The Chico Historian is an annual publication of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of the Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor Society and the California State University, Chico (CSUC) Department of History. It aims to provide students the opportunity to publish historical works, and to train editorial staff members in producing an academic journal. Issues are published at the end of each academic year. All opinions or statements of fact are the sole responsibility of the authors, and may not reflect the views of the editorial staff. The authors retain rights to individual essays.

Phi Alpha Theta states their mission is to promote the study of history through the encouragement of research, good teaching, publication and the exchange of learning and ideas among historians. The organization seeks to bring students, teachers, and writers of history together for intellectual and social exchanges, which promote and assist historical research and publication by our members in a variety of ways.

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COVER: An early third-century CE Tunisian mosaic depicting the Augustan poet Vergil (70-19 BCE), flanked by Clio and Melpomene, muses of history and tragedy. Vergil holds a scroll containing the Aeneid. The mosaic was discovered in Hadrumetum (present day Sousse) Tunisia, and is now on display at the Bardo National Museum in Tunis. Image provided by the ARTstor Collection of Gianni Gali Orti and the Art Archive at Art Resource, NY. Image reference: AA376447. Cover designed by Jacob Fender.
We dedicate this volume to
Dr. Dale Steiner

“The highest function of the teacher consists not so much in imparting knowledge as in stimulating the pupil in its love and pursuit.”
~ Henri-Frédéric Amiel
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*denotes paper presented by the author at the 2013 Phi Alpha Theta Northern California Regional Conference

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Acknowledgements

It is with great pride and enthusiasm that I present the twenty-third edition of *The Chico Historian*. The assembly of this year’s edition was made possible by contributions of many people who devoted countless hours to the collaborative effort before you.

Firstly, I would like to thank my editing team, Steve Anderson, Josh Bergeron, Jacob Fender, and Meghan Miller. I found the editing experience extremely challenging, and rewarding. Without their feedback, hard work, and comedic timing during our editorial meetings, it is very likely that this volume would have never materialized as envisioned. Special acknowledgments should go to Jacob for designing our unique cover, and to Steven and Meghan for their many liaisons with the print shop.

Special thanks to my friends Meghan O'Donnell, Kurt Greiner, and Ken Knirck, as well as my mom, Pam Egan. All four deserve my gratitude for providing valuable support, advice, and extra pairs of eyes throughout the editing process.

I would like to express my special recognition to all of the students who answered our call for articles, and submitted their work for our review. We received an excellent and varied collection of graduate and undergraduate papers, and the selection process proved difficult. We appreciate every submission and encourage all those not accepted to resubmit next year.

Each year, the support of our faculty is instrumental to our success, and I would like to thank all the professors in the department, especially those who reviewed papers before they found their way to us. Additionally, I would like to thank Claudia Beaty, our department’s dedicated coordinator, who throughout my years at Chico State has been a valuable resource, and has shown an incredible willingness to help with any request. This year, her assistance was instrumental in developing the new look for *The Chico Historian*. Special thanks are in order for History Department Chair, Dr. Laird Easton for finding additional sources of funding. Further thanks to our faculty advisor Dr.
Stephen Lewis, for his advice and guidance throughout the editing process, and to Dr. William Campbell, and Dr. Jason Nice for their support of Phi Alpha Theta and the History Club.

Lastly, the publication of The Chico Historian would be nearly impossible without the continued generosity of Professor Emeritus John Boyle. His financial contributions help our publication continue, and give History Department students an opportunity to have their work published.

Sean Painter
Editor
Editor and Contributor Biographies

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Garron Telep received his Master of Arts in History from California State University, Chico in 2012. He completed his thesis on the topic of early 20th-century U.S.-Russian Relations in Manchuria, reflecting his academic interests in American, Russian, and diplomatic history. Garron earned his Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Chico State in 2006, with a minor in History. He is a member of Phi Alpha Theta and served as an associate editor for *The Chico Historian* in 2012. He plans to teach history at the community college level before pursuing a Doctorate. His paper was written for Dr. Jason Nice’s History 423 (Tudor-Stuart Britain, 1485-1715) in Spring 2012.
The editorial board would like to welcome you to the twenty-third volume of *The Chico Historian*. This journal is proudly managed, and edited by California State University, Chico students, with current and recent undergraduate and graduate students providing all submissions. Over the course of our publication history, *The Chico Historian* has been blessed by an abundance of outstanding submissions, amounting to 182 articles by 140 contributing students. This year we add nine new articles, and three new contributors to that total. Two of these papers were presented at the 2013 Phi Alpha Theta Northern California Regional Conference at California State University, Sacramento. We hope that this year’s journal continues to meet the standards of excellence that preceding issues have established.

In our first entry, Matthew Robertson examines the communities that existed at California's Fort Ross, and argues that the brief Russian colonization of Northern California should not be a footnote in our history, but rather, deserves a more prominent place. The second entry, by Ken Knirck examines the history of Native American Religious Freedom, and how, through much of our nation's existence, natives have linked religious freedoms with their political identity. In our third article, Meghan Miller examines the evolving depictions of women in the histories of the American West. In our fourth entry, Jacob Fender argues that George Bancroft and his early history had an important contribution in the forming of American historical thought. Taylor McQuilliams explores the rise of populism in Latin America in our fifth entry, specifically examining the presidency of recently deceased Hugo Chavez as a model of populism in its ultimate form.

We move across the Atlantic to Europe for our remaining articles. In our sixth entry, Sean Painter examines the transformation of England's Richard III’s reputation. Owing to the fact that Richard's bones were recently rediscovered, this work reinforces the constant relevance of history, even if it is over five hundred years old. Our seventh entry, by Garron Telep, also examines English history, analyzing the various contributing factors to the 1530s Pilgrimage of Grace, arguing that the Pilgrimage was primarily a
religious insurrection. In our penultimate entry, Josh Bergeron explores Joseph Stalin’s adoption of the Bolshevik revolutionary-heroic tradition in pre-World War II Soviet Union. Lastly, Steven Anderson reveals how the U. S. Eighth Air Force played a critical role in defeating Germany in World War II.

The Editorial Board hopes you find these articles as interesting and informative as we did. The board sincerely thanks you for taking time to read the 2013 edition of The Chico Historian. It was a joy to put together, and we trust you will enjoy reading it.

The Chico Historian Editorial Board
THE METINI TRIPLE JUNCTION: THE RUSSIAN, ALEUT, AND KASHAYA POMO COMMUNITY AT CALIFORNIA’S FORT ROSS | Matthew Robertson

For sheer drama, perhaps no single year in the nineteenth century can compare to 1812. In Europe, Napoleon’s seemingly invincible Grande Armee met defeat and destruction in Russia. One ancient capital (Moscow) burned, and a new one (Washington D.C.) followed. On the west coast of America, the Kashaya Pomo saw a ship rise up out of the water and watched as the first coast redwood was felled in the construction of what was to become Fort Ross. Russia, the largest overland empire in the world, established a settlement at a place the Kashaya called Metini. The community that developed at this cultural nexus continues to fascinate historians and anthropologists from across the globe.

The historiography of non-Hispanic pre-American colonialism on the West Coast of America is conspicuously small, “frequently neglected, and sometimes completely ignored.”¹ This is understandable - the number of Russians never exceeded one thousand in Russian America’s brief existence.² The concept of Russians in California can be troubling, exciting, and downright shocking for students of California history. While the Spanish missions are studied ad nauseam in the California school system, Fort Ross remains a non-entity. Anthropologist Kent Lightfoot believes studying Ross in comparison to the missions is a “most instructive” endeavor - an opportunity for comparison (and contrast) to the Missions that historians and educators have overlooked.³

A brief passage from the Handbook of Americans Indians concerning Fort Ross leaps off the page compared to the material surrounding it: “A tri-cultural community evolved of Russian administrators, Aleut fur hunters from Alaska, and local Pomo Indians

² Ibid.
as laborers and agriculturalists." This three-way cultural contact at Fort Ross offers the historical community a chance to study a colonial encounter outside the perceived norm in California. Like the French in North America, the Russians focused on the exploitation of natural resources, not the enculturation and conversion of Native populations. These frontiersmen cared nothing for transforming indigenous material culture or belief systems as long as fur hunts were productive. Since Ross’ commercial purpose and large population of non-European colonists set it apart as a colonial enterprise, it is not surprising that the long-term results of this colonial encounter differ from others in California. Even a cursory study of Ross raises fascinating questions: Why was there little destruction of indigenous populations and cultures surrounding Ross? Do differences in imperial motivations explain the drastically different fortunes of Native peoples under the Russians and Spanish in Northern California?

“We tend to forget that this state was forged at the crossroads of the world,” states Kent Lightfoot. Northern California in the early nineteenth century was what Native American historians call a “borderlands” environment. California Indians lived in the midst of rival empires (Spanish, Russian, American, and British) and their agents, competing for the same land and natural resources. While the term “borderlands” is normally associated with the interior of western North America, recent scholarship has suggested that in these areas a previously underestimated level of Native agency occurred. This paper postulates that the Kashaya Pomo lived in just such an area and exerted considerable influence in the fates of their tribe and their Russian neighbors at the Ross Colony. A number of different elements coalesced at Fort Ross: Indians who incorporated the imperialist forces into their worldviews and sociopolitical systems, a region where no one foreign power could claim supremacy, the mercantile orientation of the Russian colonial endeavor (as opposed to the missionary orientation of

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5 Ibid.
6 Lightfoot, 129.
7 Ibid., 1.
8 See Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007)
the Spanish), Russian experiences in Siberia and Alaska, dedication of Alutiiq workers to the Russian-American Company, and the considerable skills and resourcefulness of the Kashaya Pomo. This fusion attracted indigenous participation in the colonial process. The Kashaya incorporated the Russian outpost into their cultural landscape as a resource. It was not until America achieved imperial supremacy in the region that the Kashaya experienced the truly devastating effects of colonization.

The colony at Fort Ross ranks among the most harmonious European-Native American relationships in the history of Euro-American imperialism. Colony Ross may be the most successful failure in the long, troubled history of European colonialism. The story of this most fascinating of multi-cultural contact zones begins a very long way from the windswept marine terraces and redwood groves of the Sonoma coast—Moscow, Russia.

Examining the history and character of Russian imperialism helps us understand how and why Fort Ross was atypical. When Moscow threw off the Mongol Yoke and rose to become the capital of Russia, the modern Russian state was born. Ivan III (1440-1505) unified the ancient lands of the Eastern Slavs under Moscow’s rule. After Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV, 1530-1584) conquered Kazan and Astrakhan, strongholds of the Tartars, the route into Siberia was clear. Russian traders monopolized access to sable, the world’s most valuable fur. In a remarkable feat of overland imperial expansion, Russians reached the Pacific Ocean less than sixty years after crossing the Urals.

These were not empty lands—they were full of indigenous peoples and rich in natural resources. Russian trappers built forts at river junctions near Native villages, exacting a fur tribute while hunting and trapping the area out before moving on. This model of establishing military dominance and a lasting tributary system is remarkably similar

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10 From 1237-1480 Russia was ruled by the Golden Horde of the Mongolian Khans. A time of foreign domination, heavy taxes levied by the Mongols crippled Russia.
11 Gibson, 233.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 234.
to the Mongol system that Russia experienced first-hand. Russian expansion into Siberia did devastating ecological damage and caused great pain and suffering to the Siberian peoples. However, a precedent was set: indigenous peoples could live their lives largely without interference from the imperial center as long as they paid the fur tax and did not militarily resist Russian expansion. Despite various “Russification” campaigns over the centuries, enculturation efforts largely failed until the Bolshevik Revolution.\textsuperscript{14} Individuals from indigenous populations entered the Russian world out of opportunism, genuine desire, or forced conscription. By the time the Russian-American company was setting sail for California in 1808, many of its workers were ethnic Yakuts, Siberians, Pomoryans, Tartars, Finns, or Creoles. They had over one hundred years of experience living with Russian rule, maintaining and modifying their Native identities. The Russian adventure across the Bering Strait into North America would have been completely impossible without indigenous participation.

What purpose did this relentless expansion serve? Russia was never short of land to use as a population outlet in case of a demographic crisis.\textsuperscript{15} The semi-feudal, state-controlled Russian economy experienced chronic cash shortages. The nation did not have a genuine monetary/cash economy until midway through the nineteenth century. When Peter the Great (1672-1725) came to the throne, empty imperial coffers presented potential roadblocks to the construction of his new capital city (the soon-to-be St. Petersburg) and the westernization he desired for Russia. Fur trapping in the eastern expanses of Peter’s empire generated a vital influx of cash for the Tsar. Chinese elites paid dearly for these decorative furs, usually beaver, sable, fur seal, and the recently discovered “Kamchatka Beaver” or “Sea Beaver,” the sea otter.\textsuperscript{16} The extraordinary price fetched by sea otter fur, almost twenty times the price of sable, prompted Russian explorers to search for more prolific hunting grounds.\textsuperscript{17}

Tsar Paul I (1754-1801) conferred a monopoly on the rights to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} The Soviet government famously printed textbooks in over 50 languages to incorporate these groups into the state.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} At the time of the 1741 anchoring of Russian explorer Vitus Bering in the Gulf of Alaska, European Russia alone rivaled the size of all of Western Europe.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Lightfoot, 115.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} E. O. Essig, \textit{The Russians in California} (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 1933), 6.
\end{itemize}
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exploit the resources of North America to the Russian-American Company. Molded after the British East-India Company, a board of directors in St. Peterburg ran the Russian-American Company and the Tsar’s family held Company stock.\(^\text{18}\) Catching the rather ill-tempered sea otter was a top priority for these imperial entrepreneurs. Luckily, some of the greatest marine mammal hunters in the world, the Aleuts, lived in Russian America.

Hunting with harpoons from lightweight, water-proof, seal-gut and wood kayaks called \textit{baidarkas}, Aleuts far surpassed the Russians in hunting skill. Russian \textit{promyshlenniks} (company employees) were found to be “entirely unfit” for marine hunting. From Kamchatka to the coast of British Columbia, the success of the whole endeavor became completely dependent on Aleutian labor.\(^\text{19}\) The Russian-American Company wielded despotic powers in its jurisdiction, acting as an empire-within-an-empire.\(^\text{20}\) Securing Aleutian and Kodiak labor for hunting sea otters involved subjugating indigenous populations to a fur tax, the taking of women and children as hostages, and conscription. Service contracts (willful or otherwise) usually ran three years with payment by commission or scrip.\(^\text{21}\) The Aleuts were so essential to Russian occupation that they had Russian citizenship bestowed upon them, essentially making them serfs.\(^\text{22}\) Since slavery was illegal in the Empire, serfdom substituted in terms of controlling the movement, rights and wages of the “contracted” Aleutian labor. For the Aleuts, it was little consolation they were indentured laborers, not slaves. With a ready labor force and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of sea otters in the waters nearby, the Russian-American Company made the Aleutian island of Sitka its American capital.

Russian rule had a devastating impact on the Alutiiq peoples. Warfare, diseases, smoking, drinking, and conscription cut the population by half in fifty years.\(^\text{23}\) It did not take many Russians to do

\(^{18}\) Lightfoot, 115.
\(^{21}\) Lightfoot, 116.
\(^{22}\) Gibson, 236.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 237.
this considerable damage—some six-hundred and fifty Russians lived in Russian-America by 1797.\textsuperscript{24} It could have been worse. Unlike the Spanish, who caused even greater devastation in Mexico and California, the Russians lacked a missionary component in their imperial drive. Colonial enterprises like the Spanish missions launched explicit enculturation programs designed to teach Natives language skills, convert them to the Christianity, and educate them to the alleged superiority of European world-views.\textsuperscript{25} These endeavors amounted to the (attempted) eradication of indigenous culture, identity, and knowledge. While a far cry from a humanitarian business model, mercantile operations like the Russian-American Company depended on Native peoples for economic success. These enterprises put little emphasis on directing the path of cultural change among Native groups. Such efforts could be extremely counter-productive. Violence against the Company or mass indigenous displacement could threaten the skilled-labor supply.\textsuperscript{26}

Within the mercantile model, the possibility of gradual acculturation and the easing of labor difficulties existed. While still a traumatic experience for many Aleuts, the Russian presence represented an avenue for enterprising or curious individuals to make a new way for themselves without risking cultural annihilation. Intermarriages between Russian men and Aleut women became common. Creoles, often baptized as Orthodox Christians when young, could choose their own identity in the imperial realm.\textsuperscript{27} The role of the church is a curious one given its prominence in Russian society; however, this prominence does not appear to have crossed the Bering Strait. Only five chapels and four churches existed in Russian America by 1833, a modest number given the expansive area and the ubiquity of multiple churches in every Russian village.\textsuperscript{28} The Orthodox Church followed the general principles of Russian dealings with Natives, and

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Lightfoot, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Lightfoot, 129. An extremely modest number given the various settlements in the expansive area and the ubiquitousness of multiple churches in every Russian village of any size at all.
“did not want to interfere with the normal way of life and the activities of the Native population.”

This approach greatly increased the prestige of the church in Native communities, and some incredible stories of the great Father Ioann Veniaminov exist that make Alaska holy ground for Russian Orthodox church members.

One particular story illustrates the connection between the Aleuts, the Russians, and the depth of the few conversions to Orthodoxy that did take place on the Russian frontier. Peter, an Aleut who converted to Orthodoxy sometime in the 1790s or early 1800s, was working on a Russian fur ship in the waters outside San Francisco Bay. When the ship came ashore, the Spanish garrison captured the crew. Padre Abella at the Dolores Mission tortured Peter to make him renounce his Orthodox faith, considered heretical by the Catholic Church. Refusing to renounce his faith, Peter died of his wounds on September 8, 1815. Peter the Aleut is now a martyr, canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church. A beautiful depiction of him graces the walls of the Holy Virgin Cathedral in San Francisco.

Not all Native Alaskans learned to live so closely with the Russians as did the Aleuts. The powerful Tlingit nation resisted Russian conscription efforts violently. The Tlingit successfully razed the city of New Archangel in 1802 after Russians occupied some of their village sites. Approximately 411 Kodiaks, 199 Russians and 11 Tlingit hostages lived in the city near the time of the attack. The flagship of the Russian Navy arrived two years later to reestablish order in the area. In 1855, the Tlingits besieged the city again.

Before the establishment of Fort Ross in 1812, the Russians had a vast wealth of colonial knowledge to draw from, gained largely through trial and error that often resulted in indigenous suffering. This experience was vital to the relatively successful relations with the Kashaya Pomo at Ross. The distinctive characteristics of Russian imperialism—non-intervention in indigenous cultural systems, lack of missionary zeal, valuing indigenous laborers as assets—enabled them to live side by side with the Kashaya Pomo.

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29 Ivanov, 22.
30 See Matthew Robertson, “America’s Forgotten Faith: The Origins of the Russian Orthodox Church on the West Coast” (paper given to Dr. Sarah Pike at California State University, Chico, Fall 2006).
31 Gibson, 239-240.
Fort Ross rests on prime colonial real-estate. The stockade sits on an easily-defensible marine terrace overlooking the rugged Sonoma coast. It lies close to redwood groves for lumber, a deep and sheltered cove for supplies to arrive by ship, fishable ocean and river resources, and large rolling hills near the mouth of the Russian River for farmland. The Kashaya had been using Metini as a seasonal village for centuries for many of the same reasons. The premise for establishing Fort Ross was twofold: hunt sea otters, and no less important, create an agricultural station capable of sustaining the chronically underfed colonies in Russian America. The Russians, with no place to grow food between eastern Siberia and the Alaskan islands, were keenly aware of California’s agricultural potential. The expensive supply chain was untenable. Geopolitics played a part too: Spain did not have a claim on the coast north of San Francisco; the British were farther north near Vancouver Island; and the Americans were not yet encroaching by land. To create a successful agricultural station, indigenous labor would be essential to the colony’s success. Once again, the Russian-American Company would be dependent on indigenous peoples. The Kashaya Pomo would determine if the Russians would stay for long.

The Pomo society that the Russian-American Company promyshlenniks and managers found at Metini was incredibly diverse and resourceful. The term “Pomo” refers to a group of seven mutually unintelligible but related languages. Mutually unintelligible, these languages differ from one another more than the Germanic languages do. The Pomo linguistic group traditionally encompasses the Russian River Valley; Clear Lake to the north, and westward to the coast. Only one linguistic group had a name for its speakers as opposed to those who spoke other languages, the Kashaya. The Kashaya geographic range encompassed many ecological zones, including

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32 Lightfoot, 119.
34 German, English, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and Icelandic comprise the Germanic language family.
redwood forests, coastal bluffs, live oak rolling hills, and semi-
mountainous regions. Kashaya settlements in this region, largely
determined by climactic factors and resource distribution, included
seasonal campsites near the shoreline and river mouths, while most
permanent villages were inland.37

It is as difficult to identify one Pomo culture as it is one Pomo
language. The Pomo recognized similar cultural institutions among
their neighbors. These similarities allowed for the construction of a
loose “nonpolitical nationality, culturally but not politically allied.”38
Interaction among Pomo groups was more intense than between Pomo
and others, at least.39 Only the Kashaya had a name for themselves as
separate from other groups. The term “tribelet” is commonly used to
describe the small, semi-autonomous kin groups that constituted Pomo
villages. Villages varied considerably in size, usually between five
hundred and fifteen hundred people.40 Each Pomo village maintained
professional positions which included skilled labor (bow making,
hunting, bead making) and medical/religious positions like the bear-
doctor. This division of labor is indicative of a highly developed,
resourceful social organization. Many villages had democratically
elected positions including chieftainships and “family captains,” while
other offices were hereditary.41

Kinship ties were the foundation of Pomo life. In the words of
one Pomo man, “The family was everything, and no man ever forgot
that. Each person was nothing; but as a group, joined by blood, the
individual knew that he would get the support of all his relatives if
anything happened.”42 The kin group could expand--while
simultaneously enhancing its social standing--by marrying into groups
not traditionally associated with the tribelet or village. Pomo marriages
were exceptionally easy to terminate, as each union received a “grace

37Lowell John Bean and Dorothea Theodoratus, “Western Pomo and
38Bean and Theodoratus, 293.
39For a similar ethnic construct with similar troubles to the Kashaya upon
American occupation, see Alexandra Harmon’s Indians in the Making.
40McClendon and Oswalt, 276.
41Bean and Theodoratus, 294.
42Bernard and Ethel Aginsky, Deep Valley: The Pomo Indians of California
period” to see if the match would work.\textsuperscript{43} If not, the couple amicably went their separate ways. This would prove especially useful when dealing with the Russians and Aleuts. Kin groups followed seasonal migration patterns, and Pomo dwellings varied in size and function depending on the stage in the migration cycle. The Kashaya built single-family conical dwelling houses out of redwood bark close to the beach to stay in when gathering food near the shoreline.\textsuperscript{44} To escape the summer heat, they built temporary shelters in the shady foothills cooled by breezes. In the permanent villages, a special semi-subterranean earth covered lodge marked the center of ceremonial life. This pattern of seasonal migration around a central location gave the Kashaya many places they could call home and an unrivaled understanding of how to use the land around them.

The diverse ecological zone the Kashaya inhabited provided an extensive menu. When the weather was warm, they fished in the ocean and gathered shellfish from tidal zones. Freshwater fish were readily available as well. In the valleys it was possible to hunt large game like elk, deer, and antelope. By all accounts, the Pomo were expert hunters, often knowing every animal in a herd. Hunters doubled as shepherds by maintaining a balance between the herd size and available vegetation to keep the herd from straying.\textsuperscript{45} The acorn provided the staple food. This abundant resource required heavy manual labor to process but was highly nutritious. While resources were abundant in the Pomo lands, they were a cautious people who knew the peril of famine. Population control was a central element of maintaining a healthy community. The Pomo practiced various methods of birth control, abortion, infanticide and occasionally geronticide to keep family units small.\textsuperscript{46}

So well developed were the Pomo’s resource allocation techniques that the standard of living and health it provided enabled Pomo women to take a sort of “maternity leave.” During pregnancy, the mother had restrictions on travel and labor placed on her. After delivery, the mother and newborn child stayed together in a special

\textsuperscript{43} Bean and Theodoratus, 296.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 292.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 290.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 295.
shelter for six weeks. This is especially interesting when compared with the more “advanced” European society of the Pomo’s imperial neighbors, the Russians. In Russia at the time of the establishment of Fort Ross, pregnant Russian women were responsible for all chores in the house and in the field, frequently entering labor mid task and giving birth in the fields. Women received a maximum of four days rest after delivery, and then returned to work. Perhaps this unfavorable comparison is why one encounters less about the “wretched state of the savage” in Russian writings than those of other European imperial powers. This was not the only unfavorable comparison though.

Pomo society featured a complex monetary economy that reached far beyond their homelands. Their protocapitalist economy involved banking against future scarcity of resources by overproduction of goods that incorporated the rich California Central Valley and most of northern California. Clamshell disks and magnesite beads as currency allowed direct money transactions (beads for fish, disks for garments) which enabled the Pomo to accumulate a surplus of goods. Because of this system, the Pomo were renowned as great counters, dealing in amounts in the tens of thousands without multiplication or division.

Perhaps no example better illustrates the tremendous skill of the Pomo at utilizing their natural resources than the story of the Army Worm. The Army Worm is a moth caterpillar about two inches long and almost hairless. The name is reflective of its tendency to attack crops in large armies. The Pomo observed that the worm only appears once every few years, and only early in the summer after periods of heavy fog. Once the conditions were right and a worm sighted, the entire village sprang into action. The worms feed on ash leaves, so the Pomo dug worm traps that encircled ash trees, creating a 4”-6” deep sand-lined trench which the worms fell into as they moved towards the trees. They placed leaves at the tree base to further entice the worms. People tended the traps to make sure no worm escaped, emptying them repeatedly to prevent over-filling and to replenish the

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47 Ibid., 296.
48 J. Sydney Jones, “Pomo,” 156.
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Methods of preparation included roasting with hot coals, boiling, raw, or drying for consumption in the winter. The Pomo gathered hundreds of pounds of dried worms, and then the worms vanished as mysteriously as they arrived.

Aspects of Pomo culture – proclivity to marry into foreign groups, skill as bankers and traders, and seasonal migration patterns – colored the Kashaya Pomo view of their new Russian and Alutiiq neighbors. Like the Army Worm, the Russian presence came suddenly and disappeared in much the same manner. For thirty years though, the Kashaya experimented with this potential resource. Unlike the Army Worm, which at worst could muster an unpleasant bite, this new resource represented real danger. A Kashaya man could find himself shipped off to Siberia in a heartbeat if he crossed the Russian-American Company. The community at Fort Ross would be an ongoing negotiation between the resourceful Kashaya, hard-working Aleuts, and their Russian administrators. What type of community would emerge?

The Kashaya Pomo called the Russians and Aleuts the “Undersea People,” owing to the appearance of their ships seemingly from “the ocean depths.” The Kashaya have several stories concerning the founding of Fort Ross, one is breathtaking in its brevity: the “Undersea People” arrived, settled close to the Indians, eventually the Indians went to work with them. After thirty years, the Undersea People left and the Indians went home.

While mostly a piece of geopolitical propaganda, the treaty between Ivan Kuskov (1765-1823) and several local chiefs for the use of the Fort Ross land at the price of three pairs of pants, three blankets, two hatchets, three hoes and an unknown quantity of glass beads represents the only time California Indians received any payment for land taken from them. The Russians did not miss an opportunity to flaunt this document to any passing Spanish missionary, both to legitimize their presence in

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50 Ibid., 204-205.
51 Ibid., 207-209.
52 It is worthwhile to note that the Russians and Aleuts were not “white people.” This term only came into use when Americans took over the area. Lightfoot, 154.
53 Glenn Farris, “Life at Fort Ross as the Indians Saw It: Stories from the Kashaya” (Sacramento: California Department of Parks and Recreation [no date listed]), 5.
northern California and show their relative hospitality to the Indians. Kashaya culture clearly defined property rights, so this document may have been welcome.

From 1812 to 1822 life at Colony Ross revolved around hunting marine mammals and trading with the Spanish missions. Relatively peaceful Russo-Aleut-Kashaya relations resulted in little extended interaction with the Kashaya community. Initially conceived as an agricultural station, it took Colony Ross quite some time to be productive in that realm. In 1820, the Russian-American Company bought large quantities of wheat from the Spanish, at exorbitantly high prices, to sustain Ross.\(^{55}\) The Russians built ships commissioned by the Spanish, who while lamenting their presence, found the Russians more amiable and proper when it came to business dealings than the Americans in the region.\(^{56}\)

Fort Ross was not the only Russian outpost in northern California. On the Farallon Islands, scarcely a dozen Aleuts and a few Kashaya hunted marine mammals. More populous was the settlement at Bodega Bay, Port Rumiantsev, which served as the major shipping port for Fort Ross. Here the Russians enjoyed good relations with the Coast Miwok, whom the Russians relied upon to pass along news of incoming ships and any impending Spanish expedition.\(^{57}\) Many Coast Miwok intermarried with the Russian workers, creating a sizable Creole population and a permanent Miwok presence at the Ross. The diversity of Colony Ross required a flexible but organized colonial system on the part of the Russian administrators to prevent domestic trouble.

The spatial organization of the colony reflected the racial/ethnic hierarchy of the Russian-American Company. Company administrators, ship captains, military officers, clerks and laborers of Russian descent occupied the highest position in the hierarchy. These people could live inside the stockade of the fort or in the Russian


\(^{56}\) Mathes, 37.

