

The Chico Historian

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David Wysocki & Bryce Havens

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Note from the Editors

The Chico Historian has now reached its seventeenth edition and remains a wonderful opportunity for history students to seize control of their education and get involved in the field they study. The collection of papers submitted for this publication of the *Historian* includes work from graduate and undergraduate students and is intended for academics or non-academics. There are no set topics needed to publish and we have once again received outstanding papers from the history students here at California State University, Chico.

I would personally like to thank, first and foremost, Bryce Havens for his outstanding work and for really bull-heading this project despite his commitments outside of the *Historian*. Bryce doubles as President of Phi Alpha Theta and has continually donated tiring quality time molding this publication from basic editing to formatting. Everything in this issue has been touched by Bryce in some form and co-editing with him has been a great experience.

Secondly, but equally as important, is Phi Alpha Theta advisor, Dr. Stephen E. Lewis. Dr. Lewis is extremely active with student groups on campus and, from what I hear, some faculty groups as well. Dr. Lewis has been the “guiding light” for Bryce and I in this project and has built a reputation, whether intentional or not, as an honest professional willing to do what he can to help out students. Without his perseverance this publication would have sputtered, at best. On the same note, all of us who worked on the *Historian* would like to thank Dr. Judy Raftery for her aid in recovering many of the papers that appear in this edition. We would also like to give many thanks to an anonymous donor who mysteriously appeared in the eleventh hour to fund this edition’s publication.

Lastly, but definitely not least valuable, were, of course, the authors that have submitted work to us. Again, we have a wide variety of paper topics and we are very proud of the work they have done. History is not easy to write and its importance in the consciousness of society is truly invaluable.

This issue had every reason to be scrapped because of the behind the scenes drama that unfolded, but we still were able to put out a quality work. I hope you not only enjoy it, but also consider submitting a paper yourself for the eighteenth edition or beyond. As Mark Twain said, “It is not best that we should all think alike; it is a difference of opinion that makes horse races.” A diversity of thought and interpretation brings us to a greater understanding and hopefully a greater sense of being. While your reading experience may not be this Zen, anything close would be fine by me.

Co-editor,
David J. Wysocki

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About the authors

Jesse Pluim: Jesse is a double major in History and German. He is currently studying in Stuttgart, Germany. After graduating from Chico State upon his return to California, he plans on attending graduate school at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Bryce Havens: Bryce is a senior and will graduate in fall 2007. He will begin his graduate studies in Chico State's MA program in history. He is the current president of Phi Alpha Theta. His interests are modern European History and he plans on pursuing a Ph. D.

Abigail Nelson-Miller: Abi is majoring in Spanish and Latin American Studies. She has studied in Madrid and in Mérida, Mexico. She will graduate in May 2008 and plans to pursue an MA degree in Latin American Studies.

Dillon Carroll: Dillon is in his first semester of graduate studies in Chico State's MA History program. He is an avid sports fan and played volleyball for Chico State. He is primarily interested in U.S. History.

Steven Kanavel: Steven is an International Relations major. He and three other Chico State students traveled to Chiapas, Mexico, at the end of 2005 to stay in a Zapatista community and observe the launch of the Zapatistas' Other Campaign on New Year's Day with other delegates from the Mexico Solidarity Network. After graduating from CSU, Chico, he plans to take a short break from school and then attend graduate school.

Drew Traulsen: Drew is a husband, father, graduate student, and cool vegetarian guy. His research interests are youth culture, music, film, art, and any number of things most historians deem insignificant.

Annelle Reed: Annelle's paper is part of a larger research project on the development of national identity through the study of several themes and events in 19th century Chilean history. For her Master's thesis in interdisciplinary studies, Annelle undertook archival research in the National Archives in Santiago, Chile and at the Bancroft Library at UC Berkeley in 2006. She completed her thesis, "Imagining Chile: Describing, Promoting and Mapping a New Nation, 1850-1884" in Spring 2007.

Brian Eckert: Brian is a Master's student in History at Chico State. His areas of historical interest include 20th century U.S. foreign policy, Latin American history, and World War II. He intends to become a History instructor at a junior or community college in the future.

Ending U.S. Isolationism: Historians Debate the Intentions of the Roosevelt Corollary

Jesse Plum

In 1904, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt issued a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which claimed to authorize U.S. intervention in Latin American nations. While the United States sought hegemony in the Western Hemisphere through the Platt Amendment and the Roosevelt Corollary, it achieved its status as world power in a state of unconsciousness. The empires of old Europe were waning. The rise of nationalism in the imperial peripheries led to political instability and the eventual abdication of local governments either through revolution or mandate. Until the rise of the Soviet Union, the United States was the only country poised to alleviate the dependency between peripheral nations and their former metropolises. Historians debate what Roosevelt actually sought to achieve through Caribbean intervention.

Scholarly contention arises in assigning primacy to the significance of European incursions in the Caribbean, the U.S. desire for hegemony, the expansion of commercial markets, and the extension of Rooseveltian ideology. The navies of European creditors assaulted the coasts of indebted Caribbean nations, demanding repayment for defaulted loans. Indigenous political instability threatened U.S. capital and citizens in the Caribbean. U.S. political hegemony would ensure political stability and secure U.S. interests. The beginning of the twentieth century was also the first time that the United States had a surplus of capital, which facilitated and necessitated an expansion of commercial markets. Furthermore, Roosevelt rhetorically propounded responsibility and just recompense and he sought to instill these values in Caribbean governments. By juxtaposing analyses, one can determine how historians rank the importance of certain factors after considering common source materials.

Historians disagree on the significance of European incursion into Latin America as a stimulus for the Roosevelt Corollary. Howard K. Beale in Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power argues that the Roosevelt Corollary was a reaction to German aggression in the Caribbean—primarily Venezuela.¹ Germany—along with Britain, France, and Italy—had issued exorbitant loans, on which impoverished Caribbean countries defaulted.² This was the case with Venezuela. On December 10, 1902, after sinking several Venezuelan gunboats, a joint Anglo-German-Italian force joined landed troops at La Guayra and proceeded to bombard Puerto Cabello.³

¹Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore, 1956), 394-96.

² *Ibid.*, p. 396.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

On December 20, the Anglo-German Navy imposed a blockade, during which the German navy bombarded Venezuelan territory. The United States and Venezuela advocated arbitration from the onset of this military operation. In February 1903, the abatement of the blockade proceeded and by May arbitration had begun at the Hague Tribunal.⁴

Beale contends that if European creditors were to use similar stratagems to elicit repayment elsewhere in the Caribbean, they would damage U.S. ideological, political, and economic interests irrevocably.⁵ European military operations threatened U.S. citizens and capital. U.S. tolerance of European intrusion amounted to U.S. approbation, consequently undermining U.S. political legitimacy in Caribbean nations. Thus, Beale concludes, the Roosevelt Corollary hindered European influence to maintain U.S. supremacy in the Caribbean. Furthermore, this was the president's intent, constituting a major policy success.

Richard H. Collin in Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean essentially agrees with Beale that the Roosevelt Corollary was a justified reaction to European intervention in the governments of sovereign Caribbean nations. He contends that European creditors, following a purposeful strategy, subjugated Latin American countries through loans and demands for disproportionate recompense. He portrays the Roosevelt Corollary as an altruistic shield protecting indebted Latin American countries from their European creditors. Collin cites Roosevelt as saying of the \$22 million in European debt, "\$18 million is more or less recognized."⁶ He propounds that lack of intervention would affirm exorbitant and illegitimate debts.⁷ He posits that the Roosevelt Corollary was intended to facilitate arbitration of debt, thus ensuring the sovereignty of Latin American nations and the safety of U.S. citizens in the Caribbean. This required the United States to mollify European influence and increase its own hegemony.

Dana G. Munro in Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 agrees that substituting arbitration of debt for military coercion was a motivation of the Roosevelt Corollary. He provides support for his thesis with the 1904 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.⁸ In 1904, the politically unstable Dominican Republic owed \$1.7 million to Italian, French, and Belgian creditors. The projected revenue for the next year totaled only \$1.85 million, with \$900,000 in arrears on promised payments and \$1.3 million for the operating cost of the

4 Ibid., pp. 397-99.

5 Ibid., p. 431.

6 Richard H. Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1990), 424-25, 556.

7 Ibid., p. 425.

8 Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (Princeton, NJ, 1964), 100.

government. Without U.S. intervention and arbitration, the Dominican Republic's default on European loans would have been irrevocable. The United States arbitrated a monthly indemnity of \$37,500 with security committed through the custom revenue of the nation's north shore ports.⁹ Even though the Dominican Republic still defaulted on its loans, the arbitration that Roosevelt mandated temporarily placated European creditors and avoided a repetition of the Venezuelan crisis.

Walter LaFeber in The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations adamantly disagrees with Beale, Munro, and Collin concerning European aspirations in the Caribbean. He contends that "U.S. Minister William F. Powell and other North Americans" conjured up the European threat to gain support for the annexation of the Dominican Republic.¹⁰ LaFeber maintains that European commercial encroachment in Latin America was a prominent factor that prompted the enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary. The \$20 million in U.S. commercial investments¹¹ compelled U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, rather than the threat of European incursion.¹²

David Healy in Drive to Hegemony cautiously agrees with Beale, Munro, and Collin. He suggests that Roosevelt exaggerated European—predominantly German—machinations to garner support for his 1904 reelection.¹³ Healy concedes that the possibility of German expansion in the Caribbean mitigated U.S. activity. However, German intentions were myopic and their lack of a surplus naval force prevented serious operations in Latin America.¹⁴ Roosevelt, playing upon anti-German sentiment, incited a public desire to inhibit German aspirations in the Caribbean. Public support justified United States intervention into strictly non-U.S. affairs between Germany and financially delinquent nations.

Conversely, Collin examines the Roosevelt Corollary from solely a Latin American perspective without giving much credence to U.S. politics in the European theater. The European section of his bibliographical essay discusses entirely secondary sources and is underdeveloped in comparison with Latin American references. This limits Collin's perception of the complexities of European penetration. For example, he often refers to creditor nations as "European creditors" in

9 Ibid., pp. 96-96.

10 Walter LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Relations*, Vol. II: *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (New York, 1993), 197.

11 About \$6.5 million of this total was in sugar production.

12 LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Relations*, pp. 197-98.

13 David Healy, *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917* (Madison, WI, 1988), 108.

14 Ibid., pp. 99, 276-277.

his analysis of the establishment of a customs receivership in the Dominican Republic.¹⁵ He creates a monolithic perception of the European creditor and does not establish ancillary European interests in the Dominican Republic to any significant extent. Through his analysis, Collin, portrays Caribbean hegemony as a power struggle between the United States and a monolithic Europe.

The differences between Beale and Collin are attributable to the scope of each study. Beale's account interprets the early Roosevelt presidency in a global context. He devotes significantly more attention to European and U.S. affairs in the South Pacific and East Asia than to the Caribbean. He applies his Pacific paradigm of analysis to the Caribbean, often citing examples of South Pacific imperial management in his Caribbean discourse. Consequently, Beale does not take into account the differences in how the public viewed distant Pacific colonialism and imperialism in the American "back yard."

LaFeber's dissent is attributable to his imperial theory. One surmises that LaFeber views political and military hegemony and commercial exploitation as mutually inclusive. Imperial prerogative, from LaFeber's perspective, was committed to perpetuating commercial expansion. His attention to the corporation as a burgeoning global factor and its impact on foreign policy advances an economic perspective not found in Beale, Munro, or Collin. Unlike Beale, LaFeber does not endorse European or U.S. prestige as a factor in defending and expanding empire. This weakens his analysis of German aspirations in the Caribbean in respect to Germany's desire to recognize itself as a global power. Germany's imperial conquest did not start until the latter half of the nineteenth century, after France, Britain, Spain, and Belgium had long established the bulk of their empires. If one were to suggest that the Roosevelt Corollary was a reaction to German military movements in the Caribbean, one must explore the visages of German recalcitrance through an examination of its ultimate economic, strategic, and political goals. One cannot categorically dismiss manifestations of culture—U.S. altruism or European prestige—or the expansion of commercial expansion as forces motivating imperialism.

Historians concede the preponderance of the goal of hegemony as a motive dictating U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean during the Roosevelt presidency. They disagree about the specific ends the United States sought and to what degree the Roosevelt Corollary cultivated hegemony. David Healy contends that the main objective of the Roosevelt Corollary was to ensure the security of U.S. lives and property in Latin America. He contends that the United States promoted regional

¹⁵ Collin, Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean, pp. 95-111.

hegemony to maintain regional security effectively.¹⁶ The Roosevelt Corollary was allegedly enunciated as a suppressive machination directed towards at the political turmoil common in Latin American nations at the turn of the century. He also contends that the policy statement prescribed peaceful (in the Dominican Republic), as well as forceful (in Cuba), intervention to maintain U.S. prerogative in Latin America.¹⁷ The method of intervention depended on the level of acquiescence to U.S. demands. Conformation to the will of the United States affirmed U.S. superiority in territories where it intervened.

Collin and Munro essentially agree that intervention under the Roosevelt Corollary was altruistic. Collin asserts that U.S. intervention was to circumscribe the machinations of despots—as was the case in the Venezuela crisis during the reign of Cipriano Castro.¹⁸ Collin cites a message from Roosevelt to Secretary of State John Hay as evidence: "It will show those Dagos will have to behave decently."¹⁹ Munro elaborates on U.S. altruism, describing U.S. sincerity in implementing the Roosevelt Corollary. He contends that Roosevelt anticipated Latin American opposition to intervention and "enlisted the cooperation of Mexico in order to avoid suspicion that would have been aroused by unilateral U.S. incursion."²⁰ The United States utilized existing influence with a third party to bolster its hegemony.

Beale argues that the Roosevelt Corollary was an example of Roosevelt's global strategy to establish the United States as a world hegemon.²¹ The circumscription of European powers, he posits, in confluence with imperial prerogative resulted in U.S. status as an empire comparable to that of European metropolises.²² The differences between Beale, Munro, Collin, and Healy are the consequence of their divergent interpretations of U.S. hegemonic aspirations. Healy maintains that Roosevelt usually sought hegemony where the United States had investments. Collin and Munro argue that Roosevelt pursued hegemony only in the Western Hemisphere, while Beale maintains that Roosevelt aspired to develop the United States into a global metropole.

Commercial exploitation as a purpose of the Roosevelt Corollary polarizes many historians. Historians do not doubt that the William H. Taft and Woodrow Wilson administrations actively sought expanded U.S. markets in Latin America. The debate is whether Roosevelt had similar

16 Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, p. 109.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 108-9, 144.

18 Quoted in Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean*, p. 410.

19 Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean*, pp. 411-13.

20 Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, p. 532.

21 Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 451-52.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 452, 457-58.

motives of commercial expansion. U.S. foreign policy during the Roosevelt administration, LaFeber argues, was “aimed at the creation of opportunity (as in Panama and the Russo-Japanese war), or the maintenance and expansion of opportunity (as in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Mexico).”²³ He posits that U.S. policy was to exploit the markets of colonized nations and not, as Munro and Colin suggest, to promote regional stability and bolster democracy.²⁴ However, the United States did not hesitate to intervene if democratically elected officials threatened U.S. economic and political interests.

LaFeber maintains that historians have greatly exaggerated Roosevelt’s reputation as a trustbuster. The Roosevelt Corollary, he argues, protected U.S. commercial interests abroad—most notably those of U.S. Steel and American Sugar Refining.²⁵ Quoting Secretary of State Elihu Root from a 1904 address, LaFeber underlines his point:

With North America for the first time accumulating ‘a surplus of capital beyond the requirements of internal development . . . that surplus increasing with extraordinary rapidity,’ there have opened ‘great opportunities for peaceful commercial and industrial expansion to the south’.³⁶

Healy elaborates on LaFeber’s model. He argues that hegemony and commercial exploitation were autocatalytic. Established regional U.S. hegemony protected U.S. commercial interests and economic expansion asserted regional authority.²⁷ Healy emphasizes Roosevelt’s utilization of U.S. forces to prevent Colombian troop movement into the Panamanian isthmus, which was the primary, inter-oceanic transit route. Columbian control would have impeded the transport of goods to Pacific markets, necessitating a perilous voyage around the southern tip of South America. In regard to the Panamanian incident, Healy writes, the U.S. “course had rested at the bottom on bullying, and virtually all of the Latin America saw it that way.”²⁸

Beale, Collin, and Munro unwaveringly dismiss LaFeber’s economic interpretation. Beale posits that two expansionist ideologies existed: one sought power and the other urged commercial expansion. He argues that Roosevelt embraced the former. The latter, during the Taft administration, practiced, but abused, commercial applications of the Roosevelt Corollary.²⁹ Beale contends that Roosevelt was interested more in power than economic exploitation. Roosevelt “was

23 LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Relations*, p. 184.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 183-84.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 185-87.

36 Quoted in LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Relations*, p. 200.

27 Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, p. 268.

28 *Ibid.*, pp. 89-91.

29 Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 449-51.

intrigued with power, with the problems of power, and the rivalries for power,” he writes, “In this, too, he was prophetic.”³⁰

Munro concurs with Beale. He insists that utilization of the Roosevelt Corollary to affect U.S. commercial interests under the Taft and Wilson administrations tainted the beneficent intentions of Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Elihu Root.³¹ Munro accuses historians who interpret the Roosevelt Corollary as a machination to expand commerce of abject presentism. He contends that certain historians wrote at a time when they perceived government policy as unprincipled and “must be explained by economic considerations.” According to Munro:

Anti-imperialist authors . . . found enough in the story of dollar diplomacy to convince them their assumption was correct. One still hears it said that the marines were sent to the Caribbean ‘to collect debts’, an idea that seems somewhat incongruous when one reflects that it was Woodrow Wilson who ordered more important interventions.³²

One infers that Munro is indicting the works of LaFeber and others of the revisionist school. Munro’s, Beale’s, and Collin’s indictments of LaFeber’s interpretation are weak. They categorically dismiss LaFeber’s claims without refuting his evidence. One alleges that the economic model of expansionism is flawed; yet, LaFeber presents substantial evidence that Munro’s, Beale’s, or Collin’s studies do not mention. One cannot conclude that the Roosevelt Corollary and the contemporaneous superfluity of U.S. capital were mutually exclusive, as Beale presumes. Conversely, one cannot assume that they were synonymous. LaFeber equates the maturation of U.S. power with the expansion of commerce and the maintenance of a corporate-dominated status quo.³³ Based on LaFeber’s estimation, capitalist governments are appendages of monolithic, myopic, and unprincipled commercial interests. LaFeber’s parochial analysis fails to take into account Roosevelt’s determination to perpetuate and cultivate power on a hemispheric and global scale.

Roosevelt acknowledged the economic benefit of his corollary, but considered it ancillary to hegemonic augmentation. Healy provides a useful paradigm in determining the economic intentions of Roosevelt. He dispels the concept of a magnanimous Roosevelt. Roosevelt viewed commercial expansion as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, as LaFeber posits. Roosevelt did not seek economic expansion for the sake of commercial prosperity; he desired hegemony and was not opposed to utilizing economic means to achieve it.

30 Ibid., p. 449.

31 Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 530-31.

32 Ibid., p. 531.

33 LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Relations*, pp. 183-84.

Historians dispute the nature of Roosevelt's expansionist ideology, although they concede it was a prime antecedent of the Roosevelt Corollary. In the wake of the Venezuelan crisis and in the shadow of an impending Dominican crisis, Collin argues, Roosevelt issued his famous corollary as a manifesto of American responsibility to intervene in the name of justice and Latin American responsibility to recompense European creditors.³⁴ He stresses that fulfilling this obligation, as Roosevelt considered it, fostered peace and order. "Roosevelt," Collin writes, "argued that making an arrangement to ensure the payment of just debts was better than going to war to protest incidents of gunboat diplomacy."³⁵ Beale concurs; Roosevelt's desire to foster qualities that he considered "manly in person and essential for the greatness of a nation" dictated his foreign policy. Those qualities were, Beale continues, "honesty, moral responsibility, courage, duty, willingness to struggle, liberty, and being civilized."³⁶

LaFeber staunchly disagrees. He maintains that Roosevelt's notions of race partially dictated the Roosevelt Corollary. According to LaFeber, Roosevelt's racism drew upon two sources. The first was Roosevelt's interpretation of Lamarckism, which states that a scion inherits acquired traits of a progenitor. Lamarckism stressed that gradual change in an environment could improve a race. LaFeber asserts, that a "Tory such as Roosevelt demanded slow change, and he also believed in a strong role for individual will." The second source was Roosevelt's reading of American history, particularly U.S. westward movement. LaFeber contends that Roosevelt viewed the U.S. West as "a mere hunting ground for savages." He then quotes Roosevelt:

I don't go so far as to think that the only good Indians are dead Indians, but I believe nine out of every ten are, and I shouldn't like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.³⁷

In LaFeber's estimation, Roosevelt absolved any qualms he had about corporate expansion in his precepts of "proper" civilization.

Beale and Munro concede that while the younger Roosevelt may have been a racist, his racial ideology as a factor in foreign policy was secondary to his drive for power.³⁸ Collin claims that the adult Roosevelt was not a racist, but rather a captive of contemporary confusion concerning racial theory. He maintains that Roosevelt had to appeal to the Southern, white constituency to win reelection in 1904. Privately, however, he "railed against their racial mores." In terms of racial

34 Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean*, pp. 410, 434.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 435.

36 Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt*, pp. 77-79.

37 LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Relations*, pp. 189.

38 Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 65-66; Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 54.

politics, Collin contends and one agrees, Roosevelt acted as a pragmatic politician and not a crusader.

Roosevelt was undoubtedly an expansionist. This begs the question of whether Roosevelt's philosophy anteceded his expansionism. Or, on the other hand, did Roosevelt justify expansionism with notions of a "superior" and "inferior" race? The evidence suggests the latter. The Roosevelt Corollary was not an extension of racial ideology. Rather, Roosevelt justified his corollary as a beneficent act of a "civilized" nation bestowing moral and political enlightenment upon "backward" nations. Roosevelt's 1904 presidential campaign is a likely source of his rhetoric and moral self-aggrandizement. Collin illustrates his moral flexibility when appealing to constituencies. Thirty-eight years after the end of the civil war, social relationships with African-Americans had not changed much in the South. During his 1904 presidential campaign, Roosevelt eschewed his affiliation with Booker T. Washington to appeal to essential Southern states.

One must also consider the American embrace of the concept of masculinity at the turn of the century as a factor explaining the enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary. Throughout the nineteenth century, the rugged individualists of the westward movement epitomized this belief. By 1900, the West was tamed; the Southern Pacific Railroad had codified a transportation network extending to all continental U.S. territories. The death of the "cowboy" allegedly had created crisis of masculinity. Roosevelt's frontier upbringing, progressive ideology, and fascination with power exemplified the new, modern man. Furthermore, Roosevelt advanced and maintained his mystique whenever he could. Often cited by Munro, Collin, Beale, LaFeber, and Healy, Roosevelt's exaggeration of his political and personal accomplishments is indicative of this. In addition, the plethora of correspondence espousing precepts of an expansionist paradigm constituted the perpetuation of neo-masculine axioms. These axioms include the glorification of necessary force (as evident in his "big stick" diplomacy) and preponderance of individual responsibility. The Roosevelt Corollary in fact was a venue for application and not a product of Roosevelt's alleged racist ideology.

