism and despair on the one hand, and the politically motivated misuse of history on the other. This paper seeks to answer the important questions that the *Historikerstreit* failed to.

The Debate

The first scholar who attempted to answer some of the questions disputed during the *Historikerstreit* was Karl Jaspers. In 1947, the existential philosopher published a small book entitled *The Question of German Guilt (Die Schuldfrage)*. In this study, Jaspers offered a philosophical examination of the culpability of the German people for the crimes of the Third Reich. He asserted that there were four types of guilt: criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical. Criminal guilt was associated with the violation of laws and those found to be guilty must accept their punishment. Political guilt measured the relationship between the state and the people. Moral guilt reflected the inner suffering and personal struggles of the individual, who is ultimately responsible for his or her actions. Metaphysical guilt tied all individuals together in solidarity, for all human beings were co-responsible for the actions and injustices of one another. The assertion here, according to Jaspers is that one may feel guilty despite his or her innocence of any actual crime.⁴

Although Jaspers's logic and arguments were philosophically complex and struggled with many issues, he made three critical points. First, all Germans were politically guilty because they “share the blame for the crimes committed in the name of the Reich.”⁵ Second, moral guilt rested solely with the individual who questioned the degree of his or her own guilt through a process of self-reflection. “The morally guilty” said Jaspers, “are those who are capable of penance, the ones who knew, or could know, and yet walked in ways which self-analysis reveals to them as culpable of error...”⁶ Moral guilt cannot be judged by another, only by the individual in regards to his or her actions. Lastly, metaphysical guilt applied both to the individual and the German people. Those who knew of Nazi crimes or were present during their commission, yet failed to stop them suffer from guilt different than all others. Jaspers applied this collectively by writing “[w]e are

⁴ Karl Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1961), 31-32.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

guilty of being alive.”⁷ Although he gave no specific prescription for this atonement, Jaspers implored every German to “transform his approach to the world and himself” in order to create the “essential basis” for the future of the “German soul.”⁸

In the four decades between the end of the Second World War and the *Historikerstreit*, German scholars grappled with this issue of guilt in their attempts to study and explain the National Socialist regime and its crimes. According to Theodore Hamerow, two ideologically opposed camps developed during this period. The first camp, comprised primarily of older scholars who had been educated before the outbreak of the war, believed that the Third Reich represented a “departure from the political spirit of central Europe.”⁹ To them, the Third Reich broke the long continuity of German historical development and progress. In order to “find deliverance from the burden of guilt,” these scholars sought to return to the spirit of traditional German values found in the German Confederation of the German Empire.¹⁰ The second camp, primarily younger scholars educated after the war, sought to redeem German history by actively confronting what they saw as historical continuity between German history and the Third Reich. For this younger generation, “National Socialism was a logical culmination of the historical development of Central Europe.”¹¹ These two camps and their disagreements concerning the nature of the Third Reich would ultimately come to fruition during the *Historikerstreit*.

The political climate of Germany during the 1980s was, in many aspects, primed for the *Historikerstreit*. Two major events set the stage for the dispute. First, in 1982, after more than a decade of liberal rule, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) lost its majority in the West German parliament to the conservative Christian-Democratic Union (CDU).¹² The second, and unexpectedly controversial, event came in 1985 with the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The new chancellor, Helmut Kohl, invited U.S. President Ronald Reagan to observe the anniversary of V-E Day in Germany as a sign of reconciliation and friendship between the two former adversaries. The ceremony was to be held at a military cemetery in the city of Bitburg. The location caused a great deal of tension and unease among many American and Jewish officials because forty-nine of the cemetery’s 2,000 graves belonged to members of the SS.¹³ Before leaving for Germany, Reagan remarked that he did not feel uncomfortable about the location because the majority of soldiers buried at the cemetery comprised regular German soldiers who were also “victims” of Hitler and the Nazis. “They were victims,” Reagan said, “just as surely as the victims in the

⁷ Ibid., 72.

⁸ Ibid., 74.

⁹ Theodore S. Hamerow, “Guilt, Redemption, and Writing German History,” *The American Historical Review* 88 (Feb., 1983): 61.

¹⁰ Ibid., 65.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Dietrich Orlow, *A History of Modern Germany: 1871 to Present* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc., 2002), 289.

¹³ Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 10.

concentration camps.”¹⁴ Many found this equating of perpetrator and victim disturbing. Despite the tension, Reagan went to Bitburg, where the ceremony concluded without further controversy. Although the “Bitburg affair” caused very little actual protest, it stirred many emotions.

The *Historikerstreit* itself began on 11 July 1986 when the prominent social philosopher Jürgen Habermas published an article in *Die Zeit* magazine. His article attacked a number of well-respected conservative historians for what he saw as “apologetic tendencies” in their writings and the political misuse of their profession. He specifically accused the historians of revising history so that it might “happily [be] made morally neutral” in order to service “a nationalist renovation of conventional identity.”¹⁵ Habermas’s targets quickly responded to his polemic by accusing him of intellectual censorship, misrepresentation of the facts, “sloppy research,” being an old Leftist still engaged in the “intellectual battles of yesterday and yesteryear,” and not being a historian.¹⁶ The debate grew in intensity over the following six months as other historians and scholars joined the discussion. Some sided with Habermas, others with his conservative targets, and some merely offered their opinion without directly taking one particular side. Despite the accusations, name-calling, and rancorous atmosphere that developed, three issues emerged as focal points: the singular or “unique” nature of the Holocaust, the historicization and normalization of the Third Reich and its crimes, and the impact of National Socialism on Germany’s sense of national identity.

History as Guilt

The most contentious and, from the viewpoint of scholars outside of Germany, most unsettling issue of the *Historikerstreit* dealt with the nature of the Holocaust. The central question concerned the singularity of the Holocaust. Was the Holocaust a truly unique event in human history, or was it comparable to other twentieth-century atrocities? Of the historians on the Right, Ernst Nolte, internationally acclaimed historian and expert on Fascism, argued most stridently against the singular nature of the Holocaust. Despite having written in 1980 that “the extermination of several million European Jews—and also of many Slavs, mentally ill, and Gypsies—is...without precedent” and that the “acts of violence perpetrated by the Third Reich are singular,” Nolte, in most of his major publications, argued against that very assertion.¹⁷ In an famous article from 6 June 1986, *The Past That Will Not Go Away*, which prompted Habermas’s polemic, Nolte compared the Holocaust to the “Asiatic” crimes committed against the *Kulaks* and the many victims of the Soviet gulags. “Did the National Socialists or Hitler,” Nolte asked, “perhaps commit an ‘Asiatic’ deed merely because they and their ilk considered themselves to be potential victims of an ‘Asiatic’ deed? Was the Gulag Archipelago not primary to Auschwitz? Was the Bolshevik murder of an entire class not the logical and factual prius of

¹⁴ Ronald Reagan, “Quotation of the Day,” *The New York Times*, 19 April 1985.

¹⁵ Jürgen Habermas, *A Kind of Settlement Damages: The Apologetic Tendencies in German History Writing*, quoted in *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust*, trans. James Knowlton and Truett Cates (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1993), 34, 42. (Cited hereafter as *Historikerstreit*).

¹⁶ *Historikerstreit*, 57, 61, 224-225.

¹⁷ Ernst Nolte, *Between Historical Legend and Revisionism: The Third Reich in the Perspective of 1980*, quoted in *Historikerstreit*, 2.

the ‘racial murder’ of National Socialism?”¹⁸ To support his claim that the Nazis had a “legitimate” reason to feel threatened, Nolte cited Chaim Weizmann, the president of the World Zionist Organization who, in 1939, said that the Jews of the world would fight with Britain against Germany during the war. Though Nolte did not condone the violence of the Holocaust, he claimed that it was not unreasonable to see why the Nazis would have interned Jews, just as Americans did Japanese civilians.¹⁹ The only real difference that Nolte perceived between the two atrocities of the Gulag and the Holocaust was the “technical process of gassing.” Thus, the “so-called” Nazi extermination of Jews, according to Nolte, “was a reaction or a distorted copy and not a first act or an original.”²⁰

Nolte’s assertions were poorly reasoned and inadequately supported by factual evidence. First, by citing Weizmann, Nolte suggested that world Jewry declared war on Germany, which was a preposterous insinuation considering that the Jews of the world were not united, nor did they have the power of a nation-state with which to threaten Germany. Nolte also forgot to mention that, in many respects, the Nazis declared war on the Jews. He made no reference to the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 or to the violence, arrests, and destruction of property committed by the Nazis during *Kristallnacht* in 1938. With regard to the casual connection between Bolshevism and Nazism, most historians believe there was insufficient evidence” for Nolte to have made such a claim.²¹ It has also been shown that Hitler had no knowledge of the crimes committed against the *Kulaks* or the violence of Stalinist Russia until late in the war. Thus Nolte’s assertion of a Nazi preventative war against Bolshevism and the Jews was groundless.²² The nature of violence was also qualitatively different. Richard Evans, in his observations of the *Historikerstreit*, shows that there is no evidence to support the claim that Bolshevik violence against the *Kulaks* and the bourgeoisie entailed the total, physical annihilation of the people. Class violence under Stalin was not aimed at world domination or the persecution of the German bourgeoisie. Bolshevik violence was a form of political terrorism; Nazi violence against the Jews “was an end in itself.”²³ Eberhard Jäckel, who caustically attacked Nolte, made the most persuasive argument for the singularity of the Holocaust: “[T]he National-Socialist murder of the Jews was unique because never before had a nation with the authority of its leader decided and announced that it would kill off as completely as possible a particular group of humans, including old people, women, children, and infants, and actually put this decision into practice, using all the means of governmental power at its disposal.”²⁴

¹⁸ *Historikerstreit*, 22.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

²¹ Peter Baldwin, ed., *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), 8.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 88.

²⁴ *Historikerstreit*, 76.

Despite the overwhelming evidence that Nolte's claims were spurious, if not bordering on apologetic, many conservative academics supported his overall revisionist argument. Though they never used expressions as blatantly insensitive and outrageous as Nolte, they supported the comparability of the Holocaust to other atrocities of the twentieth century, such as the Armenian genocide, the killings of Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War, the massacre of Cambodians during the tenure of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, and similar massacres in Latin America.²⁵ The important question here is not about the comparability or incomparability of the Holocaust, but to what ends should such comparisons be made? Comparison of historical events is a critical and useful tool of the historian. Studying the similarities and differences between events allows the historian "to establish typologies—'fascism,' 'genocide,' 'totalitarianism'—which...serve...as matrices of analogy."²⁶ The Holocaust can, indeed should, be compared to other atrocities for the purpose of scholarship and the advancement of historical study. Such comparisons should not, however, serve a means to a political end. Nolte and his compatriots on the Right, particularly Joachim Fest, Andreas Hillgruber, and Michael Stürmer, were concerned with the discipline of history. They called for consensus, "the liberation from collectivist thinking," and the end to "conformism that places under moral suspicion...the freedom to ask questions."²⁷ Such complaints sound well-intentioned but, given their political motive, they must be viewed with some suspicion.²⁸

During the keynote address to the Conference of German Historians, which took place on 8 October 1986 during the height of the *Historikerstreit*, Christian Meier quietly criticized his colleagues for engaging in a "dispute between the Right and the Left" which he saw as a problematic "example of the politics of history." Concerning the singularity of the Holocaust, Meier rightly asked "[e]ven if our crimes were not singular, how would that be advantageous for us and our position in the world?"²⁹ In the end, all historical phenomena are singular in their own right, for they all occur once in the confines of their unique historical context. As Charles S. Maier asserted, "[t]he singularity of historical events must remain to a degree ineffable....In so far as the historian studies what is unique, he cannot directly communicate it. He can represent it only by plausible analogies."³⁰ When studying truly unique phenomena such as the Holocaust, an event that in many ways is beyond comprehension, perhaps this is the best approach. Whether singular or not, the Third Reich and the Holocaust will always be part of German history.

History as Moral Burden

²⁵ Of the conservative supporters of Ernst Nolte, Joachim Fest argues most stridently for such comparisons. See *Historikerstreit*, 63-71.

²⁶ Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, 98.

²⁷ *Historikerstreit*, 17, 22, 63. Stürmer in particular has a problem with the "differing, even opposing, views of the past and the future."

²⁸ The political motives of the conservative historians will be examined more closely in the last section of this paper.

²⁹ *Historikerstreit*, 139. In the same speech, Meier insinuates that Nolte and other conservative historians have engaged in "producing mindless nationalist apologies" which he sees as dangerous for they might encourage "new attempts to relativize or to divert attention away from" the crimes of National Socialism.

³⁰ Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, 98.

The second important issue raised during the dispute concerned the historicization and normalization of the Third Reich. In 1985, a year before the *Historikerstreit*, the social historian Martin Broszat wrote an article entitled “A Plea for the Historicization of National Socialism” wherein he called for the end of the demonization and moralization of the Third Reich. Such demonization and use of overly moralistic language, according to Broszat, has resulted in the loss of the “moral force” of previously held convictions concerning the Third Reich. He believed that a “more nuanced historical analysis can make [such convictions] morally useful again.”³¹ Broszat thus promoted a more in depth, socially scientific, approach to the study of the Third Reich, rather than focusing on its political structure and crimes. By studying the hitherto neglected areas of the Third Reich, such as “legal, economic, social, and cultural” developments, especially those related to the everyday life of common Germans, Broszat believed that a fuller and more complex picture of the Third Reich could be painted.³² Such an approach would allow scholars to examine the period 1933-1945 in a broader “long-term view of the arena of modern German history....”³³ It would also show the many continuities, as well as changes, in German society both before 1933 and after 1945.³⁴

Broszat, to be sure, was not an apologist seeking to trivialize the crimes of the Nazis. He criticized Nolte for being a rueful “grand eccentric” and accused the other conservatives, above all Michael Stürmer, of trying to belittle the Third Reich and its crimes in order to make history “an ersatz religion” to be used by the state for the purpose of creating “democratic consensus.”³⁵ Despite this, his plea for historicization received much criticism. Chief among the critics was Habermas. Citing concern for the “memory of the suffering of those murdered by German hands,” Habermas believed that Broszat’s scientific and emotionless approach to studying the Third Reich was untenable. If it were carried out, according to Habermas, “our Jewish fellow citizens, the sons, the daughters, [and] the grandchildren of the murdered could no longer breathe in our country.”³⁶ Habermas thus believed that all Germans were, and perhaps forever would be, liable in some way for the crimes of the Nazis. “Can one assume the legal successorship of the German Reich?” he asked. “Can one continue the traditions of German culture without taking over the historical liability for the way of life in which Auschwitz was possible? Can one be liable for the context of the origins of such crimes, with which one’s own existence is historically woven... [?]”³⁷ Thus, German history, as Habermas saw it, “must remain painful history.”³⁸

Another critic of Broszat was the Israeli historian Saul Friedlander. Although Friedlander did not actively partake in the *Historikerstreit*, he voiced his opinion of historicization in a series of open letters with

³¹ Martin Broszat, *A Plea for the Historicization of National Socialism*, quoted in *Reworking the Past*, 77.

³² *Ibid.*, 82-87.

³³ *Ibid.*, 87.

³⁴ Evans, *In Hitler’s Shadow*, 118-120.

³⁵ *Historikerstreit*, 125,128.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 165.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 167.

³⁸ Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, 59.

Broszat shortly after the dispute end.³⁹ His primary concern was one of definition. He believed that Broszat's definition of historicization was too vague and open to a wide range of interpretations and potential misuse. Since the "history of Nazism belongs to everybody," the process of historicization could potentially cause problems between the interpretations of liberals and conservatives, as well as between Germans and Jews.⁴⁰ Friedlander's second problem was that of historical distance. Historicization implied that the Nazi period should be treated as any other period of German history, and that scholars should examine it without any moral presuppositions. This was problematic in Friedlander's mind because the magnitude of the Nazi period and its crimes remained too closely intertwined with present-day memory. "[T]his past," Friedlander asserted, "is still much too present for present-day historians, be they German or Jewish...be they contemporaries of the Nazi era or members of the second...[or] third generation, to enable an easy awareness of presuppositions and of a priori positions."⁴¹ Although he was in favor of a more complete and complex understanding of the Third Reich, Friedlander warned that historicization might lead some scholars to study Nazism "in the same way as sixteenth-century France."⁴²

The issue of historicization is closely related to the singularity of the Holocaust. Scholars such as Habermas and Friedlander believed that the historicization of the Nazi period would normalize the Holocaust, which could lead to a lack of "moral condemnation."⁴³ Although these scholars raised legitimate concerns, the Third Reich and its crimes must be historicized. The technical process of how to accomplish this can remain open for debate, but the Third Reich should, at the very least, take its place as one part of the broader story of German history. This is important for two reasons.

First, it would be immoral to allege that all German citizens are guilty of crimes they did not commit and that they must forever bear the historical burden for the actions of both their forebears and their country. The vast majority of Germans alive today were born after the Second World War. They have no living memory of the Third Reich and its crimes. According to Jaspers's philosophy, no German born after the collapse of the Third Reich can be considered guilty in any way. If Germany must forever bear the burden of its "painful history," then so must all other countries that have committed barbaric crimes against humanity. The Nazi period and the Holocaust cannot, as Nolte rightly stated, be permanently "suspended above the present like an executioner's sword."⁴⁴ All one can ask of the post-war generations is that they remember their history. Theodor Heuss, the first president of the Federal Republic of Germany, declared in a speech on 7 December 1949, "We cannot simply forget the things that people would like to forget...We cannot forget the Nuremberg Laws, the Star of David, the burning of synagogues, [and] the deportation of Jewish

³⁹ For the letters see Baldwin, *Reworking the Past*, 102-134.

⁴⁰ *Reworking the Past*, 98

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Maier, *The Unmasterable Past*, 92.

⁴⁴ *Historikerstreit*, 18.

people...to their deaths. Those are facts that we should not forget, that we cannot forget..."⁴⁵ Sixty-five years after the end of the Second World War, the act of remembrance is all that should be expected.

Second, National Socialism must also be historicized for scholarly purposes of research. As Richard Evans explained, the new approaches of the social sciences "have yielded many new insights into the nature of Nazism." Such new studies have in no way blurred the "moral distinctions," rather they have made them "more precise."⁴⁶ The period from 1933-1945 cannot be, as Michael Stürmer explained, the "be-all and end-all of German history..."⁴⁷ It cannot be studied in a vacuum. According to Konrad Jarausch, "[o]nly by putting the Nazi period back into its own past will it continue to be relevant for the present." The challenge will be to find a way that is "both ethically sensitive and truly historical."⁴⁸

History as Identity

The final issue raised during the dispute concerned the place of National Socialism within German history and its impact on German national identity. For the conservative participants of the debate, particularly Michael Stürmer and Andreas Hillgruber, the building of a positive national identity was of great concern. In his book *Two Kinds of Downfall: The Destruction of the German Reich and the End of European Jewry*, Hillgruber compared the collapse of the Third Reich in eastern Europe and the near annihilation of European Jews. He remarked that as a German historian, he found it necessary to "identify with the concrete fate of the German population in the East and with the desperate and sacrificial efforts of the German army in the eastern theater and of the German navy in the Baltic..."⁴⁹

Hillgruber's book was strongly criticized by Habermas and those on the Left for its poor methodological approach—comparing the extermination of Jews to the deaths of many German civilians along the eastern front—and its insensitive subtitle, which seemed to imply that the German Empire in the East was violently destroyed, while European Jewry passively came to a natural end.⁵⁰ What drew particular criticism was Hillgruber's claim that historians must "identify" with their subject. Habermas specifically rebuked Hillgruber for exaggerating that the Holocaust was entirely the policy of Hitler and the Nazi elite, for he felt this removed too much blame from "the mass of the [German] population...[which] was silent throughout all of it."⁵¹

⁴⁵ Theodor Heuss, speech before the Society of Christian-Jewish Cooperation in Wiesbaden, 7 December 1949. Quoted in Hans Jürgen Küsters, *Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag GmbH, 1996), 309.

⁴⁶ Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow*, 120.

⁴⁷ *Historikerstreit*, 17.

⁴⁸ Konrad H. Jarausch, "Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians," *German Studies Review* 11 (May, 1988): 296.

⁴⁹ Quoted in *Historikerstreit*, 35.

⁵⁰ Baldwin, *Reworking the Past*, 4. Hillgruber also makes the claim that the expulsion of millions of Germans from the East, which resulted in many thousands of deaths, was a specific goal of the Allied powers. Richard Evans refutes this assertion by citing a lack of significant evidence. See *In Hitler's Shadow*, 47-65.

⁵¹ *Historikerstreit*, 38.

Michael Stürmer received equal criticism for his many pleas for the construction of a positive national identity. In his article *History in a Land without History*, Stürmer cited the revived interest in history among average Germans, especially in museums and flea-markets. Stürmer surmised that this revived interest in the past was a result of “[a] loss of orientation and a search for identity...”⁵² Believing that such a lack of orientation would have political ramifications for the future, Stürmer concluded that it was “morally legitimate and politically necessary” to “search for a lost past...”⁵³ Sensing a change in the political *zeitgeist*, Stürmer warned all Germans (presumably politicians and academics) that “in a land without history, the future is controlled by those who determine the content of memory...and interpret the past.”⁵⁴

This pronouncement for historical consensus particularly disturbed Habermas, who viewed it as a nationalistic attempt to create a unified view of German history by calling “the Germans back to conventional forms of their national identity...”⁵⁵ This desire for a return to a strong, unified German state organized around some form of traditional Prussian values represented a threat to Germany’s “constitutional patriotism” and its ties to the “political culture of the West” which Habermas believed to be the greatest achievement of the Federal Republic’s post-war period.⁵⁶ Unlike Habermas, Christian Meier did not believe that Stürmer wanted a return to a strong Prussian state, although he did accuse him of “instrumentaliz[ing] history politically.” Stürmer’s politicization of history, according to Meier, was “motivated by a strange and extremely hard-to-substantiate fear...that German history could someday belong to someone.”⁵⁷

Although Stürmer’s ultimate goals remain unclear, it is undeniable that he sought to use history for political purposes. Though his desire for historical consensus and the creation of a national identity may have been well-intentioned, history should not be actively used for political purposes. History should serve to dispel the myths, legends, and spurious information on which national identities are frequently founded. Scholarly debate and the pluralism of ideas are the very heart of the historical profession. This is not to say that Germans should be forbidden from studying their past, quite the contrary. All Germans should be aware of their past and how it has shaped their lives today. But the construction of an artificial national identity based on a consensus of German history (one which is incomprehensible for the generations of post-war Germans) must not be allowed.

History and the Future

Now, more than twenty years after the *Historikerstreit*, what, if anything, can be said about its influence? Shortly after the dispute ended, most of the conservative historians agreed that the dispute had been “superfluous” and that it had quickly “degenerated into a boundless public palaver whose end is not yet

⁵² Ibid., 16.

⁵³ Ibid., 17.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 16.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 44.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 43.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 181.

in sight.”⁵⁸ This is true in many ways. Habermas’s polemics were unjustifiably harsh and reactionary, despite his legitimate concerns. The one positive side of the debate was its public forum. This allowed important issues to be addressed, albeit inadvertently, to the German populace. Sadly, the debate ultimately became nothing more than a political spectacle concerned with the control and future use of the writing of German history. Thus, it failed to answer any of the important questions that it addressed. Richard Evans described the *Historikerstreit* as uneventful because it failed to present any new research or ask any new questions. As a consequence, the only real victims of the debate were “[s]cholarly decency and [the] civilized standards of academic debate....”⁵⁹

While its circumstances and ultimate end might have proven to be uneventful, the *Historikerstreit* unsettled many foreign scholars who observed it closely. Scholars such as Richard Evans and Charles Maier believed that the ideas put forth by conservatives like Nolte and Stürmer were actually dangerous because they made “far-right thinking respectable” again.⁶⁰ Evans went so far as to accuse the conservatives, particularly Stürmer, of engaging in a new form of nationalism. By attempting to dispel the “myth” about the singularity of the Holocaust, by calling for National Socialism to be historicized in an attempt to remove the burden of guilt, by demanding historical consensus, and by promoting the use of history to create a national identity, Evans believed the conservatives wanted to return Germany to “an authoritarian political system allied to a strong and unified national consciousness.”⁶¹ Evans was actually strongly opposed to the idea of a reunified German state. He believed that the advocates for reunification did not seek the “extension of Western freedom to the East, but the resurgence of an old-style German nationalism whose commitment to freedom and democracy is extremely doubtful.”⁶² Today, reunified Germany is a flourishing democracy, both economically and militarily powerful. Even if Evans’s accusation was correct, his fears of the return of a Prussian nationalist state were sorely misplaced.

Twenty years after the reunification of Germany, what can be said about the impact of National Socialism and the Holocaust on German memory and sense of national identity? Two specific events suggest that the influence is, and will for some time remain, relatively indefinite. On 10 October 1998, Martin Walser, a prominent novelist, was awarded the Peace Prize from the German Book Association. The next day, during his acceptance speech in Frankfurt, Walser took the opportunity to criticize politicians and the German media for engaging in an overly aggressive “instrumentalization of our shame.”⁶³ He accused the media specifically of operating as a “cruel industry of memory” for the daily representation of the National Socialist past and its crimes. “Instead of being thankful for this persistent presentation of our shame,” said Walser, “I begin to

⁵⁸ Ibid., 269.

⁵⁹ Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow*, 117-118.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 136.

⁶¹ Ibid., 111.

⁶² Ibid., 102.

⁶³ Martin Walser, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” Dankesrede von Martin Walser zur Verleihung des Friedenspreises des Deutschen Buchhandels in der Frankfurter Paulskirche am 11. Oktober 1998.

look away.”⁶⁴ Walser saved his most vitriolic attack for the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, which was in the beginning stages of conceptualization at the time. Walser referred to the construction plans as the “concreting of the center of the capital city with a football field-sized nightmare” which he felt represented “the monumentalization of shame.”⁶⁵

Walser’s speech, according to Siobhan Kattago, struck a chord with many Germans, for he spoke to an issue that average Germans felt they could not—the “resentment at having to be contrite and a feeling that they have paid their debt to the past.”⁶⁶ The speech, however, was not without controversy. Walser’s remarks about the Holocaust memorial and his use of the verb *to look away*, which provocatively made reference to Germans who looked away in the face of Nazi crimes, deeply upset Ignatz Bubis. Bubis, a Holocaust survivor, accused Walser of being a “spiritual arsonist,” who sought to create a culture of forgetfulness. The dispute that ensued, much like the *Historikerstreit*, lasted for a few months before finally ending when Bubis died in August 1999.⁶⁷

Unlike Walser’s firebrand speech that called for an end to feelings of collective guilt and shame, Angela Merkel, the current chancellor of Germany, in a speech before the United States Congress marking the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, called for remembrance. She made specific reference to the Holocaust and the “hate, destruction, and annihilation that Germany brought upon Europe and the world.”⁶⁸ “I cannot stand before you today,” Merkel said, “without remembering the victims of this day and of the Shoah.”⁶⁹ Merkel also made reference to Germany’s continued support for Israel in the face of growing danger over Iranian nuclear ambitions. “For me, Israel’s security will never be open to negotiation... Whoever threatens Israel also threatens us!”

It is obvious that these speeches, as well as the concerns raised during the *Historikerstreit*, represent much more than a desire to either forget or remember the National Socialist regime and the Holocaust. They represent an attempt on the part of all Germans to come to terms with the past; a past that for a diminishing few is still living memory. National Socialism and the Holocaust will forever be part of German history and national identity. They must be accepted and remembered by all Germans. However, they cannot be allowed to define all of German history or forever burden the German people. In a sobering speech commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, former president Richard von Weizsäcker made a plea to all Germans: “Let us honor freedom. Let us work for peace. Let us adhere to the law. Let us serve our inner standards of justice. On this, the 8th of May, let us look, as well as we possibly can, the truth in the

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Siobhan Kattago, *Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi Past and German National Identity* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 157.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 157-159

⁶⁸ Angela Merkel, speech before the United States Congress, 3 November 2009.

⁶⁹ Ibid. “This day” is a reference to *Kristallnacht*, 9 November 1939.

eyes.”⁷⁰ For those Germans born after the Second World War, this, and the act of remembrance shall be their duty to history.