\(^{57}\) Khlebnikov, 194.
village a hundred meters north of the stockade walls.\textsuperscript{58} Next in the hierarchy were Creoles, a rather nebulous group of mid-managers, clerks, skilled laborers and craftsmen, who usually were the product of Russian-Indigenous interethnic marriages and lived in the Russian village area. While Creoles were paid, they usually received less than members of the Russian estate.\textsuperscript{59} Alutiiq people occupied a distinct place in the hierarchy and lived in a large village, with their Kashaya wives in most cases, on a marine terrace directly west of the stockade.\textsuperscript{60} Aleuts composed the majority of Ross’ permanent residents for the duration of its existence. As the sea otter population declined due to relentless over-hunting, the Aleuts shifted their focus to other tasks, but their presence was no less important. One Russian administrator noted, “The presence of Aleuts enables work to be accelerated in all areas, I consider it essential… to pay them for the work done at the fort.”\textsuperscript{61} However, if Fort Ross was to successfully shift to farming and manufacturing, more labor than the Aleuts would be required.

By 1822 Ross was agriculturally self sufficient, and it was time to expand the colony’s farming endeavors, which meant it was time to recruit the Kashaya as seasonal laborers.\textsuperscript{62} The Indians working at Ross represented the bottom of the colonial hierarchy, and lived in several villages close to Fort Ross, the two nearest being on separate terraces directly north and south of the stockade. It is important to note that the Russians administrators themselves recognized these categories as highly fluid, and individuals could be “promoted” based on their cultural practices. The Russians regarded ethnicity as a “state of mind” or a “matter of the spirit.”\textsuperscript{63} This consideration of ethnic identity by choice resulted from centuries of conquest in the diverse world of central Asia and Siberia. The implementation of this policy at Fort Ross enabled cross-cultural exchange and social mobility largely unimpeded by imperial managers.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} Lightfoot, 122, 140-141.
\textsuperscript{60} Lightfoot, 122.
\textsuperscript{61} Khlebnikov, 100.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{63} Osborne, 171-172.
\textsuperscript{64} Lightfoot, Martinez and Schiff, 205.
Interethnic marriages provided the most opportunities to forge new cultural practices and identities. The complete absence of Russian or Aleut women at Fort Ross made relations with Kashaya women a prerequisite for any socially-acceptable sexual activity. The Kashaya sought out marriages with Aleuts and Russians as a way to increase their family’s wealth and social standing. Their practice of giving marriages a “trial period” worked perfectly in interethnic situations. A Kashaya woman could enter into an interethnic marriage knowing that if the relationship failed, she still had the support of the community to fall back on. Given the extremely different cultures at play in these relationships, this must have been a great comfort. Subsequently, many of these marriages did not last long. This led to a high separation rate and Russian managers decried the “brittleness” of the unions. Of the fifty-six interethnic couples registered in the 1820s, none remained together by the time of the 1836 and 1838 censuses.

Without much drama, Kashaya women left Fort Ross for their homelands of their own free will, after their husbands died or returned to Alaska—Russian officials wanted no trouble with the Kashaya. Managers at Ross were careful not to refer to the Native consorts of Russians as “wives” since many of the men already had wives in Russia. Male children of these relationships often stayed with the father, while girls followed their mothers back to traditional Kashaya lands.

The Pomo women of Fort Ross dominated the domestic space at the Colony. Few adopted new identities for themselves and fewer converted to the Russian Orthodox Church. Some left Fort Ross with their husbands but most retained their Kashaya heritage and cultural values. The excavation of trash heaps, slag piles, and dwelling space at Colony Ross revealed that Kashaya practices usually trumped Russian or Alutiiq ones in the home. Traditionally Aleuts, rather than routinely cleaning the dwelling space, built a new floor on top of the debris. At Colony Ross, the wives of Aleut laborers did away with this

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65 Istomin, 4.
66 Lightfoot, 145.
67 Ibid.
68 Lightfoot, 146.
69 Istomin, 7.
70 Lightfoot, 146.
71 Ibid.
model, preferring to clean the dwelling and strictly separate residential and disposal spaces. Abandoned Aleut houses frequently doubled as enclosed garbage bins for the Kashaya. Aleut dietary staples like seal and whale supplemented the traditional local menu, although the method of preparation (roasting with hot rocks) remained local.

Kashaya cultural norms also dictated the methods in which hired Indian laborers disposed of the income they earned from working at the Colony. Food rations comprised a significant portion of payment for labor, which disappointed the Kashaya greatly. Due to a lack of familiarity and a fear of poisoning, much food provided as payment for services was dumped out or buried. They adapted to the new food as traditional food sources became scarcer. The Kashaya reworked Russian tools, goods, and beads into currency, gaming pieces, and other forms that fit into their life system.

Fort Ross served the Kashaya as a resource more than they served the Russians. Their relatively benign practices created a dynamic in which many California Indians fled to the Russian frontier to escape the Spanish missions. That the Russians were not the Spanish and operated a different system was of vital importance. The Russian-American Company encouraged Indians to settle along the southern border of the colony, thereby creating a buffer which the Indians used as protection from the Spanish. The Russians were easily the lesser of two evils for the Miwok and Kashaya Pomo.

For Ross experienced few of the same problems as the missions. In a letter received by a manager at Fort Ross in June of 1824, Padre Altimira of the Solano Mission lamented that Indians had burned the entire establishment to the ground and needed the Russians to repair iron tools damaged in the fire. In thirty years, Indians never attacked or damaged Fort Ross. One visitor went so far as to declare the fort “useless” because the Natives were so friendly. It seemed that each year more Indians came to work in the fields, returned inland for the winter, and then returned to the fort with even more Indians. As

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72 Lightfoot, Martinez and Schiff, 210-212.
73 Farris, “Life at Fort Ross as the Indians Saw It,” 2.
74 Lightfoot, 168.
75 Ibid., 135.
76 Ibid., 155.
77 Khlebnikov, 130.
78 Laplace, 6.
early as 1817, the Spanish recognized that close relations between the Russians and Natives could be a problem. Presuming conflict, the Spanish launched an expedition to investigate whether or not the Indians could be convinced to unite against the Russians. Captain Jose Fernandez reported his findings back to Reverend Augustin Fernandez de San Vicente:

“…since it was seen that the Indians serving the company were treated with great affection and faithfully complied with everything that they promised them; and, furthermore… given the fact that California authorities might attempt to remove the Russians, the Indians would enlist under their flag…did not open any situation that might disturb the good harmony that apparently reigned between the Russians and the California Indians.”

The good relationships with the Miwok and Kashaya Pomo convinced the Spanish not to attack Fort Ross. In fact, a runaway promyshlennik named Prokhor Egorov led an Indian uprising in the summer of 1824 that killed eight Spanish soldiers and the burning of the Santa Ines Mission. While Russian-Indian relations were vastly superior to those between the Spanish and Indians, there were plenty trouble spots during the existence of Fort Ross.

From the documentary record, the Russian administrators exerted a concerted effort to impress the Kashaya with their justice for crimes committed by Company employees. One Kashaya account recalls that a promyshlennik hit his Kashaya wife with an axe, and upon discovery, was whipped for half a day. Apparently this impressed the Kashaya who held no grudges over the incident. The censuses of 1822 and 1823 reveal quite a few incidents of murder between the Kashaya and the Aleuts, usually resulting in deportation to Alaska or Siberia as punishment for the guilty, regardless of ethnicity. The worst Russian offenses were armed labor raids into the Kashaya heartland to gather agricultural workers, after which the Indians worked for about two months. A new manager ended these raids, and soon the Kashaya worked with the Russians of their own accord. Perhaps the most devastating consequence of the Russian presence was Native

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79 Mathes, 307.
80 Khlebnikov, 153-156.
81 Farris, 4.
82 Istomin, 14-37.
83 Lightfoot, 139.
population loss due to disease. Smallpox, introduced at Fort Ross between 1837 and 1838 ravaged the indigenous peoples of northern California.\textsuperscript{84} 1838 saw the first inoculation of the smallpox vaccine in Native Californians and Russian officials shipped the vaccine to the government in Monterey.\textsuperscript{85}

Ties between the Kashaya, Aleuts, and Russians were numerous and strong after thirty some years of Russian occupation of the land at Metini. Russian farmers and their Kashaya wives lived on large ranches with Creole families in apparent peace.\textsuperscript{86} Since neither the Russian ranchers nor colonists at the fort possessed many horses, there was little reason for property theft on the part of Kashaya raiders.\textsuperscript{87} The number of children at Colony Ross increased as the years went along, as did Russian-Kashaya marriages.\textsuperscript{88} A new world was forming in the Russian River Valley. The relative freedom of the Kashaya Pomo colored much of Ross’ history. They made a choice to accept the Russians and Aleuts into their midst as potential resources. The Pomo, unlike many California Indians, possessed a history of inter-tribal alliances to wage war in order to drive off enemies, right wrongdoings, or settle territorial disputes.\textsuperscript{89} The Russians could easily have fit the criteria of an enemy worthy of armed combat to drive away, but the Kashaya chose otherwise. The process of culture change was firmly in their hands, and the choice of whether or not to participate in the colonial process was more often than not in their hands. If relations went sour, they had the freedom to leave their colonial life and withdraw to their older world systems and villages.\textsuperscript{90} Yet this negotiable middle-ground was not to last. Once the Russian-American Company struck a deal to have the Hudson Bay Company supply their settlements in Alaska, Fort Ross became expendable. Sold to John Sutter in 1841, the freedom of the Kashaya Pomo slowly eroded with the vanished dream of Russian California.

Under American rule, the Kashaya shared the fate of other California tribes, although they maintained a distinct identity that has

\textsuperscript{84} Osborn, 229.
\textsuperscript{85} Lightfoot, 152.
\textsuperscript{86} Laplace, 48-53.
\textsuperscript{87} Lightfoot, 158.
\textsuperscript{88} Osborn, 194.
\textsuperscript{89} Bean and Theodoratus, “Western Pomo and Northeastern Pomo,” 298.
\textsuperscript{90} Lightfoot, 179.
proven helpful in legal battles over tribal lands. The strength of Kashaya culture and the size of their population earned them status as a federally recognized tribe – a rarity in Northern California.

While it is easy to romanticize the Russian occupation, such thinking is only possible in light of the pseudo-genocidal practices of the Americans and the Spanish. What the example of the community at Fort Ross provides is the possibility of alternate methods in colonization. Imperial motivations made huge differences in colonial practices and Native relations. Indigenous responses to colonialism in California reflected the co-habitation options presented by the colonists. The Russians offered the Kashaya a chance to participate in a new system that closely mirrored traditional cultural forms. By never overtly forcing the Kashaya to accept new social practices or worldviews, and by limiting the outright damage done to the indigenous community, the Russian traders at Fort Ross showed at least a modicum of respect of (and dependence on) Kashaya culture which encouraged indigenous-colonist interaction. While poor soil quality, marine mammal population collapse and geopolitics doomed Fort Ross, as a community it was astonishingly successful. California Indians were not resigned to death and destruction at the hands of Europeans as soon as they landed. The responsibility for that, as Fort Ross shows us, rests squarely on the behavior of the imperial powers in the California Borderlands and for once, Russians appear to be the most enlightened.
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The history of Native American civil rights is replete with a vast number of complementary and contradictory legislative actions, presidential executive orders, and court cases. The process of determining the citizenship and sovereignty of this group of Americans has been complex and confusing. This multi-faceted nature of Indian legal status has made the protection of their Constitutional rights difficult. Of particular importance is the right of religious freedom. This issue is extremely important not only to all Americans with religious beliefs, but particularly important to Indians. Their struggle for identity, both legal and cultural, interlinks with their spiritual connectivity. Their religious associations and practices are often linked to sacred objects and places, and these have historically been areas of great conflict between Native Americans and the various governmental bodies of the United States. This paper examines the history of legislative and judicial actions regarding the religious activities of Native Americans. The primary focus will be on state and federal Supreme Court and lower court cases from 1977 to 2001, and the legislative, executive, and public actions that accompanied these cases. This analysis examines both the progression and regression of Indian religious rights through these various governmental actions and entities.

The first step in determining and fulfilling the legal needs of Indians is to understand the exceptional nature of their legal status, and how they fit within the cultural, legal, and religious environment of a Judeo-Christian country. Vine Deloria, Jr. succinctly summarizes the need for understanding by stating,

On balance, the difficulty and of defining the rights or religious freedom for Indians appears to lie in accommodating the free exercise clause and the establishing clause so that Indians will have sufficient leeway to exercise their rights without falling under one of the traditional categories of prohibitions. We must learn how to phrase questions of Indian religious freedom so that we can begin to achieve the proper results. We must first raise fundamental questions regarding the nature of all Indian rights: social, political, economic, educational, and religious. We must ask how Indians received these rights, why they differ in degree and kind from the
civil rights of other American citizens, and how they can be clarified and thereby protected and enforced.¹

The Courts, the Congress, and the Constitution

In the effort to establish and practice their religious rights, have Indians been better served by the state and federal legislatures or by the courts? An examination of this question and the events that comprise the chronology of this issue are debatable, but an analysis of the legislative actions and litigations lead to the conclusion that the former has been more effective than the latter. Many of the reasons for this conclusion are based on the constitutional structure of American government. The enumeration of powers, the process of placing legislators, executives, and the judiciary, all produce varying degrees of action. Supreme Court Justices, by virtue of their life tenure, are theoretically immune from political influences, yet their personal biases and judicial theories are undoubtedly in play. Their duty is to interpret the laws as they apply in circumstances of dispute, but they are limited by the text of the law that is in question, and by their judicial theories of strict constructionism or revisionism. The president can sign or veto bills, issue executive orders, and determine how vigorously the laws and policies will be enacted. But it is the legislature that has the most latitude in revising the law regarding religious freedom, and therefore the most power to establish and promote the religious rights of Native Americans. “The people’s branch” is more closely connected to the public than are the other branches, and therefore more able to tap into the zeitgeist of the electorate.

The ability of interest groups to influence their representatives regarding the issues of the day is an essential quality of the American system of governance. In the case of Indian religious freedoms, it has frequently been the collective influence and support of non-Indian religious groups that solidified and bolstered the lobbying efforts to enact or amend legislation related to Native religions. But outside influences and the will of the people is nothing without the absolute power of the legislative branch to control the governmental purse strings.

Constitutional law regarding the religious rights of Americans is complex in that religious expression is a very personal issue, yet one that can be somewhat dictated by the actions of the state. Additionally, the separation of church and state are not well defined, and the basis for their interpretation is often found in the penumbra of the Constitution. Compounding the complexities of these religious civil rights issues is the legal status of Indians and tribes, who enjoy the triple-citizenship of state, federal, and tribal governments. Although they were granted complete federal citizenship in 1924, this action only complicated the issue of their legal status and the protections that were afforded them through the various governmental bodies and jurisdictions. As citizens, individual Indians are guaranteed all of the protections of state and federal governments. But in a corporate sense, Indian tribes may be wards of the federal government and subject to strict administrative supervision. They also may be considered quasi-independent nations, whose pre-Constitutional laws and customs have only been slightly altered by their relationship with the federal government.²

**Court Reversals and Presidential Defiance**

The odd juxtaposition of Indian tribes to the federal government has always been problematic legally. Several important cases have arisen, some of which clarify the issue, and some distort or merely postpone the decision. *Johnson v. McIntosh* (1823)³, *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831)⁴, and *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832)⁵ were heard by, and ruled on by the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall between 1823 and 1832. The “Marshall Trilogy” established the doctrinal basis for defining tribal sovereignty and interpreting federal Indian law. In *Cherokee Nation v. Georgia* (1831), Marshall commented that “the relation of the Indians to the United States [was] marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else.”⁶ This often-referenced citation continues to epitomize

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³ *Johnson v. McIntosh* (21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)).
the ambiguity that has been a continual hindrance for Indian seeking redress in legal disputes. The concept of multiple and variable jurisdictions is a difficult one. Most tribal nations are land-locked between state and federal authorities. Many have their own constitutions whose powers conflict legally with the U.S. Constitution.7

The authority of the U.S. government over the Indians has often been refuted. The Supreme Court has usually been the battleground for disputes regarding sovereignty, federal rights of Indians, and rights guaranteed to them through state authority. Court cases regarding these issues have been numerous, and the rulings by the judiciary have been contemptuous, contradictory, and often ambiguous. Disagreements between the branches of government have also been associated with these cases, causing reciprocal actions from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia illustrate the adversarial relationship between the branches regarding Indian sovereignty. This battle began in 1821, when the Creeks in Georgia agreed to cede some of their land to the state. Georgia also pressured the Cherokee to cede the land. This was a common trend at the time. Other southern states, with the urging of President Monroe, acted to remove the Indians west of the Mississippi. Georgia intensified the confrontation by seizing the land from the Cherokee and usurping their rights. The Cherokee Nation and various church groups requested the state of Georgia to reverse their position, but no legislation to remedy this situation was presented. A law suit was filed on behalf of the Cherokee Nation by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). Concurrently, President Andrew Jackson pressed the U.S. Congress to pass the Removal Act of 1830, which mandated the relocation of Indians to government land west of the Mississippi river. In 1831 the Supreme Court ruled that the Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign state” and was therefore not entitled to file their case with the Court under original jurisdiction.8

This action was not quelled by the Supreme Court decision in Cherokee Nation. An 1830 Georgia law that prohibited unlicensed

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7 Deloria, Jr., “The Distinctive Status of Indian Rights,” 238.
white persons from living on land occupied by Cherokees was defied by Samuel A. Worchester, who was arrested and sentenced to four years of hard labor. Worchester contended that he was in the Cherokee Nation as a representative of the ABCFM, and that his prosecution was a violation of U.S./Cherokee treaties. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court held that congressional statutes gave the Court the authority to hear the case (reversing Cherokee Nation). It also held that Indian nations “had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, and the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.” The Court stated that the acts of Georgia “are repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.” This decision declared that Georgia laws are unenforceable on the Cherokee Nation without their consent, and through conformity with U.S./Cherokee treaties.

In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Indians. However, President Jackson (an avid proponent of Indian removal) was not satisfied with the decision of the Court. In one of the most cited remarks of presidential defiance, Jackson stated: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” Jackson’s refusal to comply with the Worchester decision created additional enforcement problems for future legislatures and courts.

Besides inter-branch disagreement over whose authority the Indians fell under, intra-branch squabbles also occurred. For nearly a century, the U.S. Senate and the President, with their powers of treaty making, held sway over the fate of the Indians. Not willing to cede all legislative authority to the Senate, the House of Representatives invoked their influence on appropriations through their power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among several States, and with Indian Tribes.” They did so in 1869 by disallowing funding for a Senate appropriations bill on Indian treaties. The House followed up on this assertion of power and their coequal status two years later by inserting language into the Indian Appropriations Act of

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1871 that read: “Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty….”

**Sensitivity and Reform**

Legislative action has been of paramount importance to the protection of Indian religious rights. Members of Congress, at the urging of their constituents and prompted by publicity by the press, have made great strides in defining and protecting these rights. A good deal of the suffering that has been inflicted upon the Indians has been caused or exacerbated by the public’s lack of knowledge regarding their lives and beliefs. In 1923, John Collier, the executive secretary of the American Indian Defense Association, testified before the House about the importance of Indian religious dances, specifically the Ghost Dance and the Sun Dance. These types of religious dances were seen by many as responsible for fomenting fear and violence, leading to the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. Official action on this issue came from Commissioner Charles H. Burke of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. On April 26, 1921 he sent “Circular 1665” to all Indian Superintendents that stated:

The sundance and all other similar dances and so called religious ceremonies are considered ‘Indian Offenses’ under existing regulations and corrective penalties are provided. I regard such restrictions as applicable to any (religious) dance which involves . . . the reckless giving away of property . . . frequent and prolonged periods of celebration . . . in fact, any disorderly or plainly excessive performance that promotes superstitions, cruelty, licentiousness, idleness, danger of health, and shiftless indifference of family welfare. In all such instance, the regulations should be enforced.

In 1928, in an effort to better legislate on behalf of the Indians and their legal and religious needs, the Institute for Government

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13 Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 120, 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871).
Research published comprehensive analysis of U.S. policy toward Indians. The Problem of Indian Administration also referred to as the Meriam Report, noted,

"[T]he common failure to study sympathetically and understanding the Indians' own religions and ethics and to use what is good in them as the foundation upon which to build. . . . The attempt blindly to destroy the whole Indian religion may in effect be an attack on some of the very elements of religious belief which the missionary himself espouses and which he hopes the Indian will adopt." 17

Understanding the needs of Indians, and empathizing with their plight was beginning to take hold with the American people and their governmental representatives. Legislative action designed to protect the religious freedom of Indians picked up in the 1960s. This was in part due to the spiritual awakening that many Americans felt at this time. The hippie culture had given people new appreciation of alternative religious beliefs and practices. Numerous bills were passed regarding Indian civil rights, the possession of eagle feathers, Taos religious shrines, the Klamath Indians, and bills protecting Indian funeral objects and graves. 18 In 1962, Congress reexamined the Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, which prohibited the sale, taking, possession, purchase, or export of these protected and endangered birds. 19 The 1962 amendment took into consideration the religious significance of eagle feathers to the Indians. It allowed possession exceptions for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.” 20

Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968

Supressing the civil rights of Indians was not the exclusive domain of the U.S. government. Because of their unique legal position, Indians who resided on tribal land were under the jurisdiction of the tribe and not afforded the civil rights protections of the United States Bill of Rights. Tribal police and government entities were free to restrict any or all of the freedoms enumerated in that document. The

18 Fisher, 13.
usurpation of these rights was commonplace in Indian communities. In order to close this legal loophole, the U.S. Congress acted.\textsuperscript{21}

As part of an omnibus bill in 1968, and with the urging of President Lyndon Johnson, the Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). This was essentially a Bill of Rights that extended protection of an individual’s civil rights from infringement by the government. In this case that was Indian tribal governments. This bill stated that any tribe operating as a self-governing entity shall “make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” This legislation gave individuals living under tribal governance virtually every protection that the U.S. Bill of Rights guarantees. These included: freedom speech and press; freedom of assembly; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; double jeopardy; self-incrimination; private property takings; speedy public trials; cruel and unusual punishment; and equal protection under the law, etc. However, acknowledging that differences existed between tribal culture and white American culture, the ICRA did not include provisions for the separations of church and state, or the establishment of religion clause. American Indian reaction to this legislation was mixed. On one side, individuals were guaranteed many of the protections offered by the federal government. On there other side, this legislation was seen as an erosion of tribal sovereignty.\textsuperscript{22}

The legislature’s progress toward protecting the religious rights of Indians continued in 1969 when Congress passed a bill that placed 48,000 acres of federally owned land in New Mexico to the Pueblo de Taos Indians. The Indians placed a great deal of religious importance on this land, especially the area known as Blue Lake. This congressional bill was designed to protect the sanctity of the land by restricting its use by non-Indians.\textsuperscript{23} The importance of this legislation to Indian religious freedom was stated by George McGovern, the Democratic Senator from South Dakota:

Mr. President, what is involved here is far more than simply a legal claim, important as that is. What really is involved here is a deeply spiritual and religious matter, which goes right to the heart of

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freedom of religion and freedom of conscience in our country, because the Blue Lake area which is in dispute, and which has been in dispute for so many years, is regarded as the most sacred of all places by the Indian people, and particularly the Taos Pueblo Indians.\textsuperscript{24}

Positive legislation continued through the 1970s. In 1978, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA). This bill recognized the inherent right of religious freedom for all people, and such rights were “fundamental to the democratic structure of the United States.” It also recognized that there exists “a rich variety of religious heritages in this country.” AIRFA further states:

[H]enceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.

The bill also directs federal government agencies to confer with Native-American spiritual leaders to establish the appropriate procedures that are necessary for the protection of Indian religious rights.\textsuperscript{25} Although the AIRFA demonstrates the sensitivity of Congress to Indian religions, it is nothing more than a policy statement. Its lack of adequate enforcement provisions has been a cause of criticism. An amendment in 1994 legalized the use of peyote for ceremonial purposes.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{The Courts of Denial}

Over the last fifty years, most of the progress in defining and securing Indian religious freedom can be attributed to law makers and not jurists. In contrast to the consistently forward movement of the laws, the courts have been just as consistent in their efforts to halt or reverse the religious freedoms that were attained by Indians and other religious minorities in the United States. Unlike religious freedom legislation, which has responded to public opinion, religious freedom

\textsuperscript{24} 116 Congressional Record 39, 331 (1970).
\textsuperscript{25} Public Law No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978).
\textsuperscript{26} H.R.4230 (1994).
litigation has been tone deaf. Noted authority on Native American legal issues, Vine Deloria, Jr. commented on this subject by stating:

That federal court decisions bear little resemblance to corresponding contemporary developments in legislation is well-known and capable of documentation in any period of Indian history. But during this particular period, unless a case was politicized and obviously had the capability of resolving the ancient schizophrenia of ward-domestic dependent nation ideology, judges did not pay much attention to events and movements in the public arena.\textsuperscript{27}

And the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts have been reticent to hear cases of controversy or substance. When they do hear these cases, their rulings are often contrary to precedent or they are so ambiguous that they lack legal merit. Adds Deloria:

\[\text{T}h\text{e field of litigation made few advances in clarifying Indian rights because of the tendency of the Supreme Court to avoid controversial Indian cases or to deal with difficult Indian subjects. It became almost a rule of thumb that if a case had little precedent possibilities, it would be taken by the Supreme Court; if it involved difficult and unresolved ideas, it would be rejected without comment.}\textsuperscript{28}\]

Two important recent cases that were heard by the courts have all served to undermine the advancement of religious freedom. The first concerns the sacredness of land, and the second regards the use of sacramental peyote. \textit{Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association}, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), centered around the construction of a paved logging road by the United States Forest Service that would cut through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest, with the possible intention of harvesting timber in the area. This activity would permanently damage the grounds that had been historically used by the local Native-American as site for conducting religious rituals. Before the road was built, the local Indians formed the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association (NICPA), and filed suit requesting injunctive relief. Both the Federal District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the government’s interest in the use of the road did not warrant the destruction of the site and the Indian’s religious use of the sacred site. The case went to the

\textsuperscript{27} Deloria, Jr., “Legislation and Litigation,” 86-96.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 92.
U.S. Supreme Court. In a 5-3 decision, the Court held that the proposed actions of the Forest Service did not constitute a violation of the NICPA’s First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion. The Court held that the government’s purpose was secular and not aimed specifically at infringing upon a religion, and that the government’s action does not coerce individuals to act contrary to their religious beliefs.\(^{29}\)

In a strongly worded dissent, Justice William Brennan (joined by fellow Justices Harold Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall) criticized the decision as being insensitive to the religious beliefs and needs of Indians. He noted that Native Americans do not rely on doctrines, dogmas, or universal truths in the way that traditional Western religions do. Instead, many tribes attach spiritual significance to the land. Each particular site offers qualities of aesthetic pleasure and silence that create religious sacredness. He laments the Court’s decision by stating that “the proposed government operations would virtually destroy the . . . Indians' ability to practice their religion.”\(^{30}\)

Brennan made it abundantly clear that the decision by the majority was less about a concern for state imposed restrictions on religion, than it was about concern that the federal government would cede its claim of management over huge areas of federal land. This case could also open the door for future suits in which Native Americans could insist on the exclusion of all human activities on sacred sites. Brennan concluded by writing:

These concededly legitimate concerns lie at the very heart of this case, which represents yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate cultures - the dominant Western culture, which views land in terms of ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief system that holds land sacred.\(^{31}\)

The second noteworthy case is that of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Alfred Smith, 1105 Ct. 1595, 108 L. ed. 2d 876 (1990). Alfred Smith (a Native American) and Galen Black (a white man) were fired from their


\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.
positions at a drug rehabilitation clinic in Oregon for ingesting peyote. Both men were members of the Native American Church, and used the peyote in religious ceremonies. They filed for unemployment benefits but were denied on the grounds that they had been fired as a result of willful misconduct.

