Book Review:
Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report On The Banality Of Evil By Hannah Arendt

By Stefanie Brearley

What for Eichmann was a job, with its daily routine, its ups and downs, was for the Jews quite literally the end of the world (153).

The purpose of Hannah Arendt’s book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, is to focus on the trial of Adolph Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 and, specifically, the crimes he is charged with, his deeds under Hitler’s regime, and the extent to which justice is served by the trial. Arendt’s account of the proceedings appears to be more complex than a simple focus on the trial would seem to imply. What Arendt reveals in her book is both a complicated defendant whose character and motives must be studied in an attempt to understand human behavior, especially obedience and deference to authority, and also the interesting nature of the trial that were the grounds for bringing Eichmann to justice.

Arendt’s discussion of the trial of Adolph Eichmann is rather difficult to grasp because she is dealing with a very complex subject matter. Not only is Arendt attempting to provide the reader with a background on the defendant standing trial, she is also attempting to reveal the intricacies associated with bringing Eichmann to trial, holding the trial in Jerusalem, and trying him on the charges of which is he accused. Arendt begins her story of the trial proceedings discussing the grounds on which Eichmann was charged and the potential controversies surrounding the issue of justice. On trial were Eichmann’s deeds when he served as a member of the Nazi bureaucracy and was responsible for the forced emigration of Jews and transporting countless Jews to their deaths in concentration camps.

Very early in her book, Arendt proposes the possibility that the prosecution is focusing its case not just on Eichmann’s actual deeds, but on the suffering of millions of Jews during the 1930s and 1940s. The prosecution seemed to be following the tone of Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who wanted the Eichmann trial to be more than just a trial concerning one individual’s deeds; he wanted Eichmann to serve as an historic reminder of the anti-Semitism that has permeated history. Indeed, the rhetoric of the prosecutors made it seem that perhaps Arendt is correct, and the prosecutors, like Ben-Gurion, “did not care what verdict is delivered against Eichmann” as long as stories of suffering were told and victims had their day in court (20). In Arendt’s opinion, however, in order for the trial to be legitimate and justice to be served, the case against Eichmann had to be focused on his deeds. On a broader scale, there were objections surrounding the Eichmann trial that went beyond the goal of the trial which was to “weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out punishment” (253). Also at issue, was trying Eichmann under a retroactive law, recognizing or ignoring the act of kidnapping that took place to bring Eichmann to Jerusalem, and trying Eichmann under the idea of crimes committed against Jewish people versus crimes committed against humanity.

While Arendt addresses these issues associated with the objections and controversies surrounding the Eichmann trial, the majority of her book focuses on Adolph Eichmann himself and his duties as a Nazi bureaucrat. Arendt offers a complete portrait of Eichmann’s personal life and professional duties as a member of the Nazi bureaucracy to show that he was a rational man who did not hate Jews and did not necessarily have strong loyalty to the Nazi party itself. Arendt also discusses Eichmann’s educational and occupational background to indicate that Eichmann was a rather thoughtless bureaucrat who would sooner follow orders than deviate from authority. Arendt’s succinct discussion of Eichmann’s personality, educational, occupational background, and duties as a bureaucrat, presents him as a man who does not think on his own, nor recognize the consequences of his actions. As such, this portrait of Eichmann serves as an interesting, not to mention disturbing, study on human behavior and the apparent inherent need to be obedient and defer to authority.

Arendt offers several different insights into Eichmann’s character to reveal his motivations and to support Eichmann’s own contention that he was not anti-Semitic. For example, observations by psychologists found him to be a normal man, free of “insane hatred of Jews, of fanatical anti-Semitism or indoctrination of any kind. He personally never had anything whatever against Jews; he had plenty of ‘private reasons’ for not being a Jew hater” (26). In another example, Arendt explains that one of Eichmann’s first endeavors within the Nazi bureaucracy required him to read a classic book on Zionism, “which converted Eichmann promptly and forever to Zionism” (40). Thus, when Eichmann was sent to Vienna in 1938 to organize the forced emigration of Jews out of Austria, any support he held for the program could arguably be based on his support of Zionism and the relocation of Jews to a land of their own, rather than a personal hatred of Jews. He favored the solution to the Jewish question to be the provision of firm soil under their feet. And in still another example, Arendt notes that when Eichmann was informed in August, 1941 that the “Final Solution” was a plan for the extermination of Jews, he is reported to have said that he had never thought of such a solution, and that its implementation would take the joy, initiative, and interest out of his work (31). Clearly, such a drastic solution to the Jewish question seemed disturbing to Eichmann. This seems to indicate that he did not hate Jews and was not motivated through his work to destroy them because of hatred.