⁷⁰ Richard von Weizsäcker, “Zum 40. Jahrestag der Beendigung des Krieges in Europa und der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft,” speech before the German Parliament, 8 May 1985.

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Ken Knirck
“Military Strategy, Politics, and Morality: Harry S. Truman’s Atomic Decision”

Introduction

When the yoke of leadership was thrust upon Vice President Harry S. Truman due to the sudden death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, nobody knew how the personality and life experiences of this Missouri haberdasher turned politician would play out in the spotlight of international war and national politics. At this time of world war, a sudden change of leadership was the last thing Americans and the Allied forces of Europe wanted. Harry Truman’s presidential metal would be tested from day one. Never has an American president been thrust so quickly and unexpectedly into a position of national and international leadership. The country and the world wouldn’t have to wait long to see how a new presidency is formed by fire and tested by circumstances not of his making. This paper will examine the personality traits, military calculations, political considerations, and the guidance of his advisors that led President Harry S. Truman to order the nuclear destruction of two Japanese cities in August of 1945.

The American people had the ultimate confidence in Truman’s predecessor who led them through the Dust Bowl, the Great Depression and nearly four years of World War II. Early in his U.S. Senate career, Truman’s patronage to Missouri Democratic boss Tom Pendergast led many to believe that Truman was simply a shill for the party. But Truman later proved himself to be his own man and loyal to his constituents and his convictions. His Protestant upbringing, his Mid-Western work ethic, and his strong desire to learn, were the tools he carried with him to the White House.

Presidential Personality

This change of attitude towards Harry Truman was evident at the time when he took over the Presidency less than three months into his term as Vice President. Although far from the proven leader that Roosevelt was, Truman’s detractors in Washington were relatively few. Confidence in Truman’s ability to lead the country in this time of world war was high. Even his detractors were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. Democrats and Republicans praised his character and openly expressed their confidence in Truman’s ability to lead. John Nance Garner, Franklin Roosevelt’s first Vice President, wrote to Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn expressing his confidence in Truman: “He’s got the stuff in him.” Writing in his diary on April 12, 1945 about Truman’s ability to handle the job, stalwart Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg lamented “I think he can.” And I.F. Stone of the *Nation*, who supported the selection of Henry Wallace over Truman for the Vice Presidency, wrote: “I hate to confess it, but I think Mr. Roosevelt was farsighted in picking Mr. Truman rather than Mr. Wallace as his successor. At this particular moment in our history, Mr. Truman can do a better job.”¹

¹ McCullough, David. *Truman*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Truman biographer Robert J. Donovan appropriately summed up Truman's ability to handle the Presidency given his personality, temperament, and experience:

"Suddenly handed the helm at a turning point in history, the former senator and small-town politician had been forced upon the journey unprepared, without being enabled by some miracle to shed a certain personal narrowness, ineptness, ignorance, impetuosity, and crudeness. Along the way, however, he was able to draw upon the resources of his own spirit, his own courage, humor, hope, good instincts, capacity to learn, willingness to face large challenges, and faith in the people and the American system of government. While he entrusted to other men like Marshall, Acheson, Byrnes, Forrestal, Clay, and MacArthur wide discretion in their fields and thus gave them a deep influence on the policies of his administration, Truman was always the president."²

Harold Lasswell praised Truman as an "ideal democrat" whose "open ego" allowed him to seek the opinions of others, cultivate friendships, and embrace optimism for the future. Yet, Truman possessed a somewhat self-destructive attitude that Lasswell referred to as "the respect-centered character" that undoubtedly adversely affected Truman's abilities as president.³

Throughout his civilian life, his early days as a low-level Jackson county bureaucrat, his time in the Senate and White House, Harry Truman pushed himself mentally and physically to the point of exhaustion on numerous occasions. He was, however capable of overcoming this self-induced stress through his understanding of the physiological causes and remedies for his mental and physical ailments. Vigorous exercise and cathartic exercises such as penning intense and emotional letters to friends, foes, and colleagues that would never be sent, seemed to get his spirits up again. Although Truman was capable of deep emotional thought, this trait was not apparent in his political decision-making process. On the contrary, presidential decisions such as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, the implementation of the Marshall Plan, intervention in the Korean conflict, and the firing of General MacArthur were all decisions that Truman made utilizing group consensus, precise diplomatic planning, and political calculation.⁴

Those around him discovered a man who was capable, confident, and well-suited for the presidency. Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, described Truman as an inexhaustible and inspirational leader. He read voraciously and had the ability to absorb and recall the finest details. He routinely worked past midnight and was up each morning by six. He slept soundly, unencumbered by worry because "he could not stay awake long enough to do so."⁵

Although James David Barber defines Truman as an active-positive personality type, "displaying high self-esteem and continual enjoyment in the exercise of power," Truman's workaholic tendencies were seen by Barber as a characteristic that is more often associated with the active-negative presidential personality type.

² Donovan, Robert J. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1977.

³ Lasswell, Harold D. *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell*. Glenn Cove: Free Press, 1951.

⁴ Hamby, Alonzo L. "An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of the Personality of Harry S. Truman." *Political Science Quarterly*, 106, no. 1 (1991): 33-55.

⁵ Acheson, Dean. "The Greatness of Harry Truman." *Esquire*. Sept. 1969, 125-127.

Barber also added that the aggressiveness that was often displayed by Truman placed him closer to the active-negative end of the presidential personality categories. Barber surmised that this aggressive behavior was overcompensation for Truman's low self-esteem and self-image.⁶ And many of Truman's friends thought of him as timid and somewhat henpecked by his wife Bess.

Truman's low self-esteem occasionally manifested itself in Truman's own revisionist history regarding his dealings with subordinates. An example of this is the way in which Truman rebuked former Secretary of state James F. Byrnes. Throughout his tenure as Secretary of State, Byrnes go-it-alone negotiating style and his conduct and policies toward the Soviet Union was an irritant to Truman. While still in the White House and four years after Byrnes had left the State Department on good terms with Truman, Truman released a memo that showed how he had forcefully controlled Byrnes. Truman alleges to have read this terse statement directly to Byrnes immediately following a verbal dressing down of Byrnes, who denied that the event occurred as Truman depicted it. Another disputed scolding of a subordinate involved Douglas MacArthur at a 1950 Wake Island conference.⁷

Truman in the Heat of the Kitchen

Truman's reason, morality, and leadership would soon be tested. Following a cabinet meeting on April 12, 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson mentioned to President Truman that development of a weapon capable of unprecedented destruction was under way. On April 25th Stimson met with Truman to brief him on S-1, the code name for the atomic bomb being developed by a consortium of American, British, and Canadian scientists known as the Manhattan Project. Stimson described S-1 as a single bomb that was capable of destroying an entire city. Truman reacted calmly to this disclosure. He promptly formed the "Interim Committee" to study the scientific, military, and moral issues that were related to the use of the bomb on America's enemies.⁸

From most accounts, Truman was comfortable with delegating. He trusted his advisors, considered dissenting opinions, and ultimately respected and adhered to the recommendations of his man in charge. In the case of the Interim Committee, Truman's man in charge was Henry Stimson. The role of the Interim Committee was strictly advisory, and Truman had placed the ultimate decision on the use of the atomic bomb with Stimson. Noted Stimson:

"The conclusions of the committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to exact a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisors, there must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire. Such an efficient shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, than it would cost."

⁶ Barber, James David. *Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1992.

⁷ Hamby, Alonzo L. "An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of the Personality of Harry S. Truman." *Political Science Quarterly*, 106, no. 1 (1991): 33-55.

⁸ Strong, Robert A. *Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in Presidential Foreign Policy Making Since 1945*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005.

Truman did not challenge the recommendation of the committee. He had concluded himself that the use of S-1 was necessary and inevitable. Concurrent with the deliberations of the Interim Committee, the battle of Okinawa was reaching its peak. The Japanese forces fought tenaciously and American losses in that campaign were staggering. Truman feared that Okinawa was a good indication of the type of fight the Americans would encounter in an attack on the Japanese mainland.⁹

A Calculation of Lives

Although some consider it revisionist history, conventional thinking regarding Truman's decision to use atomic weapons on Japan was a decision that balanced the projected allied casualties that would be incurred in a full-scale invasion of the Japanese home islands with the civilian deaths caused by the atomic bombs. In his 1955 memoirs Truman stated: "General Marshall told me that it might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy's surrender on his home grounds."¹⁰ This claim has been asserted by many to be a post-war creation to justify Truman's decision to use atomic bombs on Japan. In June of 1945, just one month before the Potsdam Conference, Truman had been warned by former president Herbert Hoover, who had himself conducted a detailed estimate of the casualties that an invasion of the Japanese home islands would cost between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men.¹¹ Whether these published numbers were a revisionist effort to justify Truman's decision, there is no doubt about the planning and preparation occurring in the late months of the war.

The code name for the overall attack on the Japanese mainland was "Operation Downfall" which contained detailed sub-plans known as "Operation Olympic," which targeted the southernmost island of Kyushu, and "Operation Coronet," which targeted Tokyo itself on the main island of Honshu. U.S. Army Intelligence estimated Japanese troops available to defend the islands at approximately 3,500,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) used the casualty figures from the battle for Saipan to estimate U.S. casualties for Operation Downfall. Using the "Saipan ratio" of one American killed and several wounded to kill seven Japanese gave a high-end estimate of 2,000,000 Americans killed and wounded during Operation Downfall.¹² These numbers were later reduced to a more palatable best-case scenario of 500,000. This became the "official" number that was often cited by war planners and President Truman.¹³

In anticipation of a vigorous and possibly prolonged battle for the Japanese islands, the War Department revised its manpower needs to an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 man per month "replacement stream" for a single front war in the Pacific that could last through 1946. By June of 1945, the Army Ground

⁹ Donovan, Robert J. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1977.

¹⁰ Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955.

¹¹ Giangreco, M.D.. "A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan." *The Pacific Historical Review*, 72, no. 1 (2003): 93-132.

¹² Joint Chiefs of staff Report 924/2, 1945

¹³ Giangreco, M.D.. "A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan." *The Pacific Historical Review*, 72, no. 1 (2003): 104.

Force replacement centers were at a war-time high of 400,000 men. Letters to House Military affairs Committee Chairman Andrew J. May that outlined the expanding manpower needs were printed in the *New York Times* on January 17, 1945. These letters called for 600,000 Army replacements and 300,000 Navy replacements by June 30, 1945. In anticipation of the invasion of Japan, the Army's Selective Service call-up increased to 100,000 per month, up from 60,000 to 80,000 in January of 1945.¹⁴

Clearly the historical revisionist theories that Truman and his advisors did not use the atomic bombs to prevent the catastrophic loss of life that would occur during a U.S invasion of the Japanese mainland are unfounded. If anything, the 500,000 casualty estimates for Operation Olympic were optimistically low. On June 18th, 1945 operation Olympic was approved by President Truman. With the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, the fact that an invasion of Japan was not necessary was more fortuitous than the military planners had realized. In after-action briefings conducted in August of 1945 following the capitulation of the Japanese revealed that the Japanese defense positions, food supplies, and training infrastructures were a great deal more robust than the American war planners had expected. Had an American invasion taken place, the casualty figure may have been closer to the upper estimates of 2,000,000 than the lower estimate of 500,000.¹⁵

Even with the war winding down in Europe, and soldiers and sailors being transferred to the Pacific theater, the man power estimates for an invasion of the Japanese homeland were staggering. Clearly Truman and his advisors were gearing up for a massive campaign and were anticipating an enormous number of casualties. Although American families were weary of the war, hatred for Japan was strong in the U.S. and an escalation in the Pacific theater would probably not have cost Truman in his domestic popularity. However, Truman was concerned about the effect of mass American casualties on the psyche of the American people. U.S. servicemen had just come out of several costly battles with the Japanese on Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa in which the American forces lost 31,000, 20,000, and 41,700 respectively. Truman's advisors had warned him that the Japanese would fight to the last man and that Japanese soldiers had shown that they would rather starve than surrender. Truman's concern that the ferocity of fighting in Operation Downfall would be equal to or greater than the fights in Okinawa and Iwo Jima was well warranted.¹⁶

On July 16th, 1945 at Trinity Test Site Zero in the Alamogordo, New Mexico Test Range, S-1 was successfully tested. It yielded approximately 20-22 kilotons. Scientists working on the Manhattan Project were uncertain how well the "gadget" would work, if at all. Word of the successful test made its way to Truman the following day. President Truman now had a better idea how and when the war in the Pacific would end. He also had a powerful chip to play in the game of one-upmanship against Joseph Stalin.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Coox, Alvin J. "Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to invade Japan in 1945." *The Journal of Military History*, 64, no. 2 (2000): 411-437.

¹⁶ Giangreco, M.D. "A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan." *The Pacific Historical Review*, 72, no. 1 (2003): 104.

The International Stage

On July 17th, 1945 in Potsdam Germany, the leaders of the allied countries of World War II met to discuss how the post-war world would look. Communist Party General Secretary Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Harry S. Truman all came into the meeting with clear intentions of securing the most for their respective countries in post-war Europe and Asia. Truman and Churchill were allied in their concern for an ever-strengthening Soviet Union, its future domination of Europe and the possibility of Soviet influence and/or occupation in post-war Japan. In an effort to intimidate Stalin, President Truman casually mentioned that the United States had successfully developed a new weapon that possessed “unusually destructive force.” Apparently Stalin’s response to Truman’s mention of the bomb was casual, due perhaps to the likelihood that Soviet spies had infiltrated the Manhattan Project that was developing the atomic bomb.¹⁷

There is varied opinion regarding the true goals of the big three at Potsdam, although some assumptions have gained much solidarity among historians. Both the United States and Great Britain were fearful of Soviet expansion; Churchill sought to split U.S. and Soviet power in order to create a British-dominated Western European Bloc, and Truman was concerned about keeping the Soviets out of the reconstruction of Japan and the subsequent control of the Japanese territories and resources. Charles L. Mee put forth the thesis that Truman was seeking to intensify and exploit hostility between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in order to expand U.S. power, and Stalin was equally interested in developing America as an external enemy of the Soviet Union in order to maintain his control of the Soviet people. Mee (and others) contend that Truman intentionally prolonged the war with Japan in order to finish development of the atomic bomb so it could be used on Japan to quickly end the war before Japan could surrender to the Soviet Union, as well as to intimidate the Soviets and Stalin.¹⁸

The Question of Conditional Surrender and Domestic Politics

President Truman had several factors to consider regarding the surrender of Japan. Soon after the bombing of Hiroshima, even before the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo decided to offer a quick surrender to the American forces. The only caveat of the offer was the guarantee that the Emperor would remain as the “Sovereign Ruler” in the aftermath of the war. Judging by the tenacity of the Japanese forces and diplomatic corps throughout the war, this sudden offer of surrender was by all accounts unexpected by Truman and his advisors. This new twist added to the dilemma for Truman. The question arose: Should Truman accept this conditional surrender and end the war quickly? Should Truman hold out for an unconditional surrender and show the world (and the Soviets) that Truman and the United States are tough negotiators and are willing to fight for their position? Should the

¹⁷ Feis, Herbert. *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

¹⁸ Mee, Charles L. *Meeting at Potsdam*. New York: M. Evans & Co. Inc., 1975.

allied forces continue to use conventional bombs until an official surrender is signed to keep the Japanese from renegeing on their promise and continue to fight? Truman, along with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, was leaning toward the position of accepting Japan's conditional surrender offer. But former Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Truman's Secretary of State James F. Byrnes argued that allowing the continuation of the imperial dynasty would embolden the militant faction within Japan, prolong the war, and anger millions of Americans who saw the Japanese Emperor as a war criminal. Although he was leaning toward holding out for an unconditional surrender, Truman reminded Stimson that he had promised at Potsdam that he would yield on the point of the imperial guarantee if the peace process was dependant "on that one point." Stimson's rebuttal to those who favored an unconditional surrender was the possibility that many Japanese soldiers would not recognize any authority other than the Emperor and that these soldiers would continue to fight throughout the Pacific despite an official Japanese surrender.¹⁹ Two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Russians declared war on Japan. As was the fear of Truman and Churchill, the possibility arose that Soviet claims on Japanese assets and their insistence on being part of the Japanese reparation was real.

On August 9th, Nagasaki was bombed. The following day, the Japanese again communicated a willingness to surrender. They were still insistent upon a guarantee of the imperial dynasty. The events and decisions of the next several days would be critical not only for the defeat of Japan, but for the post-war geopolitical situation and for Harry Truman's political future. For Truman, Byrnes, and many of the American political and military leaders, post-war Soviet-American relations were a key consideration in the conclusion of the war in the Pacific and the terms of surrender with the Japanese. The terms of surrender were a crucial piece of this complicated equation. Truman, at the suggestion of Navy Secretary Forrestal, opted for an ambiguous offer for the Japanese that made the issue of the Emperor very unclear. The reply sent to the Japanese mentioned that the Emperor would remain "for a brief period of time" and his authority "shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers." The ambiguity of the American reply to Japan were mainly in the provisions in paragraph five: "The ultimate form of the government shall...be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." This decision by Truman has been often criticized as being politically motivated. In an August 10th cabinet meeting, before the reply to the Japanese was communicated, Truman made it clear to all in attendance that he was aware that American popular opinion was strongly in favor of unconditional surrender.²⁰ Truman mentioned that of the 170 telegrams he received in the last day regarding Japan, 153 were urging unconditional surrender.²¹ Truman's decision to

¹⁹ Bernstein, Barton J. "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb." *The Pacific Historical Review*, 46, no. 1 (1977): 2-4.

²⁰ Ibid, 6-7

²¹ Wallace, Henry A. *Wallace Papers*. University of Iowa, 1945.

accept or not accept a conditional surrender was not only being considered on military, moral, and geopolitical basis, but domestic political considerations were likely at play.

The Third Bomb

The presence and possible use of a third nuclear bomb was also part of Truman's considerations. The unassembled third bomb had not yet been shipped to the island of Tinian, but six possible target cities had been selected by General Nathan Twining. These included Osaka (population 3,250,000) and Nagoya (population 1,300,000). The commanding general of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves did not believe a third bomb was necessary after Nagasaki. Although Truman had seen the atomic bombs as legitimate military weapons and their use was an appropriate and politically acceptable retaliation for the attack on Pearl Harbor, the destruction of two Japanese cities and the loss of 110,000 Japanese were beginning to weigh on his mind. Even though the American people were very much in favor of retribution and the destruction of the Japanese Empire, Truman and most of his advisors were convinced that additional destruction would be seen by the American public as unnecessary and vicious.²²

Truman's decision-making process not only had to incorporate continuing military strategy against Japan, future geopolitical strategy regarding the Soviet Union, and the morality of conventional and nuclear warfare, but the prospect of American political backlash from his decisions regarding Japan. The effort of Secretary of State Byrnes may have been somewhat motivated by the latter. Byrnes was aware of the sentiment of many Americans toward Japan and the Emperor. Many recent polls had shown that most Americans were in favor of trying Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal and executing or imprisoning him.²³

Conclusion

For Harry S. Truman, "political time" was the defining aspect of his presidency. In a time of great tumult in the world, Truman was thrust into a position that he had not prepared for and did not want. Taking the reins of power from a strong and charismatic leader like Franklin Roosevelt at a time when the world and his country were at war was a daunting task. Stephen Skowronek views the presidency as a "blunt, disruptive force" that contains either "order-shattering," "order-affirming," and "order-creating" impulses that drive the president. And these impulses must "operate in tandem" in order for the president to find his "place in history." Franklin Roosevelt had established himself and his administration as capable leaders during domestic crises and foreign conflicts. As the relatively unknown and untested successor to such a position, Harry Truman had little choice in the direction he must take the presidency. Skowronek defines the Truman presidential archetype as an "articulator" who is closely associated with a successful regime.²⁴ In Truman's case, a smooth transition was imperative. With the world at war, this was no time to be a renegade

²² Bernstein, Barton J. "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb." *The Pacific Historical Review*, 46, no. 1 (1977): 10.

²³ Gallop Poll, 512. June 1-5, 1945.

²⁴ Skowronek, Stephen. *The Politics Presidents Make*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. 20-30.

and take the country and the administration in a different direction. The country and the world were looking for stability and continuity. By most accounts this is what Truman sought to do. He kept Roosevelt's cabinet largely intact and the transition of power was quite smooth.

Truman's decision to use atomic bombs on Japan was set into motion well before he took the oath of office. The Manhattan Project had been in operation since 1941 with secret funding that was approved by Roosevelt. Virtually every top presidential advisor supported the use of the atomic bombs to speed the surrender of Japan. Truman was placed by fate at the right place at the right "political time" and he made the best of it by sticking with the Roosevelt game plan and continued the constructive and popular policies of his predecessor.

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John Class
“Riding the Tiger: The United States and the 1958 Arms Embargo Against Cuba”

On March 10, 1952, General Fulgencio Batista, the former president of Cuba, once again took control of the island nation. However, instead of waiting for the scheduled democratic elections a few weeks later, Batista staged a coup d'état to overthrow democratically elected President Carlos Prío. Within hours, Prío had fled to asylum in an embassy and General Batista became the new president of Cuba.¹ Seventy-two hours prior to Batista's takeover, the Cuban government and the United States signed a Military Assistance Pact (MAP). The MAP stated that the United States would supply the Cuban government with arms for the purpose of “implementing defense plans under which the two governments will participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.”² Over the next six years, the United States believed it upheld its end of the bargain by supplying weapons to Cuba. According to a government document, the United States provided the Cuban government with “at least 4,000 M-1 rifles, 1,500 .75mm grenades, 1,500 3.5mm rockets, 1,000 .60mm mortar grenades [*sic*], and seven tanks with 76mm guns, among a large assortment of other weapons and spare parts.”³ MAP supplied weapons helped Batista secure his position as president.

During Batista's presidency, revolutionary forces, primarily the 26th of July Movement (hereafter Movement) under the leadership of Fidel Castro, waged war against the Batista government. Castro and his Movement were upset with both the corruption within and the illegitimacy of the Batista government. In response, Batista dealt with the insurrection using what U.S. Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith called “strong-arm methods” of “fighting terror with terror”⁴ and suspended constitutional guarantees from the Cuban Constitution. These rights included democratic elections and freedom of press. In March 1958, upon worsening conditions in Cuba, the U.S. Department of State finally placed an arms embargo against the Cuban government, “suspending action on all Cuban arms requests and shipments.”⁵

Conventional scholarly explanations of the 1958 Cuban arms embargo include Washington's safeguarding of the “material stake in Cuba,”⁶ convincing Batista to “retreat from the excesses of his rule,”⁷

¹ John Dorschner and Roberto Fabricio, *The Winds of December* (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1980), 33.

² Quoted in Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martín, *The Cuban Insurrection: 1952-1959* (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1974), 198.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴ Earl E. T. Smith, *The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1962), 128.

⁵ Christian A. Herter to Earl E. T. Smith, 14 March 1958, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*, with appropriate year], *1958-1960: Cuba* (Washington, DC, 1991), 6: 60.

⁶ Morris H. Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 60.

⁷ Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 133.

and opening “a path between Batista and Castro.”⁸ Although there is substantial truth to these interpretations, this paper will show that Cuban and American public opinions, which were critical of Batista, were the determining factors that forced the United States to shift from the previous “business-as-usual, law-and-order foreign policy”⁹ to a stronger and more assertive foreign policy. The new U.S. stance left Washington with no other option than to place the arms embargo against Cuba, thereby crippling Batista’s government. Although the bulk of Washington was uncomfortable with Castro governing Cuba, both inaction on the part of Washington and the U.S. policy of non-intervention placed the United States in its own dilemma. Ultimately, the United States bears substantial responsibility for allowing Castro’s seizure of power in January 1959, as well as the adverse consequences this would have for U.S. interests in Latin America.

MAP was part of a larger U.S. military defense plan that Congress approved under the Military Defense Plan of 1951. The plan authorized \$38 million in expenditures for the military defense of several Latin American countries. As for Cuba, U.S. Ambassador Ralph Ackerman stated that Cuba’s strategic location “by reason of its proximity to the United States” was the primary reason for its inclusion in the Military Defense Plan.¹⁰ Throughout Batista’s presidency, MAP provided the Cuban military with immense support. “In fiscal year 1953,” historian Thomas G. Paterson reports, “Cuba received \$400,000 in military assistance, in 1954 \$1.1 million, in 1955 \$1.6 million and in 1956 \$1.7 million.”¹¹ In response, Batista provided the United States with assistance in the defense of coastal sea communications, maritime routes, and the Panama Canal. Additional support included U.S. access to Cuban bases and Cuba’s military in the event of a major war.¹²

Although military assistance to Cuba continued until the 1958 arms embargo, some public bitterness towards MAP existed from the moment of MAP’s inception. The public’s main point of contention was that Batista was using many of the weapons the United States was supplying against Cubans to quell civil unrest. The United States therefore acted promptly to put programs in place to combat public anger. In November 1953, the United States created a campaign between military and information officials in Cuba to “dispel a developing wave of resentment, based chiefly on misunderstandings, of our Military Assistance Agreement with Cuba.”¹³ The issue of the Cuban government using U.S. supplied weapons against Cubans was not only intolerable to many, but illegal under the provision of MAP. Recipient nations only could use MAP-supplied

⁸ Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 152.

⁹ Samuel Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 74.

¹⁰ Ralph H. Ackerman to the Department of State, 1 February 1952, *FRUS, 1952-1954: The American Republics* (Washington, DC, 1983), 4: 929-30.

¹¹ Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 59.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Walter Bedell Smith to James S. Lay, 20 November 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954: The American Republics* (Washington, DC, 1983), 4: 36.

weapons for hemispheric defense. Fighting against local revolutionaries did not qualify as hemispheric defense. However, Washington long ignored the legalities of MAP. It was not until Batista's military became increasingly aggressive that the United States seriously began to rethink its MAP policy in Cuba.

On 26 July 1953, nearly one year after Batista had assumed power, Fidel Castro dealt a major blow to the Cuban government. Castro led an armed rebellion of 125 men and women on an attack against the Moncada barracks in Santiago.¹⁴ Although the raid was largely a failure for the rebels involved, this event did ignite an era of increasing violence. Future U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Philip W. Bonsal explains the incident:

Over a hundred Cubans on both sides lost their lives, including many of Castro's men butchered by the military after the fight. A period of violent repression ensued. Hundreds of political personalities were arrested and an unconvincing attempt was made to prove Communist involvement.¹⁵

This event sparked an initial U.S. probe into the political situation in Cuba. In a memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State of Inter-American Affairs Henry F. Holland warned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Batista's "resort to stronger measures may consolidate public opinion, which heretofore has been apathetic, against the regime."¹⁶ After another tragic event in 1957, public opinion would become more consolidated and vocal against Batista.

On 5 September 1957, Cuban naval officers along with Castro revolutionaries rebelled at the Cuban naval base at Cienfuegos. The Cuban army eventually crushed the rebellion, however "casualties climbed into the hundreds and rebel prisoners were tortured and murdered."¹⁷ The high number of casualties and the way Batista chose to deal with prisoners only increased public resentment against his government. To further complicate matters, Batista had used MAP supplied military aid in breaking the Cienfuegos revolt. Ambassador Smith reported in a telegram to Dulles that a "key factor in breaking the Cienfuegos revolt was strafing and bombing rebel strong points including naval headquarters by F-47 and B-26 aircraft [*sic*]." The United States had supplied both aircrafts to Cuba with the latter being supplied under MAP. Moreover, a few "machine guns . . . bombs and ammunition used by aircrafts may have [*also*] been MAP-supplied."¹⁸ Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom worried that large sections of the public in Cuba and the United States were already critical of the Washington for its role in supplying arms to bolster the Batista regime. He warned Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy, that "criticism became more acute when MAP equipment was used by the Cuban armed forces in quelling the

¹⁴ Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, pp. 142-43; Bonachea, *The Cuban Insurrection*, pp. 19-22; Philip W. Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 12.

¹⁵ Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, p. 12.

¹⁶ Henry F. Holland to John Foster Dulles, 8 May 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957: American Republics; Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean* (Washington, DC, 1987), 6: 831.

¹⁷ Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 96.

¹⁸ Earl E. T. Smith to John Foster Dulles, 13 September 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 845.

Cienfuegos revolt.”¹⁹ Clearly, for many in Washington the U.S. “business as usual” policy towards Batista had to change.