One surmises that the Roosevelt corollary mandated justification for United States to intervene in the affairs of Latin American countries and this itself constituted hegemony. Nations that accepted the possibility of U.S. intervention and acquiesced to U.S. demands inevitably surrendered some degree of their sovereignty. The extent of their acquiescence to U.S. demands determined the degree of abdicated sovereignty. The Roosevelt Corollary was an affirmation of a U.S. will to intervene whether for economic—as LaFeber posits—or strategic interests—as Beale

argues. The fear or expectation of capricious U.S. intrusion strengthened American authority in the collective consciousness of government cadres who accepted the United States as a superior nation.

In conclusion, the objectives of the Roosevelt Corollary were multiple. Roosevelt sought hemispheric hegemony to maintain Caribbean security for U.S. interests. Always the pragmatist, Roosevelt would abate his moral paradigm to perpetuate U.S. hegemony and security. Roosevelt neither endorsed nor opposed the commercial exploitation and market expansion. Economic benefits were ancillary, though clearly participatory, in the diffusion of hegemony. Political hegemony suffused *de jure* dominion, while economic hegemony strengthened *de facto* authority.

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The Perfect Model: Butte County Agricultural Production, 1895

Bryce Havens

Agricultural production in Butte County, California in the year 1895 represents a model example of California agriculture during the late Nineteenth century. California agriculture, at the time, was characterized by an overall decline in wheat production, a dramatic shift to specialty crop production, and an increasing reliance on mechanized farm equipment. Butte County served as a premier example of these dramatic transitions in California agricultural history.

The purpose of this paper is to present a general history of the 1895 harvest in Butte County, paying special attention to some of its more decisive aspects. These included the shift from grain crop to specialty crop production, the mechanization of agriculture, the role of the railroads, labor relations between Whites and Chinese, and the life of Butte County farm hands. These issues, among others, are what made Butte County agriculture an exemplary model in California.

In order to better understand Butte County agriculture in 1895, it is important to first understand the origins of California agriculture. When California became a United States territory in 1848, crop raising farms were scarce. Large-scale cattle ranches dotted the land as part of the legacy of Mexican control of California. As historian Gilbert Fite said in his work *The Farmers' Frontier*, "There were only 872 farms in the entire state when the first census of agriculture was taken in 1850."¹ The discovery of gold in 1849 at Sutter's Mill would forever change the role of agriculture in California. Thousands of people seeking to make their fortunes flooded into the state. While some would succeed, most did not and the one thing that all the "Forty Niners" had in common was the need to eat. It soon became evident that "there was more profit to be made in raising high-priced grain, vegetables, fruits, and livestock" than mining for gold.²

During the Gold Rush, the number of farms increased from 872 in 1850 to 18,716 by 1860, while the population skyrocketed from an estimated 26,000 in 1849 to 380,015 in 1860.³ Many of these farms were built in and around California's fertile Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys. Together, these rich lands encompassed 11,500,000 acres.⁴

Many of the people who came to California during the Gold Rush were from the Midwest, an area much different in climate and geography than California. California's Mediterranean climate,

¹Gilbert C. Fite, *The Farmers' Frontier, 1865-1900* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 156.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., 157; Lawrence J. Jelinek, *Harvest Empire: A History of California Agriculture* (San Francisco: Boyd and Fraser Publishing Company, 1979), 23.

⁴Fite, *The Farmers' Frontier*, 157.

characterized by hot and dry summers, and followed by cold and wet winters, is what allowed for such a unique diversity of crops to be produced. First, however, the Midwest farmers had to adapt their methods to fit these distinct features. These lands would soon be producing the tens of millions of bushels of wheat and other crops that propelled California's farming industry onto the world stage.⁵

Throughout the late 1850s, 1860s and into the 1870s, the full potential of agricultural production in California was realized. Once farmers learned how to adapt to the unique climate, production of cereal crops, especially wheat, which was California's primary crop, took off. In what has been labeled the "Bonanza Wheat Era," California produced enough wheat to sustain itself and began to export an enormous surplus. In 1870, California farmers grew an estimated 16,657,000 bushels of wheat. By 1890, that number had more than doubled to 40,870,000 bushels.⁶ Historian Rodman Paul's study of the wheat trade between California and Great Britain shows that California shipped much of its surplus wheat to the Liverpool market. In fact, eighty percent of California's wheat exports went to Liverpool in 1867. Due to its superior quality, and the fact that much of Great Britain and Western Europe had suffered from several years of poor harvests, the wheat sold at top dollar.⁷

California's "bonanza" wheat era came to an end with the close of the Nineteenth century when wheat production slowly began to decline. This was due to a variety of reasons, chief among them was that the cost of solely producing wheat became unprofitable, and farmers were making the slow transition to specialty crop production.

Wheat became less profitable in part because of the labor costs. Economists Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode said that due to the "scarcity of labor in California" wages were on average "70 percent above those prevailing in the Midwest."⁸ According to economist Jim Gerber, the average wage for a farm laborer in San Francisco was \$32 a month in 1860, compared to a laborer in New York who received \$13.19 a month.⁹ The cost of transporting wheat also led to the decline in production. Rodman Paul describes wheat as a "bulky and low-paying commodity" that was too expensive to

⁵Ibid., 158-159.

⁶Jelinek, *Harvest Empire*, 40.

⁷Rodman W. Paul, "The Wheat Trade Between California and the United Kingdom," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 45, no. 3 (1958): 391-396.

⁸Alan L. Olmstead and Paul Rhode, "An Overview of California Agricultural Mechanization," *Agricultural History* 62, no. 3 (1988): 93.

⁹Jim Gerber, "The Origin of California's Export Surplus in Cereals," *Agricultural History* 67, no. 4 (1993): 43.

ship by railroad for the average farmer.¹⁰ In the end, it simply became impractical to solely rely on wheat for revenue. This ultimately led to a shift from wheat to specialty crop production.

As early as the 1850s, specialty crops such as fruits and vegetables were grown in California. When the profits of wheat production began to slip, farmers began to subsidize their income by producing other crops. California's soil was able to support a myriad of specialty crops such as grapes for wine production, apples, peaches, plums, nectarines, pears, apricots, and oranges. Crops such as these were expensive to produce but they fetched good market prices. Midwest and East coast farmers could not produce the variety of fruits that California farmers could, and such fruits were shipped by rail from west to east. These fruits were also economically viable because of the ability to can or dry them, so that they would not spoil in transport. By 1900, California made approximately \$35 million in wine and fruit income and was producing 95 percent of the nation's peaches and nectarines.¹¹

In order to better understand just how important Butte County was to California agriculture, before exploring the harvest year of 1895, one only need look at the numbers reported from the 1890 Census.¹²

Table 1 (Figures in Bushels)	<i>Total Wheat Production</i>	<i>Total Barley Production</i>
United States	468,373,968	78,332,976
California	40,869,337	17,548,386
Butte County	2,963,597	491,199

Table 2 (Figures in Bushels)	<i>Apples</i>	<i>Apricots</i>	<i>Cherries</i>	<i>Peaches</i>	<i>Pears</i>	<i>Plums</i>
California	1,654,636	970,941	154,063	1,691,019	577,444	1,202,573
Butte County	56,511	6,847	7,097	73,570	26,140	27,148

<i>Table 3</i>	Number of Farms	Between 100-500 Acres
California	52,894	24,531
Butte County	1,186	642

¹⁰Paul, "Wheat Trade Between California and the United Kingdom," 392.

¹¹Fite, *The Farmer's Frontier*, 159-161; Jelinek, *Harvest Empire*, 49.

¹²United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of the Census, *Report on the Statistics of Agriculture at the Eleventh Census of the United States* (Washington D.C.: 1891): 6, 8, 124, 358, 502.

With the above information in mind, it is now time to focus this study on Butte County, California in 1895. Butte County provides the perfect model for a case study of California agriculture at the end of the Nineteenth century. It followed the footsteps of its mother state to become one of California's most prosperous counties.

The Butte County harvest year of 1895 began late in 1894 when the winter rains began to fall in November. Although the rainfall (which was much needed by the farmers to saturate the soil and provide for easy plowing and planting of crops) started lightly, it soon hit Butte County by force. As reported in the *Chico Weekly Chronicle-Record* on 8 December 1894, "The rain has not been as heavy as was hoped for but...the farmers are fairly well contented."¹³ The next week, a large storm hit the Sacramento Valley in what was described as the largest storm "since the fall of '49 or the spring '50." An article from the *Sacramento Bee* stated the storm as "what our agricultural cousins call a dispensation from Heaven."¹⁴ However welcome this rainfall was, it might have been more than the farmers of Butte County wanted for a report in the paper said "The rainfall since yesterday morning in this vicinity has been of little benefit and will retard plowing for ten days or two weeks." The storm dropped a reported 1.08 inches of rain in a single day.¹⁵

By late December, the rainfall for the season was said to be at 12.37 inches compared to 7.71 the year prior. The rain continued and by late January the total rainfall was estimated to be at 26.06 inches.¹⁶ An article reported that both Little Chico Creek and Big Chico Creek flooded their banks. The streets of Chico and the farm of Emmons White were flooded on January 25 when the levee along Butte Creek broke. It was feared that "much of the grain will be destroyed" on White's farm.¹⁷ By March 30, the rainfall for the season was 30.29 inches, compared to 19.28 inches at the same time in 1894.¹⁸

Throughout the year, the weather remained tolerable and the colder weather of February, March, and April did little damage to the crops. Although there were various reports of some damage to the cherry and almond crops, the overall feeling reported was that "Jack Frost nipped a little...but the fruit is still doing nicely."¹⁹ The only report of damage to the wheat crop surprisingly came in

¹³*Chico Weekly Chronicle-Record*, 8 December 1894.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 15 December 1894.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 26 January 1895.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 30 March 1895.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 6 April 1895.

September when a heavy and very rare late summer rain unexpectedly hit Chico. September 1895 received 2.98 inches of rain compared to .40 inches in 1885. “The farmers have not stored all their grain yet,” announced the *Chronicle-Record*, “and that which is stacked in the fields will undoubtedly swell and burst the sacks.”²⁰

Although California’s winter was rather mild in 1895, parts of the Midwest suffered devastating crop failures due to their more harsh winters. Rural counties in Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Colorado suffered heavily. In true progressive style, Californians came to the rescue. The local paper reported “The California people, everywhere known for their generosity and humane impulses, will doubtless lend their aid in giving to the suffering of these sister states.”²¹

Just as California shifted to specialty crop production in the latter half of the Nineteenth century, so to did Butte County. The subject of diversified farming constantly showed up in local papers. An example of this can be seen in an article advising farmers to wean themselves from solely producing wheat. Under the headline “Wheat and Fruit” farmers were advised to “devote less of their land to wheat raising and more to fruit growing” because of the “present low price of wheat.” By starting a small orchard and adding to it little by little each year, the article reported that farmers “would soon have a fine orchard, and the returns from it would certainly pay them a better interest...than they could hope for by raising grain exclusively.”²² An article reprinted from the *Oroville Register* advised all farmers of the Sacramento Valley to meet and discuss what crops should be grown. It stated, “If the farmer is prosperous all partake of his affluence. If he is poor and in debt the whole population suffers with him.”²³ The nature of these articles shows just how important farming was in Butte County and California.

John Bidwell and his Rancho Chico serve as the best example of a diversified farm in Butte County. Although the 22,214 acres of land that encompassed Rancho Chico was vastly larger than the average Butte County farm, Bidwell’s ranch optimized diversified farming. In 1895, Bidwell had 6,500 acres of wheat that produced “an average of thirty-seven bushels” per acre.²⁴ In 1894, Rancho Chico had a diversified orchard that included 39,700 peach trees, 13,800 almond trees,

²⁰Ibid., 14 September 1895.

²¹Ibid., 5 January 1895.

²²Ibid., 8 December 1894.

²³Ibid., 22 December 1894.

²⁴Michael J. Gillis and Michael F. Magliari, *John Bidwell and California: The Life and Writings of a Pioneer, 1841-1900* (Spokane: Arthur H. Clark Company, 2004), 135.

6,300 apricot trees, 5,600 pear trees, and 4,100 plum trees. His ranch also included other smaller numbers of apple, cherry, orange, olive, and fig trees.²⁵

The other major transition that California made in the late Nineteenth century was an increasing reliance on mechanized farm equipment. Whereas harvesting grain by hand took approximately sixty hours per acre, the “machine methods of 1900, including the use of combined harvesters, cut the time to less than 3 hours in California.”²⁶ Use of mechanized machinery such as tractors and combined harvesters and threshers began during the bonanza wheat era on the large wheat ranches, but did not become widely used until the 1880s and 1890s. Although the huge combines, which were pulled by teams of sixteen to twenty horses and could cut and thresh thirty-five to forty acres a day, were not practical for small farms, other machinery was available to use.²⁷

Butte county farmers were quick to adapt to the use of mechanized farm equipment. Frequent ads appeared in local Butte County papers that promoted such equipment. One such ad, under the headline “Farmers, Orchardists, and Gardners Take Notice!” said, “When you want a wagon, buggy, cart, harness or anything in the machinery line...up to a steam engine, call on J.A. Dunn.”²⁸ Another such add, also by J.A. Dunn, listed such items for sale as gangplows, cultivators, mowers, and wheat cleaners.²⁹ The use of steam-powered combines was even prevalent in Butte County. An article on “Modern Harvesting” boasted of the “Buck Bros’ steam combined harvester” that was in use on the farm of one Joseph Entler of Chico. This combine was described as “a river boat glide over the field at the rate of about three miles an hour, cutting and threshing seventy acres of grain per day.”³⁰ Lastly, there was an exhibition that traveled around Butte County showing off the “Van Duzen Gasoline Tractor” which could be used to haul harvesters or plows.³¹

Another central issue to both California and Butte County agriculture was the role of the railroads. In his study of the Southern Pacific Railroad and the transportation rates of river going steamships, historian Michael Magliari concludes that the monopolistic control of the railroad companies gave rise to a strong Populist movement in California. As he says, “Farmers had many grievances against railroads, but their loudest and most frequent complaints centered on high freight

²⁵Ibid., 141.

²⁶Olmstead and Rhode, “Overview of California Agricultural Mechanization,” 87, 89.

²⁷Fite, *The Farmers’ Frontier*, 172-173.

²⁸*Chico Weekly Chronicle-Record*, 30 March 1895.

²⁹Ibid., 2 March 1895.

³⁰Ibid., 3 August 1895.

³¹Ibid.

rates.”³² Populism grew in the areas strongly controlled by the Southern Pacific where there was no competition for transportation of goods. But, in areas such as Butte County, where there was competition from steamships that traveled up and down the Sacramento River, Populism failed to take root.³³

Butte County farmers were certainly not fans of the Southern Pacific Railroad, as is evident in several newspaper articles. One such article said, “With the feeling of enmity that now exists against the Southern Pacific.... All that can be [sic] reasonably be asked by the shippers, is that the railroad company carries products on such rates as will leave a reasonable revenue for the railroad company beyond expenses. The farmers demand this condition.”³⁴

Despite the articles that called for lower shipping rates, a surprising article appeared calling for Chico to “become a terminal point on the Southern Pacific Railroad.”³⁵ This was argued for because these “terminal points” received a reduced shipping rate. The article stated that terminal points received the same tariff “on merchandise shipped from the East...for the same cost as can San Francisco Merchants.” It would appear that Chico and perhaps Butte County wanted to have its cake and be able to eat it to.

Despite all the business concerning the railroads, steamships continued to travel the Sacramento River and transported much of Butte County’s grain and fruit. Steamships left from San Francisco on Mondays and Fridays and it took them four days to reach Chico.³⁶ According to one newspaper article, “The rates are much cheaper than by railroad. During the past two months the freight business to Chico Landing, from San Francisco has been very heavy.” Most of the material being shipped downstream was “heavy exports of wheat.”³⁷

Another example of how Butte County followed the path of California during this time can be seen in the nature of the farm laborers. Richard S. Street’s scholarly work on the “coarse culture of California wheat harvesters and threshers” gives a brilliant portrayal of these men. Street describes the men who worked in the fields as “unemployed common laborers from the cities, as well as young men from various communities throughout the state.”³⁸ Thousands of workers were

³²Michael Magliari, “Populism, Steamboats, and the Octopus: Transportation Rates and Monopoly in California’s Wheat Regions, 1890-1896,” *Pacific Historical Review* 58, no. 4 (1989): 451.

³³*Ibid.*, 457-461.

³⁴*Chico Weekly Chronicle-Record*, 9 March 1895.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 6 April 1895.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 27 July 1895.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Richard S. Street, “Tattered Shirts and Ragged Pants: Accommodation, Protest, and the Coarse Culture of California Wheat Harvesters and Threshers, 1866-1900,” *Pacific Historical Review* 67, no. 4 (1998): 578.

needed to help with the harvest and anyone could get a job working on a farm. Forty percent of these men were “native-born Americans” while the rest consisted of European immigrants, Mexicans, Chinese, Portuguese, Italians, and Chileans. These harvesters and threshers worked long hours of back breaking and dangerous labor in the dusty and scorching hot days of the summer harvest.³⁹

The men developed a unique culture characterized by “anger, hostility, profligacy, debauchery, intemperance, [and] disregard for law.”⁴⁰ Violence was quite common among the harvesters and they “Certainly killed one another at an alarming rate.”⁴¹ Part of this violence was due to “interracial hatred.” This sad state of affairs can be seen in Butte County. In an article headlined “It was Murder,” a Swede named Nelson shot and killed a “Chinaman” with a shotgun. Nelson confronted a group of three Chinese and accused them of stealing his overalls. When the men told him that they had not taken his overalls, Nelson became enraged and “discharged his gun at one of them standing close to him, almost disemboweling him.”⁴² This incident happened on Beall’s ranch in Oroville.

Examples such as this were not only evident in the violence among wheat harvesters, but in the bitter hostility between Whites and Chinese in general. The local papers frequently covered labor issues in Butte County. Labor, whether it be on farms, in restaurants, or in hotels, was desperately sought after. Approximately 700 “Mongolian laborers” worked in Chico alone. One article concluded that the money made by Chinese laborers was “nearly” all sent back to China, whereas that money, had it been paid to White men would be spent in the community.⁴³

The only thing left to discuss now is the harvest of 1895. The grain harvested in 1895 is best described in a single article found in the *Chico Weekly Chronicle-Record* from 20 July. Wheat and Barley production was “decidedly short” as the headline read. According to the article, the heavier than average rainfall (and heavy winds), once welcomed as a “dispensation from Heaven” caused “a terrible injury to the crops in Northern California.” The yield of wheat and barley in Northern California was “50 per cent of that expected” and “50 per cent of the usual yield.” Butte County wheat yielded between “three to five sacks to the acre” where in prior years the wheat yields was between “eight to fifteen sacks.” The price of “No. 1 shipping wheat” was between “75 and 76

³⁹Ibid., 580-583

⁴⁰Ibid., 574.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²*Chico Weekly Chronicle-Record*, 23 March 1895.

⁴³Ibid., 20 July 1895.

cents.” The Barley yield was “no more than three sacks to the acre” when the average was six. The article dimly reported “A great many farmers will not be able to pay their costs this year on account of the poor crops.”⁴⁴

The total number of crops produced in Butte County in 1895 was not mentioned in the newspaper but some articles give an idea. In early April, Butte County had produced “9100 tons” of wheat between the cities of Chico, Durham, Nelson, Silsby, Nord, Cana, and Biggs.⁴⁵ The fruit production was also lower than normal. The yield of cherries on Rancho Chico was sixty tons compared to 300 in 1894.⁴⁶ This article mentioned that Rancho Chico “produces approximately 4,000,000 pounds of green peaches” although it did not say what the yield was in 1895. Other numbers given were 130,000 pounds of apricots and 150,000 pounds of prunes, though these are yields from Rancho Chico in 1894.⁴⁷

Even though the harvest for 1895 in both cereal crops and fruit was lower than expected, Butte County continued to be a major player in California agricultural production. The Census of 1900 has these yields listed for Butte County:⁴⁸

Table 1 (Figures in Bushels)	<i>Total Wheat Production</i>	<i>Total Barley Production</i>
California	36,534,407	25,149,335
Butte County	1,893,807	585,290

Table 2 (Figures in Bushels)	<i>Apples</i>	<i>Apricots</i>	<i>Cherries</i>	<i>Peaches</i>	<i>Pears</i>	<i>Plums</i>
California	3,488,208	2,547,064	318,960	8,563,427	1,912,825	5,632,036
Butte County	28,523	55,842	2,471	522,586	85,293	152,357

The total amount of wheat produced in California in 1895 was 40,097,798 bushels, while the total amount of Barley was 19,023,678 bushels. California exported 28,870,560 bushels of wheat in

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., 13 April 1895.

⁴⁶Ibid., 3 August 1895.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of the Census, *Report on the Statistics of Agriculture at the Twelfth Census of the United States*. (Washington D.C.: 1900): 155, 624-625.

1895.⁴⁹ Of all the grain produced in and exported from California in 1895, it can safely be assumed that a decent (although unknown) portion of it came from Butte County.

Despite the fact that the harvest of 1895 did not yield the predicted amount of cereals and fruits, Butte County can and should be seen as a model county in the state of California. It followed remarkably well the path taken by the state of California. This is evident in its growth in specialty crop production, mechanization of farming equipment, views towards the railroad companies, labor relations between Whites and Chinese, and in the culture and unique life of California wheat harvesters and threshers. Although time has altered this model, Butte County continues to play an important role in the life of California agriculture.

⁴⁹United States Department of Agriculture, *Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1895*, (Washington D.C.: 1896): 526, 528-529.

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The Testimonio in an Historical Context

Abigail Miller

The *testimonio* is a relatively new phenomenon which, although having been continually discussed for two or three decades now, still today has yet to be defined and definitively placed into a specific genre. Among other things, when it has been discussed, theorists ask whether or not it is literature, autobiography, journalism, postmodern, Marxist, socio-literature, etc. Another question to ask though is, what relevance do *testimonios* have and what role do they play in the study of history, if any at all? To attempt to answer this question this essay will give a brief definition of what a *testimonio* is, and compare the *testimonios* of three Central Americans (Rigoberta Menchú of Guatemala, Omar Cabezas of Nicaragua, and María Teresa Tula of El Salvador) with the history of their specific countries and the time periods of which they are the product.