Smith and Black took their case to the Oregon Court of Appeals, who reversed the decision of the Employment Division. The Court of Appeals held that denial of unemployment benefits for the religious use of peyote violated the men’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. The state appealed this ruling to the Oregon Supreme Court, who upheld the lower courts’ decision. The state then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, who remanded the case back to the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether or not the sacramental use of peyote violated Oregon’s drug laws. The Court agreed that the two men did violate Oregon’s drug law, which did not have an exception for religious use of peyote. The Oregon Supreme Court returned the case to the U.S. Supreme Court because they felt that Oregon’s lack of a religious use exception was an infringement on the free exercise of religion. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case in its new context. The Court held that: “The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use.” The Rehnquist Court found that because the Oregon drug law was non-specific about Indian religious practices, it was constitutional in its equal application to all citizens. In the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote: “It is a permissible reading of the [free exercise clause]...to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended....To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' - permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself,' contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.' To adopt a true 'compelling interest' requirement for laws that affect religious practice would lead
In both *Lyng* and *Smith*, the Rehnquist Court sided with the state and against the worshipper. These decisions did not sit well with a large segment of the public. Pressure from a variety of religious groups and the American Civil Liberties Union pushed to reform the laws that applied to religious freedom, and reverse the rulings of the courts. At state and national levels, reactions to the rulings in these cases brought legislative reform. As mentioned earlier, the 1994 amendment to the AIRFA protected the sacramental use of peyote in Native American rituals. This was a direct reaction to the ruling in *Smith*. The Oregon legislature also reacted to *Smith* in 1991 by revising their drug laws to accommodate the religious use of peyote. Immediately after *Smith*, the United States Congress began a legislative move to remedy this decision. This came in the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993. This bill did not mandate that all states legalize religious peyote use, but it did dictate that any cases involving religious freedom should be judged on the basis of the “compelling state interest” test.33

**Conclusion**

United States law regarding the separation of church and state are both complex and vague. The application and interpretation of these laws are subject to cultural, social, racial, and class bias. From the early days of the colonies, America has been a predominantly Christian nation, at least for its white inhabitants. Unfortunately freedom of religion, one of the founding tenets of this country, has meant freedom for (Protestant) Christians to foist their cultural and religious ethos on whomever they happen to encounter. Overcoming these biases and predispositions has been a long and difficult process. For the American Natives, who wished to practice their non-Christian religions, the effort to understand and accommodate their religious needs has been difficult. And their needs and rights have frequently been usurped by the governing bodies of their land. Redress for the violation of their spiritual rights should have come from the neutral, arbitrating body of the government, the courts. But this avenue of legal

correction has not been historically positive. A great deal more progress has been made through legislative action. The “people’s branch” of government has shown a great deal more sensitivity to the spiritual and legal needs of Native-Americans. Unfortunately, little can be done by any branch of the government to adequately compensate or recover the untold loss of spiritual heritage.
Native-American Religious Freedom

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The history of the American West has undergone major transformations within the last three-hundred years. The West can be seen as a product of two images, those real and unreal. The mythical West mainly existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as people pictured the West as a land of opportunity, freedom, and a place of refuge. The West existed in the imaginations of people from around the world, and those living on the eastern coast of the United States. Not everyone actually made the trek westward, but millions did. Of course, the myth of the West as an idealized place did not actually exist in reality. In reality, the West comprised much more diversity and conflict than had been previously believed. In the twentieth century, changes in western historiography have incorporated the complexities of the West by integrating women and gender into the story.

This paper explores a sample of histories of women and gender in the West, particularly to compare those considered “women’s history,” and those that take a gendered approach. It will look at histories concerning white Euro-American, Hispanic, Asian, African-American, and Native American women. Some historical studies have made it difficult to categorize different racial groups, yet as historian Margaret D. Jacobs points out, “if such terms have no objective basis, they nevertheless retain their power as terms derived from historical and social processes.” The paper will argue that the “women’s histories” add an important contribution through their movement away from Dee Brown’s “gentle tamers” stereotype. These pieces focus on the question of whether women were burdened or subjugated on the frontier. However, those that take a gendered approach through the

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incorporation of women into their societies present a fuller and more satisfying picture of events. Specifically, many of these works look at intercultural conflict between various races and classes, and often incorporate gendered rhetoric. Most of these gendered works have been completed within the last fifteen years, showing that the historiography of the West seems to be moving toward more complex and diverse issues.

Many Western histories concerning women add their stories to the existing compilation of information, providing a different aspect that exists alongside the more “male oriented” writings. Integrating women into the historical narrative proved to be a daunting task as more women entered historical academia. Dee Brown’s *The Gentle Tamers* represented the first steps towards women’s history of the West.\(^3\) This book created the image of the white emigrant woman as a “tamer” of white men and social conditions in the West. Through his work, Brown filled a major gap in Western histories that revolved around men, yet mainly focused on women’s domestic roles. Recently, other women’s histories concerning the frontier have moved away from Brown’s thesis, and instead emphasize a harsher view of the frontier. Historians argue that women of all ethnicities were not “gentle tamers” that brought domesticity and family harmony to the West. Instead, they were real women that often experienced excessive burdens or racial hostility.

In *Women in Waiting*, Linda Peavy and Ursula Smith delve into the lives of six women that stayed home as their husbands traveled to the West for new opportunities.\(^4\) Looking at the diaries and letters of the women and their husbands, Peavy and Smith claim that the women with absent husbands were put in the awkward position of entering the public sphere. Conventional norms demanded that women stay at home, yet these women had to make ends meet by not only taking over all the responsibilities of the farm, but also venturing out into the business world. Many women found socially acceptable ways to obtain money, such as

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selling butter and eggs, sewing, or going into hospitality or teaching.\(^5\) Therefore, Peavy and Smith indicate that the steps outside the domestic sphere were tentative.

Nonetheless, Peavy and Smith depict the women as constantly facing trials to test their strength in the absence of their adventurous husbands.\(^6\) The authors depict life on the home frontier as exceptionally burdensome, and portray the women as unendingly stalwart. They convincingly argue that the heroics of women at home were equal to those of men abroad. These women are obviously not “gentle tamers,” as they are constantly shown as taking control of their homes and financial difficulties in the absence of men. However, echoes of Brown’s work still exist, as the main subjects are white women and domesticity. Overall, this book serves as a good example of a work concerning white women in the West. It illuminates the little-known “home frontier,” yet it has its limitations that reflect Brown’s limited view in *The Gentle Tamers*.

Besides the women’s histories that examine whites, many others involve females of non-European descent. In “Chinese Immigrant Women in Nineteenth-Century California,” Lucie Cheng shows that Chinese women faced social subjugation in the American West.\(^7\) In the nineteenth-century, California had a small population of Chinese women, roughly five to six percent of the total Chinese-American population in the state. She claims that this often over-looked group rarely came to California out of their own will. Instead, many were forced into prostitution through kidnapping, contracts, or sales from their families in China. After landing in San Francisco, the women were displayed for sale before either becoming a concubine or a prostitute.\(^8\) She claims that “their concentration in the least-esteemed occupations reflected the lack of employment opportunities for women, not only in relationship to Chinese men but also in relation to white

\(^5\) Ibid., 4-5, 18.  
\(^6\) Ibid., 72, 79.  
\(^8\) Ibid., 244-249.
women.” Cheng thus depicts Chinese women as becoming subjugated upon arriving to the frontier. Contrasting to the “gentle tamers” ideal, which did not even take race into account, these women faced a harsh reality in the supposed “land of opportunity.” The author asserts that these women faced hostility from both Chinese men and white Americans.

Ann M. Butler’s “Still in Chains” also highlights race and the harshness of the frontier. She looks at the incarceration of African-American women in Western prisons after the Civil War. Butler insists that the incarcerations challenge the idea of the West as a region of freedom where African-American women could escape the vestiges of slavery, because they faced a hostile frontier. Louisiana, known as “Gateway to the West,” held sixty-seven African American women between 1866 and 1872 in its penitentiaries. Upon examination of the prison records, all but one had been born within a slave state, and most of the women were charged for minor robbery crimes. Only five could read, and many were underweight and sustained some type of injury or ailment. In addition, Butler briefly investigates a small sample of white women, and suggests that they may have been treated more fairly than their African-American counterparts. The author thus shows that the lives of African-American women did not change much once on the Western frontier. She provides a good framework for studies of African-American women on the frontier. Furthermore, she debunks the myth of the West as a place of opportunity for blacks, and illustrates that racism persisted on the frontier. However, Butler does not fully investigate issues of power that these women may have had within the penal system.

While the majority of ethnic women’s histories deal with racial subjugation to white settlers, Sylvia Van Kirk’s Many Tender Ties provides a different angle. She argues that Native women in the Canadian fur trade were not passive victims to white

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9 Ibid., 250, 253, 254.
11 Ibid., 20-21.
12 Ibid., 26-33.
male trappers, but active participants that took steps to improve their status. Through these sometimes long-lasting relationships, Native women took advantage of opportunities within the fur trade and acted as crucial “women in between” white and Native men. These women helped dress furs, served as interpreters, and provided emotional support.\textsuperscript{14} The author does point out that these women were often confined to the domestic sphere and were always defined in their relationship with men. Nonetheless, status could be obtained through the trader relationships. She contends that the women led better lives in the fur-trading forts. While they had previously acted as “beasts of burden” within their tribes, they could expect a more sedentary and comfortable routine in the forts.\textsuperscript{15} Overall, Van Kirk advocates the historical investigation of sex roles and the power that women obtained, and thus provides a convincing piece that explores women’s agency within their society. She convincingly indicates that these women exercised influence as to better themselves in the fur-trade society.

It is apparent that Van Kirk and the other authors of histories concerning women in the West have made a considerable contribution. However, some historians have questioned if these pieces accurately reflect the complexity of the American West. In “Women of Color and the Rewriting of Western History,” Antonia I. Castañeda asserts that historians should look at the relations of power among women of different races, classes, and cultures.\textsuperscript{16} She also contends that differences and conflict should be analyzed within different groups, and that social categories and concepts should be re-examined. She claims that most studies concerning women deal with descriptions of contact between white men or women and women of color. However, histories of women in the West have yet to branch into intercultural or interracial relationships. Furthermore, Castañeda insists on looking at women’s gender experiences that their culture and society

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 1-8, 53-73.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 80.
influenced. Overall, she calls for the use of an approach that encompasses relationships between men and women of different cultures, and the conflicts and issues of power that arose from them.

Joan Wallach Scott’s “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis” seems to have influenced Castañeda’s point of view concerning gender experiences. Scott calls for a shift away from studies concerning the subordination of women as individuals. Instead, Scott advocates a new definition of gender that rests on two interrelated parts. First, that gender is an element based on perceived differences between the sexes. She asserts that certain symbols within society can have masculine or feminine meanings that are often in a fixed binary opposition with each other. Second, gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power. She insists that the relationships between male and female influence hierarchal structures and issues of equality. This can also involve issues of race and class. Both Castañeda and Scott advocate a method that explores power relations that stem from gendered rhetoric.

Various works concerning women in the west reflect this movement toward gender studies that both Castañeda and Scott called for. These works explore intercultural conflict between different races and classes, along with issues of power between masculine and feminine representations. Historians examining women in the American West have investigated these topics in a variety of contexts, such as through interracial marriages, the effects of wealth within different ethnic groups, and societal perceptions of domesticity and patriarchy. These all illustrate the extreme diversity and complexity of the West and the frontier.

In “The Eastmans and the Luhans,” Margaret D. Jacobs emphasizes the social constructions of gender, race, and culture through her examination of interracial marriages between white

\[17\] Ibid., 54-66.
\[19\] Ibid., 1053-1075.
Jacobs looks at two examples in particular, the Eastman and Luhan marriages, through the utilization of the contemporary writings of both couples. She contends that while society was usually sympathetic toward the white men that married Native American women on the frontier, interracial relationships between white women and Native American men were seen as scandalous. This was partially due to the fact that women had no economic status of their own, and their position was mediated through their husbands. Essentially, when a white woman married a Native American, she became a Native American herself. This occurrence threatened the American patriarchal order, and took away a source of power for white men.

Jacobs particularly explores the gendered language that white women and Native American men used to explain their unions. The Eastmans, both writers, publicly justified their marriage as a method to integrate Native Americans into white society. This reflected the attempts of reformer and missionary groups that were bent on Native American assimilation. However, the Charles and Elaine Eastman later divorced for various reasons, one being their conflicting viewpoints on gender roles. While Elaine displayed dissatisfaction in the fact that Charles could not be the male provider she hoped him to be, Charles associated masculinity with physical strength. In addition, Charles had a different idea of womanhood than his wife, as he believed in complete domesticity. Jacobs thus explores issues of power and race within Western societies. Unlike the women’s histories, this piece explores issues of power through interracial marriages. Through her examination of the language used by the two couples, Jacobs comes to interesting conclusions that link together race and gender.

Mirosalva Chavez-Garcia’s article “Guadalupe Trujillo”
also explores issues of race and gender, yet she also inserts class. She looks specifically at how Mexican and Native American women related to one another within the Mexican legal system outside Las Angeles. She utilizes court records to explore the trial of Guadalupe Trujillo, who was accused of murdering her Native American servant, Ysabel. Chavez-Garcia argues that cases such as Trujillo’s shed light on the power structure between Mexican women, who could attain social status through landed husbands, and Native American women, who had little agency. She contends that although Native Americans attempted to enter the Hispanic world, there were no “ties of sisterhood” between the two groups of women. While Trujillo maintained the identity of a gente de razon (people of reason), Ysabel was a genizaro, or a captured Native that was forced into servitude.

Chavez-Garcia also examines gendered rhetoric that came into play during the trial. One can see this through the social norms that came into play during the trial. Trujillo’s husband used gendered rhetoric as to tarnish the name of Ysable, claiming that she committed infanticide in New Mexico. He thus slanders Ysabel’s identity as a mother. Furthermore, Trujillo is convicted, not because her testimony of self-defense fell through, but because the judge deemed her actions as improper. Typically, the patriarch disciplined members of the household, not the wife. Overall, men still maintained a higher status than women of all races in New Mexican society and dictated the social norms. Hence, Chavez-Garcia thus illuminates the fact there were divisions of hierarchical power between different groups of women in New Mexico. Class was obviously an important factor in the relationships between various groups of women in the West. The author also effectively examines ideas of femininity and masculinity within this particular society.

Similarly, Cecilia M. Tsu’s “Sex, Lies, and Agriculture,” examines class, gender and power relationships between Japanese

25 Ibid., 31-33.
26 Ibid., 33, 35.
27 Ibid., 39-40.
men and women in rural California.\textsuperscript{28} Many Japanese men immigrated to California in the early nineteenth century to work as farm laborers, yet Japanese women were very scarce. Tsu contends that in contrast to the popular image of family-oriented community life, class and gender issues cased tensions and violence. Morgue inquests show that Japanese men fought over women, and that the men often attempted to rape Japanese females.\textsuperscript{29} Tsu argues that Japanese men equated class status in their community with success in farming and maintaining a family. When they could not obtain these goals, the result was often violent. Looking at two rape cases in particular from contemporary coroners’ reports, Tsu points out that the two men who committed the crimes came from unstable economic backgrounds. Furthermore, both attempted to attack the wives of the more prosperous Japanese men that had homes and families.\textsuperscript{30}

Tsu insists that these women also had to deal with negative perceptions of themselves from white males. In the coroner’s inquests concerning the attempted crimes against them, white males described them as either overly protective of their honor, or loose and immoral. One woman, who was killed by her attacker, was labeled as a likely prostitute. Besides reflecting contemporary notions of gender, these reports also highlight race issues, as many cases were written off as mysterious “Chinese inscrutability,” that observers claimed to not have understood.\textsuperscript{31} Accordingly, like Chavez-Garcia, Tsu paints a complex picture in which class and economic status play a large role. Tsu also convincingly integrates issues of gendered rhetoric. While Japanese women may have had more freedom in the West compared to their homeland, they still had to face hostile language and images.

Lynn M. Hudson considers the roles of masculinity, femininity, and the fear of wealthy African Americans in “‘Strong Animal Passions’ in the Gilded Age” which deals with the trial of a

\textsuperscript{28} Cecelia M. Tsu, “Sex, Lies, and Agriculture: Reconstructing Japanese Immigrant Gender Relations in Rural California, 1900–1913.” \textit{Pacific Historical Review} 78 (May, 2009).
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 174-181, 191.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 192-195.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 199.
wealthy senator in 1884 and 1885. The case concerns an Irish American woman and purported prostitute Sarah Hill, who charged the wealthy William Sharon with adultery and desertion. Hill claimed that the two had been secretly married in 1880. Mary Ellen Pleasant, the African-American entrepreneur, became involved as she owned boarding houses that may have offered prostitutes to its clients. Furthermore, Hudson investigates the racial and gendered language that came to play a large role in the trial. Many wondered if Pleasant had some kind of “unnatural power” over Hill, due to the widespread nervousness of the relationship between a white and black woman. Hudson claims that Pleasant effectively took on the identity of a mammy during the trial, which she suggests resonated with American cultural icons rooted in slavery. Hudson asserts that gendered rhetoric also influenced the case, as early depictions of Hill portrayed her as a harlot before she later took on the image of a scorned and victimized woman. Most court observers sided with Hill, and the judge passed moral judgment on Sharon for not controlling his “animal passions” or sexual appetite. Hudson argues that the court’s condemnation of Sharon represented the negative image of unregulated behavior and masculinity. Thus, similar to Chavez-Garcia’s piece, Hudson explores perceptions of masculinity as well as femininity.

Differing from other pieces, Jean Barman investigates sexuality along with issues of race, and gender between white men and Native American women in “Taming Aboriginal Sexuality.” Investigating nineteenth-century British Columbia, she asserts that men could use their power and status to simultaneously condemn Native women sexuality while also using it for their own sexual gratification. However, Barman also shows that Native women

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32 Lynn M. Hudson, “‘Strong Animal Passions’ in the Gilded Age: Race, Sex, and a Senator on Trial,” in *Women and Gender in the American West*, eds. Mary Ann Irwin and James F. Brooks (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004).
33 Ibid., 259-263.
34 Ibid., 267-276.
36 Ibid., 213.
did exercise agency through attempts to control their own sexual behavior, particularly through liaisons with non-Native men and reporting instances of abuse. Nonetheless, by the time, British Columbia incorporated into Canada in 1871, missionaries, government officials, and Native men took active steps to “tame” Native women sexuality. All three groups believed that Native women should remain in the domestic sphere, and used gendered rhetoric to propagate this idea. Barman asserts that “this tripartite alliance, wherein men in power buttressed and comforted each other, was grounded in mutual expediency and, to some extent, in mutual male admiration.” In addition, racial tensions affected this alliance, as seen through the campaign to return Native women to Native men.37 Barman proves in her article that sexuality also could factor into questions of gender and race.

Works considering women and gender have come a long way since Brown’s “The Gentle Tamers,” which provided an overall narrow view of women and gender relations on the Western frontier. It is apparent that the works considered “women’s history” are moving away from the “gentle tamers” stereotype through their introduction ethnicities and their questioning of whether women were burdened or subjugated on the frontier. However, with the introduction of histories concerning gender and intercultural power relations, more complex issues are being addressed. These include those works that answered the calls Castañeda and Scott through the investigation of cultural conflict between different races and classes, and the utilization of gendered rhetoric to explore ideas of femininity and masculinity. Topics such as interracial marriages, the effects of wealth within different ethnic groups, and perceptions of domesticity and patriarchy all illuminate the many intricacies of the West. The works comprising gender have mainly been completed within the last fifteen years, indicating that the historiography of the West is presenting a fuller picture of events.

37 Ibid., 213-222.
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Religion formed George Bancroft’s core, from how he viewed and understood history, to his lifelong devotion to the principles of Jacksonian democracy. The son of a renowned Unitarian minister in Worcester, Massachusetts, Bancroft embraced Trinitarianism, a belief in progress, determinism and the concept of man’s essential goodness and impulse to justice. Influenced by his New England upbringing and the assimilation of German thought, Bancroft’s world view paralleled Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Transcendentalists with some notable exceptions. Bancroft’s God lived in the world, and through historical examples could prove, “Providence, calling our institutions into being, has conducted the country to its present happiness and glory.”

His father, Aaron Bancroft, led a liberalization of Massachusetts religion. Turning from the stern Calvinism of his father, Aaron supported the spread of Unitarianism until, by 1819, that sect dominated New England over the old Calvinist theology. In contrast with his own father’s parenting technique, Aaron Bancroft encouraged free inquiry, and the improvement of one’s own mind. Understanding his own stance on issues concerning Unitarianism and Orthodoxy, he treaded carefully to avoid coloring his children’s perceptions of the debate with his own thoughts, encouraging that they judge the truth for themselves. George Bancroft, born in 1800 to a home filled with the stored up knowledge in his father’s library, established his independence of thought, deep respect for learning and meticulous habits of scholarship from Latin and Greek classics, John Locke, and the works of the Puritan fathers, as well as deep discussions between parents and siblings concerning a world of ideas.

After graduation from Harvard in 1817, Edward Everett, one of Bancroft’s professors who had received his doctorate from the University of Göttingen, urged the young man to complete his

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education at Everett’s alma mater. Studying under historians A.L. Heeren, Johann Eichhorn, Leopold Von Ranke, and Gottlieb Planck, Bancroft immersed himself in the precepts of German Romanticism. After graduation, he enrolled in Berlin University and studied under Georg Hegel, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, synthesizing many of the intellectual components of what would, a decade later, become American Transcendentalism. In fact, in a letter written in 1821, only months after arriving in Germany, Bancroft used language similar to Emerson’s in describing the doctrine of self-reliance and its dependence on God: “… for our faith and our virtue we must not depend on any external impulse, but draw it from a source, which is always ours. … The precept ‘Be perfect as God is perfect,’ contains in itself the very essence of morals and religion. Such are the principles to which I have been led.”

Bancroft’s understanding of the human race and its role in a providentially ordained order, and how political science, critical theory, education, ethics, and history pertained also to a divine schematic hinged on five perfectible principles: an unbounded faith in humanity, and in humanity’s natural goodness; humanity’s faculties of conscience and reason; love for one’s fellow man; and the recognition of beauty. Reason allowed man to unerringly discern truth; conscience, or “the instinct of the deity,” brought an intuitive understanding of justice; love for one’s fellows led to benevolence; and an innate sense of beauty ensured correctness in matters of taste and aesthetic judgment. Bancroft’s faith in humanity and humanity’s natural goodness, and all of the other core principles radiating out from within each person, meant that the great mass of humanity, and Americans in particular, formed a great body whose collective voice rang with God’s own truth. Unlike later Transcendentalists, Bancroft did not believe that voice could be heard simply by going out among the people or by plunging into the wilderness. A poet (here including Emerson), “repeats the message of the Infinite, without always being able to analyze it, and often without knowing how he received it, or why he was selected for its utterance.” History provided the opportunity to engage at length

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with the infinite, “for she not only watches the great encounters of life, but recalls what had vanished, and partaking in a bliss like that of creating, restores it to animated being … as she reclines in the lap of eternity, [she] sees the mind of humanity itself, engaged in formative efforts … Of all pursuits that require analysis, history, therefore, stands first.”

Initially concerned about maintaining his religion in the face of New England’s perception of German “atheism,” as time passed Bancroft grew troubled by his ministerial prospects on completion of his studies. “Tis out of the question to expect, that in any American University whatever, the station of Professor of theology would be offered to me or anyone else, who had got his theology in Germany,” he wrote to Everett. During his coursework at Göttingen and Berlin Universities, he frequently travelled to country parishes to preach to small, indifferent congregations, and abhorred the carousing and rowdy behavior of his fellow students. Upon completing his studies, Bancroft travelled around Germany, France, and Italy, meeting Goethe, Lord Byron, Washington Irving, and Lafayette, moving in the brightest social circles in Paris and Berlin and Rome, shedding his puritanical mannerisms in favor of continental ones. Bancroft had no love for Goethe, whom he considered “too dirty, too bestial in his conceptions.” He enjoyed a memorable meeting with Byron, and returned to Massachusetts in 1822. Despite ardent Germanophilia over the course of his life, and perhaps appropriating the notion of the Volk from Herder, Bancroft looked to the culture of the United States, raised from a long colonial period, filtered by the frontier setting and extreme distance from what he saw as a corrupting European influence into mankind’s last hope.

Having studied during the flood-tide of German Romanticism, which even as he left the continent had only just arrived in Great

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3 Nye, Brahmin Rebel, 33-34, 37; and Nye, “The Religion of George Bancroft,” 218.

Britain and the United States via the poetry of Coleridge and Carlyle, Bancroft landed in Boston on the bleeding intellectual edge. He’d studied with Hegel in Berlin, read Kant, Fichte, Herder and Novalis in the original German at a time when few Americans had the ability to read that language. Rather than electrifying New England, his foreign ideas made him an unpopular minister upon his return to New England, and dissatisfied with the entrenched teaching establishment at Harvard and his own skill as an instructor, Bancroft explored and enunciated his beliefs in essays and orations published throughout his life. Most notable, his oration, *The Necessity, the Reality, and the Promise of the Progress of the Human Race* (1854), outlines how “the glory of God is not contingent upon man’s goodwill, but all existence sub-serves his purposes. The system of the universe is as a celestial poem, whose beauty is from all eternity, and must not be marred by human interpolations.”  

History, as the means by which humanity could view the divine schematic, illustrated humanity’s central role as the principled beings created for the perpetuation of a metaphysical endgame.

Bancroft’s adherence to his principles led him not only to history, but also forged him into a life-long Democrat in the Jacksonian mold. Having married into an important Massachusetts banking family, and professing interest in politics, Bancroft ignored offers from the ever-dominant Massachusetts Whigs for patronage and position and instead courted Democratic Party leaders in Boston, who in turn ignored Bancroft until he published the first volume of his *History of the United States* in 1834. He entered politics to participate in great events, and wrote history to explain the same. Reviews critical of his historical effort placed an emphasis on the democratic ideals bursting forth from the text, the inevitable march of progress that resulted in self-governance by the people that essentially “cast a vote for Jackson.” Bancroft’s stated aim was the correction of errors in previous attempts at American history. In applying modern, German historical methods to its preparation, Bancroft was the first American historian who conscientiously attempted to make no important statement without reference to an original document. While critics might have deemed

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his first volume a “vote for Jackson,” the majority of public sentiment failed to take note of any political slant. In fact, Bancroft conveyed “with sincere conviction what the American people had been saying and thinking for a generation,” that the United States served a divine purpose, and similarly had a divine prerogative to spread liberty across the whole world.  

The ideas in The History of the United States emphasize positive human progress, though not in a continual upward march towards perfection. “… the end of what is now happening, though we ourselves partake in it, seems to fall out by chance. All is nevertheless one whole; individuals, families, peoples, the race, march in accord with the Divine will; and when any part of the destiny of humanity is fulfilled, we see the ways of Providence vindicated.” Bancroft’s form of universal history has a ring to it similar to St. Augustine’s City of God, written at a time of comparable societal dislocations like those suffered during the Revolution, and in light of both the democratic surge across American society, as well as a validation of Christianity. Bancroft’s work, labeling and plotting various stages of history with the final stage ending in the American Revolution, presented progress as the lesson of history, from the moral and spiritual death of the Old World, to the triumphant seizure of humanity’s second chance in the New World. The story of the American colonies, of the eventual United States, served as the culmination of divinely instigated historical forces pushing mankind in the direction of freedom, so that The History of the United States became an “epic of liberty,” and to Richard Lewis, “undependable as history,” but “recognizable as epic myth.” Bancroft could establish the Puritans, “many of the men of high endowments, large fortune and the best education; scholars, well versed in all the learning of the times; clergymen, who ranked among the most eloquent and pious in the realm- embarked with Winthrop for their asylum, bearing … the charter, … the basis of their liberties,” in a land “planted

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with a noble vine, wholly of the right seed.” With no fear for troubles on the far side of the ocean, parted from England forever, the exiles exclaiming pluckily, “Our hearts … shall be fountains of tears for your everlasting welfare, when we shall be in our poor cottages in the wilderness.”

The answer to tyranny resided in the wilderness, in the closeness with the beauty of the eternal, such as when the previously maligned puritans cast Anne Hutchinson and her followers into the wilderness a mere seven years after building a refuge from the same. Bancroft vindicates Hutchinson: “The principles of Anne Hutchinson were a natural consequence of the progress of the reformation. She had imbibed them in Europe; … in the very year in which she was arraigned at Boston, Descartes, like herself a refugee from his country, like herself a prophetic harbinger of the spirit of the coming age, established philosophic liberty on the method of free reflection. Both asserted that the conscious judgment of the mind is the highest authority to itself. Descartes did but promulgate, under the philosophic form of free reflection, the same truth which Anne Hutchinson, with the fanaticism of impassioned conviction, avowed under the form of inward reflections.”

Challenges to power in the Old World sent incongruous philosophies into the New, and when tyranny had established a barrier to developing philosophies in the New, adherents to those developing philosophies struck out for virgin territory to establish “… one more little republic in the wilderness, organized on the principles of natural justice by the voluntary combination of the inhabitants.”