Arendt offers additional examples about Eichmann’s experiences within the Nazi bureaucracy to reveal he did not hate Jews. For instance, Eichmann was sent to inspect the concentration camps that were to serve as killing centers. He observed the operations of a mobile killing unit that dumped corpses into open-air ditches. Eichmann found these activities and sights to be upsetting, and told his superiors he was not “tough enough” to handle seeing such atrocities, even through Arendt writes that in actuality, “Eichmann did not see much” (89).

In order to support a complex point, Arendt seems to feel that it is important to illustrate that it was not hatred of Jews that kept Eichmann working at his job. If Eichmann had been driven by Anti-Semitism, the role he played in sending so many Jews to their deaths over so many years, would make more sense. What is less understandable, and, thus even more disturbing, is that despite his apparent lack of anti-Semitism, and regardless of his alleged disturbance at the thought of the Final Solution, he still continued to perform the tasks that resulted in the death of millions of Jews.

Another insight Arendt reveals that adds to the puzzle of Eichmann’s actions and motivations, is that he did not originally have strong party loyalty toward the National Socialist Party, even though he eventually joined the ranks of the S.S. and served a 13-plus career under Hitler’s regime. Indeed, Eichmann entered the S.S. in 1932 at the suggestion of a friend. His reasons for joining the organization were certainly not based on loyalty to or even much knowledge about, the Nazi party. Eichmann did not know the party program nor had he read Mein Kampf. Rather, he saw joining the party as a chance to leave a job he detested, as a traveling vacuum salesman, and embark on a career as a bureaucrat.

After serving in the S.S. in Germany, in 1934, Eichmann applied to work for the S.D., the Intelligence Service operated by Himmler. Arendt tells us that he applied for the S.D. because he was bored with the day-to-day routines of the S.S. Eichmann, “seems to have known nothing. . . of the nature of the S.D. when he entered it because the operations of the S.D. had always been top secret” (36). Thus, getting involved with the S.D. for its intelligence and spying functions was not part of Eichmann’s intentions; he was just looking for something else to do. The fact that Eichmann had no party loyalty that led him to join (and perhaps) continue service with the Nazi party, is another complex issue in understanding why he continued at a job that led to the death of so many Jews.

In addition to portraying Eichmann as neither anti-Semitic nor as a Nazi party loyalist, Arendt reveals that Eichmann considered himself nothing more than a law-abiding citizen who followed the orders assigned to him by his superiors in the hierarchy of the Nazi bureaucracy. Arendt clearly wants to stress that Eichmann’s motivations as a bureaucrat were to complete his tasks. In doing so, he slowly advanced his career within the bureaucracy and realized some professional success. In working on “the Jewish question,” Eichmann discovered that “there were two things he could do well, better than others: he could organize and he could negotiate” (45). Having strengths in these two areas helped him to be efficient when it came to the task of relocating Jews. For instance, his task to relocate Jews from Vienna in 1938 resulted in the forced emigration of 45,000 Jews over an eight-month period. Under Eichmann’s supervision, “in less than eighteen months, Austria was cleansed of close to a hundred and fifty thousand people, roughly sixty percent of the Jewish population” (44). Eichmann was not responsible for the plan to force Jews out of their countries of residence; however, he was responsible for carrying out the orders of forced emigration. Eichmann was effective and efficient at his tasks because they were tasks he could do well, and tasks that he was ordered to do.

The forced emigration of Jews, as mentioned above, were what Eichmann considered his duties within the bureaucracy. Furthermore, in carrying out his duties, he was not just following the orders handed down to him by his superiors, he was obeying the law, because the orders of the Fuhrer were equivalent to law.

Although the above descriptions of Eichmann’s actions and motivations are a significant part of Arendt’s book, her project also brings up questions about the actual case against Eichmann. She notes that there is some question about the fact that Eichmann was brought to trial in Jerusalem, that he was charged with committing crimes against the Jewish people, and that he was hanged as a result of his deeds. The judgment in the Eichmann case was that he had committed crimes against Jews with the intent to destroy people, based on four counts. Arendt questions, though, why he was charged with crimes against Jewish people, and not also crimes against humanity. She questions whether justice would have been better served had Eichmann been charged with and found guilty of crimes against humanity by an international tribunal. Additionally, the basis on which Eichmann was kidnapped and brought to the land of the victims to be tried offers another controversy to the case because such actions were unprecedented. Regardless of these controversies surrounding the case, Arendt makes clear that her task, as stated earlier, is to cover the trial of Adolph Eichmann in order to determine if justice was fulfilled. Even though the court “was confronted with a crime it could not find in the lawbooks and with a criminal whose like was unknown in any court, at least prior to the Nuremberg Trials,” her story of Eichmann and the trial supports that justice was indeed served to a defendant who was found guilty on the basis for which he was tried (298).