In his article, “Anatomía del testimonio,” John Beverley describes in detail this phenomenon. According to Beverley, a *testimonio* is a nonfiction, personal narrative in which one person (or at times a collective of people) tells of an event in their life, a section of their life or their whole life up until the present. The story is recounted in first person and the protagonist is the person recounting the events (like one would do in an autobiography). Even though *testimonios* are nonfiction one has to remember that they are creations of human memory, so there may be little discrepancies, but for the most part they are factual. While *testimonios* can be produced by the witness him/herself, many times it involves a professional second party that records, transcribes and edits the oral narration of the witness (in this way it does not require that the witness be literate).

Testimonios reflect the experience of historically excluded or marginalized peoples; they give name and voice to an otherwise anonymous population (Beverley 15). In *testimonios* the witnesses speak of “a lived experience of repression, poverty, exploitation, marginalization, crime, [or] struggle” (Beverley 9), and generally imply a need for social change. Even though the *testimonio* is presented in first person, it is not an autobiography; the experiences that the witness/author gives testimony to reflect the experiences of their whole community. Since the *testimonio* is a nonfiction work and it describes the experiences of a whole community, one can speculate that it could be used in the study of history. The following three examples will help to affirm this speculation.

In Guatemala, a country in which sixty percent of the population is indigenous, there was a thirty-six year revolutionary civil war that spanned from 1954-1990. As a result of this war 200,000 people were disappeared and/or were killed, the majority of whom were indigenous. This conflict

began in 1954 with the U.S.-backed overthrow of the legally elected Arbenz government, imposing the first of many military leaders, Colonel Castillo Armas.

Once Castillo Armas came into power he disbanded and declared all things seemingly pro-revolutionary illegal. Among these things were land reform, labor laws, literacy programs, pro-revolutionary organizations and political parties, all of which “were deemed ‘pro-communist indoctrination’” (Jonas 269). Included in this ‘anti-communist’ trend was intense repression of every person who was even suspected of having pro-revolutionary ideals. During this period the distribution of wealth grew horribly unbalanced; the poor grew poorer while the rich constantly accumulated more wealth and land. Malnutrition became commonplace for many indigenous and poor ladinos, and Castillo Armas was only the beginning.

After Castillo Armas the Guatemalan military regimes not only continued but also grew in size, power and repression for the next thirty years. According to Jonas, the military became a “literal ‘killing machine,’” and employed the use of death squads who by the end of the conflict were responsible “for over 40 percent of the total [civilian disappearances] for all Latin America” (272). In the government there was no hope for change; the military kept itself in power through military coups, fraudulent elections, and military control over civilian leaders until 1990.

After going into exile, in 1985 Rigoberta Menchú (with the help of Elizabeth Burgos-Debray) published her now world famous *testimonio: Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia*. Menchú is a Maya woman who grew up in the area of Quiché in the western highlands of Guatemala, and who up until about three years before publishing her *testimonio* only spoke a few words of Spanish. In her *testimonio* she explains a great deal of the Mayan culture and customs and also recounts the story of her family, community, and more specifically the life of an indigenous woman in Guatemala during this time period. She focuses on her culture and the prejudices that they encounter, their utter poverty, exploitative working conditions, her political activity, and the death of her family.

Everyone assumed that everything she had written in her *testimonio* was completely truthful, and therefore could be used as an alternative way to see and study the Guatemalan conflict, until a young anthropologist named David Stoll went to Guatemala and conducted his own investigation. There, through talking to other people he found out that not everything she had written in her *testimonio* was completely accurate, and ended up bringing his findings and doubts to light in his book, *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*.

Stoll's book questions the veracity of Menchú's *testimonio*, and therefore also questions its historical relevance. In his article, "Tarnished Laureate," Larry Rohter delineates some of Stoll's doubts: the death of her brothers Nicolás and Petrocinio, her father's land dispute, and whether or not Menchú received schooling (58-65). These arguments started an international debate about Menchú's *testimonio*, many times leading to her story being discredited, but one must not forget that Stoll's arguments also have to be checked for veracity, especially keeping in mind the definition of a *testimonio*.

In her *testimonio*, Menchú (198-207) states that her brother Petrocinio was tortured and burned alive with a group of other young people and that their family and the whole community was forced to watch in September of 1979. Stoll argues that this did not happen, and that Menchú was not there to watch it. Menchú agrees that she was not there, but that she believes that this was the fate of her brother, and since his body has never been recovered (he was disappeared) there is no proof that this was not his fate. Also, as Allen Carey-Webb explains in his article, "Teaching, Testimony, and Truth," "independent human rights records do record the public burning of indigenous people by the army in Chajul at roughly the same period" (322), and in the following year there was a "massacre at the Spanish embassy, in which Guatemalan security forces burned alive over three dozen indigenous protesters" (Jonas 274).

Menchú describes the death of her other brother Nicolás (59-63). She says that while she and her mother were working, her younger brother Nicolás, who was two years old at the time, became very sick, and after fifteen days died of malnutrition. Stoll argues however that this did not happen and that her brother Nicolás is alive and well. In response to this Menchú explains that she had two different brothers named Nicolás, and that it was the first that had died in the fields. If one does not consider her word credible enough, they can look into Guatemalan history where it blatantly states that "illiteracy was widespread, malnutrition universal, hunger frequent, disease rampant, living rudimentary and life short" (Handy 205). Even if she made up this little brother as Stoll suggests, this would not have been an uncommon event.

As for Stoll's argument about Menchú's father and his land disputes, Menchú explains that they believed the Ladinos had bought the land from other indigenous people and were using the Quiche names on the paperwork (Carey-Webb 323). It is also important to point out though that the land disputes Menchú discusses in her *testimonio* are very probable considering that even before 1970, "2 percent of the population controlled 67 percent of the arable land" (Jonas 270). This

proportion, of large quantities of land in few hands, only grew through the 1970s—meaning that land was being taken away from the peasants and indigenous populations.

The last argument that Stoll makes is that in spite of the fact that Menchú claims to never have received formal education, in fact she attended “prestigious private boarding schools” (Rohter 59). Menchú counters though, explaining that she purposefully omitted any information about the school for its own safety and that the scholarships she had received to attend the school only permitted her to take three hours of class a day, “and the rest of her time was spent cleaning the school as a servant” (Carey-Webb 323).

In his arguments, Stoll seems to forget one main defining point of a *testimonio*; a *testimonio* is not an autobiography but rather reflects a whole community. Menchú explicitly tries to make this clear in the first paragraph of her *testimonio*: “quiero hacer un enfoque que no soy la única, pues ha vivido mucha gente y es la vida de todos” (Burgos and Menchú 21). This is an important piece of information because even if these specific situations did not happen directly to Menchú or to her family, historically it is known that these same situations occurred in the poor and/or indigenous communities of Guatemala.

With regard to Menchú’s *testimonio*, it is easy to answer the original question, as to what relevance *testimonios* play in the study of history, considering that Stoll has gone through the trouble of looking for historical faults in it. If the reader of Menchú’s testimony remembers that it is not an autobiography and that what she is describing is not just her life but rather the life of many common poor Guatemalans during the 1960s-1980s, then yes her *testimonio* can be used to study Guatemala’s history, though the reader will need some supplemental information to see the whole picture. With regard to the other *testimonios* that have not been studied in depth by anthropologists, can they be used in the study of history?

Nicaragua’s revolutionary conflict was long and drawn-out like that of Guatemala but the main difference between the two is that Nicaragua’s revolution was successful. Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in Central America and has felt for many years the very strong hand of the United States.

The United States had for many years supported oppressive authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua which ultimately brought about popular struggle. This struggle started in the 1920s under Augusto César Sandino. After six years of struggle their leader Sandino was killed, Anastasio Somoza came into power, and the movement was forced into the mountains to continue

as a guerrilla war. “At the hands of Anastasio Somoza’s National Guard (1934), most of Sandino’s followers were soon killed by the U.S. trained National Guard” (Prevost and Vanden 531).

Anastasio was the first of three Somozas who controlled Nicaragua for 43 years in an “increasingly repressive family dictatorship” (Prevost and Vanden 531). During the beginning of their dictatorships the guerrilla movement continued quietly but it was not until the assassination of Anastasio (1956) that the movement started again at full force. In 1961 the guerrilla movement formally became the FSLN, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional. Their goal was to mobilize the population, mostly focusing on the peasants in the countryside, while fighting off the National Guard’s heavy repression.

Under Anastasio Jr., the third Somoza dictator, more and more of the population agreed with the Sandinistas. As shown in the aftermath of the 1972 earthquake that devastated Managua, in which Anastasio Jr. used the situation to further increase his personal wealth, his dictatorship was visibly corrupt and incompetent.

In the next seven years his National Guard “carried out [the] arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and murder of hundreds of peasants” (Prevost and Vanden 536) and increased its terror in the urban areas. These acts of terror only served to undermine his popular base until 1979 when he fled the country, giving victory to the Sandinistas.

In 1983 Omar Cabezas published his *testimonio*, *La montaña es algo más que una inmensa estepa verde* in Mexico. Cabezas, born in 1950, was a law student at the UNAN (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua) in León when in 1968 he was recruited into the FSLN by an old classmate. In his *testimonio* he describes his involvement in the FSLN: his political work on campus, in the neighborhood of Subtiava in León, and his experiences becoming a guerrilla fighter, training in the mountains and subsequent networking with the campesinos. His *testimonio* is that of a guerrilla who was for the most part not on the front lines but whose work was nonetheless vital to the movement.

In his *testimonio* Cabezas gives the reader a good idea as to what type of work was done in the universities, what life as a guerrilla fighter is like and how difficult winning campesino trust was, but he does not give a really good or detailed account of what was happening nationally during this time. The reader sees the movement the same way a guerrilla would, continually sacrificing for the movement while cut off from most communications. He mentions the important national events like the December 1974 FSLN take over of a high profile Somocista house in which the Sandinistas held everyone hostage in order to negotiate with Somoza, and he really shows the reader how this

was a movement that spanned across generations, but apart from this he offers very little in terms of the actual history of the times.

Cabeza's testimony, while it is a great read and gives a great insider's account of the life of a guerrilla, would not be a good candidate to explain the history of the Nicaraguan revolution. Comparing this *testimonio* with that of Menchú, in terms of deciding whether or not *testimonios* can be used in an historical context, one sees that it must be decided on a case-by-case basis. As for *La montaña...*, to be used in the study of history it would be better to read about the history first and use this (if at all) as a supplemental source.

The third *testimonio* that will be discussed here, *Este es mi testimonio: María Teresa Tula, luchadora por-derechos humanos de El Salvador* describes the Salvadoran conflict which began in the 1970s and escalated exponentially in the 1980s. During this time, like in Guatemala, there was continual and blatant electoral fraud mixed with a powerful, oppressive military. There was also very strong U.S. influence, exceeding that of Nicaragua.

Each new government during these two decades was increasingly oppressive of the left and those possibly aligned with the left, which only caused more polarization throughout the country. The government-run death squads committed their most famous and controversial assassination when they killed Archbishop Romero during mass in March of 1980. Romero was loved and respected by all of his parishioners and by many other Salvadorans. He actively fought and spoke out against human rights violations, and it is because of this that he was killed. During this same year the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional), a guerrilla movement, was founded (LaFeber 253).

The next ten years were tumultuous and the population was in a constant state of terror. The FMLN was not able to make as much ground as the FSLN had in Nicaragua because of the astonishing amount of aid that was being sent from the United States. President Ronald Reagan, in fear of another revolutionary victory like that in Nicaragua, continued sending aid to El Salvador, covering up all signs of human rights violations. In El Salvador, "the real power was held by the armed forces and their U.S. sponsors" (LaFeber 313) who during the 1980s gave El Salvador a total of three billion dollars, at an average of \$800,000 a day for the whole decade (LaFeber 354)

In 1991 the FMLN and the Salvadoran military and government agreed to a United Nations negotiated settlement and cease-fire. In this settlement the FMLN was given some political power; their "demands were to be institutionalized and accepted by [Alfredo] Cristiani," (LaFeber 358) the Salvadoran president. Once the numbers were tallied in the aftermath of this conflict, it came to

light that out of a population of five million, “at least 75,000 people [were] dead with another 1,000,000 displaced” (LaFeber 358).

In 1994 María Teresa Tula, in collaboration with Lynn Stephen, published her *testimonio* which describes her life and experiences in El Salvador. In her *testimonio* she gives an overview of all the life-changing events that she experienced starting with her birth in 1951 up until the cease-fire in 1991-1992.

Tula grew up with her grandmother and had her first baby at the age of fifteen. At seventeen she met the man who would become her husband and who would bring her, indirectly, into political activism, José Rafael Canales Guevara. After participating in a strike at the sugar factory where he worked he was sent to jail by the National Guard. During her visits she came into contact with some women working for CO-MADRES (Comité de Madres y Familiares de Presos, Desaparecidos y Asesinados Políticos de El Salvador) who invited her to their meetings.

She became heavily involved with CO-MADRES, actively working and fighting against the Salvadoran human rights violations. In describing her political activism she also describes her experiences with her husband who, once released from prison, did not want her to be an activist any longer. They had one eye-opening physical fight over this topic one night, after which with the intervention of the women from CO-MADRES, they managed to work things out. Tula says that, “all the women in CO-MADRES had problems at home, just like me” (Stephen and Tula 73), so she was in a place that understood her situation and could offer support. Along with giving her personal story in her *testimonio*, she keeps the reader informed as to who the political leader is at the time, and what is happening with the opposition.

In 1980 her husband was taken and killed and she had to hide because they came back looking for her too. In May of 1986 they succeeded in capturing her. They blindfolded her, interrogated her, tortured and raped her, and after a few days they let her go. Then not too long afterwards she was captured again, this time by the ‘Policía de Hacienda’ who tortured and interrogated her for five consecutive days and nights. After this they sent her to a woman’s prison where she stayed for two months until the president, forced by international pressure, let her out. In 1987 she left El Salvador for good, first to Mexico and later to the United States where after eight years the government awarded her political asylum.

In contrast to Cabezas and Menchú’s *testimonios*, Tula (and Stephen) actively gives her readers snippets of Salvadoran history throughout her *testimonio*. The reader can see this not just by reading the text but also by looking at its footnotes. The footnotes explain some of the

Salvadoran organizations, who some of the political characters were, what specific decrees permitted, and explain the final peace accords. Also the *testimonio* offers three supplemental chapters written by Kelley Ready and Lynn Stephen describing testimonial literature, Salvadoran women's organizations from 1970-1993, and the woman in El Salvador's economic history.

With all of these historical references Tula and Stephens create a text that can be considered vital to understanding the Salvadoran conflict. They give the reader an inside view of the conflict, from the woman's view, and from a human rights activist's view, none of which are reported in detail in general readings of history. This specific text could be the basis for learning about the Salvadoran conflict with very little supplemental information.

As seen in these three examples of *testimonios*, some, like Menchú's and Tula's, are perfectly relevant and can be useful in the study of history, while others, like Cabezas', can only be used as a type of optional supplement. *Testimonios* can be great additions to history because they offer alternative, insider views of what was going on during specific time periods in many countries around the world. Since each *testimonio* can focus on a wide range of topics and lengths of time, before deciding whether or not they would be relevant to the study of history, they have to be read and analyzed on a case-by-case basis to see what their contents are and to see if they match up with historical facts. Whoever does this analysis though must keep in mind what the parameters of a *testimonio* are, and remember that they are not autobiographies, but rather representative of whole groups of people.

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An American Teacher in the Philippines

Dillon Carroll

December 10th, 1898 marked the day that America legally took over the Philippines, serving them as a protectorate under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. The United States took the Philippines as a colony; promising instead of hegemonic rule, training for eventual self-government. To express American exceptionalism in the Pacific, the United States sent teachers over to the Philippines to educate them in the ways of the West and to prepare them for self-government. In 1904, a young man named Bruce Richardson went to the Philippines to do this such thing.

Once Richardson arrived in the Philippines, he began writing letters home to his parents in Butte County, California. Through these letters historians were able to see American views of the Filipino. Richardson was very critical of the Filipinos when he first arrived, but he soon developed fondness and admiration for them. Despite this fondness, he still never came to trust the Filipinos. However, Richardson's tenure in the Philippines lasted 35 years and resulted in his marriage to two Filipina women.

Less than a year after the Treaty of Paris was signed, the United States wanted to change control of the islands from military jurisdiction to a civilian government. This civilian government was called the Philippine Commission. The first Philippine Commission arrived in the Philippines in 1899, while the "Insurrection" was still in full scale. This first commission was headed by Jacob Gould Schurman of Cornell University who was charged by President McKinley to organize, "the most humane, pacific and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants."⁵⁰

The next year Schurman informed President McKinley that he could not continue with his job as president of the first commission, so McKinley drafted a second Philippine Commission to take over for Schurman. All of the members of the second Philippine Commission were American and were appointed by President McKinley in April of 1900.⁵¹ No Filipinos were yet involved in governing their own islands.

The Philippine Commission was the executive and the legislative; the military was the judiciary. They immediately began to promote to the American people and corporations to

⁵⁰J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, "Thirty Years of American Filipino Relations, 1899-1929" *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 8 (September 1929): 505.

⁵¹Ibid., 506.

immigrate to the now “pacified” Philippines. They promoted education by building schoolhouses and they created the Bureau of Education, therefore becoming the first colonial state to try to educate a conquered people. “The introduction of a compulsory system of public education was intended to be the cutting edge of the social and political revolution, the device that would make a difference between a literate oligarchy and an educated democracy.”⁵² Until the inauguration of William Taft as the first Governor-General of the Philippines on July 4th 1901⁵³, the commission was the executive and legislative. After Taft became Governor-General, the commission was forced to balance power with that position. But there still was no Filipino assembly.

Taft was received well by the natives. It is amazing how well he was received considering the power that the governor-general held. The governor-general was almost all powerful; the only governmental agency that could limit the power of the governor-general was the Philippine Commission. The governor-general had to consult the Philippine Commission on the appointment of officers and the execution of the law.⁵⁴ The power that was vested in the governor-general could be exploited when he declared a state of emergency; this state is defined in elastic terms: “He is granted extraordinary powers in case of rebellion or invasion, and, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the writ of habeas corpus to place the islands, or any part of them under martial law.”⁵⁵

It is interesting to note that upon Taft’s arrival in the Philippines he was not received well by the military, especially General Arthur MacArthur. MacArthur did not believe there was a need for a civilian government and thought that the Filipinos would need “bayonet treatment,” for at least a decade.⁵⁶ The civilian government that began to gradually assert their power over the Philippines following 1900 was supposed to set up a government that guaranteed constitutional rights to the Filipinos. The Philippine Commission, civil governor, and the United States were training the Filipinos for self-government, and, therefore, no Filipino who accepted the hegemony of the United States would be deprived of life, liberty, due process of the law, the right to a speedy trial, and

⁵²George E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1964): 65.

⁵³Bennett, “American Filipino Relations, 1899-1929”, 506.

⁵⁴Jose P. Melencio, “The Constitution of the Philippine Islands.” *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 3 (1921): 181.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 181.

⁵⁶Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951): 65.

private property.⁵⁷ However, Filipinos were not allowed to own firearms, or had the right to a trial by jury, nor did they achieve their independence until 1947.

When the so-called “Philippine Insurrection,” was in its closing phase in 1901, the civilian government of the Philippines began to promote education of the Filipinos by American teachers. This policy culminated with the arrival of the USS *Thomas* on the islands on August 21, 1901. Paul A. Kramer, explains, “The civilian government successfully promoted American teachers as its true representatives. Of all the icons of U.S. colonialism, there was none more vivid or long lived than the arrival of the USS *Thomas* to the islands on August 21, 1901.”⁵⁸

It could be argued that the arrival of the USS *Thomas* was perhaps one of the most significant events for the budding civilian government. It was the first phase in paving a bright future for American-Filipino relations. Even Chico’s local paper, the *Daily Record* recognized the event. “Educators for Philippines: Among the educators who are quite well known in Northern California and who will sail on the transport “Thomas” next Tuesday for the Philippines...Misses Clara Bennett and Bessie Taylor of Chico.”⁵⁹

The previous years had been punctuated with small victories for the U.S. military, such as the taking of Manila, but were also fraught with guerilla fighting. Most of the military leaders were astonished that the resistance lasted so long, and was embraced by so many Filipinos. After war broke out in February of 1899, many officials believed that the war would not last the year, perhaps ending by November. General Elwell S. Otis who was in command of the American forces in Manila, was instructed by McKinley to convince the Filipinos that the “United States was on a mission of benevolent assimilation.”⁶⁰ But fighting broke out in February of 1899, and Otis was instructed to pacify the rebellion. Otis assumed the fighting would not last long after the collapse of the Tagalog provinces. He was astonished when other groups such as the Ilokans, Pangasanese, and the Visayans all resisted American troops as vigorously as the Tagalog’s had.⁶¹

The still-forming civilian government had very little to celebrate since they still could not pacify the native population and convince them that they did want the best for the Filipinos. Then 509 American teachers arrive in the aforementioned ship, the USS *Thomas*. No colonial state had ever brought in educators to the population that they were simultaneously trying to subdue. Most of

⁵⁷Ibid., 64.

⁵⁸Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (North Carolina: the University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 168.

⁵⁹*Chico Daily Record*, 20 July 1901.

⁶⁰Grunder and Livezey, *The Philippines*, 53.

⁶¹Grunder and Livezey, *The Philippines*, 56.

the American civil government employees knew this, as did the passengers on the *Thomas* itself. Kramer tells us:

Importantly, the ship's arrival-made representative of the essence of Philippine-American relations-set the United States apart as a national-exceptional case, placing it above an abstract world of lesser empires. If reconcentration had made the United States seem dangerously like Spain and Great Britain, the teachers arriving on the *Thomas* would, some hoped, restore the fabric of U.S. national exceptionalism.⁶²

The *Thomas* arrived in the Philippines in 1901. Three years later, Bruce Richardson arrived in the Philippines. Bruce Richardson was born on April 22nd, 1880 and was the son of Pierce Chamberlain Richardson and Mary Jane Coon. Pierce Richardson was one of fourteen children and grew up in Indiana, Missouri and Iowa and finally in April of 1864, Pierce with his brother Jared V. Richardson left on the Overland Trail to California. Pierce purchased an area of land near Chico, California in 1871. Between 1871 and 1875 Pierce brought the rest of the Richardson family to the area he had purchased which came to be known as Mud Creek.⁶³ Mud Creek later became known as Richardson Springs. The Richardson family owned winter ranges in Grizzly Valley and Bruce Richardson inquired about Grizzly often in his early letters, to Chico from the Philippines in 1904 and 1905. "I suppose by this time you have brought the stock from the mountains. Will be glad when I get your letters telling of things happening about Grizzly."⁶⁴

Richardson arrived in Daet in 1904, which is on the Southeastern side of the island of Luzon, south of Manila, and east of Paracale. Richardson was immediately obsessed with witnessing a cockfight when he got to the Philippines. He wrote obsessively about cockfights back to his parents in his first few letters. It seems very strange that he wrote about such a condemned sport to his own parents. Perhaps cockfighting was so dazzling and strange that he wanted his parents to know about it.

I was intending going to see a cockfight this afternoon, but it has begun heavy raining. I guess I'll cut it out. Someday I'll go down, see one and describe, how it went off. That [cockfighting] is the natives' chief source of sport in the islands. It is a universal custom all over the entire archipelago."⁶⁵

Richardson is apparently subject to watching the participants walking to and from the cockfights, but he apparently never witnessed one. Perhaps Richardson did in fact witness one, if

⁶²Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 169.

⁶³Larry Richardson, "Northern California History: Richardson Springs," 15 March 1971, Special Collections, Meriam Library, CSU Chico.

⁶⁴Bruce Richardson, Philippine Islands, to P.C. Richardson, Butte County, 15 October 1904, letter in the hand of Bruce Richardson, Special Collections, Meriam Library, CSU Chico, Chico.

⁶⁵Ibid., 18 September 1904.

not many cockfights, but preferred to keep his parents' in the dark about it, fearing judgment or reprisal for attending such a reproachable event. Or perhaps he never did attend a cockfight, or he did and forgot to write about it. Either scenario, Richardson includes his own personal opinion on cockfighting and Filipinos, "You can then in a way imagine how bloodthirsty and cruel these people are."⁶⁶ He then continues in great detail, his witnessing of the events.

Great crowds assemble every Sunday out past our house a piece, and watch with much hollering and yelling, the bloody fights... Each Sunday I see pass the sports with their fighting cocks under their arms going to the cock-pit. And as sure as I see them going, I see them leaving. Some carrying dead and mangled birds, others carrying victors from the lucky pit.⁶⁷

Richardson very early in his tenure in the Philippines made his opinions of the Filipinos blatantly transparent. He has not had much interaction with the Filipinos, since he has just arrived in the Philippines, but very early in his letters, Richardson refers to the Filipinos as *bloodthirsty* and *cruel*, words that conjure images of savagery and barbarism. Even after referring to the Filipinos as *bloodthirsty* for participating in a cockfight, he says, "The rain will keep me from the cock-fight today. I intend to go so as to have something to write about next week. I have not ever witnessed one."⁶⁸ Richardson obviously absolves himself from reprisal with the sentence; *I have not ever witnessed one*. But his criticism and his hypocrisy are very clear. Richardson does not seem to condone the act of cockfighting, denouncing it as *bloodthirsty* and *cruel*, yet he still plans to witness a cockfight as soon as the weather will permit him.

One occurrence, which Richardson finds very cruel and peculiar, is the treatment of stray dogs by the natives of Daet. Richardson writes that the native people of the Philippine Islands are very heartless toward stray dogs, and will beat and stab and pour scalding water on them. To keep them away from food is the most likely cause of this action. There also may have been an abundance of stray dogs, so the only action was to limit the population. Perhaps in a psychological sense, these natives were taking out their frustration that came with the uneasiness of so many government shifts in the past decade. Or perhaps that is being far too critical of a very simple event. In any case, Richardson relates to us: "In other ways they satisfy this craving by throwing "bolo" knives or pouring hot water on stray dogs, of which every Filipino town is not meagerly supplied."⁶⁹

⁶⁶Bruce Richardson, 18 September 1904.

⁶⁷Ibid., 18 September 1904.

⁶⁸Ibid., 1 October 1904.

⁶⁹Bruce Richardson, 18 September 1904.

It is very interesting to note the two differences between the Filipino mind, and the American mind when dealing with this problem of stray dogs. The Filipino natives prefer to beat the dogs, throw knives at them, pour hot water on them; while Richardson and his American companions prefer to shoot the dogs that come around. Richardson denounces the behavior of beating these stray dogs as *cruel*, he then goes on to say that he has shot and killed up to twenty dogs since his arrival in Daet. “We shoot them [dogs] when they come sprawling around under our kitchen. All told we have killed about 20 since I have been here, and still they keep coming around though not quite so numerously.”⁷⁰

Richardson then continues in his description of the Filipino treatment of the problem of stray dogs in Daet. “It is different with a native though, he would rather scald or wound a dog than kill him outright. I heard a dog yelling the other day and looking up saw a woman punching a wounded and helpless dog with a long stick...leaving you with a part of the cruelty the most of these people are capable of and like to do.”⁷¹

Besides teaching his English class, of which Richardson rarely writes, he seems to have very little contact with the native population in the early years of his stay on the Philippine Islands. He most likely was unhappy teaching because he wrote so little about it. Perhaps his students were not learning as fast as he thought they should. The early contacts with Filipinos that Richardson does have seem to indicate the position of the Filipino people at the time. Richardson comes into contact with wealthy Filipino families who entertain him and seem to be trying to impress him. “Was out last Sunday to a big Filipino dinner. There was enough guests to make two tables of about ten each. I was at the home of our pupils, a young well to do girl of the school. There in their glory were all the nobility and upper crust of Daet...I sat between two Filipino ladies, with one on either side of me to tickle your elbows.”⁷²

Richardson also frequently comes into contact with his *muchacho*, or a boy who serves him and helps him with his needs. “We have to carry all our water from the river about 4 or 5 hundred yards. That is, of course our house “*muchacho*” (boy) does. A white man never does any work in an oriental country, so when I speak after this of my or our doing, this and that, it means always through the agency of servants.”⁷³ There must have been more positions that Filipinos were filling at the time, but his students’ families and domestic help are the circumstances in which Richardson

⁷⁰Ibid., 18 September 1904.

⁷¹Ibid., 18 September 1904.

⁷²Bruce Richardson, 15 October 1904.

⁷³Ibid., 7 November 1904.

makes contact with Filipinos in his earliest tenure of the Philippines Islands. Because the Filipinos seem to be doing a lot of work for visiting Americans, it is easy to imagine the growing tensions that might have existed between many Filipinos and Americans.

There is a particular facet of daily life that Richardson soon becomes involved in, injecting him into the life of the well-to-do Filipinos. That facet is dancing. This seems to be one of the most popular things to participate in while staying in the Philippines. Richardson himself admits to joining in on the festivities. Richardson dances on Sundays, which apparently still invoked some Puritan thought that Sunday should be held for worship and not for sports. "After dinner that Sunday afternoon in the Philippines we danced till five o'clock."⁷⁴

He speaks in great detail of the great joy he took in dancing with the Filipinas. In his early years of 1904 and 1905 he says that he participated in dancing because it was customary for him to do so. It most likely was customary for him to participate in dancing with the family that was entertaining him. But by 1907 Richardson speaks of the great joy he takes in dancing with the natives. He even seems to enjoy the company of the Filipinas, and holds them in higher esteem than most.

Now I danced and never once had a thought of it's being Sunday till the next day. You do these things because it is "custombre." And you do them without thinking...of course you could not get an American crowd to dance on Sunday, or hardly even extend a Saturday night ball till 12:05. But as I said before, over in this country you are doing things which you never once think would ever be done.⁷⁵

Richardson is a very well educated young man. He is easily able to distinguish and remarked the differences of culture between Americans and Filipinos. His statements, although sometimes prejudiced, cannot be judged by the reader because Richardson was operating with a very different worldview during his life. Racism towards Asians was accepted and often encouraged. But regardless of these attitudes, Richardson is still able to give insightful information about American-Filipino relations. He tells a story about how Puritan Americans can easily get caught up in dancing, with the story of an Oklahoma couple who arrived in the Philippines on the same boat as he. Richardson refers to them as Mr. and Mrs. Meeker. Mr. and Mrs. Meeker were religious and disapproved of dancing under any circumstances. But upon arriving in the Philippines they soon take up dancing with great joy. Richardson tells us:

⁷⁴Bruce Richardson, 11 February 1905.

⁷⁵Ibid., 11 February 1905.

They were good and excellent people, very sensible, and held right ideas. But always disapproved of dancing... Now they came to be stationed in a neighboring province and this is what a friend of mine wrote me today about the matter. 'Meeker and consort are in Boac, Mrs. is all the go. She has thrown prejudice to the winds, and is dancing to beat the band. Mr. also says he indulges occasionally.'⁷⁶

By early 1905 Bruce Richardson seemed to have adapted reasonably well to the Philippines. He began to take notice of the Filipina women and seemed to be interested in finding a mate. "But in the Philippine Islands I have found no dusky damsel yet that could ever own a coconut grove with me. And I say this with much more tolerance of their company than when I first arrived in the islands. Then I could not, but now I can call and talk with these people with considerable pleasure."⁷⁷

Bruce Richardson has begun to feel very comfortable in the Philippines. He has spent a fair amount of time with the Filipinos, and has begun to enjoy their company. The climate of the Philippines has not yet given him any problems, as it did many of the American soldiers during the Philippine-American War when malaria and dysentery were very common illnesses to Americans in the Philippines. "I don't know when I spent 9 months in a more equitable climate. I have not been ill a day, nor spent a sleepless night since I have been to Daet."⁷⁸

He enjoys the company of his colleagues in the Bureau of Education and in February he takes a vacation to the Banquet province of the Philippine Islands. It is here that Richardson comes into contact with the effects of the civilian government, namely the Philippine Commission. On January 1, 1903, Governor-General Taft declared the summer resort of the civilian government to be Baguio.⁷⁹ Baguio was chosen because of its cool weather, being in the Banquet Province and at a higher altitude than Manila. Construction began in 1903 to build a road from Manila to Baguio for the civilian government to be able to reach Baguio for the summer months. Governor-General Taft believed that if Americans and Europeans were going to come and live in the Philippines, they would need a place where the weather was more suitable. Four thousand workers were employed and the road was opened to traffic on March 27, 1905, the total cost being \$1,966,874.⁸⁰ The damage done to the Banquet road by the tropical rains prompted constant repairs by the

⁷⁶Bruce Richardson, 11 February 1905.

⁷⁷Ibid., 11 February 1905.

⁷⁸Ibid., 11 February 1905.

⁷⁹Charles Burke Elliot, *The Philippines: To the End of the Commission Government*. (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), 295.

⁸⁰Ibid., 296.

administration, (which by 1913 had amounted to \$2,754,281)⁸¹ but Governor-General Taft and Cameron Forbes completely embraced the project. In 1906, negotiations were made for a railroad leading to Baguio as well.

Richardson commented on the work the Commission had been doing on improving the Philippine infrastructure: “This place [Banquet province] is a kind of summer resort and has achieved much insular fame because of the famous Banquet railroad the Philippine Commission has been working at, and spending funds for so long a time.”⁸² But Richardson is not idealistic. He knew that not all governments are perfect and recognizes that the civilian government of the Philippines is flawed. “It is probably aired well in the anti-administration papers of the states. You perhaps have heard of it before. Some say the road is impracticable and only a ruse to spend the insular funds. Others say the Philippine Commission have spent so much money already on it, that they don’t like to give it up.”⁸³

Richardson, like many Americans in the Philippines, needed a few years to adjust and trust the natives. He spoke very differently of the natives from 1904 when he first arrived, to 1907 when he “breaks up his mess and moved into a healthy Filipino family.”⁸⁴ He had held semi-racists views of the Filipinos in his early tenure in Luzon, especially when he visited Bilibid prison on May 16 of 1905. Richardson noticed that there were white men imprisoned along with Filipinos and thought that it was a great humiliation for those white men. “For indeed it is quite a humiliation to be incarcerated in penitentiary with the little brown brothers, whom race prejudice, will never permit the white man to love, but little more than the negro.”⁸⁵

By April of 1907 Richardson seemed to be very familiar with Filipino the culture and ways and for the most part has begun to trust the Filipinos much more in fact, he seemed to be very fond of them. This is quite a difference from 1904 and 1905 when such words as *barbaric* and *cruel* were used when referring to Filipinos. He was still very fond of dancing in the Philippines, and it seems to be the place where Richardson interacted the most with the natives. Richardson wrote to his parents in 1907. “You can’t imagine how much fun one can have over here among these people. Though you went to a dance every night you would never lay your hand on a corseted back. I have done so only those times when I’ve attended the great functions.”⁸⁶ This is a very sensual remark,

⁸¹Ibid., 298.

⁸²Bruce Richardson, 11 February 1905.

⁸³Bruce Richardson, 11 February 1905.

⁸⁴Ibid., 9 April 1907.

⁸⁵Ibid., 16 May 1905.

⁸⁶Ibid., 9 April 1907.

in which Richardson says that the Filipino girls rarely wear undergarments under their dresses, which he does not seem to disapprove of at all.

Richardson soon grew very fond of Filipina women, especially the *mestizas* of Daet where he was staying and working. It is inevitable that American men and women would come into close contact with Filipino men and women during the occupation. The relationship of Americans and Filipinos seemed to be strained at the outset of American tenure, but soon grew into individual tolerance and even fondness, a fondness exemplified by Richardson's relationship with the Filipina women. "Daet has quite a rank in the outside towns, for the cleverness and beauty of the girls. It is true no other town has girls who play tennis, even in Manila you'll be lucky to find native girls playing at all. We taught them the game on our court and they became so enthused over it they built a court in their own yard."⁸⁷ Richardson went on to say, "They all [mestizas] can speak more or less English, and with our Spanish we manage to sing both Eng. and Sp. Songs and have a right-glorious time...they are a jolly crowd and far surpass other towns in the art of entertaining and hospitality; especially in their ability to converse."⁸⁸

Positive American and Filipino relations were increasing in every part of the country. This is supported by the letters of Bruce Richardson, who in 1907 moved in with a Filipino family and spent an increasing amount of time with the Filipinos prior to his arrival in 1904. This process of assimilation was also shown in the civil government by the formation of the Philippine Assembly. Until 1907 the Philippines had been ruled and governed by the Philippine Commission and the Governor-General. Filipinos had no right to governance in their own country until the Philippine Assembly was formed. This assembly was created by the Philippine Organic Act, approved on July 1, 1902.⁸⁹ The Philippine Organic Act provided for the creation of a lower house of Legislature, composed entirely of Filipinos, to be known as the Philippine Assembly. This provision was to come at the discretion of the President of the United States after necessary conditions were met. In 1907, President Roosevelt felt those conditions were indeed met, and on October 16, the Assembly was inaugurated.⁹⁰

Americans seemed to be slowly gaining more trust in the Filipinos just as Richardson had, and the fruit of this trust was a newly formed bicameral government. In 1907, the Filipinos were

⁸⁷Bruce Richardson, 9 April 1907.

⁸⁸Ibid., 9 April 1907.

⁸⁹Kramer, "*The Blood of Government*", 165.

⁹⁰Bennett, "American Filipino Relations," 507.

beginning to fill more positions in the government, “the Commission, five Americans and four Filipinos, forming the upper house, and the Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos, the lower.”⁹¹

Inherent responsibilities and rights came with the Assembly. Those consisted of passing the annual budget, elections of commissioners, bills, resolutions and petitions (most pertaining to independence), and providing a check and balance against the Commission.⁹² Besides these rights and responsibilities, the Assembly also had the power and responsibility to “appoint two resident Philippine Commissioners to Washington, who should sit and speak, but not vote, in the House of Representatives.”⁹³ Although these resident Commissioners seemed like they were powerless, they still could lobby. Manuel Quezon used his power as Resident Commissioner to convince the United States to assign Francis Harrison as Governor-General in 1912.

Suddenly, the term “the Philippines for the Filipinos”⁹⁴ was beginning to take shape. The days of the United States hegemony of Philippine government seemed to be coming to a close. However, amidst the advancement of Filipinos in civil government, the power still resided in the American Commissioners and the Governor-General. Filipinos were denied several constitutional rights that Americans were given, which Bruce Richardson was aware of. “There are two rights constitutional denied us in the P.I. and these are the right to trial by jury and the right to bear arms.”⁹⁵

Amid all the apparent growing trust of Filipinos by Americans, there still was some discontent about the Philippine Assembly among civil employees. “There was considerable doubt among Americans as to the wisdom of the establishment of the Philippine Assembly. Some thought, and still think, that its creation was premature; others that its creation at all was poor policy.”⁹⁶ Many perhaps believed that the creation of the Assembly was a poor idea because the Filipinos were not fit for self-government. Indeed, many conservatives fervently believed this notion. Others seemed to have thought that the government would sustain a “loss of efficiency”⁹⁷ and perhaps succumb to internal shortcomings, or even worse, a plot of treason against the American civil servants.

⁹¹Ibid., 507.

⁹²J.A. Robertson, “The Philippines Since the Inauguration of the Philippine Assembly,” *The American Historical Review* 22 (July 1917), 818.

⁹³Bennett, “American Filipino Relations,” 507.

⁹⁴Robertson, “The Philippines Since the Inauguration of the Philippine Assembly”, 817.

⁹⁵Bruce Richardson, 18 February 1909.

⁹⁶Robertson, “The Philippines Since the Inauguration of the Philippine Assembly”, 817.

⁹⁷Ibid., 817.

Despite Richardson's obvious growing fondness toward Filipinos, and especially Filipino women, he still maintained a typical American distrust of Filipinos. This is demonstrated in 1909 when Richardson got infected with dysentery, which many Americans were inflicted with in the Philippines. Dysentery is an infection of the intestines, defined as, "a disease with inflammation of the intestines, causing severe diarrhea."⁹⁸ This is usually caused by unclean drinking water, of which Richardson admitted to drinking. There is a doctor in Daet that Richardson could have seen, but he chose instead to travel to Manila to seek treatment. Richardson chose to do this because he did not trust the Filipino doctors. "There is a native doctor at Daet, but no American doctor, but I have yet to see the color of the hair and eyes of a Filipino medico [doctor], that I could call in to prescribe even for 'Mac'[Richardson's dog]."⁹⁹

In 1909 Richardson moved from Daet to Indan and began to teach. Indan is on Luzon, directly south of Manila, west of Daet. In Indan, Richardson shed light on a particular problem that faced the relationship of Americans and Filipinos. That problem was miscommunication. It could be very easy for a Filipino to misunderstand an American, or for an American to misunderstand a Filipino. Here in Indan, two monkeys were harassing the population near Richardson's home. They attacked a boy, who fought them off with a bolo, but was bitten in the process. Richardson asked a man simply named Mr. Liñan, if he could borrow his gun, and thus the miscommunication ensued.

I now telephoned to the owner of the other gun in town, about a mile away, telling him what had occurred, and asking for his shotgun to finish the job...monkey in Spanish is "mono" and I told him my two "monos" had escaped and were attacking the public. There is another word "moro" which means the half-civilized people of Mindanao. So in the course of our Spanish conversation over the phone, Mr. Linan, the owner of the gun, thought I said "dos moros" instead of "dos monos" had escaped and I was asking for a gun to kill them. So he said he could let me have his gun to kill two people, neither he nor I had understood clearly what the other had said over the phone.¹⁰⁰

More peculiar than the actual conversation is the fact that Mr. Liñan was going to give Richardson his gun. But it is apparent how misunderstandings could occur and sometimes cause serious problems.

Richardson soon expressed interest in resigning from the Bureau of Education, after he bought a few shares in a mining operation. "If my game goes alright in Paracale, I shall resign from

⁹⁸Eugene Ehrlich and others, eds., *Oxford American Dictionary: Heald Colleges Edition* (Oxford University Press, Inc., 1980), 269.

⁹⁹Bruce Richardson, 1 July 1909.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 18 February 1909.

my position as teacher and spend my time there for a while.”¹⁰¹ Perhaps Richardson was frustrated with teaching, or bored. In any case he eventually did leave his position as teacher, “I suppose Kane told you all about my resigning from the Bureau of Education and going into a store at Paracale.”¹⁰²

In 1909 Richardson moved to Paracale, which is directly west of Daet and opened a mining store. The store closed within the year, and in that same year Richardson moved to Baguio, the summer capital of Manila and got a job in the Department of Automobiles of the Banquet Road. But Richardson was soon forced to go back to the Bureau of Education after losing his job in Baguio. “While I was in Baguio, I was in book keeping dep’t of the Automobiles of the famous Banquet Road, the storms took out the road so I went back to teaching.”¹⁰³ Richardson does not seem to be thrilled to have to go back to teaching.

While Richardson was in Baguio in 1910, the popular Philippine Assembly was called to have, what is now referred to as an extraordinary session of the legislature. There was an increase of total revenues eight months prior to February 1910, of 938,072.80 pesos.¹⁰⁴ The Governor-General Cameron Forbes called the meeting in order to appropriate sums for public works, and for increases to certain government bureaus. Legislation that was voted on included an annual sum of 1,500,000 pesos for the construction of roads and bridges, most likely for the Banquet Road, which Forbes fully endorsed. There was also a vote for an appropriation of 150,000 pesos to cover the deficit of the Bureau of Education, which was Richardson’s former employer, and an appropriation of 850,000 pesos for the Bureau of Agriculture to continue the fight against rinderpest.¹⁰⁵ All of these appropriations showed an interest to advance the Filipino people and the Philippines as a country, by the Assembly.

In 1911 Richardson moved to Mindanao, the large southern island inhabited by Muslims and a small contingent of Christian Filipinos, and began teaching the Muslim Filipinos in Cotobato. Richardson spent several months in Cotobato, and then moved to Zamboanga, on the south-west tip of Mindanao. He held a brief tenure in Zamboanga, and in 1912, he moved to Iligan, on the north coast of Mindanao. Richardson wrote extensively about the Muslims and the political situation of the Philippines during his tenure in Mindanao. At first it seemed that he did not particularly enjoy

¹⁰¹Bruce Richardson, 18 February 1909.

¹⁰²Ibid., 19 June 1911.

¹⁰³Ibid., 15 October 1911.

¹⁰⁴J.A. Robertson, “The Extraordinary Session of the Philippine Legislature, and the Work of the Philippine Assembly,” *The American Political Science Review* 4 (November 1910), 527.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 528.

Mindanao, or the Filipinos. “Well, Dad, I have gone back into teaching the little brown brothers (They may be brothers of Will Taft but their no brothers of mine.)”¹⁰⁶ Richardson expressed a lack of shared identity with the Filipinos in 1911. This was most likely due in part to his frustration from having to go back to teaching.

The question of the *Moros* was difficult for the American government to solve, as it had been for the Spanish before them. Mindanao geographically made up one-third of the Philippine Islands, but Mindanao’s non-Christian population made up only ten percent of the population of the Philippines. Because non-Christians were not entitled to representation in the Philippine Assembly, the civil government came up with a different solution. “The upper house, or the Philippine Commission, had exclusive jurisdiction over the non-Christian parts of the archipelago-almost one-third of the total area of the Islands.”¹⁰⁷

Richardson recognized Iligan and the Moro provinces as unique. Because Iligan is part of the Moro province, it was not entitled to the rights that the rest of the Philippines were entitled to, most notably, representation in the Philippine Assembly. It seemed that Iligan was ruled mostly by *bayonet treatment* of the Muslims. The government used *datu*’s or chiefs to either support the United States officials, or they turned the *datu*’s against each other. Richardson tells us:

Iligan is in the northern part of the island of Minanao, and politically is a part of the Moro province, a somewhat special form of government made necessary by the presence of so many people of Moro or Mohammedan faith. The popular Philippine Assembly has no jurisdiction over the Moro Province, for this province, among other non-Christian provinces...is not entitled to representation in the Assembly. These special provinces are ruled by the Philippine Commission acting alone.¹⁰⁸

By 1912 Richardson had become very careful about what he labeled and gave unrestricted opinions about. Even writing home to his parents, he was careful not to label the *Moros* as savages without completely explaining himself. Richardson spoke of the school where he worked: “It is the first establishment of an American School in the lake region for these backward, misguided, murderous savages.”¹⁰⁹

But Richardson was quick to explain exactly what he meant. This probably stemmed from the fact that Richardson had such a long tenure in the Philippines without ever going back home. He does not go home until 1915. So up until 1912 he has been in the Philippines for eight years. “I

¹⁰⁶Bruce Richardson, 15 October 1911.

¹⁰⁷Maximo Kalaw, “The New Philippine Government,” *The American Political Science Review* 13 (August 1919), 418.

¹⁰⁸Bruce Richardson, 30 September 1912.

¹⁰⁹Bruce Richardson, 30 September 1912.

mean ‘savages’ in a restricted and peculiar sense, not aiming to convey that they possess no civilization nor practice none of the arts of peace.”¹¹⁰

In 1912 the Republican Party lost the candidacy for president. The Democratic champion Woodrow Wilson became the President of the United States. Thus, the Republican instituted “policy of gradual participation in government”¹¹¹ by the Filipinos that existed from 1900-1912 abruptly came to an end. Richardson seemed to support Woodrow Wilson, “It is quite likely the best man will win and that I believe is Woodrow Wilson.”¹¹²

President Woodrow Wilson immediately replaced the sitting Governor-General Cameron Forbes with Francis Burton Harrison, after being convinced to do so by Manuel Quezon. Francis Harrison had been a New York Congressman, and for years, “had been a prominent supporter of Filipino independence and who, on his arrival in Manila, publicly described himself as ‘Filipino in all but race’”.¹¹³ The new administration’s ideology was described as “Filipinization” and was the handing over of civil offices to Filipinos. This rapid involvement of Filipinos in government was intended to perhaps quicken an American withdrawal from the Philippines without evoking a collapse and thus inviting in a foreign power, such as Japan. In fact, at the same time that Harrison came to the Philippines, “all the five Americans and three of the four Filipino members of the Philippine Commission were removed and replaced by new men.”¹¹⁴

This was an easy fact to notice for Richardson who was subject to Filipinization all around him. “Filipinization of the entire Philippine service has been going on very hastily since the time Harrison arrived.”¹¹⁵ Richardson did not seem to convey an opinion for or against Filipinization, but he did comment on the displacement of the former American civil employees released by Harrison’s administration.

So many Americans have been displaced by Filipinization of the Civil Service, that large numbers have found themselves without jobs. Many of them are married to native women and have families. Such of course could not well return to U.S....What the gov’t did was to allot \$100,000 to help those help themselves by starting farms.¹¹⁶

By July of 1914 Richardson had left Mindanao and was working as a school official in Lucina, back on the island of Luzon. Contrary to what one would think about an American in the

¹¹⁰Ibid., 30 September 1912.

¹¹¹Bennett, “American Filipino Relations,” 508.

¹¹²Bruce Richardson, 30 September 1912.

¹¹³Bennett, “American Filipino Relations,” 508.

¹¹⁴Bennett, “American Filipino Relations,” 508.

¹¹⁵Bruce Richardson, 20 March 1914.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 20 March 1914.

Moro Province, Richardson seemed to thoroughly enjoy the company of the *Moros*, more than the company of some Americans. Many would have thought that a Christian American would detest the Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao under any circumstances, based on their religious differences. But Richardson tells us: “I liked Mindanao and was not afraid of the Moros but sometimes over here we meet an individual of our own kind who is ten times meaner and more detestable than any member of a wild tribe or Christian brown in the whole archipelago.”¹¹⁷ Richardson also later in the same letter refers to a Muslim Filipino of Mindanao as a “Greasy, black Moro,”¹¹⁸ an obvious contradiction to his former statement, but perhaps Richardson had not fully developed his opinion of the *Moros*.

Richardson also tells us of an individual living in the Philippines by the name of Charles H. Beelar. Beelar was an American soldier turned entrepreneur who came to the Philippines out of the U.S. Army and was soon married to a well-to-do Filipina woman. Richardson said this about the marriage: “However happy Beelar was with his family nobody knows, but it is not stretching the imagination or truth to say that such could be possible between the Christian white and the Christian brown.”¹¹⁹

This statement is a prelude to his letters where we are given clues that Richardson himself married a Filipina woman. In 1915, Richardson left Manila and came to Chico, his first visit back home to California. When he returned to Manila, Richardson wrote his cousin Bill, who helped him with money so he could return to California. Here is where we are given a first clue of his involvement with a Filipina woman. “Two weeks before I left Manila I had \$300 dollars for the trip which would have been a great plenty for me. Just at that moment my woman took sick and had to have an operation or likely die. She had saved my life once, and I could not, would not go away without treating her.”¹²⁰

Obviously Richardson does not divulge whether his *woman* is a *Christian white* or a *Christian brown*, so this woman could have just as easily been an American woman. But to the trained eye, there is a clue that it is not an American woman that is his *woman*. Richardson was very careful to let his cousin Bill know that this letter was intended for his eyes only. “Well, Bill, I

¹¹⁷Ibid., 5 July 1914.

¹¹⁸Bruce Richardson, 5 July 1914.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 5 July 1914.

¹²⁰Ibid., 15 November 1915.

see I have two pages there that it won't do to leave laying around where curious feminine eyes will fall upon them, so I request you to take care."¹²¹

This still is not definitive proof that Richardson was in fact involved with a Filipina woman. The final conclusive proof is in a letter written a month later to his mother, Mrs. Mary J. Richardson, and his sister Nellie, after he had returned to Manila from California. He started off this letter with the same request that he asked of his cousin Bill. "This one [letter] is, however, especially written to you and for you and you need not show it to anyone if you do not want to. In fact there are some whom this letter could not do a bit of good and might cause themselves and endless amount of harm."¹²²

In this letter, he spoke about Nieves, his woman, and mentions her in a way that suggests that his mother and sister already know about her; Richardson most likely told them about Nieves on his prior visit to California. Richardson is sent a box of apples from California and he spoke of his wife, Maria Nieves de Gayte, and how she enjoyed the apples, and also her reaction to his return to the Philippines. "Nieves enjoyed them both [apples] so much. If you had seen that girl cry when she saw me you would have thought she had lost her best friend in the world."¹²³ Richardson specifically references her Filipino background in a very telling line. "The fact of the matter is Filipinas cry too easily, and I didn't want her to cry at all."¹²⁴

Richardson went on to mention his marriage to Nieves. He spoke about his reasons of marrying Nieves and these reasons are quite practical. "Her [Nieves] marvelous natural musical ability and unbounded kindness in caring for me at a time when I was extremely sick were both factors in producing in my unmusical and at that time, infirm condition, a sort of harmonic relation which culminated in marriage."¹²⁵

Bruce Richardson married Maria Nieves de Gayte sometime before 1915, but it is unclear what happened to her. He re-married on May 14, 1925 to another Filipina woman named Mary Cristobal. Richardson and Cristobal had a daughter named Belle Richardson, born on June 16, 1926. It is not known what happened to Cristobal and his daughter Belle. Bruce Richardson stayed in the Philippines until 1941, when he departed Manila on a Red Cross Hospital Ship. He was deathly ill and had to be carried by stretcher to the ship. During the voyage, he gained fifteen

¹²¹Bruce Richardson, 15 November 1915.

¹²²Ibid., 15 December 1915.

¹²³Ibid., 15 December 1915.

¹²⁴Ibid., 15 December 1915.

¹²⁵Bruce Richardson, 15 December 1915.

pounds and was able to walk off the ship when it landed in San Francisco on August 7, 1941. He arrived home in Chico on August 8, 1941. Bruce Richardson passed away on May 19, 1959, of thyroid cancer.¹²⁶

Through viewing Richardson's letters, historians are given personal insight into how individual Americans viewed Filipinos during America's experiment with imperialism in the Philippines in the twentieth century. Richardson's early tenure in the Philippines is marked by fascination for and disapproval of Filipinos. He soon developed a fondness for the Filipinos through contact in social occasions, such as dances, dinners, and singing. Amidst that growing fondness, he still continued to exhibit distrust of Filipinos. Ultimately Richardson's fondness outweighed his distrust, evidence of which is his marriage to two Filipina women.

The American government, dominated by the Republican Party until 1912, was instituting a gradual policy of participation by the Filipinos, but the power still resided in the American dominated positions of the Commission and the Governor-General. When Francis Burton Harrison and the Democratic Party took leadership of the islands, they could have given the Filipinos independence, but they did not. American hegemony of the Philippine islands lasted until 1947.

The American teachers that came over on the *USS Thomas*, and people like Bruce Richardson did have an impact on their Filipino students. Despite Richardson's apparent frustrations with teaching, he was able to affect some of his students in a positive way. Before he died, Richardson recognized the name of one of his former students, Salvador H. Lluch. Larry Richardson, Bruce's nephew, wrote to Lluch and received a response. Larry then again wrote Mr. Lluch the day before Bruce passed away, with a touching editorial of Bruce's reaction to Lluch's correspondence. "It has given him the greatest pleasure and understandable pride to have had your testimony...as to the use you have put to the training he was able to impart to you and others as your teacher and supervisor. This and the regard you have expressed for him has also given we of his family new and greater pride and understanding for him and his work."¹²⁷ Although American involvement in the Philippines was marked by much distrust, racism, misunderstanding, and corruption; it was also a site of growing fondness, sharing, education and prosperity between white Americans and pacific Filipinos.

¹²⁶Larry Richardson, *Botty Bruce Richardson*, written in the hand of Larry Richardson, Special Collections, Meriam Library, California State University, Chico.

¹²⁷Larry Richardson, to Salvador H. Lluch, 18 May 1959, transcript typed by Larry Richardson, Special Collections, Meriam Library, California State University, Chico.

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The Rhetorical Weapons of the Zapatistas

Steven P. Kanavel

“... in political struggle one should not ape the methods of the ruling classes, or one will fall into easy ambushes.” — Antonio Gramsci

The Zapatistas in Chiapas, who have received declarations of support from around the world, have become the face (although theirs are mostly obscured) of one of the more prominent revolutionary social movements of today. Having distanced itself from the rhetoric and tactics of previous Latin American revolutionary movements which were suppressed for their presumed radical leftist orientation and supposed connections to the Soviet Union, the Zapatista movement has chosen to emphasize its indigenous roots, thus making it a more difficult target for forcible suppression. Possibly in response to the global show of support that they have received, the Zapatistas have made a point of stating that theirs is not an isolated and self-concerned struggle, but rather a part of a global movement against neoliberal policies which has manifested itself in various forms all over the world. At the center of all of this, at least in the mind of the broader public around the world, is a masked man who goes by the name Marcos and serves as the group’s unofficial spokesperson, chief propagandist, public relations representative, and— some might allege— *de facto* leader. He intentionally submits himself to the status of *subcomandante* so as to diminish his perceived leadership role within the movement and its formal organizations, such as the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN in its Spanish acronym) and its now defunct political front (the FZLN). But, in the wake of the semi-official start of the Zapatista uprising in 1994, and its subsequent coverage in the international media, Subcomandante Marcos emerged a celebrity of sorts, appearing to many outsiders as a new and exotic sort of guerrilla leader. His distinctive rhetorical style, and the character of Zapatismo in general, have led a number of international observers to attempt to understand the movement using foreign intellectual concepts, such as postmodernism and Antonio Gramsci’s idea of the war of position, as analytic frameworks. (Whether this is an appropriate interpretation of a movement with a primarily indigenous base is another matter.) The usefulness of his celebrity status cannot have been lost on Marcos— even if, as a revolutionary tactic, it is a bit removed from the *foquismo* that served Che, Fidel, and their compatriots so well in Cuba. The unique position he occupies, both within the Zapatista movement specifically and within the broader global social justice movements, should provide Marcos with a

useful platform for the articulation of his political views and of the grievances of marginalized peoples in Chiapas and elsewhere. As the past thirteen years have demonstrated, however, he has seized this opportunity in unusual and sometimes baffling ways.



Barn in Oventic, Chiapas, a Zapatista stronghold. Photographed by the author.

Marcos' preference for the sly and the indirect, and his penchant for poetic musings in place of the typical rhetoric of revolutionary vanguards, have done much to separate him from previous revolutionary leaders to whom he might have otherwise been compared. The mainstream media, as a rule, tends to treat him more as an object of whimsy than with the scorn they would usually unleash upon the dreaded "Marxist guerrilla."¹²⁸ It is to his credit that Marcos has, to some extent, adopted the figures of speech and symbolic references of the indigenous people with whom he has aligned himself. As some critics have been quick to point out, however, Marcos himself is not an Indian, and he comes from a decidedly different socioeconomic and educational background than the natives of Chiapas. To what extent, then, does his style derive from traits of indigenous culture, and to what extent does it derive from the ideas of European intellectuals? It is not unreasonable to

¹²⁸ Even when Marcos is identified— not quite accurately— as a Marxist in the international press, it is typically presented as quaint rather than ominous. See, for instance, the article "Masked Marxist, With Marimbas" in the *Los Angeles Times* of January 23, 2006. This article, it should be noted, also contains numerous factual misrepresentations and misleading statements.

suppose that both sources inform his ideology and rhetoric, although he himself has acknowledged that the indigenous influences are something which he picked up as he became more engaged with the communities in southern Mexico.¹²⁹ Based on the number and character of the interviews that the popular press conducted with Marcos in the early years of the movement, it would seem that he played a considerable role in helping the movement keep the attention of the public, both inside and outside of Mexico. In the longer term, though, have Marcos' methods been helpful or detrimental to the Zapatista movement? In the perception of the casual international observer, Marcos and his special brand of rhetoric are central to the movement. Is Marcos, when he amuses the general public through his calculated elusiveness, flowery language, and cute anecdotes about penguins,¹³⁰ only succeeding in further politically marginalizing the people he means to champion? Or can this approach be more fully understood in terms of concepts that are foreign to the Mayan experience?

Several intellectuals and commentators have attempted to place the movement in the context of some confrontation between forces of modernity and of postmodernity. The argument is sometimes made that the EZLN has transcended the politics of modernity and the strategies of the modern guerrilla movements. Pablo González Casanova considers the concept of postmodernism useful to understanding Zapatismo, relating the movement to other, similarly oriented ones around the world and stating that the language and discourses of the Zapatistas' autonomous good government councils necessarily contain "elements of European and North American postmodernism, in their more creative and radical manifestations."¹³¹ Others, such as James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, "have called postmodernism into question both as an intellectual and political force and as a useful means of analyzing or characterizing the Chiapas rebellion,"¹³² while also objecting to the classification of the Zapatista movement as "indigenous." Mark Berger, reviewing the intellectual approaches that have been taken to analyzing the Zapatista movement, notes that Petras and Veltmeyer "argue that postmodernism has no bearing on progressive political change and social liberation in the Americas. They locate the EZLN and indigenous and/or peasant movements elsewhere in Mexico as part of an incipient 'third wave' of revolutionary movements in

¹²⁹ See Saul Landau's 1996 film *The Sixth Sun*, and other published interviews.

¹³⁰ In 2005, *el pingüino zapatista*— actually a chicken— became an unofficial mascot for the Zapatistas, when it was noticed wandering around a jungle camp with, apparently, a penguin-like gait. In a later communiqué, Marcos indicated that *el pingüino* had become part of the EZLN General Command.

¹³¹ Pablo González Casanova, "Los *caracoles* zapatistas: Redes de resistencia y autonomía," *La Jornada*, Sept. 26, 2003. (<http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2003/09/26/per-texto.html>) .

¹³² Mark T. Berger, "Romancing the Zapatistas: International Intellectuals and the Chiapas Rebellion," *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (March 2001) p. 150.

Latin America that draw on a mixture of indigenous ideas and practices, liberation theology, and Marxism, within which class and class struggle remain central concepts” (ibid). Daniel Nugent persuasively argues that the postmodernist interpretation of the Zapatista movement is based on unclear definitions for “modernism,” failing to account for many essentially premodern influences in this supposed struggle against modernism, and that it ultimately obscures more than it reveals.¹³³ Josée Johnston comes to similar conclusions, telling us that “A better analytical starting place is not abstract Western theoretical debates about modernity and postmodernity, but the actual substantive demands put forward by the Zapatista rebels.”¹³⁴ As Nugent sums up: “To assert the fundamental ‘postmodernity’ of the EZLN is not really to analyze ‘actual events’ in Chiapas. It is more a way of allowing some intellectuals to appropriate these events, to situate these complex historical developments on their own (intellectual) terrain, to assimilate them to a discourse that permits computer-literate academics to feel good about themselves.”¹³⁵

Perhaps it should come as no surprise that this analytic thread would contribute little to an understanding of what is taking place in Chiapas— it is unlikely that the average Chiapanecan native cares much for the debates of European political philosophers. In the case of the Zapatistas, however, one man serves as the principle intellectual author, both figuratively and literally, of the political platform of the EZLN. And, as some commentators have pointed out, Marcos himself is almost certainly familiar with those debates. It has been known (or at least strongly suspected) for some time that Marcos is actually Rafael Guillén, a former professor at UAM with a background in philosophy. He was “unmasked” by the Mexican government in early 1995, in a presumably calculated assault on his cult of personality. Guillén is known to have written a thesis on the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, and was reportedly a part of a group at the university which was interested in “[Althusser’s] theories of ideology and communication, and on something they called *gráfica monumental*.”¹³⁶ Alma Guillermoprieto notes that “Marcos’s preoccupation with symbolic language is certainly worthy of a student of Althusser. He has created his own dazzling image as a masked *mito genial*— his term, meaning an inspired act of mythmaking” (ibid). His

¹³³ Daniel Nugent, “Northern Intellectuals and the EZLN,” *The Zapatista Reader*, Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002 (originally published in *Monthly Review*, July 1995).

¹³⁴ Josée Johnston, “Pedagogical Guerrillas, Armed Democrats, and Revolutionary Counterpublics: Examining Paradox in the Zapatista Uprising in Chiapas Mexico” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Aug. 2000), p. 464. Johnston, it would seem, is not strictly opposed to using abstract Western theoretical debates as a reference point for understanding the Zapatista movement, considering that she later applies Gramscian concepts to it. More on this will follow.

¹³⁵ Nugent, op. cit. p. 356

¹³⁶ Alma Guillermoprieto, “The Unmasking,” *The Zapatista Reader*, p. 37 (originally published in *The New Yorker*, March 13, 1995).

voluminous output— which has come in the form of letters, communiqués, speeches, interviews, poems, Internet postings, and more— is almost always highly stylized and almost never conventionally direct. As Ilan Stavans observes, Marcos’ speeches and writings “seamlessly mix fiction with reality, becoming masterful self-parodies, texts about texts about texts [...] full of postscripts and qualifications and references to high and low, from modernist literature and academic Marxism to pop culture.”¹³⁷ From the Zapatistas’ first emergence into the public consciousness, Marcos has avoided the typical brand of Marxist vanguard rhetoric. After receiving a letter from the Basque separatist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Marcos (who is nothing if not irreverent) responded with a letter disclaiming ETA’s methods and bearing a postscript reading: “I shit on all the revolutionary vanguards of this planet.”¹³⁸ Undoubtedly, Marcos’ style and his unusual approach to guerrilla tactics have served a purpose. But the Zapatistas have made demands of the government which have not been met; their achievements, though significant, have yet to catch up to their aspirations. Is it in the best interest of the movement now to have as its primary spokesperson a man who prefers poetically whimsical anecdotes over clear articulation of a political platform?

Possibly. Writing from his cell, Antonio Gramsci tells us that the “superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack seemed to have destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defence which was still effective. The same thing happens in politics, during great economic crises.”¹³⁹ He calculated that concepts used in military science could be indirectly related to politics; that, sometimes, an effective military strategy could be translated into an effective political strategy. Where a premature frontal assault fails, a good *comandante* will pursue the greater tactical advantage. Gramsci’s precise meaning is sometimes difficult to discern from his fragmentary prison writings, but the “war of position” and related concepts nevertheless factor prominently into his political thinking.

The connections between Gramsci’s analysis of subaltern relations with civil society and Marcos’ frequent, even clichéd allusions to the Zapatistas’ use of words as “weapons” has not gone

¹³⁷ Ilan Stavans, “Unmasking Marcos,” *The Zapatista Reader*, p. 391 (originally published in *Transition*, Spring 1996).

¹³⁸ Letter dated Jan. 2003 and reported in *La Jornada*. Translated by Laura Fecha. (<http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/2003/marcos/etaJAN.html>)

¹³⁹ Antonio Gramsci, “War of Position and War of Manoeuvre,” from the Prison Notebooks (http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/prison_notebooks/reader/q13-24.htm)

unnoticed. Josée Johnston writes that “[Gramsci’s] conceptualization of a *war of position* is a useful tool for understanding an armed struggle that targets ideas through armed strategies. In his prison writings, Gramsci contemplated the nature of revolutionary change, and saw a historical shift in strategy occurring from the ‘war of movement’ to the ‘war of position.’ In a war of movement, a ruling group seizes control of the state, as in the Bolshevik or Cuban Revolution... In a war of position, counter-hegemonic organizations merge together to form a new historic bloc and build up the social foundations of a new state.” Johnston does not see that the Zapatistas could possibly accomplish this task on their own, but she maintains that “the Zapatistas’ armed struggle was fought on the level of a Gramscian war of position [...] to capture the hearts and minds of Mexican civil society in order to rearrange power relations at a more profound level.”¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, Johnston believes that “The history of failed social revolution in Mexico partially explains the Zapatistas’ decision to wage their war on the level of civil society” (p. 469). According to Kathleen Bruhn, “The EZLN has borrowed more from Gramsci in tactical than in organizational terms, beginning with one of the key resources in a Gramscian war of position: the creative use of language. Gramsci saw languages as ‘hegemonic instruments which [could] reinforce the values of common sense or potentially transmit new ones.’”¹⁴¹ In the Zapatista identity, words assume a similar importance, although in a somewhat different manner. Bruhn describes this as the *palabra verdadera*. “Words,” she says, “play a key role in Zapatista understanding of social exchange. The ‘true word’ or ‘word of truth’ of the Zapatistas becomes an ambassador to society, which must respond to it with a ‘word’ of its own, creating dialogue... The *palabra verdadera* is... the key to Zapatista revolutionary strategy: a unifying consciousness and ultimately a weapon. The word, like class consciousness, expresses the identity of a social subject, though in the Zapatista lexicon, indigenous identity replaces class” (p. 33).

¹⁴⁰ Johnston, pp. 467-468

¹⁴¹ Kathleen Bruhn, “Antonio Gramsci and the *Palabra Verdadera*: The Political Discourse of Mexico’s Guerrilla Forces,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999) p. 31



This artwork adorns another building in Oventic. At least thirty percent of the Zapatista regular army is female, and the rank-and-file consists of indigenous people from four Maya ethnic groups—Ch’ols, Tojolabals, Tzeltals, and Tzotzils. Photo by Steven Kanavel.