Yet the dramatization of history that Lewis condemned seems to miss the point: that the “epic myth” is wholly intentional. The extensive use of figurative language suggests not the death and rebirth of mankind from Old World to New, but a return to “Edenic innocence.” The reversal consists of the return from the decadence and corruption of the Old World to the simple purity of the New World, so that as the second chance of man is seized and exploited in the New World, the old sins are laid to rest, and Liberty reigns in a return to a

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12 Ibid., 391.
13 Ibid., 392.
golden age.\textsuperscript{14} For a nation in the grip of religious revival, that believed itself to be a culmination of sorts in a divine scheme, at the end of one history and the beginning of a new, Bancroft’s Jacksonian impulse, combined with his prototypical transcendental ideas tapped directly into the national psyche. In reaching back, beyond Columbus to Scandinavian adventurers, Bancroft extends the reach of Europeans as far back as the historical record will allow, noting that all the tales of Viking expeditions come from a narrative and not from hard fact. Unwilling to take vague locations and traditional forms too seriously, he casts doubt on the previous historians who reported the Scandinavian conjecture as fact.\textsuperscript{15} However, Bancroft did not always let the veracity of facts obscure what he wanted to impart to his readers, using somewhat mystical and spontaneous occurrences not related to the past, nor explained by it. Irreconcilable contradictions between research and religious faith proved no obstacle for Bancroft, who describes how Hooker and Haynes, founders of Connecticut, “struck the rock in the wilderness so the waters of liberty gushed forth in copious and perennial fountains.” If all existence served God, as Bancroft believed, liberty could gush from a stone, both as a means to self-reliance, and God’s central role in the unfolding narrative of advancement.\textsuperscript{16} He returns to the supreme importance of the land throughout the History: “Political wisdom is not sealed up in rolls and parchments. It welled up like the waters from the hillside,” further illustrating how humanity learns from creation’s example, as willing agents of Providence.\textsuperscript{17} The land itself as an organic agent is key to Bancroft’s metaphor and myth; Bancroft emphasizes the fertility and fecundity of the land in many idyllic descriptions of the New World that first associates the land with Edenic myth. Secondary features, such as the remoteness of the colonies, result in the unfettered prosperity of the settlements, and the natural setting encourages the liberty of the people through their own self-reliance, and the care of Providence.\textsuperscript{18}

Far from being a regression to primitive nature, progress

\textsuperscript{15} Bancroft, “History,” 1:5-6.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 403; and Woolf, 351.
\textsuperscript{17} Bancroft, “History,” 6:399; and Bancroft “The Necessity,” 15.
through the Edenic myth is a return to innocence as a measure of historical change, i.e. the Puritans leaving tyrannical England, and Hutchinson and her followers leaving a newly tyrannical Boston, each departure a fresh beginning. For Bancroft, the settling of North America presented a final cycle, stabilized by the U.S. Constitution so that eventual corruption was forestalled indefinitely. The fertility of the virgin land is lauded, but Eden is achieved and not found in the wilderness. The garden had to be built before the virtue of the land gained a measure of purity over native claims to the New World. To assert a supreme claim to the land, Bancroft cites English common law, how improvement of the land, construction of permanent buildings and boundary fences denoted ownership and control. Bancroft presents an ancient and acceptable legal argument for the rights of the settlers in the New World.19

The providential charge of man, to seek beauty and equanimity, justice, and the absolute knowledge of truth gave the American people, through all of colonial history to push ever forward towards the inevitable assertion of democracy, of freedom from European tyranny and corruption. As a core belief of George Bancroft, these ideas moved through his text to put form to the perhaps communal idea of what being an American represented in an age when nationalism, national identity and expansionism were taking root. The changing tune of historical inquiry as the nineteenth century marched forward established different standards, and discarded old methods, both of which have served to discredit George Bancroft as the preeminent historian of his time. Condemned to relative obscurity for both his enthusiastic and life-long Jacksonian boosterism, and the ever increasing and more sophisticated image of the past established by both more primary documents and different scholarly methods than those available in the mid-nineteenth-century, historians of the latter nineteenth and twentieth centuries put too much emphasis on the now-current standards that permeate the field of history.20 Bancroft wrote history as an explanation, and in every event he sensed the movement of God across the face of the waters. Many of his contemporaries did

19 Ibid., 590; and Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18.
as well. He spoke to his own generation in a radical way that soon became commonplace, then discarded. When his generation had mostly passed on, George Bancroft remained, a relic of that earlier time, unable to fathom the changes in his field occurring around him, but glad to see the work moving forward. The changing methodology left Providence out of the historical picture, and for Bancroft, that revision doomed his history to mere literature, to “epic myth.”

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21 Dawes and Nichols, “Revaluing Bancroft,” 284-293; and Nye, Brahmin Rebel, 5-12.
Bibliography


“Pronounced dead, buried, un lamented, with a stake through the heart, populism returns, like the living dead of Latin American politics, to haunt the sentient world, undeterred by the bright dawn of democracy and neo-liberalism.”¹ ~ Alan Knight.

Until the twentieth century, scholars did not consider populism a political ideology, and some still do not. Yet, populist discourse is present from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte to Hugo Chávez. Paul W. Drake, in his famous article on populism, inquires whether this political movement requires a checkup or a requiem, because by the 1980s many scholars considered populism a relic; similarly, according to Knight’s hypothesis, populism should have accepted its funeral oration.² Yet, this paper seeks to prove that this ideology, whose requiem is inessential, is not a specter haunting Latin America, but a living political ideology inherent to understanding Latin American politics in the twenty first century. Defining populism, seeking its causation (theories of origin), and identifying its manifestation in different eras are keys to understanding the persistence of this political style and the success of the leading contemporary Latin American populist, Hugo Chávez.

**Defining Populism**

Populist ideologies are simply hard to define. For example, three general characteristics of Latin American populism are personalistic, demagogic leaders, mass following from the lower classes, and urban policies including modernization, social integration, and redistribution. Mexico’s PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*), for instance, was, in chronological order, revolutionary,

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agrarian reformist, developmentalist, industrialist, and neoliberal. However, in terms of style, populists were not always demagogic; some populists had a following from the middle and upper classes, and some appealed to the rural sectors instead of the urban. Populism, at times, was a political movement with support from the masses, but did not have an effective structure to accomplish its economic goals, and at others, it was an instrument used by leaders to control and reinforce the traditional classes through feigned promises of upward mobility.

Despite the prevailing notion that populism seems to be “a conceptual bag full of inconsistent definitions,” at least one element is ubiquitous, a paternalistic bond between leaders who promise the “nationalistic redemption” of the “downtrodden” masses. If paternal, authoritarian, demagogic leaders have always dominated Latin American culture as Drake suggests, and if the masses are culturally predisposed to follow such leaders, then a working definition of populism is crucial. Nevertheless, experts cannot agree on a single definition and even seem to have an “academic distrust” of populism.

Carlos De la Torre offers perhaps one of the preeminent definitions of populism:

[As] an interclass alliance based on charismatic political leadership; a Manichaean and moralistic discourse that divides society into el pueblo and oligarchy; clientelist networks that guarantee access to state resources; and forms of political participation in which public and massive demonstrations, the acclamation of leaders, and the occupation of public spaces in the

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5 Muñoz and Kiddle, 2-3.
6 Waisbord, 198.
7 Canovan, 137-138, 141; Drake, 219, 221. Drake argues that populist paternalism is the remnant of the paternalism of nineteenth century caudillos.
8 Waisbord, 223.
name of a leader are perceived as more important than citizenship rights and the respect for liberal democratic procedures.\textsuperscript{10}

Kurt Wayland notes, “[p]opulism is best defined as a political strategy” and suggests that if populism is defined strictly along its political lines then its socioeconomic policies are left open to “flexibility” and the “opportunism of populist leaders.”\textsuperscript{11} Contrarily, Edwards takes a more critical approach defining populism as a “set of economic policies aimed at [the] redistribution of income by running high and unsustainable fiscal deficits and expansive monetary policies and by mandating wage increases for the public-sector workers that are not justified based on increases in productivity.”\textsuperscript{12} Roberts adds to the definition “a top-down process of political mobilization,” and Knight includes “a reformist rather than revolutionary programme” in the “usual suspects” of populism.\textsuperscript{13}

This paper defines populism as a political style where society is divided into two new, polar opposite groups of ‘the people’ and ‘the elites,’ whose leaders promote the will of ‘the people’ through Manichaean discourse and reformist, redistributive economic policies. Furthermore, this paper considers peasants, workers, the urban poor, and at times, disenfranchised members of the middle class, the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia as constituting a multiclass-coalition known as ‘the people.’ As such, ‘the people’ are opposed to the traditional, landed aristocracy, foreign powers, political institutions, multinational corporations, and at times, certain domestic classes.

\textsuperscript{13} Kenneth M. Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,” \textit{World Politics} 48, no.1 (Oct. 1995): 88; Knight, “Populism,” 224-225, 226, 231, 237. Knight states that due to the divergence of scholars, the only sure definition of populism is its etymological root-\textit{populus}, or ‘the people,’ so by consequence, populism could be defined as a movement, government, party, leader, or political style that has something to do with ‘the people.’ However, haziness encompasses what said movement, etc. has to do with the people; what is more, “who” exactly constitutes \textit{the people} also poses a challenge of terms. Furthermore, there is a lack of theoretical analyses of populism, which adds to the difficulty in defining it as a political style. See also Kirk Hawkins, “Populism in Venezuela: The Rise of Chavismo,” \textit{Third World Quarterly} 24, no. 6 (Dec. 2003): 1139.
including the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and intelligentsia known as ‘the elites.’ Most importantly, ‘the people’ who support the leader, and ‘the elite’ who do not support the leader, are not ridged groups; occasionally some classes, as stated above, divide themselves between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ within any given populist movement.

**Theories on the Causes and Origins of Populism**

Due to the wide variety of populist regimes, theories on the causes of populism may be even more ambiguous than the definition. However, tracing the roots of inequality to the colonial period helps to explain how an extremely stratified society formed the foundations for the mass politics of the twentieth century. As Drake notes, the durability of Latin American populism emanates from the “rural, seigniorial, Roman-Catholic, and Ibero-American heritage of ingrained inequality.”

Thus, the large discrepancy in the distribution of wealth in Latin America makes the region more susceptible to populist movements because of the large group of people at the bottom of the proverbial “totem pole.”

Contemporary scholars attribute the causes of populism to an accumulation of events that can include urbanization, stagnant or rapid economic growth, a large, disenfranchised populace, and the emergence of new social classes culminating in a ‘crisis.’ This paper agrees with Knight’s statement that affording crisis as the cause of populism is superficial, when in fact crisis is a “loose description” of multiple events. Actually, the causes of populism are quite simple: economic inequality from the mercantile system during colonialism and the staples economy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries combined with the lower classes’ development of a class conscience and allegiance to a paternal leader lie behind every populist regime.

**Manifestations of Populism**

Ideally, populist leaders promised to right the wrongs done to
the people by transforming society through higher wages, stronger unions, better housing, better healthcare, more education, and social security. In addition, paternalism and promises of tangible rewards gave populists the ability to win over “multi-class clients” leading to mass support at the national level. Populists have democratic convictions and like elections, because winning elections legitimizes populism. Although populists are not fond of the upper class, they do not seek to incite class warfare, merely to gain political and social concessions.

In reality, populist leaders, like other political leaders, are given to despotism, corruption, nepotism, megalomania, and narcissism. In fact, some critics characterize populist leaders as “inciting mass mobilizations through false promises for the purpose of attaining power.” Ironically, mass mobilization could, and did topple populist governments when leaders reneged on their promises. In addition, when necessity dictated, they used authoritarian means to maintain their power; Drake agrees with de la Torre that their “tactics” depended on what was practical, not necessarily on respecting democracy. Due to the mixture of social classes, populist regimes could easily switch from leftist rhetoric to conservative administration once in power, and many populist leaders did tend towards conservatism and corporatism over time to institutionalize followers, in a “controlled mobilization” of the working class.

**Early Populism (1910s-1920s)**

Populism during the twentieth-century came in three distinct forms, as Drake labeled them: early, classic, and late. Beginning in the 1920s, urbanization gave rise to urban politics as much of the rural

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18 Drake, 218, 235, 237. For Instance Getúlio Vargas, the “father of the poor,” was an exalted leader who spoke for Brazil’s underprivileged. See also Conniff, 3.
19 Ibid., 230.
20 Ibid., 234. Drake states that “redistributive, democratic, populist, technocratic, authoritarian, and corporatist” ideologies can be found in the same populist movement. In addition, both Juan Perón and Getúlio Vargas were devoted to expanding popular participation but had dictatorial dispositions towards followers and opponents.
21 Ibid., 227, 228.
22 Knight, “Populism,” 229; Conniff, 22.
23 Drake, 225.
24 Muñoz and Kiddle, 3; Drake, 223, 224. See also de la Torre, 4.
25 Knight, “Populism,” 234, n.51; Drake, 226, 234.
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populace relocated to the cities. Early populism emphasized the urban poor, workers, and sometimes the middle class at the expense of foreigners and the upper class.\(^{26}\) To assuage the instability of the movement’s multiclass makeup populists sought to win the hearts of the working class by compliments, national identity, and denouncing ‘the elite’ through Manichaean discourse.\(^{27}\)

A primary example of an early populist movement would be the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, or APRA, a movement that emerged in Peru in the 1920s under the leadership of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. APRA was an urban movement that supported social integration under a program of *Indigenismo*.\(^{28}\) Most of APRA’s support came from students, union labor, and rural wage laborers.\(^{29}\) Other early populists include Argentina’s Hipólito Yrigoyen, and Mexico’s Francisco I. Madero, Venustiano Carranza, and Alvaro Obregón.\(^{30}\) Unfortunately, early populism did not reach out to the rural poor, nor did they accomplish much in terms of social control, national integration, or advancing populism. However, they did contribute to enfranchising the masses politically by implanting ideas of upward mobility and suggestions that populism would return the country to its “traditional” cultural values giving the people control over the economy and society.\(^{31}\)

**Classic Populism (1930s-1950s)**

Even though Latin America during the 1930s had become

\(^{26}\) Conniff, 6, 14; Drake, 227, 228, 230. Drake states that sometimes the bourgeoisie tried to influence populists, but more often than not, they fought populists; moreover, the white-collar workers (the middle class) initially allied with populists but during the inter-war years, they fought to retain their political gains from populists.

\(^{27}\) Knight, “Populism,” 229-230; Conniff, 17; Canovan, 140; Drake, 232. Early populist mobilization, like their campaigning techniques bears a striking resemblance to left-wing mobilization of the working class in early twentieth-century Europe.

\(^{28}\) Conniff, 13-14. See also Joanne Hershfield, “Screening the Nation,” in *The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940*, eds. Mary Kay Vaughan and Stephen E. Lewis, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 266. Hershfield gives a good working definition of *Indigenismo* as “a network of intellectual, political, and artistic ideas that argued…that the roots of…national identity could be found in…Indian cultures.”

\(^{29}\) Conniff, 14.

\(^{30}\) Muñoz and Kiddle, 3, 6; Knight, “Populism,” 236.

\(^{31}\) Conniff, 7; Drake, 231, 234, 236. In this context, “traditional” means the indigenous cultural values of the native peoples of Latin America.
somewhat industrialized and urban, its staples economies had not expanded sufficiently to cover the needs of the poor. The post-World War II economic boom, provided the optimum time for the reemergence of populism. Many Latin American nationalists believed that further industrialization was necessary for them to compete on the world market, and many classic populists pursued economic policies based on import-substitution-industrialization, nationalized industry, and state protection for workers.

Like early populists, classic populists promised to improve standards of living and focused on social problems. The most favored groups in classic populist movements were unions, the middle class, and the “petite” bourgeoisie. Excluded groups included peasants, merchants, and the landed aristocracy. By the classic populist period, many Latin American countries had extended suffrage to women, young adults, and the semi-literate, who in turn voted for populists who would defend their interests against traditional interest groups. Further, fiercely nationalistic Classic populists used mass media and transportation to aid voter recruitment and focused much of their efforts on winning elections.

Classic populism advanced political participation, democratic rights, unionization, industrialization, education, and welfare more effectively than early populists could. Perhaps the most important contribution of classic populism is that it squarely pitted the common person against the old aristocracy and foreign imperialists who had dominated much of Latin America since the conquest, and against the economic liberalism of the nineteenth century. Classic populism thus constituted a more radical threat than did early populists.

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34 Chasteen, 257; Waisbord, 199.
35 Chasteen, 256, 257.
36 Conniff, 15.
37 Chasteen, 255.
38 Conniff, 7; Chasteen, 248, 255. For example, Perón used airplanes and trains to travel around Argentina.
40 Chasteen, 255.
In the end, inflation, the failure of import-substitution-industrialization to generate economic growth, political trouble in satisfying large coalitions of diverse interests, and structural collapse all contributed to the demise of classic populism.\(^{41}\) In addition, it would seem that classic populism suffered “routinization” and “institutionalization.”\(^{42}\) This means that, once in office, populists institutionalized a non-institutionalized movement through the bureaucracy, making populism impractical. The 1930s and 1940s provided an ideal time for the emergence of populism, yet populists largely failed, leading many scholars see the 1930s-1940s as a purveyor of chaos.\(^{43}\)

This paper examines three of the more dynamic classic populist leaders: Cárdenas, Trujillo, and Perón, to illustrate how their different styles contributed to the movement. Lázaro Cárdenas, or more importantly, the political movement that surrounded him – *Cardenismo* – left a legacy in Mexico much in the way Peronism left a legacy in Argentina.\(^{44}\) While in office, Cárdenas campaigned throughout the countryside, often hearing the grievances of the poor, the workers, and the peasants who had gained class-consciousness during the Mexican Revolution. It seemed that Cárdenas was fulfilling the goals of the revolution because he redistributed eighteen million hectares of land to the peasantry and expropriated foreign-held oil fields. Yet, *Cardenismo* seems to have failed as a political movement, as Cárdenas faced social and political crises of worldwide depression, and a burgeoning population, which led him to name the conservative Ávila Camacho as his successor. In light of its failure, Cardenistas continued to call for reform from below, leading the election of the late populist Luis Echeverría.\(^{45}\)

Some controversy still surrounds Cárdenas’ classification as a populist. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of Lázaro Cárdenas, argues that

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 255; Knight, “Populism,” 235; Drake, 238-239.
\(^{42}\) Lindsay Cherith Ramirez, “A New Perspective on Bolivian Populism,” (Master’s Thesis, University of Oregon, 2009), 2. See also Knight, “Populism,” 231-232.
\(^{43}\) Drake, 234; Knight, “Populism,” 237.
\(^{45}\) Muñoz and Kiddle, 8.
his father was not in fact a populist but a popular ruler because he “was convinced of the need for peasants and workers to be organized so they could be empowered, not to build political apparatuses or support for his personal promotion, but to achieve their class goals.”

Moreover, C. Cárdenas argues that his father “didn’t make demagogic offers or incite hate toward his rivals in order to win over supporters or to maintain his influence.” The younger Cárdenas makes a good point, but one must take into account the time and place. Cárdenas was able to mobilize the peasants and workers, and he was able to pursue his goals without “demagogic offers” and “hate” because Indigenismo and Mexicanidad held that national identity could be found in Mexico’s indigenous culture. Mexican populism, at least during the reign of Cárdenas, should be viewed as a continuation of the revolution, whereas by the time of Echeverría, Mexico had degenerated politically with a greater degree of stratification, to the levels seen in Argentina during Juan Perón, in Brazil during Getúlio Vargas, and in Perú during Juan Velasco.

Quite opposite of Cárdenas and a more successful populist dictator than Juan Perón, the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo is the epitome of classic populists’ success. The Great Depression, centralization of political authority, and a weak aristocracy “enabled Trujillo to take over the reins of power and stay there” for thirty-one years. “Trujillo, plausibly the most narcissistic populist, was known for his lasciviousness, vanity, and larger-than-life theatrically” as “evidenced in his… grandiose costumes, his immaculate grooming, and the prodigious consumption of food, drink, and women.”

After the crisis of hurricane San Zenón in 1930, Trujillo “emerged as a strong man,” or caudillo, “at the helm of a strong state,” and many conservative nationalists felt that a strongman was needed to


47 Cárdenas, viii.


49 Ibid., 1. Derby later writes on page 106 “Caudillismo fashioned strongmen as culture heroes who created loyalty among followers by means of patron clientelism, patronage, and ‘political prestige,’ becoming collective symbols of masculine values such as bravery and skilled oratory.”
lead the country on a path of progress. Some populist aspects of Trujillo’s regime included using the military to patronize the Dominican peasantry with the illusion of class mobility and enfranchisement of the peasantry through extensive land grants. Derby states, “[T]he regime extended the state into civil society by fashioning…vernacular politics based upon idioms of masculinity, personhood, and fantasies of race and class mobility.” Trujillo also committed a horrible race-based ethnic cleansing of Haitians on the Dominican frontier. Trujillo was successful classic populist because he “controlled mobilization,” delivered on his promises, and encapsulated every Dominican man’s dream of rising from nothing and achieving absolute power and wealth.

Last, the most well known classic populist is Juan Perón, a nationalist army officer who won the Argentine presidency due to large support from workers, occupying the office from 1946-1955. In addition to using labor as his driving force, Perón had charisma and demanded loyalty from his followers. He used the Partido Peronista (Peronista party), the Partido Peronista Feminino (Women’s Peronista party), and the military to control politics and mobilize supporters. Knight notes that Peronism in the early years was “radical, spontaneous, and populist,” yet in the later years it became “conservative, controlled, and elitist,” and that while initially Perón promised material benefits, he later shifted to clientelism.

Perón won a majority in a free election, his party controlled both houses of Congress, and after taking office, the Argentine Congress stacked the Supreme Court with his cronies. In light of these favorable conditions, and the booming economy following World
War II, biographer Robert J. Alexander states that Perón chose dictatorship once in power “more or less deliberately.”\textsuperscript{60} Perón used repression, directing his attacks against the landed oligarchy and industrialists.\textsuperscript{61} In fact as Alexander notes, Perón sought to bring Argentina under his sole control through actions including the “destruction of freedom of the press, persecution of leaders of the Opposition… election rigging, [the] expansion…of the secret police, destruction of the autonomy of the labor movement, [and the] establishment of government-dominated organizations.”\textsuperscript{62}

In 1949, Perón revealed his murky political and economic policy. The ideology of \textit{Justicalismo} was a “third position” between capitalism and socialism, and individualism and collectivism. Perón’s government tried to end foreign ownership of commerce by nationalizing the country’s meatpacking, banking, insurance, and railroad industries.\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, the government began a lofty, five-year industrialization plan designed to stimulate the economy. In reality, however, real wages decreased and Perón botched the rural economy.\textsuperscript{64} For example, when he took control of the government agency in charge of buying and selling Argentine grain he lowered the prices of grain and beef. The extremely low fixed prices put many rural agriculturalists out of business, thus reducing the amount of land under cultivation and leading to economic stagnation.\textsuperscript{65}

Perón failed to take advantage of the post-war boom and led Argentina into stagnation, centralization, personalism, demagoguery, and repression.\textsuperscript{66} Page concluded that “Perón created a distinctively Argentine brand of authoritarian populism straddling both sides of the political spectrum… based on social democracy.”\textsuperscript{67} Undoubtedly, Perón’s nastiest, dictatorial legacy was the polarization of the political

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Alexander} Ibid., 53, 55.
\bibitem{Canovan} Canovan, 144-145.
\bibitem{Alexander1} Alexander, 55.
\bibitem{Alexander2} Alexander, 73-74; Chasteen, 259, 266. Chasteen points out that the plan was more of a “bust than industrialization.”
\bibitem{Alexander3} Alexander, 64-65.
\bibitem{Tamarin} Tamarin, 42-43.
\bibitem{Page} Page, 501. Critics of Perón characterize him as “cynical, [with] the utter disdain for the truth, the lack of principle,” selfishness, and irresponsibility. With “[the] willingness to condone violence,” distort truth “beyond recognition,” and reject responsibility.
\end{thebibliography}
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spectrum into supporters and non-supporters, each with complete, vehement intolerance towards the other.\textsuperscript{68}

Although Perón’s failures are immense, his successes are equally as great. Peronista social programs included old age pensions, sick pay, minimum wage, child labor laws, cheap housing, and social security.\textsuperscript{69} In addition, Peronism extended primary and technical education into the provinces, enfranchised women, gave workers limited control of the workplace, and university education opened to all students who had completed secondary education.\textsuperscript{70}

Late Populism (1960s-1970s)

Upon Perón’s return to power in October 1973, he lacked “any clear political philosophy [and]…strategic objectives to reunite and stabilize the country and repair social ills.”\textsuperscript{71} Perón died nine months into office on July 1, 1974. In 1976, Argentina fell to another military coup, effectively ending populism in twentieth century Argentina.\textsuperscript{72}

While Perón’s second term is unambiguous, the late Mexican populist Luis Echeverría is more puzzling. A period of stabilization characterized the Mexican economy during the 1940s and 1950s. However, diminished government resources, a weak public sector, a rise in the federal deficit, a trade deficit, rising unemployment, and a weak national market prevailed during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{73} Furthermore, tensions had emerged between the conservatives, composed of the bourgeoisie and foreign capital, who favored the current economic model of development and the progressive intelligentsia, composed of students and ideologues from the middle class, who believing their government was illegitimate, favored a return to Cardenismo.\textsuperscript{74}

Elected in 1970, Echeverría sought identification with Cárdenas, scrupulously imitating Cárdenas’ style in rhetoric,

\textsuperscript{68} Alexander, 74.
\textsuperscript{69} Canovan, 145-146.
\textsuperscript{70} Tamarin, 42; Alexander, 68.
\textsuperscript{71} Alexander, 151, 152-153.
\textsuperscript{74} Basurto, 96, 100.
campaigning, and identification with the common people.\textsuperscript{75} “Echeverría’s intent was to rescue the autonomy of the state… [by] restoring to the state its role in guiding the development process.”\textsuperscript{76} To do this Echeverría needed a sociopolitical base to provide support for his programs. As the old mass mobilization models were outdated, Echeverría created a new way to mobilize the people, including peasants. He saw the solution to agrarian problems through rural industrialization, the formation of rural cooperatives, the redistribution of land, and the reform of ejido (communal land) laws.\textsuperscript{77}

Nevertheless, his solutions were nothing more than theory. The plight of the rural peasant did not change, and in fact, his visits to the countryside, besides showing his charismatic qualities, had the unexpected consequence of encouraging land invasion by the peasantry.\textsuperscript{78} Echeverría’s reforms failed because the office of the president lacked the political power of earlier generations, his subordinates failed to follow through with his promises, and he failed to harness mass mobilization.\textsuperscript{79}

Critics claim that Echeverría’s populism was “bland” and “institutional” unlike classic populism.\textsuperscript{80} Knight surmises that Echeverría “broke too many of the unwritten rules of the game.”\textsuperscript{81} Particularly, he failed to satisfy state-business relations, state-union relations, and the political organization of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Furthermore, “No amount of populist rhetoric, social reform, or participatory political thinking could compensate for the excess of abuse suffered by citizens” in the massacres at Tlatelolco in 1968 and Corpus Christi in 1971, and a dirty war characterized by urban violence, kidnapping government officials, and student strikes.\textsuperscript{82} The success of Cárdenas and the failure of Echeverría lay in part to their relative contexts, mainly the difference in socioeconomic and

\textsuperscript{75} Muñoz and Kiddle, 9; Knight, “Cárdenas and Echeverría,” 35.
\textsuperscript{76} Basurto, 98.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 102.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 103, 105; Muñoz and Kiddle, 7.
\textsuperscript{80} Knight, 232.
\textsuperscript{81} Knight, 34.
\textsuperscript{82} Muñoz and Kiddle, 7-8; Diane Davis, “Policing and Populism in the Cárdenas and Echeverría Administrations,” in Populism in 20th Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría, eds. Amelia M. Kiddle and Maria L. Muñoz (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 135, 159.
political conditions of 1930s and 1970s Mexico.\textsuperscript{83}

**Between Late Populism and Contemporary Populism (1970s-1990s)**

Wayland notes that the “syndrome of populism…was one of the enemies that the military regimes [especially in Argentina and Pinochet’s Chile] of the 1960s and 1970s sought to extirpate.”\textsuperscript{84} After the demise of military juntas in the 1980s and 1990s, popular, less repressive leaders emerged. Some scholars consider post-military leaders of the 1990s to be neo-populists due to their popular support, but that is a mistake. By classifying popular leaders such as Menem, Fujimori, Collor, and Bucaram as populists, “the remaining socioeconomic characteristics [of populism] would have to be abandoned, and the concept would become a purely political notion.”\textsuperscript{85}

To prove the point, “neo-populists” of the 1990s did away with the welfare state of the classic populists, implemented market economics, and adopted the Washington consensus.\textsuperscript{86} If market economics and populism are not mutually exclusive, then such leaders have expertly adapted populist politics to neoliberal economics; however, these ‘populist’ leaders also bowed to the demands of big business, international finance agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and placated foreign interests over the interests of the masses.\textsuperscript{87} The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s promised immediate success after initial shock, yet neoliberalism gave Latin America ten years of financial crashes, poor economic growth, disillusioned masses, and high unemployment, inequality, and poverty.\textsuperscript{88} Because these leaders “violate[d] popular interests” through neoliberal market reforms,” the neoliberal reformers of the 1990s cannot by definition be populist.\textsuperscript{89} In fact, neoliberalism seems to have facilitated the rise of

\textsuperscript{83} Knight, 36.
\textsuperscript{84} Wayland, 6. See also cf. Drake, 236; and Conniff, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{85} Wayland, 8.
\textsuperscript{86} Waisbord, 199-200. The Washington Consensus is an economic reform package attributed to the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury Department meant to stabilize Latin America after decades of right-wing dictatorship, multiple “dirty” wars, and a floundering economy.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 200-201.
\textsuperscript{89} Wayland, 9.
contemporary populism.

**Neo-Populism**

Considering the unfulfilled promises of neoliberalism and the legacy of populism, the people of some Latin American countries have opted to return to a form of populism most closely related to classic populism. It would seem that in the case of Hugo Chávez, the leading contemporary Latin American populist, ‘the people’ want and actively elect a leader who puts their interests above those of ‘the elite.’ Edwards notes that Chávez “is the product of the government-led import substitution policies…and of the policies of the out-of-touch political elite.”

Like classic populists, Chávez has nationalized foreign industry, filled the government with his supporters, changed the constitution, and established social reforms; furthermore, Chávez has assumed dictatorial powers and he uses the media to broadcast his government’s message.

Chávez is a model populist leader; he embodies charisma, scorns the wealthy and international institutions, and is above democracy because he “personifies the people” through democratic rhetoric where the people are guided into following his programs.

The key to understanding Chávez’s popularity is that he “brought ‘dignity’ to the poor and excluded,” who constitute the majority of Venezuelans. In the same manner as Trujillo, he “takes care of the poor,” “is on their side,” “speaks for them,” and has what can be described as a “mystical contact with the masses.” He, like Trujillo, also looks like the masses.