Originally, both the Eisenhower administration and Batista had dismissed Castro’s Movement. Historian Jules R. Benjamin attributes this to the relatively small size of the Movement which was “fewer than three or four hundred in all [except for] the last months of the conflict—and because their more impressive urban support structures were necessarily hidden from view.”²⁰ Even as late as December 1956, slightly more than two years before Batista would flee the country, Rubottom advised in a conversation with the Department of State that Castro’s Movement “had little support from the Cuban people, and seemed satisfied that it would be brought under control.”²¹ U.S. Ambassador Arthur Gardner gave similar estimates to the State Department. He stated that there was “no evidence [that] insurrectionary groups have a large following.”²² To those in Washington, Castro’s Movement represented little more than minor resistance. However, in early 1957, a series of articles in the *New York Times* would familiarize Americans with Castro’s Movement and bring to the forefront the turbulent situation in Cuba.

In early 1957, after Batista falsely claimed the killing of Castro during an earlier raid, Castro chose the *New York Times* as the media outlet to refute Batista’s allegation and advertise the strength of his Movement. Through an intermediary, Castro contacted Herbert Matthews, the Latin American affairs specialist on the *Times* editorial board, to write his story. After interviewing Castro and fellow revolutionaries in their mountain hideout on 17 February 1957, Matthews wrote a series of articles that appeared on the *Times* front pages of issues on February 24, 25, and 26. “Cuban rebel is visited in hideout,” announced the newspaper’s front page on February 24. In his articles, Matthews portrayed Castro as a hero, commenting that “he has strong ideas of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, to hold elections [*sic*].” Also, Matthews denounced Batista as a dictator, speculating that “from the look of things, General Batista cannot possibly hope to suppress the Castro revolt.” Additionally, in the articles Castro himself stated he was bitter that the Cuban government was using U.S. supplied weapons “against all the Cuban people . . . [however] you can be sure that we have no animosity toward the United States and the American people.”²³

Reactions to the *Times* articles in Cuba were damaging to the Batista government. Upon the first publication of them, Cuban Minister of National Defense Santiago Verdeja claimed that Matthews had fabricated his interviews. He referred to them as “chapters in a fantastic novel.”²⁴ Not until the *Times* published a photograph of Castro with his signature and the date of the interview did the Cuban government admit that Castro was indeed alive. Batista confirmed that the interview “had in fact taken place, and its

¹⁹ Roy Rubottom to Robert D. Murphy, 23 September 1957, *ibid.*, pp. 852-53.

²⁰ Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, p. 132.

²¹ Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 6 December 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 838.

²² Quoted in Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, p. 146.

²³ *The New York Times* [hereafter *NYT*], 24 February 1957, p. 1.

²⁴ Quoted in Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 78.

publication was of considerable propaganda value to the rebels.”²⁵ The Matthews articles exposed Batista’s lie regarding Castro’s death. Many Cubans who previously had taken for granted the truth of Batista’s propaganda now began to wonder what other lies he was circulating.

After the articles appeared, factions began to emerge among Washington politicians. A majority in Washington continued to show their support for Batista, agreeing with Ambassador Gardner that the articles were exaggerations and Batista had the situation “fairly well under control.”²⁶ Still, a few politicians had become upset with the government of Cuba and began to question U.S. backing of the dictatorship. In an unofficial letter to Matthews, U.S. Information Service Officer in the Cuban Embassy Richard G. Cushing confessed that “often I had the unpleasant feeling in the pit of my stomach that our foreign policy was faulty and that I was in error, in the larger scheme of things, to be involved in propagandizing it.”²⁷ Although Cushing’s sentiments reflected the minority opinion in Washington, an early sense of uncertainty about the Batista government had surfaced.

Following the Matthews articles, the public in the United States was much more willing than Washington to reject Batista. Matthews’ account of Batista as a “hostile dictator” led many Americans to regard his regime as an oppressive dictatorship. Meanwhile, Americans equated the ideals that Castro expressed of “liberty, democracy, [and] social justice,”²⁸ “to be an espousal of their own ideals.”²⁹ Ambassador Smith, who supported Batista, acknowledged that “the press did much to create a popular delusion that because Batista was the dictator who unlawfully seized power, Castro must, on the other hand, represent liberty and democracy.”³⁰ Furthermore, historian Benjamin writes that the Matthews articles “helped establish a positive image of the rebels in the United States—one that lasted throughout the war against Batista.”³¹ The media’s impact on U.S. relations with Cuba was huge. As the public’s view of Castro’s Movement became more favorable, the U.S. relationship with Batista began to crumble.

Along with Batista’s aggressive tactics and the publication of the Matthews articles, the January 1957 suspension of Cuban constitutional guarantees further added to the American public’s growing disdain for the Batista government. The suppression included freedom of expression, right of assembly, freedom of movement, and imposed press censorship. In an unfortunate telegram to Dulles, Ambassador Gardner sympathized with Batista’s choice to suspend constitutional guarantee:

If existing censorship withdrawn . . . we anticipate heavy attacks on [Batista] administration by opposition and friends and relatives of deceased. Undoubtedly press will use gruesome pictures of victims some of which now being published There is strong possibility

²⁵ Quoted in Bonachea, *The Cuban Insurrection*, p. 92.

²⁶ Quoted in Ambassador Gardner Dispatch 531, 28 February 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 841.

²⁷ Quoted in Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 79.

²⁸ *NYT*, 24 February 1957, p. 1.

²⁹ Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, p. 150.

³⁰ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, p. 40.

³¹ Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, p. 144.

serious further reduction confidence in and respect for government by people in general as knowledge such extreme methods and brutality becomes widespread [*sic*].³²

Gardner's support of Batista was not surprising. According to Smith, who replaced him, "Ambassador Arthur Gardner, and Mrs. Gardner, had been close personal friends of President Batista, even to playing canasta several times a week."³³ For those who opposed Batista, Gardner's and Batista's close relationship became a source of animosity toward the United States. In May 1957, less than three months after making these statements, Gardner resigned due in part to his unwavering support of the Batista government.³⁴ For many observers, Gardner's removal signaled a change in U.S. policy.

Ambassador Smith broke away from Gardner's "hands off" approach to Cuban affairs and made several early attempts to persuade Batista to restore constitutional guarantees. Years later, when reflecting on his earlier ambassadorial duties in Cuba, Smith wrote that he "had made every effort during many meetings with Batista to obtain the restoration of constitutional guarantees and the lifting of the press censorship."³⁵ Batista, on the other hand, argued that a restoration of guarantees was not a possibility "until the activities of Prío and Castro [were] curtailed."³⁶

Allegedly, Carlos Prío, the former President of Cuba, was providing arms to Castro rebels. At the time, Prío was living in Florida and had an agreement with U.S. government not to conduct an anti-Batista campaign while in the United States.³⁷ Smith commented that "for some time [Prío] openly defied United States neutrality laws by shipping materiel from Florida to the revolutionary forces in [Cuba]."³⁸ In a telegram to Dulles, Smith laid out one scenario:

If US takes measures to stop Prío's activities I will be in position to suggest to Batista that it is US hope that [the Cuban government] can then restore constitutional guarantees, thus enabling Cuba to hold genuinely free and open elections. If we are unsuccessful in that step, Department may then wish to review its policy with respect to Cuba in so far as [the] military assistance program is concerned.³⁹

Although Dulles recognized that Batista was attempting to impose conditions on the United States,⁴⁰ Washington agreed to oblige Batista's request. After an initial investigation, a U.S. Grand Jury indicted Carlos Prío. In a telegram to Smith, Dulles wrote that the reasoning behind the indictment was "discouraging illegal

³² Arthur Gardner to John Foster Dulles, 15 February 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 840.

³³ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, p. 20.

³⁴ Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, pp. 88-89; Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, p. 17; Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution*, p. 145.

³⁵ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, pp. 64-65.

³⁶ Earl E. T. Smith to John Foster Dulles, 2 November 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 862.

³⁷ Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 83.

³⁸ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, p. 65.

³⁹ Earl E. T. Smith to John Foster Dulles, 2 November 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 862.

⁴⁰ John Foster Dulles to Earl E. T. Smith, 18 November 1957, *ibid.*, p. 864.

activities of Prío and followers and providing for [an] approach to Batista on possible political solution.”⁴¹ While it appeared that Batista had won a major victory, his brashness in fact would lead to his downfall.

Batista realized the benefits of aligning himself with the United States. For this reason, he took every opportunity to use his friendship with Washington as a weapon against his enemies. Prior to the indictment of Carlos Prío, Batista claimed that he had “intended to use the U.S. Grand Jury investigation as [a] signal for a ‘get tougher’ policy.” Washington recognized both the untruthfulness and the possible harmful effect that such a stance could have in the United States. In a telegram to Smith, Dulles instructed the ambassador to emphasize to Batista that the investigation “is in accord [with] due process of law and U.S. cannot assume evidence developed under oath will be sufficient [to] warrant prosecution; and [it] is strictly a judicial process.”⁴² Dulles hoped to persuade Batista to restore guarantees and fulfill U.S. obligations towards neutrality laws, while at the same time distance Washington from the unpopular Batista government. Eventually, the Immigration and Naturalization Service would decide against deporting Prío due to lack of evidence, as well as perhaps the more important fear that it could “bring further charges from anti-Batista elements of U.S. favoritism toward the present regime.”⁴³

Batista not only attempted to use U.S. legal obligations as a means to publicize U.S. backing of his government, but also flaunted the military aid that Washington was providing him. Like the attempt to deport Prío, drawing attention to U.S. arms supply to Cuba only invited additional criticism towards Washington and further damaged U.S.-Cuban relations. In a 1957 memorandum, Assistant Secretary Rubottom acknowledged how, “our Government was subjected to bitter criticism both in the United States and in Cuba in January of this year when seven M-4 tanks purchased in this country were delivered to the Cuban Army amid considerable publicity and fanfare.”⁴⁴ Criticism towards the United States and its policies regarding Cuba became increasingly strong. Washington finally began to realize that any sign of military support for Batista could damage severely the image of the United States and would have a negative effect on U.S. interests worldwide. Cuba already had requested 20 armored cars and other weapons. In January 1958, Washington still was prepared to accommodate such a request. However, fearing further adverse publicity, Under Secretary of State Christian Herter instructed Smith to advise Batista to “restrict official publicity [for] shipment arrival and limit use to training and other inconspicuous tasks.”⁴⁵

By early 1958, the United States was distancing itself rapidly from the Batista government. Both Americans and Cubans were aggravated that the U.S. government, who was currently fighting for democracy and freedom in the Cold War against Soviet tyranny, was at the same time supplying weapons and support to what many judged as a hostile dictatorship. In January 1958, Director of the Office of Middle American

⁴¹ John Foster Dulles to Earl E. T. Smith, 14 November 1957, *ibid.*, p. 863.

⁴² John Foster Dulles to Earl E. T. Smith, 18 November 1957, *ibid.*, p. 864.

⁴³ Quoted in Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 83.

⁴⁴ Roy Rubottom to Robert D. Murphy, 23 September 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 6, p. 852.

⁴⁵ Christian A. Herter to Earl E. T. Smith, 22 January 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, p. 13.

Affairs William Wieland penned a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Rubottom regarding the shipment of the armored cars. He warned that “public and congressional opinion against sale of arms, especially heavy equipment, to a dictatorship is strong.”⁴⁶ Also, certain members of Congress became vocal about their animosities towards Batista, and towards Washington for supporting him. Senator Wayne Morse described the regime as a “fascist dictatorship”⁴⁷ and Representatives Adam C. Powell, Jr. “called for an immediate halt to all U.S. military assistance and the withdrawal of the U.S. army, naval, and air-force missions that existed only to serve the Batista coercive apparatus.”⁴⁸ By this time, many politicians in Washington had given up on the Batista government altogether.

On 25 January 1958, amid dwindling support at home and abroad, Batista surprised many of his opponents and finally restored constitutional guarantees in most areas of Cuba. These rights included a free and open presidential election which he scheduled for early July. The July election would determine a successor for Batista whose presidential term was to expire in February 1959. In a telegram to the Department of State, Ambassador Smith championed the constitutional guarantees as a possible solution to the Cuban problem. As Smith wrote at the time, “apart from their great significance for coming elections, they are of utmost importance to restoration of normal conditions in Cuba.”⁴⁹ The thought in Washington was that a less oppressive atmosphere for the elections might allow the Batista government to hold out until its replacement in February 1959. Meanwhile, pro-Batista elements within Washington commenced a campaign to refute Castro’s support in the United States and present “the other side of the Castro story to the United States press as well as to Congress.”⁵⁰ Some in Washington, including Smith, hoped to juxtapose Castro’s negative side with Batista’s recent granting of Cuban rights, thereby swaying Americans towards rejecting Castro and supporting Batista.

There were two main reasons why Batista’s restoration of constitutional guarantees did not succeed. First, most Cubans were not convinced that Batista would permit truly free and open elections. In a U.S. Congressional meeting, U.S. Representative Powell informed Washington that “more than 40 religious and profession groups, whose names sound like a roster of Who’s Who Among Respectable Organizations, signed a public statement denouncing Batista’s latest farce, an attempt to hold elections on June 1.”⁵¹ In addition to Cuban distrust of Batista’s ability to conduct open elections, Americans were apprehensive as well. In a telegram to Ambassador Smith, Secretary Dulles acknowledged a *New York Times* editorial that suggested open elections in Cuba were unlikely.⁵² Indeed, the editorial was profoundly skeptical:

⁴⁶ William Wieland to Roy Rubottom, 17 January 1958, *ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, p. 59.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Earl E. T. Smith to Department of State, 26 January 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1860*, 6, p. 15.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 116.

⁵¹ Quoted in Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution*, p. 60.

⁵² John Foster Dulles to Earl E. T. Smith, 21 February 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, pp. 36-37.

The only candidates are pro-Batista men plus a few discredited opportunists with little popular following. The same army and police leaders against whom the island is in partial rebellion with run the elections.⁵³

Batista's assurance of a free election convinced neither Americans nor Cubans and thereby allowed Castro to continue attacking the illegitimacy of the Cuban government.

The second reason Batista's new policy failed was that almost immediately after the restoration of constitutional guarantees, Castro's Movement and other rebel groups began to increase their terrorist activities. As Castro intended, this forced Batista once again to become more coercive. Ambassador Smith noted later in his memoirs that after the January restoration of guarantees, "the burning of the sugar cane, to harm the economy of Cuba was intensified."⁵⁴ The purpose was to attract further American attention with direct threats against Cuban and American economic interests. Another measure Castro's Movement took to acquire attention was the kidnapping of Argentine race car driver Juan Manuel Fangio. For many Americans, this only reinforced their notions "that the regime could not protect visitors [nor] maintain order."⁵⁵ Terrorist activities and widespread violence within Cuba compelled Batista to take decisive action. Not knowing what else to do, on 12 March, Batista re-suspended constitutional guarantees and naturally American support plummeted further.

Opposition forces in Washington now became the majority as support for Batista's government virtually ceased. Ambassador Smith described the resurfacing of elements in the Eisenhower administration against Batista: "The Rightist-dictator-haters and the pro-Castro elements, whose estimate of the situation was that Batista could only control through strong-arm methods, were back in charge."⁵⁶ Furthermore, the suspensions along with Batista's "strong-arm methods" became the two issues that forever marred his reputation. On 31 December 1958, the day before Batista fled the country, a meeting convened in Washington to discuss the Cuban situation. Responding to the question why Batista was so hated, Assistant Secretary Rubottom answered that "there were two primary reasons: first, because he took constitutional processes away from the people, and second, because of recent repression and some brutal treatment of people."⁵⁷ For these two reasons it was no longer a viable option for the United States to provide support, especially military assistance, to the Batista regime.

Negative public opinion toward Batista, both within Cuba and the United States, brought the Eisenhower administration to this crucial juncture. Washington was thereby forced to take action in order to distance itself from the Batista regime. On 14 March 1958, Washington made a decision that publicly removed U.S. support for Batista and doomed any hope his government had for survival. In a telegram to

⁵³ *NYT*, 21 February 1958, p. 22.

⁵⁴ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, pp. 76-77.

⁵⁵ Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 117.

⁵⁶ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, pp. 88-89.

⁵⁷ Roy Rubottom, Memorandum of a Conference, 31 December 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, p. 323.

the Cuban Embassy, Under Secretary Herter informed Ambassador Smith of the suspension on the export of 1950 M-1 rifles to Cuba. Herter added that the “Department feels long range U.S. interests [are] served by suspending action on all Cuban arms requests and shipments.”⁵⁸ The United States placed an arms embargo on the Cuban government. Batista could no longer rely on the United States for military support. Castro soon had a clear path to power.

The 1958 arms embargo had devastating consequences for the Batista government. First, it removed U.S. military aid that Cuba’s leader desperately needed to fight Castro’s Movement and remain in power. In a December 1958 memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified that a result of the embargo was the “inability of the Cuban armed forces to combat rebel troops.”⁵⁹ However, the embargo had not limited completely Batista’s ability to obtain weapons. To acquire more arms, Batista looked to other countries, primarily the Dominican Republic.⁶⁰ During this period, the dictator Rafael Trujillo controlled the Dominican Republic. Castro, prior to Batista’s 1952 coup, had been “involved in a plot to overthrow the dictator.”⁶¹ Batista’s new weapons alliance with the Dominican dictator, while providing the Batista government with arms, only further perpetuated the tyrannical character associated with his government.

The second and foremost consequence of the arms embargo was that it inflicted a psychological blow on Batista because it publicly ended U.S. support for his regime. Without U.S. backing to legitimize his government, Batista’s political power and influence rapidly evaporated. Ambassador Smith was correct in assessing that the embargo had “a moral and psychological effect on the Cuban armed forces that was demoralizing to the nth degree and it built up the morale of the revolutionary forces.”⁶² Without U.S. support, many observers concluded that the United States regarded the Cuban government and Castro’s Movement as legitimate equals. After the Department of State issued a public statement in March 1958 announcing that the United States was “shipping arms to neither the rebels nor to the government of Cuba,” Ambassador Smith argued that “the State Department created the impression that the United States considered the rebels as being on the same plane as the government of Cuba.”⁶³ In a government document, Smith also remarked that the government of Cuba “considers our arms embargo policy as unfriendly to it and as providing aid, assistance, and moral support to the rebels.”⁶⁴

At the time, the Eisenhower administration announced publicly that MAP regulations had limited the U.S. ability to provide Batista with weapons. In fact, growing resentment towards the Batista regime was the real reason for the arms embargo. In a news conference in April 1958, Secretary Dulles commented that the arms the United States had supplied to Cuba “for hemispheric defense” had been suspended because they

⁵⁸ Christian A. Herter to Earl E. T. Smith, 14 March 1958, *ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff to Neil H. McElroy, 30 December 1958, *ibid.*, p. 321.

⁶⁰ Joseph S. Farland to the Department of State, 15 December 1958, *ibid.*, p. 293.

⁶¹ Dorschner, *Winds of December*, p. 32.

⁶² Quoted in Bonsal, *Cuba, Castro, and the United States*, p. 21.

⁶³ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, p. 131.

⁶⁴ Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Cuba, 8 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, p. 188.

were being used “to conduct a civil war.”⁶⁵ Nonetheless, within Washington, hemispheric defense issues related to MAP typically were ignored, as primary concern focused on the predicament of negative public opinion towards the United States for supplying weapons to the Cuban dictator. In a letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, now Acting Secretary of State Herter advised for example that the United States should not supply weapons to the Batista government due to negative public opinion “in most of [Latin America], not to mention important elements of press and congressional opinion in the United States.”⁶⁶ Ambassador Smith’s analysis of the cause of the arms embargo was that “severe pressure was brought to bear on the State Department by members of Congress, the press, representatives of the revolutionaries in the United States, and American public reaction.”⁶⁷ Washington succumbed to public pressure and thereby unknowingly set the stage for the overthrow of the Batista government. Washington clearly set in motion the events leading to Batista’s downfall, apparently without fully grasping the negative consequences of its actions.

Many people within the U.S. State Department to be sure were suspicious of Castro, fearing that his government would not be a desirable alternative to Batista’s. In a top secret memorandum to the White House, Acting Secretary Herter criticized Castro’s Movement, warning that “there are clear indications that irresponsibility and a degree of anti-American sentiment are characteristics of the Castro movement.”⁶⁸ Historian Paterson summarizes the reasons for the anti-Castro judgment in Washington:

Overall, the violent acts of rebellion endangered U.S. economic and strategic interests. U.S.-owned property on the island was being destroyed and American lives jeopardized. Castro loomed too as a threat to U.S. hegemony in Latin America, for he endorsed revolutions against dictators, some of whom stood fast with the United States as allies.⁶⁹

Unfortunately for those in Washington who were critical of both Batista and Castro, there was no strong alternative.

Although Washington acknowledged that a Castro controlled Cuba was unwelcome for U.S. interests, the United States took no action to stop Castro’s Movement. American politicians also recognized that U.S. inaction only was helping to aid Castro’s Movement. Park F. Wollam, the Consul in Santiago, sent a letter to the Department of State noting that “the Government of Cuba is undoubtedly irritated since efforts at non-involvement have in effect aided the opposition.”⁷⁰ Also, the public U.S. policy of non-intervention further limited the U.S. ability to take any action to stop Castro. However, in late 1958, it became apparent that the United States needed to form a plan to stop Castro before there was no alternative other than watching him gain control of the country.

⁶⁵ John Foster Dulles, “News Conference of April 8,” U.S. Department of State *Bulletin* 38 (8 April 1958): 688-89.

⁶⁶ Christian A. Herter to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 23 December 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, p. 305.

⁶⁷ Smith, *The Fourth Floor*, p. 139.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Dorschner, *Winds of December*, p. 246.

⁶⁹ Paterson, *Contesting Castro*, p. 121.

⁷⁰ Park F. Wollam to Terrence G. Leonhardy, 25 August 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, p. 200.

After months of indecision and inaction, in late December, Washington finally made a decision to find an option other than supporting Batista and accepting Castro. The original plan, which Ambassador Smith had laid out in August, was to “encourage moderate elements within the [Cuban] Armed Forces and the legal opposition to overthrow Batista and establish a provisional government.”⁷¹ Washington spent the next few months discussing Smith’s plan. Finally, on 26 December 1958, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency contacted two promising “third force” alternatives. The two choices were Ramón Barquín, an imprisoned army colonel, and Tony Varona, the former prime minister of Cuba. Washington considered both men qualified candidates because of their anti-Batista and pro-American stances.⁷² Unfortunately, by the time Washington decided to act, it was too late. Too much time had passed since imposition of the arms embargo. Castro was just days away from seizing control of the Cuban government, which would leave the United States to deal with a wound for decades that was in large part self-inflicted.

Ambassador Smith, who was one of the few American politicians that still had faith in the Batista government, continually urged Washington to lift the arms embargo. In December, the Department of State informed Ambassador Smith that re-supplying the Cuban government with arms was no longer possible: “In present circumstances any material increase in military support [to the] government of Cuba would expose U.S. government to widespread charges within and without the hemisphere of intervention in Cuba’s internal dispute.”⁷³ Additionally, Washington realized that to provide assistance once again to the Batista regime would contradict Washington’s public commitment to advance freedom in the Cold War. The Office of Middle American Affairs reiterated these sentiments in a memorandum that recommended continued non-intervention in Cuba: “To throw our support at this time in favor of the expiring Batista regime would, it is believed, destroy the last remaining faith which the majority of the Cuban people have in U.S. protestations of support for the cause of democracy in a free world.”⁷⁴ The United States thus found itself in a predicament, but one of its own creation.

On 1 January 1959, at 2:40 a.m., General Fulgencio Batista, the president of Cuba, boarded an airplane at the Columbia airfield in Havana and flew to the Dominican Republic. Batista left behind the war-torn country of Cuba, never to return. Castro’s Movement immediately began to advance towards the Cuban capital of Havana. On 9 January 1959, the rebel Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement assumed power over the government of Cuba. It began a new and increasingly unhappy era in Cuban relations with the United States.

Since World War II, the United States had maintained a cooperative relationship with the government of Cuba. However, Batista’s strong arm methods and suspension of constitutional guarantees branded the president as a tyrannical dictator. Strong public resentment aimed at Batista soon redirected

⁷¹ Paper Prepared by the Embassy in Cuba, 8 August 1958, *ibid.*, p. 189.

⁷² Dorschner, *The Winds of December*, pp. 284-86.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Draft Memorandum prepared in the Office of Middle American Affairs, 25 July 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 6, p. 171.

toward the United States for supplying weapons to the unpopular dictator. This forced the United States to reevaluate its friendship with Batista. In March 1958, the Eisenhower administration, reacting to public demands, placed an arms embargo on the Cuban government. This action effectively distanced it from the unpopular Batista regime, but it also created the predicament of opening the door for Castro's Movement to seize power in Cuba. Earlier, in April 1958 following the arms embargo, Ambassador Smith had alerted Washington that without a plan, the removal of Batista would have unpleasant consequences. His telegram to the Department of State delivered a prescient warning:

[I]t is relatively easy to change dictators but very hard to get rid of a dictatorship. It is the people of Cuba who are "riding the tiger." Exchanging tigers is no solution.⁷⁵

For both better and worse, Washington policies had facilitated the Cuban exchange of tigers.

⁷⁵ Smith to the Department of State, 1 April 1958, *ibid.*, p. 76.

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Alex Redmond
“Strategic Bombing and the Failure of the Luftwaffe”

After the conclusion of the First World War, there was no question that air power would play an integral role in future wars. Air power enthusiasts were committed to the idea that upcoming military conflicts would be decided exclusively by the proper utilization of air forces. It is easy to see why this was a prevailing belief - radar was still in its infancy, and many cities' only means of knowing if an air attack was imminent was visual spotting, which only gave a window of a few minutes for people to prepare. People viewed the threat of air warfare in a similar light as nuclear fears during the cold war.¹ British Prime Minister, Stanly Baldwin gave a voice to many peoples' fears in his 1932 address to parliament, when he uttered the now infamous phrase warning people that “the bomber will always get through.”²

In September 1939, the Nazi war machine set its sights firmly upon its eastern neighbor, Poland. The German air force preformed admirably during the Polish campaign, keeping the outdated Polish air force crippled, and destroying the country's infrastructure.³ It should be noted that the Luftwaffe's success could largely be attributed to the fact that it was performing exactly the role that it had been designed for, up until 1939 – that of tactical ground support.⁴ However, as Richard Overy points out, the European victories enjoyed by the Luftwaffe during the years 1939-1940 played to the Luftwaffe's strengths.⁵ Furthermore, the one-sided victory against Poland served to mask the force's true weakness, resulting in the Nazi leadership adopting an exaggerated view of the air force's relative strength. For both administrative and functional reasons, after its initial military successes during the opening of the Second World War, the Luftwaffe languished in the tactical stage of its development, tied to joint action in cooperation with ground forces. The Luftwaffe found itself unable to advance into becoming an air force capable of carrying out a true strategic air campaign, independent of ground troops, and for this reason, eventually failed.

Before continuing on, it is important to define exactly what is meant when referring to strategic and tactical use of air power, and how the two doctrines differ from each other. Tactical utilization of air power relies on co-operation and coordination with ground forces.⁶ Countries with strong traditions of the army, such as Germany were prone to developing tactical air forces.⁷ A tactical air force can be utilized both offensively and defensively. Offensively, tactical doctrine emphasizes engaging and destroying an enemy's air force to gain air superiority, ensuring the safety of ground forces. Additionally, a tactical air force on the

1. Vincent Orange, “The German Air Force Is Already “The Most Powerful in Europe””: Two Royal Air Force Officers Report on a Visit to Germany, 6-16 October 1936,” *The Journal of Military History* 70, no. 4 (2006): 1014.

2. Stanly Baldwin, “The Bomber Will Always Get Through,” *Essential Speeches* (2003).

3. James S. Corum, *The Luftwaffe Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 272.

4. R. J. Overy, *Goering* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1984), 169.

5. *Ibid.*, 169.

6. R. J. Overy, *The Air War* (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), 8.

7. *Ibid.*, 9.

offensive is expected to disable rear depots and bases, increasing the efficiency of an attacking army.⁸ Defensively, a tactical force is expected to fulfill a similar role: to protect troops on the ground and rear areas from enemy air attacks.⁹ Both the offensive and defensive utilizations of a tactical air force are strongly tied to the operations and movement of ground forces. The objectives of tactical air power are short term – the primary emphasis is placed upon directly disabling military targets.

