

THE CHICO HISTORIAN

**Volume 31
2022**

**The Journal
of the Chico
State History
Department**



“A strange thing is memory, and hope; one looks backward, and the other forward; one is of today, the other of tomorrow. Memory is history recorded in our brain, memory is a painter, it paints pictures of the past and of the day.”

- *Grandma Moses*

Cover Art & Design

Photo of Trinity Hall, 2022 by Marie Swanson. Constructed in 1933, today it is the home of the CSU, Chico History Department.

History Department
California State University, Chico
400 West First Street
Trinity Hall Room 223
Chico, California, 95929-0735
(530) 898-5366

The Chico Historian is an annual publication of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of the Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor Society and the California State University, Chico (CSUC) Department of History. It aims to provide students the opportunity to publish historical works, and to train editorial staff members in producing an academic journal. Issues are published at the end of each academic year. All opinions or statements of fact are the sole responsibility of the authors and may not reflect the views of the editorial staff. The authors retain rights to individual essays.

Phi Alpha Theta's mission is to promote the study of history through the encouragement of research, good teaching, publication, and the exchange of learning and ideas among historians. The organization seeks to bring students, teachers, and writers of history together for intellectual and social exchanges, which promote and assist historical research and publication by our members in a variety of ways.

We dedicate this volume to Dr. Kate Transchel

Dr. Transchel, a historian of Russia, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and European Women's History, will be retiring from her teaching position here at Chico State in December 2022. Dr. Transchel received her Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and began teaching at Chico State in 1996. Her passion for history, activism, and her genuine love and care for her students has inspired many. Dr. Transchel's presence on campus will be greatly missed, but her infectious spirit and grace will carry on in all the students whose lives she has impacted.

“Well-behaved women seldom make history” – Dr. Laurel Ulrich



The Chico Historian

Volume 31: 2022

The Annual Publication of the
Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta
and the Department of History
California State University, Chico

Chief Editors

Riley Rosenberg and Emily Swanson

Editorial Board

Patrick Blinkinsop

Corina Bowman

Clare Grim

Vivian Hernandez

Casey Johnson

Bryn McFarren

Kira Runkle

Advising Faculty

Dr. Alisa Wade, Phi Alpha Theta

Contents

Introduction & Acknowledgments	viii
Contributor and Editor Biographies	xi

Articles

<i>The ‘Frisco Fight for the Post-War Future: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s Efforts to Promote Civil Rights on the World Stage in 1945</i>	
MARYANN SPEARS	1

<i>The Implications of Ignorance: Discrimination, Prejudice, a Lack of Assimilation, and the Misunderstandings of Italian Socialism as it Related to the Internment of Italian Americans during WWII</i>	
CASSIE FERRAIUOLO	15

<i>The United States’ Severance from Fulgencio Batista</i>	
HAYLEY TYSON	30

<i>No Justice for the Outsider</i>	
LUKAS SANDRO	43

<i>Conflict is an Opportunity for Growth: Evangelical Expansion During the Guatemalan Civil War</i>	
SEAN MELLON	57

<i>The Antislavery Roots of the Women’s Suffrage Movement</i>	
KIRA RUNKLE	71

<i>Reproductive Commodification in Southern Antebellum Plantations: Economics and Agency of the Enslaved Female from 1800-1860</i>	
EMILY SWANSON	81

<i>Compañeras: Roles of Women in Latin American Leftist Revolutions</i>	
HANNAH WILLIAMS	100
<i>The Pill and its Impacts on American Society, 1960-1980</i>	
VIVIAN HERNANDEZ	113
<i>The Feminist Movement and its Evolution in Modern Mexico, 1970s-2000s</i>	
ANAHÍ MARTINEZ	128
<i>Fatality Beyond Battle: The Role of the Smallpox Epidemic in the Revolutionary War</i>	
BRYN MCFARREN	142
<i>American Gay Soldiers in World War Two: A Performance in Gender and Sexuality</i>	
BENJAMIN ROBERTSON	152
<i>Creating the Liberator</i>	
PATRICK BLINKINSOP	169
<i>The Politics of Redemption: Lessons from the Life of George C. Wallace</i>	
SAMUEL RUTTENBURG	184
<u>Appendix</u>	
Phi Alpha Theta 2021-2022 Initiates	197

Introduction & Acknowledgements

It is our greatest pleasure to present to you this year's edition of *The Chico Historian*, the student-run periodical of the Chico State History Department. Now in its thirty-first volume, this edition showcases the remarkable work done by Chico State History students over the last year. The sheer number of submissions made it difficult to decide which papers to include, but with the guidance of faculty and our dedicated column editors, this year's edition has shaped up to be one of the best yet. Representative of the fantastic scholarship undertaken at Chico State, this edition features fourteen papers written by CSUC students, current and alumni, which is a larger number of papers than most editions of *The Chico Historian*. In it, contributors drew on a plethora of sources and perspectives for research stretching from the late-eighteenth century to the present. The journal could not have come to fruition without the patience, diligence, and hard work of our amazing editorial board, student contributors, and advising faculty.