While Arendt said her task in this book was to report on the Eichmann trial, the end result of the book is a very important case study on human behavior, specifically obedience and deference to authority, and the impact such behavior can have on organizations in general. As was presented previously in this review, Eichmann did not seem to be a man whose motivations to carry out the orders of his superiors were due to a severe hatred of Jews or a complete adherence to the National Socialist party ideology. Instead, Eichmann’s motivations appear to be selfishness: performing the tasks assigned to him as a member of the Nazi bureaucracy were the only things in his life it appeared he could do well, and as such, he was eager to proceed with those tasks. Saying that he was selfish and enjoyed his work, however, is not enough to explain Eichmann’s actions and why he was charged as one of many persons responsible for the murder of millions of Jews. Eichmann was one of many bureaucrats responsible for the death of Jews because he carried out orders from his superiors that he clearly knew would lead to their deaths. It seems that whether or not he knew there would be a “Final Solution” or how many dead bodies he actually saw is irrelevant because he did know that the orders he gave for transportation of Jews to killing facilities would lead them to death.

If Eichmann knew following orders would be so destructive to so many people, then why did he obey? This question can attempt to be answered by looking at human motivations and ideas relating to organization theory. Regarding human motivations, Stanley Milgram found that when put in a situation of subordination where there is a clear authority figure giving orders, even if those orders might be to inflict harm or pain on another person, the subordinate person tends to follow the direction and orders of the authority figure. The reasons Milgram gives for such deference to authority are several: people follow the narrow task assigned to them and do not consider its overall consequences, and people give up their sense of responsibility for their own actions to the person giving orders. Following the orders of the narrow tasks and eliminating a sense of personal responsibility, could arguably apply to Eichmann’s situation in carrying out the orders of his superiors that lead to the death of millions of Jews. Understanding this concept of human behavior in no way justifies Eichmann’s actions, but it does serve as a means to explain why a person might comply with orders that result in such horrific acts.

While human behavior in deference to authority is perhaps one way to analyze Eichmann’s actions, another means is through the structure of bureaucracy and certain tenets upon which classic organization theory is based, such as specialization of tasks and division of labor. Analyzing Eichmann’s actions in such a manner actually points to some of the negative effects bureaucracy, division of labor, specialization of tasks and efficiency can have, as they did in the case of the systematic, administrative massacre of millions of people.

According to Max Weber, the ideal-type bureaucracy operates within a system of rational authority because such a system is based on rules and law, such as those found in a constitution. The bureaucracy in which Eichmann operated was clearly a system of rational authority; it was the bureaucracy of the German government, of which the Nazi party was in power. This bureaucracy contained elements of what Weber’s “ideal-type bureaucracy,” by which he meant an organization that is ordered by rules, has a strict system of hierarchy and authority, is managed through written documents, and selects qualified workers. Weber believed that an organization ordered in this way would be tremendously efficient. However, he also cautioned that the very same principles of organization that would produce such efficiency, could also produce some very negative behaviors. As already noted, Milgram found in his studies of human behavior that division of labor allows people to ignore responsibility for their own actions. The system of bureaucracy under the Nazi regime was based on a system of specialized tasks and divided labor. Arendt’s description of Eichmann’s position in the bureaucracy points to this division of labor: “Eichmann’s position was that of the most important conveyor belt in the whole operation, because it was always up to him and his men how many Jews could or should be transported from a given area, and it was through his office that the ultimate destination of the shipment was cleared” (153). While division of labor meant that Eichmann was responsible for the shipping of Jews, and not the actual killing of them, he must still be held accountable for his actions because they did, in the end, contribute to the deaths of a multitude of people. As Arendt puts it: “the extent to which any one of the many criminals was close to or remote from the actual killer of the victim means nothing, as far as the measure of his responsibility is concerned. The degree of responsibility increases as we draw further away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands” (247).

This discussion of division of labor, combined with ideas of bureaucracy and specialization of tasks, shows the dangers associated with an efficient bureaucracy. It also shows how, in the case of administrative actions that resulted in the massacre of millions, individual behavior that makes up only one small piece of the organization actually holds a lot greater responsibility for the organization’s overall actions than might usually be thought.

I am of the opinion that the ideas presented in Arendt’s book are very difficult to grasp because she portrays such a complex character who does not hate, but has no conscience, and simply performs his job based on the orders he is given. Trying to understand Eichmann through studying his behavior and recognizing that he is like so many people who defer to authority and follow orders of superiors in no way excuses his behavior, nor does it serve as a way to justify what he did. Rather, it serves as a call to all persons to recognize how dangerous it can actually be to follow orders without thinking, and thus charges them to be aware of their own actions and, most importantly, the responsibility they must take for their actions. Arendt’s book is a mandatory read for students of organization theory because it points to some of the negative aspects associated with bureaucracy and tenets of organization theory. It is also a mandatory read for all persons to learn about the destruction we can inflict on one another in order to see that it never happens again.

References

Arendt, Hannah. (1964, 1994). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin.