OPERATION HAWAII: PRELUDE TO PEARL HARBOR
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5 December 1991

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INTRODUCTION

Although fifty years since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, this paper goes back to 1904-05 and the Japanese-Russian War, when Japanese attack and battle techniques were being perfected and to 1921, the year the Japanese government was spending 46 percent of its national budget on military activities. The paper also covers the years between 1931 (when hostilities commenced between China and Japan) and 1941. In 1931 Herbert G. Yardley, an ex-poker-playing cypher expert, published The American Black Chamber; Yardley’s book dealt with the American espionage activities during and after World War I, and because of this book, Yardley has been credited for causing World War II more than any other individual.

The 7th of December 1941 has a memorable ring to it and four years from now we will see another series of remembrances. As one has written about 1941-1945:

“Unless an American forested out the truth, he’s likely to accept that the Pacific War went somewhat like this: Pearl Harbor gets attacked; Japanese Navy suffers a defeat at Midway; Marines take Guadalcanal; Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa; Two atomic bombs get dropped; Japan surrenders.”

The author continued: As “Australians with whom I met [United States Japanese American soldiers] served might say, ‘Not bloody likely!”’* [stress in original]. A similar truncated statement might be made by some for the events leading up to December 7, 1941: it is hoped that this paper will point out some of the complexities and personalities that led to “a date which will live in infamy.”

World War II activities of 1941-1945 are for another occasion and in this item I would like to cover the actions that led to the attack of the Japanese Navy at 7:55 a.m.

1 For “Anthropology Looks At...” at CSU, Chico, on 5 December 1991.
When Japanese planes bombed Pearl Harbor, destroying American planes and sinking or damaging 19 vessels (1,077 men killed on the USS Arizona alone), Americans were shocked. Some 2,335 American servicemen as well as 68 civilians died that day and the United States of America finally became involved in World War II; as one author stated, "boys became men and men became heroes in an hour." As a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor the United States eventually awarded fourteen Medals of Honor as well as fifty-three Navy Crosses, four Silver Stars, and four Navy and Marine Corps medals to individuals who were in the Territory of Hawaii that day.

World War II, the greatest cultural phenomenon to occur on this planet in our lifetimes (perhaps only being eclipsed by the breakdown of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991) resulted in the deaths of some 20 million in Asia and 50 million in Europe. When the United States declared war on Japan on the 8th of December 1941, the Pacific War was already ten years old because Japanese aggression began on the Asian mainland in 1931. Ienaga pointed out this fact in his 1968 Japanese publication (for a Japanese audience) entitled The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II:

"The Pacific War began with the invasion of China in 1931. Widely condemned by the League of Nations and many other countries as a violation of the Kellogg-Brandt Non Aggression Pact and the Nine Power Treaty on China, the attack made Japan more isolated and desperate and ultimately led to war with America and England. In Japan, the few opponents of an imperialistic war against China never had enough popular support to prevent the conflict and were easily silenced."

In the 1980s, a similar statement would be made in another publication:

"The first major blow [by Japan] fell on September 18, 1931, when [Japanese] Army conspirators in Manchuria staged a fake sabotage of the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railroad. Blaming it on Chinese troops, Japanese forces, led by ultra-nationalistic younger officers, immediately overran Manchuria without a shred of official [Japanese] approval. The [Japanese] civilian government stood by helplessly as the entire nation applauded the military's conquest. On that fateful September day, Japan took its first step into the 'dark valley,' [Kurita Tanaka] as the Japanese call the bled, bloodstained decade that preceded World War II."

World War II had begun in Europe in September 1939. By 1941, numerous atrocities had already occurred on that continent and concentration Camps were an established cultural phenomenon since 1933. At Babi Yar in the Ukraine, on September 29-30, 1941, Nazis massacred an estimated 30,000 individuals labeled as " Jews."

4 A.J. Barker, 1969, Pearl Harbor (Ballantine Books), page 125.
6 Susan J. Pharr et al., 1985, Japan, page 87.
As a total global phenomenon World War II was brutal. In the Soviet Union alone, among military forces, there were 7.5 million deaths; Germany had 3.5 million deaths; the British Commonwealth had slightly more than 500,000 military deaths; and in the United States, there were some 407,316 military deaths. American deaths in World War II should be compared to American involvement in the First World War (1917-1918), when there were "only" 117,708 United States military deaths. The Korean War (1950-1953) resulted in 54,346 United States military deaths and the Vietnam War (1964-1973) had "only" approximately 59,151 United States military deaths. One has to go back to the American Civil War of 1861-1865, when 498,232 American died to come close to United States military deaths during World War II.  

The above numbers do not include the 6,000,000 individuals of Jewish or Polish or Gypsy or other ethnic or political affiliation who died during what has been termed the Holocaust, a period of time that began in 1933. In that year the first concentration camp was opened on Wednesday, the 22nd of, under the command Heinrich Himmler (Commissioner of Police for the city of Munich, nine miles southeast of the village of Dachau. On the 21st of March 1933 the following modest announcement appeared in the Münchner Neuesten Nachrichten:

"On Wednesday, March 22, 1933, the first concentration camp will be opened in the vicinity of Dachau. It can accommodate 5,000 people. We have adopted this measure, undeterred by seditious scribblers, in the conviction that our action will help to restore calm to our country and it is in the best interests of our people."

The camp, originally a munitions factory during the first world war, was to become infamous for thousands of deaths and the grotesque words over the back gate which stated: "Arbeit macht frei" or "Work makes you free." The first "protective-custody prisoners" at Dachau were guarded by the Savaria State Police but on April 11, 1933, the SS (or Schutzstaffel), literally "protection squad" or "defense unit," a personal guard for Adolf Hitler, took over and used Dachau as a training ground to test new killing techniques; it has been written that "the transformation of the terror system of National Socialism into bloody reality began in the Dachau concentration camp."

Years later, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain would make Munich somewhat famous after a four-power meeting that was held between Chamberlain, and Premier Daladier (France), Chancellor Hitler (Germany), and Premier Mussolini (Italy). On September 30, 1938, Chamberlain declared that the Munich Agreement would result in "peace in our time." Within a week Hitler's forces moved into a disputed area of Czechoslovakia and within a year and a half war would erupt throughout Europe.

Japan and China, you will recall, had already been engaged in war since 1931, in December of 1937 Japanese troops conquered the Chinese City of Nanjing (or Nanjing) and what has been termed the "rape of Nanjing" occurred:

"Between 105,000 and 200,000 Chinese were executed. At least 5,000 women, girls, and children were raped before they were killed. Everything of value in the city was pilaged and whole sections of it were systematically put to the torch. Before Warsaw, before Buchenwald, Nanjing was the great atrocity."

The poet W.H. Auden published it in 1945 as follows:

"But ideas can be true although met die,
And we can watch a thousand blues
Maps active by one mile;
And maps can really point to places
Where life is evil now:
Nanking; Oachau."

The 7th of December 1941 is important for the United States and also for memories associated with the Holocaust: on that day in Poland, Nazi technicians "at the Kulmhof death camp in Poland gassed the first group of the Holocaust's martyred 6 million" and also on that day, the "Nacht und Nebel" (or "Night and Fog") order was issued by Hitler.

"The Nacht und Nebel Erlass...or Night and Fog Decree, one of Hitler's personal edicts, was issued on December 7,...Directed against persons endangering German security and specifically against members of resistance groups in German-occupied territories, it proposed that execution was not itself a sufficient deterrent against anti-German threats. Thus, not all agitators would be killed upon discovery; many individuals would be transported to an unknown location. Their destiny never to be learned by outsiders."

The 7th of December 1941 was indeed a day of truly global proportions.

Perspectives: 1940 and 1941

Such were some of the world-wide activities occurring before America's entry into World War II. Following the idea of a publication entitled War Without Mercy: Race A Power in The Pacific War, this paper points out that World War II meant different things to different people.

11 David Bergamini, 1971, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, pages 2-3.
"To over fifty million men, women, and children, it meant death. To hundreds of millions more in the occupied areas and theaters of combat, the war meant hell on earth; suffering and great, often with little if any awareness of a cause or reason beyond the terrifying events of the moment. To nations everywhere, World War Two meant technological innovation, bureaucratic expansion, and an extraordinary mobilization of human resources and ideological fervor. Governments on all sides presented the conflict as a holy war for national survival and glory, a mission to defend and propagate the finest values of their state and culture."16

On December 7, 1941, the United States were already at war. Not everyone in the United States (a) wanted to get into war in Europe or (b) believed that the United States should get into war at all. When the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, returned to London on September 30, 1938, after his disastrous meeting with Hitler in Munich, "fully 59 percent of the American people surveyed approved of the bargain that abandoned Czechoslovakia to Hitler."17

In 1940, however, as more individuals in the United States thought about the possibility of war, the Congress of the United States voted for a "Selective Training and Service Bill" which would "draft" young men for a one year period.

A Gallup poll of mid-August [1940] indicated that in this time of fast-converging war clouds, the nation was 71 per cent behind the draft bill. The feeling in Congress was equally strong—so much that supporters hardly bothered to argue for the bill. It became law on September 16.18

A year later, the mood of the American nation and politicians had shifted. Although there were public lobbying against the 1940 law, opposition to the draft increased dramatically in 1941. In 1940, 1000 of Congressmen of citizens were established to debate war. Charles A. Lindburg, 1927 zero of the flight across the Atlantic Ocean stated "The three most important groups which have been pressing this country towards war are the British, the Jewish and the Roosevelt Administration."19 Lobbying in 1941 increased against extending the draft law (including an "American Peace Mobilization" movement which conducted a White House vigil of 1,029 continuous hours and a "Mother's March on Washington"). Political maneuvering in Washington, D.C. also increased (including actions of a young Congressman named Lyndon Johnson).

The 1941 bill passed, but as David Brinkley, a journalist in Washington, D.C. at the time later wrote: "The vote was 202 to 202. Four months before Pearl Harbor the United States had decided, barely, to keep its armed services and some armed services they were: in 1941, when more than 17,000,000 men registered for the draft, resulting in 921,722 men who found themselves in the army" some astonishing American information came to light for "there for every of every hundred selectees

were rejected by the [U.S.] army as unfit for general military service. ... [and] one man in five was illiterate.\textsuperscript{21} (It must be pointed out, however, that although the Japanese version of conscription had been established in 1873, in 1937 the Japanese rejection rate on medical grounds was sixty per one hundred.\textsuperscript{22})

**Perspectives: 1941 and Earlier**

The *Atlantic Monthly* of August 1941 quoted Captain William T. Pullerstein (former Chief of U.S. Naval Intelligence), who stated that "The Hawaiian islands are over-protected; the entire Japanese fleet and air force could not seriously threaten Oahu" and on December 4, 1941, the United States Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, was quoted as saying that "No matter what happens, the U.S. Navy is not going to be caught napping."\textsuperscript{24} On the 24th of January 1940, however, the same Secretary of the Navy wrote to the then United States Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, "Hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor."\textsuperscript{24}

With hindsight, one must have to think "What was going on? What was going on with American elected representatives?" Every graduate of the Japanese Naval Academy over the years 1931-1941 was asked the same final exam question: "How would you carry out a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?"\textsuperscript{29}

In 1932, Admiral Frank A. Schofield (retiring Commander of the United States Pacific fleet) arranged for the United States aircraft carriers Saratoga and Lexington to stage a successful surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor. It has been written that "Japanese observers reported the fact; Tokyo carefully recorded it."\textsuperscript{26} In 1937 the American fleet had war exercises in the Pacific and a fleet was sent toward Hawaii; Pearl Harbor was successfully attacked. As the author wrote in 1970: "The American Navy should have paid attention to the lesson learned from the mock attack on Pearl Harbor back in 1937."\textsuperscript{27} It is interesting to read a particular United States Presidential address, the State of the Union Message, to the Congress of the United States:

"Owing to the peculiar situation of Japan, and the anomalous form of its government, the action of that empire in performing treaty stipulations is inconstant and capricious. Nevertheless, good progress has been effected by the western powers, moving with enlightened concert."

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There is reason to believe that these proceedings have increased rather than diminished the friendship of Japan towards the United States.\footnote{28}

These words, from President Abraham Lincoln's 1864 State of the Union message, perhaps lend some credence to the theory that tension between Japan and America had existed since the 1853 visit of United States Commodore Perry to Japan. As the 19th Century continued on its course, and the United States expanded around the world (especially in the Pacific), Japanese-American relations did not improve. Emerson and Holland writing in 1867 had the following:

"Japanese-American relations had begun to sour as the new [20th] century began. The United States was taking an increasing interest in Pacific affairs, thereby posing to Japanese eyes a threat to Japan's interests in the region. Washington annexed Hawaii in 1897 and the Western Samoa islands in 1899; and the Spanish-American War of 1898 established the Philippine Islands as part of the United States.\footnote{29}

World War II did not develop out of a vacuum. World War II has been traced to the 1915 Treaty of Versailles and rampant economic problems which faced Germany in the inter-war years (and hence the rise of Adolf Hitler). Just as situations in Europe grew out of World War I, so did World War II Pacific events influence World War II Pacific events. Barbara Tuchman has written eloquently of the European actions of World War I and America's entry into World War I because of a decoded telegram from Germany to Mexico on the 16th of January 1917. Tuchman also discusses German interests in Saja California in 1901 as well as Japanese interests in 1909:

"[In 1908] ...the American Minister in Guatemala advised Washington of a rumor that Japan, by secret treaty, had acquired lease of a naval base at Magdalena Bay, the largest and most secure on Mexico's pacific coast, the same place that the Kaiser had once coveted. Washington's worried queries were met by official denials, but the reports persisted over the next years, usually accompanied by the story of disguised Japanese soldiers...ready to swarm across the Rio Grande, or, alternatively, seize the Panama Canal.\footnote{30}

Tuchman wrote that although there is no archival evidence that the treaty between Japan and Mexico existed, "[in 1908] Japan was making common cause with the Mexicans, who had not forgiven the loss of Texas\footnote{31} after the Mexican War in the 19th Century!

As a result of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, the United States "rounded out the present-day continental limits of the United States, with the exceptions of the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 and the Alaska Purchase of 1867 and "together with the Louisiana Purchase [of 1803], the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of February 2, 1848, constituted one of the two most important territorial additions in the

\footnote{30} Barbara Tuchman, 1955, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, page 34.
\footnote{31} Barbara Tuchman, 1955, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, page 34.
entire history of the United States." They were (and are) some "long memories" around. The United States-Mexican War was one of territorial expansion of the United States. Tuchman continued:

"They [the Japanese] began to talk about the Mexicans as their racial brothers, descended from Japanese fishermen who had long ago been brown across the Pacific on a raft. Japanese trading ships visited Mexican waters, in 1811 came Admiral Yashiro, Grand Admiral of the Japanese fleet, on a state visit. Entering into the Mexican Minister of War at a splendid banquet at Chapultepec, the Admiral rose, rather unsteadily after seven courses and seven wines, to toast this 'fraternal feast' of the Mexican and Japanese Army and Navy and to make a speech teeming with sentiments of common action against a common enemy. He stressed the similarities of the Mexican and Japanese people: "the same blood flows in their veins (dangerous applause); both have temble and untamable volcanoes which, though now quiescent, can erupt and make the world tremble in their fury (cries of approval); both are building up their Armies and navies to resist insults to their nations honor (Viva Japan! Pala los Gringos!). No doubt was left of the common enemy."33

On the 6th of March 1912, President Taft of the United States announced that two-thirds of the regular standing United States army (20,500 individuals) had been mobilized and sent to the Mexican border: "Mr. Taft said it was maneuvers, but everyone else said it meant war with Japan."34 American troops went into Mexico in 1914 and 1916-17, but there was no war with Japan at this time.

JAPANESE EXPANION AND PLANNING

Japan developed into a formidable world power by the end of the 19th Century and continued to consolidate its position as the 20th Century developed. Interestingly enough, it has been written that "the most distinctive feature of Japanese imperialism is that it originated within the structure of informal empire which the West established in East Asia during the nineteenth century."35 Just as 19th Century Europeans and Americans saw tremendous opportunities in China, so did the Japanese. British merchants, realizing the value of trade, sold "English textiles to India, shipped India cotton to China and Chinese silk, tea and porcelain back to the United Kingdom.36

Wars, treaties, and an eventual break-up of the Chinese Empire began to take place in the 19th century and Japan took advantage of the situation. Part of the Chinese Navy had been defeated in the Japan-China War of 1894-1895 and "China sued for peace, which was signed on April 17, 1895."37 In addition to a cash settlement from China, Japan also received the island of Formosa, location of Mt. Mt. kii, the highest mountain in the Japanese Empire.

33 Barbara Tuchman, 1958, The Zimmerman Telegram, page 35.
34 Barbara Tuchman, 1958, The Zimmerman Telegram, page 35.
36 Harriet Servant, 1900, Shanghai: Collier's Print of China, page 10 and page 15.
In 1904-1905 Japan defeated a "European" power (Russia) both on land and at sea and after the Treaty of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, USA (signed on September 5, 1905), Japan received the Southern half of Sakhalin island, as well as territory on the Asian mainland, and recognition as having major political and economic influence in Korea. The Peace Treaty was negotiated by then President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States and he received the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize for that effort.

Several things about the 1904-1905 Japan-Russia war must be commented on: Japan was in an expansionist mode for several reasons, including the fact that (a) China was having its own problems with European countries increasing their spheres of influence in China and (b) Japan was concerned about a growing Japanese population. There were two major battles in the 1904-1905 war that demonstrated Japanese battle skills: the last one being the engagement between the Japanese fleet and the Russian fleet on May 27, 1905, at the Battle of Tsushima (or the Battle of the Sea of Japan, Николаевская битва) when the Russian fleet was destroyed and the first attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur on February 9, 1904. The 1905 battle ended the war while the 1904 attack began it. Japan formally declared war on Russia on February 7, 1904. Two contemporary authors have written somewhat prophetic words on this early 20th Century war:

"When the Russo-Japanese War started on 8 February, 1904, no army or navy in modern history had ever been so superbly backed up with a massive intelligence operation."

"The ultimate effect of this [1904] surprise attack before the declaration of war was well-appreciated by subsequent generations of Japanese staff officers. In this sense Port Arthur can be regarded as a dress rehearsal for Pearl Harbor."

Perhaps the Japan-Russia War gave an indication of the horrors to come in World War I which would engulf Europe in 1914: Russian-controlled Port Arthur, in China, was besieged by the Japanese for five months during the war and when it was surrendered to the Japanese on December 31, 1904, "more than 28,000 Russians had died, and almost 58,000 Japanese."

One final point that must be made concerning the 1904-1905 war: certain Japanese were not at all pleased with the outcome of the Treaty negotiated at Portsmouth: New Hampshire, USA, and when the terms of the treaty were made public there was an immediate outburst of popular indignation in Japan. Perhaps the 1911 visit of the Japanese training fleet to Mexico under Admiral Yahiro and Tschuman's comments earlier on "Viva Japan!" are now placed into broader perspective.

39 John N. Westwood, 1973, The Illustrated History of the Russo-Japanese War, page 19; this point is also made by Edward Hyams, the translator of the 1980 edition of Georges Blond's Admiral Togo, when Hyams writes "The Port Arthur attack might also be considered a 'dummy run' for the Pearl Harbor attack" (page 150).
In an intriguing volume dated June 1945, completed before the War in the Pacific ended entitled *Japan in Defeat*, the anonymous authors wrote:

"The effect of the spectacle of the defeat of China in the wars of 1895-92 and 1895-96, of the helplessness of Japan herself in the face of Perry's naval squadron of 1853, and of the sudden realization of the superior power and wealth of Western nations, was greatly to reduce the Japanese respect for, and sense of cultural solidarity with, China, and to cause Japan to go to school with the West in order to master the economic, administrative, and military techniques of western civilization. To some extent there was a genuine interest in, and enthusiasm for, Western institutions, ideas and ways of living for their own sake, even if only as a fashionable craze, but the dominant motive of the Meiji reformers was certainly to learn from the West the secrets of national power [stress added]; it was because the Western nations were successful and powerful on the material plane that their culture was deemed worthy of imitation."

In the 19th Century Japanese individuals had been sent to Europe to study various techniques, new technological advances were incorporated into their weaponry, and Japan expanded. Vice-Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1847-1934), victor of the Battle of Tsushima on May 27, 1905, received some of his naval training in England over the years 1877-1878. Togo's flagship for the battle was the Mikasa, "the most admirably batted ship of her day" and it had been constructed in England.

Isoroku Yamamoto (born Isoroku Takano in 1884 but adopted into the Yamanoto family in 1914), overall planner of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, was an ensign in the Imperial Japanese Navy on the cruiser *Nachi* in the War of 1904-1905 and after World War I he studied at Harvard University:

"Yamamoto's views were informed with a realism derived from firsthand observations and experience in the United States. He had attended Harvard as a language officer during 1919-1921, revisited the country on an inspection tour in 1923-24, and served as naval attaché in Washington from 1925 to 1927. He often warned against the mistake of dismissing the American people as 'weak-willed and spoiled by material luxuries'; on the contrary, he asserted, they were infused with a 'fierce fighting spirit and an adventurous temperament.'"

One notes that after Yamamoto's "return to Japan he was dean of the Kasumigaura Air Training School, 1924-25" and "he then returned briefly to the United States as naval attaché in Washington." It is clear that the Japanese were viewing their global role in the early part of the 20th Century: in 1907 Marshal Arimoto Yahagata (1839-1922) presented a report to then Emperor Yoshito (1879-1926) entitled "Plan for Imperial

National Defense" which included "desired levels of army and navy armaments and operation plans; it specified Russia as the major hypothetical enemy."46 This was the plan associated with the "Strike North" faction: "Proponents of the idea that Japan must devote all her military energies to preparing for an inevitable war with Communist Russia"47 and:

"the school of thought for northward advance, onto the mainland and directed against Russia, came to be associated with the army. As a corollary, gunship-on, the school of thought for southward advance, towards the southern islands and aimed against the Pacific Ocean power America and other colonial powers in the Southeast Asian region, became the preserve of the navy."48

In 1909 the United States was "added to the long-standing list of probable enemies" of Japan and "after the latter part of the 1930s the British Commonwealth was added to the probable-enemy list, side by side with the United States."49 Lest one think that the Japanese were the only ones creating various global scenarios, as early as 1903 the United States Army and Navy were working on their own global plans.

"As soon as the euphoria of America's 1898 victory over Spain faded away, and especially after Japan defeated Russia in 1904-05, American strategic planners began to awaken to the harsh realities of the imperial position awarded their country by the 1898 Treaty of Paris, most notably the Philippines. ... Within the armed forces the Joint Army and Navy Board began in 1903 to grapple with the problem of creating a viable national strategic plan that included the defense of the Philippines. At the instigation of Lieutenant General Adna R. Chaffee, chief of staff of the army, the Joint Board commanded in 1904, soon after Japan's attack on Russia, to prepare a series of plans for joint army-navy action against possible enemies. This evolved into the so-called color plans, each known by the color that served as a code reference to the country to which the plan referred. The Orange plans for Japan were among the most prominent of the color plans...."50

Over the years 1924 to 1933, the American officers who went through the United States Naval War College played a hypothetical war game called "Orange" which had been adopted from the 1903 plans:

"The so-called 'Orange Plan' for war with Japan was one of a number of contingency plans developed by the United States before World War I. They were often referred to as 'color plans' because the hypothetical

47 David Bergamini, 1977, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, pages 1167-1168.
enemies were each assigned a color: red for Great Britain, black for
Germany, green for Mexico, orange for Japan. ... At the Naval War
College, a generation of officers debated, tested, and refined, war with
Orange. One hundred twenty-seven times—In chart maneuvers and board
games—the American fleet crosses the Pacific to do battle with its
Japanese opponent. How much useful knowledge was distilled from these
games is still a matter of debate. [United States Navy] Admiral Nimitz
insisted that 'the courses were so thorough that nothing that happened in
the Pacific War was strange or unexpected.' One historian of the war
college agrees, declaring that the war game was 'prophetic...the oracle
of victory,' while Kennedy, an equally knowledgeable analyst, finds that
the studies were 'impeded by insufficient data for realistic war games,
avoidance of alliance problems, and disproportionate emphasis on
tactics.\textsuperscript{51}

\textbf{INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES}

\textbf{Duplicity}

World War II began in 1931, thirteen years after the fighting of World War I
ended. In the years after World War I the United States was not a military power by
any means and there was a time of pacifism in the country prior to World War II. This
was true, even though in the 1930s there was an apparent attempt by certain American
businessmen to either remove and/or place a military government in charge of the
United States, removing President Franklin D. Roosevelt from the Presidency!

A twice-time recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor, America's highest
war-time decoration, Major General Sm defy Darlinglon Butler (1961-1940) was
approached by certain businessmen and he refused them: as The New York Times of
November 21, 1934 stated it: "General Butler bares 'Fascist Plot' To Seize
Government By Force.\textsuperscript{52} The plot did not succeed, and Butler was criticized for
fabricating the story, but the plot probably occurred! The Japanese had been fighting
on the Asian Mainland since 1931, Adolf Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany in
1933, and wars meant business. In 1935, General Butler wrote a short anti-war book
titled War Is A racket, reminiscent of Vietnam-Era activities of the 1960s and
1970s:

'[War] is conducted for the benefit of the very few at the expense of the
masses. Out of war a few people make huge fortunes. ... There are
40,000,000 men under arms in the world today, and our statesmen and
diplomats have the temerity to say that war is not in the making? Hell's
bells! Are these 40,000,000 men being trained to be dancers? ... Yes, they [munitions makers, bankers, ship-builders, manufacturers, meat
packers, speculators] are getting ready for another war. Why shouldn't
they? It pays high dividends. But what does it profit the masses ... who
are killed? [Americans in past wars] were made to ... regard murder as

55-57; Spector cites Michael Vlahos (1980), The Blue Sword: The Naval War College
and the American Mission 1919-1941, pages 143 and 119.

the order of the day. . . . We used them a couple of years and trained them
to think nothing at all of killing or being killed. Then suddenly, we
discharged them and told them to do their own readjusting; ... Many, too
many, of these fine young boys were eventually destroyed mentally....