Chávez, like Perón, believes in participatory and representative democracy, which reflects his strategy for changing Venezuela through legal, political means. He states that the Revolutionary government has one goal: “to achieve the greatest

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90 Edwards, 191.
91 Ibid., 192. In the case of Chavismo, ‘the people’ consist of rural peasants, the urban poor, and workers. ‘The elites’ consist mainly of the middle class, the old aristocracy, and multinational corporations.
92 Naím, xxi.
happiness for all the people.”94 In addition, contrary to popular opinion, the revolution is technically democratic, as Chávez has never violated the letter of the law.95 For example, he cites his first decree as president that called for a new constitution. The Constituent Assembly was completely independent of the congress, the Supreme Court, and the president.96 However, Chávez’s supporters fill these bodies and they do his will; thus in a sense, Chávez has legally assumed dictatorial powers.

Despite some scholars’ views that his authoritarianism and economic policies are “eroding” political freedom and will take generations to restore, the new Bolivarian constitution of Venezuela is an original conception that seeks to maintain democracy over all public offices, national resources, the distribution of wealth, and broad human rights by “planting a unifying ideology in the soul of the masses.”97 This constitution is an unfinished, ever-evolving organism that seeks to use the system to “achieve the people’s political goals” by regulating vast aspects of social, political, and economic life.98 In essence, the new constitution is a communal document that brought populism to the constitutional level, where plebiscites and referendums can augment, change, and make reforms to the constitution.99 Chávez states that the new constitution is a work of the people through the participatory process and he encourages people “to read, discuss, analyze, interpret, and love it.”100

The Bolivarian Constitution provides for a mixed government, not truly democratic or truly autocratic. For example, the Empowerment Laws allow ministers to act for the ‘greater good’

95 Hawkins, 1155, 1157.
96 Chávez and Guevara, 22-23.
97 Naím, xv, xix; Edwards, 188-189; Chávez and Harnecker, 107. Chávez terms his revolution a Bolivarian Revolution. He, like Bolívar, seeks to throw the American yoke off the region and economically integrate all Latin American countries into one single, huge country composed of a league of republics, one pole in a multi-pole world. See also Chávez and Harnecker, 120, 122.
98 Edwards, 186, 187. The Bolivarian Constitution is quite opposite to that of the United States, which seeks to maintain the status quo.
99 Ibid., 186. Chávez and Harnecker, 106.
100 Chávez and Harnecker, 106.
without seeking consensus. This law allows ministers to write a law, send it to the president for his signature, and notify the National Assembly. Laws passed this way are collectively termed *empowerment laws*, and they affect all aspects of society from land reform, fishing, and banking, to microfinance and hydrocarbon laws.

In addition to promoting the will of ‘the people’ through legal, somewhat democratic means, Manichaean thought, containing images of light and dark, good and evil, “corrupt elites” and “browbeaten people,” heavily influences the movement’s rhetoric. Chávez sees the grand narrative of history as “a struggle by ‘the people’ against the forces of oppression and imperialism,” a struggle in which ‘the people’ will eventually triumph. Furthermore, Chávez uses phrases reminiscent of an ‘us-them’ relationship, where ‘us’ is the revolutionary government and the people and ‘them’ is the old oligarchy who “hate” and “scorn” *el pueblo*. Chávez’s is evocative of classic populist speeches, following the footsteps of Perón and Trujillo, embodying the popular will, using moral discourse to unite the masses against their oppressors.

Taking another cue from Trujillo and Perón, once in power Chávez invited the poor to gather at the presidential palace so he could hear their grievances. In addition, Chávez uses his television program *Aló Presidente* to speak directly to the people and listen to their concerns eliminating the need for political parties, something Perón could never do. Surpassing earlier populists, Chávez utilizes and manipulates the media, obliging print, radio, and television stations to cover and propagate government initiatives. The Ministry of Information and Communication, using “chains,” can order all broadcasting stations to air public events, microcredit grants, military ceremonies, and other events focusing on the revolutionary government

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102 Chávez and Hamecker, 108.
103 Hawkins, 1154.
104 Ibid., 1154.
105 Ibid., 153; Marcano, 266.
106 Chávez and Guevara, 33.
107 Ibid., 35; Naím, xx.
108 Chávez and Hamecker, 145.
and leader. Essentially, the goals of Chavismo subordinate the media’s freedom of speech.

Before Chávez’s election, the economy of Venezuela was in crisis. As he puts it, “Massive external debt, low wages, inflation running at over 35 percent, almost 20 percent unemployment, [and] generalized poverty” characterized the economy. According to Chávez, the Bolivarian Revolution is anti-neoliberal and the economic goal is an alternative to pure capitalism. Much like Perón’s Third Position, his main economic goals are the nationalization of key industries, economic growth, and improved social services; Chávez aims to liberate Venezuela through the decentralization of economic power.

In the first years of the twentieth-first century, Chávez instituted a six-year economic plan, from 2001-2007, to guide economic development. This plan halted the privatization of the oil industry in Venezuela, and, is the one crucial event inherent to understanding Chávez’s continuing success in light of the global economic recession of 2008. The restructuring of the Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) led to the 2002 attempt to oust Chávez in a coup d’état; furthermore, multiple strikes by opposition oil workers (between April 2002 and February 2003), gave Chávez the opportunity to nationalize PDVSA, saving it from the “saboteurs.” Incidentally, as more than ten thousand oil workers had lost their jobs, the government furnished supporters with those jobs.

On one hand, Edwards and Naím agree that Chávez’s success is due in large part to the oil boom where prices doubled and the events of September 11, 2001, when the United States focused across the

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109 Marcano, 200-201. Between 1999 and 2004, chain time went from approximately sixty-two hours per year to approximately twenty-five days and eight hours per year.
110 Hawkins, 1156.
111 Chávez and Guevara, 24, 43.
112 Chávez and Hamecker, 114, 116-117; Edwards, 197.
114 Chávez and Guevara, 45.
115 Hawkins, 1144; Marcano, 166.
116 Edwards, 199.
ocean to wage war, in effect less concerned with events in Latin America. On the other, Edwards is very critical of Chávez’s economics. He argues that “growth has been mediocre at best,” citing rapid inflation, food shortages, the constant allocation of twenty five percent of the budget toward social programs, and a national growth rate that is less than the regional average. He concludes, “If it weren’t for the oil boom, Venezuela would have experienced a negative growth rate in income per capita during the years of the Bolivarian Revolution.”

Edwards is right that oil money is a reason for Chávez’s initial success. However, the oil boom does not help to explain Venezuela’s improving economy after the 2008 global economic crisis. For example, Venezuela has maintained a consistent foreign debt of 25 percent of its Gross National Product, compared to U.S. foreign debt at 300 percent. In addition, Venezuela’s economy grew 5.6 percent in the first half of 2012. In light of Edwards’ criticism, oil money made Venezuela less susceptible to foreign investors, culminating in Venezuela severing ties with the World Bank and IMF and the repayment of its debt in 2012. Despite many negative views, the Venezuelan economy is growing.

Unlike import-substitution-industrialization, the oil boom gave Chávez the opportunity to design a patronage system that is much more successful than that of his predecessors. The Plan Bolívar is the encompassing program of social welfare. Cultural centers, termed

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117 Naím, xiii-xiv.
118 Edwards, 192, 203.
119 Ibid., 200-201. Venezuela’s average GDP between 1999 and 2007 is 3.5 percent compared to Chile at 3.8 percent, Costa Rica at 4.6 percent, and Perú at 5.0 percent.
123 Chávez and Guevara, 36; Edwards, 197.
missions, in small towns, communities, and poor neighborhoods, focus on different areas of public health. Some focus on literacy and primary or secondary education, while others focus on clinics, hospitals, incidentals for the poor, and creating markets. Moreover, the revolutionary government canceled enrollment fees for schoolchildren making it possible for 60,000 impoverished children to attend school. In a period of three years (2000-2003), Chávez claimed to “have cut infant malnutrition by 10 percent,” “cut infant mortality,” and “allocated much more money to education-from less than 3 percent to more than 6 percent of the budget.”

Ultimately, it is hard, if not impossible, to ascertain if the mission programs actually work. Besides the seemingly genuine, altruistic motives behind the Plan Bolívar, no external auditing agency exists and all statistics about the number of participants, income invested, and results come from the government, making it the sole source on the effectiveness of the missions. This leads some to argue that the mission system’s sole purpose is to help Chávez retain power. These critics are correct that the missions help Chávez to retain power. For example, his supporters might receive a medical mission or a mission for higher education in their neighborhood. However, he clearly would not be as popular or strongly supported by the people if the missions failed to deliver. Where classic populists failed to satisfy the coalition of diverse interest groups supporting their movement, Chavismo, through mission patronage, continues to satisfy the people’s desire for improved healthcare, literacy, education, and basic necessities.

From Chávez’s political style, rhetoric, and economic reforms it is evident that, whether or not he considers himself a populist, he is

124 Edwards, 197, 198; Chávez and Harnecker, 143. Chávez claims that the missions are a response to the will of the people. For example, in 2002, Chávez launched a major program of medical missions aimed at providing medical services to the poor in their neighborhoods. See also Chávez and Guevara, 51-52.
125 Chávez and Guevara, 38. The government also set up the People’s Bank in 1999 to give micro-loans to the poor and most loans were for less than one hundred dollars.
126 Chávez and Harnecker, 117. Edwards concludes that although, poverty has declined, little evidence exists that the quality of life for the poor has increased, because underweight babies, inaccessible potable water, a high illiteracy rate, and housing with dirt floors still persist. See also Edwards, 201.
127 Marcano, 269.
128 Chasteen, 338-339; Hawkins, 1138; Edwards, 198.
closely following in the footsteps of classic populists. In addition, contrary to many scholars’ initial predictions, he has been very successful. In large part, the fortune of the oil boom guaranteed that Chávez would be a much more successful leader than the classic populists had been. Chávez’s state-capitalism is a much more successful economic policy than import-substitution-industrialization. Furthermore, unlike classic populists, Chávez has not undergone routinization or institutionalism. Unlike Perón’s Argentina, there are no diverse political interests to satisfy – only ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ His paternalism is stronger than the paternalistic bond between classic populists and the masses; mainly because the Plan Bolívar has delivered at least the minimum amount of social welfare required to keep the people believing in the government. It would seem that the new elite of Venezuela, with the blessing of the democratic dictator, continue the revolution through legislation designed to promote and protect ‘the people.’

**Conclusion**

Chávez is the most prolific neo-populist, and Latin Americans have been quick to take advantage of the dwindling U.S. presence and improving economies in their countries to elect other populist leaders. Evo Morales of Bolivia (2006-present), Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua (2007-present), and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007-present) have allied with Chávez and signed the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas. In addition, Ollanta Humala of Peru (2011-present) has expressed sympathy for Juan Velasco’s government (1968-1975) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina (2007-present) considers herself a Peronista. While not populist, Luis Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2010-present), both of Brazil, have instituted controlled popular reforms. One reason for their initial success may be that, with the exception of Lula, Rousseff, and Kirchner, all are mestizo. In fact, they may turn out to be much more successful, as long as they can improve their countries’ economies and social welfare programs, simply because they truly identify with the common person, as they are one.

Populism has had a long and difficult road. During the twentieth century, many obstacles obstructed its path. While the neoliberal reformers of the 1990s promised success, neoliberalism and
the Washington Consensus brought a decade of poor economic growth, high unemployment, and increasingly disillusioned masses. That is not to say that populism during the twentieth century offered a better alternative. Yet, neoliberalism has facilitated the reemergence of populism throughout Latin America. Still, many western scholars and politicians, as well as the western media, look upon this controversial political ideology with intense loathing. Moreover, the United States, while affirming every nation’s right to self-determination, continues its policies of subversion in Latin America. In fact, populism is a direct result of U.S. subversion in the region. In a world of national self-determination, it would seem that a double standard exists. Furthermore, the old, bi-polar world faded away with the end of the Cold War and Chávez is correct in his view that the world is becoming increasingly multi-polar as new countries emerge on the global economic scene. Populism has potential. The question is, will its proponents be allowed to experiment with this ideology to find the best policies for their respective countries, or will neo-populism falter and follow the same path as twentieth-century populism? Therefore, not requiring a requiem for the time being, Latin American populism is a living, evolving ideology inherent to understanding Latin American culture and politics in the twenty-first century.
Bibliography


“AND EVERY TALE CONDEMNNS ME FOR A VILLAIN”: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW OF ENGLAND’S RICHARD III | Sean Painter

Literature, film, and television abound with numerous memorable villains. These disreputable fictional characters are often one-sided, their appeal, and portrayal understandable and requisite. Without them, heroes would lack necessary foils. Similarly, the villains created by history remain equally popular. In 1591, William Shakespeare wrote Richard III. Based on biased historical sources, it became one of his more popular history plays, and cemented Richard III’s reputation as a villain. For those outside academia, Shakespeare’s characterization remains the common interpretation, although not necessarily accurate or deserved. His guilt or innocence still sparks heated debate. The ever-evolving depictions of Richard’s reputation thus offer an opportunity to examine how the portrayal of history remains in constant sway, and requires frequent reexamination.

Shakespeare did not write in a vacuum. When he described Richard as “foul bunch-backed toad,” he based his colorful prose on the contemporary historical scholarship of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.¹ These “histories” denigrate Richard as a villain, and often depict his innately wicked nature.² The immense sum of scholarship is daunting. Since his death in 1485 at the Battle of Bosworth, over five hundred years of character debate have resulted in numerous interpretations, and historians in opposing factions; Ricardians and Anti-Ricardians debate the historical evidence.³ This paper will analyze samplings of Richard III scholarship from the fifteenth century to twentieth century, and track his changing reputation through various sources. In recent scholarship, his reputation has made a remarkable recovery, and remains a hotly debated subject.

¹ William Shakespeare, Richard III, Act IV, Scene IV, line 83.
³ Ricardian is a popular term used to describe historians (professional or amateur), and writers who endeavor to rehabilitate the reputation of Richard III. No “official” designation exists for those who continue to argue the traditionalist point of view.
The War of the Roses

Paramount in any discussion of Richard III and his reputation is familiarity with the background events that led to his usurpation of his nephew’s (Edward V) throne, and two short years later, his own removal by Henry Tudor (Henry VII) in the War of the Roses. Historians agree that the conflict popularized as the Wars of the Roses began at the First Battle of St. Albans in 1455. However, like other historical events, the prelude to St. Albans is equally important. In 1377, after ruling England for fifty years, Edward III died, and left the kingdom to his ten-year-old grandson, Richard II. The young king fell under the domination of his uncles, who unceasingly sought power, most notably, John of Gaunt, the Duke of Lancaster. In 1399, Gaunt’s eldest son, the exiled Henry of Bolingbroke returned to England from France, usurped power from his cousin, and declared himself king, ruling as Henry IV, the first of the Lancastrian kings.

The House of Lancaster, a cadet branch of Edward III’s Plantagenet line, ruled England until 1455, when the House of York challenged the reign of Bolingbroke’s grandson, Henry VI. By 1461, the House of York had solidified its claim, and three Yorkist kings ruled an England wrought with conflict until 1485. The first York monarch, Edward IV, governed until his death in 1483. Shortly after, Richard III seized power from his young nephew, Edward V.

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4 Contemporary participants or historians did not use the term “War of the Roses” to refer to the events the present day scholars group as the conflict that ripped apart the English Plantagenet dynasty. Sir Walter Scott created this romantic description in his nineteenth century novel, *Anne of Geierstein*. Scott poetically lifts from Shakespeare’s *Henry VI Part I*, a scene in which the Houses of Lancaster and York pick their respective red and white roses and refers to the conflict as the Wars of the Roses. Nevertheless, the historic symbols of each house were indeed a white (York) and a red (Lancaster) rose, and were worn on the respective heraldic badges of their feudal armies. See A.J. Pollard, *The Wars of the Roses* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 5.

5 Edward III’s eldest son and presumptive heir (Richard II’s father), Edward the Black Prince died in 1376.

6 The House of York was a rival Plantagenet cadet branch. Their claim to the English throne was superior, descending from Edward III’s second and fourth sons, Lionel of Antwerp and founder of the House of York, Edmund of Langley, 1st Duke of York. Conversely, the House of Lancaster claim to the throne was based on their descent from Edward III’s third son, John of Gaunt, who founded the House of Lancaster.

7 For a brief period between October 1470 and April 1471, Henry VI regained the throne.

8 Edward V never formally ruled. Per Edward IV’s will, Richard ruled as Protector.
Obtaining the throne through questionable legal means, he ruled until 1485, when Henry Tudor defeated him in battle at Bosworth.

The Tudor dynasty started on insecure ground, with their claim to the throne relying on an illegitimate genealogical descent from John of Gaunt. Despite questionable claims to the throne, Henry VII asserted his right to the throne through conquest. He united the warring Lancaster and York Houses by marrying the daughter of Edward IV, thus ending the Wars of the Roses. The symbolic Tudor Rose combined the Lancastrian red rose with the Yorkist white rose. Often described as the “demarcation between the medieval and modern age,” the Tudor Monarchy ushered in a new era of English history.

To promote their reign, the Tudors welcomed historical criticism of their predecessors and thus it is not surprising that Richard III bore harsh criticism in Tudor England.

**The Sources**

Undoubtedly prompted by a Tudor public relations campaign to promote the recently established dynasty, and to underscore the righteousness of the usurpation of the Lancastrian regime, the maligning of Richard’s reputation earnestly began after his death. The bulk of traditional scholarship foundations derive from late fifteenth century and early sixteenth century accounts. The last York king faced immediate criticism from historians, both English and foreign, who focused on his criminal acts, the most significant, the disappearance of his two nephews. However, this remains but one of the many charges levied at Richard that supported his demonization. In

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9 Richard solidified his claim by having Parliament declare his nephews bastards, and therefore illegitimate to rule.

10 Henry VII’s maternal great grandfather was John Beaufort, the illegitimate son of John of Gaunt and his mistress (and later third wife), Katherine Swynford. Henry VII claimed the throne via this genealogy. Richard II later legitimized Beaufort and his descendants in 1390 and in 1397, the Beaufort family was again legitimized by a declaration from Parliament. However, this declaration barred them from inheriting the throne.


12 While the Tudors certainly benefited from an evil Richard, modern historical opinion exonerates the Tudors from previously established scholarly beliefs that they deliberately set out to blacken his reputation. However, the Tudors did benefit these interpretations and facilitated their creation. See Hammond, 138.

13 Edward V and his younger brother, Richard.
addition to this popular charge, historians have accused him of murdering several other important figures. Modern scholarship highly suggests Richard’s innocence. Ricardians accuse other prominent figures (most notably Henry VII) as perpetrating the vilest crime, the murder of his nephews. However, these views benefit from earnest historical reexamination that was not possible in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.

**Fifteenth-Century Sources**

The *Croyland Chronicles* remain an important medieval source for English history. A secular scholar with access to king’s court presumably wrote the Second Continuation of the Chronicle during the last months of 1485. This individual interpreted the events surrounding Richard with a negative bias. The chronicler describes his rise to the throne in a constructed narrative and includes events that later historians would elaborate on in gaudy detail. Included is a scathing indictment of Richard’s execution of Lord Hastings (as well as other supporters of Edward V) and demonstrates the contempt that contemporary historians had for his actions before any Tudor influence on historical interpretation could have begun.

Besides the *Croyland Chronicles*, other contemporary commentaries and depictions on the character of Richard III existed, and these descriptions offer incredible insight into a king that would in

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14 These include Edward, the Prince of Wales (son of Henry VI), Henry VI, George, the Duke of Clarence (his brother), Edward V, and Anne Neville (his wife). Also receiving criticism from historians are Richard’s orders of execution of Edward V’s guardians, (including the Earl Rivers and Lord Hastings) and his intention to marry his own niece, Elizabeth of York.

15 The *Croyland Chronicle* was written at the Abbey of Croyland between 655 and 1486 A.D., and first published in Latin in 1596 in London. The reliability of its text is often questioned because of its numerous incarnations and anonymous editors through the centuries.

16 The Second Continuation of the Chronicle covers the period between 1459 and 1486 A.D. The exact identity of the Chronicler remains a mystery. Some modern scholars agree that the most likely candidate was John Russell, Bishop of Lincoln, and later Richard III’s Lord Chancellor. See Alison Hanham, *Richard III and His Early Historians, 1483–1535* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 74, 88. See also Henry T. Riley, trans., *Ingulph’s Chronicle of the Abbey of Croyland with the Continuations by Peter of Blois and Anonymous Writers* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1908), vii.

17 For example, the chronicler portrays Richard’s execution of Lord Hastings and other supporters of his nephew as an act of utter tyranny, writing “the three strongest supporters of the new king being thus removed without judgment or justice, and all the rest of his faithful subjects fearing like treatment.” See Riley, 488.
short time endure the ignominy of historians. Astonishingly, in an era where few offered positive interpretations of Richard, a small number of these early descriptions prove complimentary. Often these non-historical commentaries came from foreigners like Nicolas von Poppelau. During his visit to London, he gained an audience with Richard, and remarked in his travel diary that he had a “great heart.”

While Poppelau offered positive remarks about Richard, not all observations from foreign travelers were positive. Dominic Mancini, an Italian diplomat in service of the French, visited England in 1483 and later recorded his observations. In his work, he accuses Richard of having murdered his nephews after assuming the throne. Modern scholars criticize his observations. Mancini spoke only Italian, and relied on his English hosts for interpretations of events that he witnessed. P. W. Hammond suggests, his “words would seem to show that at least some of Richard’s subjects were willing to believe the rumors about him.” The rediscovery of Mancini’s observations in 1934 reenergized interest in Ricardian studies in the twentieth century, and as Alison Hanham discerns, offered historians “a reliable yardstick against which to judge the accuracy of other writers.”

Contemporaneous observations that offer favorable criticism of Richard are often from non-historians, and their remarks are generally brief calculated praises intended to please him while he reigned. Thomas Langton remarked in a letter that Richard’s charity greatly benefited the poor unlike any other monarch before him, and that “God hath sent him to us for the wele of us all.” As Hammond astutely writes, Langton “had just been made Bishop of St. David’s … and hoped for further promotion, so he was likely to be biased in his favor” toward the king. Calculated praise is a side effect of living in

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18 Poppelau was a Polish merchant in service of the Hapsburgs who visited England for two months in 1484. Quoted in Hammond, 134.
19 Mancini’s work is titled Dominicus Mancinus ad Angelum Catonem de Occupatione Regni Anglie per Riccardum Tercium.
20 Mancini writes it was widely believed that Edward’s [Edward IV] two sons must have their fate by some unspecified act.” See Elizabeth Hallam, ed., The Wars of the Roses: From Richard II to the Fall of Richard III at Bosworth Field – Seen Through the Eyes of their Contemporaries (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), 294.
21 Hammond, 137.
22 Mancini’s observations were rediscovered at the Bibliotheque Muncipale in Lille, France. See Hanham, 65.
23 Quoted in Hammond, 134.
24 Ibid.
an era where there was no free press. Expressed opinion often did not represent a subject’s true feelings.

John Rous falls into this category. While Richard was alive, he praised him as a “‘good lord,’” but after his death becomes hostile towards him. In Historia Regum Angliae, he describes Richard’s involvement in most of the crimes previously attributed to him in damming prose. In describing his regency of Edward V, Rous compares the king to a vicious wolf and Edward to an innocent lamb. Then, setting precedence for future historians, he ruthlessly attacks the king’s physical appearance, equating him to an unnatural monster. The “usurper King,” who “ascended the throne of the slaughtered children whose protector he was himself,” was said to have been “retained within his mother’s womb for two years, emerging with teeth and hair to his shoulders.” He also “was small of stature, with a short face and unequal shoulders.” Rous additionally mentions a “stinging tail” that Richard possessed. The grotesque physical description of Richard would become another literary tool for future historians to debase his character. While Richard did suffer from scoliosis, which resulted in a slightly higher left shoulder, he was not the monster or hunchbacked villain that Rous or Shakespeare described. Nevertheless, these physical descriptions, would endure in histories written into the nineteenth century. Rous’ commentary undoubtedly serves as the basis for future physical descriptions by later historians. Directly copying another historian’s work (plagiarism by modern standards) occurred commonly in fifteenth century and early sixteenth century histories.

Sixteenth-Century Sources

Two sources, written close to each other, and prominently well known, offer the earliest attempts at recording the history of Richard III in the sixteenth century. The first of these historians, the Italian

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25 Ibid., 104-106.
26 Rous writes, “the new King was removed from his loyal servants and received with kisses and embraces [from Richard III] like an innocent lamb falling into the hands of wolves.” See Hanham, 118.
27 Ibid., 120.
28 On February 4, 2013, experts from the University of Leicester announced that DNA tests proved that the skeletal remains found the previous year at the Greyfriar site were in fact the remains of Richard III. The skeleton showed severe scoliosis and major trauma wounds.
humanist Polydore Vergil arrived in England in 1502, “already a scholar of international standing.”  In 1505, encouraged by Henry VII, he began writing *Anglica Historia*, which presented a “favourable interpretation on the rise of the House of Tudor,” and a negative depiction of the fall of the House of York. The concept of a “Tudor Myth” originates from Vergil who “saw a specific pattern in the succession of 15th-century kings and superimposed a moralistic interpretation of divine retribution.” From this, Tudor propaganda was born.

Vergil certainly includes negative descriptions of Richard in his history, and relies on sources such as the *Croyland Chronicles*. However, to dismiss him as a Tudor propagandist negates an important work in English history. He spent twelve years writing *Anglica Historia*, and its quality of research is evident when compared to other contemporary works and subsequent writings. Vergil did favor his Tudor patron, but did not invent history. He scoured both written and oral sources, and Ricardian Jeremy Potter remarks that he can be “called the father of English history.” Vergil, by contributing to the “Tudor Myth,” undoubtedly writes descriptions that are more negative about Richard, finding him guilty of murdering his nephews, and accuses him of other crimes. For example, he writes that Richard poisoned his wife and killed Henry VI. Left to the last page of his

29 Ibid., 125.
30 Vergil completed *Anglica Historia* c. 1512-13, but it remained unpublished until 1534.
31 Hammond, 139.
33 Shakespearean scholar, E. M. W. Tillyard, formally created the term “Tudor Myth” in 1940s to describe the notion that that the Tudor dynasty’s Welsh ancestry was destined by god to bring stability to the English monarchy. See E. M. W. Tillyard, *Shakespeare’s History Plays* (New York: MacMillan, 1946), 29-32
34 Hanham, 126.
37 Vergil writes that “the contynuall report is that Richard killyed him [Henry VI] with a sword.” See Ibid., 156.
history, Vergil leaves his reader with a dark unpleasant and scathing
description of Richard, commenting that he “was little of stature,
deformyd of body, thone showlder being higher than thoother.”

Vergil’s contemporary and acquaintance, Sir Thomas More,
authored the History of King Richard III, the most famous “history” on
the subject during the sixteenth century. This history serves as a
scathing narrative and an example of traditional Tudor history.
According to Hammond, More’s reputation helped his history form
“the prevailing view of Richard for the following two centuries.” Several historians argue that the History of King Richard III is more
literature than history. Jeremy Potter writes, “it is not history, but a
literary exercise in the dramatic presentation of villainy,” and
Hammond indicates that “in More’s work Richard was evil
incarnate.” The work covers only a small portion of Richard’s life,
the pivotal year 1483, when he seized the crown, allowing a greater
focus on his numerous crimes.

More’s physical description is the best literal imagination of
Shakespeare’s hunchbacked villain. He describes Richard as “little of
stature, ill featured of limes, croke backed, his left shoulder much
higher than his right.” He further describes him as being “malicious,
wratfhull, [and] enuious.” More also colorfully states that Richard
“slewe with his owne hands” Henry VI, and describes the murder of his
nephews in equally damning prose.

Despite these colorful descriptions, historians often argue that
the History of King Richard III is not a true history but a “treatise
against tyranny.” Arguments supporting this often cite the imaginary
dialogue throughout the work that “implies that the writer was a
contemporary witness of some of the events described.” One

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38 Ibid., 226-7.
39 Hammond, 139-40.
40 Hanham, 152-3.
41 Potter.
42 Hammond, 140.
Thomas More, Volume 2: The History of King Richard III (New Haven: Yale University
44 Ibid.
46 Hammond, 139.
47 This is a historical impossibility. In 1483, Thomas More was seven years
old. It is probable that More’s intentions were not to write a history of Richard III but

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"And every tale condemns me for a villain"

historian argues, “it is time we stopped reading the History with a deadly literalness,” and view it as satire. Notwithstanding More’s intentions to write either a history or satire, his work had a profound influence on the negative reputation of Richard III and perpetuated an enduring traditionalist image.

More’s influence becomes clear when examining the histories of two of England’s popular chroniclers, Edward Hall and Raphael Holinshed. Hall’s Chronicle (c. 1542) and Holinshed’s Chronicles (c. 1577) predictably present negative portrayals of Richard. Both built on their predecessors (Holinshed relied heavily on both More and Hall). It is not an exaggeration that Hall and Holinshed plagiarized More. There are strikingly similar passages that quickly allow categorization of Hall and Holinshed as traditionalist historians. While the former paraphrases More, the latter quotes More verbatim. Of greater importance, William Shakespeare relied on both chroniclers as sources for his Richard III (c. 1591), which even today negatively defines Richard’s reputation.