While diverse in subject matter, the contributions in this issue of *The Chico Historian* center on the theme of historical memory, highlighting untold or understudied aspects of recognizable moments in history. Organized through their thematic connections, the essays run chronologically and sometimes narratively. The papers' authors provide a nuanced and fuller understanding of familiar historical events by reinterpreting or recentering the past. Organizationally, the journal begins with its first thematic connection: papers looking at the American political environment. To begin with, Maryann Spear's "The 'Frisco Fight for the Post-War Future: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's Efforts to Promote Civil Rights on the World Stage in 1945" pushes back against the idea that the Civil Rights Movement in the United States began in the 1950s, and instead makes a case for the long Civil Rights movement. Cassie Ferraiuolo, in "The Implications of Ignorance: Discrimination, Prejudice, a lack of Assimilation, and the Misunderstandings of Italian Socialism as it Relates to the Internment of Italian Americans during WWII," looks at the commonly overlooked experience of Italian Americans during WWII, and how US red scare politics affected Italian's assimilation and experiences. Hayley Tyson's essay "The United States' Severance From Fulgencio Batista" displays a watershed moment for US Cold War foreign policy, marking the transition from a supposed humanitarian-

centered approach to one focused on “anything but communism.” Looking at the 1979 Greensboro Massacre, Lukas Sandro’s “No Justice for the Outsider: Ku Klux Klan and Nazism” displays media and governmental bias against the Communist Workers Party and argues against the idea that the Civil Rights Movement marks an end to the fight against racism. Lastly, Sean Mellon’s paper titled “Conflict is an Opportunity for Growth: Evangelical Expansion During the Guatemalan Civil War” shows how the ideology of the religious right under Reagan’s administration affected the Guatemalan Civil War.

Our next thematic connection seeks to highlight women’s agency and involvement in social movements in the US and Latin America. To begin, Kira Runkle, in “The Antislavery Roots of the Women’s Suffrage Movement,” argues against historiography that disconnects the women’s suffrage movement from the abolitionist movement in the United States. Emily Swanson’s “Reproductive Commodification in Southern Antebellum Plantations:

Economics and Agency of the Enslaved Female from 1800-1860” addresses the commodification of enslaved women’s bodies in southern antebellum plantations while also looking at agency and resistance often overlooked in narratives of enslavement. Hannah Williams’ paper “*Compañeras*: Roles of Women in Leftist L.A. Revolutions” explores women’s roles in communist and socialist movements in Latin America and argues women’s increasing involvement in those social movements prompted greater advancement for gender equity. Vivian Hernandez’s “The Pill and its Impacts on American Society, 1960-1980” explores the historiography of the birth control pill in the United States, highlighting the significance and opportunities the pill created for women. To close out our section on women’s agency and participation in social movements, Anahí Martínez’s “The Feminist Movement and its Evolution in Modern Mexico, 1970s-2000s” looks at second-wave feminism in Mexico and how women’s organizing brought about social and cultural advancements for women’s rights.

The final essays provide shifting perspectives on frequently studied historical events, highlighting how historical memory changes and adapts to historiography over time. This section opens with Bryn McFarren’s “Fatality Beyond Battle: The Role of the Smallpox Epidemic in the Revolutionary War,” which examines smallpox’s role in the American Revolution. In “American Gay Soldiers of World War Two: A Performance in Gender and Sexuality,” Benjamin Robertson highlights American gay men’s participation in WWII and the discrimination they

faced because of their sexuality. Patrick Blinkinsop’s “Creating the Liberator” analyzes Simón Bolívar’s life and legacy and the ever-changing narratives surrounding how he is remembered. To round out our section on historical memory and shifting perspectives, Samuel Rutenburg’s “The Politics of Redemption: Lessons from the Life of George C. Wallace” grapples with the legacy of the controversial pro-segregationist George Wallace.

We would like to express our deepest gratitude to all those who made this issue of *The Chico Historian* possible. We are grateful to the History Department, including department chair Dr. Robert Tinkler and Administrative Support Coordinator Alyssa Danielli, for the generous departmental support given to *The Chico Historian*. We also thank Dr. Alisa Wade, who served as the faculty advisor for the journal and provided invaluable insight and advice. Additionally, we would like to express our appreciation for History Club and Phi Alpha Theta co-advisor Dr. Sinwoo Lee. We also wish to extend our thanks to all Chico State faculty who mentored and advised students, helped craft their papers, and supported them in the submission process. We deeply appreciate all our contributors, who so willingly went through the editorial process with us. Lastly, the chief editors would like to thank the members of our editorial board, who volunteered their time to solicit submissions and edit papers, enabling us to present this issue.

The Chico Historian Editorial Board

Contributor and Editor Biographies

Patrick James Blinkinsop is a graduating senior at CSU Chico. He is majoring in History and has an interest in the popular memory of historical figures. Patrick's paper is the product of Dr. Lewis' Latin American-focused HIST 490W.

Corina A. Bowman is a junior at Chico State University, majoring in History and graduating in the spring of 2023. Originally from Modesto, California, she transferred to the CSU from Modesto Junior College. Her main area of interest in history includes, but is not limited to, gender history concerning the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, an interest encouraged by taking courses with both Dr. Wade and Dr. Transchel during her first year at the CSU, and previously with Professor Kerr at MJC.

Cassie Ferraiuolo is a History graduate student at Chico State as well as a U.S. history teacher in Colusa, CA. She is interested in many areas; however, European history, art history, and local history have a special place in her heart. This paper was written for Dr. Transchel's European-centered HIST 490W.

Clare Grim is a graduating senior from CSU Chico studying history with an interest in women's history, as well as the history of the United States' energy and oil policies. Her research currently focuses on the history of oil production and consumption, emphasizing its relationship to wars.

Vivian Hernandez is a graduating senior double-majoring in History and Latin American Studies with minors in Spanish and Global Development Studies. She will be entering the History Ph.D. program at UCLA in the fall, where she will focus on Modern Latin American history, specifically women's and gender history in twentieth-century Mexico. Vivian wrote this paper in the spring of 2020 for Dr. Wade's HIST 600 Graduate Research Seminar with the hopes of gaining a better understanding of the historiography of birth control in the United States.

Casey Johnson is a graduating senior studying History at CSU Chico. His historical interest is modern United States History, with a focus on the impacts of racial violence and white supremacy outside of the US South.

Anahí Martínez is a fourth-year majoring in History and minoring in Asian Studies. Her research interests involve Latin American Studies, Japanese history and culture, and gender studies. Anahí wrote this paper in Fall 2021 for Dr. Lewis' HIST 490W class.

Bryn McFarren is a graduating senior at CSU Chico studying history. Her historical interests include early and colonial United States history. Bryn wrote this paper in Spring 2021 in Dr. Wade's HIST 431 class.

Sean Mellon earned a Bachelor of the Arts in History after four years at Chico State and graduated following the Spring semester of 2021. Sean wrote this paper during his final semester for Dr. Lewis' History 490W class. His research on Guatemala was motivated by an acute interest in historical materialism and the United States' abuses of the Truman Doctrine.

Benjamin Robertson graduated from CSU, Chico, with his History M.A. in the Fall of 2021. His areas of interest are the history of fascism and 20th-century Germany. He has recently shifted his focus toward gender and sexuality in East Germany, which was spurred on by this graduate research project.

Riley Rosenberg is a first-semester student in CSU Chico's History MA program. He is interested in all sorts of history, but he has recently been interested in labor and political history. This was Riley's first time being Chief Editor of *The Chico Historian* and he learned a great deal from his fellow students and the wonderful faculty at Chico State.

Kira Runkle is a second-year undergraduate student in the History Pre-Credential Program at California State University Chico. She enjoys many aspects of history, but she is most interested in women's history, social history, and European history, especially in regard to revolution. After completing her undergraduate studies, Kira hopes to obtain her M.A in History and teaching credential to teach history at the high school level. This paper was originally written for Dr. Wade's 300W: Historical Methodology class, which focused on diversity within the United States of America. This class made her realize how many marginalized groups are left out of the historical archive and the importance of extending their agency within historical writing. In her free time, Kira enjoys reading, spending time with friends, exploring nature, and painting.

Samuel Ruttenburg is a History major at CSU Chico set to graduate in May 2022. His goal as an historian is to spark difficult and necessary conversations that explore the dark and beautiful depths of human nature. He spent his early twenties working on farms and in bagel shops before returning to finish his college degree. This paper was written in Fall 2021 for HIST 446: The American South, proctored by Professor R. Tinkler. Samuel would like to thank Prof. Tinkler for the feedback, encouragement, and keen southern insights that made this paper fit for publication.

Lukas Sandro is a graduate student at CSU Chico. His field of interest is in East Asian and Russian history, with a specific focus on gender studies. He wrote this paper for Dr. Livingston's HIST 490W, Historical Research, and Writing, in Spring 2021.

Maryann Spears is graduating from Chico State in May of 2022 with a double major in History and Liberal Studies. This paper was written for Dr. Matray's 490W course in the Fall of 2021. This paper intersected her interest in 20th century United States political history with Dr. Matray's specialty in the United States foreign relations. Further inspiration came from the works of historian Carol Anderson.

Emily Swanson is a graduate student at CSU, Chico. Her historical interests are gender and sexuality in American history, the history of childbirth and midwifery, domestic material culture, and literary history.

Hayley Tyson is a fourth-year student majoring in History. Her research interests are in United States history, specifically social and political history. Hayley wrote their paper for Dr. Lewis' Latin American focused HIST 490W.

Hannah Williams is a graduating senior from CSU Chico as a History major. She will return in the fall as a graduate student to get her single subject teaching credential with the goal of becoming a high school history teacher. This paper was written for Dr. Lewis' Latin American History focused HIST 490W class during the Fall of 2021.

Articles

The 'Frisco Fight for the Post-War Future: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's Efforts to Promote Civil Rights on the World Stage in 1945

Maryann Spears

World War II called upon many countries to fight for human rights on the world stage. The United States fulfilled this obligation when it joined the war alongside the major Allied powers of France, Britain, and the Soviet Union to free the world of fascism. The U.S.'s role in fighting for democracy abroad looks nothing short of hypocritical when juxtaposed with the simultaneous domestic fight to end racial discrimination. Civil rights activists saw this as a prime opportunity to force the U.S. government to be consistent and enact reforms to achieve equality for marginalized groups in the United States.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) took hold of the opportunity to have the world's attention on the need for human rights and democracy. The NAACP saw a great need to globalize conversations about discrimination and race. Walter White, executive secretary of the NAACP, and NAACP co-founder W.E.B. Du Bois persuaded the U.S. State Department of the necessity of publicizing Black Americans' ongoing struggle for equal rights and opportunities under the law. The upcoming UNICO in San Francisco was the perfect opportunity, and the two aforementioned individuals were appointed as consultants. This paper will explain the reasons why White and Du Bois were ultimately unsuccessful in implementing their agenda at the UNICO and how their actions and policy choices at the UNICO affected their domestic campaign by drawing divisions between colonialism and communism. The political environment that surrounded the NAACP going into the 1945 San Francisco Conference forming the United Nations, particularly Red Scare politics and US colonial interest, made it impossible for them to achieve their desired goals of expanding the rights of Black Americans through internal institutions.

The goal of the 1945 San Francisco Conference was not to end the ongoing World War; rather, the only concern of the participants was the formation of an international organization with the strength to prevent such conflicts in the future. Fifty nations attended the gathering, with a total of 850 delegates. Including their respective staff and consultants, there were 3,500 people in attendance.¹ The conference set

¹ The United Nations, "History of the United Nations: The San Francisco Conference," <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/san-francisco-conference> (accessed October 1, 2021).

out to decide the structure for how the United Nations would operate. The delegates created four commissions— General Provisions, General Assembly, Security Council, and Judicial Organization. Each was further split up into committees. The primary focus of the NAACP’s attention and action was the Committee on Trusteeship within the General Assembly Commission.²

At the conference, the attending nations were building upon the work the Allied powers had already completed at the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences in August 1944 and February 1945. However, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China were the only countries at these earlier meetings and therefore played pivotal roles in agenda-setting. John Foster Dulles, later secretary of state for the Eisenhower administration, admitted that many of the shortcomings of the two aforementioned conferences may have resulted from the lack of representation of less economically powerful nations.³ This setback in the early stages of the organization made it difficult for smaller nations to advocate for their rights internationally, which is most evident when looking at the issue of colonization and representation within the Trustee Council.⁴ Further examination of the geopolitical context outside of the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences is necessary to further understand the challenges the NAACP faced.

Conversations surrounding the role of race in World War II started long before any talks of peace, focusing on the relationship between race at home and the fight for freedom abroad. Although Robert Vann did not officially coin the term “Double V” campaign until 1942, the movement’s roots started before World War II with the Black Internationalist Movement of the 1930s. Hitler and Mussolini’s disenfranchisement and discrimination of Black people made it easy to connect the fight for civil rights domestically to the fight against fascism abroad. Many Black leaders supported the war effort because of this connection. The “Double V” represented a victory for civil rights both at home and abroad.