One reads this, keeping in mind that it is the same Major General Butler who stated the
following to an American audience in 1932:

"The Japanese have been getting ready for the Chinese invasion for the
past ten years. And be warned. Remember, if it suits the purpose of the
Japanese to kill Americans, that's exactly what they'll do—and the softer
we are, the more they will kill." 54

Big business did have interests in the potentials of war, but Major General Butler must
not have appreciated the way they wished to maintain involvement. William Stevenson
wrote a 1976 book entitled The Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War, dealing with
British espionage activities during World War II. Stevenson pointed out that beginning
in 1927, Standard Oil of New Jersey maintained close relationships with the German
industrial firm of I.G. Farben:

"The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was discovered to be
maintaining close relations with Nazi Germany and especially with I.G.
Farben, which, apart from its involvement with concentration camps and
mass-extermination techniques, had a special intelligence section known
as N.W.7 working hand-in-glove with the economic section of German
intelligence. Standard Oil's relationship went back to 1927, when it
began a series of agreements with Farben. The Standard Oil description of
the basic agreement was: 'The I. G. are going to stay out of the chemical
business.' In 1929, they consummated what each corporation called 'a
full marriage': Standard had a free hand in oil anywhere in the world in
exchange for giving Farben no global competition in the chemical
industry."

After Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected for his unprecedented third term as
American President, in 1941 British Intelligence in North America turned over a 400
page report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the "links between Nazi
corporations and American businessmen." As William Stephenson, the individual who
was known by the code-name Intrepid, stated it: "If the Nazis won, some of the business
realists would have been impeccably Nazi. ... If the Nazis lost, the same businessmen
were impeccably American." 55 Trading With The Enemy: An Expose of the Nazi-
American Money Plot (C 1944-1946) by Charles Higham (1980) points out the
extent of multinationalism during war and is highly recommended. Multinational
 corporations know of no ideology save to make money. 56

54 In Edward Oxford, 1991, "Intrigue in the Islands" in American History Illustrated,
56 Higham points out: "From the outset I realized that in researching the subject I
would have to carve through an ice cream mountain of public relations. I searched in
vain through books about the corporations and their histories to find any reference to

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Espionage

If anyone can be considered a prophet of a war in the Pacific between the United States of America and Japan, it could possibly be Homer Lea. Born on November 17, 1876 in Cripple Creek, Colorado, the Lea family moved to Los Angeles in 1892 and Lea attended public schools before going to Leland Stanford College in 1895 (now Stanford University). A hunchback, Lea never grew taller than five feet, had bad eyesight, but he had a global understanding of political affairs that was unmatched in his day. Unable to join American forces in the Spanish-American War of 1898, Lea went to China and served as “General” with Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (eventual 1911 leader of China from the Manchu Dynasty).

In July of 1899 Lea sailed from San Francisco for China, stopping along the way in the Territory of Hawaii (annexed by the United States in 1898) as well as Guam and the Philippines (both ceded to the United States by Spain after the 1898 Spanish-American War). After spending two years in China, Lea returned to the United States in 1901 but then went back to China in 1904. Returning back to California he travelled and wrote and in 1909 he published The Valor of Ignorance, wherein he described a future Pacific war. Some 10,000 copies were sold in the United States but The Valor of Ignorance was met by mixed reviews and went out-of-print by 1922. Lea died in 1912. Clare Booth, however, has some interesting words, in a 1942 reprint of the edition:

“The Indifference of the Ignorant [American] public, the violent reaction of professional pacifists and ivory tower literati, might have made Lea bitter, but for another circumstance. He began to receive high letters of praise [for his 1909 book] from important military men all over the world—and even a few statesmen. The Japanese militarists paid him and even greater compliment. In Japan The Valor of Ignorance went into twenty-four editions in one month [stress added]. The blurb on the jacket of the popular edition brought out by Hakutoukwan, Tokyo’s foremost publishers, read, “excellent reading matter for all Oriental men with red blood in their veins.” And the Japanese government made it required reading for officers in all the services.” (Booth 1942: xxxii).57

questionable activities in World War II. It was clear that the authors of those volumes, granted the cooperation of the businesses concerned, predictably backed off disclosing anything that would be revealing. To this day the pulps of American do not suspect The Fraternity.” C, Higham 1983, Trading With The Enemy: An Expose of the Nazi-American Money Plot (1933-1945), pages 12-13; another intriguing strand to follow is the 1978 book entitled Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler’s Rise to Power 1918-1933 by James Pool and Suzanne Pool. 57 Booth continued: “German and Russian military schools followed. The King of Italy sent a personally annotated copy to his Chief of Staff. But in Sandhurst [in Great Britain] and West Point (USA), although the book was duly placed on the shelves, the reading was optional. Strangest compliment of all was paid to Lea twenty-odd years later by a man called Adolf Hitler. Given a copy, no doubt, by ‘geo-political’ Professor Haushofer, he cribbed several paragraphs on the apparent inability of the democratic
After World War I (1914-1918), nations around the Pacific Ocean became extremely active in world-wide affairs. Japan was allied with the victors of World War I and received Germany’s island possession in the North Pacific as a result of the War. In 1921, twenty years before Pearl Harbor, Japan was spending approximately 48 percent of its national budget for the armed services and in that year a British naval expert, journalist, and spy by the name of Hector Bywater published *Sea Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem*.

By 1932, Japan had 256,000 individuals in the army, 1,250 military planes, ten battleships, eight heavy cruisers, nineteen light cruisers, 110 destroyers, sixty-seven submarines, and three aircraft carriers. In 1932, United States military strength was truly modest; the United States Army had slightly less than 120,000 individuals and was ranked 17th in the world and the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Corps were little better.

In 1921 Bywater wrote that “It is some ten years since Homer Lea wrote his book, in which he described at great length the transport of a huge Japanese army across the Pacific, its landings in Washington, Oregon, and California, and its eventual conquest of the whole Pacific slope.” Although Bywater was off by two years, he was referring to the 1909 edition of *The Valor of Ignorance*, written by Homer Lea.

That a war might be imminent in the Pacific was evident. A 1991 publication by William H. Honan, entitled *Visions of Infamy: The Untold Story of How Journalist Hector C. Bywater Devised The Plans That Led To Pearl Harbor*, attributes the attack on Pearl Harbor to Bywater himself. Honan believes that Bywater’s writings, including his 1925 publication entitled *The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33* was an inspiration for Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Japanese Fleet and planner of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. This same line of reasoning is also evident in John Toland’s monumental 1970 publication entitled *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire* wherein he also speculated on a Bywater-Yamamoto connection, pointing out Yamamoto’s presence in Washington, D.C., as naval attaché when Bywater’s 1925 book was published.

One may also read Oxford In 1991 pointing out a Lea-form of government to defend itself in time, and inserted them into a book he was writing in jail called, *Main Kampf.*


Bywater-Yamamoto connection. Although Honan acknowledges Lant’s 1909 Valor of Ignorance, Honan wrote:

"...nearly a half a century after Yamamoto unleashed Japanese forces in the Pacific, it can be shown that while serving as Naval Attaché in Washington [D.C.] in the late 1920s he reported to Tokyo about Bywater’s war plan and then lectured on the subject, adopting Bywater’s ideas as his own. Years later—long after it had become encoded in his mind—Yamamoto followed Bywater’s plan so assiduously in both overall strategy and specific tactics at Pearl Harbor, Guadalcanal, the Philippines, and even the Battle of Midway (which the Japanese lost) that it is no exaggeration to call Hector Bywater the man who ‘invented’ the Pacific War." 66

It is interesting to learn how a researcher works. After finishing a 1970 article for American Heritage about Bywater’s potential influence on Isoroku Yamamoto, Honan went to the United States Library of Congress:

"Looking up Bywater’s name in the card catalogue, he [Honan] was surprised to discover that several of the titles under his name were in Japanese. Honan learned that the titles were books of Bywater’s that had been translated into Japanese—ones of which had been prepared by the Japanese Imperial Navy General Staff for the use of top naval officers." 66

One cannot help but wonder what electronic catalogues will do for this type of sleuthing in the future.

Espionage played a massive role during World War II and had a very important part in both the prelude to Pearl Harbor and the controversy which surrounded the attack. In his 1967 monumental publication entitled The Code Breakers: The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn relates the activities of Herbert O. Yardley, a cryptographer employed by the United States Government during World War I. Yardley was in charge of a group known as the “Black Chamber” and his group intercepted extremely important Japanese telegraphed instructions for the 1921 Washington, D.C. Naval Conference.

From the 21st of November 1921 until 6 February 1922, a four-month conference was held to set limitations on naval arms throughout the world and an eventual “ratio” of tonnage for line vessels was established: for the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy it was to be 5:5:3:1.67:1.67. 57 Within a decade, however, Japanese individuals were furious with this ratio when they discovered, in a 1931 American publication by Yardley entitled The American Black Chamber, that American cryptographers had “broken” the Japanese code that gave instructions to the

delegates at the Conference: is short, the American players knew the cultural rules by which the Japanese were playing by!