Strategic bombing varies from tactical doctrine in several ways. Primarily, according to R. J. Overy, strategic campaigns are “operationally distinct from the actions of ground forces”.¹⁰ Also, rather than quick, direct strikes against enemy forces, the goal of a strategic bombing campaign is to undermine the enemy’s capability to carry out wartime activities through continuous long-term attacks.¹¹ A strategic bombing campaign will not limit itself to military targets in order to inflict maximum damage upon an enemy’s war-making capabilities. Rather than directly attacking enemy forces, strategic bombing aims to defeat an enemy through the destruction of economic resources and undermining citizen morale.¹²

Many of the traditional detractors of strategic bombing doctrine often cite an overestimation of its destructive and disruptive impact on civilian morale. However, an important aspect of the early proponents of strategic bombings’ argument was the assumption that attacks against population and industrial centers would employ explosive, incendiary, and chemical bombs.¹³ David MacIssac argues that while chemical weapons were not used in the Second World War; out of fear of retaliation, it should not detract from the arguments of earlier strategic theorists, who assumed gas attacks would be employed against civilian populations.¹⁴

As was previously mentioned, early in the war the Luftwaffe was quite successful in its operations. In the campaign against Poland, however, the air force had many factors going in its favor which gave it an advantage it would soon lose. The German blitzkrieg employed in the Polish campaign required close coordination between ground troops and their air support. After neutralizing the Polish air force, the Luftwaffe then proceeded to support armies in the field, as mobile artillery.¹⁵ In fact, James S. Corum makes the claim that from its initial inception in 1934, the Luftwaffe was mainly viewed within the framework of joint air-ground (tactical) operations, while strategic utilization was never top priority.¹⁶ This position was made quite clear in the *Luftwaffe Regulation 16, Command in the Air War*, which specifically stated that “The

8. Ibid., 9.

9. Ibid., 9.

10. Ibid., 12.

11. Ibid., 12.

12. Ibid., 12.

13. David MacIssac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 630.

14. Ibid., 630.

15. Overy, *The Air War*, 28.

16. James S. Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941,” *The Journal of Military History* 59, no. 1 (1995): 58.

mission of the armed forces in war is to break the enemy will. The will of the nation is most strongly embodied in its armed forces. Therefore, the destruction of the enemy armed forces is the primary goal in war."¹⁷ The German air force had been able to practice its role in infantry support during the Spanish Civil War, where 20,000 Luftwaffe personnel were involved in combat operations.¹⁸

One of the principle reasons behind Germany's failure to field a proper strategic bombing force was as simple as the planes the Nazis developed. In 1936, Commander-in-chief, General-Feldmarschall Herman Goering planned for the development of several heavy bombers.¹⁹ However, the Air Ministry eventually shelved both the four-engine planes in development, the Dornier Do 19 and the Junkers Ju 89.²⁰ The German aircraft industry was unable to produce engines of sufficient power to keep the heavy bombers flying.²¹ Undaunted, the Heinkel heavy bomber, He 177 was slated to become the Luftwaffe's strategic bomber during the mid 1940s. However, Goering's timetable assumed a peacetime schedule wherein war would not occur until 1942, or even later.²² As a stopgap, Goering approved the development of a fleet of medium bombers, the Junkers Ju 88; these smaller planes could fulfill the roles of army support or long range bombing as necessary, and were cheaper to produce than larger planes. Overy points out that Goering's plans didn't differ much from those of the Royal and American air forces, as neither country was able to deploy their heavy four engine planes until 1942.²³

One of the principle difficulties faced by the Luftwaffe during the war was Germany's inability to advance beyond its use of medium bombers, the Ju 88s. The situation was further exacerbated by the aircraft's manufacturer promising more of the planes than it could deliver, while exaggerating the Ju 88's capabilities in an attempt to secure the contract. Goering's development schedule was further disrupted by the outbreak of war in 1939. Denied the four to five years of peacetime that he had counted on to construct his fleet of heavy bombers, Goering had neither the planes, nor the infrastructure and personnel to mount any kind of heavy strategic bombing campaign, and so had to rely on the Ju 88s. Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, shortcomings in the development of its bombers were not the only problem the organization had to face.

The Luftwaffe's development of a strategic force was further hindered by a chronic shortage of raw materials in Germany. The Great Depression had caused a major decline in the value of German exports, limiting the amount of hard currency available to spend on raw materials for rearmament.²⁴ Due to Germany's poor financial situation, foreign suppliers were reluctant to do business on credit, and by 1935

17. Ibid., 58.

18. Corum, *The Luftwaffe*, 271.

19. Overy, *Goering*, 167.

20. Williamson Murray, *Luftwaffe* (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co., 1985), 10.

21. Overy, *Goering*, 10.

22. Ibid., 167.

23. Ibid., 167.

24. Murray, 3.

stockpiles in all areas were dramatically reduced.²⁵ Steel represented an intrinsic aspect of both military rearmament and industrial growth, and as such became highly sought after. Domestic German steel manufacturers became backlogged with orders that they were unable to fill.²⁶ As a result of this situation, steel rationing was imposed February 23 1937.²⁷ The Luftwaffe suffered greatly because of the rationing and Goering approved an updated program that included major cuts. The Luftwaffe's industry workforce was cut immediately by 10 percent, and by the fall of 1937; there were talks of cutting production plans by 25 percent, and plant expansion by 66 percent.²⁸ Between April 1937 and the summer of 1938, contrary to the necessities of rearming, Luftwaffe aircraft production actually decreased.²⁹

In addition to steel, the Nazi war machine was plagued with the problem of fuel. Germany has no natural petroleum sources, and thus expended a large amount of resources converting coal into petroleum products.³⁰ Even so, the production of synthetic fuel was never able to keep up with demand in an increasingly mechanized economy where demand was rising much faster than production.³¹ As an example of this imbalance of production, in 1938 Nazi storage tanks only contained 25 percent of the fuel necessary for wartime mobilization, and at the same time aviation lubricants sat at 6 percent of what was necessary for war.³²

Luftwaffe production ran into further difficulties once war broke out. Allied bombing attacks on Germany forced the Luftwaffe to make a drastic shift in its production model. In order to mount a defense against the Allied strategic bombing campaign, the structure of the Luftwaffe became distorted. It became necessary to shift away from the production of bombers, instead building mostly fighters. In fact, by 1944 only 18 percent of all German combat aircraft produced were bombers, down from over 50 percent in 1942.³³

Given the serious economic constraints placed upon the developing Luftwaffe, the creation of a strategic air force was simply not a realistic goal. Neither the raw materials nor the hard money were available to construct a large fleet of heavy bombers. Rationing necessitated that the different branches of the military share what limited steel was available, resulting in a situation where none of them received the metal in sufficient quantities. German air planners were severely limited, both before and during the war; resulting in a smaller tactical Luftwaffe.³⁴

25. Ibid., 3.

26. Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction The Making and Breaking of The Nazi Economy* (New York: Viking, 2006), 231.

27. Ibid., 231.

28. Ibid., 232.

29. Ibid., 232.

30. Murray, 3.

31. Ibid., 3.

32. Ibid., 3.

33. R. J. Overy, "The Naval and Air Campaigns as Critical to Allied Victory," *Major Problems in the History of World War II*, eds., Mark M. Stoler and Melanie S. Gustafson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 146.

34. Murray, 4.

Prior to and throughout the course of the war, poor intelligence, combined with Goering's tendency to believe his own version of events, limited the Luftwaffe's effectiveness. Because of the inconsistencies between reality and the reports coming in, the Luftwaffe's ability to function as an effective fighting force was compromised. Also, during the development period of the air corps, the poor information affected important design decisions, and continued to confirm Hitler and Goering's inflated opinions of the Luftwaffe.³⁵ In fact, prior to the war, Goering regularly received estimates of the numbers of Allied planes that were well below the actual strength. Overy states that Goering was "more inclined to believe the intelligence reports... conformed with his own version of events"³⁶ – a predisposition that didn't help the situation at all.

Another monumental failure on the part of Nazi intelligence was its inaccurate assessment of England and the Royal Air Force in 1940, just prior to the Battle of Britain.³⁷ The Luftwaffe owed much of its success to its ability to destroy rival air forces while they were still grounded. But it would find disabling Britain's air force to be a fairly difficult task, given that they had no idea how to prioritize targets. Corum makes the claim that the Luftwaffe's poor knowledge of Britain was a result of the Nazi leadership giving the air force insufficient time to gather proper intelligence prior to the attempted invasion.³⁸ It could be said that the outbreak of war in 1939 disrupted the planning process, much like Goering's strategic bombing program. This can be taken as yet another example of the Nazi leadership's disjointed style of command. The decision to start the war was made with little regard given to the preparedness of the fighting force.

So then, the Battle of Britain, which took place from July to August, 1940 serves as an excellent case study of the Luftwaffe in action. The Battle of Britain marked the first time that the Luftwaffe was required to function as a truly strategic force, and subsequently represented its first major failure. It was during The Battle of Britain that many of the Luftwaffe's weaknesses were finally exposed. The Battle of Britain was to be one of the most decisive battles in European history. By May of 1940, Germany had managed to soundly put an end to French military resistance, leaving Britain to face the Nazi onslaught alone.³⁹ If the Luftwaffe had been able to defeat the British Royal Air Force (RAF), and gain air superiority, the door would effectively be opened for the German army and navy to begin a sea invasion of the island nation, stamping out the last resistance to the Nazi advance.

However, the German strategic offensive in The Battle of Britain was plagued by many of the issues raised in this paper. For the first time in the war, the Luftwaffe faced an enemy force with well organized air defenses, and a clear view of air strategy.⁴⁰ Since 1939 the British had been planning for an attack of exactly

35. Overy, *Goering*, 171.

36. *Ibid.*, 170.

37. Corum, *The Luftwaffe*, 283.

38. *Ibid.*, 283.

39. Corum, *The Luftwaffe*, 277.

40. Overy, *Goering*, 170.

this nature, and their equipment had been specifically designed to counter enemy air assault.⁴¹ This provided a stark contrast to the planning on the part of the Luftwaffe, since a campaign of that nature had not been a part of German air planning.⁴² The strength of the British position was further reinforced by the severe unsuitability for their roles exhibited by German planes involved in the attack.

As mentioned before, the Germans did not have access to any type of four engine heavy bomber – the kind necessary for carrying large bomb-loads over long distances. Instead, the Luftwaffe was forced to fall back upon its two engine medium bombing force of He 111s, Do 17s the Ju 88s.⁴³ The medium bombers simply were not able to carry the large quantity of bombs over long distances necessary to inflict any significant strategic damage.⁴⁴ Also, the issues with German planes were not exclusively limited to bombers. The fighter planes necessary for protecting bombers were restricted by their small fuel reserves, leaving the bombers easy prey for British fighters over large parts of the enemy’s territory.⁴⁵ German heavy fighters and dive-bombers were found lacking, because they were primarily designed for tactical implementation, not guarding bombers or attacking well defended ground targets.⁴⁶ German dive-bombers in particular proved to be far too slow to attack those well defended targets.⁴⁷ The RAF found itself in a situation where it was able to use its fighters in the role where they were most effective, combating enemy bombers. By comparison, the Luftwaffe was forced to use its fighters in a much less effective escort role, squandering their initial advantage in pilot experience.⁴⁸ Finally, Overy makes the claim that all the advantages enjoyed by the British could still have been overcome by massive bombing attacks or by overwhelming numerical superiority but the Luftwaffe, however did not have the resources available for either.⁴⁹

A crucial aspect of a strategic bombing campaign involves possessing enough knowledge about your enemy’s infrastructure to determine where the bombs need to go. The Luftwaffe was sorely lacking in the area of military intelligence during the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe simply did not know enough about Britain, its war industries and the RAF to deal any real damage.⁵⁰ Without the knowledge of how British air defenses worked, which bases belonged to fighter command, and where the important aircraft production centers were, the Luftwaffe was effectively firing blind.⁵¹ The intelligence situation was exacerbated by inaccurate reports regarding both RAF production numbers and the damage inflicted by Luftwaffe bombing. For example, German intelligence routinely underestimated British production capabilities. The assumption

41. Ibid., 170.

42. Overy, *The Air War*, 31.

43. Corum, *The Luftwaffe*, 282.

44. Overy, *Goering*, 171.

45. Overy, *The Air War*, 32.

46. Ibid., 32.

47. Overy, *Goering*, 171.

48. Overy, *The Air War*, 34.

49. Ibid., 32.

50. Corum, *The Luftwaffe*, 283.

51. Ibid., 283.

was made that the RAF would only be able to produce 180 fighters a month and that number would only decrease once the air attack started.⁵² In reality, British production numbers averaged 480 a month, over two and a half times the German estimation.⁵³ While German intelligence was underestimating RAF production numbers, they were overestimating the damage caused by their bombing runs. A particularly telling statistic is the August 20th estimation that in the first week of the Battle, they had managed to destroy 644 British aircraft, and permanently disable 11 airfields. In reality, however the actual number was 103 planes, and one temporarily disabled airfield.⁵⁴

In closing, and as the Battle of Britain made painfully evident, the Luftwaffe lacked the planes, leadership, resources and intelligence to undertake a truly strategic bombing campaign. The German economy during the 1930s rearmament simply could not support the development of the kind of air force necessary to prosecute a strategic bombing campaign. The Luftwaffe preformed admirably when acting in a tactical capacity, as this was its primary purpose, and many of its planes were designed to assist in the support of ground forces. However, the Luftwaffe lost so many planes and personnel during its failed attempt at strategic bombing that production was taxed trying to keep up with replacements and reserves.⁵⁵ Attempts at using the Luftwaffe as a strategic force, such as during the Battle of Britain were akin to hammering a square peg into a round hole, leaving what was left afterwards splintered and broken. The losses incurred in this failed venture led to the eventual failure of the Luftwaffe as a whole.

52. Overy, *Goering*, 171.

53. *Ibid.*, 171.

54. *Ibid.*, 171.

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Kevin Dewey
“Lifting Them to His Image: Dean C. Worcester and the Philippines”

In 1898, the United States declared war on the once powerful Spain. Citing humanitarian reasons, such as the liberation of Cuban and Philippine revolutionaries, America mobilized to begin its status as a new world power. Historian Frank Friedel asserted, “The Spanish-American War, lasting only a hundred days, was too brief and successful to become unpopular, but the cruel campaigns against the Filipino *insurrectos* brought forth vehement dissent.”¹ The Philippine Insurrection and subsequent establishment of a Philippine civil government were considerably shaped by Dean Conant Worcester. As a statesman, he outlasted every other and dominated any legislation related to the Philippines. Worcester penned many articles and virulently defended the actions of himself and the McKinley and subsequent Republican administrations. When it looked as if war would soon erupt, Worcester favored intervention so strongly that he was labeled a “jingo” and many of his colleagues felt that he should enlist in the army. However, much to his own dissatisfaction, “compulsion would have been quite unnecessary had it not been for physical disability.”² Worcester embodied the imperialist spirit that Americans began to feel after the Spanish-American War; his career characterized the dominant paternalistic arguments about the abilities of the Filipinos, the responsibility of the United States and the overall development of the new Philippine state.

At the outset of the war, Worcester quickly discovered that most people lacked any information as to even the location of the Philippines. He described one comedic incident, “I fancy that the knowledge then possessed by the average American citizen relative to the Philippines was well-typified by that of a good old lady... [who] said to me ‘Deanie, are them Philipians you have been a visitin’ the people that Paul wrote the epistle to?’”³ The Philippines were viewed as a wild, tropical place that few in the United States had any knowledge. Worcester had visited the archipelago during the early 1890s two separate times and soon found his knowledge of the local peoples, Spanish colonial administration and geography greatly in demand.

Worcester received his opportunity for adventure and travel from Professor Joseph B. Steere, a multi-faceted zoologist at the University of Michigan. Steere visited the Philippine Islands in the early 1870s in order to collect specimens and generally explore the vast wilderness.⁴ According to Worcester, “he found the archipelago in an unsettled state” and encountered the fierce Muslims in the South who, at the time, were a serious disruption.⁵ But, Steere succeeded in his travels, returned with many new animal species and was often the first white man to explore some of the smaller islands.⁶ Steere’s travels helped to plant a seed for

¹ Frank Friedel, “Dissent in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection,” *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 81 (1969), 167.

² Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1914), 7.

³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴ Rodney J. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1991), 10-11.

⁵ Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippine Islands and Their People* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1898), vii.

⁶ Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 10.

adventure in Worcester when he studied zoology under him at the University of Michigan. It was there that Worcester obtained the opportunity to voyage to the Philippines on Steere's second expedition in 1887. Among the members was Worcester's colleague Frank Bourns who would impact the career of Worcester and become his close friend.⁷ This visit gave Worcester his first taste of the Philippines that eventually developed into an obsession. After the Steere Expedition concluded, Worcester would plan a much more formal trip funded by Louis F. Menage, on which he was accompanied by some of his previous travelling partners.⁸

The Spanish colonial government frequently disrupted both expeditions. Grossly bureaucratic and corrupt, many administrators seemed to take a particular liking toward inconveniencing the travelers. Also, Worcester lived in close proximity to locals and was able to gain firsthand knowledge of their complaints against the Spanish authorities. He wrote that "officials were quite frank in discussing...the affairs of their several provinces, and we gained a very clear insight into existing political methods and conditions."⁹ The knowledge gained from these encounters did not seem too important at the time but the "rapid march of events" toward war inspired the writing of *The Philippine Islands and Their Peoples* which subsequently propelled Worcester to fame.¹⁰ Though frustrated by poor Spanish rule, Worcester also found many positives during his expedition. He found the natural resources of the archipelago to be wondrous and alluring. He noted the extensive selection of fruit, the hardiness and beauty of the lumber and the vast mineral deposits that could be found on many islands. But, he lashed out at the Spanish government which seemed the "most serious obstacle" to the prosperity of the islands due to its "hostile attitude" toward trade. The Spanish seemed to have a "disposition to check enterprise by all manner of legal quibbling, and to kill profits by levying exorbitant taxes."¹¹ Moreover, "the lack of not only railroads, but of roads of *any* description, ha[d] impeded communication and transportation."¹² Worcester saw great potential in the Philippines that the Spanish were squandering through their inefficient and inadequate rule. He believed that if "the islands c[a]me under control of some progressive nation, great opportunities will open before the capitalist who has patience and enterprise enough to familiarize himself thoroughly with existing conditions, and to overcome the obstacles which they present."¹³ Like many imperialist theorists of his time, Worcester saw the Filipinos as a savage people that could only be brought to civilization by American paternalism. Oddly, according to Worcester's biographer Rodney J. Sullivan, Worcester remained "apparently oblivious" to a United States occupation of the Philippines in 1898 and instead mused on the idea of Japan acting as the civilizing nation.¹⁴

⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁸ Worcester, *Islands and Their People*, ix.

⁹ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Worcester, *Islands and Their People*, 74-75.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹⁴ Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 31.

The Filipino people fascinated Worcester, in particular the non-Christian tribes that inhabited the highlands and mountains. He viewed the natives with both scorn and wonder, describing them as “philosophers” who’s “wants are so few, and nature has done so much for him, that he finds it possible to rest much of the time.”¹⁵ He also found them to be talented musicians and was “rather touched by their never failing hospitality,”¹⁶ Conversely, he believed that Filipinos “lied most unconscionably” with “no sense of moral guilt,” were “irresponsible in financial affairs” and “indolent;” although he excused the latter as merely caused by the tropical climate.¹⁷ In a classic argument of the time, he hoped to civilize the Philippines by acting as a mentor or tutor. Therefore, when the United States gallantly sailed into Manila Bay, a great opportunity suddenly arose for Worcester to aid in the civilization of his beloved archipelago.

The Spanish-American War broke out in April 1898, after the sinking of the USS Maine by a Spanish mine in Havana Bay. The *Pacific Rural Press* exclaimed, “There is a rise in patriotic fervor this year such as the country has not seen for a generation.”¹⁸ The United States government quickly realized it was desperately short of men and beckoned for volunteers. Men rushed to enlist and on April 22, 1898 the Mobilization Act allowed the National Guard to participate in the overseas war.¹⁹ President McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers in order to fight the war and subsequently doomed any chance of an organized mobilization.²⁰ The chaotic situation failed to prevent a quick success and the United States confidently defeated Spain. Ironically, maintaining the possessions gained in the Treaty of Paris would prove a far more difficult endeavor than actually obtaining them.

The United States now held a valuable asset close to markets in Asia. On 1 January, 1899 the *San Francisco Chronicle* published an article proudly extolling the new American colony. The article proclaimed that the Philippines possessed “soil...which there is none more fertile in the world,” focused on the agricultural and manufacturing possibilities and viewed “in the occupation of the Philippines ...the establishment of an important commercial entrepot at the gateway of the vast empire of China....”²¹ Though many were excited about the new economic prospects, many saw the occupation as a possibility to tutor and sculpt a savage people. Worcester downplayed the explicit exploitation of the islands for monetary gain and instead focused on the tutelage of the people. He still desired to promote business on the islands and even fell into periodic scandals later in his career as he sought to develop his business connections in anticipation of leaving the service, but this came second to the development of the Filipinos into an image of White America.²²

¹⁵ Worcester, *Islands and Their People*, 75.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 136.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 477-478.

¹⁸ *Pacific Rural Press*, 1 July 1899.

¹⁹ Richard K. Hines, “First to Respond to Their Country’s Call: The First Montana Infantry and the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898-1899,” *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 52, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), 49.

²⁰ Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 93.

²¹ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 January 1899.

²² Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 152-162.

The war in the Philippines was complicated by the apparent need of some Philippine support against Spain. American authorities chose the instigators of an insurrection that occurred in 1896, the leader of which, Emilio Aguinaldo, would become infamous for his campaign against the Americans. The Spanish brought the rebellion to an end by signing the Treaty of Biak-na-Bato that exiled the leaders with a large monetary sum and promised reforms, most of which never came to fruition.²³ Apparently, United States policymakers believed they needed an ally in the Philippines in order to help the war effort until enough troops sailed the long passage from the Pacific coast. The Filipino insurgents took this opportunity and bartered with the American Consul in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, for their use as an allied fighting force. These discussions became a huge focus of Worcester's defense of the American occupation since many had claimed, including Aguinaldo, that the United States had offered independence to the Filipinos but had ignored these promises and undermined the Filipino effort. A principle provocateur for this allegation was James "Judge" Henderson Blount, an American statesman who served as an army officer and then judge in the Philippines.²⁴ Worcester spent a hefty chunk of his *Philippines Past and Present* deliberately mitigating and critiquing Blount's claims. In many ways, the arguments put forth by both men can be seen as pinnacle examples for the imperialist and anti-imperialist claims.

The allegation that the United States dangled independence to Aguinaldo and then later denied it infuriated Worcester. It implied dishonesty on the part of the Americans, a quality Worcester found antithetical to his image of America. He referred to Judge Blount's assertion of a "de facto alliance" between American and Filipino forces and his "charg[ing] of bad faith" on the part of American statesmen.²⁵ To Blount, a strident anti-imperialist, the American occupation had begun with duplicitous lies which provided further evidence for his argument against American imperialism. Aguinaldo claimed the United States directly promised him independence under American protection in exchange for aiding the American war effort. He stated, "Consul Pratt...answered my inquiry...that the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine government under a naval protectorate, but there was no necessity to put it into writing..."²⁶ In addition, Consul Pratt had supposedly claimed that the exiled Filipinos were "fit for self-government" and could be trusted in forming one.²⁷ Blount asserted that the State Department instructed Pratt to not make promises he could not keep but to place the Filipinos in a state of confused limbo. It is important to note that at this time the Filipino forces had surrounded the city of Manila and American troops

²³ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 19-21.

²⁴ James Henderson Blount, "Philippine Independence: Why?," *The North American Review* 185, no. 617 (21 June 1907), 365.

²⁵ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 19. James Henderson Blount, *The American Occupation of the Philippines: 1898-1912* (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), 1.

²⁶ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 27.

²⁷ Blount, *American Occupation*, 12.

were still on transports in the East Pacific.²⁸ Therefore, Blount believed that the Americans tricked the Filipino government into helping their cause by giving them vague hopes of secured independence and recognition.

Worcester decried Blount's claims as untrue and anti-American. He disregarded Aguinaldo's claims by citing various miscommunications and asserting their dishonesty. Many of Worcester's claims come directly from a manuscript written by John R. M. Taylor which he cited at length. It is important to note the uniqueness of Taylor's work because Worcester drew so much from it, even though the article was never published and remained out of the hands of scholars until the 1950s. The work was compiled by Taylor while he served in the army as a formal account of the American occupation. Historian John T. Farrell, who first shed light on this peculiar piece of history, argued that it showed the Filipino Insurrection as a continuation of previous revolutions.²⁹ Luckily, Worcester had access to this document and often used it verbatim for his arguments. One particularly interesting claim made by Taylor, and corroborated by Worcester, was that much of the blame for Aguinaldo's false idea of American promises of independence came from the poor and possibly dishonest translating of an Englishman by the name of Howard Bray. Bray served as a go-between for the Americans and Filipinos while they were discussing their partnership since a language barrier existed between the two parties. Taylor asserted that Bray had translated Pratt "to say...more than he intended and his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and promises."³⁰ Also, Worcester used racial arguments to undermine the Filipino position. He alluded to the "stereotyped Filipino procedure" that involved "having said just exactly what one did not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth."³¹ Worcester placed the blame squarely on the Filipinos for the problem of promised independence and his use of racial arguments to denounce the Filipinos occurred frequently.

The debate between Worcester and Blount should be seen as representative of the larger arguments of imperialism and anti-imperialism. Both men were widely published and respected due to their long tenures in the Philippines. Interestingly, according to Sullivan, Worcester often publicly declared an opinion while in private he would hold an opposing view. In a letter to his brother he stated, "From what I am able to learn I am inclined to think that Pratt and Wildman [US Consul in Hong Kong] promised what they had absolutely no right to promise.... [The Filipinos] undoubtedly feel, and with some show of reason, that we have gone

²⁸ *Ibid*, 13.

²⁹John T. Farrell, "An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R. M. Taylor and the Philippine Insurrection Record," *The Catholic Historical Review* 39, no. 4 (Jan., 1954), 388.

³⁰ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 25-26.

³¹ *Ibid*, 34.

back on our promises to them.”³² Worcester’s conflicted statements most likely indicated an adherence to the common argument with apparent private reservations. The debate between Worcester and Blount continued for years.

On January 18, 1899, the First Philippine Commission met in Washington to discuss the current Philippine situation and receive instructions. Worcester received a position on the commission due to his knowledge of the islands and his frequent writings on the subject. According to Worcester, the Commission sought “to ascertain what amelioration in the condition of the inhabitants and what improvements in public order were practicable....”³³ They also had the power to appoint officers, collect taxes and commence the building of infrastructure. In short, the Commission’s endeavored to aid the military government in order to pacify the country and improve the situation. The McKinley administration formed the commission before the war broke out on 4 February 1899 and it initially had a peaceful purpose. Worcester chafed at any insinuation that he had been sent to the Philippines to aid the war effort. He wrote, “There was no war when we started, and we were expressly enjoined from interfering with the military government or its officers. We were sent to deliver a message of good-will....”³⁴ These accusations upset Worcester because he felt that the American presence enlightened the Filipinos. He recalled how the Philippines had been in a state of disarray “overrun with thieves and murderers” with “no attempt made to enforce law and order.” Furthermore, the “public schools were abandoned,” towns had fallen under control of mafia-like strongmen and even insurgents called the situation “complete anarchy.”³⁵ The only way the Philippines would be restored was through the tutelage of progressive Americans.

When war broke out on 4 February 1899, it only strengthened the view of many, including Worcester, that the Filipinos could not be dealt with as civilized people. Many Americans deemed the revolutionary Philippine government, headed by Aguinaldo, as not representative of the people. Worcester declared Aguinaldo a dictator and compared him to Porfirio Diaz of Mexico.³⁶ He argued that the Philippine Republic did not actually constitute a true republic since it lacked popular support. In an article printed 2 November 1899, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, quoting the First Report of the Philippine Commission read, “the uprising was treated at first with indifference and later with fear.”³⁷ Worcester greatly influenced the Commission’s report as he had assumed a fairly dominant role. Working with his old colleague and travel partner, Frank Bourns, he gained access to the military authorities which enabled him a strong position.

³² Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 67.

³³ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 301.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 302.

³⁵ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 16 November 1899.

³⁶ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 242.

³⁷ *San Francisco Chronicle*, 2 November 1899.

Sullivan noted how Worcester desired to “Americanize” the Filipinos since they could not govern themselves and their supposed leaders failed to address their needs.³⁸

Worcester denied that the leading Filipinos wished to form a republic, or even knew the meaning of the term. He summarized Aguinaldo’s proclamation that provided representatives from every *pueblo* under Philippine control and allotted various powers to them. The military held the dominant authority and the elite, “admittedly very few in number, absolutely control[led] the masses.”³⁹ Worcester posited that even though Aguinaldo and his cohorts had proclaimed a Republic, in reality they held sway over the people with a brutal military dictatorship. In addition, even in the few cases of true democracy, the average Filipino either declined to participate or fell under the control of a local *presidente* who negated the electoral process.⁴⁰ The Filipino masses failed to provide themselves a true Republic and could not be trusted to do so again if the United States withdrew. According to Worcester, Aguinaldo controlled a government that rested all of its powers in him and his central group. To support this, Worcester described how lower-ranking, less-educated officials and townsfolk called Aguinaldo by royal titles. They referred to themselves in letters to him as “your vassal” and designated official declarations as “royal decrees.”⁴¹ Worcester questioned how the Filipinos would be able to govern themselves when he found the closest example of self-governance a dismal failure.

The Filipino people failed to recognize their new government or to give it any popular support. Worcester put it this way: “The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had guns in their hands. It is not probable that many of them had any conviction concerning the form of government which would be best for the Philippines.”⁴² In fact, the people probably “accepted a president and a republic...without caring very much.”⁴³ The average person probably hoped their taxes would be lowered and their means of existence meddled with less. Worcester asserted that when elections were held the populace was wholly ignorant of them. He noted the pathetically low voter turnout —generally less than one percent— in major cities and towns as evidence for the lack of public electoral responsibility. To Worcester, the Filipinos simply understood the new government as a replacement to Spanish rule. It functioned similarly and they could not be given the responsibility to overthrow it in exchange for a true republic. The Filipinos required constant, diligent tutelage by the Americans over a long stretch of time in order to be successful. Worcester wrote, “A determined and well-organized minority had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous, and leaderless majority.”⁴⁴ Even if the republic was to survive, he downplayed its ability to

³⁸ Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 71.

³⁹ Worcester, *Past and Present*, 242, 246-248.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 242-246.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 252.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

stay in power by saying, “The record the Philippine republic has left behind it contains nothing to confirm the belief that it would have endured, even in name, if the destinies of the islands had been left in the hands of the men who set it up.”⁴⁵ Consequently, the Philippines existed in a state of fearful anarchy and lawlessness. For Worcester, their only salvation depended on American occupation.

The argument over whether the Filipinos were a homogenous or heterogeneous society became a key point of dispute for imperialists and anti-imperialists. If the Philippine islands consisted of a wide-ranging collection of tribes then they would fail to govern themselves properly because of the lack of a unifying force. On the other hand, if the islands’ populace thought of themselves as mostly one particular ethnic group then they could be merged under a national banner. Once again, Blount and Worcester went head-to-head as to the correct answer to this question. Worcester divided the Filipinos into three broad categories which he then divided into roughly 84 tribes. He ranked the three races, Indonesians, Malays and Negritos in order of the fairness of their skin, their perceived intelligence and physical characteristics. The closer any of these characteristics approached that of a white man’s, the more positive light Worcester placed on the group.⁴⁶ Thus, he sought to define the archipelago as being disparate and under the domination of the Tagalogs in the North. Blount, alternatively, argued Americans and Europeans invented the differences between the Filipinos. He stated, “One Filipino does not differ from another any more than one American does from another American—in fact they differ less, considering immigration.”⁴⁷ He further expounded on this by comparing the linguistic diversity that existed in the Philippines—the principle languages of Tagalog, Ilocano and Visayan existed in the North, Central and South respectively—to that of Switzerland, a prosperous, yet multi-lingual country.⁴⁸ Blount consciously connected the Filipino situation to that of a European state in order to stress that the two possessed fewer differences than many argued. While Blount argued the Filipinos held the capacity to exist as a unified, integrated culture, Worcester still believed that the diversity of the island was simply another obstacle to the advancement of the Philippines.

With the calming of the Philippine Insurrection in the early twentieth century the Republican administration, Worcester included, now moved to determine the state of the Philippines. The administration formed the Second Philippine Commission or Taft Commission to enact laws, create infrastructure and govern the islands. Worcester was the only holdover from the previous commission that had begun the transition to civil government. The Taft Commission’s statesmen repeatedly argued to maintain possession of the Philippines in order to train the natives.⁴⁹ Henry C. Ide, Governor-General in 1905 and a close colleague of Worcester on the Taft Commission, was one such man who articulated the imperialist viewpoint. His

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁴⁶ Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 91.

⁴⁷ Blount, *American Occupation*, 298.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 299-308. Worcester, *Past and Present*, 325-330. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 65.

beliefs coincide very closely with those of Worcester and parallel those of the Republican, imperialist administration. In his article entitled *Philippine Problems*, he briefly summarized the dominant suggestions contrary to American possession of the islands. An interesting theory advocated allowing massive Chinese immigration into the islands in order to improve the economy. The Chinese occupied an important but tenuous position in the Philippines. They operated most of the merchant shops and controlled much of the money but the populace generally loathed them. Worcester noted that they had intermarried with the natives producing a *mestizo* unique to Southeast Asia. Also, they had tried to mingle with the natives by “nominally adopting Christianity,” but in reality they remained a fairly separated, conservative group with “rooms in the rear of their shops” used to “propitiate their old deities.”⁵⁰ The natural contempt of the Filipinos for the Chinese, much like that of the average European toward the Jews, prevented this theory from going into effect. Also, in true imperialist style, Ide believed the Chinese would drive the natives out of every possible economic or industrial niche due to their superior racial traits. In addition, he stated, “our interest... is not primarily the development of the *islands*. But the development of [the people of the islands].”⁵¹ Thus, the transformation of the Filipinos garnered far more importance than the economic status of the archipelago.

Another suggestion, formulated by William Jennings Bryant and propounded by Blount, demanded full independence to the Philippine islands as soon as possible with the exception of the Moro Provinces which fell under separate jurisdiction. Worcester argued that if the Moros deserved specific treatment, why would the Malays warrant better? The other islands, to Worcester and Ide, lacked sufficient civilization to require independence and needed an extended tutelage by Americans in order to achieve it.⁵² The anti-imperialists loudly stated that the Filipinos desired independence, a fact that was undeniably true. But, to Worcester, Ide and many other imperialists, the Filipinos could not govern themselves. Ide mentioned the great benefits that the Philippines received under American occupation, notably, “the construction of roads and bridges,” development of educational facilities and “the organization of municipal, provincial and insular governments.”⁵³ Worcester possessed these same notions of American benevolence. According to Sullivan, he particularly concentrated on the ideal of educating the Filipinos since Democracy could not be achieved unless the people were well-learned.⁵⁴ Anti-imperialist arguments missed the fact that, for most imperialists, the Filipinos did not have the quality of mind, from Worcester’s perspective, to actually understand what was best for them.

In the end, the imperialists won the arguments; subsequent Republican administrations throughout the first decade of the twentieth century kept the Philippines as an American colony in order to civilize its

⁵⁰ Worcester, *Islands and Their People*, 37, 327.

⁵¹ Henry C. Ide, “Philippine Problems,” *The North American Review* 186, no. 625 (Dec. 1907), 510-514, 513.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 515-516.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 519.

⁵⁴ Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism*, 91.

backwards inhabitants and exploit the wealth of the islands. Worcester remained in the civil service of the Philippines until 1913 when he resigned in the face of a new Democratic administration. He died there in 1923, affluent and comfortable.⁵⁵ His energetic attitude and fierce disposition meant he was either highly esteemed or reviled. In present history he is often remembered in a negative light due to his racist rhetoric, but during his tenure he would have been viewed by many as a magnanimous figure trying to aid those who needed it most. Dean Worcester believed that the only way for the Philippines to improve itself was through the long, seemingly unending paternalistic tutelage of the Americans and he attempted to do this with an honest intention to better the people that fascinated.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 235.

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Sean T. Painter
“Plautus and his Prostitutes”

Introduction

It is human inclination to desire an enduring memory, but a natural proclivity of historiography is the inevitable omission of individuals who do not play significant roles in history. The early Republican Roman historical record is filled with recollections and accomplishments of politicians, soldiers, and the wealthy, but absent for the most part are the common people. To explore the characteristics of these otherwise forgotten characters, historians can examine the literature, and seek to define how common Romans may have acted. The plays of Plautus are an abundant source, and his many stock characters offer possible insights into the characterization of daily Roman life. Of these characters, a popular reoccurrence is the prostitute. Plautus' depictions are valuable because they represent one of the few characterizations of prostitutes that scholars have been able to examine in the Middle Republic. Unlike Plautus' other stock characters, prostitutes seem to be varied in their depictions. This also makes their use as representations of historical prostitutes problematic.

The scope of this paper will examine Plautus' use of prostitutes in his plays. Are Plautus' depictions of prostitutes when compared to Republican Rome historical records and depictions of prostitutes a fair assessment or vivid literary creations? This paper will further examine Plautine theatre, and Plautus' implementation of various stock characters, with great attention paid to the prostitutes in *Menaechmi* (*the Brothers Menaechmus*), *Aulularia* (*the Pot of Gold*), *Mostellaria* (*the Haunted House*), *Miles Gloriosus* (*the Braggart Soldier*), and *Truculentus*.

To understand Plautus' stock characterization, it is important to understand the background and cultural importance of the setting in which his plays were performed. Plays were performed at religious festivals and games, often organized to curry favor with deities in times of upheaval, dedicate a temple, or to celebrate military victory.¹ These festivals and games were a prevailing “expression and function of Roman religious life,” and religion dictated the audiences' expectations.² Religion dominated the lives of Romans. Polybius, the Greek historian who spent many years in Rome in captivity commented on the importance of religion in Rome, stating:

The sphere in which the Roman commonwealth seems to me to show its superiority most decisively is in that of religious belief. Here we find that the very phenomenon which among other peoples is regarded as a subject for reproach, namely superstition, is actually the element which holds the Roman state together. These matters are treated with such solemnity and introduced so frequently both into public and into private life that nothing could exceed them in importance.³

¹ Richard C. Beacham, *The Roman Theatre and Its Audience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 19.

² *Ibid.*, 21.

³ Polybius 6.56 (All references to the text of Polybius are based upon Scott-Kilvert's Penguin edition and translation of 1979).

The games and festivals in which the plays were performed took on a special status. They were meant to be revered and sacred, but at the same time entertaining. Sponsored by magistrates aiming to curry favor with the public, those in attendance went “with the expectation of being entertained.”⁴ The plays were not the centerpieces of the festivals and competed for an audience with other forms of entertainment. Entertainment options were limitless during these “community celebrations” that served as “public holidays in the context of a calendar that had no regularly occurring” holidays.⁵ Processions, sacrifices, races, animal fights, boxing, gladiatorial combat, and juggling, competed for the goal of “impressing and pleasing a crowd out for a good time.”⁶ The plays therefore attracted a certain demographic of the attending revelers.

The audience at these plays varied. According to historian Richard C. Beacham, “all citizens had the right to attend,” including women and slaves “who were not, however allowed a seat.”⁷ Plautus had to keep his audience entertained and interested in what was being presented on the stage. Not only were there other entertainment options but there was no permanent seating for most viewers, increasing the difficulty of sustaining the audience. The audience of the plays is important. As Harriet I. Flower correctly asserts: “the theatre of the late Republic was a highly political arena.” Even though the plays were based on Greek originals, the audience had no difficulty voicing reaction to social or political issues. Plautus’ plays frequently inverted societal norms for comedic effect, playing on the already rambunctious crowd.⁸

Of Plautus’ comedies, twenty-one are extant.⁹ Although, based on Greek New Comedy plays by Menander and other Greek authors, Plautus drastically changed the dynamic of his plays. Male stock characters dominate his plays. Scholar Ann R. Raia counted 154 male roles compared to sixty-one roles for women.¹⁰ These characters include a “cast of characters, such as the young lover, the straitlaced father, the wily slave, braggart soldier” and many more.¹¹ Throughout the surviving plays, versions of these characters and others appear. Plautine scholars use his stock types to analyze popular society and attempt to determine if these stock characters are a valuable historical basis for real Romans. While men do dominate Plautus’ *dramatis personae*, his plays do “contain lively female roles,”¹² which play considerable parts in most of the plays. These women fall into five stereotypes: the *puella* (the young maiden); the *matrona* (the married woman); the *ancilla* (the hand maid); the *anus* (the old woman); and the most interesting, the *meretrix* (the

⁴ Beacham, 22.

⁵ Harriet I. Flower, “Spectacle and Political Culture in the Roman Republic,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic*, ed. Harriet I. Flower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 326.

⁶ Beacham, 22.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁸ Flower, 326.

⁹ Elaine Fantham, “Literature in the Roman Republic,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic*, ed. Harriet I. Flower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 277.

¹⁰ Ann. R. Raia, “Women’s Roles in Plautine Comedy,” Paper delivered at the Fourth Conference on Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies (Oct. 1, 1983), published online at <http://www.vroma.org/~araia/plautinewomen.html>. It should be noted that Raia’s count is 54 or 61, depending on whether the seven women who are discussed but never appear are counted. Since one of these is a prostitute, I included the higher number.

¹¹ David Konstan, *Roman Comedy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 16.

¹² Fantham, 278.

courtesan or prostitute).¹³ In Plautus' plays, the word *meretrix* is used more than any other synonym, creating a construct of how Plautus saw his prostitutes as those that were more reputable than the lowest sex workers in Rome.

Of the sixty-one women in Plautus' plays, nineteen are prostitutes.¹⁴ They appear in at least ten of Plautus' plays. In an examination of the usage of *meretrix*, Marsha McCoy denotes that "Plautus uses the word seventy-two times."¹⁵ Depending on the translation, these women are listed in the *dramatis personae* as variations of prostitutes, the most common being courtesan, prostitute, or the enthusiastically descriptive "girl of joy." There is a wide variety of descriptions in modern translations of these plays.¹⁶ These varied descriptions allude to the numerous descriptive Roman adjectives for prostitutes.¹⁷ Harry E. Wedeck assesses that there were twenty-five different synonyms for prostitute in Rome. The two most commonly used were *meretrix* and *scortum*.¹⁸ *Meretrix* usually meant officially recognized prostitutes.¹⁹ *Scortum*, the more derogatory term, referred to the clandestine "streetwalkers," who sold their bodies on "the steps of monuments, on public benches, at tombstones, under archways, or near aqueducts."²⁰ When Plautus wanted to denote a less reputable prostitute, *scortum* was frequently used, with modern translations depicting the word as the less favorable word, harlot.

In Plautine comedy, women are depicted from the man's point of view. These men represent the majority of Plautus' stock characters. For example, young men in these plays are often dominated and supported by their clever slaves, who almost always seem to be one-step ahead of their masters. Palaestrio in *Miles Gloriosus*, and Tranio in *Mostellaria* are prime examples of this characterization, frequently using their "methatheatrical humor" to drive and construct the plot.²¹ As well as appearing dimmer than their slaves do, a domineering wife often controls the men in these plays. Noted Plautine scholar Erich Segal comments that, "Plautine wives are nothing but a parade of untamed shrews."²² In *Menaechmi*, Menaechmus, laments about his wife and mistress:

¹³ Raia, 1. Raia's article has no page numbers. The page was determined by saving the article as a Microsoft Word with Times New Roman 12 point font. Repeating this process should result in similar page determinations.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Marsha McCoy, "The Politics of Prostitution: Clodia, Cicero, and Social Order in the Late Roman Republic," in *Prostitution and Courtesans in the Ancient World*, ed. Christopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 178.

¹⁶ See Z.M. Packman, "Feminine Role Designations in the Comedies of Plautus," *The American Journal of Philology* 120, no. 2 (Summer, 1999): 245. Packman's article goes into great detail regarding the various role designations for female characters.

¹⁷ Harry E. Wedeck, "Synonyms for Meretrix," *The Classical Weekly* 37, no. 10 (January 3, 1944): 116.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ A modern correlation might be the registered prostitutes found in legal brothels in Nevada.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Fantham, 278.

²² Erich Segal, *Roman Laughter: The Comedy of Plautus* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 25.

Hah – my wife thinks that she hurts me, when she shuts the door on me. / But, as far as entering, I've got another, better place. / You don't like me. I'll live through it since Erotium here does. / She won't close me out, she'll close me tightly in her arms, she will.²³

In addition, he bemoans “Neither wife nor mistress will believe a single thing I say.”²⁴ He is joined in his lamentations by Simo in *Mostellaria*, who joyfully boasts how he avoided having intercourse with his shrewish wife after she cooked him dinner:

Never have I eaten better. / What a fine dinner prepared by my wife. / But after she wanted to ‘sleep’ and I wouldn't let her. / That old hag made a dinner better than usual, simply a plot to get me to bed. / ... Secretly, quietly, I have slipped out. / Wife will be wild at me, I have no doubt.²⁵

Simo further insults his wife by analogizing his bedroom to torture and a less desirable activity than conducting business in the Forum, “the bedroom is torture ... / Better work in the forum than bed her at home.”²⁶ The purpose of these social inversions were primarily to entertain. They certainly provided moments of private laughter for the slaves and women in the audience who undoubtedly observed the play in the vertical position fantasized that life someday might imitate art in which slaves were leaders to their masters and women in a position to dominate their men. While slaves and women often had their moments in the plays, the suspended disbelief was always accompanied by reality. In Plautine comedy, slaves are “threatened ... with extreme violence: pain, beatings, threats of torture,” with these batteries being the source of comic relief. Women are routinely debased, keeping them in their place. This dichotomy reinforced the purpose of the plays, a temporary distraction and not a social revolution.

The *meretrix* is certainly one of his more dependable stock characters. Prostitutes are central to the plot in many Plautine comedies. Plautus' prostitutes can be divided into three subtypes. The first is the “kept woman,” loyal and sexual with only one client. Her foil is the entrepreneurial and clever “professional” prostitute who schemes many men and has loyalties to none. Third, is the courtesan “with the heart of gold.” The courtesan is the prostitute who has a loyal and loving boyfriend who goes to great lengths to free her. This fits nicely with Plautus' most common story line involving prostitutes. The play's heroine, who at the beginning of the play is a courtesan, but later in the plot is “eventually discovered to be a well-born maiden ... and her marriage to the hero of the play ... necessary and suitable” to the conclusion of the play.²⁷

The “kept woman,” the “professional” prostitute, and the “courtesan” can be further divided by their moral character. Raia separates Plautus' *meretrix* into two categories, the *meretrix mala* (wicked prostitute) and

²³ Plautus *Menaechmi* 669-671.

²⁴ Plaut *Men.* 700.

²⁵ Plautus *Mostellaria* 690-699.

²⁶ Plaut *Mostell.* 706-707.

²⁷ Konstan, 26.

the *meretrix bona* (good prostitute).²⁸ Raia further breaks down the career of the Plautine prostitute, and these stages are characteristic of the prostitutes in the five plays reviewed for this paper. The earliest stage of a prostitutes' career begins when she is young, inexperienced and beautiful. In Plautus' plays, this young inexperienced woman is usually the girlfriend of only one man, making her a "courtesan." Her lover often has to struggle to raise money to purchase her freedom. Philematium in *Mostellaria* is the primary example of this character.²⁹ The prostitute at mid-career is the most represented prostitute in Plautine comedy. Erotium (a "kept woman"), from *Menaechmi*; Acroteleutium (a "professional" prostitute) from *Miles Gloriosus* and Phronesium (also a "professional prostitute") from *Truculentus* serve as examples of this stage. These women are written as materialistic, spending "their days ... bathing, perfuming, and ornamenting themselves with the clothing and jewelry" that their lovers adorn on them.³⁰ Unlike the prostitute at the beginning of her career, the mid-career prostitute is well versed in her trade and can manipulate men with relative ease. She has maintained her beauty, but is not as vibrant as when she was younger. At the end of her career, the prostitute in Plautine comedy is transformed into a *lena*, the female equivalent of the pimp or a maid to a younger more nubile prostitute and frequently gives her advice, solicited and non-solicited. Scapha, in *Mostellaria*, represents the latter of this stage.³¹

Menaechmi

The *Menaechmi* is a play about escaping from the rigors of life. The two brothers represent two dueling desires. While Menaechmus I seemingly lives both lives in the play, the audience never sees him enjoy the fruits of the spontaneity and luxury that he has set up. The desire to live free from the "every day agenda" and "innumerable ties, legal financial and social obligations" and to escape his shrewish nameless wife is bountifully present.³² Menaechmus I laments that:

Where I'm going, what I'm doing, what's my business all about, / Deals I'm making,
undertaking, what I did when I was out. / I don't have a wife, I have a customs office
bureaucrat, / For I must declare the things I've done, I'm doing, and all that!³³

It is his twin brother, Menaechmus II, that the audience sees enjoy the pleasures for which his brother longs, even though Menaechmus I is the one who sets everything in motion. Menaechmus I's pleasurable release lies conveniently across the street at Erotium's house. Erotium, the prominent female character in the play, is a prostitute. Segal colorfully describes her as a "lady of pleasure," and this lady of pleasure represents a foil for Menaechmus I's wife. Throughout the play, he will berate his wife in her person and in her absence while praising his lover. She is "pleasure personified." With her entrance on stage, Menaechmus I enthusiastically

²⁸ Raia, 5.

²⁹ Ibid., 6.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Segal, 43.

³³ Plaut *Men.* 115-118.

cries out “Oh, my joy! My wife, my wife! When I see you – how I hate *her!*”³⁴ He also describes her beauty as more powerful than the sun and quite romantically states, “How the sun’s eclipsed by all the blazing beauty from her body.”³⁵

Menaechmus does not hide his affair with Erotium from his wife. Brazenly telling his wife his future plans to dine with Erotium, Menaechmus scolds his wife:

So watch for trouble if you’re wise; / A husband hates a wife who spies. / But so you won’t have watched in vain, for all your diligence and care, I’ll tell you: ‘Wench to lunch today, lovely dinner off somewhere.’”

This is characteristic of many of the plays and perhaps Roman society. Prostitution (while not a well-respected profession) was not the demeaning institution that it is viewed as presently. Marsha McCoy postulates that Roman society had very little stigma attached to solicitation of prostitution because of the many prominent examples in Roman literature.³⁶ However, this apparent universal acceptance was not the only opinion. Cato the Elder, Rome’s protector of moral integrity, urged that men should not strike their wives or indulge immoderately in commercial sex.³⁷ In Rome, brothels were not segregated. While records for the Republican period are sparse, there is ample evidence in later periods.³⁸ For example, in Pompeii, brothels seem to have been situated in a variety of places all over town, near gates, upper-class houses, baths, hotels, and snack bars ...³⁹ and not in defined “red light districts.” Contrast this acceptance to the modern opinions on prostitution, where for the leading majority willing tries to enforce the idea that prostitution is “hidden away from public view.”⁴⁰

When providing presents for his mistress, Menaechmus simultaneously disparages both his wife and Erotium. Boasting his theft of a valuable dress from his wife’s wardrobe, he states “I’ve robbed a rat,”⁴¹ but in expressing his desire to give the ill-gotten dress to Erotium, he harshly describes her as “my little slut.”⁴² Further passages articulate opinion and characterization of prostitutes. Most of the colorful and amusing

³⁴ Plaut *Men.* 189.

³⁵ Plaut *Men.* 179.

³⁶ McCoy, 182.

³⁷ Phyllis Culham, “Women in the Roman Republic,” in *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic*, ed. Harriet I. Flower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 147.

³⁸ As stated, historical evidence of prostitution in the Early Republic is lacking. There is an abundance of information for later periods. For an extensive examination of brothels in Roman society, particularly Pompeii, including zoning, laws, and advertising see Thomas A. J. McGinn’s works which discuss many of the parallels alluded to here in great detail. The two most important works are: *Prostitution, Sexuality, and the Law in Ancient Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) and McGinn’s later work *The Economy of Prostitution in the Roman World: A Study of Social History and the Brothel* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

³⁹ Thomas A. J. McGinn, “Zoning Shame in the Roman City,” in *Prostitution and Courtesans in the Ancient World*, ed. Christopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 161.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 164. Prostitution in the modern United States is only legal in Nevada. Brothels are in sparse rural locations.

⁴¹ Plaut *Men.* 133.

⁴² Plaut *Men.* 130.

depictions ensue when Menaechmus' twin is mistaken for Menaechmus and proceeds to receive "everything for nothing," and receives all the pleasures that his brother has set up. This farce is typical in comedic tradition.⁴³

Menaechmus' servant Peniculus characterizes prostitutes' female charms in the art of separating a man from his purse (a theme that becomes vastly apparent in *Truculentus*) when he states "sluts can talk so sweet, while they see something they can snatch from you."⁴⁴ Menaechmus II's servant Messenio during the beginning of the confusion in which Erotium's cook has mistaken Menaechmus II for Menaechmus, asserts that the woman living in Erotium's home is "some sort of slut" and gives ample warning to his master about entering:

Wanton women have this way: They send their servants or their maids to port / To see if some new foreign ship's arrived in port. / To ask around, 'Where are they from? What are their names?' / Right afterward, they fasten on you hard and fast. / They tease you, then they squeeze you dry and send you home.⁴⁵

Messenio repeats his characterization later stating, "wanton women are this way, whenever they can sniff some silver."⁴⁶ Erotium herself contributes to her reputation when she describes her home, and characteristically describes a brothel and how it contributes to squeezing men dry: "See that the incense is burning, the couches have covers. / Alluring décor is exciting for lovers. / Lovers love loveliness, we don't complain, their loss is our gain."⁴⁷ Erotium is the type of prostitute that may be loyal to one man. It is certainly implied that she is loyal to her lover next door, or at least men who look exactly like him. Although never seen on stage, she is an expert in sexual intercourse and provides her client(s) a place to come receive some "joy."⁴⁸ However important she is to her client, she will remain an object of pleasure. Upon Menaechmus II's conquest of Erotium, he expresses humorously that "what man in just a single day / Received more pleasures, though expecting none at all: / I've wined, I've dined, I've concubined."⁴⁹ Towards the conclusion of the play, when Menaechmus II's sexual encounter of mistaken identity is discovered by his brother, his brother surprisingly responds with glee "O by Pollux, I rejoice if you had fun because of me!" This demonstrates that Erotium and prostitutes like her, are indeed objects of pleasure and treated as such by the men with whom they associate.

Aulularia

The mention of prostitutes in *Aulularia* is limited. Phrygia and Eleusium have no spoken lines and are referred to only once in the play when the cooks who are preparing the wedding feast argue:

⁴³ Segal, 49.

⁴⁴ Plaut *Men.* 194.

⁴⁵ Plaut *Men.* 339-343.

⁴⁶ Plaut *Men.* 377.

⁴⁷ Plaut *Men.* 352-353.

⁴⁸ Plaut *Men.* 676.

⁴⁹ Plaut *Men.* 473-474.

Congrio. But it's not fair! / You mis divided, giving them the fatter lamb.
 Strobilus. So now you'll get the fatter flute girl – Phrygia, / You go with him. And
 you Eleusium, / Come into our house.⁵⁰

In the *dramatis personae*, neither Phrygia nor Eleusium are referred to as prostitutes. Instead, they are listed as “flute girls,” which could be a literal label for what they are, musicians, or a reference to female musicians who in the Republic “were more like musical prostitutes than performers who might be offered respect.⁵¹ Unfortunate woman, either slaves or free women, did resort to such careers in the “hospitality and entertainment sectors of the economy.”⁵² Women like Phrygia and Eleusium can be a representative sample of women forced to incorporate sex into entertainment. They are also a representation of the “household slaves [that] were routinely beaten and sexually exploited.⁵³ Culham relates the horrifying reality that “female slaves as young as seven were given to male slaves as rewards.⁵⁴

There was some chance of hope for these skilled prostitutes, especially at those who were adept at claiming the social ladder of Roman society and became affluent. The Roman writer Aulus Gellius relates the occurrence of one such woman, who rose from the ranks of lowly prostitute to one that operated “at the highest economic ranges in the hospitality profession.”⁵⁵ This unnamed prostitute was accosted by a high-ranking magistrate, and defended herself by throwing a rock at him. Charged with assault by her attacker, her prosecution was never carried out, due to the public ire of the magistrate’s outrageous manner. Such respect was rare. As demonstrated by depictions of prostitutes in *Menaechmi*, prostitutes are rarely portrayed with respect.