Further illustrating the connections, Marcos himself has asked rhetorically: “What is the frame of reference of ‘common sense’? Is it not that of the dominant ideology?” He seems to think so. This is why “the EZLN restates political language in other terms.” Gramsci, likewise, felt it was “necessary for a subaltern class challenging an incumbent hegemony to attempt to build a new common sense by attacking the assumptions embedded in existing language,” according to Walter Adamson.¹⁴² Marcos’ comments here appear distinctly Gramscian in tone. Is this conscious on his part? Bruhn says that, considering the intellectual climate in Mexico during the period in which Marcos was educated, it is “impossible to believe he has had no exposure to Gramsci” (ibid). This may be so, but if Marcos has consciously taken influence from Gramsci in tactical terms, he would likely be aware as well that the war of position, according to Gramsci, must follow a “reconnaissance of the terrain and identification of the elements of trench and fortress represented

¹⁴² Quotes all cited in Bruhn, pp. 43-44.

by the elements of civil society” in a given country, in order to determine whether there exists a “proper relation between State and civil society.”¹⁴³ Such a “reconnaissance” might reveal the war of position (at least as Gramsci envisioned it) to be tactically inappropriate in the Mexican context. Whether this is actually true, of course, is debatable, and Gramsci himself is not completely clear on the matter. Still, the “war of position” provides a more cogent framework for an analysis of the EZLN’s engagement with Mexican civil society than the postmodernist arguments, even if it does not satisfactorily explain the discursive approaches of the Zapatistas.

It is not difficult to agree that discourse is a very important front— perhaps one of the most important— on which to engage in battle. As Bruhn points out, the EZLN has exercised an uncommon degree of terminological restraint in avoiding the rhetoric of the typical guerrilla movement in its communiqués and other documents. The indigenous base of the movement is highly stressed, as are uncontroversial ideas like democracy, liberty, justice, dignity, and so forth. Words too connotative of Marxism are generally avoided,¹⁴⁴ and criticism of U.S. policies regarding Mexico is rather soft and carefully phrased. Marcos does not wish to offend the movement’s hard won international sympathizers. It is not just the substantive content of the words that matters, though; they derive part of their value from their rhetorical flair. With a more generic approach, the Zapatistas may not have made the same impression that they initially did. At this point, however, it may be worth asking whether it would be more constructive for Marcos to begin moving toward a more direct way of interacting with the public. The latest Zapatista project, a sort of engagement with Mexican civil society known as *La otra campaña*, has not attracted a great deal of attention in the international media since its official launch on New Year’s Day of 2006, and, significant though it may be, it will probably remain a relatively marginal political force because of this.¹⁴⁵ The Mexican political establishment, besides, was likely more concerned with other issues, such as its *own* campaign leading up to the election and its contentious aftermath, than it was with the Zapatistas, who positioned themselves, as always, outside of the mainstream of Mexico’s electoral politics.

¹⁴³ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, International Publishers, 1971 (edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith). p. 238

¹⁴⁴ It is possible that this may be changing to some degree. In his address to supporters of *La otra campaña* in San Cristóbal de las Casas on Jan. 1, 2006, Marcos did not hesitate to describe the campaign as “anticapitalista.” Perhaps it is a testament to the movement’s current marginality that this has not attracted more attention?

¹⁴⁵ It does not help matters that the campaign suffered some notable setbacks in the early months of 2006, particularly a temporary suspension following police violence in Atenco that May.

If Marcos were now to begin distancing himself from his trademark rhetorical style (and, if he has shown us one thing over the past thirteen years, it is that he and his rhetorical style are inseparable), he would likely alienate— or at least baffle— many supporters. Furthermore, he must be conscious of this. In the beginning, the words alone probably would not have been enough to arouse so much interest; it took more extreme measures, such as armed uprising and violence and the seizure of municipalities, to help make the Zapatistas a center of attention. This has left them in a somewhat difficult position. As early as 1996, Régis Debray observed that Marcos was trapped in “the unpleasant dilemma of either being criminalized if he renews combat [...] or of being relegated to folklore if he remains with his arms at his feet.”¹⁴⁶ How can the Zapatistas generate that sort of notice again without doing something stupid or politically indefensible? If Marcos knows, he’s keeping it a secret for now.

The Zapatista movement, even if it is not accurate to call it a rebellion in the traditional sense, has, in some respects, been more successful than many modern rebellions. First, it has survived for almost fourteen years. The importance of this should not be underestimated, in view of the large military presence which has been maintained in Chiapas and the potential threat which the Zapatistas were initially recognized as posing, as indicated by the Chase Manhattan Bank’s notorious suggestion to the Mexican government in early 1995 that they “eliminate the Zapatistas.” Significantly, it would seem that the idea of an open attack against the Zapatistas has over the years become more unlikely, as the movement has successfully aligned itself with the global social justice movement (or anti-globalization movement, as some still insist on labeling it) while at the same time emphasizing its indigenous character, despite the apparent contradiction in this. Finally, the Zapatista movement has managed to defy easy characterization, making it subject to a wide range of interpretations. This, coupled with the shifting and sometimes unclear political objectives of the EZLN, has the added effect of making it difficult to determine precisely how successful the movement has been, as well its future potential. There is, after all, no simple measurement of the effectiveness of the political war of position. Still, it is hard to avoid the impression that the Zapatistas have lost some of the momentum that they gained in the first few years of the uprising. This is not simply because they have failed to command as many newspaper headlines as they initially did. It is because the Mexican political establishment no longer seems to consider the Zapatistas a political force of any great consequence. Subcomandante Marcos can hardly be blamed

¹⁴⁶ Régis Debray, “A Guerrilla with a Difference,” *The Zapatista Reader*, p. 344 (originally published in *Le Monde*, May 1996; translated by Elena Lledó).

for regarding Mexican electoral politics an ill-suited venue for initiating change of the sort that the Zapatistas want to bring about. It may be worthwhile, however, for Marcos to reconsider how he interacts with Mexico's political elites if he wants to remind them that the Zapatistas cannot be ignored, and to remind the Mexican public that ending the PRI's monopoly of power was only a first step to bringing that change.

A Brief History of Album Cover Art and the Debate Over the Genre's Artistic Status

Drew Traulsen

The history of recorded music has both a long and dynamic tradition. Yet strangely, the history of album cover design and those who create it is relatively new. As a matter of fact, although album cover design has been around since the late 1930s, the numerous artists, designers, and photographers who have ventured into this medium have yet to be recognized as “fine artists” by the larger artistic community. The keepers of the fine art mythos – critics, curators, and traditional artists– subscribe to a limited and exclusive definition of art that classifies the work of album cover designers as lacking artistic innovation. For them such endeavors remain nothing more than commercial design or mere product advertising. Those artists who have ventured into the world of album cover design disagree with this notion, pointing to the fact that the wide variety of musical forms and musical artists alone requires vigorous and constant innovation on their part. While this debate seems far from resolution, perhaps an examination of the development of the album cover and those who have worked to embellish them may both prove enlightening and, possibly, help legitimize the work of countless album cover designers.

It’s hard to imagine a time when album cover artwork didn’t exist. Initially, at the end of the nineteenth century, recorded music was formatted as a 10” disc that played at 78 rpm. These discs were packaged and sold in plain cardboard boxes lined with lint. With time, some record companies began adorning these boxes with a simple note as to the recorded quality of the music or the company logo.¹⁴⁷ Other record companies were packaging collections of thematic material into multi-disc collections that were housed in unadorned books resembling photo albums.¹⁴⁸ In 1910, with the technological improvement and mass production of the more durable shellac disc, companies were able to abandon the bulky cardboard box and replace it with a plain paper envelope (or “sleeve”) that allowed only the circular label on the record to be seen through a cutout in the center.¹⁴⁹ Since the record’s label usually provided all the pertinent information (i.e., artist, writer, company, etc.), this packaging method, which was much cheaper than the bulky cardboard box and album formats, was standardized and replicated throughout the industry. Thus the term “album” to describe a single unit of sale came into vogue.

¹⁴⁷ Roger Dean and David Howells, *Ultimate Album Cover Album* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1987), pg. 14.

¹⁴⁸ Prior to 1920, groups of similar sound recordings had been available in bound collections called “albums.” This origin of the term “album” is a misnomer then in its present day usage. Nonetheless the terms “album” and “record” are used both synonymously and interchangeably within this analysis

¹⁴⁹ Dean and Howells, pg. 14.

As the decade wore on though, realizing the importance of both eye appeal and the marketing possibilities of the blank paper sleeve, some companies started experimenting with distinctive sleeve design schemes.¹⁵⁰ These designs often formed a frame for the circular record label because “in many of the most aesthetically pleasing examples, the label provided the focus for an integrated design.”¹⁵¹ After all, it was the round label, often in multiple colors including silver and gold which gave the neutral black disc its distinguished and distinctive appearance. Soon record companies began to focus on the sleeve itself, adorning them not only with the company name, but often with the names of major record retailers such as Woolworth’s or the advertisements of subsidiary companies like needle manufacturers¹⁵².

Also during this time, the recording industry underwent some important changes. First was the personalizing of paper sleeves with a photograph or illustration of and the name of the artist found within, not to mention the composer/writer of the individual piece of music.¹⁵³ As a matter of fact, by 1939, with the popularity of the previously mentioned album style books, some companies began adorning them with illustrated covers, “usually drawings in several gaudy colors, sometimes with a picture of the artist superimposed on them.”¹⁵⁴ Unfortunately, while the picture of the featured artist changed from album to album, the initial artistic adornments were often replicated and repeated. Another change came in the way records were packaged, as some companies began replacing the flimsy paper sleeve with a sturdier and more protective blank cardboard sleeve.¹⁵⁵ Most importantly, in 1939 Columbia Records became the first label to manufacture the 10” 33 1/3 rpm long playing record format or “LP.” Even more significant, Columbia became the first record company to establish an art department to design its advertising campaigns.¹⁵⁶ Its first director was the visionary graphic designer Alex Steinweiss.

Steinweiss had worked as a Depression era WPA poster artist. His move to Columbia Records was unprecedented as it presented him with an industry that had no history of a significant graphic tradition. Subsequently, he wound up creating countless “ads, posters, booklets, and catalogs for classical, pop, and international”¹⁵⁷ artists. After several months of ad work,

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Dean and Howells, pg. 14.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Dean and Howells, pg. 15.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Jennifer McKnight-Trontz and Alex Steinweiss, For the Record: The Life and Work of Alex Steinweiss, Inventor of the Album Cover (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2000), pg. 2.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pg. 3.

“Steinweiss had what amounted to an epiphany: He thought that the way Columbia was selling their records was ridiculous. The generic plain paper wrappers were unattractive and lacked any appeal.”¹⁵⁸ Steinweiss realized that the plain cardboard covers, along with being more protective, could also easily be embellished with unique artwork that was mass-produced and then glued to each side. He secured permission from his bosses to experiment with designing several covers with original art. Although production costs had increased with these new covers, sales dramatically increased as well, especially for the albums with Steinweiss’ art.¹⁵⁹ Columbia’s choice to mass-produce them soon became the industry standard as every other record label moved to incorporate cover art onto their products. It would seem that original cover art had passed the test.

All of Steinweiss’ cover artwork maximized the limited space of the 10” x 10” cover “by using poster elements – a strong central image, bold type and lettering, and distinctive colors.”¹⁶⁰ Rather than show a portrait of a recording artist, he used musical and cultural symbols to stimulate the audience’s interest. He explained his technique thusly, “I tried to get into the subject either through the music or the life and times of the artist/composer.”¹⁶¹ Such a philosophy resulted in classic artwork for the likes of concert pianist Bela Bartok, conga artist Desi Arnaz, composers George Gershwin and Count Basie, and singer Paul Robeson, to name but only a few¹⁶². Countless musicians gratefully appreciated Steinweiss’ efforts to increase both the aesthetic feel and sales of their recordings.

During World War II, Steinweiss left Columbia records to work for the U.S. government designing cautionary displays and posters for the U.S. Navy Training Center in New York City. After the war he decided not to return to Columbia, instead opting to work as a freelance graphic designer.¹⁶³ In 1948, he was asked to develop a design for the 12” x 12” LP jacket by the president of Columbia Records. The new packaging, “a thin board covered with printed paper, soon became the standard for the industry...Steinweiss’ invention was effective protection for the LPs, but it also allowed more artistic variety.”¹⁶⁴ This variety was a mixed blessing for the inventor because advancements in printing invited more studio and conceptual photography, which quickly overshadowed Steinweiss’ more illustrative style. Regardless of the proliferation of the new

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pg. 4.

¹⁵⁹ McKnight-Trontz and Steinweiss, pg. 6.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., pg. 7.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pg. 4.

¹⁶² Ibid., pg. 5-7.

¹⁶³ Ibid., pg. 10.

¹⁶⁴ McKnight-Trontz and Steinweiss, pg. 10.

photographic trends, he was able to art-direct, design photo shoots, and illustrate album covers for almost every major label during this period.

Much to Steinweiss' chagrin, a trend emerged during the 1950s that would negatively impact the world of album cover design as the two fastest growing and most influential media, popular music and film, threatened to strip cover designs of their individual uniqueness. Not surprisingly, "the biggest record companies in America were associated, in varying degrees, with the film industry, and their publicists were quick to exploit the fact that recorded music and films shared the same market."¹⁶⁵ In response, many record labels realized that the eye-catching imagery of the film poster was both an easily adapted and cheap way to adorn the 12" x 12" space of an album cover. During this period the most common form of album cover design was a simple photograph of the artist accompanied by both its title and some sort of slogan (i.e., "50,000,000 Elvis Fans Can't be Wrong," "Sensational American Hit-Makers," or "The New Sound!"¹⁶⁶). Although it would seem that vapid consumerism had won out over artistic expression, a smaller musical genre would keep the artistic tradition in album covers alive.

Jazz, with its slightly sophisticated audience, was associated with long musical improvisations and its album covers would prove just as influential as the music they housed. In the 1950s, jazz labels were usually small companies "run by dedicated people with a strong sense of musical history who were more concerned with making jazz music available than with huge profits."¹⁶⁷ Often one person handled record production, marketing administration, and packaging, and this informality together with the improvisational nature of the music, led to a more flexible approach to the problem of design.¹⁶⁸ Within the genre there was a conscious attempt, as Steinweiss had done a decade earlier, to link the visuals to the music. Jazz music tended to be associated with the avant-garde and before long both avant-garde imagery and abstract expressionism found their way onto jazz record covers. This would have an incalculable affect on the next generation of album cover designers.

In the late 1950s, rock-n-roll had all but died out in the United States. Original rock-n-roll artists such as Chuck berry, Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, and Buddy Holly had either died, or been marginalized by poor professional or personal decisions. In response, the major labels had attempted to replace them with the less rebellious, more accessible "teen idol" (e.g., Fabian, Bobby

¹⁶⁵ Dean and Howells, pg. 16.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Dean and Howells, pg. 16.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Darin, Dion, Neil Sedaka, etc.). Yet, across the Atlantic, British youth were embracing the original American rock-n-roll and its iconography. With the ascendancy and massive popularity of groups such as the Beatles and Rolling Stones, “record companies were obliged to make certain concessions to major artists.”¹⁶⁹ Of these concessions, the one most directly tied to the resurgence of album cover design was the notion of “artistic freedom/control.”¹⁷⁰ In “Swinging” London, “the worlds of fashion, advertising, fine art and popular music became inextricably involved with each other and an elite group of photographers, models, designers, filmmakers, artists and performers”¹⁷¹ quickly became the arbiters of taste.

One has to look no further than the first Beatles or Rolling Stones album covers and compare them to those from three years later to see the sharp contrast in visual and artistic design styles. Many members of English bands that emerged during this period, including the Beatles, The Who, Rolling Stones, and Pink Floyd, all had art school backgrounds or connections. Their reliance on art school friends for album cover designs pushed art-directors at record companies to “become more sensitive to the possibilities of the album cover medium.”¹⁷² Album cover design was being lumped in with and labeled “Pop Art” and this definition was “bringing about a situation of feedback between the ‘fine’ arts and everyday visual ephemera which was exhilarating for artists, critics and the public alike.”¹⁷³ As both Steinweiss and jazz music had proven in the previous decades, new artists “helped propel the [record] companies out of their pre-conditioned attitudes to packaging and design...it was only then that the sales-oriented people and the recording artists themselves began to understand the ‘commercial value’ of a well-designed cover.”¹⁷⁴

The “psychedelic era” of the middle 1960s served to expand artistic expression and it wasn’t long before album covers began conveying psychedelic themes. Utilizing a number of new techniques, including fish-eye and wide-angle photography, day-glo colors, and collage style montages, artists were able to convey the thoughts, feelings, and in some cases, the music of many of the bands they were representing.¹⁷⁵ The best examples include the Beatles’ “Revolver” (psychedelic) and “Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band” (psychedelic, collage and day-glo colors), Cream’s “Disraeli Gears” (psychedelic, collage and day-glo colors), the Rolling Stones’

¹⁶⁹ Dean and Howells, pg. 17.

¹⁷⁰ Brad Benedict and Linda Barton, Phonographics: Contemporary Album Cover Art and Design (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1977), pg. 6.

¹⁷¹ Dean and Howells, pg. 17.

¹⁷² Dean and Howells, pg.18.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Walter Herdeg (Editor), Graphis: Record Covers (New York: Hastings House, 1974), pg. 9.

¹⁷⁵ Dean and Howells, pg. 18.

“Between the Buttons,” and The Jimi Hendrix Experience’s “Are You Experienced” (wide angle/fish eye photography). In San Francisco, artist Rick Griffin used “convoluted forms and the stylized lettering of Art Nouveau”¹⁷⁶ to design concert posters and, in a style termed “Organic Modern,” also produced a host of distinctive Grateful Dead album covers.

If the mid-1960s was the era of psychedelic experimentation and introspection, the late-1960s and much of the 1970s were the years of rock-n-roll’s overindulgence. During this era rock-n-roll stars hunkered down in their elaborate mansion studios and spent hours perfecting the perfect sound and years recording perfect albums. Record covers would also undergo changes during this overindulgent period as well. No strangers to the value of eye-catching and elaborate packages, record companies began experimenting with a host of new packaging options. For album cover artists and designers, this era was a great opportunity to expand their creativity levels. Almost overnight, “double sleeves became the norm even for new groups; fold-outs, die-cuts, embossed and complicated constructions hit the market, with posters, books, and other novelties thrown in.”¹⁷⁷ Some of the notable albums from this period include The Jimi Hendrix Experience’s “Axis Bold As Love” LP (gatefold cover), the Beatles “Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band” LP (gatefold cover, poster, and paper dolls insert), Andy Warhol’s zipper adorned cover for the Rolling Stones’ “Sticky Fingers” LP, or the Small Faces’ “Ogden’s Nut Gone Flake” LP, which simulated a circular tobacco tin instead of the traditional 12” x 12” square cover.

Just as it would seem that album cover design had gone as far as it could, an interesting change occurred. By the middle 1980s the long playing record, which had been the industry standard for nearly 35 years, was slowly faded out and replaced with the high-tech compact disc (CD). The era in which album “covers were revered as ‘emblems of generational identity,’ and widely regarded by graphic designers and – more importantly, the record buying public – as one of the principal arenas for artistic expression and visual experimentation”¹⁷⁸ was in for a major change. For some artists and designers, not to mention musicians who had grown accustomed to the visual options presented by the 12” x 12” cover, the change was a difficult adjustment to make. In response, musicians and artists had to rethink their design options. The result has been quite astounding.

Initially, the CD format was a 5” x 5” plastic case that allowed for a front cover (and usually a booklet of lyrics), a back cover, and two thin 1/8” spines. For the artist it was only a matter of

¹⁷⁶ Dean and Howells, pg. 18.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pg. 19.

¹⁷⁸ Intro, Contemporary Music Graphics (New York: Universe Publishing, 1992), pg. 4.

shrinking down a larger piece of work to fit the new format. Over time though, some record companies began experimenting with alternative packaging options that included miniature cardboard album covers, gatefold and multi disc packages, and colored or clear plastic case packaging. With such a wide variety of packaging options it was only a matter of time before graphic designers and visual artists began experimenting with and pushing the medium in new directions. The challenge of the CD format, like the 10” and 12” format before them, “has produced an ingenious array of design solutions, including the use of concertina foldout covers to dramatically increase the space available for both graphics and text, and the utilization of unusual materials for the CD case, such as tinted plastic, tin, and cloth, as well as various types of paper, card, and wood.”¹⁷⁹ Also, unlike the 12” record album format, CDs allow the designer to incorporate the disc’s surface into the larger design scheme. The numerous concepts currently in production or those being experimented with are literally astounding.

As to whether or not album cover artwork is a legitimate art form, the jury is still out. In the middle 1990s, an upscale furniture, fixture, and accessories company called Restoration Hardware began manufacturing and selling album cover wall frames. These simple 12” x 12” frames allow record albums to be professionally displayed as if they were pieces of legitimate art. And why shouldn’t they be considered art? Album covers have become permanent items that many consider objects of affection. Often owners remember their favorite records by conjuring up the cover in their minds. “Sometimes the sleeve will remind them of their personal lives, sometimes it will reflect the music of the period and, on rarer occasions, it will echo the changing world at large.”¹⁸⁰ But, personal feelings of the owner aside, does this make the designs presented on album covers art?

The answer of course, depends upon whom you pose the question. The keepers and protectors of the *fine art* tradition – critics, curators, and traditional artists – might answer in the negative. Their beliefs are shaped by an exclusive definition of art and their characterization of album covers as nothing more than commercial designs or product advertising. To the album cover artist though, who makes, or attempts to make, a different product each time he creates a new design, his “artistic innovation is vigorously encouraged both by the wide range of music itself and by the people who buy it.”¹⁸¹ This notion is proven by the diverse mediums utilized for album

¹⁷⁹ Roger Walton (Editor), Sight for Sound: Design and Music Mixes Plus (New York: Hearst Books International, 1998), pg. 6.

¹⁸⁰ Dean and Howells, pg. 76.

¹⁸¹ Dean and Howells, pg. 76.

cover artwork. Styles used include but are not limited to, fashion, photography, modern surrealism, collage, fantasy/sci-fi, illustration, and abstract art. As one album designer describes, “it is a creative furnace where new heraldry, new icons, and even new languages are formed in a constantly changing ferment of image invention.”¹⁸²

While the packaging of recorded music has become an increasingly efficient mediator between musicians and their public, it has more importantly resulted in some of the most striking commercial art ever created where “its dynamism derives from the fact that it is, so to speak, art selling art, artists packaging artists.”¹⁸³ One has to look no further than Andy Warhol’s early participation in the jazz world or his venture into rock-n-roll with The Velvet Underground or the Rolling Stones to prove this point. Album cover artwork, whether on the 10” x 10” cardboard sleeve pioneered by Alex Steinweiss in 1939 or the present day 5” x 5” CD jewel case, has played a significant role in both popular culture and the art world. Such endeavors have been labeled merely graphic design by some, but more importantly as Commercial Art, Pop Art, and Folk Art by many observers. This fact alone legitimizes these artist’s endeavors. But perhaps, as critics and supporters attempt to characterize its appeal, categorize its product, and demonize or canonize its work, most would argue that the best judge of an album cover’s significance rests upon the people who connect with and purchase it.