"During the summer of 1921, the Black Chamber solved telegram 813 of July 5 from the Japanese ambassador in London to Tokyo. It contained the first hints of a conference for naval disarmament—an idea that powerfully gripped the imagination of a war-weary world. ... A few months before the November opening of the disarmament conference in Washington, daily courier service was set up between the Black Chamber and the State Department. An official grinningly remarked that State's upper echelons were delighted with the cryptoanalysts' work and read the solutions every morning with their orange juice and coffee. The conference sought to limit the tonnage of capital ships, and as negotiations were proceeding toward its chief result—the Five Power Treaty that accorded tonnages in certain ratios to the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan—Yardley's team was reading the instructions of the negotiators."68

Yardley described it in 1931: "Stud poker is not a very difficult game after you see your opponent's hole cards."69 One expert on espionage wrote in 1983 that "Yardley, as much as any man, helped to cause World War II."70

This is a weighty statement, placing the blame for World War II on a single cryptographer. The reason Yardley wrote his own version of American cryptoanalysis techniques is that when Herbert Hoover was the President of the United States, from 1929 to 1933, he appointed Henry L. Stimson to be his Secretary of State. Stimson served as Secretary of State after Roosevelt won the election of 1932 (and then Cordell Hull was appointed by Roosevelt), but in 1929 Stimson abolished the cryptoanalysis work of Yardley and his group stating "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."71 In 1982, however, a leading espionage expert pointed out the following:

"The closing of the Black Chamber is 1929, following Secretary of State Stimson's moralistic bombast, was more illusion than reality. His cutting off of funds for Yardley's maverick organization resulted not in an end to cryptoanalysis, but merely in transfer to another department. Gentlemen would continue to read each other's mail—only now they would be wearing Army green and the crossed flags of the Signal Corps."72

Yardley wrote his book because he was out of work and he needed an income. The American Black Chamber was an instant success, selling 17,391 copies in the United States, 6,840 copies in an English edition (under the title of Secret Service in America), as well as French, Swedish, and Chinese versions; it was in Japan however, much like Homer Lea's 1909 work of The Valley of Ignorance, that Yardley received the greatest success; 33,118 copies were published in a Japanese edition! On a per capita

basis, these means that more than three times as many were sold in Japan as were sold in the United States!

Japan subsequently denounced the Treaties that resulted from this conference and a 1935 article by a retired Netherlands Naval Officer took the position that "Japan emerged as the real victor at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921." This occurred because the Japanese navy went ahead and modernized anyway!

Since there were authors, military individuals, and spies from the turn of the century who were all aware that something could be happening in the Pacific, what about the American politicians? One author wrote the following in 1989:

"Over the years, mythologists have built an industry on attempts to prove that President Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the Japanese attack and deliberately sacrificed the pacific Fleet to bring the United States into war against Nazi Germany through the back door. Conspiracy theorists charge that the master plotter in the White House deliberately ignored clear signals of an impending attack on Hawaii to unite the American people behind him. Most researchers reject the conspiracy theory, but it is a myth that will not die."74

There was not a "conspiracy" but an overwhelming body of data that certain United States policy-makers decided not to share with appropriate individuals and the data or information did not turn into intelligence! This is the point clearly made by Wolfsatter in her 1982 publication entitled Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. "In short, we failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones"75 and this is re-echoed in Slackman's Target: Pearl Harbor when he writes that in 1941 "Secrecy inevitably begot ignorance and confusion."76

In June of 1941, for example, the American commercial attaché in Mexico City submitted a report to the United States Office of Naval Intelligence:

"Related with my recent report on activities at Honolulu Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the use of the word Molokai [an island in the Hawaiian archipelago] I have run across the following vital information bearing on that subject and related features" and "The American Naval attaché had forwarded this report to Washington with the observation that it possibly contained 'an element of truth, in spite of its apparently fantastic nature, and in spite of this officer's reluctance to report what may prove to be totally unfounded rumors."77

Other information concerning the Territory of Hawaii came to certain Washington individuals in 1941: Dusko Popov was a Yugoslavian who had been recruited by the

74 Nathan Miller, 1989, Spying For America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence, page 256.
Germans to spy on England but he defected to the British side. While ostensibly working for Germany, Popov was sent to the United States in 1941 to establish a spy ring in this country.

“He was given a list of questions to guide him that were hidden in a microcode glued to a telegraph form. Much of the questionnaire dealt with general matters such as shipping, aircraft production, and troop movements, but fully a third of it revealed a strong interest in Pearl Harbor and the surrounding airfields and defenses. Obviously this information was being sought by the Germans for their Japanese allies.”

Up on reaching the United States, Popov was interviewed by J. Edgar Hoover (of the FBI). Hoover, most unfortunately, did not trust Popov and only “only sent the White House about a quarter of the questionnaire and did not even include the part on Pearl Harbor.”

On the island of Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands, there were not only espionage activities conducted by representatives of the Japanese consul there was also an anthropologist on the faculty of the University of Hawaii who was a spy for Japan: Klaus Melhnert obtained a position at the University of Hawaii in the 1930s and remained until June 16, 1941, when he sailed for China. His chief espionage contribution for the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor appears to have been information on the United States fleet activities of 1937. When the President of the University was informed of Melhnert’s activities, Melhnert sailed for China. Melhnert, and others, made their contribution to the attack, but as Prange pointed out “by turning the lock on the door at 1742 Nuanu Street in Honolulu. Washington could have dried up Japan’s source of information on the U.S. Pacific Fleet” for there were a total of 234 Japanese consular agents in Honolulu.

Some United States individuals did think that something was wrong in Hawaii: In 1934, a United States Army Lieutenant Colonel by the name of George S. Patton was sent to the Territory of Hawaii as an Intelligence Officer, a position he held until 1937. Sometime between 1935 and 1937 he developed a plan (never implemented) to seize 128 individual “of the islands” Japanese community as hostages in the event of war between Japan and the United States.

In the 1940s the United States was not the only government that failed to heed the warnings of professional spooks about impending warfare by those hostile to the nation; consider, if you will, the following statement:

‘With the largest foreign intelligence network in history, the Soviet Union suffered in the early hours of June 22, 1941, the greatest intelligence disaster of the Second World War. The disaster derived not from any shortage of intelligence but from the analysis and use made of it. The surprise achieved by the German invasion was made possible both by

75 Ellis M. Zacharias, 1946, Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer, p. 193.
80 Gordon W. Prange, 1981, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, pp. 151-152.
the nature of the Soviet intelligence system and by the personal failings of the dictator at the head of it. 82

The Soviet Union had long considered that Japan would be the major threat to the Soviet Union in the 1930s/1940s and the German threat of invasion was ignored:

"Until the mid-1930s Moscow regarded Germany as a much less serious threat than Japan. ... if Moscow's fears of Japanese attack were sometimes exaggerated, they were not without foundation. The Japanese were split for several years into two warring factions: the Kodo-ha, which wanted war with Russia, and the less adventurous Tosei-ha, whose ambitions were centered on China. Not until 1936, after a failed coup d'etat by the Kodo-ha, did the Tosei-ha gain a clear victory over their rivals.83

Hitler sent his armies to invade the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and World War II continued to expand.

Comments

With the historical hindsight of 20-20 vision, the 1941-1945 war with Japan now seems inevitable and one has to wonder why individuals prior to Pearl Harbor didn't see it as such? From today's perspective, it is clear that some individuals in the United States were not doing something properly: the Americans were not appreciating the results of good old-fashioned research, scholarship, and military intelligence.

"Operation Hawaii" (or Operation Z), the code name given by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto for the attack on the Hawaiian islands, was a success in exactly these areas.