Mostellaria

Mostellaria begins with a common Plautine plot, in that the absence of the patriarch allows his dependents “limitless revels.”⁵⁶ In his father’s absence, Philolaches went on a lavish spending spree, throwing a magnificent party that seemingly never ends and freeing his beloved girlfriend, Philematium, who happens to be a prostitute. However, Philematium is more than a prostitute. She, like the prostitutes from *Aulularia*, is a flute girl, reinforcing historical references in Plautus’ work and described as such by Phaniscus:

⁵⁰ Plautus *Aulularia* 330-332.

⁵¹ Culham, 154.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 152.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 152.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Ibid., 154.

⁵⁶ Segal, 27.

Sir, I'm well aware of where I'm going, and the place I'm at. / Philolaches lives here – he's the son of Theopropides. / When his father went abroad on business, then the young man freed a Music girl.⁵⁷

She is a prostitute lucky enough to be in love with her “darling benefactor” who went into debt to free her.⁵⁸ She is beautiful, but needs constant reassurance on her appearance and wardrobe. She asks her maid, Scapha, a retired and hardened prostitute, to look her over, to determine if her “costume” is nice enough. Scapha reassures her mistress of her beauty and sarcastically reminds Philematium that “lovers don't love women's clothes; they love what's stuffed inside them.”⁵⁹ Scapha's statement, while added for comedic effect, also reinforces perceptions from *Menaechmi*, where the “girls of pleasure” were sexual objects. Perhaps wanting to prevent future heartbreak for her mistress, Scapha scolds Philematium for only loving Philolaches:

By Castor, yes. You're wrong to put your hopes in just one lover, / To be so dutiful to him, rejecting other men. / Fidelity's for wives, but not for mistresses.⁶⁰

Despite her warnings that it's foolish to think “that man will always be your friend and benefactor,” Philematium vows to “stay ... monogamous to him,” and to “be as lovey-dovey to him as I was before.”⁶¹ Undeterred by Philematium's infatuation, Scapha mockingly suggests that if “he's to be your only lover for your whole life long” then she should honor and obey by adorning “a wifely hairdo.”⁶² Scapha's remark about “a wifely hairdo” is a reference to the clothing hierarchy that existed in Roman society. In Rome, clothing expressed not only wealth and power but also conveyed social status.⁶³ This was especially true among women, where dress and hairstyles could “indicate a woman's rank, status, and morality.”⁶⁴ By changing her hairstyle and clothing, she would then appear as a noble woman. Scapha's remarks are not the only place in Plautus that refers to prostitutes changing their clothing to appear above their class. In *Miles Gloriosus*, Palaestrio remarks that the prostitute brought into their plan to trick Pyrgopolynices should:

Have her in disguise, so she'll look like a married woman- / Hair combed high, with ribbons and the rest. She must pretend that / She's your wedded wife. Now train the girl!⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Plaut *Mostell.* 969-971.

⁵⁸ Plaut *Mostell.* 167.

⁵⁹ Plaut *Mostell.* 168.

⁶⁰ Plaut *Mostell.* 187-190.

⁶¹ Plaut *Mostell.* 205 and 220.

⁶² Plaut *Mostell.* 223.

⁶³ Kelly Olson, “*Matrona and Whore: Clothing and Definition in Roman Antiquity*,” in *Prostitution and Courtesans in the Ancient World*, ed. Christopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 186.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁶⁵ Plautus *Miles Gloriosus* 790-793.

Scapha may not be a romantic but she does offer sound advice from her experience, solidifying her role as Philematium's mentor. She advises Philematium not to over powder her face, as there is "no need to gild the lily."⁶⁶ She further advises not "to overpaint an absolutely perfect picture" by using too much rouge, or to use too much perfume as "perfect women smell of absolutely nothing."⁶⁷ Her sagest advice to Philematium was for her to wash her hands after holding a silver mirror because the smell of silver from the mirror might make Philolaches "suspect you've taken silver from a man," proving her unfaithful.⁶⁸ This collection of advice is filled with imagery that denotes a woman who is maintaining her looks for a lover and maintain the ideal male fantasy. As she is relatively new, Philematium is mentored by another prostitute, and will in time personify a wiser, more sexually experienced professional prostitute for her customers. The next characterization of the prostitute occurs very vividly in *Miles Gloriosus*, which contains a more prominent example of the prostitute slave stock character through the character Philocomasium, and a very interesting portrayal of the professional free prostitute depicted by the character Arcoteletium.

Miles Gloriosus

The principal plot of *Miles Gloriosus* revolves around Palaestrio, a typical Plautine clever slave, and his attempt to reunite his former master, Pleusicles, with his girlfriend, Philocomasium. On his way to inform his master about Philocomasium's abduction from Athens, Palaestrio is kidnapped by pirates and conveniently sold to the same man who stole Philocomasium, a soldier from Ephesus. In Ephesus, Palaestrio hatches his plot of trickery to fool Pyrgopolynices (the titular character. Enlisting the aid of a sympathetic neighbor, Palaestrio orchestrates a plan to trick the Braggart Soldier into freeing Philocomasium by enlisting the aid of a prostitute, Arcoteletium to feign romantic interest for the Braggart. By the end of the drama, Pyrgopolynices is successfully fooled and Pleusicles leaves with his beloved Philocomasium, with Palaestrio in tow.

Two different types of prostitutes are depicted in *Miles Gloriosus*, and their behaviors complement each other and serve as an example of the dynamic between *meretrix mala* and *meretrix bona*. Philocomasium is representative of the "kept woman" and *meretrix bona*. Depicted as the more virtuous courtesan in the play, she truly loves Pleusicles. However, she is not as innocent as other Plautus prostitutes, who like Philematium in *Mostellaria*, are seemingly unaware of the power of their feminine charms. Philocomasium is quite capable of deceit but while Arcoteletium uses her expertise in deceit for profit, Philocomasium uses it for the noble purpose of escaping her captivity.⁶⁹ Her ability at deceit is portrayed numerous times. She convinces

⁶⁶ Plaut *Mostell.* 259.

⁶⁷ Plaut *Mostell.* 263, 275.

⁶⁸ Plaut *Mostell.* 269.

⁶⁹ Anne Duncan, "The Infamous Performers: Comic Actors and Female Prostitutes in Rome," in *Prostitution and Courtesans in the Ancient World*, ed. Christopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 260-261.

Sceledrus, the Braggart's slave in charge of her keep, that it was in fact her twin that he saw kissing an unknown male next door and not her. Her confidence in pulling off this comical mistaken identity is best detailed in dialogue. When Palaestrio questions her ability, she responds: "What? I could make / A dozen damsels devils with my surplus shrewdness!"⁷⁰ Philocomasium implies that she is clever enough to perform this task with enough deceit left over to teach a dozen other women how to be deceitful. Her trickery is immaculate, and while Sceledrus is accurate in his suspicions, he is so fearful that he might be wrong that he runs away.

Philocomasium represents a very real part of Roman society. She is essentially a sex slave. Stolen by Pyrgopolynices for his eventual conquest, she would have historically had very little to do to contest her fate. A very real characteristic of Roman life was the exploitation of female slaves by their male owners. Susan B. Pomeroy comments "the master has access to all his slave women" whenever he wanted.⁷¹ She cites several historical examples, including the two great Roman statesmen, Scipio Africanus and Cato the Elder. Africanus had a relationship with one of his slave girls, and upon his death, his wife freed her. Cato the Elder, "an authority on Roman virtue" engaged in a relationship with one of his slaves after his wife's death. Cato, also "pimped" his female slaves to his male slaves for a "fixed fee."⁷² Philocomasium's role in the play is a comic watering down of the real horrific practice of sexual slavery in the Ancient World where in harsh reality, no woman enjoyed sexual freedom.

The line between a professional prostitute and a woman forced into sexual slavery is loosely addressed in Plautine comedies. The professional prostitute undoubtedly is portrayed in a more cynical and materialistic, only providing her services when paid, with no exceptions. An example of this is seen in Erotium in *Menaechmi*. However, Erotium, despite her materialistic nature does not represent the cold-hearted calculated machinations that the truly professional prostitutes exhibit. Neither does Arcoteletium, who is definitely a professional prostitute, and not a slave, or new courtesan. When carrying out their ruse on the Braggart Soldier, Palaestrio requests from Periplectomenus a woman capable of extraordinary deceit:

Palaestrio	Could you find a woman for me- someone beautiful and charming, / Someone full of cleverness and trickery from tip to toe?
Periplectomenus	Freed or free-born girl?
Palaestrio	It doesn't matter, just be sure and get me / One who's money- loving, and who earns her keep by being kept. / One who's got a mind- she doesn't need a heart- no woman has one.
Periplectomenus	Do you want a ... green one ... or a ripe one?
Palaestrio	Just be sure she's juicy. / Get the freshest, most appealing girl you possibly can find.
Periplectomenus	Say- I have a client- a luscious, youngish little courtesan! ⁷³

⁷⁰ Plaut *Mil.* 356.

⁷¹ Susan B. Pomeroy, *Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), 192.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 192.

⁷³ Plaut *Mil.* 782-789.

Periplectomenus “luscious, youngish little courtesan” is Arcoteleutim. She is the embodiment of what Palaestrio required, and proves this in her flawless execution of Palaestrio’s plan. Like Philocomasium, she needs no coaching in her deceit. When Periplectomenus attempts to coach her to “play her role as the *matrona*,”⁷⁴ Arcoteleutium, cleverly responds:

Now don’t you think I’d be a stupid idiot to undertake / An unfamiliar project or to promise
you results, / If I were unacquainted with the whole technique- the art of being wicked?⁷⁵

Arcoteleutium, while not particularly devious (the trickery in *Miles Gloriosus* is not prompted by her), does demonstrate that deceit is a useful skill for prostitutes. Her later statement that “it’s wickedness or wiles that’s wanted of the woman,” further demonstrates the prostitute’s many roles in society. Arcoteleutium is not a *meretrix mala*, but it is hard to qualify her as a *meretrix bona*. Her characterization of a scheming wicked woman and prostitute is tame compared to the depiction of prostitutes in *Truculentus*, which creates a very unflattering depiction of the world’s oldest profession.

Truculentus

The plot of *Truculentus* is very simple. A scheming prostitute, Phronesium, engages in a plan to trick a foreign soldier Stratophanes into believing that a child that Phronesium has “borrowed,” is actually his. The rest of the play deals with Phronesium and her protégé Astaphium and their dealings with various clients. Through charming manipulations, these prostitutes are able to extort a great deal of wealth from these men, who seem completely helpless to control themselves when around these women. Each hoping that Phronesium will favor them, these men assist in her schemes. Dinarchus in pursuit of Phronesium, loses his entire family fortune, but would repeat his mistakes for more time with her. By the end of the play, when Dinarchus discovers that the baby Phronesium is using to fool another man is biologically his, he is not outraged. Instead, he allows her to continue using the child in the hope that he will be repaid with “kindness.” None of the men in the play, Dinarchus, Strabax, Truculentus, or Stratophanes is able to resist the charm and manipulation of these women, and by the conclusion of the play serve as nothing more than an example of men controlled by their lusts, who have learned nothing.

P.J. Enk states that the women in *Truculentus* show “how unfaithful, how greedy of gain, how inhuman, how dangerous are those harlots who reduce young men to extreme poverty by means of their flattery and lies.”⁷⁶ The main prostitute of *Truculentus*, Phronesium is introduced to the audience by her main suitor/victim, Dinarchus, in very unflattering terms, highlighting her ease in manipulating men:

⁷⁴ Duncan, 261.

⁷⁵ Plaut *Mil.* 879-880.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Konstan, 144.

Here lives a woman named Phronesium. / In her methods of procedure she is worthy our times: / never does she ask a lover to give her / things already given, but concentrates on making all that is left him leave him, by virtue of the / teasing, taking ways our ladies have. / For this is what they all do, once they realize that they are loved.⁷⁷

Further, he complains that, no matter how much a man gives a prostitute, her insatiable need for more is ever-present. The prostitute tries “you with calls for cash or wine or oil or wheat to see if you’re liberal or thrifty.”⁷⁸ Comparing her to an expert fisherman, she makes “good care no fish ... gets away.”⁷⁹ Even if the suitor is successful in obtaining love, and gains a moment of temporary happiness, the prostitutes succeed in eventually destroying this by their insatiable greed. Further frustrating for the suitors is the prostitutes’ lack of any loyalty. While this is not surprising to the reader, it is quite shocking that:

As soon as she found another man, she could get more out of, she thereupon / in –ushered him, as a better prodigal, to my seat, despite her earlier talk how she loathed him, / blast her!⁸⁰

Here Dinarchus laments about Phronesium’s attention to the soldier who she is trying to trick into believing that a baby she stole is his, thus requiring him to support her and her “baby.” If the ruse were successfully maintained, Phronesium would extract from a client a continual source of income without having to maintain a romantic relationship. Greed by prostitutes in *Truculentus* is not only expressed by Phronesium but her maid and protégé, Astaphium who states:

A courtesan ought to be like a bramble bush, / and make certain that any man she touches gets / stuck or stung. She never should take notice of / a lover’s pleas; if he give her nothing, he’s to be cashiered for desertion. You won’t ever find a / high class lover that doesn’t hat his bank account. / He’s no use, unless he enjoys following up new gifts with newer ones. The man who’s loved at /our house is the one who forgets the gift that’s / give. He can love while he can pay; when he / can’t, let him try another occupation. If he can’t / pay, himself, he should give place to those can, and do it gracefully.⁸¹

Greed drives these women. As David Konstan wrote in his analysis of *Truculentus*, “Phronesium may have her preferences among her suitors, but her overriding preoccupation is with cash.”⁸² As the plot unfolds and Phronesium entangles the soldier, Stratophanes, her avarice increases, and she rebuts the soldier’s advances because he has not lavished her with enough gifts. Astonished and angered that she now pays

⁷⁷ Plautus *Truculentus* 10-20.

⁷⁸ Plautus *Truculentus* 35.

⁷⁹ Plautus *Truculentus* 40.

⁸⁰ Plautus *Truculentus* 80-82.

⁸¹ Plautus *Truculentus* 220-235.

⁸² Konstan, 147.

attention to another man, Strabax, Stratophanes is scolded by Phronesium who advises him that she loves other men because “it profits her to do so.”⁸³

Despite the apparent outward greed that they show, the men in their lives are unable to break the cycle. Diniarchus would eagerly repeat his actions if only he “could ... drop into some big handsome legacy.”⁸⁴ While the prostitutes in the play are without morals, it is hard to find sympathy for their customers. In this dark comedy, Plautus’ expresses a tale of morality. Absolute greed, and want is devastating to those who in engage in it. The characterization of prostitutes in this play represents the possible alarm that Plautus had in the decay of the Roman society.

Conclusion

Plautus’ plays offer many vivid depictions of generally pedestrian characters that otherwise would be unrepresented in the historical record. While Plautus does portray a wide array of characters in his plays, most of these are facile stock characters with very little variation between plays. This served a dramatic purpose. The audience is allowed to quickly identify the particular characters. While Plautus used the prostitute as a stock character, he also varied its presentation, presenting it in multiple forms. Rarely are they singled into one distinct stock characterization like his many other characters. This would seemingly create an argument that their usefulness for historians is greater. Wider variety denotes a greater possibility of a characterization approaching historical accuracy. However, even in their varied roles and depictions the prostitutes in the plays serve different functions. Scarcely mentioned in *Aulularia* their presence serves as a possible connection to historical prostitution to which historians can easily connect. In *Mostellaria*, they are peripheral to the plot, and represent the playful girlfriend courtesan. In *Menaechmi*, the main prostitute is an example of a *meretrix scortum* but not the “wholesome courtesan,” as she is concerned for with money than fidelity. The shrewdness and harshness increases dramatically among the prostitutes in *Miles Gloriosus* and *Truculentus*, where the latter probably offers the historian the most cynical depiction of the prostitute. It would seem that in an examination of prostitution in the Early Roman Republic, where historical records are limited, the literary snapshot created by Plautus is an ideal examination of the role of the prostitute in Roman society.

⁸³ Duncan, 265.

⁸⁴ Plautus *Truculentus* 340.

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Curtis Jeffords
**“Transcending Ethnic Boundaries: Class and the Legal Foundation of
Racism in Seventeenth Century Virginia”**

The debate concerning blacks and the development of racism in colonial Virginia is vibrant. As the historiography suggests, arguments range from racism as an established presence from the first appearance of Blacks in Virginia in 1619, to racism as a social construct created through the efforts of elite Virginians. Ethnocentrism existed amongst Europeans in 1619; however racism, the notion that one is biogenetically superior to another, became an accepted value through the changing nature of law and its ability to create separate social spheres based on race. The study of 17th Century Virginia law, particularly through examples of slavery’s transition from a customary practice to statute law, regulation of sexual relations, and protection of the institution itself provide examples of how legal means were employed to separate blacks and whites. This attempt at separation, however, did not always occur when human interaction took place. In fact, Virginia’s history of white and black relations in the 17th Century is laden with examples where class transcended ethnic or racial lines. Furthermore, the notion of class consciousness is not only evident through actions of lower class blacks and whites but through the concerns of the elite. Clearly, despite the use of legal means to create separate social spheres, black and white relations in 17th century Virginia provides a reference point in which class conciseness transcended the social construct of race.

According to Jack P. Greene “the American South, with its hordes of black chattel slaves, was bound to become an embarrassment.”¹ The roots of Virginia’s relationship with the abusive institution of race based slavery can be traced to an era long before the inception of the United States, a time when Virginians were loyal British subjects harboring no intentions of creating an independent nation. As aforementioned, blacks arrived in Virginia in 1619. Seemingly anticlimactic, one of John Rolfe’s two letters concerning the event, briefly mention that in “the last of August [1619] . . . a dutch man of warre . . . sold us twenty Negars.”² According to Winthrop D. Jordan, following this arrival the rise of slavery in 17th Century Virginia can be outlined in three stages. The first of these stages is “[p]rior to about 1640” were there is little evidence to illustrate the treatment of blacks. The second ranges from the 1640s to 1660s where sources reveal that lifetime service and hereditary status were readily applied to blacks. Finally, in the 1660s “slavery was written

¹ Jack P. Green, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 1.

² “A Relation from Master John Rolfe,” in Warren M. Billings, ed., *The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606-1689* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 155; Kenneth Morgan, *Slavery and Servitude in Colonial North America: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 29; Alden T. Vaughn, “Blacks in Virginia: A Note on the First Decade,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 29 (July 1972): 470.

into statute law.” It is precisely this process of institutionalizing slavery, accompanied with analysis of laws and events therein that has led to one of the richest historiography debates in American History.³

Approaching this historical period, in particular attempting to explain the origins of racism in 17th Century Virginia requires acquainting oneself with principle works of historical research related to the field of study. For this purpose Alden T. Vaughn’s “The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century Virginia” will be utilized as a point of reference. Furthermore, Vaughn’s article provides precise meaning to key terms, borrowing definitions from sociologist Donald Noel. These include ethnocentrism (“in-group glorification”), prejudice (“a hostile attitude toward members of a specific group”), and racism (“an ideology based on the conception that racial groups form a biogenetic hierarchy”).⁴ For the purpose of this paper Noel’s definitions will be employed. Finally, although other relevant research has been published since Vaughn’s article in 1989, it remains the standard for exploring the synthesis of historical scholarship which forms the foundation of debate concerning racism and slavery in 17th Century Virginia.

Oscar and Mary Handlin’s 1950 article “Origins of the Southern Labor System,” is generally looked at as the source of the modern race-slavery debate. Rather than recognizing slavery from the onset of black’s presence in Virginia, the Handlin’s argued that although “unfree,” black’s status was that of white “indentured servants, debtors working off obligations, [and] criminals serving sentences.”⁵ Furthermore, the Handlin’s argued that when blacks were called slaves in the historical record it referred to their social status and use in menial labor rather than signifying race based slavery. Not until the 1660s, when a series of laws reduced blacks to life time servitude did race become an issue. According to the Handlin’s, it was only after being debased through statute law that “the trace of color became the trace of slavery.”⁶ Primarily based on the status of blacks prior to the 1660s (most agreeing that the first blacks in Virginia, as well the majority of subsequent generations, were slaves), most historians have largely rejected the Handlin’s findings. Their contribution, however, can be credited with sparking a generation of scholarship revolving around the institutionalization of slavery and the development of racism in 17th Century Virginia.

Two of the most influential historians to partake in the debate are Winthrop Jordan and Edmund Morgan. Among other subjects, Jordan’s study *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (1968), addresses 17th Century Virginia. Exploring English attitudes towards blacks before 1619, *White Over Black* illustrates a “breadth and depth of English prejudice against Africans . . .” Therefore, English

³ Winthrop D. Jordan, *The White Man’s Burden: Historical Origins of Racism in the United States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 40. Jordan clearly states that prior to 1640 little is known about the treatment of blacks. Jordan does not refute the fact that they were slaves or servants. However, most mainstream historians agree that the first blacks in Virginia were slaves and that prior to 1640 the majority of blacks were bound to a lifetime of servitude. Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), 311.

⁴ Quoted in Alden T. Vaughn, “The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,” *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 97 (July 1989): 346.

⁵ “[U]nfree” quoted in Vaughn, “The Origins Debate,” p. 316; *Ibid.*

⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 318.

prejudice was “unconsciously” imported into Virginia, resulting in a view of blacks in the colony as “visually, socially, and perhaps biologically distinct people, in . . . every way inferior to everyone else.”⁷ Furthermore, because the English had no statute law recognizing slavery prior to the 1660s, blacks were enslaved based on custom rather than legal principles. In contradiction to establishing the presence of prejudice and perhaps racism in Virginia’s earliest stages, however, *White Over Black* reiterates Jordan’s argument from “Modern Tensions and the Origins of American Slavery,” that “rather than slavery causing ‘prejudice,’ or vice versa, they seem . . . to have generated each other. . . . [Having] been equally cause and effect . . . [they] dynamically join[ed] hands to hustle the Negro down the road to complete degradation.”⁸ Despite this inconsistency *White Over Black* remains a pillar in the race-slavery debate.

Edmund Morgan’s chief contribution to the debate is represented in *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*. *American Slavery, American Freedom* argues that racism was a component of slavery in Virginia from the onset. That being said, prior to the influx of high numbers of African slaves class prejudice could easily be mistaken for racial prejudice. Only when black slaves became the principle labor force in Virginia did racial prejudice lead to degradation. Furthermore, in the 1670s and 1680s Virginia elites deliberately fostered contempt between whites and blacks in an effort to avoid class conflict. Morgan’s interpretation signifies the importance of class conflict in encouraging elites to pursue racial harmony among whites. This shift, together with the rising numbers of African slaves, pushed racial prejudice to the forefront in an effort to promote racial consciousness over class consciousness.⁹

Jordan and Morgan’s contributions are cited in almost every piece of historical scholarship produced in response to slavery and racism in 17th Century Virginia. However, it is problematic to argue that racism was intact in Virginia upon the arrival of blacks in 1619 and throughout the 17th Century. Morgan states in *American Slavery, American Freedom*: “Virginians did not enslave the persons brought there by the Royal African Company or by the private traders. The only decision that Virginians had to make was to keep them as slaves.”¹⁰ Morgan wrote this statement in order to raise a question to refute, and although it is an oversimplification of black’s status in Virginia, it deserves a closer look.

Blacks entering Virginia likely came as slaves for the purpose of manual labor. Similarly, indentured servants came to Virginia to fulfill the same duties. Furthermore, indentured servants and slaves shared an almost identical existence of ill treatment and degradation in Virginia. Therefore keeping blacks in a perpetual state of servitude, the status in which they were received, points more directly at ethnocentrism and class based prejudice than racism. To extend slavery to Europeans would have been impossible, yet continuing the practice of utilizing African slaves, a model used throughout the Atlantic world, created little

⁷ Ibid., pp. 321-322.

⁸ Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 80; Vaughn, “The Origins Debate,” pp. 322-323.

⁹ Vaughn, “The Origins Debate,” pp. 326-327.

¹⁰ Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, p. 314.

problems in New World context. The near identical treatment of blacks and whites proves that prejudice was based on social status rather than race.

Moreover, elites who harbored prejudice against blacks represented a minority of the total population. In looking at relations among poor whites, indentured servants, and blacks (the three groups who comprised the majority of the population) it is helpful to apply some of the principles Brian Sandberg utilized in exploring borderlands in the Americas between 1492 and 1700. Sandberg argues that individual “identities [within borderland societies] seem to have been incredibly flexible and changeable.”¹¹ The malleable nature of individuals can be applied to 17th Century Virginia. Virginia colonists lived on the borders of empire, which created room for deviation from social norms in England. Of course this deviation did not exist only because of location, class prejudice against both blacks and whites provided one of the agents for transcending ethnic boundaries. Indentured servitude rivaled slavery in brutality and similar to slaves servants contracts could be bought and sold. Furthermore, until around the turn of the century most blacks came from Barbados rather than directly from West Africa. Thus they had time to learn English and “adjust . . . physically . . . [and] mentally to an alien culture.”¹² These factors led blacks and whites to share a level of intimacy which blurred boundaries that may have otherwise existed. In this context it becomes increasingly challenging to label Virginians racist.¹³

How then did racism evolve in Virginia? As previously mentioned, racism is the ideology that one racial group is biogenetically superior to another. Creation of the ideological stance of race superiority requires not just degradation of a particular group but the separation of that group from others that share similar experiences. In 17th Century Virginia statute law created the foundation of separation between blacks and whites. For colonial elites, who harbored just as much class based prejudice as race based prejudice; law provided the means to separate individuals at the lower rungs of society along ethnic lines. Through prejudicial laws black’s status in Virginia became legally bound to life time servitude while simultaneously attempting to divide those comprising Virginia’s lowest social status.

Part of creating separate social spheres among blacks and whites required creating a legal foundation for the institution of slavery. Virginia’s first legal recognition of slavery came in an act passed in 1661. The act, which stiffened penalties for whites who ran away with blacks, highlighted the fact that “negroes . . . are incapable of making satisfaction by addition of time.” As punishment, longer terms of servitude did not apply to blacks due. It continued, “*Bee itt enacted* that the English so running away . . . shall serve for the time

¹¹ Brian Sandberg, “Beyond Encounters: Religion, Ethnicity, and Violence in the Early Modern Atlantic World, 1492-1700,” *Journal of World History* 17 (March 2006): 7.

¹² Timothy H. Breen, “A Changing Labor Force and Race Relations in Virginia 1660-1710,” *Journal of Social History* 7 (Autumn 1973): 16-17; Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, p. 296.

¹³ Ira Berlin, *Many Thousand Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 44.

of the said negroes absence as they are to do for their owne . . .”¹⁴ The act provided recognition of slavery while concurrently enforcing separation between ethnicities. Servants who at one time might have run away with blacks would likely refrain thereafter for fear of a more rigid penalty. Legislators authored another act reinforcing slavery in 1662. This act applied to the status of black women’s children, stating “all children borne in this country shalbe held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother . . .”¹⁵ Clearly enacted to legally protect slave owners property, this legislation furthered the transition from customary to institutional slavery.

Statue law also utilized religion to reduce the status of blacks and create ethnic separation. Prior to the 1660s black conversion to Christianity allowed more mobility within Virginia’s society. In fact, a 1662 court ruling granted freedom to a non white through religious context. Metappin, a Powhatan Indian who had been purchased for life, gained his freedom due to the fact that he spoke “perfectly the English tongue and desir[ed] baptism.”¹⁶ This path to freedom, however, was closed via a 1667 act which declared that “baptisme doth not alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or ffredome.”¹⁷ While religion was used in 1667 to block possible routes to freedom, in 1670 it was used to reinforce social separation. This act stated “that noe negroe . . . though baptized and enjoyed their owne ffredome shall be capable of any such purchase of Christians, but yet not debarred from buying any of their owne nation.”¹⁸ Clearly, the incorporation of religion in law provided the means to two ends, strengthening slavery’s legal standing and reiterating separation of blacks and whites.