Shakespeare relied on traditional Tudor propaganda that portrayed the last York king in a highly negative light, and the resulting play continued Richard’s historical debasement. The negative depictions in Shakespeare’s play are obvious before the reader even experiences the searing prose. By examining the longer descriptive

write a satire similar to Utopia focused on history and aimed at his historian colleagues, most notably Vergil. Quoted in Hanham, 152.

Ibid. Considerations for More’s intentions are important. While More did write an arguably traditionalist pro Tudor history, he hardly had fondness for the Tudor regime. His own father was executed by Henry VII, and he himself would later be executed by Henry VIII. See Ibid., 155-156. See also Potter.

Hall’s Chronicle is the common short title for the longer title, The Union of the Two Noble and Illustrate Families of Lancastre and Yorke, and Holinshed’s Chronicle is the common short title for the Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland.

For example, in describing Richard’s appearance, Hall paraphrases More and Vergil and adds a few of his own details to further disparage Richard


For a detailed analysis of Holinshed’s usage of Holinshed, see W.G. Boswell-Stone, Shakespeare’s Holinshed: The Chronicle and the Historical Plays Compared (New York: Benjamin Bloom, 1896) and Annabel Patterson, Reading Holinshed’s Chronicles (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). An additional valuable source is E. M. W. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays (New York: MacMillan, 1946), 40-64, where Tillyard explains the importance of both chroniclers as historians and in relation to Shakespeare.

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titles on the numerous quarto and folio frontispiece, a Tudor bias is obviously illustrated. These creative titles served as attention grabbers, and colored the opinion of those who attended or later read the play.

While Shakespeare’s history plays can hardly be confused with scholarly historical research in the present day, these plays influenced perceptions about English history, with some mistaking them for actual depictions of sixteenth and seventeenth century history. The play’s negative portrayal of Richard continued to resonate with the public in subsequent centuries, and greatly affected his image well into the twenty-first century because of the play’s popularity. Performed frequently on stages around the world five centuries after its first performance in Elizabethan England, Richard III continues to contribute to opinions regarding Richard. In addition to the stage, four major film adaptations of the play exist. Of these films, Laurence Olivier’s 1955 adaptation remains the most critically acclaimed, and represents a visual synthesis of Shakespeare’s characterization. Olivier himself was sympathetic to Ricardians but presented his abbreviated Richard III in a Shakespearean vein. Richard is the villain of the film and portrayed with “long dark dank hair hanging to his shoulders, crooked nose and twisted body, spindly legs, one shorter than the other, and the stunted hand.”

53 For example from the First Quarto edition, the title of Richard III presents itself as The Tragedy of King Richard the Third. Containing, His treacherous Plots against his brother Clarence: the pittiefull murther of his innocent nephewes: his tyrannicall vsurpation: with the whole course of his detested life, and most deserued death.

54 There is the popular belief that the Duke of Marlborough is to have once remarked that Shakespeare was the only history that he had ever read. See Hammond, 140.


57 Ibid.
however include a lengthy disclaimer at the beginning of the film that the story presented was the “most infamous, of the legends that are attached to the Crown of England.”\textsuperscript{58} In a subsequent radio interview promoting the film, he discounted traditional propaganda, stating, “there’s no reason to suppose that he killed the babies in the Tower” or that “there’s no real reason to suppose he had a hump on his shoulder.”\textsuperscript{59} Oliver’s film had a wide audience and contributed to both the popularity of Shakespeare and Richard’s villainous image.\textsuperscript{60} These cinematic entries reinforce an image created in the sixteenth century, and continued to form the foundations for current opinions about Richard III, perpetuating a five-hundred-year-old stereotype.

**Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Sources**

Incredibly popular his lifetime, Shakespeare’s negative portrayal of Richard III is not indicative that he held a poor opinion of him, but rather that he understood the politics of sixteenth-century England. Under the Tudors, writing that was deemed seditious could lead to severe punishment.\textsuperscript{61} The popular historical interpretation of Richard III would not face serious reexamination until the beginning of the seventeenth century with the accession of the Stuart dynasty in 1603. While descended from Henry VII, the Stuarts had very little incentive to promote traditionalist history glorifying the Tudors over the Yorks. However, over one hundred years of traditional history had become accepted fact. Those historians who wished to reexamine history could do so without fear of political reprisal, and as a result, Ricardians slowly began to emerge to counter traditionalist historians.

In the seventeenth century, Sir George Buck emerged as the first Ricardian. In 1619, Buck authored his *History of King Richard the*
Buck’s original work set out to “answer for him and to clear and redeem him from those improbable imputations and strange and spiteful scandals and rescue him entirely from those wrongs and to make truth … present herself to the light.” In defending Richard, Buck became one of the first Richard III historians to seek out primary sources not fully evaluated by previous historians. A. N. Kincaid assesses that Buck strove for accuracy in history. The result was a balanced account that “offered a complete defense of the king … that Richard possessed all the virtues that a king should have, being moderate, temperate, merciful and generous.” Buck did not single handily change public opinion, and traditional interpretations continued. Published in 1622, Sir Francis Bacon wrote *The History of the Reign of King Henry VII*. While not the subject of Bacon’s history, Richard III suffers a negative portrayal. Bacon relied on traditionalist histories, consulting More, Vergil, and Hall. Similar to More, Bacon invented dialogue to fill in the gaps of his history. To preface the righteousness of Henry VII’s usurpation, and demonstrate the lack of public support for Richard, Bacon rehashes his various crimes, including the murder of his brother, nephews, wife, and Henry VI. However, despite these traditional charges, Bacon makes no mention of Richard’s physical appearance, and praises his military virtue.

A century later, traditionalist histories continued to rely on centuries’ old sources rife with Tudor propaganda. Philosopher David Hume, cited the *Croyland Chronicle*, More, and Vergil in his *History of England* (1754-62). Only a single chapter of the six-volume history covered the War of the Roses, and it takes a very traditionalist view. He writes that “The Duke of Gloucester was capable of committing the
most bloody and treacherous murders with the utmost coolness and indifference.”

Countering Hume’s authoritative work was author and politician Horace Walpole and his *Historic Doubts on the Life and Reign of King Richard the Third* (1768). While Sir George Buck became the first major defender of Richard, Walpole offered “the most thorough-going defense of Richard III” since his death. *Historic Doubts* prominently challenged accepted historical facts about Richard III, and his history began as an earnest reexamination. Walpole wrote that it occurred to him “that the picture of Richard the Third, as drawn by historians, was a character formed by prejudice and invention.” In Richard’s defense, Walpole drew on Buck’s arguments and thesis, but being a gifted writer, formed his thesis in a more clear and logical manner. He set out to attack Henry VII, whom he described as a “mean and unfeeling tyrant” that “blackened” Richard so that he could “appear in a kind of amiable light.” He thoroughly analyzes Richard’s seven major crimes, and concludes his involvement in most was “improbable.” He argues that there are “no authentic memorials of Richard’s crimes, or at most, no account of them but from Lancastrian historians.” This leads to his harsh criticism toward traditionalist sources. For example, he charges More’s history as nothing more than “invention and romance.” *Historic Doubts* became a bestseller and an influential piece of Ricardian scholarship for historians in the following centuries.

**Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Sources**

The nineteenth century saw “the beginning of a long-term change in the reputation of Richard … [and] the development of a more

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70 Hammond, 141.


72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., xv. See page 6 of this paper for a listing of those crimes. Walpole lists the crimes on page 3.

74 Ibid., xiv.

75 Ibid., 19.

76 Hammond, 142.
scientific approach to historical studies.”77 If Hume and Walpole defined the eighteenth-century examples of traditionalist and Ricardian viewpoints, emerging as their counterparts a century later were historians James Gairdner and Clements Markham. Gairdner’s *History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third* (1878) takes what one historian describes as the “Morean” view, “strictly in accordance with the Tudor tradition.”78 Influenced by Walpole’s work, Gardiner sought to determine if Richard “was really a tyrant,” or the victim of propaganda, and ultimately determined the “portrait with which we have been made familiar by Shakespeare and Sir Thomas More” is the correct characterization.79 He repeats many of the traditionalist attacks against Richard, and finding no redeeming qualities in him, repeats the outlandish rumor of Richard’s monstrous birth and hideous appearance. Gairdner finds him guilty of all the murders that Tudor historians have charged Richard with since the fifteenth century, except that of Edward of Lancaster (Henry VI’s son).80

In a direct rebuttal to Gardiner, Markham released *Richard III: His Life and Character, Reviewed in the Light of Recent Research* (1906), and set out to prove “that Richard III must be acquitted on all counts.”81 Divided into two sections, the first part serves as a conventional biography favored toward Richard in every possible way. For example, in describing Richard’s physical attributes, he asserts that while Richard had one shoulder higher than the other, it was not noticeable or a cause of weakness. Markham further demonstrates his affection for his subject, describing him as “dreamy … earnest … resolute and fearless.”82 In the second part, Markham refutes centuries of Tudor propaganda, attacking both the historians, and their charges in systematic fashion. For example, he denies Richard’s murder of Edward of Lancaster, by arguing that the latter died in the Battle of Tewkesbury.83 As for the main charge, Markham indicts Henry VII as

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 144.
80 Ibid., 14.
82 Ibid., 124.
83 Ibid., 78.
the true perpetuator, and devotes significant time to building his case that Henry “had a strong motive” to kill Edward V and his brother.84 The last chapter is entirely devoted to attacking Gardiner’s position, and ultimately concludes that Gardiner failed to provide critical evidence for his position.85 In his defense of Richard III, Markham showed considerable research, and furthered the Ricardian cause in a centuries’ old debate. Despite this, Gardiner’s book (and opinion) would remain the “standard biography of him for many years,” and it would not be until the 1950s that further significant scholarship in the field found publication.86

Modern Scholarship: Mid Twentieth Century and Beyond
Paul Kendall published the first major work in the modern era of Richard III historiography in 1955. His Richard III does not attempt to avoid the controversy, nor does it attempt to qualify him as villain or hero. He presents contemporary evidence, and ignores most traditionalist histories, providing a fair assessment of Richard’s involvement in his supposed crimes.87 Kendall presents a thorough analysis of Richard’s changing reputation by portraying “what manner of man Richard was,” and sought to leave “moral judgments … to the reader.”88 According to A. Compton Reeves, Kendall described his subject in “compelling fashion,” and “did a major service for the study of Richard,” and likely influenced countless future scholars.89

Kendall’s work predated “an explosion of scholarly research on the fifteenth century” that led to an overwhelmingly collection of biographies devoted to Richard III near the quincentennial of his

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84 Ibid., 254.
85 Ibid., 299.
86 Hammond, 145.
87 Regarding Richard’s guilt or innocence concerning his nephews, Kendall writes “to deal with the central of mystery … requires an analysis of evidence that is deadly to biography.” Kendall examines the issue thoroughly in an appendix and determines that “it is very possible that King Richard is guilty of the crime … that either Henry the Seventh or Henry Stafford, second Duke of Buckingham” are also possibly guilty. He provides evidence of guilt and innocence for all three concerned individuals. See Paul Murray Kendall, Richard the Third (New York: W.W. Norton, 1955), 12, and 466-95.
88 Kendall, 12. Kendall’s historiography of Richard III is both critical and analytical of the various sources and an excellent summary of works written prior to 1955.
89 Reeves.

Cheetham does not attempt “to whitewash his subject [and] contributes instead a lucid discussion of the evidence.” His work serves as an excellent introductory text with reproductions of many of the source documents, and historical artifacts to aid beginning readers. Jenkins sets out to disprove previous historians’ statements that fifteenth century contemporary rumors about Richard’s crimes did not exist. She does not attempt to darken him in a traditionalist manner, and actually praises his character. However, she does find Richard guilty of his nephews’ murders.

Ross’ Richard III offers a balanced alternative to Kendall’s tempered Ricardian biography. Similar to Kendall, he provides a summary traditional historian scholarship, and determines that “Richard III has been the most persistently vilified of all English kings.” While Ross’ work paints a harsher picture than Ricardian biographies, it is not a negative examination. He argues that to comprehend Richard, judgment

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90 Hammond, 147.  
92 While maintaining a balanced portrayal of Richard, Cheetham ultimately concludes that Richard remains “the prime suspect … the evidence is not conclusive in a legal sense, and never will be. Richard stands convicted not so much by the evidence against him as the lack of evidence against anybody else.” See Cheetham, The Life and Times of Richard III, 151.  
94 Jenkins finds it plausible that Richard murdered his nephews, but highly unlikely that he is guilty of the various other crimes. She writes “Richard committed the crime … how much reason he felt he had to do it, and how much the circumstances of his past had contributed to the doing. The story is not the sensational one of the crime of a habitual murderer, but the awe-inspiring one of a capable, strong minded, dedicated king driven to a dreadful act from he chose to think there was no escape.” See Ibid., xi.  
should consider his historical environment and not his actions. The work received praise from both traditionalists and Ricardians, with Jeremy Potter declaring that Ross’ biography “displaced Professor Kendall’s history as the standard biography.” Kendall and Ross remain significant due to their endeavor to strike a balance. Other works “allow their enthusiasm for one side or the other to run away.” Books by Williamson and St. Aubyn fit into this category. Williamson’s The Mystery of the Princes takes a heavily Ricardian stance, while Aubyn’s The Year of Three Kings favors the traditional approach of depicting Richard as guilty of his crimes.

Most modern scholarship discounts Tudor interpretations, or at least minimizes their importance. However, Seward’s Richard III fully embraces the darkest interpretations of Richard. For Seward, it was a difficult decision. He “believed passionately in his innocence” as a child, but the writings of Thomas More convinced him of Richard’s guilt, and that “the evil Richard is even more interesting than the good Richard.” Seward, while maintaining a traditional approach, separates himself from other traditionalists through his appreciation of Richard as something that is “not a monster; but a peculiarly grim young English precursor of Machiavelli’s Prince.”

Conclusion

In 1983, five hundred years after Richard III ascended the
throne, one historian acknowledged that while it may be “improbable … new documents will be found requiring a total revision of all that is known about Richard, the flood of literature devoted to his career show no signs of diminishing.” Presently, this statement proves to be accurate. Academic interest remains strong with contributions occurring regularly. Both traditionalists and Ricardians still postulate theories regarding Richard’s culpability, with no established consensus. He remains a popular subject for public debate, and three mock trials have acquitted him. Richard lives beyond actual history, and is a popular subject for novelists writing romantic historical fiction. Today, The Richard III Society dedicates scholarship to clearing his name. Resulting from the efforts of supporters valiantly defending him, Richard’s reputation has improved greatly since 1485. For most, he is no longer the monster that More constructed and Shakespeare solidified. For others, he remains guilty. According to Cheetham, the “lack of evidence against anybody else” leaves Richard as the only viable suspect. This divide will remain until irrefutable evidence that vindicates or condemns Richard surfaces. Perhaps his bones will provide the proof. In 2012, after being lost for

104 St. Aubyn, 253.


106 In 1984, Richard was tried for his crimes in a made for television courtroom drama. According to A.J. Pollard, “the play-acting was unscripted and no one knew what the outcome would be, not even the performers, until the jury delivered its verdict.” See Pollard, 228. In October, 1996 and June, 1997, William Rehnquist, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court heard Richard III’s case at mock trials, and both times found him innocent. See Jeanne Trahan Faubell, “Not Guilty – Again! Three Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court find Richard III Not Guilty Following Mock Trial Oral Argument Hold at the U.S Supreme Court,” Richard III Society, American Branch, http://www.r3.org/trial/trial2.html (accessed 12/01/2009).

107 The most notable modern work of romantic fiction is Josephine Tey’s The Daughter of Time (1956).

108 The Richard III Society, founded in 1924 as the Fellowship of the White Boar dedicates itself to clearing Richard’s name. Initially, the society was a group of Richard III enthusiasts; however, it has grown into what A. J. Pollard describes as “a flourishing and respected historical society, committed to the propagation of research.” See Pollard, 218.

over five centuries, researchers rediscovered his skeleton in Leicester, England. Even if no formative answer avails itself from this amazing historical (and lucky) finding, the discovery will no doubt ignite additional academic and popular interest. Until a definite answer emerges, the study of Richard III serves as an excellent example of how history remains a subject under constant revision.
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"And every tale condemns me for a villain"


"And every tale condemns me for a villain"


In the fall of 1536, several thousand people in the north of England took up arms under the name the Pilgrimage of Grace, ready to march on London with a litany of demands for Henry VIII. Never leaving the north, the king was able to diffuse the rebellion before much bloodshed having convinced the leadership of the insurrection that their demands would be heard, and they would receive pardon if they stopped the fighting. However, in the end, though the king upheld his promise of pardon, he did not meet their demands. In recent scholarship, there has been a debate as to what type of rebellion the Pilgrimage of Grace was—religious, socioeconomic, constitutional, or political. Given the structure of English society and culture in the 1530s, all four of these categories were deeply entwined. Yet this paper argues the case for the religious disruption being the most important factor motivating the rebellion. The Pilgrimage occurred a few short years after VIII separated the Church of England from the Holy See in Rome, and occurred the same year small monasteries were closed. Rumor of further religious changes sparked the people to rebellion. Though the title *The Pilgrimage of Grace* was used only by rebels in Yorkshire led by lawyer Robert Aske, most scholars include other uprisings that occurred in Lincolnshire as part of the rebellion. This paper considers all of the northern rebellions of late 1536 as The Pilgrimage of Grace and treats them as a single event.

Not all historians agree about the primacy of religion in the rebellion. Ethan H. Shagan finds the rebellion more a result of politics than religion, writing, “while ostensibly opposed to Henrician reform in all its guises, in practice the rebels disagreed significantly over what an acceptable religious settlement might look like.”¹ Since they could not agree upon religion, Shagan argues the real cause of the uprising was the avarice, greed, and immorality of Henry’s government.

Shagan argues that even religious grievances were political issues. He writes that the Supremacy challenged people’s “political loyalty in which obedience was due to the King so long as his policies did not violate God’s law or undermine the fabric of the commonwealth.”² According to Shagan, because the royal supremacy made Henry both the head of state and church, anything involving

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² Ibid., 127.
religion would be inherently political. Yet, this puts politics on a higher spot than makes sense, since if the Pilgrimage of Grace was a popular rebellion, then why did a political process that already excluded most Englishmen and women just then erupt in discord? Focusing on politics ignores that politics is about policy, and the policies that the rebels were acting out against were primarily religious in nature. The commons would have most acutely felt policies like the closing of the monasteries, and the restrictions on worshipping saints as religious issues, which would have convinced them to take up arms.

Tudor historian G.R. Elton holds a different view of the primary causes of the Pilgrimage of Grace. “Money,” he writes, “not the faith, caused the people to stir, if the stories spread are any indication.” He cites popular rumors of “new taxes, loss of church plate, licenses for the eating of better food,” and others “carefully designed to disturb the common people.” Elton argues that they rose in rebellion since they were “already much unsettled by what had in fact been happening to familiar practices of daily piety, they were led to believe often extravagant tales of further doings which would touch their pockets.” He contends that the religious changes worried the commons to the point that they were willing to believe that more economically painful reforms were on the way, but that they were not enough of a factor to foment rebellion on their own.

Elton also argues that the rebels were “organized from above,” and done so successfully because “the materials of disaffection and protest lay thick upon the ground.” He posits that the gentry who, themselves left out of power at the ascendancy of the Privy Council, co-opted existing discontent among the commons in order to further their selfish grab for a bigger hand in government instigated the rebellion. But, the Pilgrimage of Grace included a large cross-section of people; from the commoners who probably made up the bulk of the armed force, up to the gentry who were the leaders and spokespeople. It is natural that the different levels would have different grievances and goals, but both groups are in fact represented in the articles presented to the Kings representatives at Pontefract. The educated elite who drafted the articles would obviously make their grievances prominent, but this does not indicate their dominance as the Pilgrims’ sole motivation.

C.S.L. Davies takes the view that religion drove the rebellion. He describes the people and the uprising as being:

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4 Ibid., 199.
5 Ibid., 205-206.
bound together not by feudal loyalties but by an elaborate oath. Its imagery was religious; the rebels called themselves ‘Pilgrims,’ they carried banners of the Five Wounds of Christ and invoked God’s grace and defense of Holy Church in their marching song. They demanded the rooting out of heresy, the restoration of recently dispossessed monks and nuns to their convents, an end to the despoilation, and even the renunciation of the recently asserted royal headship of the church.  

He takes the overt imagery and declarations at face value, seeing them as evidence that religion was the primary cause. But, like Elton and Shagan, Davies also folds other causes into that which he sees as the most important and argues for the prevalence of socioeconomics and politics under the umbrella of religion. For example, speaking of the dissolution of the monasteries, he writes the “defense of the church and defense of the poor against the crown became a single issue.”

Moreover, who was to encourage rebellion? Davies writes, “the clergy were in the best position to spread rumors and to incite the people, and they had excellent reasons of their own for doing so.” While this is certainly true, Davies does include some problematic arguments. For instance, he claims that parishioners in the North would not care about a law removing a church’s ornate chalice because they had “little direct material interests in the state of the church.” Therefore, “the use of tin chalices would not hurt their pocket, although it might offend their sense of propriety and their communal pride.” However, it seem likely the parishioners felt that the church’s holdings were seen as something that affected their own pocket, since like Morebath they probably took part in raising money to purchase the chalice (or other church wealth) in the first place.

R.W. Hoyle’s *The Pilgrimage of Grace and the Politics of the 1530s* puts forward a view similar to Elton in that he describes the uprisings as initially popular revolts among the commons that were co-opted by the gentry. His study focuses mainly upon the gentry involved, and draws from prosecution records. Since the crown only prosecuted gentry, Hoyle finds it “very difficult to reach the voice of the rank and file in the Pilgrimage of Grace because they largely

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7 Ibid., 72.
8 Ibid., 69.
9 Ibid., 79.
escaped scot-free.”¹² Hoyle warns “it is not methodologically legitimate to employ statements of aims created at the end of the revolt to illuminate the causes of the rising.”¹³ He argues against using the *Lincoln Articles* or the *Pontefract Articles* as evidence of why the rebellions started. This is probably too cautious, as just a few months passed between the beginning of the rebellion and the drafting of the grievances to send to Henry VIII. Though it is probably impossible to do any more than make general statements about why the rank and file commoner joined the cause, it is unlikely they would have continued to support it if the final declaration made in their name did not include their grievances. Taking the articles as representative of the goals of the commoners, the fact that the bulk of them relate to recent changes in the church indicates the importance of those issues to the rebels.

Before judging the religious significance, it is important to understand the socioeconomic situation in rural Tudor England during the first half of the sixteenth century. During this period, many landowners were evicting tenants from the land they farmed and replacing them with more profitable ventures in a process called enclosure. This had a profound negative effect on peasants and commoners, causing high levels of poverty. In response, Henry VII passed the *Act Against Pulling Down of Towns* in 1489 as an attempt to prevent the destructive process. Remaining very controversial nearly a quarter century later Thomas More included a scathing description of enclosure practices when he published *Utopia* in 1516, writing,

> Your sheep,” I said, “that commonly are so meek and eat so little; now, as I hear they have become so greedy and fierce that they devour human beings themselves. They devastate and depopulate fields, houses and towns. For in whatever parts of the land sheep yield the finest and thus the most expensive wool, there the nobility and gentry, yes, and even a good many abbots—holy men—are not content with the old rents that the land yielded to their predecessors. Living in idleness and luxury without doing society any good no longer satisfies them; they have to do positive harm. For they leave no land free for the plough: they enclose every acre for pasture; they destroy houses and abolish towns, keeping the churches—but only for sheep—barns. . . This enclosing has led to sharply rising food prices in many districts.¹⁴

Though a fictional account, this captures the transition that was occurring in much of England during the early modern era. The lower

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¹² Ibid., 24.  
¹³ Ibid., 21.  
classes of people lost the land they depended on, while the cost of basic staples increased.

More’s *Utopia* presents social and economic reasons for unrest in the time period, but they were of secondary importance as causes of the Pilgrimage, making many susceptible to unrest when Henry’s government further attacked their religious traditions in 1536. But, once the rebels were on the march, more old-standing grievances like enclosure were included in the message. The thirteenth *Pontefract Article* asks that “all intakes [and] enclosures since anno 4 Henry VII (1488-9)… be pulled down except mountains, forest, and parks.” The loss of land and livelihood was still a problem for the people of the rural north, and so they addressed that grievance. That this was the thirteenth in a list of twenty-four, though shows that this was more a contributing factor than an immediate cause for the uprising.

Fears over enclosure extended to worries “related to the tenurial and communing rights enjoyed by customary tenants and now felt to be under threat, as landlords sought to replace fixed by revisable rents and dues and to deny free grazing rights on wasteland by using enclosures to create new farms or rented pastures.” Enclosure and rising rents were economic threats to the commons. This fear translated into then ninth *Pontefract Article*, which asked that lands in the north “be by tenant right, and the lord to have at every change 2 years’ rent for gressom and no more according to the grant now made by the lords to the commons there under their seal.” This was a way to limit the changing and increasing rents that the commoners would have to pay and offset some of problems caused by enclosure.

In 1529, at the height of Henry’s *great matter*, the official process of breaking England away from communion Rome had begun with the convening of the Reformation Parliament. According to a report published in 1548, Edward Hall described that the commons “began to commune of their griefs wherewith the spirituality had before time grievously oppressed them,” presenting the monarch with six grievances that were church-related, but more economic in nature. “These things [church grievances] before this time,” Hall continued, “might in nowise be touched nor yet talked of by no man except he would be made an heretic, or lose all that he had, for the bishops were chancellors, and had all the rule about the king. . . .” That is, before

the Reformation Parliament, Parliament did not encroach upon church domain. In response to their complaints, Henry agreed to pass two bills that “sore displeased the bishops,” but pleased the House of Commons. This was the moment when “God had illuminated the eyes of the king,” in Hall’s words. Ecclesiastical grievances were no longer something MPs avoided. More importantly, Henry VIII began the process of making church decisions in England, rather than deferring them to Rome.

In a 1533 letter to Archbishop Cranmer, Henry wrote that “we [I], being your King and Sovereign, do recognize no superior in earth, but only God, and not being subject to the laws of any other earthly creature.” The Act in Restraint of Appeals put that statement into law, giving Henry imperium in his kingdom by making the king the highest power in England, answering only to God. The following year, in a royal proclamation, Henry announced that they had by law “expired, abolished separated and secluded out of this our realm the abuses of the Bishop of Rome, his authority and jurisdiction of the long time usurped as well upon us and our realm as upon all other kings and prices and their realms.” The Act of Supremacy completed the process, declaring that Henry was “the only Supreme Head in earth of the Church of England.” This shift is of course why the primarily religious grievances of the rebellion were directed at the king.

Supremacy itself was of course not the immediate cause of the Pilgrimage of Grace, but in it lay the genesis of what would make up the bulk of the grievances listed at Pontefract. The second article addresses this issue, asking:

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\begin{align*}
to \text{ have the supreme head of the church touching } & \text{ cure antimarum } \\
to \text{ be reversed unto the see of Rome as before it was accustomed to } & \text{ be, and to have the consecrations of the bishops [to be restored to } \\
& \text{ the clergy] from him without any first fruits or pension to him to } \\
& \text{ be paid out of this realm or else a pension reasonable for the } \\
& \text{ outward defence of our faith.}
\end{align*}
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The rebels, having no issue with the king’s temporal supremacy, want matters of the spiritual (cure antimarum) decided by the traditional Catholic hierarchy. Thomas Cranmer, the Archbishop of Canterbury was a Protestant and disliked by many. Additionally, they ask for the “consecrations of the bishops” to be returned to the control of clergy as

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20 Ibid., 59.
21 King Henry VIII to Archbishop Cranmer 12 April 1533, in Byrne, 121.
22 King Henry VIII to the Sheriffs 9 June 1534/5, in Ibid., 123.
23 Ibid., 125.
well.

In 1534, the implications of these changes became clearer in the Act of Succession. Afterward, Eamon Duffy writes, “Every man in England over the age of 14 was required to take an oath accepting the provisions of the Act,” and this was their “first direct encounter with the changes which were about to shatter their world.”

Though Duffy describes the people of Morebath, not Yorkshire, the people of the northern counties likely had similar feelings. In fact, “there was a great deal of support for the cause of the ‘Northern men’ throughout England, and not least in the West Country,” Duffy writes.

Regardless of locale, taking this oath would have been impossible for any practicing Catholic. To them, the king’s marriage to Catherine remained legitimate, and Mary remained heir to the throne. Accepting Anne meant ignoring the fact that the Pope was still the head of their faith. Indeed, the Yorkshire rebels included the status of Mary as a grievance in the Pontefract Articles, illustrating what an inflammatory issue this was for them. In the third article, the rebels “humbly beseech our most dread sovereign lord that the Lady Mary may be made legitimate and the former statutes therein annulled…”

In addition to this, article sixteen reads “item, the statue of the declaration of the Crown by will, that the same may be annulled and repealed.” Not only did the rebels want the restoration of Mary, they wanted to remove from the Crown the power to choose its own successor. They knew a Protestant monarch would choose Protestant children, continuing the perceived innovations in religion. Importantly as well, the people saw providence in whether a legitimate heir was produced for a king, and it was thought to be God’s punishment if one could not be. These grievances are certainly political, but they are primarily religious.