"The requirements of success for 'Operation Hawaii,' as it was called, were many: secrecy; first-rate intelligence; superb coordination; high technical skills; many technological innovations, including development of new aerial torpedoes and new techniques for refueling at sea; absolute devotion to the cause at hand; and the cooperation of the weather and the waves."84

Consider the following on America of 1941:

"Yet, early in 1941, despite the secrecy, U.S. Ambassador Greaves [in Japan] heard from Fujiwara's minister to Tokyo about a rumor that Japan was planning an attack on Pearl Harbor. Greaves reported it to Washington, where it was immediately discounted. American officials simply could not believe—then or in the months following—that such an audacious assault was even possible. Moreover, officials in the Navy and State departments

82 C. and O. Gordievsky, 1990, KGB: The Inside Story Of Its Foreign Operations From Lenin to Gorbachev, page 298. The activities of the Komitet Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti, or the Committee of State Security, is beyond the scope of this paper.
were astonished that an ambassador of Grov's caliber could take seriously such an obviously ridiculous story.85

Gordon W. Prange, writing in his monumental 1981 publication entitled At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, has a summarizing statement of "what if" leading up to the successful attack in Hawaii:

"Pearl Harbor resulted from a vast combination of interrelated, complicated, and strange historical factors: on the one hand, bountiful human errors of great variety, false assumptions, fallacious views, a vast store of intelligence badly handled; on the other, precise planning, tireless training, fanatical dedication, iron determination, technical know-how, tactical excellence, clever deception measures, intelligence well-gathered and effectively disseminated, plain guts—and uncommon luck. One cannot point a finger at any one of these factors and say, 'Ah, that did it!' any more than one can look at a building and say, 'See that brick; it is the whole structure.'86"

When Prange conducted his monumental research, this may have been the case, but a 1991 publication entitled Betrayal At Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt Into WWII by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave might provide researchers and interpreters of Pearl Harbor with the proverbial "smoking gun" to end the "what if" question once and for all. The authors, with very impressive credentials and documentation, unequivocally state the following:

"On the evidence presented in the book, we show that Churchill was aware that a task force had sailed from northern Japan in late November 1941, and that one of its likely targets was Pearl Harbor. Churchill deliberately kept this vital information from Roosevelt, because he realized an attack of this nature, whether on the U.S. Pacific Fleet or the Philippines, was a means of fulfilling his publicly proclaimed desire to get America into the War at any cost.87"

The world of geopolitics and espionage is a complicated one, with decisions (and lack of information to make decisions) having world-wide ramifications. Perhaps the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been prevented if it had been decided to prevent it, perhaps not.

Prange wrote in 1981 that "no other aspect of the Pearl Harbor story has generated more heat and less light than the 'weather code' referring to a warning sent to Japanese embassies around the world on November 19, 1941, that hostilities were imminent: 'in case of Japan-U.S. relations in danger: Higashio kazame (east wind rain).'88 Prange continued with the following: 'Was the implementing message

86 Gordon W. Prange, 1941, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, pp. xv-xvi.
received or not? It appears unlikely that Japan ever used the code.*8 It is believed that Japan never sent any message to anybody saying anything like "We shall attack Pearl Harbor" and that the aforementioned Rivestbridge volume rests on the memory of an Australian code breaker working in Singapore.*


Rivestbridge points out, however, that his co-author Eric Nave (whom Kahn describes as "an Australian code breaker") served for 42 years in intelligence and code-breaking with the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Navy, and the Government Code & Cipher School of Great Britain, and the Central Bureau and the Security Intelligence Organisation of Australia, and is described as "the father of British code-breaking in the Far East" (James Rivestbridge and Eric Nave, 1991, Betrayal At Pearl Harbor: How Churchill Lured Roosevelt Into WWII, page 10). Interesting interpretations of the "execuse" message are also to be found in Ronald Lewin's 1985 The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and The Defeat of Japan, pages 70-76.


OPERATION HAWAII

On the 20th of August 1939, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy. Yamamoto was not at all enthusiastic about a war with the United States and although he "believed that Japan would be defeated in a protracted war" he was also a professional military man. Yamamoto was aware of Bywater's work (and perhaps the work of Hoher Lea and others) and the planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor began in 1940.
On the 23rd of October 1941 the Japanese vessel *Yokosuka Maru* arrived in Honolulu to remove Japanese nationals back to Japan and gather final intelligence for the attack on Pearl Harbor. On November 1, 1941, the *Tokyo Maru* also docked in Honolulu. When this vessel left on November 8th, it carried the final sketches of Pearl Harbor as well as plans for Hickam and Wheeler airfields.

"These were to prove invaluable to Yamamoto’s pilots although it is probable that the most valuable acquisition was a set of postcards bought at one of the gift shops in Honolulu. Priced at only one dollar these gave an aerial panoramic view of Pearl Harbor [stress added], and less than five weeks later every Japanese pilot in the planes which attacked the base had a set of them in his cockpit. (The postcards had been photocopied and grid-ed into squares. Squares were allotted to airoint and every pilot knew what ships he could expect to find in his own target area.)"94

On the 2nd of December (Japanese time), "various units of the Combined Fleet received a message in Yamamoto’s name: ‘Niiyaka-yata nobora’ (Climb Mt. Niiyakaa) 1208." 95 One remembers that Mt. Niiyakaa was on the island of Formosa (Taiwan), the highest mountain in the possession of the Japanese Empire and that Rusbridge and Nave wrote that the British Far East Combined Bureau "intercepted" a message on December 2, 1941: “Climb Niiyakayama 1208, repeat 1208.” It hardly needed a codebreaking genius to deduce that this was the date of the opening attack.96 Agawa wrote: this meant "Operations will commence on the day beginning at 0000 hours, December 8," and the attack on Pearl Harbor took place as scheduled.97

"In the predawn hours of Sunday, December 7, 1941, a Japanese task force under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo bore down upon Oahu. His formidable armada centered around six aircraft carriers. Upon reaching a point some 220 miles north of the island, they launched two successive waves totally 380 aircraft—40 torpedo bombers, 78 fighter aircraft, 103 high-altitude bombers, and 124 dive bombers. Their targets were the ships of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s U.S. Pacific fleet at moorings in Pearl Harbor. The Japanese also concentrated heavily upon American airpower located at army airfields and naval air stations throughout the island—Hickam, Wheeler, Ford Island, Kaneohe, and Ewa. Before a single shot had been fired, the Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, leader of the air strike, knew that the Japanese had achieved surprise, and so advised the flagship Akagi, by the code word *Total Total Total* (Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!)*98

The banner that flew on Admiral Nagumo's flagship Akagi was the same banner that was carried on the Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Togo in the successful 1905 Battle of Tsushima.99

While the Japanese attack on the 7th of December 1941 was an overwhelming success (the Japanese lost 155 men and five midget submarines, nine fighters, and fifteen dive-bombers), they failed to destroy two major aspects of 20th century technology: the repair facilities located at Oahu and the oil storage; Petroleum, obviously a major contributing factor to the war in the Pacific, fueled the ships and planes of the fleet, and it all had to be shipped in from the American mainland.

"Admiral Chester Nimitz, who became Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was later to say: "We had about 4 1/2 million barrels of oil out there and all of it was vulnerable to .50 caliber bullets. Had the Japanese destroyed the oil," he added, it would have prolonged the war another two years."100

In the United States there was outrage and war was declared on Japan on the 8th of December 1941. In Tokyo there was mixed feelings, but the Japan Times & Advertiser of December 10, 1941 had the following:

"It is still too early to observe in true perspective the results and significance of the battle of Hawaii which the Imperial Navy opened on Monday morning [Japanese time]. However, the facts and figures already given out by official quarters are quite sufficient to show the turn of the war which has been staged with dramatic suddenness, which is explainable only by the magnitude of the decision Japan has been forced to make... The aim of the war is clear as far as Japan goes. It aims at the ultimate object of a new order for East Asia."101

CONCLUSIONS

The war that raged in the Pacific for the rest of 1941 through August 1945 was brutal: a colleague of mine, P. Willey, has cited the words of Haines on a battle in North America and they are most appropriate for a Pacific setting as well:

"In one way a battle [or the attack on Pearl Harbor] is a moment in time, existing briefly on its own bloody field form some great national purpose... But in another way, a battle is also an epicenter, generating shock waves felt both to a distance and over many years— influencing group fortunes, of course, but also deranging individual lives and setting in motion events to bless or trouble their future."102

101 In Ralph E. Weber (Editor), 1972, As Others See Us: American History in the Foreign Press, pages 248-250.
While there were Japanese and Americans who thought the war was wrong, and unspeakable horrors would result, hundreds of thousands participating and non-participating civilians and combatants were killed in the Pacific during WWII. Battles decided the war and electronic cryptographic work provided the margin of success for the physical battles: "No history of the Pacific War can fail to show the vital role played by intelligence in that conflict."  

"Less than six months after their victory at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese sent forth an enormous, combat-seasoned fleet of eighty-eight surface warships with the dual mission of capturing Midway atoll and forcing the remnants of the weaker end U.S. Pacific Fleet to their destruction. This was to be the opening salvo of their second phase operations which contemplated the isolation of Australia at one extreme and possible capture of Hawaii at the other. But events did not conform to the Japanese pattern, forewarned through superior cryptanalysis and radio intelligence, American naval forces much inferior numerically to the Japanese (twenty-eight surface warships), but superbly led and manned, sped past Midway and were waiting on the enemy's flank [stress added]."  

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was assassinated by American Naval fliers when his plane was shot down on the 18th of April 1943 while on an inspection tour in the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. Japan's plans for a conquered Hawaii after a successful war never came to pass. "Remember Pearl Harbor" became the rallying call and as William T. Laurence wrote in The New York Times on September 9, 1945, after accompanying the B-29 bomber that had dropped the second Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki: "Does one feel any pity or compassion for the poor devils about to die? Not when one thinks of Pearl Harbor and of the Death March of Bataan."  