Blacks also faced harsher prejudice in legal terms of servitude than other ethnic minorities. In 1670 Virginia law makers declared that “all servants not being christians imported into this colony by shipping shalbe slaves for their lives; but what shall come by land shall serve, if boyes or girls, until thirty years of age, if men or women twelve years.”¹⁹ As Kathleen Brown points out, “[t]his law made two crucial distinctions.” The first returns to the issue of religion, with non-Christians “forming the potential pool of slaves.” The second point distinguished terms of servitude between two different ethnic groups. Native Americans, those that “come by land,” serve specific term limits, while Africans, those “imported into this colony by shipping,” were slaves for life. Because of the close proximity of blacks and whites, Virginian law makers utilized more rigid structure in law to maintain the deprivation of blacks. Native Americans had never made a large

¹⁴ William Waller Hening, *The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, From the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619*, vol. II (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823), 26; Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, p. 311.

¹⁵ Hening, *The Statutes at Large*, vol. II, p.170.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 155; T.H. Breen, “Creative Adaptations: Peoples and Cultures,” in Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole, eds., *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 218-219.

¹⁷ Hening, *The Statutes at Large*, vol. II, p. 260.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 280-281,

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 283; also found in Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 136.

proportion of the labor force in Virginia, juxtapose to blacks who worked closely with whites and whose numbers steadily increased from their inception in 1619.²⁰

Perhaps the most pressing issue surrounding ethnic separation came in preventing sexual relations between blacks and whites. Indeed, scholars such as Kathleen Brown and Kevin Mumford argue that prosecution of sexual crimes defined racial boundaries more than any other transgression in 17th Century Virginia. Brian Sandberg's borderlands study can again be applied in the context of sexual relations. The flexible nature of sexual relations in Virginia, compared to England, created a backlash of legislation against black and white sexual relations. Illustrating the nature of borderlands, Mumford states that "laws of miscegenation were inventions of the New World."²¹ The Hugh Davis case in 1630 exemplifies the attempt at sexual separation: "Hugh Davis to be soundly whipped, before an assembly of Negroes and others for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in lying with a negro . . ."²² The Davis case represents the first attempt at legally repudiating sexual relations between blacks and whites. Brown points to the fact that although Davis received "roughly the same legal treatment as illicit unions between white people," the court's description deviated from other cases through the implication that Davis sinned and defiled himself before god.²³

In 1662 Virginia legislators officially made fornication between whites and blacks a criminal offence. The second clause of the statute condemning children of slaves to their mother's condition concluded "that if any christian shall committ ffornication with a negro man or women, hee or shee soe offending shall pay double ffines imposed by the former act."²⁴ This law had two important consequences. The first, and most obvious, is that it heightened the penalty for illicit fornication when committed with blacks. Second, and more important, it was directed at the white individual, thus providing extra incentive for whites to avoid sexual relations with blacks. This attempt at race based separation, however, did not always have the desired affect. Between 1681 and 1691, justices in Norfolk County punished seventeen white women for bastardly, four having given birth to mulatto children. An example of this is provided in 1681 in the William's Case. Mary Williamson was charged with committing "the filthy sin of fornication with William a negro" Williamson was fined five-hundred pound of tobacco while William (the "negro"), charged with fornication as well as behaving "very arrogantly," received thirty lashes.²⁵ Most women who committed illicit sexual acts with black men were servants, poor, and single, illustrating that those who shared similar situations crossed ethnic boundaries.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Kevin Mumford, "After Hugh: Statutory Race Segregation in Colonial America, 1630-1725," *The American Journal of Legal History* 43 (July 1999): 284-285; Sandberg, "Beyond Encounters," p. 7; Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, p. 211.

²² "Hugh Davis's Case, 1630," in Billings, *The Old Dominion*, pp. 160-161.

²³ Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, p. 195.

²⁴ Hening, *Statutes at Large*, vol. II, p. 170.

²⁵ "William's Case, 1681," in Billings, *The Old Dominion*, p. 161; Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, pp. 195-197; Martha Hodes, *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 24.

Furthermore, aside from illicit sex, prior to 1691 blacks and whites could legally marry. However, an act in that year made it illegal for any “English or other white man or woman being free . . . [to] intermarry with a negroe, mulatto, or Indian man or woman bond or free,” and that if any such union should occur those individuals would “be banished and removed from . . . [the] dominion forever . . .”²⁶ Moreover, the law heightened fines for free English women who gave birth to mulatto children. The significance of this law is colossal. It makes all interracial sex illicit, stripping the right of sexual relations from those who previously had legal protection, or a least no deterrent. Proving to be the pinnacle of legal efforts at separation in the 17th Century, it is clear that the foundation of a race based society in Virginia had been laid. Clearly, despite the nature of human interaction in Virginia’s lower social rungs, lawmakers were going to move toward undermining class consciousness and promoting race based degradation.²⁷

Sexual intimacy was not the only way that ethnic boundaries were broken, blacks and whites also rose in armed rebellion together. Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676 represents the greatest upheaval in colonial Virginia’s history. Virginia was ripe for rebellion in the 1670s, as Peter Thompson illustrates “white Virginians of all ranks were haunted by the specter of helpless dependency . . . on a worthless crop, on a corrupt colonial government and unjust tax system, or on rapacious neighbors and cruel masters . . .”²⁸ Although Thompson statement excludes blacks, they defiantly comprised a portion of those Virginians unhappy with their situation. Clearly, individuals who comprised the lowest class within Virginia, poor whites, indentured servants, and black slaves, viewed elite planters and the legislative body as the source of their oppression. Furthermore, elites were clearly concerned about the class consciousness of blacks and whites.²⁹

Elite planters had long been weary of the sort of Europeans that had been coming to Virginia. England had used Virginia as a destination for its idle inhabitants, or the “very scum and off-scouring” of England, as some planters viewed the new colonists.³⁰ To compound the problem, more servants were living out their terms of servitude, which created a pool of freedmen with no land. Because the price of tobacco was subject to a fluctuating market, elite Virginians created “an artificial scarcity of land,” leading single freemen to become part of what was called the “giddy multitude,” a group already including servants and slaves.³¹ In a letter to the King in 1673 regarding the problems faced in defending Virginia, Governor Berkeley and other members of the Assembly specifically mentioned the “giddy multitude.” The letter stated:

Wee leave at our backs . . . Many Servants (besid[e] Negroes . . .) . . . Both which gives men fearful apprehensions of the dainger they Leave their Estates and Families in

²⁶ Hening, *Statutes at Large*, vol. III, p. 87.

²⁷ Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, pp. 197-198; Berlin, *Many Thousand Gone*, p. 44.

²⁸ Peter Thompson, “The Thief, the Householder, and the Commons: Languages of Class in Seventeenth-Century Virginia,” *William and Mary Quarterly*: 260.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260.

³⁰ Quoted in Breen, “A Changing Labor Force,” p. 5; Thompson, “The Thief, The Householder, and the Commons,” p. 261.

³¹ Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, p. 295; Breen, “A Changing Labor Force,” pp. 1, 6.

. . . [while] defend[ing] the Borders, Of which number alsoe at least one third are Single freemen . . . or men in such debt, both which Wee may reasonably expect upon any Small advantage the Enemy may gaine upon us, wo{u}ld [sic] revolt . . . in hopes of bettering their Condition . . .³²

Elite planters were aware of the complaints of the poor, servants, and slaves, and as already illustrated had attempted to separate this disgruntled class of people along ethnic lines.

Conscious of separating blacks and whites into separate spheres, Virginia law makers also took legal precautions to ensure their safety. Prior to Bacon's Rebellion, aware of rising tension, lawmakers enacted a law declaring that "if any slave resist his master . . . and by the extremity of the correction should chance to die, that his death shall not be accompted ffelony

. . ."³³ Because slaves could not have time added to their term of service, this legislation could be utilized as a mechanism for keeping slaves docile. Furthermore, slaves could no longer use the courts to defend their physical well being, a right that indentured servants maintained. However, despite the threats and attempts at separation blacks participated in Bacon's Rebellion in 1676. The rebellion itself was short lived, and its leader Nathaniel Bacon died before it successfully overthrew the government. Yet it offers an interesting look into black and white class consciousness.³⁴

Bacon died in October 1676; however, members of his rebel force still fought. One such group was composed of "freemen, servants, and slaves."³⁵ When Captain Thomas Grantham reached Colonel John West's plantation, the rebel's stronghold, he found four-hundred whites and blacks in arms. Even upon the surrender of most, eighty blacks and twenty white refused to give up their weapons (they to being eventually returned to their masters). This episode of resistance among blacks and whites, despite the fact that the rebellion had already crumbled, proved that individuals in 1676 did not view race as the primary social characteristic. Furthermore, the label "giddy multitude" included blacks, illustrating that elites similarly did not view race as the primary social distinction, or at least proves elites were aware of a class consciousness among blacks and whites. Again, blacks and whites in similar situations transcended ethnic boundaries.³⁶

Not long after Bacon's Rebellion statute law provided another crippling blow to the status of blacks. The 1680 law declared that "it shall not be lawfull for any negroe or other slave to carry or arme himself with any club, staffe, gunn, sword or any other weapon of defense or offence . . ."³⁷ Another gun law affecting blacks was passed in 1640. Although historians have read much into this statute it has been largely taken out

³² "The Dutch Burn the Tobacco Fleet, July 1673: The Problem of Defending Virginia Against Attack," in Billings, *The Old Dominion*, p. 259.

³³ Hening, *Statutes at Large*, p. 270.

³⁴ Timothy Breen and Stephen Innes, "The Atlantic World and the Origins of Slavery: Prejudice or Profit?," in Francis G. Couvares, Martha Saxton, Gerald N. Grob, and George Athan Billias, *Interpretations of American History: Patterns and Perspectives*, vol. I: *Through Reconstruction*, 7th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 122.

³⁵ Quoted in Breen, "A Changing Labor Force," p. 10; Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1984), 84.

³⁶ Breen, "A Changing Labor Force," p. 11.

³⁷ Hening, *Statutes at Large*, vol. II, p. 481.

of context. The case of William Harmon, a free black farmer in 1676 who won a court case revolving around a purchased fire arm, and the fact that blacks had been armed in Bacon's Rebellion provide evidence that the 1640 gun law provided vague guidelines for blacks ability to carry weapons at best. However, the 1680 law clearly defined it illegal for blacks to carry a weapon. The ability to rebel now hindered, this act furthered legal separation between blacks and whites. Moreover, it distinguished that even free blacks could not carry a weapon, which in 17th Century Virginia place them at a disadvantage in more ways than those pertaining only to self defense.³⁸

It is problematic to view social structures through statute law. However, law created a foundation for racism in 17th Century Virginia, and once the population of blacks increased at toward the end of the century the table was set for Virginia's society to become intertwined with racism. From 1680 to 1700 the estimated number of slaves in the Chesapeake tripled, rising from 4,300 to 12,900. Furthermore, during the last two decades of the 17th Century the majority of slaves arriving in Virginia came directly from West Africa rather than Barbados. Without the benefit of understanding the English language and English customs, as slaves from Barbados likely had, the Africans seemed particularly wild and brutish to colonials. Moreover, the language barrier likely prevented communication between newly arrived Africans and poor whites. Through the culmination of these events Virginians came to view slave uprising as the most ominous threat to the safety of the colony. It is at this time that the distinction between class based prejudice and race based prejudice are no longer blurred.³⁹

Martha Hodes states that "[a]s the fundamental labor system of the south changed from white servitude to black slavery, the separations between Europeans and Africans became crucial to whites in order to sustain the institution of racial slavery."⁴⁰ Through the use of law, even prior to immense numbers of blacks being imported into Virginia, separation was precisely the goal. Legally defining terms of servitude and using religion and sexual relations in statute law worked to achieve that destination. Ira Berlin builds upon reasons for the institution of slavery and its effect on race: "New World slavery did not have its origins in a conspiracy to dishonor, shame, brutalize, or reduce slaves on some perverse scale of humanity" This is true. Most blacks in Virginia were held as slaves; however, their status was inherited prior to arrival and evidence suggests that their treatment did not deviate from the treatment of indentured servants until the 1660s. Berlin, however, goes on to state, "if slavery made race, its larger purpose was to make class."⁴¹ This is where 17th Century Virginia deviates from Berlin's study of slavery in North America. Slavery may have been a prerequisite for race but race truly grows out of the separation of social groupings. Furthermore, Virginia elites created legislation with the deliberate purpose of separating different ethnicities that comprised

³⁸ T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes, *Myme Owne Ground: Race and Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 26-27.

³⁹ Morgan, *Slavery and Servitude in Colonial North America*, p. 30; Breen, "A Changing Labor Force," pp. 13, 16-17.

⁴⁰ Hodes, *White Men, Black Women*, p. 30.

⁴¹ Berlin, *Many Thousand Gone*, p. 5.

a distinct social class. Statute law was utilized to create a foundation for the separation of blacks and whites within the lower rung of society. Even with slavery intact, however, class consciousness moved individuals to transcend ethnic boundaries.

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Christopher Lasley
“Carl Schmitt’s Enduring Attack on Liberalism”

Carl Schmitt, once known as the crown jurist (*Kronjurist*) of the Third Reich, is widely considered by both his supporters and critics to be one of the greatest political minds of the twentieth century. He rose to prominence as a professor of public law, joined the Nazi party on May 1, 1933, spent over a year in an American internment camp, and in 1985 died in his hometown of Plettenberg at the age of ninety-five. Schmitt’s theories reemerged in the post-war political debate, but ironically his anti-liberal brand of conservatism found an audience with the European New Left of the sixties and early seventies. From the nineteen eighties onward an increasing number of Schmitt’s works became available in English. His attack on normative law found a place in postmodernist thought, and in the United States the neo-conservative movement incorporated Schmitt’s attack on the welfare state into their own political ideology.

This paper will examine Schmitt’s theories on politics, the state, and his criticism of liberalism. It is important to note his early works sought to save the Weimar Republic from ruin by reforming the state around a strong authoritarian leader. Before Hitler’s rise to power, Schmitt had no intention of aiding or becoming associated with the National Socialists. Instead, his theories, including the famous “friend-enemy antithesis” in *The Concept of the Political* are best understood as a reaction to Germany’s troubled experiment in constitutional democracy.

Despite his ties to National Socialism, the theories of Carl Schmitt continue to influence political and intellectual thinking in Europe and the United States. After the fall of the Third Reich, Schmitt’s works along with his celebrity fell into the shadows. In the United States, intellectuals dismissed Schmitt’s anti-liberal theories as National Socialist ideology. American interest emerged slowly, and in 1976 the first edition of *The Concept of the Political* became available in English.

Schmitt’s political philosophy begins with the fundamental question of human nature. For Schmitt, men are not creatures correctly labeled as good or bad, but rather as cunning and dangerous. In 1927 Schmitt wrote, “if men were good my views would be wicked; but men are not good.”¹ He believed if the world were truly good both priests and statesmen would be useless.² Instead states require strong central authority to maintain order.

Schmitt’s concept of human nature leads into his basic theory of state and politics. The state is best understood in the broadest sense. We should not concern ourselves (Schmitt thought) with an exact understanding of the state because states can manifest themselves in a variety of forms.³ The ambiguity of the word “politics,” on the other hand, troubled Schmitt. In a general way we all understand the word has

¹ Joseph W. Bendersky, *Carl Schmitt: Theorist For the Reich* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 85.

² Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, edited and translated by George Schwab (Rahway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 65.

³ *Ibid*, 19.

something to do with the state, and the state has something to do with politics, but as Schmitt rightly pointed out, this is not a satisfactory definition.⁴

Schmitt believed the definition of politics must denote the existence of two extreme possibilities. In the world of morality there exists the extreme possibility of good and evil. Economically, businesses are either profitable or they are unprofitable, and aesthetically an object or person can be labeled as beautiful or ugly.⁵ He argued politics boiled down to the polar extremes of “friends” and “enemies.”⁶ Schmitt’s famous “friend/enemy antithesis,” as originally articulated in *The Concept of the Political*, is his single greatest contribution to political philosophy. Certainly no other work provides a clearer insight into Schmitt’s basic understanding of political and state theory as it reoccurs throughout his later works.⁷

The “friend/enemy antithesis” has nothing to do with religious convictions or morality. The enemy of the state need not be morally repugnant. Schmitt, a devout Catholic in his youth, believed the Bible’s insistence to “love one’s enemy” referred to personal enemies not political ones. Therefore, Christian politicians need not love their political enemies. In *The Concept of the Political* the Crusades are cited, along with other wars between Christians and Muslims, as evidence: “Never in the thousand-year struggle between Christians and Moslems did it occur to a Christian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of love toward the Saracens or Turks.”⁸

The state is the central player in politics. Schmitt believed politics only applied to states, and not to organizations or private individuals because only states can have political enemies.⁹ Often the word politics is thought of in relation to party politics, but this is only the case when a party is strong enough to place the state’s existence into question.¹⁰ For example the National Socialists became a political enemy of the Weimar government once the Nazis gained enough power to threaten the state’s survival.

Noticeably absent from Schmitt’s “friend-enemy antithesis” is a definition, or discussion, of political friends. *The Concept of the Political* explores the state and its relation to the enemy, but discussion of political friendship is lost to some unknown fate.¹¹ Perhaps Schmitt ignored political friendship because only an enemy can test a state’s political strength. For states to survive they must remain politically strong in the face of the enemy.¹² Internal strife and political weakness within the Weimar Republic shaped Schmitt’s opinions of politics. He argued internal fighting among political factions not only weakened the state structure, but also damaged a state’s sense of national identity.¹³

⁴ Ibid, 20.

⁵ Ibid, 26.

⁶ Ibid, 26.

⁷ Bendersky, 85.

⁸ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 29.

⁹ Ibid, 30.

¹⁰ Ibid, 32.

¹¹ Mark Lilla, “The Enemy of Liberalism,” *The New York Review of Books* volume 44, no. 8 (May 15, 1997).

¹² Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 53.

¹³ Ibid, 32.

The existence of state enemies is irrefutable evidence that war is a normal, part of the political landscape. The world does not have peace, harmony and security, but rather the constant possibility of war.¹⁴ Utopian dreams of a one-world state are impossible because the existence of a state presupposes the existence of a political enemy. Thus Schmitt concluded the world would always have at least two states.¹⁵

The state alone determines when an internal or external enemy threatens “existence, independence, and freedom.”¹⁶ As the decisive political authority, states alone decide when to declare war against a perceived threat. Schmitt believed warfare to be an extreme possibility, but one that tests a state’s political will and strength.¹⁷ This is not to say he idealized war, but rather accepted the political reality of war, and correctly believed a future conflict between the great powers could easily turn into a second world war.¹⁸

To understand Schmitt’s opinions on dictatorship and liberalism we must examine his historical generalizations. Before the Enlightenment, kings and other monarchs controlled the state.¹⁹ Both the educated elite and the peasantry accepted the state structure of royal absolutism out of belief in the theological principle of the divine right of kings. Theology taught the devout to accept the sovereignty and supremacy of God. Schmitt saw religion as a framework that made it easy for the pious to follow a temporal ruler’s absolute authority. Medieval authoritarianism is understood in Schmitt’s *Political Theology* as dictatorship derived from, and justified by, theology.²⁰

The Enlightenment brought traditional authoritarian theories of the state into question. Philosophical debate about the nature of God is directly tied to the emergence of deism. Schmitt saw deists as politically and socially destructive. Their denial of traditional beliefs and values set Europe on a course toward atheism and anarchy. In a world without God’s active presence, the justification for royal absolutism falls apart. Schmitt believed theology and politics shared an important connection, which revolutionary intellectuals wanted to destroy. In place of God as the center of politics, Enlightenment thinkers turned politics into a natural science. Schmitt objected to politics and law as a form of science, and believed such ideas to be the fundamental problem with liberalism.²¹ Counter-Enlightenment thinkers remained theistic in their religious beliefs, and used theology as evidence of the sovereign’s rightful place as head of state.²²

¹⁴ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 65.

¹⁵ Ibid, 54.

¹⁶ Ibid, 46.

¹⁷ Ibid, 35, 54.

¹⁸ Ibid, 54.

¹⁹ Schmitt’s generalizations oversimplified the nature and character of feudal rule.

²⁰ Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, edited and translated by George Schwab (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), 36, 51.

²¹ John P. McCormick, *Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 148.

²² Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 37.

Schmitt's historical criticism of parliamentary democracy is best understood as a flawed and romantic version of nineteenth century political history.²³ He saw the past as comprised of winners and losers, with absolutism in the latter category. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Europe's monarchs proved no match against revolution, reform and the "triumphal march of democracy."²⁴

Constitutions degrade the head of state by turning the once esteemed position into a component of the government apparatus. Before the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the ruler enjoyed a concrete position. His or her subjects understood the sovereign as belonging above politics and law. Liberals claimed this type of leadership to be impossible in an enlightened state. But when we examine Schmitt's 1934 *On the Three Types of Juristic thought* we see that Hitler's position of Führer exemplifies Schmitt's concept of a sovereign existing outside of law and daily politics.²⁵

Liberalism became the vogue in Europe and turned the sovereign into an abstract legal notion. Schmitt believed this weakened the state's ability to act decisively during emergencies.²⁶ While formulating his famous "friend/enemy antithesis" Schmitt described the fall of absolutism, and the rise of parliamentary democracy as result of the Napoleonic Wars. After the defeat of France, liberals believed the English victory to be irrefutable evidence of democracy's triumph over authoritarianism.²⁷

Schmitt viewed John Stuart Mill as the quintessential liberal thinker of the nineteenth century. Mill's *On Liberty* intrigued Schmitt, but he dismissed both Mill and liberalism as an "antiquated" school of thought.²⁸ Before states extended the vote to women and national minorities, members of parliament came from the educated gentry class. Now that liberal reforms gave more people the privilege to participate in state affairs, parliaments lost their charm and class.

Schmitt published *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* during the Weimar Republic's hyperinflation crisis of 1923. Liberal financial collapse gave Schmitt an opportunity to move against the entire theory of liberalism.²⁹ With economics on the mind of most intellectuals, he argued parliamentary democracies operated identically to liberal economics. Members of parliament compete for the approval of the masses like businesses compete for customers.³⁰ Thus parliamentary systems cannot be relied on during an emergency.³¹

Parliaments of the twentieth century contained too many members with questionable backgrounds and poor educations. This compromised the position of parliament as an intellectual body. Schmitt believed today's politicians concerned themselves too much with the concerns of the commoners, thus defeating

²³ William E. Scheuerman, *Carl Schmitt: The End of Law* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 109.

²⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, translated by Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), 22.

²⁵ Carl Schmitt, *On the Three Types of Juristic Thought*, translated by Joseph W. Bendersky (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 55.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 22.

²⁷ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 74, 75.

²⁸ Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary democracy*, 7.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 1.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 39.

³¹ Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 7.

parliament's place as an intellectual body.³² In addition, legislatures of Schmitt's time no longer conducted themselves in meaningful debate like their nineteenth century counterparts.³³ Schmitt went so far as to call contemporary debates "meaningless formalities."³⁴ Schmitt's opposition to parliamentary governance reflected his disdain of the common person's voice in government.³⁵

Liberal state theory is based on the idea of universal law. Schmitt explained natural law as analogous to modern electronic traffic lights. The law attempts to calculate and control the flow of state and society, like traffic signals control the flow of vehicles. Schmitt believed law to be a poor method of controlling society. In addition, Liberal individualism makes it impossible for a state to create order through law.³⁶

Schmitt's attack on the fundamental concepts of natural law holds appeal to postmodernist thinkers. After the Second World War, postmodernists contributed to the emergence of an "international renaissance in Schmitt Studies."³⁷ He believed natural law to be an impossibility. For a law to be based on nature the state would first have to determine what a natural situation looks like. If we determine that, we then have to decide what makes a person normal.³⁸ Schmitt pondered the issue further by accepting the possibility of a normal or natural situation. He then asked what becomes of natural law when the normal state is disrupted? In the case of war or other emergency the state would be forced to judge the situation abnormal, and abandon all legal assumptions. During a state of emergency the theory of normal law is thus proven impossible.³⁹ The state of emergency or "exception" requires states to abandon law in favor of political survival.⁴⁰

Liberal parliamentary democracies and their normative legal systems fail to understand crime as a moral outrage. Concrete states, like the German Empire or the Third Reich, recognize crimes like treason as morally wrong. Normative legal practice is only able to understand crime in a mechanical way. Here Schmitt again cites treason as his example. In normative jurisprudence when a person commits treason the offender has broken a legal statute, and thus the state is permitted to punish the traitor. The process is handled by the state, but the inherent ethical outrage of the crime is ignored.⁴¹

States based on normative thought require their citizens to swear allegiance to a constitution, whereas in concrete societies subjects recognize and pledge themselves to the sovereign or head of state.⁴² Interestingly, Schmitt avoided citing the Weimar Republic as an example of constitutional democracy.

³² Scheuerman, 39, 41, 42.

³³ Ibid, 47.

³⁴ Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, 6.

³⁵ Scheuerman, 75.

³⁶ Schmitt, *On the Three Types of Juristic Thought*, 54.

³⁷ Ibid, 3, ("Introduction" by Joseph W. Bendersky).

³⁸ Ibid, 46.

³⁹ Ibid, 56.

⁴⁰ Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 6.

⁴¹ Schmitt, *On the Three Types of Juristic Thought*, 83.

⁴² Ibid, 82.

Perhaps the infancy of the Nazi state made Schmitt hesitant to criticize the old regime. Instead Schmitt focused on the United States for his criticism of the modern liberal state.⁴³

Liberal social structure has pluralistic consequences. In the United States and Great Britain citizens view nationality as only one component of their identity. Workers belong to labor unions, and the religious identify with their faith. Schmitt believed liberal pluralism allowed social groups to collaborate and give each other strength. These different social groups could easily form a “common antipathy” toward the state. Schmitt viewed liberal ideas of individualism and pluralism as recklessly welcoming the potential of a political enemy at home.⁴⁴

The “friend/enemy antithesis” applies to all states. Therefore liberal governments must have political enemies. Parliamentary democracies and constitutions claim to represent humanity, and thus liberal states declare themselves in opposition to aristocracies and dictatorships. Schmitt argued liberal states are not the political friends of humanity because the collective whole of humanity is not political.⁴⁵

If humanity cannot be invoked in politics, then the entire basis of liberal state theory is a fallacy. When liberal nations go to war they claim to be fighting on humanity’s behalf. Schmitt dismisses this as nothing more than an “especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion.”⁴⁶ As discussed earlier, for a state to exist there must be the possibility of war against the political enemy. Liberalism promotes the individual’s right to live freely without government intrusion. War is contradictory to liberal theory. Liberalism recognizes people as individuals, and individuals cannot have political enemies. Schmitt reasoned it impossible for a state to conscript their citizens to fight in a war without infringing on personal liberties.⁴⁷

Liberal nations veil their political purposes behind the mask of humanitarianism. When democracies declare war they justify it by labeling their opponent a criminal against humanity. Schmitt saw this as an elaborate, and deceptive way for a liberal state to declare its political enemy. *The Concept of the Political* concluded with Schmitt’s final jab at liberalism, “Liberal states cannot escape the logic of the political.”⁴⁸ The reason liberal states cannot avoid the “the friend-enemy antithesis” is because liberalism is a critique of the state rather than a true state theory.⁴⁹

Constitutional democracies blur the distinction between society and state. The former German Empire viewed the needs of the state as greater than the concerns of society. Schmitt believed a state’s political strength depended on the dualism of state and society, and thus the strength of an authoritarian ruler

⁴³ Ibid, 86.

⁴⁴ Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 40, 41, 45.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 54.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 54.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 71.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 79.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 70.

insured that the two concepts remain separate.⁵⁰ Starting in the nineteenth century states turned to liberalism. From that point onward society began its invasion of the state.⁵¹ Schmitt argued modern constitutional parliaments fuse state and society together creating the “total state.”⁵² The problem with the “total state” is that it creates burdens and obligations that weaken a government’s ability to respond to political emergency.⁵³

Schmitt’s critique of liberalism brings us to his argument in favor of authoritarian democracy. Liberalism held no trademark on the word “democracy” because liberalism and democracy are two separate ideas. A true democracy is one where the state acts on the behalf of the political majority. To insure the majority’s needs are met the state has to deny political rights to state minorities. Universal suffrage gives small political groups a voice in politics, but creates injustice for a greater portion of the population. Schmitt called equal rights “irresponsible stupidity.”⁵⁴

A state need only possess a vague notion of “the people” to be considered democratic.⁵⁵ Schmitt viewed the purpose of voting as a way to ensure that those who rule the state share a common relationship with their electorate. Because of the impractical nature of direct democracy people allow a council of “responsible” persons to control the state. As the people are not directly ruling themselves, Schmitt argued one “trusted” individual could represent the people as effectively as a parliament.⁵⁶ Schmitt’s concept of a democratically principled dictator fulfilled the liberal ideal of a “defender of the constitution.”⁵⁷ Schmitt believed the dictator to be a true steward of the state constitution. Only an individual with authority outside of normal law can recognize when the legal system must be suspended to insure the state’s survival during a national emergency.⁵⁸ Schmitt believed dictatorship to be the only viable state structure in a world with political enemies.⁵⁹

Post-war political groups on both the left and right utilized Schmitt’s works. A new generation of intellectuals became acquainted with Schmitt when *The Concept of the Political* was published in the nineteen fifties.⁶⁰ In the sixties members of Europe’s New Left, who saw capitalism and materialism as anti-democratic, turned to Schmitt. In *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* Schmitt attacked the lack of transparency

⁵⁰ Ibid, 25.

⁵¹ Scheuerman, 86, 87.

⁵² Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 69.

⁵³ Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 6.

⁵⁴ Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, 10-12.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 25.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 34.

⁵⁷ Schmitt, *On the Three Types of Juristic Thought*, 55.

⁵⁸ Schmitt, *Political Theology*, 5.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 66.

⁶⁰ Carl Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political*, translated by G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007), “Forward.”

in parliamentary procedure, and accused elected officials of conducting too many “back-room dealings.”⁶¹ Some on the left believed Europe’s parliamentary structure to be essentially a large oligarchy.⁶²

Some American neo-conservatives view the modern welfare state as an example of societal intrusion in the state.⁶³ It is here that Schmitt’s criticism of the “total state” entered American politics. Neo-conservative ideology seeks to liberate the state from the concerns of society, and thus free the ruling class from the needs and wants of society.⁶⁴

Republication of *The Concept of the Political* prompted Schmitt to update his “friend-enemy antithesis.” Schmitt wrote *Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the Political* as a response to changes in politics and warfare in the post-war era. Aware of his own critique of John Stuart Mill, Schmitt feared future generations might call his own theories antiquated. Thus Schmitt modernized his ideas to explain how the “partisan” fits into the world of the political.

The word “partisan” is used as a blanket term for paramilitary groups, which we would today call freedom fighters, or terrorists.⁶⁵ Schmitt argued the partisan proved the “friend-enemy” antithesis. War on an internal or external threat is properly understood as the declaration of the political enemy, even though the partisan is not a state.⁶⁶ Schmitt argued his political theories are as valid today (1963) as they were when he first articulated them in the nineteen twenties and early thirties.⁶⁷

The theories of Carl Schmitt left a major impact on twentieth century political philosophy. While many of Schmitt’s original publications wait to be translated, his essential works, like *The Concept of the Political*, are accessible in English, and have made a lasting mark on political and intellectual circles. It is only a matter of time before the complete canon of Carl Schmitt becomes available in English. Schmitt’s attack on liberalism and the “friend-enemy” distinction of politics continue to influence both political and intellectual circles in Europe and the United States.

⁶¹ Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, 49, 50.

⁶² Jan-Werner Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2003), 171-175.

⁶³ Scheuerman, 85.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 139.

⁶⁵ Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 22, 23.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 51, 85.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 95.

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Michael Antongiovanni
“When Two Worlds Collide: Cultural Confluence in North America after 1492”

Just over 500 years ago, an event of the highest historical significance occurred. Two cultures previously oblivious to each other collided. The indigenous peoples of Europe and the Americas met and for the first time were aware of new lands and peoples from across the sea. Michele Foucault’s theories attempt to explain the nature of European and Native American responses to the confluence of these cultures. Foucault ideas describe how and why individuals and groups facing tectonic change take action in pursuit of a combination of their personal objectives, the needs of their people, and the standards of society. His theories provide a means of achieving a more sympathetic interpretation of both European and Native people’s actions informed by structures beyond the control of individuals, tribes, or even nation states.

For Europeans, the discovery of new lands held great promise of adventure. In the centuries that followed, prospect of economic gain and military glory for God and country compelled Europeans to pursue conquest and riches. The world suddenly expanded. Neither church teachings nor the knowledge inherited from the Ancients hinted at this new reality. Their discovery upset fundamental aspects of European thinking and challenged previously unquestioned timeless truths. If basic facts of nature were mutable, what other revealed and accepted truths might also be subject to change? The need to revise and amend traditional teachings to accommodate basic geography deeply troubled the existing authorities. The impact of 1492 on European culture was both dramatic and immediate, but we will see that the impact on Native peoples of the Americas proved even greater and more remarkable.

Unlike Europeans who experienced the discovery of a new land and its people with immediate and substantial consequences, the vast majority of America’s Native peoples initially were at best only vaguely aware of their exposure to Europeans. However, the discovery of 1492 initiated a transformation in the following centuries that rendered their world unrecognizable. The presence of European People was initially very small, but as it expanded, they exerted an ever-increasing impact on traditional Life Ways. These influences were sometimes embraced, but often resisted. At first European People and their trade-goods marginally enhanced traditional patterns of native life. However, over time they exerted increasing levels of influence that reshaped native cultures in dramatic and often devastating ways.

1492’s accident-of-discovery initiated a wave of irresistible change destined to play out in preordained ways. Foucault believed that while change occurs constantly it progresses at different rates over time. Whatever the pace of change, fast or slow, individuals caught up in it only incompletely understand its nature. Furthermore, they may not understand their response to the change and the impact of those actions on their lives and the world around them.¹ With this as a fundamental assumption, massive change equally challenged both Europeans and America’s Indigenous Peoples. Any depiction of events addressing the interaction of

¹ Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 18

these peoples should resist a narrative form that pits good forces against bad, right intention versus wrong, or noble action confronting injustice. Rather it is a story of unintended chaos brought on by the confluence of these various peoples responding to rapid and massive change, often with devastating consequences.

The philosophy of Michel Foucault may also hold some clues as to the nature of the interactions between these peoples. Gary Gutting in his introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault* says that many of Foucault's histories fall under the category he designated "history of the present." History is supposed to be about the past, but Foucault's histories seem to be motivated by a recognition that some social circumstances—an institution, a discipline, a social practice is terribly wrong in the present. His motive for embarking on a history is to use an understanding of the past to explain something that is intolerable in the present.² His book *Discipline and Punish* is just such a history of the present, in which he investigated modern prisons and in so doing developed a theory of power that he believed relevant in other domains. He applied this theory to other present day institutions such as schools and armies and drew conclusions from this general theme. His ideas may also provide insight into the interactions between Europeans and Native Peoples. Foucault's theories help explain why the history of North American Native peoples occurred as it did. His history of the present illuminates the past.

The discovery of the new world dramatically altered the rate of change for Native Peoples. Previously stable Life Ways that provided economic security and cultural continuity for centuries suddenly became obsolete. The introduction of European novelties was sometimes incremental, manageable, and useful. But often they were abrupt, overwhelming, and devastating. Foucault believed these reconfigurations were continuous and led to new forms of power and domination. He coined a term "Power/Knowledge" to express this concept as the interdependence of "Knowledge" (the mastery of the new technology) and "Power" (the benefits that flow from mastery of the new skill). Changes in Power/Knowledge redefine what counts as important. Essential claims for one time and place become irrelevant in another context. Certain claims are dismissed as useless not because they are false, but because they cease to matter in the context of the new Power/Knowledge regime.³ The abrupt introduction of European firearms is a devastating example of this phenomenon. It may still be true that certain individuals were highly skilled with a bow, but in the new context, it ceased to be relevant.

The confluence of European and Native peoples set off dramatic reconfigurations of Power/Knowledge from first contact. It is in this sense that the new world is new for all peoples involved. Daniel Richter in his book *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* illustrates the incongruous nature of the Power/Knowledge systems of European and Native Peoples at the moment of first contact. He describes an imagined gift ax that some of John Cabot's men left behind after their contact with the Native People of New England in 1497. While the fishermen recognized the object as a cutting

² Ibid, 10

³ Merquior, *Foucault*, 109

implement, the material drew their attention with its unique texture and black color. The Native People of New England rejected the ax's utility as a tool in deference to the importance of the material. In this case, local Power/Knowledge persisted and preexisting social, economic, and political patterns subsumed the ax. In a local context, the native fishermen pounded the ax with stone tools into amulets. Honored visitors received the amulets and carried the new material into the continental interior. In this way, awareness of strangers from across the sea was transmitted among America's Native Peoples and the "New World" slowly emerged.⁴

From this and other contacts, change occurred slowly and might have seemed natural, benign, and almost entirely positive. However, the cumulative impact of these changes became apparent to Native cultures only after they had become irreversible. European manufactured goods at first slipped naturally into existing patterns of exchange—more often as objects of art or religious ritual than items of utility. Most often early European goods became raw materials processed by indigenous technologies for indigenous purposes. A copper kettle for instance was immediately cut into small pieces and then refined further by others along the distribution chain eventually finding its way as bits of copper used as ritual items, jewelry, cutting implements, or weapons. Through this process, we continue to see Native Power/Knowledge as operative. Richter confirms this point when he states European trade conformed to Native contexts throughout the sixteenth century.

As late as 1600 in most of eastern North America the Native people valued material goods from Europe primarily as raw materials to be fashioned into familiar kinds of objects and as markers of privilege status earned by those with access to them. Both derived their significance from Native contexts rather than from the European economic and social environments from which the goods had originally been designed.⁵

This however eventually changed as European traded goods became more readily available and consistently supplied. They ceased to serve as raw materials and instead became direct replacements for traditional Native items. Brass kettles replaced ceramic pots because of their practical superiority. In this way, new patterns of behavior emerged. European trade goods were no longer exclusively valued in the context of Native cultures but understood in European terms. Native Peoples now used Cabot's ax to cut.

Native peoples began to understand and rely on European goods more frequently. Kettles of brass, copper, or iron provide a good example of this transformation. Traditional clay jars were used but they were easily broken and the materials hard to find. Kettles not only proved stronger than earthenware but also could be transported anywhere and placed directly over a flame. Previously, to raise broth to a boil, it was necessary to heat rocks or coals and place them carefully in the heavy fragile pot. Now, soup could simmer almost untended in a kettle hung directly over a fire all day and night. Once kettles and fire became easily

⁴ Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country*, 12

⁵ *Ibid*, 43

transportable hunting camps for the first time had hot meals.⁶ These were unequivocal improvements. Once this new truth emerged, the old reality became irrelevant. While copper pots represent an excellent illustration of change in the years following 1492 it is but one of many examples including: cloaks, blankets, nightcaps, hats, shirts, sheets, hatchets, iron arrow heads, bodkins, swords, picks, knives, prunes, raisins, corn, peas crackers, sea biscuits and tobacco.⁷ These minor and often trivial behavioral shifts when taken together result in the world becoming a very different place for Native Peoples.

Foucault concerned himself with one such shift in his work *Discipline and Punish*. In this book, he considered the widespread change in the penal practices of Europe and North America between 1791 and 1810. He noticed a departure during this period from massive but infrequent exercise of coercive force through public execution, military occupation, and violent suppression of insurrection to constant uninterrupted social constraints characterized by practices of discipline and training. Through discipline and training society formed new gestures, actions, habits, and ultimately new kinds of people. A similar shift occurred when European life ways confronted the culture of Native Peoples throughout the new world.

An example of this emerging cultural phenomenon occurred in the Spanish mission project of the Texas borderlands of the early 18th century. Juliana Barr in her book *Peace Came in the Form of A Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderland*, outlines the threefold purpose of the mission communities. In addition to the requirements that the mission be self-sustaining and able to defend itself, Franciscans hoped to teach the resident Natives all the skills they required to become citizens of Spanish Society. Fray Mariano de los Dolores expressed this desire when he wrote, “The Indians must work their own fields, build their own houses and churches, breed cattle, protect and maintain them; eat and dress themselves and have necessity for civil and rational style of living”. This self-reinforcing training process encouraged the Indians to “gather more readily in the new pueblos, embracing our religion and become subjects of his Majesty.”⁸ The Mission project therefore strove to provide Indians with self-sufficiency and common defense. But, the missions also (through discipline and training) transformed the Indians into a new people—proper Spaniards.

Foucault unwittingly articulates the goals of the mission when he describes the machinery of power that provides foundation for the regime of discipline and punishment when he writes:

The human body was entering a machinery of power that exploits it, breaks it down and rearranges it... it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus, discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, “docile” bodies.⁹

⁶ Ibid, 44

⁷ Ibid, 43

⁸ Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 138

⁹ Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 95

The Spanish strove to create docile bodies. To convince the Indigenous People to do as they prescribed to “work their own fields, etc...” but equally important, to operate in a “civil and rational style of living”¹⁰ as the Spanish wished. Many of the institutions of modern life, schools, military organizations, and work practices employed such techniques of subjugation. Foucault noticed a shift in political practice from the display of power as spectacle, to the exercise of power through a gradual development of techniques of surveillance and documentation. The modern world’s reluctant acceptance of such limits on personal freedom may seem necessary and reasonable, but Native Peoples, unfamiliar with such controls, summarily rejected them. Informed with this understanding one can more easily anticipate the inevitable failure and abandonment of Texas Missions.

Almost a century later, the first Utah treaty attempted to achieve similar goals of assimilation. Article seven of the treaty required the Utes to reside on the treaty land and be “farmers upon it.” They were to “cease the roaming and rambling habits which have hitherto marked them as a people” and generally to “behave well” for if they did then the government would “take care of them.”¹¹ The implications were clear. Utes would remain confined within the boundaries of the reservation as set out in the treaty. Ute leaders and signatories to the treaty understood clearly that upholding the commitments of the treaty were essential to survival. The Utes strove to break down and rearrange their life ways and behave well. Ned Blackhawk in his book *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* notes that New Mexico’s Indian agent James S. Calhoun and others repeatedly found the Utes to behave very well and no one complained of their conduct. Blackhawk also referenced John Greiner the acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs who wrote of the Utes in 1852 as “the easiest managed of any Indians in the territory and with good treatment can always be relied upon.”¹²

It is this sort of confinement and systematic obedience that so concerned Foucault. It is deeply disturbing to see a people by all possible means transform themselves in response to forces largely beyond their control. The Utes as an act of free will pursued specific behaviors in their own best interest. They understood the larger system within which they operated and the benefits of disciplining themselves to behave in a manner perceived as compliant. The Utes reformed themselves, dramatically altering their Life Ways and native culture to conform to European-American expectations. Similar to the Spanish Missionaries hoped to attract Indians to the mission system European-Americans hoped the Indians would see the benefits of this new style of life and adopt it of their own free will. In much the same way, the superior utility of a copper pot was recognized and freely adopted in a previous age. However, while the benefits of a copper pot were clearly understood and translated seamlessly between cultures, the experience of the Utes and the Spanish mission system suffered fatally from fundamental and systematic miscommunication and lack

¹⁰ Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 138

¹¹ Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land*, 196

¹² *Ibid*, 196

of appreciation for the native people's valid life ways. The Utes policy of peaceful coexistence eventually gave way to disillusioned frustration, the treaty was abrogated, and the Utes abandoned diplomacy in favor of violence.¹³ Likewise the Spanish Missions of Texas were abandoned as failures.¹⁴

The depth of cultural misunderstanding is further revealed by Franciscans relentless desire to estrange Native men and women from their traditional work roles to more closely resemble the patterns of work recognized by Spanish society. They wanted to structure labor systems at the mission around clear divisions of gender that located men in the fields and women within the confines of mission living quarters. This ran counter to Native women's traditional role tending the fields, and men's preference for hunting and fishing. Missionaries seemed incapable of perceiving the validity of Indian labor choices. In much the same way that indigenous and European peoples interpreted the proper use of a copper kettle differently. Franciscans' maintained a vision of the sacred household as a man's domain where he protected his wives, daughters, sisters, and mother as property. The Franciscans ignored existing cultural norms. They demanded a system of confinement that explicitly defined the roles of all family members within the context of Spanish culture. The message was clear; women should be grinding grain and preparing meals in their homes. The Spanish designated women's traditional role of working in the field as properly men's work. However, unlike the copper kettle where Native Peoples recognized and understood the European interpretation of the object as a cooking implement, they largely rejected Spanish division of labor. The Spanish could not understand Native Peoples traditional gender roles. Franciscans tried to use the day to day functioning of the mission settlements to train Indians in patriarchal customs of family life, especially by directing Indian men to assume their proper place as head of household. Spanish officials encouraged the adoption of new labor routines and transmission of these habits to their sons in accordance with divine law and patriarchal custom. Captain Juan Valdez describes the promise not only to cultivate their lands but also to "teach their sons to do the same" in order to "obey the law of God."¹⁵ Again we see possibly earnest attempts to remake the native peoples in an image of the good Spaniard. That is, better living through Hispanization.¹⁶

Examples of fundamental misunderstanding between Native Peoples and Europeans abound. Alexandra Harmon begins her excellent history *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities around Puget Sound* with descriptions of early interactions between the native people of the Pacific Northwest and English Fur Traders referred to as "King George men."¹⁷ These early interactions characterize the essential nature of bilateral cultural understanding and the importance of what anthropologist Marshall Sahlins calls a

¹³ Ibid, 197

¹⁴ Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, 158

¹⁵ Ibid, 138

¹⁶ Ibid, 120

¹⁷ Harmon, *Indians in the Making*, 10

culture's "structures of significance."¹⁸ Harmon believes the Natives in Klallam territory and the King George men did not share the same structures of significance. She offers as an example the guesswork and improvisation required by both King George men and Natives upon the opening of Fort Langley, on the Fraser River, in what is now British Columbia, Canada. The English fortified the outpost signaling to the locals that they were here to stay and able to defend themselves. It therefore confuses the English when after initially peaceful relations violence escalated. The English assumed that their canons spoke the language of universal force that was readily discernable by the Indians. However, Harmon points out that this interpretation "rested on an erroneous assumption that Indians shared and understood their conception of power."¹⁹ All involved drew on concepts and patterns they regarded as common sense; but they did not draw on the same concepts and associations.²⁰ While the English thought their exhibition of force was undeniable, the Natives acknowledged King George men's advantage in certain circumstances, while never doubting that in other equally important contexts the balance of power would turn in their favor. A critical distinction to note is the indigenous people focused on individual relationships rather than power wielding institutions or national groups. Harmon noted, "much as children deciding who goes first know that the sign for rock beats the sign for scissors but scissors beats paper and paper beats rock" an individual's effectiveness varies depending on the specific circumstances.²¹ Native peoples were willing to concede some power to the English, but reserved other domains for their own superiority and that overall the relationship was one of equality.

This relativity in a system of differences is expressed by Joseph Rouse in his essay *Power/Knowledge* when he summarizes Foucault's idea as the practice of "normalizing judgment"²² as the construction of norms in a specific domain. This process results in the emergence of a population arrayed on a spectrum of possible values without reducing the individual to the average. A benign example from modern life that illustrates this concept is the emergence of blood pressure as an indicator for measuring health. When a large sample of individuals has their blood pressures measured, a spectrum of possible blood pressures emerges. While each individual retains their individual blood pressure, new value judgments are possible when measuring the results against the norm defined by the population. Now everyone's individual blood pressure is located specifically on a range of possible blood pressures from low to high. A system of differences emerges and everyone is expected to operate within a normal range.²³ In the case of Blood pressure, this information is very useful in anticipating and overcoming diseases. Other systems of differences are less useful. In early nineteenth century Klallam culture Harmon notes, the most highly esteemed people were

¹⁸ Ibid, 20

¹⁹ Ibid, 20

²⁰ Ibid, 20

²¹ Ibid, 22

²² Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 98

²³ Heyes, *Self transformations*, 15

those “able to promote peaceful relations, amass wealth, and enhance others welfare.”²⁴ These priorities took precedent over martial prowess and native peoples were attracted to English outposts because of the opportunities found there. For Foucault the set of norms defines the people and from this definition, a population emerged.²⁵

This process explains how individuals can begin to identify themselves (and be identified by others) as part of a group that had never previously existed. The recognition of this group and membership in the group is equally important to the members who are identified as belonging to the group and those who (through behaviors inconsistent with normative standards) are classified as outside the group as the intellectual “other.” Harmon offers the testament of a South Puget Sound man born in the 1840 whose term for white people derived from the word for “left off” in his dialect as in “something lacking.”²⁶ This example is particularly illustrative because it implies that Native peoples were responsible for defining their own group and they felt more-whole-than and superior-to whites. The process of becoming Indian as a discrete and monolithic group is a substantial development of the interrelations between native and European peoples. A major theme of Harmon’s book is the changing and dynamic nature of tribe affiliation prior to contact with the King George men and Bostons. She is challenged by the term Indian and concludes, “There is no evidence that indigenous peoples around Puget Sound had a single name for themselves until they or their offspring accepted the name Indian.”²⁷

Native people’s fluid sense of identity may seem odd to our western sensibility, but it is central to Foucault’s understanding of power. He was suspect of contemporary Western political thought’s preoccupation with the question of defining power in relation to political sovereignty and moral legitimacy. Rouse describes how for Foucault power is not something that is “acquired, seized or shared, something one holds on to or allows to slip away”²⁸ or that power is “employed through net-like organizations”²⁹ it is rather “social alignment” Rouse invokes Thomas Wartenburg to explain:

A field of social agents can constitute an alignment in regard to a social agent if and only if first of all their actions in regard to that agent are coordinated in a specific manor. To be an alignment, however, the coordinated practices of these social agents need to be comprehensive enough that the social agent facing the alignment encounters that alignment as having control over certain things that she might either need or desire... The concept of social alignment thus must provide a way of understanding the “field” that constitutes a situated power relationship as a power relationship.³⁰

²⁴ Harmon, *Indians in the Making*, 24

²⁵ Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 98

²⁶ Harmon, *Indians in the Making*, 40

²⁷ *Ibid*, 9

²⁸ Gutting, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, 94

²⁹ *Ibid*, 94

³⁰ *Ibid*, 105

Shifts in these dynamics created new Power/Knowledge structures that result in a waxing or waning of certain group's power based on their relative position within the new dynamic. Native American History is littered with examples of peoples who were caught up in the endless process of these ever-shifting power structures.

Claudio Saunt's book *Black, White, and Indian* illustrates many of these shifting dynamics. It portrays a Creek Family living in the American South during the 19th century and serves as a fascinating case study in cultural adaptation, and transformative group identity based on power relationships. The family's patriarch, Robert Greirson, was a Scottish immigrant who moved to the creek nation in the seventeen eighties to participate in the deerskin trade. He personified the dual nature of European involvement in Indian society as both an unwelcomed outsider and an irresistible opportunity. Saunt expresses this complexity when he states, that just like the copper pots they sold traders were also "purveyors of social change." He goes on to explain, "by reshaping the economy and transforming the demand for labor, each good traded had significant social repercussions."³¹ Robert settled in present day Alabama near the town of Halabie in the heart of the Creek Nation. He married Sinnugee, a Creek woman, and was adopted into the community. Over the next twenty years, the couple raised a family of eight children as members of the Creek Nation. The origins of this family illustrate the cultural dynamism of late eighteenth century America. In the span of only one-generation a family originating from very different cultural backgrounds was able to make a life that set the Grayson Family off on a track of ongoing cultural transformation that played out over the next one hundred years. Through this autobiography we learn that some family members, such as George's grandmother Katy, lived as white, holding slaves and prospering while other relatives rejected white habits and were "scarcely better off than some slaves."³² Like measurement of one's blood pressure against a standard, individuals who conformed to the cultural norms were rewarded and those who deviated were reformed or rejected. Measurement against these norms dramatically influences one's circumstances in society. Saunt shows ways in which the colonial economy rewarded households who organized themselves based on patriarchal, nuclear families. He states, "The more closely Creeks conformed to this model of social organization, the better they fared economically."³³

By the mid-nineteenth century therefore, Creek families organized along more traditionally native lines lived in poverty, while patriarchal families were better off.³⁴ Some family members were poor because they chose to live in traditional ways, while others prospered because they conformed to the new European social norms. A flexible combination of blood and behavior therefore defined economic and cultural success in nineteenth century American. Creeks could aspire to be affluent by adopting a style of life that appeared white or they could descend the social hierarchy possibly into black slavery for deviating from this norm. For

³¹ Saunt, *Black, White, and Indian*, 15

³² *Ibid*, 80

³³ *Ibid*. 147

³⁴ *Ibid*. 147

some it was even possible to achieve this identity transformation daily. Saunt presents the experience of Chester Adams who recalled as a child “when I went to the store with my black cousins we sat in the segregated section. When I went with my white cousins we sat in the white section but when I went alone I sat wherever I wanted.”³⁵

The Dawes Commission of 1893 brought the shifting nature of the Grayson Family and Creek identity into sharp relief. In a manor similar to the earlier attempts by Spanish missionaries, a new round of cultural engineering began. The Dawes Commission strove to implement European desires (now in the form of the United States Government representing European-American interests) to reform Indian behavior to conform to expected norms. The commission, initiated by President Cleveland, intended to absorb the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole into the United States when previously they had been exempt from the policies of allotment. The commission needed to identify exactly who was a member of the tribe in order to assign allotments. Once allotted, the commission was to reform every Indian home. In terms that echo the desires of the Spanish of an earlier age former-Senator, Henry L. Dawes said, “until the wife shall sit by her hearthstone clothed in the habiliments of true womanhood and the husband shall stand sentinel at the threshold panoplied in the armor of a self-supporting citizen of the United States.”³⁶

What had been a relatively fluid process of tribal membership with individuals moving in and out of the tribal nation and up or down the class structure was reduced to a static list base on one criteria—inclusion on the roll. The Role was a listing of members in The Creek Nation. The United States government and the Creeks consulted two rolls to define membership in the Nation; one listing individuals who were Creek by blood and the other listing former slaves. Like one’s blood pressure, each individual was measurement on this criterion and judged either normal (on the role) or abnormal (not on the role). In a disciplined and ordered society, it was just that simple. For some, demonstrating membership was straightforward, those who appeared on the 1890 and 1895 rolls as Creek citizens were enrolled by blood. Others, who appeared on the 1869 Dunn Roll of ex-slaves, were enrolled as freedmen. However, many did not neatly conform to either of these two rolls. Foucault would notice how well this example illustrates his recognition of the modern social trends towards documentation as a means of control. Everyone is measured on this criterion and then compared against the norm. There can be no more simple measurement or tyrannical conformance to a norm. Each individual is either on the list or not. Those who do not conform to the standard are defined as “other”, just like the King George men more than two centuries before. The situation devolved to the ridiculous when the commission assumed the authority to remove names from the roles by simply cutting them physically from the list with scissor.³⁷ Saunt describes how documentation, the authority of the state,

³⁵ Ibid, 110

³⁶ Ibid, 153

³⁷ Ibid, 155

and the mechanical act of scissors cutting paper in this case serve as the final arbiter of one's essential nature as Creek.

Saunt's description of the Grayson family's story serves as a microcosm of the larger history of Native Peoples as they negotiated the shifting economic, political, and social circumstances of a new and changing world. Saunt demonstrates how Grayson family members succeeded in direct relation to the degree they conformed to White European standards of behavior. This conformity causes Saunt to conclude for the Creeks, "Survival demanded the strength not only to walk the trail of tears but also to disown family members, disenfranchise relatives and deny the past."³⁸ All native peoples made difficult choices, from among undesirable options, based on limited or incorrect information, in order to survive. These facts are disturbing, but Foucault's ideas may help disentangle the truth and myth of a complex history and illuminate something more of our shared past.

³⁸ Ibid 215

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