A. Phillip Randolph, the leader of the March on Washington Movement in early 1941, proposed a march in Washington D.C. to demand equal rights for African Americans. This action led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to end racial discrimination in the defense

² “Proposed Structure: The United Nations Congress on International Organization,” *Alliance Review*, (30 April 1945): 3.

³ Sylvanna M. Falcón, *Race, Gender, and Geopolitics in the Establishment of the UN*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

industry through Executive Order 8802.⁵ The barring of discrimination in industrial employment was an example that the war helped turn the tide toward Black American equality. The war provided an intersection for pan-racialist and Black American leaders to fight for a more equitable world for all peoples. This movement brought with it an increase in race consciousness among much of the Black community. In addition, the movement gave the Black community a new sense of empathy and understanding for colonized people. Despite this, there were also widely held views doubting the U.S. capacity to apply its wartime goals abroad to domestic issues in peacetime.⁶

The NAACP was not alone in joining the fight for a more globalized view of racial equality. The National Urban League, the National Negro Conference, the National Council for Negro Women, the March on Washington Movement, and the NAACP made up the five most dominant civil rights organizations at this time, and all took similar policy positions to the NAACP in regard to foreign affairs. All of these groups sought to see a world rebuilt after the war in a way that barred racial discrimination and brought freedom and democracy to all. The National Urban League (NUL) was adamant that peace could not be limited to restoring life as it was before the war began. In an article published in the NUL's journal in 1945, author Pearl Buck noted that "the war ends then, with mankind holding the atomic bomb in one hand and in the other imperialism, domination over colonial people and the colored races, prejudices, and distrust."⁷

As previously mentioned, the March on Washington Movement played a key role in desegregating the U.S. defense industry, but this did not end skepticism of the U.S.'s claim to be fighting for freedom and democracy. Randolph criticized the war effort more generally, stating that the conflict had more to do with a power struggle among imperial nations than bringing freedom to oppressed peoples.⁸ Mary McLeod Bethune was the founding president of the National Council for Negro Women and a prominent member of the NAACP. Bethune would attend the San Francisco Conference under her NAACP title as one of its three consultants to the U.S. delegation. Nonetheless, her organization was outspoken about the connection between domestic turmoil in regard to civil rights and the growing global unrest towards the pre-war colonial

⁵ Waldo E. Martin Jr. and Patricia Sullivan, *Civil Rights in the United States: Double V Campaign*, (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2000).

⁶ James L. Roark, "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 1943-1953," *African Historical Studies* 4, no. 2 (1971), 254-55.

⁷ Pearl Buck, "Where the People Stand," *Opportunity*, XXIII, 4 (Fall, 1945).

⁸ Roark, "American Black Leaders," 255.

system.⁹ The National Negro Conference was critical of the impact of U.S. foreign policy on colonized people. The organization also believed that Black Americans had a sense of responsibility in advocating against such detrimental actions on behalf of the United States.

Many Black leaders explored the connection between race and economic structures through the impact of the Great Depression, further pushing the two forces together. Black Americans were among those the economic collapse hit hardest. In the 1932 NAACP address to Congress, "The American Negro" the delegation stated, "is going to find freedom and adjustment mainly through an improvement in his economic status."¹⁰ Some, like Abram Harris and his fellow socialists from Howard University, took this idea further when they urged the NAACP to adopt a message that would ask Black Americans to view their discrimination within the larger picture of labor issues in the United States. Some NAACP leaders met Harris' proposal with cynicism because they feared this strategy would cause their organization to lose its identity and credibility as a civil rights organization. They also worried that such a message may be too narrow and would only gain appeal among socialists or communists. Although they did not shift their organizational mission towards endorsing labor concerns, they did continue to tie themselves to prominent labor groups and unions like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). One can see this as the NAACP's recognition of the relationship between race and economic structures.¹¹

Seeing as the United States aimed to stop the spread of communism both domestically and internationally, the relationship between the NAACP and the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) was notable. Many leaders within the NAACP were also members of the National Negro Conference (NNC), an organization with unapologetic ties to the CPUSA. The 1930s brought the NNC closer to the CPUSA as CPUSA membership greatly expanded towards the end of the decade. NAACP leaders grew increasingly concerned with the NNC and the extent to which the Soviet Union influenced its policies. The NNC's ties to the Soviet Union caused the NAACP to further separate itself from the NNC.¹²

In 1940, the NNC cleared its leadership of any non-communists. At the same time, Max Yergan became president of the NNC. Yergan was only involved in the San Francisco Conference in an

⁹ *Ibid.*, 254-56.