In Japan, during World War II, civilian deaths would result not only from bombings but also from malnutrition and disease. In April of 1941, ten years after the war with China began in, the basic staple of rice was rationed in Japan and death was ever-present:  

"[In Japan], up till 1938, deaths from tuberculosis [for example] numbered 40,000 per year, already a high figure, but in 1942 the figure was 160,000, and in 1943 it exceeded 170,000. After 1944, the Japanese Government stopped announcing the figure."  

The war turned against Japan after the 1942 Battle of Midway but the Japanese public was not told the truth. The war in the Pacific was a long and bloody war and it was a war of attrition and extensive deaths on both sides. The Battle of Midway was the  

104 Gordon W. Prange, 1982, Miracle At Midway, page xi.  
turing point in the 40-month conflict in the Pacific yet it was a lengthy period of time between mid-1942 and August 1945:

"Following the Battle of Midway, United States forces did not confront a major Japanese fleet until mid-1944. They did not engage even a medium-size Japanese army until 1944. Yet by that time Japan had been effectively defeated." 108

The total number of casualties in Pacific battles were immense and thousands died on both sides.

"The impression statistics of war, tallied after the hostilities, do give some measure of the blood and treasure expended. There are, however, several that do not conveniently fit the next, clean tables of military statistician. Of the total number of Americans who died in the Pacific, the remains of 30,000 were never recovered. While one percent of those taken prisoner of war in Europe died, fifty-seven percent of American prisoners in the Pacific succumbed in captivity." 109

On July 10, 1944, battles on Saipan (Mariana Islands) saw 24,000 Japanese die and 1,782 taken as prisoners. Some 4,000 Americans died and 10,000 were wounded. Williams and Wallace have written about Japan’s notorious Unit 731 and Japanese biological warfare plans. Japanese had been preparing to supply bacteriological weapons for the Pacific conflict since May 1944 and a ship loaded with plague-infested fleas was sent to Saipan, but was sunk en route. 110

By 1944-1945 the United States was planning its invasions of the main islands of Japan under the rubric of "Operation Olympic" and the southern main island of Kyushu, location of Kagoshima Bay (where the Japanese had created a Pearl Harbor in miniature in the Fall of 1941 to practice their attack) was set to be invaded on November 1, 1945. The American invasion of the island of Honshu (location of Tokyo), code-named "Operation Coronet" was scheduled for March 1, 1946. 111

As American invasion plans for the Japanese islands proceeded, "conventional" bombing of Japan continued: in 1945, on the 9th of March, 325 American B-29 bombers raided Tokyo, under the direction of Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. LeMay was a believer in strategic bombing to end the war and on this single 1945 evening massive death struck Japan: "the incendiary bombs [on March 9, 1945] killed 83,733 human beings, injured half that number and destroyed more than a million buildings." 112

LeMay’s ideas were supported and the cities of Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe were bombed on March 11, 14, and 16, 1945.

111 James Jones, 1975, WWII: A Chronicle of Soldiering, page 222 and see E. P. Hoyt, 1972, The Carrier War, page 2, for the role of Kagoshima prior to December 7, 1941.
"At one night Tokyo had suffered a greater disaster than any other city on earth, greater than London or Berlin or Hamburg or Dresden, greater than Hiroshima and Nagasaki which were to come. The stories of the ordeal were horrendous. Flames hundreds of feet high in a rolling wall of fire moved toward the buildings."\textsuperscript{113}

The European War ended in May 1945 and the most highly decorated American Army military unit for all of World War II fought in Europe: the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, volunteers composed of AJAs, or Americans of Japanese Ancestry. AJAs also fought gallantly in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{114}

World War II in the Pacific continued with ferocious bombings of Japan: 302 B-29s were sent to Tokyo on May 10, 1945, with incendiaries and high explosives to hit industrial sites and naval fuel storage facilities. On May 14, 1945, 472 B-29s were sent with incendiaries to bomb the urban area of Nagoya. Between May 8, 1945 and August 6, 1945 (until the nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima), a total of 14,836 B-29 bombers were launched against various targets in Japan in anticipation of the invasion of the Japanese Islands.\textsuperscript{115} It was clear that Japan was losing the war yet it is recorded in the 1945 Minutes of the Japanese Supreme War Council Meeting that "on June 8 [1945], at an Imperial Conference, the army and navy leaders expressed their determination to carry on the war, no matter what" [stress added].\textsuperscript{115}

American planners were aware of Allied and German invasion deaths in June 1944 at Normandy in Europe. Considering what the Americans would be facing in Japan, the Japanese-American invasion death toll was estimated to be very high on both sides. The American Invasion of Kyushu Island for November 1, 1945, was planned to include 551,180 individuals: 392,920 personnel from the United States Army and 159,260 from the United States Marines, not including the naval and air personnel which would assist in the invasion. The invading American forces would be facing a Japanese defense force estimated at 791,700 individuals.\textsuperscript{117} Jones wrote:

"...the thought that the United States actually came that close to a bloody all-out invasion of Japan proper is chilling. The loss of life on the U.S. side alone, never mind the Japanese, would have more than tripled, quadrupled the combined losses of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese losses would have sent it sky high. That the planners were aware of the near certainty of this bloodbath is clear in the number of divisions they allocated to the invasion: twenty-eight. With more to follow, as reinforcements and replacements were needed."\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{113} James Jones, 1975, \textit{WWII: A Chronicle of Soldiering}, page 274.


\textsuperscript{117} Dr. Warner & P. Warner, 1992, \textit{The Sacred Warriors: Japan's Suicide Legion}, p. 299.

In the The Sacred Warriors: Japan's Suicide Legions, Warner and Warner point out that American estimates of what was available for defensive purposes in Japan was discovered to be grossly inaccurate after the war ended:

"When the war ended on August 15 [1945], Japan still had some 12,725 planes of all types—5,661 in the Army and 7,047 in the Navy. A hundred underground aircraft plants were in various stages of completion, although most of the machinery was not yet in production. Nevertheless, the production figures from both surface and underground plants in July [1945] revealed that a total of 1,131 new planes had been built during the month. There was general confidence [in Japan] that the underground plants would be in full production by the end of the year and that, until the actual invasion, production could at least keep pace with aircraft losses. Scarcely a village of any size did not have some sort of aircraft manufacturing activity, while abandoned mines, railway tunnels, viaducts, and even the basement of department stores had been turned into factories to feed the demands of the kamikaze corps."119

World War II came to a halt with two bombs: the Atomic Bomb was dropped by The Enola Gay on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and the second Atomic Bomb was dropped by The Grande Artist on Nagasaki on August 9, 1945.

"Yet even as late as the Nagasaki explosion, the Army Chief of Staff insisted on remaining senior officials that Japanese soldiers and sailors were not permitted to surrender under any circumstances; suicide was the only acceptable way out. On August 13, four days after the explosion of the Nagasaki bomb, Vice-Admiral Takeo Onishi, the creator of the kamikaze missions, was still advocating that the government reject surrender. Instead, he said the Japanese should fight to the bitter end, and 20 million should sacrifice themselves in suicide attacks against the invading troops."120

Emperor Hirohito of Japan made a recording on the 14th of August 1945 and although some discredited soldiers attempted to stop the broadcast (scheduled for the 15th), the record was broadcast and the message finally ended battles in the Pacific. An English translation of Emperor Hirohito's speech is interesting to read for the word "surrender" does not appear: "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage"121 and the use of the "most cruel bomb" might end all of human civilization." In a 1984 publication entitled Japan's Decision to Surrender, the point was made that the wording in the Emperor's August 1945 speech gave "the inference was that Japan, by her own act, was saving the rest of the world."122

One of the interesting aspects of World War II in the Pacific is that there is evidence that certain Japanese militarists were working on the development of a Japanese atomic bomb to be used against the American invasion forces of the Japanese

122 R. Butow, 1954, Japan's Decision to Surrender, page 2.
main islands. This Japanese scientific endeavor began in the 1930s and continued up to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.123

The 1942 Battle of Midway was heavily analyzed by Japanese militarists (because they obviously lost the Battle) and in the Tokyo-based Pacific War Research Society one reads in their 1972 volume entitled The Day Man Lost Hiroshima, 6 August 1945, about ideas prevalent in Japan in 1942. The charge had been given to a Japanese committee which held its first meeting on 8 July 1942:

"As time went on, Japanese losses, both on the sea and in the air, mounted staggeringly, and now the [Japanese] navy found itself forced to consider the feasibility of producing a new and powerful weapon. That weapon was the atomic bomb [stress added]. As a result of these consultations, the [Japanese] navy determined, in the spring of 1942, to undertake studies on the utilization of atomic energy-studies to be directed by the Technological Research Unit."124