Furthermore, the primary Pontefract Article asks “to have the heresies of Luther, Wycliffe, Hus, Melanchthon. . . the works of Tyndale, of Barnes, of Marshall. . . and all other heresies of Anabaptist clearly within this realm to be annulled and destroyed.” They list many reformers by name, suggesting some level of familiarity with these “heresies.” The placement of them as the first grievance suggests that the rebels viewed the changes as arising from Protestant authors, and so the eradication of their ideas would be the first order of business.

However, further changes to England’s church irked the

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25 Duffy, 86-87.
26 Ibid., 92.
27 “The Pontefract Articles,” quoted in Hoyle, 461.
28 Ibid., 462.
29 Ibid., 461.
conservatives in the north and elsewhere. The *Ten Articles* put forth in 1536, though not a wild departure from Catholicism, did effect how the people worshiped. One article declared that “the rude people should not from henceforth take such superstition” as the veneration of images “for else there might fortune idolatry to ensue, which God forbid.”

Another injunction around the same time declared that “it shall profit more their soul’s health, if they do bestow that on the poor and needy, which they would have bestowed upon the said images or relics.” To the pious, changing the way that they worshipped images would have had a large effect on church life. As Duffy has shown, maintaining the various images was an important part of parish life, something that the community participated in as a whole. Some, like St. Sidwell in Morebath, held very specific meaning for an individual town, and this attack upon the image of a saint would seem particularly personal.

However, the most immediate cause of the uprising was the dissolution of the smaller monasteries, which occurred in early 1536. But here, there is a difference between the rebels of the Pilgrimage of Grace and their countrymen in Dorset. Duffy writes that it is “perhaps unlikely that anyone in Morebath wept bitter tears over the disappearance of their local monastery,” though maybe some had “shaken their heads over the attack on religious life that it represented.” It may be the case that in Morebath the monastery did not have a positive role in local life. However in the North, the monasteries represented much more to the people, especially the commons.

Hoyle points out that Robert Aske was “never monocausal” but “placed a particular emphasis on the dissolution as inciting revolt.” In this case, Hoyle underplays how specific the Pilgrimage’s leader was in placing the dissolution as the main reason for rebellion. In his interrogation, Aske stated directly that “the suppression of the abbeys was the greatest cause of the said insurrection, which the hartes of the comens moste grudged at.” Aske explained this was important to the northerners:

> Because the abbeys in the north parts gave great alms to poor men and laudably served God . . . And by occasion of the said suppression the divine service of almighty God is much diminished, great number of masses unsaid and the blessed

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30 Byrne, 240.
31 Quoted in Duffy, 91.
32 Ibid., 24-27, 71-72.
33 Ibid., 90.
34 Hoyle, 46.
consecration of the sacrament now not used and showed in those places, to the distress of the faith and spiritual comfort to man’s soul, the temple of God ruffed and pulled down, the ornaments and relics of the church of God unreverent used, the towns and sepulchers of honourable and noble men pulled down and sold. . . Also in and many of the said abbeys were in the mountains and desert places where the people be rude of conditions and not well taught the law of God, and when the abbeys stood, the said people not only had worldly refreshing in their bodies but also spiritual refuge both by ghostly living of them and also by spiritual information and preaching.  

In Northern England, the monasteries had a significant impact in preaching to the people, especially those in outlying areas, or travelers. Additionally, the abbeys served the poor, which would have been especially important, given the economic issues previously discussed. Not least, Aske brings up that the rebels disliked the unceremonious manner in which reformers treated previously sacred church property.

The rebels’ unhappiness with the dissolution appeared in the fourth grievance in the Articles. It reads “Item, to have the abbeys suppressed to be restored unto their houses again.” That this was such a short entry may seem incongruous with Aske’s statement that the dissolution was the primary reason for the uprising, but it makes sense as the final spark. The people of the North had been experiencing religious changes since the late 1520s, and the dissolution was just the last and most visible in a line of perceived affronts to their religion.

More importantly, rumors were rife in the fall of 1536 even more drastic changes were coming in the immediate future. Wilfrid Holme, a northerner who was not part of the rebellion, captured the spirit of the spreading rumors that lead to the uprising in these selected lines from The Fall and Evil Success of Rebellion:

How Antechriste was borne, this rumor went ful wide, / For of Abbeys they said there might not one abide, /And churches and chappels they shall be oppresst, /Fasting and prayer, and good worke are set a side, /And yº sacraments shalbe naught, these words they expressed.
When this could not auaile, then properly they inuented /Friers, Pardoners to the people for to prate, /How burials and mariages they should be presented, /With churchings and christenings to pay a noble rate … They moued the ignorant and debill wits God wote, / Thus persuaded by intisement of priests avaritious...

36 Ibid., 561.
37 “The Pontefract Articles,” quoted in Hoyle, 461.
38 Wilfrid Holme, The fall and euill success of Rebellion from time to time, University of Virginia Library,
Holme suggests that “priests avaricious” tricked many into rebellion by spreading knowingly false rumors. They said that the churches themselves were next for destruction after the abbeys; that the central Catholic belief in good works was in jeopardy; and that the prices for regular religious ceremonies—marriage, christenings, burials—were going to increase.

Davies suggests that the spreading rumors were not solely of a religious nature. “Fear of draconian taxation was one of these” commoner’s fears, he writes, “alongside were a variety of ‘religious’ issues, of which fear of a wholesale attack on the practices, furnishing, and even the fabric of the parish church seems to the core.”39 Fear of new taxes may have added to the furor, but the perceived attack in their church was the commons most comprehensive grievance. They were already unhappy with what they saw, and the possibility of further religious change put them to a boil.

The previously discussed issues were more likely to affect ‘the commons’ than would cause problems to the gentry. However, they were not the only ones aggrieved or the only ones to join the fight. This was not an attempt at revolution, where those without attempted to wrestle some sort of economic control of their lives from an established elite. The Pilgrimage of Grace was, in essence, a conservative rebellion with mostly religious goals. The Pontefract Articles use words like “restore,” “repeal,” “as before it was accustomed to be,” and other pleas to overturn unpopular laws. The reformers were the rebels’ enemies.

The man blamed by many as the reason for much of the changes was Henry’s chief minister Thomas Cromwell. He was a protestant, and because in “Tudor politics the monarch was the key guarantor of good government, of the impartial administration of the law and of the maintenance of civil peace,”40 he was one of those blamed for the problems. Article eight requests “to have the Lord Cromwell, Lord Chancellor, and Sir Richard Rich, knight, to have condign punishment as the subvertors of the good laws of this realm and maintainers of the false sect of those heretics and the first inventors and bringers in of them.”41 This political grievance, stems from a religious motivation. These evil advisors to the otherwise good king were “heretics,” “maintainers of the false sect” and “inventors.” The articles mention their subversion of “good laws,” but taken in context

39 Davies, 79.
40 Hoyle, 55.
41 “The Pontefract Articles,” quoted in Ibid., 461.
with the first article, this seems more like a religious grievance with a political solution, though, when the monarch is head of church, and state, separating the two remains nearly impossible. Shagan suggests that “the abandonment of good lordship, perpetrated by evil counselors around the king” so broke the traditional power structure that “much of the rhetorical work of the Pilgrimage, then, was to reconstruct good lordship through the creation of a properly functioning socio-political order within the rebellion itself.” He argues that the rebellion re-created the chain of being on a small scale because it was no longer being played out in the large-scale. This fits with the conservative nature of the pilgrimage, but it does not explain why the commons would rebel. If the rebellion was the upper classes reasserting the order of the chain of being with themselves as the head, it would not explain why the peasantry participated in such great numbers.

Religious issues were in the final demands put forth at Pontefract, but other demands were included. The higher sorts, like Aske and the leaders, seem motivated by politics, as they would have been more aggrieved by any loss of power to the Privy Council. Michael Bush assesses “a loss of rights, of one sort of another, was at the time a prevalent complaint throughout much of the north.” Aske and his colleagues would likely have felt this, explaining why he wanted the king dismiss the bishops and heretics he saw as usurpers and “put them from their authoritie.” The gentry’s class saw their power eroding, and the Privy Counselors benefitting. They were especially aggrieved that Archbishop Cranmer, like Cardinal Wolsey before him, came from a non-noble background.

Regardless of class, the oath the pilgrims took when joining the ranks of the rebellion shows a confluence of religion and politics as well. The oath read:

Ye shall not enter into this our Pilgrimage of Grace for the commonwealth but only for the love that ye do bear unto almighty God, his faith, and to holy church militant [and for] the maintenance thereof, to the preservation of the king’s person [and] his issue, to the purifying of the nobility, and to expulse all villain blood and evil councilors against the commonwealth from his grace and his privy council of the same. And that ye shall not enter into our said Pilgrimage for no particular profit to yourself, nor to do any displeasure to any private person but by the counsel for the commonwealth, nor slay nor murder for no envy, but in your hearts put away all fear and dread, and take afore you the cross of Christ and in your hearts his faith, the restitution of the

42 Shagan, 95.
44 Bateson and Crumwell, 561.
The Noise and Rumor Redounded

church, the suppression of these heretics and their opinions by the holy contents of this book.\textsuperscript{45}

The oath taker declares his allegiance first to God and religion and to the king only second. The king is not the enemy; the Privy Council and those around the king are the enemy and source of the problems. The goals put forth are clearly religious: restoring the church, and suppressing heretics. The political aspect of the oath, consisting of the mention of the Privy Council, exists as a means to an end, wholly dependent upon the declaration that they are the source of the religious issues. Additionally, this oath is free of class distinction. Constructed to be universal, the pilgrims made it inoffensive to all. This indicates that social issues were secondary and everyone working for the same religious goals was more important than the imposition of order from above.

Concurrent with the pilgrimage, northern clergy held convocation at Pontefract at the same time of the formation of the Articles. In \textit{The opinion of the clergy of the north parts}, they put forth fourteen heads covering religious issues that parallel the Articles, but tackle solely religious matters. The first article declares:

\begin{quote}
we think that preaching against the purgatory, worshipping of saints, pilgrimage, images, and all books set forth against the same or sacraments or sacraments of the church to be worth to be reproved and condemned by convocation, and the pain to be executed that is devised for the doers to the contrary, and the process to be made hereafter in heresy as was in the days of King Henry the Fourth.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

As would be expected, the convocation presented the identical views on reversing Henrician “innovation.” The further thirteen articles cover the same religious grievances as have already been discussed above. Though there is no surprise that the “political” Pontefract Articles and the more religious \textit{Opinions of the clergy} contain a huge amount of overlap, the fact that they did match so well indicates the level of religious conservatism among the people in the north and why religious changes were important enough for them to take up arms.

While the Pilgrimage of Grace was essentially a religious uprising, Duffy reminds “there was no such thing in Tudor England as ‘religious causes alone,’ for religion was inextricably woven into the social fabric, and a change in the doctrinal definitions was more than a slight adjustment in the way people prayed.”\textsuperscript{47} That is why there are

\textsuperscript{45} “The oath of the honourable men,” quoted in Hoyle, 457.

\textsuperscript{46} “The opinion of the clergy of the north parts,” quoted in Ibid., 463.

\textsuperscript{47} Duffy, 141.
political, social, and economic demands that sit side-by-side with religious questions in the *Pontefract Articles*. More accurately, many demands fit into more than one of these categories.

Shagan writes, in 1536 “the Pilgrimage directly threatened the government’s survival: with perhaps 50,000 men in arms, if the rebels had marched on London no royal force could possibly have stopped them.”\(^48\) This was a formidable army, but because they were motivated primarily by religion and still believed in order and their monarch, marching on London was never their intent. These conservative warriors still believed that Henry VIII was a good king and that he would at least listen to their grievances. They believed the king would agree with them and reverse the changes to their church, if only they could wrest control his bad counselors. Nevertheless, by 1536, they certainly felt they had to do something. Enclosure was causing unemployment and vagrancy, and the closing of the monasteries on top of that destroyed one of their only safety nets. These reasons, primarily religious, but intertwined with the socioeconomic and political, are what drove the people of the *Pilgrimage of Grace* to rebellion.

\(^{48}\) Shagan, 89.
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MENTALITÉ OF WAR: THE REVOLUTIONARY-HEROIC TRADITION AS A TOOL OF STALINISM  | Josh Bergeron

“We have conquered on the Civil War front. We shall conquer also on the economic front.”¹ So read the banner on a factory façade at the end of Fyodor Gladkov’s 1924 novel Cement, simultaneously showing support for the Bolshevik Party’s New Economic Policy (NEP) and unease over its ideological contradictions. Ironically, Vladimir Lenin conceived the NEP as a “retreat” from War Communism’s “offensive” toward socialism. Yet, as Gladkov’s work suggested, even those who embraced the potential recovery power of this policy could not refrain from using the rhetoric of war to describe it. Historian Stephen Cohen fully captures the pervasiveness of this militant mentalité in what he calls Bolshevism’s “revolutionary-heroic tradition.”² Whether by accident or design, this trend would play an especially fundamental role in Soviet society under the tutelage of Joseph Stalin, from his dismantling of the lenient NEP in the late 1920s to the opening acts of the Great Patriotic War just over a decade later. In fact, the Soviet Union’s victorious emergence from WWII as a global power seemed to legitimize Stalinism’s excesses of rhetorical and physical militancy, as it suggested any policy pursued in the name of this revolutionary-heroic tradition had effectively prepared the country for war. By all accounts, Stalin’s Soviet Union had already been at war for decades, and it was this reality that allowed it to survive and ultimately overcome the Nazi war machine.

Though Stalin would wield it as a tool, or, perhaps more accurately, as a weapon, the revolutionary-heroic tradition was in no way crafted by his hands. Rather, it was forged in the ecstasy of the October Revolution of 1917, and sharpened under the domestic and foreign War Communism policies in place during the subsequent Civil War. In his 1937 book The Revolution Betrayed, the exiled Leon Trotsky defined War Communism as the “systematic regimentation of

consumption in a besieged fortress.”3 Indeed, “White” counter-revolutionaries and foreign interventionists besieged the newly formed Soviet Union on all sides, requiring an emergency centralization of rule and radicalization of policy that resulted in the nationalization of the whole sphere of production, an almost complete prohibition of free trade, and a virtually moneless economy.4 Were it not for the external determinism of policy vis-à-vis foreign intervention or the near economic collapse that followed the chaos, War Communism might look like an era of steadfast Marxist ideology and absolute Bolshevik control. Yet from that sense of absolute control, the paranoia and anxiety of being literally encircled by ideological enemies, and the adrenaline of victory, a “revolutionary romanticism” was forever engraved into the Soviet mentalité, which yearned for the “consistently revolutionary and uncompromisingly radical” policies of wartime.5

Both the Bolsheviks’ restlessness in peacetime and the excesses of militant paranoia can best be understood against the backdrop of this period. In sociological terms, a culture of urgency was born.

Yet despite its ideological clarity, War Communism had brought the country and its government to “the very edge of the abyss.”6 Victory in the Civil War forced the gaze of the Bolsheviks inward to face the country’s administrative chaos and economic devastation. In addition to the stagnation and deterioration of industry, years of drought and famine combined with the wartime policy of food requisitioning to bring agricultural regions beyond the brink of starvation and mutiny. To make matters worse, the end of the war had necessitated the demobilization of five million Red Army soldiers, who had long been a core component of the proletarian support base for Bolshevik rule. Unemployed, hungry, armed, and stranded, these former vanguard forces manifested their disillusionment into such Soviet public-relations disasters as the Kronstadt Rebellion, the crushing of which drew intense ire internationally from many former Bolshevik sympathizers.7 The Bolsheviks themselves looked as though

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5 Cohen, 129.
6 Trotsky, 161.
7 Fitzpatrick, Russian Revolution, 93.
they had abandoned two of their main camps of support – the peasantry and the proletarian army – and they had to act quickly before revolutionary victory turned into structural implosion.

It was here that Leon Trotsky, of all people, provided the groundwork for Stalin’s later policies. He argued that a “top-down military organization and discipline” approach ought to be applied to society as a whole in peacetime, through the mobilization of the “labor front” as yet another military campaign.8 Instead, however, at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, Lenin proposed his New Economic Policy, during which the new Bolshevik regime could “consolidate victories from the revolution […], restore the shattered economy […], and calm the fears of the non-proletariat.”9 In practice, this would mean a relaxation on private trade and ownership, concessions to the intelligentsia and former class enemies through the consultation of bourgeois specialists and tsarist military officers, and an alliance with the peasantry reinforced by the replacement of food requisitioning with a tax-in-kind. Though even Trotsky would acknowledge the necessity of such a policy, the evolutionary-reformist pragmatism of the NEP effectively tranquilized the revolutionary-heroism of the Bolshevik spirit. The partial revival of capitalism was “offensive and frightening” to rank-and-file members of the party, who were overcome by a sense of alienating failure.10 Yet it was this mentality that Stalin was able to manipulate for his revival of revolutionary-heroism near the end of the decade.

Tolerance for the mixed economy was further embodied in the resurgence of well-off kulak peasants,11 and the creation of a new class of small market entrepreneurs bitterly termed “Nepmen.” Where War Communism once offered a sense of absolute political and social control within Red-occupied territory, Bolsheviks under the NEP now found themselves being expected to coexist with, and even encourage, class enemies in an environment that, as Trotsky later asserted, gave

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8 Priestland, 98.
9 Fitzpatrick, Russian Revolution, 96.
10 Ibid.
11 It should be noted here that the extent of the kulaks’ prosperity varied depending on the era and location of the peasants in question, as well as the ideological agenda of the speaker. They are best understood as peasants whose wealth, property, and productivity were extensive in comparison with their counterparts, though the definition changed for Stalin’s purposes to peasants who refused to have their land collectivized.
“bourgeois tendencies [a] more copious field of action.” These tendencies included a revival of prostitution, drug trafficking, gambling, profiteering, and corruption, as middle-class capital was given the freedom to flow into profitable outlets not controlled by the state. Historian Crane Brinton once noted, “[T]he return of the bourgeois vices was so obvious […] that even foreign Communists noticed the fact.”

The lenience on former class enemies extended beyond the socioeconomic sphere and into that of management, as party leaders conceded that state and industrial administration would suffer without the expertise of former tsarist advisors and bourgeois financial specialists. This led to the creation of an extensive non-party bureaucracy whose sole responsibility was the direction of a Communist Party government. In fact, by 1929, only twelve percent of state employees were Bolsheviks. The extreme distrust of this bureaucracy helped to excite the class antagonisms and frequent purges of the 1930’s. In every sector of Soviet society, expectations of liberal tolerance and coexistence replaced absolute Bolshevik control over Russia’s destiny.

If the New Economic Policy posed a threat to the average Bolshevik through its dissolution of absolute control, the loss of that control threatened to undermine their sense of unity. While the Russian socialists had never been fully unified, the revolutionary-heroic tradition that surged in the age of War Communism was defined by democratic centralism, strict ideological obedience, and a singular goal of victory against class enemies. With the implementation of the NEP in 1921, and the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, an unstable order was born. While some officials tried to make “state capitalism” work, others began breaking with party centralism to ban private trade on their own terms, and factions started to grow. Ironically, while “the fear of a schism and the insistence of unity” were core aspects of

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12 Trotsky, 193.
14 Cohen, 276.
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Bolshevik vanguardism before Lenin’s death, the legacy and policies he left behind were key components in the fragmentation of the Party that resulted in Stalin’s division and conquering of the Trotsky Left and Bukharin Right years later. Yet this loss of unity also extended to those whom the party claimed to represent. The decentralization of industry and the advice of bourgeois managers led to the imposition of wage cuts, tighter labor discipline, and growing unemployment on the working class. As a result, the NEP began to be referred to as the “New Exploitation of the Proletariat.”

Still, the New Economic Policy proved to be a great success. By 1928, both the amount of land under cultivation and the rate of industrial output either reached or exceeded pre-WWI levels. What’s more, as David Priestland argues, “[The] NEP rescued the Communists by appeasing the peasantry,” putting off a confrontation between the two supporting camps of the Bolsheviks. Had they continued with the policies of War Communism, the impending collapsed economy, spreading mutiny, and devastating famines would have destroyed the Soviet Union outright. This simultaneous socioeconomic progress and identity degeneration created a number of undeniable tensions – between tolerance and suspicion, self-discipline and daring, efficiency and integrity, and shame and pride.

One contemporary academic commentator claimed, “No longer waging an open war against each other, good and evil coexist today in the same collective.” Nostalgia for clarity was obvious.

As it would turn out, though the revolutionary-heroic tradition and rhetoric of war retreated from the public after 1921, the NEP reinvigorated socialist radicalism and the desire for open class warfare. As Robert Tucker suggests in his biography of Joseph Stalin,

Four or five years of the NEP, though a time of great changes, had

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17 Priestland, 100.
19 Priestland, 100.
20 Lih, 245-246.
21 Priestland, 143.
22 Ibid., 145.
not remade these people and their political ethos. Many of them still felt a certain hankering for the Sturm and Drang of the earlier years of combat, still fresh in their memories.\textsuperscript{23}

The resurgence of this latent desire, however, was not merely a proletarian rebellion against the mediocrity of NEP-era economic stability. On the contrary, the partisan masses were revisited by a specter from the Civil War – the defensive fear of being surrounded by class enemies. As Eric Hobsbawm suggests, “The NEP years relaxed the non-political atmosphere, but not the feeling that the party was a beleaguered minority.”\textsuperscript{24} Firmly in power by 1929, Stalin merely had to tug at the strings of the hibernating party militancy, and the ideological apparatus of war fell firmly back into place – and tug he did. Beginning that year, Stalin’s First Five Year Plan, with its intensive policies of collectivization and industrialization, seemed to answer the nostalgic calls for a renewed offensive toward socialism. Yet this “revolution from above” stood on the shoulders of the economic recovery of the 1920’s, allowing him to pursue policies that would otherwise have crippled the Soviet Union. While on the surface the NEP’s apparent compromises and contradictions with Marxist theory, and its “retreat” from the centralized gains of War Communism, delivered blows to the major components of the revolutionary-heroic tradition of Bolshevism, its cultural tolerance and economic recovery provided the conditions for the tradition to survive in the shadows and later resurge with a vengeance. The policy’s restoration of grain and industrial production to pre-war levels, and the subsequent increase in the size of the proletarian population, tipped the balance of power from the countryside to the city, giving Stalin the confidence to politically confront the peasantry and any other subjects of class-antagonism throughout the 1930’s.\textsuperscript{25} Stalin even went so far as to suggest that this was a premeditated program. On December 27, 1929, as he announced the new policies of collectivization and dekulakization, he petitioned to the audience not to view the NEP as merely a retreat, as an externally determined sign of temporary weakness. “As a matter of fact,” Stalin

\textsuperscript{25} Fitzpatrick, \textit{Russian Revolution}, 117.
insisted, “even when the New Economic Policy was being introduced, Lenin said that it was not only a retreat, but also the preparation for a new, determined offensive against the capitalist elements in town and country.”

Here one can observe Stalin’s strategic genius, with which he legitimizes even unpopular policies with the rhetoric of tactical warfare.

The advent of Stalinism was not merely a resurgence of militant rhetoric, however. From the end of the NEP to the onset of WWII, the Soviet Union was a nation visibly at war. More specifically, there was a war on the economic front. John Scott, a Bolshevik sympathizer who left America to contribute to the industrialization drive of the first Five Year Plans, said as much about his stay in Magnitogorsk: “All during the thirties the Russian people were at war… In Magnitogorsk, I was precipitated into a battle. I was deployed to the iron and steel front.” Indeed, as if Stalin were parroting Trotsky’s post-Civil War ambitions, ‘fronts,’ ‘fighters,’ ‘mobilizations,’ and ‘ambushes’ all became terms for concerns of economics and production. As Sheila Fitzpatrick argues, this became a “war against Russia’s backwardness, and at the same time a war against the proletariat’s class enemies inside and outside the country.” It has even been suggested that this was the period of “Stalin’s ‘war against the nation.’”

Yet as much as it was a recall of the heroism of the revolution, it was also a direct response to recent concerns. In 1926-7, many Bolshevik leaders, including Stalin, were convinced that the British and French were planning an invasion. To make matters worse, there was a simultaneous grain procurement crisis due to a poor harvest, which Stalin blamed on the greed of “kulak hoarders.” These anxieties, some real and others delusional, served as a reminder to Stalin of the omnipresence of counter-revolutionary tendencies both within and without the borders of the nation. In harmony with this sentiment, he announced in 1931, “We are fifty to a hundred years

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26 J. V. Stalin, "Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R." (speech, All-Union Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions, Communist Academy of the C.E.C., Moscow, December 27, 1929).
27 As Eric Hobsbawm puts it, “the Soviet planned economy was a kind of war economy.” Hobsbawm, 382.
28 John Scott, Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia's City of Steel, ed. Stephen Kotkin. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1989), 5.
29 Fitzpatrick, Russian Revolution, 120.
behind the advanced countries. We must close this gap in ten years. Either we achieve this, or they will do us in.”

During the three Five Year Plans that encompassed the 1930’s, the closing of this ‘gap’ took the form of a militant campaign toward heavy industrialization and a steep increase in the defense budget in preparation for foreign invasion. As Fitzpatrick explains, “[W]hether the Soviet Union survived that ‘last, decisive battle’ would depend on how much socialism had been built – measuring socialism in the most concrete way possible.” Indeed, the Soviet Union began to industrialize at a break-neck speed. Allegedly, its share of world production grew ten percent between 1929 and 1937, and it became one of the top producers of electrical power, machinery, and tractors. As Nicholas Riasanovsky asserts, “not only did production greatly increase, but entire new industries appeared, while huge virgin territories, including the distant and difficult far north, began to enter the economic life of the country.” Within these new territories were industrial centers like those that those John Scott worked in at Magnitogorsk. In fact, Stalin’s creation of an overnight industrial heartland behind the Ural Mountains, far from the reaches of any invading army, was, according to Scott at the advent of the Second World War, “one of Russia’s best guarantees against total military defeat.”

Yet, productive forces of the period were plagued with poor quality products, wage cuts for harder work, and the nationally devastating outcome of intensified collectivization in the countryside. The later 1930’s also saw the Great Purges and the extensive use of the Gulag. Beginning with the Show Trials against Stalin’s party rivals like Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and Nikolai Bukharin, these tools were later used at the whim of mere rumors, wiping out even Stalin’s pool of generals. While steeped in the intense paranoia of being surrounded by class enemies that had its roots in the Civil War, the distrust of the non-Party bureaucracy that resulted from the policies of the NEP, and the shrewd political intrigue of Stalin himself, the

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30 Priestland, 146-8.
32 Riasanovsky 492-3.
33 Scott, 109.
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purges also had a somewhat more practical element to them. As described by the propagandists at the time, their purpose was “to rid the country of traitors, hirelings of the Soviet Union’s enemies, who would betray it in time of war.”\(^3\) It is important here to dispel the naïve notion that Stalin himself, or his uncontrollable delusional paranoia, was responsible for every purge and exile. Rather than a denial of his culpability, this assertion suggests instead that Stalin did not need to be directly responsible. Cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek refers to the minutes of the 1930s Politburo meetings in arguing that though “[Stalin] himself had generated the destructive fervor,” it was the younger members of the committee that often demanded immediate executions without trial, in eagerness to prove their revolutionary zeal to him.\(^5\) This is merely an example of Stalin’s effectiveness in wielding the Bolshevik revolutionary-heroic tradition.

This attitude influenced the treatment of Old Party officials and peasantry alike. In the countryside, the policy of collectivization was concomitant with dekulakization, effectively an active class war against “affluent” peasants. Several million citizens either died in famines exacerbated by the failure of agricultural policies, were sentenced to the Gulag for hard labor due to perceived crimes and guilt-by-association, or fled to the cities to take on new identities and hide from persecution. Stephen Cohen recalls an old aphorism about tsarist history once again relevant to this era: “The state swelled up; the people grew lean.”\(^3\) Indeed, as Tucker states, “the kokhoz was actually perceived by many Russian peasants as a revival of serfdom.”\(^3\)

Despite the severe negative impact of Stalinist policies on millions of Soviet citizens, by 1939 Stalin had effectively harnessed the revolutionary-heroic tradition of militant Bolshevik spirit to prepare for foreign invasion, as the country had already been at war for decades. This was ominously embodied in the opening pages of Eugenia Ginzburg’s autobiographical account of her experiences in the Gulag. It opens with a phone call in 1934, from which she is summoned to report by a Party member. She later learns she must answer to

\(^3\) Ibid., 11.
\(^3\) Cohen, 340.
allegations of her conspiring with an alleged Trotskyite, but her initial response to the summons itself was “Is it war?”\textsuperscript{38} Even then, bellicose mentalité was nationally pervasive. As Mark Edele and Michael Geyer describe it, war had been a recurrent phenomenon for forty years, and “in the mentality born of this conflict… on which Stalinism was built – politics became an extension of war, not the other way around.” Further, it was “a political system ‘whose innate harshness replicated life in the military in many ways.’”\textsuperscript{39} This era of Bolshevik leadership, though it would mimic Trotsky’s earlier mentalité and rhetoric of war during the early 1920s, is immortalized in his Revolution Betrayed as the degenerative “Soviet Thermidor,” drawing decisive parallels to the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror under the tutelage of Jacobins such as Maximilien de Robespierre (to whom he would have likened Stalin himself.) Crane Brinton, in his groundbreaking Anatomy of Revolution, wholeheartedly agrees with Trotsky’s characterization. Brinton suggests that, as in every revolution with a Thermidorean Terror, in Stalinist USSR there existed what he referred to as a “war psychosis.”\textsuperscript{40} This “war psychosis,” however, was less a popularized mental instability than it was the institutionalized belligerence of Bolshevik revolutionary-heroism.

With the nation’s history already couched in the revolutionary-heroic tradition and the omnipresence of war, Stalin merely had to mobilize the masses into a personal army of laborers for the production of an industrialized nation that was both mentally and physically ready for total warfare. In addition to this process of industrialization, as Scott articulated, through the other policies of Stalinism,

The population was taught by a painful and expensive process to work efficiently, to obey orders, to mind their own business, and to take it on the chin when necessary with a minimum of complaint. These are the things that it takes to fight a modern war.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38} Evgeniia Ginzburg, Journey into the Whirlwind, trans Max Hayward et al (San Diego: Harcourt, 1995), 3.


\textsuperscript{40} Brinton, 232.

\textsuperscript{41} Scott, 266.
This sentiment is almost sufficiently verified by examining the fact that the Soviets attained victory in the Great Patriotic War despite the destruction Stalinism wrought on the Soviet Union itself. As stated above, millions of civilians were killed, exiled, or imprisoned due to the severe policies of collectivization, dekulakization, and the Great Purges. The officer ranks of the Red Army were decimated, and the pervasive alienation in the countryside resulted in over one million deserters and defectors during the war. Some sources even suggest that many in rural areas like the Ukraine openly welcomed the Nazi soldiers as liberators, though they would later come to regret being host to the violently slavophobic invaders.42

Yet, despite all of this, the Soviet Union was still victorious against the Nazis. It would seem that John Scott’s assessment of the importance of the industrial heartland in a time of siege was wholeheartedly true. Prior to invasion, the Soviet Union was already out-producing the German economy, including in the defense industry, and the centralized location of many industrial centers beyond the Urals allowed for constant production even when the Germans had advanced nearly to Moscow. Next to production, as David Priestland argues, Stalin’s centralized administrative system had many other advantages, including the ability to “control and direct food and industrial goods throughout the war, thus avoiding mass civilian starvation whilst maintaining defense production.” He even suggests that the ruthlessness of Stalin and the efficiency of his secret police “helped to stem the collapse of order.”43

That these successes were enough to override the excessive failures of Stalin’s regime and lead the Soviets to victory suggests that Stalinism’s militant wielding of the tradition of revolutionary-heroism and mentalité of war contributed directly to Soviet legitimacy, rather than against it. As David Rowley states, “the war had brought the purges and the terror to an end, and the invasion seemed to justify the crisis atmosphere of the 1930’s: The foreign threat had not been imaginary.”44 Whereas Tsarist Russia had failed in their wars with Japan (1905) and European powers during World War One (1914-
1917) only a generation earlier, Stalin and the Communist Party had succeeded, and regained lost territory in the Baltic and in parts of Ukraine. In effect, the Soviet system, and Stalin’s regime, “proved itself” as not simply legitimate, but also necessary. Whether this was merely the coincidence of a multitude of other determinations in Russian and Soviet history may never be known. Stalin, however, did not hesitate to suggest their often-doubted revolution, and more importantly his own questionable and frequently devastating policies, had finally been legitimized:

The lessons of war are that the Soviet structure is not only the best form of organization… in the years of peaceful development, but also the best form of mobilization of all forces of the people to drive off the enemy in wartime.

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45 Ibid, 188.
46 Priestland, 204.
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When describing the bombing raids over the Nazi Germany by the United States Eighth Air Force, World War II veteran pilot Budd J. Peaslee says “In these great air battles the fighting was intense and vicious, with the Germans making the Americans pay dearly to fly their bombers over the lands of the Third Reich.”

Between 1943 and 1945, the United States Eighth Air Force lost thousands of planes, and tens of thousands of men attacking the Third Reich. It is important to analyze why the Eighth Air Force suffered such high casualties at the hands of the Nazis, and if these bombing missions, with such high casualties achieved their goal of dismantling the Nazi war machine from the air. This paper explains why the Eighth lost so many men and planes, and examines the level of success (and failure) that these bombings had on the impact of the war in Europe.

The history of the Eighth Air Force began on January 2, 1942 with its official activation as a branch of the VIII Bomber Command at the Savannah Army Air Base in Georgia. On May 5, 1942, Commander Hap Arnold of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) appointed General Carl Spaatz the overall commander of the VIII Bomber Command.

Throughout the year, the Americans established bases in England and planes were flown over to begin their build up for the fight against Hitler’s Germany.

The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress became the principal bomber to carry out these campaigns. Designed for high altitude and long range bombing operations, the United States started production of the B-17 in the 1930s. They typically had a flying ceiling of 20,000 feet (in unpressurized cabins) and could fly 650 to 800 miles at a speed of 180-250 miles per hour. The crew consisted of ten men: A pilot, copilot, navigator, flight engineer, radio operator, left and right side gunners, tail gunner, ball turret gunner and bombardier. For defense, the fortress bristled with ten 50-caliber machine guns to combat the Luftwaffe (German Air Force). This was the earliest design of the B-
As the war progressed, the Boeing Company re-designed the *Flying Fortress* multiple times to take attacks deeper into the Third Reich.\(^4\)

After training and conducting small raids with British fighter crews, the Americans launched their first bomber mission on August 17, 1942, targeting a railway yard in Rouen, France. The yard suffered considerable damage and no bombers were lost.\(^5\) Throughout 1942 and early 1943, the VIII Bomber Command launched similar attacks over Nazi occupied territories. While the Eighth suffered losses, they were light compared to later in the war.

In January 1943, several leaders of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met with American leaders, including Hap Arnold, and Ira Eaker, second in command to Spaatz, in Casablanca to discuss the future of Allied bombing on the Third Reich. After much debate, both sides came to an agreement that the British would continue to conduct night bombing missions (which they had been doing since 1941), while the Americans bombed by day, believing that their new Norton Bombsight made bombing much more accurate. This decision led to dramatic changes for the Eighth Air Force, and to staggering losses of planes and men.\(^6\)

As the Eighth Air Force’s strength increased, campaigns began to venture deeper into Nazi occupied France and Germany and losses began to mount. One of the first blunders by the USAAF was their assessment of German fighter defenses. By the spring of 1943, Command thought that the Germans situated their main fighter strength along the coast of France. In fact, Germany had laid out a web of bases inland in France and Germany, allowing *Luftwaffe* fighters the ability to take off from practically anywhere in France, Germany, or other occupied countries to attack the bombers. Americans had to face fighters almost all the way up to their target.\(^7\)

The lack of fighter protection from the *Luftwaffe* also daunted the Eighth. The early American escort fighter was the *P-47*

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\(^5\) Peaslee, 86-87.


While known for sporting heavy armament and a sturdy exterior, it lacked the fuel capacity required to provide long-range escort to the bombers. The planes had to break off part of the way, leaving the bombers to the fate of the Luftwaffe.\(^8\) Many accounts describe German fighters being spotted ahead of the bomber formation. Knowing the distance of the escorts, they waited until the Thunderbolts peeled off, then went in for the attack. This blunder in American strategic planning cost the Eighth dearly.\(^9\) It would not be until the deployment of the \textit{P-51 Mustang} in 1944 that the bombers received escorts to their targets and back.\(^10\)

Along with the lack of escort, the Americans woefully underestimated German air defenses. The German 88 Millimeter Cannon, one of the best guns of the war, was an all-purpose artillery piece designed to destroy ground vehicles and aircraft. The 3,000 pound gun fired a radar guided explosive shell, called flak, between 20,000-39,000 feet.\(^11\) However, General Curtis Le May, who later became famous for his command in the Pacific theater, calculated that it had to take 372 rounds from an 88 to accurately hit a \textit{B-17}. Le May did not come up with these numbers out of thin air. He writes in his memoir that during missions, many of the bombers broke formation and scattered when attacked. These actions led to many mid-air collisions. It also caused many planes to become separated from the rest of the bomber formation, making them easy targets for German fighters. To make matters worse, when the bombers dropped their bombs while maneuvering, their accuracy suffered and many bombs missed their target.\(^12\)

Veterans of earlier raids argued that if they flew straight for more than ten seconds, “the enemy are bound to shoot you down.”\(^13\) Le May took every bit of intelligence he could gather to see if the assumption was accurate. While he did not explain his mathematical

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\(^9\) Hansen, 170-171.

\(^10\) Arnold, 376.


\(^12\) Curtis Le May and MacKinlay Kantor, \textit{Mission With Le May: My Story} (New York: Double Day, 1965), 234, 237.

\(^13\) Ibid., 230.
formula, he did explain what factors he counted. He included accuracy of a German anti-aircraft crew against a plane flying at 25,000 feet, German flak gun accuracy, and basing his calculations off the French 75 mm gun used during World War I, making slight modifications for the Flaker 88.\footnote{Ibid, 236.}

He tested his theory on November 23, 1942, when his 305th bomb group, a squadron within the Eighth, took off for a mission over St. Nazire, France. His squadron was the only group that flew straight and did not break formation. After the mission, Allied reconnaissance photos showed that Le May’s group “dropped more than twice the number of bombs in that target that day, more than any other group put down.”\footnote{Ibid, 245.} Le May summed up his theory in one sentence, “Now I know how we were going to bomb.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The bombers also had to fly straight in order for the Norton Bombsight, a sight mounted in the nose of the B-17 to aim their bombs, to attempt to accurately drop their payload onto the target. But Le May was using an old artillery manual, which made it difficult for an accurate assessment for the German 88’s accuracy.\footnote{Astor, 95.} The German gunners created a tactic called the box barrage, when a group of 88’s zeroed in on a section in the sky (hence “box”) and bracketed it with flak when the bombers flew through it. Untold numbers of bombers fell to this German tactic.\footnote{Peaslee, 98.}

The Germans also never remained static when it came to devising ways to destroy American bombers. Besides the strategies of the anti-aircraft guns, the Luftwaffe drew up tactics specifically for the heavy bombers. The principle fighter for the Luftwaffe was the Messerschmitt Me 109. Designed in 1935, the 109 had a maximum speed of 354 miles per hour and a service ceiling of 36,000 feet. While not very maneuverable and possessing a low rate of climb, the 109 made up for it with its speed, being one of the fastest planes in sky until the P-51. It also carried an armament of two machine guns and a 20 mm cannon in its nose. In the hands of a skilled pilot, the
Messerschmitt dealt heavy damage to the Eighth.\textsuperscript{19}

Adolf Galland, the most famous German ace in the war with over 300 air kills, drew up a tactical regulations manual in 1942, which prescribed methods on how to attack B-17s. One method involved German planes passing ahead of the bombers until they were three miles ahead of bomber formation, then swinging around and attacking the bombers head on. Because early B-17s lacked fire protection in its nose, the Germans aimed for the cockpit. After firing from 875 yards, they passed above them. Another Galland tactic involved the attacking of one Flying Fortress by multiple fighters. Targeting the rear, they tried to destroy the tail flaps, which made the plane lose control. This resulted in not only in lost bombers, but scores of planes returning to their airfields in England missing their noses and chunks of their tails.\textsuperscript{20} Peaslee attests to this strategy, saying, “Head on attacks not only rattled the bomber crews, but also had a detrimental effect on the accuracy of bombing when encountered on the bomb run.”\textsuperscript{21} General Arnold also mentions Galland’s tactics:

\begin{quote}
In the fall of 1942, the B-17’s were already returning to bases with noses and tails shot off-in one famous case with the plane literally shot in half, the fuselage held together only by a bit of metal at the bottom...\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

It was not until gun turrets were mounted in the nose in later models that this tactic could be deterred.

Flying the missions by day also made the war for the Eighth extremely difficult. As stated earlier, the Casablanca conference came to the agreement of the British flying by night and the Americans by day. Conducting their campaigns by day, the bombers became easy targets to the Luftwaffe. When they conducted their bomb runs to the targets, the 88 crews had much less difficulty in targeting the bombers to shoot them down than at night.

These strategies and flaws in the USAAF led to startling casualties during combat missions. In an attempt to destroy the fighting

\textsuperscript{21} Peaslee, 97.
\textsuperscript{22} Arnold, 486.
capacity of the *Luftwaffe*, on June 10, 1943, orders dispatched to the Eighth and the RAF stated to attack the air bases and the industrial plants of Germany.\(^{23}\) On September 6, 388 *B-17s* took off to bomb the industrial city of Stuggart. However, due to engine trouble, which forced many bombers to turn back, and fighter attacks, only 150 made it to their target. Forty-five planes were lost and 450 men were killed or captured.\(^{24}\) On October 8, the attack on the city of Bremen, rich with oil and a dockyard, the Eighth suffered thirty bombers and 300 men lost. A day later, an attack on Gdyina-Danzig harbors in Poland cost twenty-eight bombers and 280 men.\(^{25}\)

The most infamous example of high bomber losses were the campaigns to bomb the ball-bearing factories in Schweinfurt and the *Messerschmitt* factory in Regensburg, Germany. On August 17, 1943, two hundred and sixty-one bombers took off from England in a planned joint attack on both targets. Due to poor weather, the first bomb group took off on schedule, while the second did not take off until four hours later. The forces never met up as planned. The Germans mauled the first group of Americans before they got to their targets. Due to the delay, the Germans had time to land their planes, rearm, refuel, and launch counter attack against the second wave of bombers. By the end of the mission, the Eighth lost seventy-one bombers and 710 men. An additional 12 men died in bombers that returned safety to England.\(^{26}\)

The Eighth Air Force suffered greatly during its service in World War II. By war’s end, an estimated 4,200+ aircraft (*B-17s*, *B-24s*, and various fighter escorts) had been destroyed, and over 42,000 men killed or captured.\(^{27}\) With such a large sacrifice, it is important to ask the question: Did they successfully obtain their objective, and cripple the Nazi war machine by constant air attacks? The answer is a mixture of both yes and no. While the Eighth did not successfully fulfill some objectives, it achieved overwhelming success with

\(^{23}\) Astor, 132.
\(^{24}\) Arnold, 450.
\(^{25}\) Peaslee, 185.
others. Michael Sherry suggests that the Eighth Air Force, overall, was not successful at their mission of complete destruction of the Nazis. He argues that “the Nazis never suffered seriously from shortages of antifriction with ball bearings; fighter output dipped slightly for a while, then rose again.” Sherry is stating that while the production of war fighters decreased briefly from the bombings, factories soon recovered and began producing them at a faster rate. General Arnold adds to Sherry’s claim, describing the entrance of allied troops into Germany:

As our ground troops entered Germany and found more airplanes parked around than Goering (commander of the Luftwaffe) ever had in 1943, and as captured production figures showed the monthly output of single-engine fighters to have been far higher after our campaign than before, there was another tendency to doubt. The Air Force, said certain ground officers and correspondents, had deceived itself and the public! This bomber ballyhoo was all nonsense! The Luftwaffe had not been destroyed at all!

Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief architect, and later his Chief of War Production discusses in his memoirs the attacks of the Eight Air Force and his German fighter production, stating,

In these months (1944) we were producing more and more fighter planes. Altogether, during this late phase of the war twelve thousand seven hundred and twenty fighters were delivered to the troops which had started the war in 1939 with only seven hundred and seventy one fighter planes.

Another important statistic to analyze is the numbers of planes Germans produced during the crucial air raids in 1943-44, and the effect of Allied bombing on their production. According to statistics compiled by the Quarter-Master of the Luftwaffe after the war, the factories produced 24,807 German aircraft of all types during 1943. By 1944, production jumped to 40,593. A year later, production had dropped to 7,540. While these numbers may not be one hundred

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29 Arnold, 484.
percent accurate, it does show that fighter production did not decrease, but actually increased when the USAAF made the destruction the Nazi aircraft industry the upmost priority.\textsuperscript{31}

Sherry also claimed that the Air Force commanders overestimated the damage that the bombers inflicted on a target. In actuality, the bombings had not been as accurate as the American Commanders thought.\textsuperscript{32} Arnold again provides the best source of Sherry’s arguments, when he stated, “the fact we had to return to the same targets and hit them again and again within a few months had caused our bombing claims to be challenged.”\textsuperscript{33} Sherry also points out that the Allied Commanders “underestimated Germany’s resilience.”\textsuperscript{34} Arnold again provides evidence, stating, “It was not understood that the more valuable the factories were, the faster they were rebuilt, either in the same place or somewhere else.”\textsuperscript{35}

The best example is Schweinfurt. Less than two months after the first bombing, the plant had been repaired and had resumed full production of ball bearings. On October 14, 1943, two hundred and ninety-one bombers took off to attack the factory again. The planes flew into the teeth of the \textit{Luftwaffe}. By the end of the mission, seventy-one \textit{Flying Fortresses} had been shot down or had to be scrapped upon their return to England with hundreds of allied airman lost. Another 121 aircraft had been damaged. While the bombers inflicted more damage on Schweinfurt, the Germans rebuilt it, forcing more raids to be launched before the end of the war.\textsuperscript{36}

Yet, this does not seem like the whole picture. It is obvious that the Allied armies eventually defeated Germany, and it is preposterous to assume that the Eighth Air Force did nothing more than be cannon fodder for German gunners and planes. There is more to analyzing the Eighth’s contribution to Allied victory than the number of times they dropped bombs on a target. The first item to look at is the strength of the \textit{Luftwaffe}. General Arnold writes:

\begin{flushright}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Galland, 240.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Sherry, 158.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Arnold, 484.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Sherry, 158.
\item \textsuperscript{35} Arnold, 484.
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In January 1943, 42 percent of the German Fighter strength was concentrated in Western Europe, 33 percent in Russia, and 25 percent in the Mediterranean area. In October of that year, the line up was 19 percent on the Russian Front, 12 percent in the Mediterranean, and in Western Europe 60 percent.\(^\text{37}\)

Germans statistics agree with Arnold’s statement. By the time of the invasion of Normandy in June of 1944, the *Luftwaffe* had 1,179 planes stationed for the defense of the German homeland.\(^\text{38}\) There were drastically fewer planes on the Eastern Front, which by that time had only 441 planes (294 operational), and in the Mediterranean, with 102 (seventy-one operational).\(^\text{39}\) These figures demonstrate that Germany regarded the Allied bombers as a high threat, forcing it to station more planes to defend their homeland than on the other fronts.

In view of these numbers, it is startling to see such a quick shift in German fighter power to Western Europe. This means that while the Eighth Air Force was flying into the teeth of the Germans, other fronts (especially in Russia) not only had a break from the *Luftwaffe*, but also allowed their planes to dominate the skies in their operations. The Eighth, in a macabre way, siphoned off German fighter strength that benefited other theaters of war.

When Germany shifted its fighters to protect their homeland, a large shift in personnel followed. While the Eighth lost scores of planes to the Germans, the *Luftwaffe* eventually began to suffer as well. As the war continued, German planes began falling out of the sky at a rapid pace. Credit, in part goes to the previously mentioned introduction of the *P-51 Mustang* in 1944, which not only provided long-range fighter escort, but out-ran and out-maneuvered the German *109*. The *Mustang* pilots developed the tactic of flying ahead of the formations to engage the enemy fighters and clear the way for the bombers.\(^\text{40}\) Another reason resulted from giving bombing crews a number of missions for a bomber crew to complete. Once the number was completed, the crew went home. Conversely, the Germans sent their crews up as many times as they could to fight the Americans and British. Eventually, the skilled fighters’ luck ran out, and they were

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\(^{37}\) Arnold, 322.

\(^{38}\) According to the Statistics, only 656 were immediately available for operations, which will be explained further along in this paper.

\(^{39}\) Galland, 241.

\(^{40}\) Hansen, 170-171.
shot down. Those who flew after them never had the same skill as their predecessors, leading to a less efficient fighter force. Additionally, the Americans, even with their high losses, replaced their crews quickly, while the Germans did so sporadically.

The statistics of German aircraft losses from 1939-1944 show the dramatic climb in fighter losses. According to the Quarter-Master, from September 1st, 1939- June 22, 1941, the Luftwaffe suffered 18,533 casualties (killed, wounded, or missing.) However, from June 22, 1941 – March 31, 1943, the number climbs dramatically to 48,554 casualties. Then from January 1, 1944- December 31, 1944, the number drops to 29,830. While it can be argued that not all of these losses are attributed to the Eighth Air Force, it nonetheless proves that as the war progressed, fighter losses spiked. By 1944, the Luftwaffe had lost most of its skilled pilots, resulting in a plunge in fighter strength, and a drop in American combat casualties.

This did not mean, however, that the Third Reich did not put up stiff defense after 1943. A good example is the first attack on Berlin by the Eighth on March 4, 1944. During their first attack the formations flew into poor weather, scattering the group to bomb targets of opportunity. Only a single bomber group made it to Berlin and dropped its payload. Two days later, over 600 B-17s returned to Berlin. However, even with the high loss of pilots, the Germans bitterly defended their capital. The Eighth lost seventy bombers and 700 men.

The Third Reich’s factories were well protected, and many bombers fell to their defenses. But there were more than just ball bearings, and fighter plants that the USAAF desired to attack. The next target is one of the most important to any modern military, oil. The Allies knew that if they destroyed the oil plants that belonged to the Reich, they could dramatically cripple the Nazi war machine. On May 12, 1944, a large strike force of 935 bombers, escorted by fighters from the Ninth Air Force and RAF left Britain on one of the first missions against the Nazi oil refineries. The Luftwaffe sent up an estimated force

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41 Sherry, 158.
42 Arnold, 487.
44 Peaslee, 274.
of 150 to 200 planes against the bombers. The Germans mauled the first wave of incoming bombers in a ferocious aerial battle. However, the escorts of the second wave arrived and cleared the path for the remaining B-17s. The anti-aircraft fire was moderate but not serious. More than 800 bombers reached their targets, dropping 1,718 tons of bombs on the synthetic oil plants at Zwickau, Merseburg-Leuna, Brüx, Lützkendorf, Böhlen, and other cities. Allied losses amounted to forty-six aircraft lost and 460 men killed or captured, while the Germans lost over sixty planes.45

The bombing of these factories achieved an overwhelming success. Several German fighters had been shot down, and many of the factories had been damaged, some heavily. The oil plants of Brüx, Rohlen, and Zeitz were temporarily knocked out. At Merseburg-Leuna, the bombing happened to destroy a building that was conducting experiments with heavy water, a component in the development of atomic weapons.46

The bombing of the oil fields on May 12 devastated the Germans so much, Speer wrote in his memoirs:

I shall never forget the date May 12...On that day the technological war was decided. Until then we had managed to produce approximately as many weapons as the armed forces needed, in spite of considerable losses. But with the attack of nine-hundred and thirty-five daylight bombers of the American Eighth Air Force upon several fuel plants in central and eastern Germany, a new era of the war had begun. It meant the end of the German war production.47

A little over two weeks later, on May 28 and 29, the Eighth once again set out to attack German oil fields. The next raids damaged the factories in Magdeburg, Zeitz, and Leuana. In the month of May alone the German production of fuel sank to 120,000 tons a month, 30,000 tons below the Luftwaffe minimum monthly requirements. A little over a week later, the loss of fuel had a critical affect on D-Day. Germany did not have the fuel required to send up enough fighters to attack the bombers, and when the Allies invaded at Normandy, many

46 Fagg, 176
47 Speer, 346.
German planes were left stranded on the ground. Additionally, the Germans lacked the pilots and fuel to transport vital supplies to the beachheads at Normandy when the invasion occurred.\(^{48}\)

Even though the Germans quickly repaired their factories, which forced the Eighth to conduct multiple missions on the same target, constant repairs also strangled the German war effort. Each time the Eighth damaged a factory, repair crews needed to fix and/or relocate them. This cost the Germans precious time and materiel, while the Americans continued their assaults. Relocation took even more time and resources. Factories had to be disassembled, transported, and rebuilt at a new location. As a result of constant relocation and damage, many facilities never returned to full operational production, forcing the German War Department to stretch their reserves of whatever material they had.\(^{49}\)

Along with material, the bombings forced millions of able-bodied individuals from fighting on the front line. Due to the intensity of the bombings, the Germans set up a defense force of two million soldiers and civilians in order to protect their homeland. These soldiers and civilians, while dealing heavy losses to the Eighth and other bomber commands, had to stay within Germany at all times and could not be released to fight against the Allied armies.\(^{50}\) Since these men had to stay behind, it meant fewer troops to fight on the battlefield. The Eighth contributed to the non-deployment of millions of soldiers, giving aid to all fronts.

By 1945 the, Allies controlled the skies. However, the Germans still had one last tactical advantage to introduce, the *Messerschmitt ME 262*, the world’s first jet fighter. Capable of speeds of 500 miles per hour, it outran any Allied plane in the sky. It also contained deadly 30 mm cannons, which shredded *B-17s* and any other planes it encountered. While 1,294 of these planes were built, only around a quarter saw combat. Even though the Germans did shoot down bombers and fighters, the 262 entered too late into the war to turn the tide. The Eighth now deployed up to 1,200 planes at a time to a target with even higher numbers of fighter escorts. Coupled with the destruction of the oil depots, the 262 flew limited engagements against

\(^{48}\) Bekker, 354.

\(^{49}\) Sherry, 484.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.
the Eighth, primarily from the lack of fuel. Similar to 1943, the *Luftwaffe* also proved incapable of replacing the 262 pilots lost in combat.\textsuperscript{51}

The last mission flown by the Eighth came on April 25, 1945. Just two weeks away from the Nazi’s surrender, *B-17s* took off to bomb one of the last available targets of the war, a munitions plant in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Since the end of the war was in sight and the Allied leaders did not wish to create complications between them and Soviets after the war, they dispatched *P-51s* the night before to drop pamphlets to warn the Czech workers of the attack the next day and to not go to work, something that never happened in 1943. The strike force took off the next day. While approaching the target, *ME 262s* rose up to engage the bombers and Flak 88s opened up around Pilsen. While the fighting was sporadic and vicious, the bombers delivered their payloads and turned for home. The bombers successfully flattened Pilsen. Thanks to the early warning, only seven Czech workers were killed. The Eighth lost six planes and sixty men, but this time many crashed in Allied territory, sparing many of those who bailed out from becoming prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{52}

The last mission over Pilsen possessed two important points. The first being the Eighth’s ability to conduct a mission that deep into the Reich without high losses, which in 1943 seemed like a dream. Thanks in part to the earlier missions in 1943, with the killing of top German pilots and the destruction of the oil fields, the once mighty *Luftwaffe* had been reduced to a meager fighting force. The other point is that while being depleted of fuel and completely outnumbered, the *Luftwaffe* continued to fight the bombers to protect their Reich, showing that, for some Germans, their will never broke.

The air war between the Eighth Air Force and the *Luftwaffe* can be classified as a war of attrition. Both sides slowly slaughtered one another over the skies of Europe with the goal of victory. The Americans, initially lacking fighter escort and underestimating Germany’s defenses, suffered tremendously, losing thousands of men.

\textsuperscript{51} Bekker, 356-360.
in 1942-43. However, with the advent of improved fighter escort and the destruction of Germany’s oil supply, the casualties among bomber crews slowly began to decrease.

By 1945, the Eighth and other Allied air forces possessed air supremacy over Europe. In that year, eighty-one percent of the combatants flew their required number of missions. Of the crews who flew missions during 1942-43, just thirty-five percent of them survived, while in 1944, the number had increased to sixty-six percent. The *Memphis Belle* became the first bomber crew to successfully complete its twenty-fifth mission on May 19, 1943. The media used the *Memphis Belle* as a propaganda piece, claiming the plane’s return as a victory over the Germans. It also inspired a documentary and a fictional film. However, the return of the bomber also showed the fragileness of the Eighth Air Force. From its activation, it took over a year for one plane to complete its number of required missions and for its crew to go home. Even after the *Memphis Belle*, most planes in 1943 did not successfully complete all their tours.\(^\text{53}\)

With the evidence shown, it is clear that the Eighth Air Force failed in completely destroying the German war machine in a decisive swoop. Planes missed their targets, Germans rebuilt their factories quickly, and Nazi military production did not falter. The commanders of the Eighth did not obtain their goal of a quick destruction of the Third Reich, and the bomber crews paid for their flaws.

While the Allies failed in completely destroying Germany’s weapons of war, the bombers destroyed the Nazis’ oil refineries, limiting fuel to the *Luftwaffe*. It split the Germans Fighter Command, focusing almost all its attention to the defense of Germany, giving aid to the other fronts. It also slowly wiped out many of the best fighters in the German Air Force, leaving less skilled pilots to take on the Allies. While German planes still came out of the plants, very few Germans possessed the skills to fly them efficiently. The Eighth also stretched thin the supplies the Germans had. Due to repeated attacks, the Germans had to repeatedly rebuild, which cost time and materiel. And to protect their homeland, a large defense force had to be created. Germans in the high command, including Albert Speer, credit the actions of the Eighth Air Force for the eventual defeat of the Third

\(^{53}\) Astor, 130.
The Germans surrendered on May 8, 1945, ending the war in Europe. Thankfully, for the men of the Eighth, the Japanese surrender three months later spared them from missions over Japan. The Eighth proved a valuable fighting force in the effort to defeat the Third Reich. While the men who flew the bombers did not quickly destroy the German war production and suffered heavily from the blunders of their commanders, they slowly dismantled the Nazis’ ability to continue waging war against the Allies. Even with such high casualties, the men continued to fly, knowing the war needed to be won. The men of the Eighth showed bravery in some of the most brutal fighting in World War II. It is because of their sacrifices that the Eighth Air Force shall be remembered for years to come.
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