¹⁸² Spencer Drate, Designing for Music (New York: PBC International, Inc., 1992), pg. 8.

¹⁸³ Brad Benedict and Linda Barton, pg. 6.

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*Reaching out to Progress:
Chilean Identity and Santiago's International Exposition of 1875*

Annelle Reed

“La Exposición Internacional es el testimonio más elocuente de la grandeza de nuestros destinos: es el clarísimo espejo en que van a reproducirse nuestras esperanzas, porque los pueblos que así trabajan, tienen derecho a la felicidad.”¹⁸⁴

Guillermo C. de Larraya, Correo de la Exposición, 16 Septiembre de 1875

Since the first international exposition held in London in 1851, world fairs and international expositions became a means of building national identity and national unity for both hosting countries and participating countries. The goals of these international gatherings have served both internal and external political and economic purposes while also impacting local and international elite culture. The growth in participation and public interest in these events in the 19th century indicate the focus of cultural values on efficiency, modernity, consumer culture and abundance. The displays and exhibits often provided a showcase for cultural values and demonstrations of power. World fairs are still held every several years even in the 21st century, yet modern avenues of instant communication through television and the internet have taken over many of the functions of the earlier world fairs. For the first 100 years, since London's 1851 exposition, these events were influential sites for the display of hegemonic power, imperialism, racist ideologies, new technologies and ‘progress’ (Rydell, 1984, 22).

In a recent work, Rydell and his co-authors present six avenues of interpretation of world's fairs¹⁸⁵ (Rydell et al, 2000, 5). One method of interpretation, termed “cultural hegemony,” considers the goals of the organizers and their intentions to influence both their own citizens and international visitors. This is the perspective of study most relevant to this paper. In this case the organizer and sponsor is the Chilean government. My research studies Chile's official exposition correspondence and the *Correo de la Exposición*, the journal of this event, for indications of the country's emerging national identity. While often promotional in nature, these documents reveal the identity of Chile as imagined by Chilean leadership in the 1870s in their representation of the country's history, heroes and economic potential. Due to Chile's position as a newly independent, non-imperialist nation, I

¹⁸⁴ “The international exposition is the most eloquent testimony to the greatness of our destinies: it is the clearest mirror that reflects what our hopes will produce, because those peoples who work like this have the right to success”

¹⁸⁵ Rydell, Robert W., John E. Findling, and Kimberley D. Pelle. *Fair America*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press. 2000. Rydell et. al. suggest that there are 6 approaches to the study of World Expositions: (1) cultural hegemony which centers on the organizers and producers of the event, (2) audience-centered view of how fair-goers receive fair, (3) counter-hegemony which considers how exploited peoples benefited from fair exhibition, (4) anthropological study of a modern day ritual focused on consumerism and personality, (5) documentary approach to the technological, scientific, architectural and urban planning dimensions of fairs, and (6) non-academic histories of the fairs by writers and collectors which convey the excitement of these international events.

view this approach in terms of a nation-building exercise for both Chilean and international consumption whereby the Chilean elites sought to place their nation in a positive position among the leading European and American nations. This event in 1875 provided the venue for the presentation of Chile and its national identity to the world.



Chile's Preparations and Expectations for the event

Chile was one of 34 countries to accept Britain's invitation to participate in the 1851 Crystal Palace exposition in London (Greenhalgh, 1988, 12). By 1875 Chilean leadership was familiar with the expectation and promise of hosting such an event from participation in earlier international fairs and its hosting of two national expositions within the previous 6 years. Santiago had been the site of a national exposition in 1869, the *Esposición Agrícola*, in which Chilean agriculture was the focus. Most notably, in 1872 Chile staged a national exposition of Arts and Industry that included displays in agriculture, industry and art. These national expositions showcased the country's

interest in progress and modernity within a European framework. After the 1872 national expo the leadership was prepared to move these expositions to an international level.

The 1860s and early 1870s were a period of rapid change in Chile in terms of the development of infrastructure and society. The growth of communication and transportation systems is one aspect of Chile's development. Railroad construction of more than 1,000 kilometers was in place by the mid-1870s. The construction was completed with both government and private funding (Collier and Sater, 2004, 73). Modern, rapid communication systems were also established. By 1874 the country was connected by telegraph with Europe, via Brazil and underwater cable (Foresti et al., 1999, 337). Foresti et al. describe the urban centers of Chile in this period. Valparaiso, a port city of some 150,000 inhabitants, was a modern international city by the 1870s. Santiago had also established its position as the capital city and urban center of the country. Other Chilean cities had populations of 20,000 or fewer and functioned on the periphery of Valparaiso and Santiago (1999, 346). International visitors to the exposition would see the two most developed centers of the country but they would leave with little information about rural areas and populations.

Political stability and the appearance of increased material well-being in Chile inspired pride among the urban Chileans in the late 19th century (Collier and Sater, 2004, 103). Santiago's exposition of 1875 reflects the enthusiasm and expectation of future prosperity for this young Latin American nation. The Chilean elite and their President at the time saw a clear path to growing success and progress in the nation in the 1870s. True to the positivist attitudes of the times, they believed that any obstacles of economic and social instabilities could be solved through applications of science and organization. They looked to the United States and Europe for methods and technologies that could advance their nation. This international exposition offered an ideal arrangement for technology transfer from the Chilean perspective.

In the initial decree, dated January 2, 1873, President Errázuriz invited national and international participation in this government-sponsored event. Errázuriz wrote that this event will exhibit "natural, industrial, manufactured and artistic products from Chilean producers and from any other countries who would like to participate" (MIN, 1873). While we can fit the Chilean fair into Rydell's category of cultural hegemony, this event is unique because of Chile's geographic location and, in terms of economic development, its tenuous position on the periphery of industrialized and imperialist countries.

Indeed, most of the expositions held in Latin America in the 19th century espoused different goals than those organized in Europe and North America during this period. The expositions of Rio

de Janeiro, Santiago, Caracas, Buenos Aires and Guatemala City were organized to present their countries in a positive light¹⁸⁶. Most of these countries sought to attract investment as well as to promote further modernization and industrialization in their countries. Chile was interested in attracting investment, but also sought recognition as part of the civilized, industrialized world. The purpose of the Chilean expo resonates with Gonzalez-Stephan's description of the Caracas exposition of 1883 as an avenue to "staking claim to a place in 'Western civilization'" (2003, 238).

Building the Economy

The Chilean leadership and elite class were aware that their country's narrowly defined economic development relied heavily on the export of copper, wheat and flour in the 1870s. According to the call for exhibitors, Chileans were seeking new technologies and inventions that they could apply in their current agricultural, mining, and manufacturing industries. In the 1870s, mining of copper was Chile's largest export category, averaging more than 44% of the country's total exports with an annual value of more than 16 million dollars per year in 1872 and 1873 (Carmona, 1875,1). Agricultural products, namely wheat and flour, accounted for 43% of exports in 1872 and 38% of exports in 1873, with more than \$14 million in annual exports (Ibid, 1875, 1). Yet, the boom and bust cycle of wheat production for export had nearly ended by 1875. The demand for Chilean wheat and flour by the U.S. and Australia had ended almost as quickly as it had appeared in the mid-century. Improved transport times and southern hemisphere production had allowed Chileans to continue exporting wheat to England into the 1870s. However, by 1878 *The Economist* in London had stopped including price quotes of Chilean wheat in its publication (Collier and Sater, 2004, 82).

Despite the economic potential of Chile as promoted by the government during the Exposition, the country's manufacturing base was weak and had not implemented many technological production advances in its mining and agricultural sectors. Arnold Bauer attributes this lack of investment and technological advance to several characteristics of the Chilean elite. He notes that landowners recognized the volatility of the agricultural export production that kept them from investing in infrastructure and new production methods (1975, 69). Additionally, Bauer notes that sufficient labor allowed landowners to continue to rely on manpower and traditional farming practices instead of applying mechanized methods (1975,150). Thirdly, lack of domestic demand

³Literature on Latin American participation in international expositions has expanded rapidly in recent years. For studies of the participation of other Latin American countries in international expositions,, see works by Ingrid E. Fey on Argentina, Beatriz Gonzalez-Stephan on Venezuela, Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo on Mexico, and Frederic Martinez on Colombia.

for agricultural products also resulted in little incentive to modernize production systems and seek greater outputs in all sectors including cattle (1975, 121).

The president of the Ministry of Agriculture, Domingo Bezanilla, emphasized in his correspondence the need to recognize “the current situation of Chile”, referring to its narrowly focused economy, and to encourage the building of industry beyond agriculture and mining (MIN, June 1873). Bezanilla solicited exposition entries by four main themes: primary materials, machinery, industrial and manufactured goods, and fine arts (MIN, June 1873 correspondence). Each category consisted of numerous sections totaling 26 different classifications of entry to the fair. Additionally, a special section for public education was included at the fair. Chile sought to build their educational system in terms of curriculum and teaching materials, and even school furnishings. The *Programa Jeneral* provided this listing of categories to countries interested in participating.

Unlike earlier regional or national fairs in Chile, Santiago’s international exposition differed in the breadth of displays and their focus on technology and progress. The fair was inclusive of traditional, homemade and handmade products although the emphasis was on modernity and the inputs, inventions and processes that could offer modern, efficient output. Most sections of the exposition described by the *Programa Jeneral*, asked for displays of mass-produced goods and the technologies to allow for large scale production. However, openings for traditional, homemade entries were also included to a lesser degree. There was a section for prepared foods such as dried fruit, breads, sugar, and beverages. Handmade as well as machine-made lace and embroidery were listed in the manufactured section as well.

The availability of and desire for material goods was growing in Chile as elsewhere. Just as was the case in Europe and the United States, availability, if not production of, material ‘decorative’ goods was a sign of progress and modernity. In the industry and manufactured section one category allotted for “artículos de decoración i ornamentación de habitaciones”. The inclusion of this category reflects the existence of an upper class Chilean interest in fine material, decorative items. Indeed, Chile’s ruling class and landowners would become known for their conspicuous consumption in the later part of the 19th century and early 20th century.

The international exposition fits easily into Foucault’s themes of the modern power structures (1980) which define the modern industrialized view of man and machine. International expositions were not about the individual and there were few elements that pertained to social wellbeing in these events. Instead, they revealed the hierarchy of power. Education, nourishment,

and clothing are the sections that especially expose the power structures within which items were entered into the exposition. These sections also come closest to acknowledging the existence of the average citizen within these power structures. This is where we can most clearly recognize class and social divisions. In one group of the industry and manufactured category, all articles of dress were accepted, although the details in the description place emphasis on “complete outfits for the working classes” and clothing “applicable for conditions of duration and at low prices for correctional facilities or public welfare” (*Programa Jeneral*).

Manpower was not the focus of progress, as can be understood in an article in the *Correo* about sewing machines, which praises these machines as if they were a beloved family member. The machine, rather than the human, would lead to a glorious destiny of modernization and development: “the most perfect machines, most numerous and powerful, inviting us to follow them on the road to civilization and prosperity“ (October 2, 1875). Advance in agricultural production methods emphasized machinery. Progress in agricultural production was manifested in the types of crops and methods of production but labor issues were not part of the exhibition despite their position as a critical component of this sector.

The *Correo* also mentions four special awards offered in areas that will specifically meet the needs of Chile (September 16, 1875). Here again we see the focus on technological advances. The first two awards, a sum of 1,000 pesos each, are designated for railway and water distribution systems specifically to fit the needs of Chile. The third award is for a drilling apparatus for mining. The fourth award, in the amount of 500 pesos, was for a study of the needs and social state of the rural classes in Chile. This fourth award indicates an emerging awareness that attention needed to be given to the situation of the rural classes. While there are few examples of class consciousness in Chile, the Chañarcillo strike of 1865 was probably the first miners strike in Chilean history and may have introduced the possibility of labor uprisings to the country¹⁸⁷ (Collier and Sater 2004, 93). Yet it should be noted that other studies found that the state of rural dwellers became less important to those who had the power to improve rural conditions. Landowners increasingly spent less time outside of the city. Most of their money and investment was aimed at improvements in urban living (Bauer, 1975, 174).

⁴ With the owners’ attempt to impose wage-lowering regulations at the Charnarcillo mines in 1865, the workers organized a strike and successfully won. Collier and Sater note that mining camps were volatile and social disturbances may have occurred there as early as 1834, but this 1865 strike was the first example of successful organization by workers.

Other types of exhibits introduced visitors to Chile through the country's natural resources. On the second floor of the main exposition palace a wooden map of central Chile was placed on exhibit. This map conformed to the topography and geology of central Chile. Natural resources were to remain a key to Chile's development and position within the world economy and wood in particular has been an important export product for southern Chile into the 21st century. A collection of Chilean wood was submitted to the exposition by Mr. Guillermo Frick.

The *Correo de la Exposición* included a report by Mr. Frick on the types of trees and shrubs found in Chile in the area of Valdivia, their common names, and general information about their location, size and uses (November 6, 1875). Frick notes that the *Pelmen* or *Pino Araucano*, known to be used by the Spanish marines for masts, also produce fruit which were harvested and sold by the indigenous populations to residents of Valdivia. This is one of the few mentions of the native populations in Chile in the *Correo* publication. As noted above, the representation of Chile, its nation and people, generally ignores the existence of non-Europeans. References to Chilean history and art at the exposition also excluded folklore of the indigenous cultures.

Presenting the Chilean Nation

Part of creating national identity is the invention of traditions. Hobsbawm defined three major innovations relevant to the invention of tradition: primary education, invention of public ceremonies and mass production of public monuments (1983, 271). The International Exposition in Santiago reveals the acknowledgement of the role of such inventions. The special section on public education at the Exposition also falls within Hobsbawm's definition of the invention of tradition. The creation of monuments at the exposition such as the statue of Conquistador Pedro Valdivia was the beginning of the building of a national story and a national identity for Chileans, albeit one with grave implications for Chile's indigenous peoples.

Documents written both prior to and during the Exposition sought to introduce Chile to the world in terms of its history and potential. Beyond economic potential, a positive perspective of the Chilean people and culture was presented. As government official Adolfo Ibáñez wrote in official correspondence to Chile's diplomatic representatives in Latin America and North America, the government had in mind a double objective with the organization of the exposition: to introduce new industries in Chile and to present Chile to other 'civilized' nations (MIN, vol 665, January 16, 1875).

In her description of Argentina's pavilion at the 1889 Paris Universal Exposition, Ingrid Fey (2000, 63) notes the depiction of two Argentine identities: the cosmopolitan, modern (urban)

Argentina and the traditional, rural Argentina which was the source of the country's natural resources. Fey recognizes the combining of these two identities at the Paris exposition. Chile placed only one identity on display at the 1875 exposition: that of the modern, European-style Chile found principally in the urban areas. Although natural resources were recognized as a key component of Chile's economic future, visitors would not encounter many indications of these rural, industrial areas. Resources were figuratively and physically removed from their origins to be properly presented at the exposition.

What is left out of a display or description is also revealing. The indigenous population was not included in this exposition, as an entity or even as an oddity as occurred at later international exhibitions. Anthropological displays began at the 1889 exposition in Paris and were more prominent at the 1893 World's Colombian Exposition. Most often these exhibits featured 'living' anthropological exhibits which were meant for entertainment but also for educational purposes as with anthropologist Franz Boas' exhibits which sought to place indigenous peoples within the context of their traditional housing and daily tasks (Rydell et al., 2000, 38). The absence of the indigenous peoples of Chile and the other Latin American nations indicates their non-involvement, exclusion and irrelevance in the eyes of the hosts of the exposition.

The only evidence of the existence of indigenous populations was to be found in the display of artifacts from earlier civilizations. Two collections from Ecuador are noted in the *Correo*. As described in an article titled "Antiguedades del Ecuador", the importance of these collections is measured in terms of understanding the state of civilization in earlier times (October 2, 1875). An additional document by Benjamin Rencoret which accompanied his collection of archeological artifacts from Ecuador calls on Chile to be "an example of refined Americanism by founding an American archeological academy". Rencoret goes into detail about the types of artifacts that should be included and the areas of study necessary in such an institution. Areas of study were to include archaeology, ethnography, ethnology, and ethnogenetics. He notes that South America has fallen behind North and Central America in the study and understanding of earlier civilizations of their region. Notably Rencoret is also offering to obtain and sell some of these artifacts to Chile for its national collection.

The Santiago Exposition aimed to acquaint the world with Chile, its landscape, its resources, and its national story. The European-defined history of the country was also on exhibit. A sculpture of Pedro Valdivia commissioned by the Chileans and created by Italian sculptor Costoli stood "among the multitude of details that adorn the avenues and surrounding of the main palace of

the Exposition” (*Correo*, September 16, 1875). Valdivia is described as a warrior, the founder of Santiago in 1540, and the “first representative of the conquest of our glorious future” (ibid). Another commissioned work of art is also featured on the first page of the second edition of the *Correo*. This painting of the abdication of Bernardo O’Higgins in 1823 is described in full detail in the second issue of the *Correo* dated October 2, 1875. The symbolism of this painting by Manuel Antonio Caro is striking. It depicts the civilized manner of the Chilean people and government. There is calm in the stances and expressions of O’Higgins and the other individuals and a notable lack of violence amidst a serious and urgent political crisis.

Comparing Chile to its Latin American neighbors

International expositions provide numerous possibilities for comparisons between countries and there was a competitive nature to these events. Comparisons and competition between the countries of Latin America were evident in the articles of the *Correo*. Chileans compared their nation with their Latin American neighbors as a way of defining the country’s own emerging identity. Judging by some of the criticisms of Chile’s neighbors in the *Correo*, it seems that this publication, written in both French and Spanish, was produced primarily for Chilean and European readers. These articles reveal how Chile compared other Latin American countries to their own both in terms of society and culture and in terms of economic position and potential. For example, Bolivia’s collection is described as relatively poor. The silk production endeavor is considered to exist exclusively due to foreign investment and “will probably disappear by the same hand that initiated it”¹⁸⁸ (*Correo*, January 26, 1876). On the other hand, the *Correo* sees coca production as “destined to become an object of a vast commerce” in Bolivia (ibid). The *Correo* notes that Venezuela is just in the raw material production stage of development (November 6, 1875), and Argentine production has suffered from civil unrest (December 5, 1875). None of the Latin American countries seem to have the stability and opportunity that is alluded to in Chile’s presentation of its own country.

Shortly after the close of the Exposition in January of 1876, this optimistic view of Chile’s future was clouded by economic downturns, unfavorable weather conditions, and clashes with neighbors to the east and the north. Territory disputes leading to the War of the Pacific and the pacification of the Mapuche brought the harsh realities of state conflict to the forefront and obscured much of the goodwill trumpeted by the *Correo*. The 1875 Exposition was a brief high point in the country’s 19th century history, in a period of rapid change throughout Latin America.

¹⁸⁸ “probablemente desaparecerá con la mano que lo han findado”

The Exposition is clearly a testimony to Chilean elite aspirations and their allegiance to the ideas of positivism in 1875 but not necessarily a gateway to the greatness of the country's destiny as Larraya wrote on opening day (see opening quotation). Yet many of the aspects of Chilean national identity as constructed by the elites and found in promotional exposition literature remain a part of Chilean identity in the 21st century. The unique combinations of landscape, climates and resources of this narrow land and its homogeneous population are still relevant when compared to other Latin American countries including Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil.

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Ties of Singular Intimacy: U.S. Imperialism in Cuba, 1895-1934

Brian Eckert

From the time of the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States has taken special interest in Latin American affairs.¹⁸⁹ Cuba has not been an exception to this rule. Throughout the nineteenth century, Americans had argued various fates for Cuba. Some argued for the annexation of Cuba to the United States, others advocated imperial colonization of the island, and yet some Americans just wanted Cuba to achieve its independence from the Spanish Empire.¹⁹⁰ Finally in 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American War, the United States gained control over Cuba. President William McKinley declared that he wished to create “ties of singular intimacy” with a future independent Cuba.¹⁹¹ Even though the United States granted the Cuban people independence in 1902, Cuba remained under U.S. imperial power through military interventions and economic dependence for decades through these ties of singular intimacy. How did the United States use imperialism to wield control over Cuba from the late nineteenth century through the early 1930s, and how were these policies justified to the American public?

A brief review of Cuban history leading up to the late 1890s is important in understanding the events that unfolded over the next three decades. Spain claimed Cuba as a colonial possession for the better part of four centuries by the time the Cuban people first revolted in 1868. This first war for independence lasted for ten years and ended in failure.¹⁹² The second war for independence erupted in 1895, and drew the attention of many American and international observers. The President of the United States, Grover Cleveland, opposed involvement and declared and maintained neutrality as the United States’ policy toward the Cuban revolution during his administration.¹⁹³ Even the American press advocated restraint against intervention. ““It is no part of the business of the United States or the American people to foment quarrels anywhere or to interfere in them,”” the *New York World* stated.¹⁹⁴ The *New York Tribune* argued that the American

¹⁸⁹ John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* (New York, 2004), 69.

¹⁹⁰ Harry F. Guggenheim, *The United States and Cuba: A Study in International Relations* (Freeport, NY, 1934), 3-4.

¹⁹¹ Quoted in David A. Lockmiller, *Magoon in Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention, 1906-1909* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1938), 11. President McKinley made this statement in his message to Congress, December 5, 1899.

¹⁹² Philip S. Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism: Volume I 1895-1898* (New York, 1972), xviii. Foner believes that the Treaty of Zanjón essentially established a truce that would last until the second war for independence, xix.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 203. Grover Cleveland served as president for a second term between 1893 and 1897. He had previously served a first term from 1885 to 1889.

¹⁹⁴ Quoted in Joseph E. Wisan, *The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898)* (New York, 1977), 44.

people “are not anxious either to fight for [the Cubans] or to obtain the island by conquest.”¹⁹⁵ While the press encouraged the Cubans’ struggle for independence, they did not want to see the United States drawn into a war with Spain to achieve that goal for Cuba.

This viewpoint began to change by the time William McKinley took office as president in March 1897. Reports of Spanish violence and cruelty had been published in the U.S. press since the middle of 1896. The press detailed accounts of Spaniards murdering Cuban prisoners through shootings and beatings.¹⁹⁶ Various newspapers began calling for American intervention, not necessarily through war, but any means in which the “outrages in Cuba” would be stopped.¹⁹⁷ The *New York Journal* believed that it would be to Spain’s domestic benefit to release control of its colonial possessions.¹⁹⁸ By early 1898, McKinley had authorized the battleship *Maine* to sail to Havana under the pretense of protecting American citizens there, and also as a gesture of friendship toward Spain.¹⁹⁹ On the evening of February 15, 1898, the *Maine* exploded in Havana Harbor and killed 266 men on board.²⁰⁰ The American press influenced the public so much about the “treachery of the Spaniards,” that the public assumed that Spain had deliberately destroyed the *Maine*.²⁰¹ As Joseph Wisan states, “Little wonder that the ‘average reader,’ indoctrinated with these opinions, called on his Government for War.”²⁰²

On April 25, 1898, President McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war. Congress declared that a state of war against Spain had existed since April 21.²⁰³ The war lasted four months, and officially ended in a treaty on August 12, in which the Cubans were completely left out of the negotiations.²⁰⁴ The United States took over control of the island, rather than giving the Cubans their independence. U.S. control would last until May 20, 1902, when the Cuban republic gained its independence at last.²⁰⁵

However, the United States had given the Cubans an ultimatum in order to grant independence to the island. The Cuban constitutional convention had to adopt the Platt

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Wisan, *The Cuban Crisis*, 65.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 163.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War, Vol I*, 228.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 236-237.

²⁰¹ Wisan, *The Cuban Crisis*, 460. In actuality, Spain had nothing to do with the destruction of the *Maine*. Subsequent examinations have proven the explosion to be an accident.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Foner, *The Spanish-Cuban-American War, Vol I*, 276.

²⁰⁴ Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1983), 210.

²⁰⁵ Aviva Chomsky, Barry Carr and Pamela M. Smorkaloff, eds., *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham, NC, 2003), 143.

Amendment, which gave the United States broad discretionary powers over Cuba, in the Cuban constitution; otherwise the United States would continue its occupation.²⁰⁶ The Platt Amendment had been passed by the United States Congress as an amendment added to the Army Appropriations Bill of 1901-1902, that had been introduced by Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut.²⁰⁷ President McKinley signed the bill in March 1901.²⁰⁸ The Platt Amendment became a very controversial document of U.S. policy and its imperialism in Cuba. Article III of the amendment gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs whenever the U.S. felt it was necessary to protect the Cuban republic. Article IV stated that any acts of the United States during its military occupancy were ratified and thus legal statutes. Article VII dictated that the Cuban government would sell or lease locations for the United States to establish naval bases and coaling stations for the defense of Cuba and the United States.²⁰⁹ The Platt Amendment laid the groundwork that led to many U.S. interventions through the first three decades of Cuban independence.²¹⁰

Some have claimed that the United States used the Platt Amendment to assist the fledgling Cuban republic, and to ensure its sovereignty from foreign powers. While it is possible that this may have been a motivation in passing the amendment, it is more likely that its purpose would be to legally intervene in Cuban affairs to promote U.S. imperial policies. As Louis Pérez claims, “The Platt Amendment rested on the central if not fully stated premise that the principal danger to U.S. interests in Cuba originated with Cubans themselves...”²¹¹ Americans feared that granting the Cubans full independence without the Platt Amendment in place would severely harm U.S. interests there. The amendment basically guaranteed that the United States could have legal grounds for intervening in Cuba, even if it was actually to protect American rather than Cuban interests. This becomes more apparent when historians examine the “authors” of the Platt Amendment. While Senator Platt created most of the legislative amendment himself, several others had a heavy hand in creating and interpreting the legislation.²¹² U.S. Governor-General of Cuba, Leonard Wood, worked towards making an agreement between the United States and Cuba that would promote their common interests.²¹³ Essentially, this boiled down to an agreement that would actually benefit the

²⁰⁶ Leland H. Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony: A Study in Sugar* (New York, 1928), 77.

²⁰⁷ Guggenheim, *The United States and Cuba*, 74; Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony*, 77.

²⁰⁸ Chomsky, et al., *The Cuba Reader*, 147.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 147-148. It is through Article VII of the Platt Amendment that the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay was established, and is still an active U.S. naval base to this day.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 143.

²¹¹ Louis A. Pérez, Jr., *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy* (Athens, GA, 1990), 110.

²¹² Lockmiller, *Magoon in Cuba*, 11.

²¹³ Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony*, 75.

United States and its imperial interests before that of Cuban interests. U.S. Secretary of War, Elihu Root, believed that, “To ensure Cuba’s independence it seemed necessary for the United States to secure rights there which everyone would recognize and respect...,” and not have the United States’ power be limited to emergency situations.²¹⁴

As mentioned earlier, the fate of Cuban independence rested upon the adoption of the Platt Amendment in the new Cuban constitution. There were no alternatives in Secretary Root’s opinion. ““Under the act of Congress they never can have any further government in Cuba, except the intervening Government of the United States, until they have acted.””²¹⁵ The last part of Secretary Root’s statement meant that the United States would continue to occupy Cuba until the constitutional convention adopted the Platt Amendment. As can be clearly seen, the Platt Amendment was not established for the protection of Cuban independence. Rather, its purpose was to guarantee the United States the right to intervene in Cuban affairs whenever it wished to protect U.S. interests there. The amendment was created under the auspices of establishing a mutually beneficial treaty with the Cuban republic, whereas its real purpose was solely to further U.S. imperial power over Cuba. However, the Cubans capitulated to the U.S. demand by adding the amendment as an appendix to their constitution.²¹⁶ Finally on May 20, 1902, after more than three years of U.S. occupation, Cuba was granted its independence.²¹⁷ Unfortunately, the Platt Amendment gave the United States the power to reoccupy Cuba three additional times over the next thirty years.²¹⁸

An intriguing way to view how the United States justified its imperialism in Cuba is through an examination of American political cartoons printed from just before the Spanish-American War through the Cuban Revolution of 1933. By examining these cartoons, we can see how American popular opinion may have viewed the Cuban republic and the imperial policies of the United States. As John J. Johnson states, “Mass communications, to achieve their objective of influencing public opinion... must reflect the realities, beliefs, and psychological needs of the cultures of which they are a part.”²¹⁹ Historians can study how the American public justified their government’s imperial control over a supposedly sovereign nation through the imagery of political cartoons.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 74.

²¹⁵ Quoted in Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 111-112.

²¹⁶ Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 112.

²¹⁷ Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *Cuba and the United States 1900-1935* (New York, 1935), 87-88.

²¹⁸ The U.S. military reoccupied Cuba from 1906-09, in 1912, and 1917-20. Chomsky, et al., *The Cuba Reader*, 143.

²¹⁹ John J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature* (Austin, TX, 1980), 3.

The first perspective of Cuba in political cartoons came in portraying Cuba and its people as a woman. This portrayal dominated the perspectives of Cuba in the years preceding the Spanish-American War, and the four-month duration of the war itself. A cartoon printed in June 1896, evokes many influential perspectives of the years just before the war began. “The Cuban Melodrama” portrays the quintessential figure of the United States, Uncle Sam, as the protector of the woman representing Cuba.²²⁰ The villainous figure portraying Spain seems to shrink away from Uncle Sam’s challenge for Miss Cuba. Miss Cuba kneels at Uncle Sam’s feet and clings to him, and he rests his protective hand upon her head. “The Cuban Melodrama” contains several important American perspectives about Cuba at this time. The first perspective is the representation of Cuba. Cuba’s depiction as a beautiful woman makes her desirable to the United States, and encourages empathy for her suffering at the hands of the Spanish. Another important factor is that Miss Cuba is Caucasian. By giving her Caucasian features, the cartoon presents the image that the Cubans are kindred spirits to the Americans, and deserve to be treated as well as any other Caucasian race. Again, this makes the prospect of obtaining and protecting Cuba as a desirable option to the American public.

Another image of Cuba as a woman was the cartoon, “A Suspicious Looking Fish,” published in February 1898 in the *Minneapolis Journal*.²²¹ Miss Cuba is labeled “Cuba Libre,” and has been impaled upon the bill of a marlin representing Spain.²²² Uncle Sam dives into the water in order to save the severely injured Miss Cuba. The imagery evokes the view that the United States is rescuing another nation from the clutches of an evil empire. Spain is not even portrayed as human in this cartoon, while both Uncle Sam and Miss Cuba are human. One can argue that this could have pushed the American public into dehumanizing the Spanish, which would have given the United States a feeling of superiority.

While many images of Cuba as female came before the war, cartoons sometimes portrayed a feminine Cuba after the war in order to influence public opinion toward the annexation of the island. One example of this is “Miss Cuba Receives an Invitation,” printed in the *Chicago Record-Herald* in 1901.²²³ In this cartoon, the United States is also portrayed in its feminine counterpart,

²²⁰ Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, 81.

²²¹ Charles Lewis Bartholomew, *Cartoons of the Spanish-American War* (Minneapolis, MN, 1899). This source is in microfilm format. There were no page numbers to reference each image that it contained.

²²² “Cuba Libre” means “free Cuba.” This term seemed to be somewhat common during the months leading up to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. It can be seen in several other political cartoons from other sources that have been used in this paper.

²²³ Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, 89.

Miss Columbia. She sits before a map of the United States, and offers Miss Cuba to join the Union as the forty-sixth state. Miss Cuba wears broken shackles, with a ball and chain representing Spain lying at her feet. Once again, Miss Cuba has light skin, Caucasian features, and is distinguishable from Miss Columbia only by her black hair. By presenting Cuba as a woman, John Johnson argues that she would “evoke not only the image of peace and order but also the need to be protected.”²²⁴ Through annexation the United States would gain Cuba’s resources, and the Cuban people would receive the benefits of becoming part of the United States. Both this cartoon and “The Cuban Melodrama” portray a powerful sense that the annexation of Cuba would have been highly beneficial to the United States.

However, not all the images of a feminine Cuba were used to promote the idea of Cuban annexation. In the cartoon “Abandoned,” Miss Cuba is left to her own demise by the U.S. Congress and the sugar trust.²²⁵ Congress had passed severe tariffs on Cuban sugar and tobacco, with the support of the sugar and tobacco trusts. These powerful trusts in American business feared that Cuba’s sugar and tobacco would eventually cut sharply into their profits, as the Cuban products were produced at much lower costs. By encouraging Congress to increase the tariffs on Cuban sugar and tobacco, the trusts would retain their profits and share of the market. As a result of the Congressional tariffs, many Americans worried that the newly independent Cuba would be unable to survive, as much of the Cuban economy was dependent on exporting to the United States. Yet again, Miss Cuba is portrayed as a beautiful, Caucasian woman in this cartoon. This signified that if the tariffs were removed, the United States would find a beneficial trade relationship with Cuba, in a dominant role (hence the reason for a Cuban woman).²²⁶ The image also suggested the American public should empathize with Cuba, by evoking pity for Miss Cuba in the cartoon. The cartoon also allows the historian to see that the American public feared Cuba’s economy, and thus independence, would collapse unless the United States removed the severe tariffs on Cuban sugar and tobacco. The economic imperialism of the United States would be jeopardized if the Cuban economy collapsed.

Political cartoonists utilized a feminine Cuba to suggest certain perspectives of that nation. The first perspective would be that Miss Cuba represented a peaceful nation. Another was that she could be seen as desirable by the United States for trading purposes or even annexation. Finally, a feminine Cuba suggested a subservient role to the United States. The United States could benefit by

²²⁴ Ibid., 88.

²²⁵ Ibid., 93.

²²⁶ Ibid., 92.

taking what it wanted without having to worry about reprisals from a subservient Cuba. Also, by repeatedly giving Miss Cuba Caucasian features, the images created support for the Cuban people. Caucasians were civilized and could fit more easily into the United States. These feminine perspectives were utilized by the American press to justify to the public the government's imperial policies toward placing Cuba within the U.S. Empire.

A strong and powerful use of imperial imagery in American political cartoons was the racial depictions of Cuba as black. In one cartoon printed in the *Philadelphia Inquirer* in 1898, Uncle Sam physically supports the various territories that he has acquired in the Spanish-American War.²²⁷ All of these figures, including Cuba, are depicted as black pygmies. The use of black figures brings to mind the strong feelings of white superiority during this time in history. At the end of the nineteenth century, blacks continued to be highly discriminated against and thought of as inferior to whites. Cuba's portrayal as black referred to its supposed inferiority to the United States, and therefore should be subservient to the U.S. Also, the use of black figures suggests a lack of civilization. Their "native" appearance reinforces the feelings of white superiority. Black Cubans are not cultured and remain primitive. By depicting Cuba in this manner, the American public would not have any issue with the imperial policies directed toward Cuba. The Cubans needed the United States to protect them, and more importantly, to civilize them and bring them into the modern world. This view can be correlated with that of the Europeans' justifications of colonizing Africa in the same time period.

An influential cartoon that depicts Cuba in the form of a child was printed in the *Chicago Inter Ocean* in 1905.²²⁸ In this cartoon, Uncle Sam stands to one side of the image, holding Porto Rico's hand. Opposite of Uncle Sam and Porto Rico is Cuba. Porto Rico is pictured as a child in fine, proper clothing. He appears to be well behaved, and most significantly, is white. Meanwhile, Cuba is dressed in shabby clothing, playing with a gun and knife, and is black. The significance of the image is that Puerto Rico had been under total U.S. control since the end of the Spanish-American War. Cuba had been given independence three years earlier and now suffered from instability. The American public would have been given the impression that Cuba was irresponsible, not ready to have full sovereignty, and was racially inferior to other nations such as the United States and even Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico acted as a symbol in justifying U.S.

²²⁷ Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, 163; Chomsky, ed., *The Cuba Reader*, 137.

²²⁸ Chomsky, ed., *The Cuba Reader*, 138; Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, 127.

imperialism in this cartoon because he was civilized, well-mannered, and proper due to the influence of the United States.

A major focus of the political cartoons from the period just after Cuban independence revolved around reciprocity. Reciprocity was the idea that Cuba should be able to benefit in trade just as much as the United States, based on the relationship between the two nations. The tobacco and sugar trusts in the U.S. made reciprocity very difficult to achieve in Congress, as mentioned earlier. The treaty on reciprocity with Cuba did eventually pass. Ultimately, as it will be shown later, the Reciprocity Treaty just opened the door for increased U.S. economic control.

In one of these cartoons, Cuba is represented by a black boy who wishes to speak to the U.S. Congress about reciprocity, but is blocked by the sugar and tobacco trusts. Cuba is portrayed in almost the exact same manner that southern blacks were depicted during this time.²²⁹ The black Cuban boy dresses in similar clothing as southern blacks, and even has the same oversized bandage on his toe. Cuba's statement is in a typical "black" southern dialect: "Pahdon me; but would you ge'mmen move aside so's I could get in?"²³⁰ The cartoon purposefully tries to influence Americans to associate Cubans with their own feelings and animosity toward southern blacks. However, the cartoon also attempts to create sympathy for Cuba in its battles for reciprocity with the United States. This cartoon allows historians to view the battles that Cuba had to fight against U.S. economic imperialism in order to receive a more fair trade agreement.

A strong image of Cuban "incompetence," and the justification of U.S. intervention, can be seen in a cartoon printed in 1912 in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*.²³¹ A Cuban child, who is also black, has dropped and broken a jar that represents self-government. He exclaims, "Golly. I've gone an' did it again!"²³² Meanwhile, an American flag hovers behind him, reminding him of what happens when his incompetence has to be corrected by the United States. The *Cleveland Plain Dealer* published this cartoon at the time of the third intervention by the United States. The purpose was to make the American public believe that Cuba could not handle self-government because the nation was too childlike and incompetent for self-rule. This cartoon was justifying the imperialist actions of the United States by claiming that the Cubans were incapable of handling independence, as this was the third occasion that the U.S. was forced to take control of Cuba.

²²⁹ Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, 167.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, 143.

²³² Ibid.

By portraying Cuba as a child and black, the cartoons put forth the idea that Cuba was unable or incompetent to handle independence. Cuba was too young or uncivilized, and was therefore susceptible to outside influences that could lead the nation down the wrong path. Along with this argument was the idea that Cuba needed to be protected, as parents protect their children. The United States was depicted as assuming the parental role and became the guardian of Cuba. The United States would also civilize the Cuban people and help bring them into the modern civilized world. This is how these types of cartoons justified the imperial policies of the United States.

However, not all of the political cartoons that were printed depicted Cuba in such a derogatory manner. Harkening back to the similar meanings behind the “Miss Cuba” cartoons, “All sizes and good fits for all the family” tries to show how Cuba could be incorporated into the U.S. family.²³³ Published in the *New York Herald* in 1898, this cartoon depicts Uncle Sam handing out new clothing to Cuba, the Philippines and Porto [sic] Rico. The clothing is similar to Uncle Sam’s, covered in stars and stripes, and symbolizes the incorporation of these territories into the American empire. The difference in this cartoon, from those discussed earlier, is that it depicts Cuba as a fairly light-skinned adult man. He is dressed in typical peasant clothing, and has a mustache (which is a strong indication of adulthood). This image of Cuba is quite different from most other depictions. Usually Cuba is a black child, or a white woman. The artist seems to portray Cuba in a manner that shows the nation as competent and able to be independent in the future. Had the purpose been to annex Cuba, there would have been no reason to make it a male figure, instead of a female one. However, there is one element that does connect this cartoon to many others. Uncle Sam is a much larger figure than any of the three territories in the image. This reinforces the idea that the United States was a superior nation that is displayed so prominently in many cartoons about Cuba from this time period. Yet even though this cartoon does cast Cuba in a different light than most other political cartoons from the same era, the incorporation of Cuba into the U.S. Empire is still supporting the imperial policies of the United States Government.

Political cartoons proved to be very powerful images in justifying U.S. imperialism in Cuba during this time period. By manipulating the way in which Cuba was depicted, each cartoon was able to put forth certain perspectives and beliefs that influenced the American public’s opinion and justified their government’s imperial politics. These perspectives were highly effective in

²³³ Charles Nelan, *Cartoons of Our War with Spain* (New York, 1898). As with the Bartholomew collection, this work also does not contain page numbers.

reinforcing preconceived beliefs of the American public, and greatly justified the United States' imperial actions toward Cuba. Americans viewed Cuba as needing to be rescued, as racially inferior, suffering from immaturity, and incompetent to deserve full independence.

Even though the United States used military force to keep Cuba under its imperial guidance, Americans also used economic power to further their control of the island. As Jules Benjamin claims, "Cuban-U.S. trade was of great importance to the United States and, as it became the very basis of the Cuban economy, vital to that state."²³⁴ By examining the trade statistics from early twentieth century, it can be plainly seen that the United States used its economic power to force the Cuban economy into the U.S. imperial fold. "At its height the United States supplied 73 percent of Cuban imports and took 84 percent of her exports."²³⁵ The Cuban economy relied almost entirely on the trade relations between the United States and Cuba. Nearly three-quarters of all items imported into Cuba between 1902 and the mid-twenties came from the United States, while almost eighty-five percent of Cuba's exported products were purchased by the United States. The aforementioned Reciprocity Treaty gave "a practical monopoly of the Cuban import market to the United States..." according to a publication by the U.S. Commerce Department.²³⁶ Cuba was intricately tied into the United States' empire through its economy. It would have been economic suicide to sever ties with the United States and its imperial policies.

Another aspect to the economic power that the U.S. market had resulted in Cuba's increasing dependency on the production of sugar, which enhanced U.S. control in this important area of the economy. By the 1920s, Americans owned 41 of 184 sugar mills, and produced 63 percent of the total sugar harvest.²³⁷ The concentration of American investment in the sugar market made it almost impossible for the Cuban economy to diversify.²³⁸ However, American-owned interests in Cuba were not limited to just sugar. Due to market and price fluctuations, U.S. businessmen looked for additional investments beyond the sugar industry. These businessmen realized the potential of Cuba as a tourist destination and began to heavily invest in expanding this market in the 1920s. U.S. investors built hotels, casinos, golf courses, and horse-racing tracks. Cuba became popular during the Prohibition Era, as Americans could drink all they wished on the

²³⁴ Jules R. Benjamin, *The United States and Cuba: Hegemony and Dependent Development, 1880-1934* (Pittsburgh, PA, 1974), 24.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Quoted in Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 122.

²³⁷ Pérez, *Cuba and the United States*, 122.

²³⁸ Lester D. Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History* (New York, 1968), 137.

exotic island.²³⁹ The amount of American capital invested in Cuba had “increased from approximately \$50 million in 1898 to 1.25 billion by the mid-1920s...the most influential American investment came in sugar, railroads, public utilities, hotels and real estate, tobacco, mining properties, merchandise, banking, and warehouses.”²⁴⁰ Unfortunately for the Cuban economy, the tourism boom and investments ended with the Great Depression, the repeal of Prohibition, and the Revolution of 1933.²⁴¹ Due to the large amount of American-controlled investments, and such a huge focus on sugar, Cuba became almost entirely dependent on the United States in order to keep its economy afloat. These economic policies and investments only added to the United States’ imperial control over Cuba, as these policies were just as powerful as the political control wielded by the United States.

The United States’ policies of imperialism and intervention in Cuba finally came to an end during the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt. In May 1934, the Roosevelt administration completed a new treaty with the Cuban republic that abrogated the 1903 treaty that embodied the Platt Amendment. After more than three decades of U.S. imperialism in Cuban affairs, a new era had begun.

What were the United States’ reasons and justifications for the “unprecedented interference in the internal affairs of a foreign state?”²⁴² According to Lester Langley, there are several arguments. One stems from the theory that the U.S. government, especially the State Department, tried to secure unproblematic access for private American business interests to invest capital in Cuba. Another theory Langley puts forth is that it was of the utmost necessity to protect the Panama Canal and prevent European influence in some of the weaker Caribbean republics.²⁴³ While these theories have creditability, it is also likely that the United States had wished to create its own overseas empire. The nineteenth century belief in Manifest Destiny had achieved the conquest of the North American continent, and now the United States took that belief a step further in trying to conquer territories beyond the boundaries of the continent. The European race for global power and conquest was taking place at this time, and the United States wished to be a global force as well. The United States had to create its own empire to establish its greatness among the world powers.

²³⁹ Chomsky, et al., *The Cuba Reader*, 245-248.

²⁴⁰ Langley, *The Cuban Policy of the United States*, 136.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 251.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 151.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

The United States used both political and military power, as well as economic power, to establish control over the supposedly independent Cuban republic. The Platt Amendment gave the United States the legal justifications for intervening in Cuba's internal affairs for the first three decades of its independence. American capital flowed into Cuban investments, thus creating the ties of singular intimacy that President McKinley wished to create, and linking the Cuban economy directly to the United States. The United States justified its imperial policies to the American public by projecting certain images of the Cuban people. Cubans needed to be protected by the United States; they were too childlike or racially inferior in order to sustain self-governance. The United States had an "obligation" as the great power in the Western Hemisphere to guide the Cuban republic toward "independence." Ultimately, the United States attempted to create an overseas empire in the mold of Manifest Destiny. Cuba did not exist as an independent nation, but rather as a colony of the United States in all aspects except in name. The United States forced Cuba into its empire for more than three decades before Cuba finally achieved its true independence.

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