Certain elements of the Japanese military were attempting to develop a nuclear device which would be used in the war against the United States of America and this decision was made well before 1942. Writing in his authoritative 1936 Pulitzer Prize winning volume entitled The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Richard Rhodes states that both the Japanese Imperial Navy and the Army Air Force "had moved separately since 1941 to promote atomic bomb research"125 and Thomas and Writs, writing in the 1977 book entitled Enola Gay, corroborate this point; they go so far as to state that Dr. Tsuchisaburo Asada ("possibly Japan's most imaginative scientist") worked closely with the Japanese military prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor *and on December 17, 1941, he was one of the scientists selected to work on Project A. This was the code name for Japan's atomic research.126

Weintraub writes that on August 5, 1945 (the day before the Atomic Bomb was dropped on Nagasaki by the Enola Gay), a meeting was held in the Hiroshima Castle between the theoretical physicist Professor Yoshiraku Mimura and military men:

"Within months, a massive invasion of the home islands seemed likely. 'Could you tell us, sir,' a young lieutenant colonel asked, 'what an atomic bomb is? Is there any possibility that the bomb will be developed by the end of the war?' ... Mimura entreated, knowing nothing of any Japanese enterprise to apply fission theory to bomb-making. 'But I can tell you this much: not before the end of the war.'"127

Another Japanese atomic scientist associated with Japanese research on the bomb was Yoshio Nishina, who had studied Physics in Europe in 1921-1928 under the Nobel Prize Winner Niels Bohr. After Hiroshima, on August 7, 1945, Nishina mad a visit to Hiroshima to analyze the damage and he had a conversation with the Japanese Deputy Chief of the General Staff:

"At dawn on August 7 the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Kawabe, had received a further report with a sentence that was at first incomprehensible: 'The whole city of Hiroshima was destroyed instantly by a single bomb.' Kawabe immediately remembered that Nishina had once told him, at an earlier date, that according to information supplied by the Japanese Naval Intelligence Service, atomic bombardment was a possibility. As soon as the professor appeared Kawabe asked: 'Could you build an atom bomb in six months? In favorable circumstances we might be able to hold out that long (stress added).' Nishina replied: 'Under present conditions six years would not be long enough. In any case we have no uranium.'"128

Thousands of deaths, planned biological warfare, and real (and potential) atomic warfare came about as a result of Pearl Harbor. We must also remember that United States Executive Order 9066 (signed on February 12, 1942 and resulting in the internment of more than 100,000 Japanese-American citizens in various camps) also resulted from Pearl Harbor.129 The National Park Service in charge of the Arizona Memorial (124 feet long by 38 feet wide) is located in Pearl Harbor. A major tourist attraction of Hawaii (in addition to the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific or "Punchbowl"), the memorial was designed by Alfred Preis (intended as an aisle on America's entry into the war130) and it must be visited to begin to understand and feel "a date which will live in infamy." World War II was brutal.

EPILOGUE

"They lived in a squatter; some whites might have found more alarming had it not been so conveniently out of sight. Alley dwellings often had no plumbing. One water faucet on a pipe rising up from the ground served several houses. Open-ended barrels set down over holes in the ground served as privies—the city health department counted fifteen thousand of them—and were used by as many as thirty people each. The alley shacks themselves were crumbling, unpainted and filthy. Social workers and social scientists studied life in the alleys the way anthropologists studied life on the Pacific Islands."131

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129 Please note the following: "Because President Roosevelt's executive order was not specifically addressed towards Japanese or Japanese-Americans, it was potentially applicable to all persons and not restricted to conditions of war. To prevent a repetition of the blanket injustice allowed under 9066, the JACL (Japanese American Citizens League) lobbyed actively for its repeal. On February 19, 1976, President Gerald Ford formally rescinded the order" (STRESS ADDED) (James Oda, 1981, Harry's Struggles of Japanese Americans: Parian Fighters From American Concentration Camps, page 17.
130 A.P. Hyde, 1982, Pearl Harbor: Then and Now, page 49.
131 David Brinkley, 1988, Washington Does It War, page 15.
This statement comes from a 1988 work by David Brinkley entitled *Washington Goes to War*, and it is a description of pre-World War II Washington, D.C., in the United States of America. Whenever possible, I argue that World War II was the greatest global-scale cultural event to occur on this planet, and Brinkley's book aptly points out the development of Washington, D.C. from the 1930s and 1940s: World War II did it.

As we move into the 21st Century, almost 50 years since Pearl Harbor and 60 years since the first Japanese attacks in China, I am not going to get into a pompous phase and ask the question of "are we currently on a collision course with Japan again?" We might be, we might not: anyway, who would listen to a relatively obscure Professor from California. I will, however, share the saddest words I came across in researching this paper: "In many ways, the Second World War was a replay of the first."

One can only hope that the survivors of a future war will not state that World War II was a replay of World War II. War is an exceedingly inefficient and stupid form of international diplomacy.

I will, however, raise the questions: how much of what was presented had you been aware of? Did you learn something new? Did you think about something old in a new context? How do we interpret culture(s)? And how do we learn about history?

I do know, for example, that Professor Joe Conlin's 1990 textbook *The American Past: A Survey of American History*, raises the statement of "was the atomic bomb necessary" to end the war with Japan and points out the pros and cons of such a question. While I do not read Japanese, I read enough English materials to know that questions such as these, and other topics, are not offered in Japanese history texts. A recent *New York Times Magazine* article, entitled "Pearl Harbor in The Mind Of Japan" has the following statement:

"A recent newspaper article quoted a Japanese high-school teacher complaining that his students were surprised to learn that there had been a war with the United States. The first thing they wanted to know, he said, was who won."

Historical ineptitude, however, is also prevalent in this country as an article on the 10th of November pointed out under the title of "Texas Holds Up Stupid Textbooks" and the fact that numerous history textbooks were being delayed for adoption in that state because of "many 250 errors" in the various books, including one book which stated that "the United States ended the [1953] Korean conflict by 'using the bomb.'"

There is a contemporary Japanese organization that provides free trips for American teachers to Japan and also provides them with a teacher's guidebook.

"Much of the information Japan filters to American teachers is generic, like descriptions of its geography, climate, wildlife, and population. But other items echo many of Japan's standard propaganda themes... Many of these teaching materials present history and... from a Japanese perspective. One widely distributed workbook funded in large part by the Japanese explains that Japan's military invasion of China was a response to European and American insults after World War I—live not racism. Another guide glosses over Japan's subjugation of Korea and Taiwan and its military occupation of China, much as Japan's own school textbooks do. The atrocities Japan committed against the Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, Dutch, Americans, British, and others who came under Japanese control in World War II are conspicuously omitted—just as they are in Japan's own textbooks. On the other hand, these texts pay substantial attention to America's role in 'creating' the war in the Pacific. U.S. actions that are said to have influenced Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor, and Japan's perspective of America's dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." The author of this recent (and disturbing) book dealing with Japan's political influence in the United States continues:

"The way the Japanese government, which controls the education curriculum in its own country, presents much of this information is deeply disturbing, as if one sought to teach about Germany's role in World War II without mentioning its conquests, its brutal occupations, or the Holocaust." 136

One may not be aware of all of the situations mentioned above, but one should be aware of the fact that something called "reality" exists and we can only "comprehend" a miniscule fraction of it and we can only "teach" or "share" or "communicate" about an even smaller fraction of that fraction... The Wall Street Journal quoted Sir Isaac Newton [1642-1727] on 1 November 1991:

"What we knew is a drop; What we don't know is an ocean."

I also appreciate the statement of Wilson, writing about the Chinese-Japanese War years: "When tigers fight, the forest is shattered." 137

An education should shout out one to go beyond the immediate drop that you know about. An education should encourage one to go beyond the drop that you are taught about. An education should also encourage one to make your own contribution to the ocean of culture around us.

The anthropologist deals with culture. We observe only a portion of culture when we work with people around the world. We are well aware that there is much more below the surface and that is what we try to understand. This is definitely the exciting part about education, about life.138

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Urbanowicz was born in 1942 and attended New York University (1960-1961). After serving in the United States Air Force (1961-1965) he received the B.A. in Sociology/Anthropology from Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington (1967) and the Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Oregon (1972) based on fieldwork in the Polynesian Kingdom of Tonga (1970-1971). After teaching at the University of Minnesota (1972-1973) he joined the faculty of California State University, Chico, and is now a Professor of Anthropology at that Institution. He was Associate Dean in the Center for Regional and Continuing Education at CSU, Chico (1977-1988) and over those years was involved in the University's distance education activities utilizing satellite technologies and he still follows aspects of information technologies on a global scale. Research interests in 20th Century science and various applications (Urbanowicz 1989, 1991a, and 1991b) influenced his interest in espionage techniques via the electronic medium. Urbanowicz made his first visit to Hawaii in 1970 and has been researching issues relating to World War II, and the impact of tourism in Hawaii, ever since.

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138 This brief paper is part of a larger piece of on-going research into World War II. An earlier version of this paper was discussed with my seminar students (ANTH 306B: Pacific) in the Spring of 1990.


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Characters 97233 16625
Words 15622 2640
Lines 1783 244
Paragraphs 735 139

1 December '91 10 Point Geneva