¹⁰ Manfred Berg, "Black Civil Rights and Liberal Anticommunism: The NAACP in the Early Cold War," *Journal of American History* 94, no. 1 (2007), 79-81.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹² *Ibid.*, 76.

unofficial capacity due to his Communist Party ties. Because of this, his petition to the State Department to attend the UNCIO was not as successful as the NAACP's. As the war continued, the CPUSA shifted its messaging. It believed that imperialist motivations drove the war after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941. At this point, the CPUSA called upon members to aid the fight against fascism in Europe. Such positional incongruencies were the cause of concern for many civil rights leaders. They feared that the CPUSA was a dangerous organization to be aligned with.¹³ Du Bois later stated that the CPUSA was "suicidal" because he believed that the actions of the Soviet Union were misaligned with the fundamental principles of Marxism.¹⁴ The NAACP distanced itself from the Communist Party and decided against becoming an interracial labor movement. Despite this, the NAACP did continue to tie itself to many powerful unions and labor groups, such as the CIO. This was one means by which the NAACP recognized the relationship between race and economic systems.¹⁵

NAACP leaders received criticism for their decision to distance themselves from communism. In response, NAACP leaders called it the price they had to pay to ensure the organization's survival. Manfred Berg contends that the CPUSA and the NAACP could have had a "unique opportunity for a progressive civil rights alliance."¹⁶ Despite its distancing on policy grounds, there was little evidence that the NAACP purged communists or leftists from its leadership ranks or were subsequently opposed to Marxist or socialist ideas. The most prominent example of this is Du Bois. As a self-proclaimed leftist, Du Bois frequently criticized capitalism and its adverse impact on Black Americans. "The NAACP," Berg contends, at its core, "expected racial change to result from political reforms, not from revolutionary class struggle."¹⁷

America wrestled with the relationship between race in both domestic and international matters. During the Cold War, many liberals wanted racial reform to be a national security concern. Many of these people feared that the U.S.' mistreatment of minority groups might receive international scrutiny. After all, the United States criticized other nations for similar restrictions on freedom.¹⁸ Meanwhile, Southern conservatives were vehemently opposed to expanding civil rights and communism and often conflated the two. This was the sentiment

¹³ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 79-81.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 76

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 81-84.

NAACP leaders were actively trying to avoid by distancing themselves from the CPUSA. Conservatives did not distinguish between Communist ideals and the actions of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's opposition to race-based discrimination made it easy for some individuals to denounce civil rights for Black Americans as a Communist idea. Even before the end of WWII, these sentiments were rampant throughout the nation. The early connections between communism and the civil rights movement are important because the same sentiments manifested themselves at the United Nations Conference in 1945. Nowhere was this more evident than on the issue of colonialism.

The State Department supported the concept of involving citizens in such a monumental moment in international history. From the department's perspective, the NAACP's presence at the conference could help drum up public support for the United Nations. In addition to the NAACP, the State Department invited 42 other national organizations centered around various issues to serve as consultants to the U.S. delegation. Even in the planning stages, it was clear that the State Department viewed the UNCIO as work above the average citizen. Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. viewed his role as solely to create the charter where the new international organization would be formed. He did not want to pick up issues that he viewed as unrelated to his limited role, such as the topic of race in a domestic or international context. Despite the barriers that were clear prior to the conference, the NAACP did its diligence in preparation for the event.¹⁹

Under the Truman administration, the NAACP continued to balance its domestic and international agendas. The organization was wary of pushing President Truman too hard on colonial issues because it hoped he would be an ally in its civil rights efforts. Because NAACP leaders doubted the United Nations' ability to implement change, they realized the importance of maintaining a functional relationship with the Truman administration.²⁰

Each of the individuals that attended the San Francisco Conference with the NAACP delegation brought a unique perspective. Walter White, the Executive Secretary for the NAACP, was the leading voice of the organization. He saw his role at the conference as maintaining a united front between himself and his fellow consultants in lobbying for the NAACP's agenda. Furthermore, he intended to maintain control over the broader message coming from the organization. White had developed a close relationship with the Roosevelt administration and

¹⁹ Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and The African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 39-41.

²⁰ Manfred Berg, "Black Civil Rights and Liberal Anticommunism," 75-96.

former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Prior to the conference, White made attempts to lobby both the Roosevelt administration and the first lady on the issue of colonial reform, but with little success. As the conference neared, White doubted the abilities of some of his fellow delegates. When White had to leave San Francisco during the preparation for the conference, he wrote to his colleague Roy Wilkins asking him to take his place because he did not feel as if “Du Bois nor Bethune [were] capable of conducting this work.”²¹

W.E.B. Du Bois was vociferous in advocating for economic change as a way to improve the overall lives of Black Americans. As a founding member of the NAACP, Du Bois occupied a position of very high regard within the organization. This allowed him a sense of freedom to speak and act without the oversight of NAACP leaders. His fellow NAACP consultants did not share this privilege. Du Bois had left his role as editor of the NAACP's magazine *Crisis* following an argument with White. White believed that Du Bois had made improper comments on behalf of the organization. Rather than issuing a retraction, Du Bois resigned. In the lead-up to the conference, White invited Du Bois to rejoin the NAACP's leadership as the Director of Special Research. Du Bois accepted.²²

Even with their history, White recognized that Du Bois' career uniquely prepared him for the issues minorities faced globally. Du Bois' wealth of knowledge and international prestige as a diplomat made him a key asset on the NAACP consultation team. Du Bois' first task as Director of Special Research was to evaluate the results of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the foundation that it laid for the United Nations. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal for an international organization avoided any mention of colonies or their supervision. Du Bois' interpretation of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal was that it was clear that neither the United States nor Britain would come close to the issue of human rights as they feared drawing attention to human rights abuses in their colonial practices.²³

Following his assessment of the Dumbarton Oaks framework, Du Bois sought to collect the opinions of Black Americans so he could hear their voice in promoting their desires on the international stage. As further preparation for the conference, Du Bois spoke with leaders of the liberation movements in colonized regions and solicited mandates from Black organizations to gain support for the representation of Black

²¹ Kenneth R. Janken, “From Colonial Liberation to Cold War Liberalism: Walter White, the NAACP, and Foreign Affairs, 1941-1955,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 21, no. 6 (November 1998): 1080.

²² Carol Anderson, “Eyes Off the Prize,” 38.

²³Ibid., 39.

Americans at the formation of the United Nations. It is unequivocal that the relationship between Du Bois and White was tenuous at best. Their ongoing struggle for control would boil over again during the conference in San Francisco.

Mary McLeod Bethune was the third and final consultant on behalf of the NAACP. Bethune was instrumental in the women's suffrage movement before the 1920s. Through her activism, she befriended first lady Eleanor Roosevelt and later received an appointment as Director of Negro Affairs of the National Youth Administration. In addition, Bethune served as an advisor to President Roosevelt as a part of his so-called "black cabinet." Her attendance at the San Francisco Conference broke barriers in that she was the only non-white woman in attendance.²⁴ Upon accepting White's invitation to the conference, Bethune endorsed the policy intentions of the NAACP on behalf of the National Council of Negro Women.²⁵ Her work in the field of race and international relations was most pertinent to an understanding of the UNCIO. Thus, over the course of her career, she successfully advocated for Black people in a wide variety of roles. The intersectionality of her experience was not only groundbreaking but provided a valuable addition to the American delegation.²⁶

The San Francisco conference opened on April 25, 1945. Just four short days into the UNCIO, Mason Roberson reported in the *Chicago Bee* that the U.S. support for creating an international trusteeship to oversee colonial activities brought support from the Soviet Union, France, and the Netherlands. This report remained hopeful of the possible changes that could come as a result of the NAACP's involvement in advising the U.S. delegation on this issue.²⁷ On May 1, 1945, the NAACP delivered their formal statement to the American delegates to Secretary of State Stettinius and the press. In the statement to the American delegates, the NAACP consultants drew upon promises made in the proposed charter to point out the hypocrisy in the United States' position. This statement started with the agreed-upon notion that

²⁴Debra Michals, "Mary McLeod Bethune 1875-1955," National Women's History Museum, <https://www.womenshistory.org/education-resources/biographies/mary-mcleod-bethune> (accessed October 12, 2021).

²⁵Mary McLeod Bethune, Telegram from National Council of Negro Women to NAACP, April 16, 1945. W. E. B. Du Bois Papers [hereafter Du Bois papers], (MS 312). Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, Amherst, MA.

²⁶Rondee Gaines, "Rhetoric and a Body Impolitic: Self-Definition and Mary McLeod Bethune's Discursive Safe Space," *Howard Journal of Communications*, vol. 27 (2016), 167-81.

²⁷Mason Roberson, "Frisco Conference to Listen to Negroes on Colonial Affairs," *Chicago Bee*, April 1945, 29, 1.

the newly formed international organization would seek to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, language, religion, or sex.”²⁸ The NAACP consultants then argued that with the currently proposed charter, the organization would not have the power to achieve any such goals. In particular, it pointed to the issue of “domestic jurisdiction” that limited the ability of the United Nations to intervene in colonial affairs. The statement also highlighted the lack of representation or protection for the majority of the individuals living under colonial rule.²⁹

In a confidential telegram to his fellow NAACP consultants on May 3rd, White reported on the conversations he had with American delegates in the two days prior. One of the encounters, he recalled, was with John Foster Dulles. According to White, Dulles warned “everyone to be disappointed, including the American delegation, at what is done, and even more at what is not done at San Francisco.”³⁰ White goes on to add “that we must remember that making peace is a hard and slow job.”³¹ Further within this telegram, White states that the organization had the verbal support of the U.S. secretary of state for their amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks proposal in relation to colonization. Secretary Stettinius pledged to help White persuade the other American delegates, and he remained skeptical that the U.S. would make any movement in that field at that time.³²

In the face of growing pessimism, the delegates continued on their mission. On May 5, 1945, *The Peoples Voice* quotes Mary McLeod Bethune:

This is no occasion for frivolity or a social whirl, but rather a serious, momentous period in which all citizens should prayerfully consider the results the leaders must obtain. The public should ask that the men and women in whose hands and voices the decisions are to be made, which will be lasting and grave, should have courage and inspiration to bring the utmost concentration to the breaking down of barriers for greater liberty and brotherhood. This occasion is something we have never

²⁸ Telegram from NAACP to United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, May 7, 1945. Du Bois Papers, UMAL.

²⁹ John Pittman, “Frisco Conference Highlights,” *People's Voice*, May 5, 1945.

³⁰ Confidential memorandum from Walter White to Du Bois and Mary McLeod Bethune, May 3, 1945. Du Bois Papers, MS 312, UMAL.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Confidential memorandum from Walter White to W. E. B. Du Bois and Mary McLeod Bethune, May 3, 1945. Du Bois Papers, MS 312, UMAL.

passed through and is to set up a structural plan for the improvement of all peoples.³³

Bethune was clear in recognizing the magnitude of creating an international organization to improve the quality of life for global citizens. She called upon the public to demand that their leaders have the courage to act.

In response to the continued petitioning of the NAACP consultants, Dulles worried that shutting out the consultants' views completely might have negative consequences. Dulles' actions display that he viewed allowing the NAACP's role as nothing more than a strategic public relations move; he feared that the growing distaste could prove to be volatile if the NAACP and its members turned against the United Nations.³⁴ To pacify the NAACP, Dulles supported declaring "freedom from discrimination on account of race, language, religion, or sex." This declaration came at a steep price in that Dulles also went on to include the domestic jurisdiction amendment. This relinquished any power of the United Nations to investigate issues that lie within the concerned state.³⁵ On May 12th, 1945, the *Cleveland Gazette* reported that the NAACP consultants were trying to secure the support of foreign delegations to call for the abolition of colonialism. It also reported that while some members of the American delegation were in alliance with the NAACP, they were reluctant to take any action. In addition to the United States, the British did not wish to address the issue of colonialism.³⁶

As the San Francisco conference waged on, it became evident that Du Bois increasingly lost confidence in the ability to bring change through an international organization. In a letter he wrote to Louise D. Shivery on May 21, 1945, he stated that he was "afraid it is too late to do anything now" and would therefore be leaving on the 26th of that same month.³⁷ On June 19th, the *Negro Star* reported that the NAACP had once again petitioned Stettinius to amend policies pertaining to the trusteeship system. The petition failed.³⁸

In the June issue of *Crisis*, the delegates reported back in an editorial titled "San Francisco." In the editorial, they wrote that

³³ John Pittman, "Frisco Conference Highlights," *People's Voice*, May 5, 1945.

³⁴ Anderson, "Eyes Off the Prize," 48-49.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 49.

³⁶ "Formal Demand for Race Equity at San Francisco Parley" *Cleveland Gazette*, May 12, 1945.

³⁷ Letter from W. E. B. Du Bois to Louie D. Shivery, May 21, 1945. Du Bois Papers, MS 312, UMAL.

³⁸ "NAACP Insist Independence Petition Rights be Included in Trusteeship Aims," *Negro Star*, June 29, 1945.

discussions did “not touch in any manner the colonies held at present by the great powers.”³⁹ This article also mirrored the growing pessimism that the delegates felt in their ability to bring about change at the conference. They wrote that they did not expect to bring about sweeping change. However, they were nonetheless disappointed at the lack of movement of the American delegation on the colonial issue. They also noted that the American delegation to the committee on trusteeship broke from traditional American colonial policy by not stating that those living under colonial systems had the right to self-government in due time.⁴⁰

Secretary of State Stettinius thus had to clarify further the position of the United States on the potential path to independence for colonized countries. He stated that the United States did endorse the idea of independence for their colonies when they were capable. The NAACP supported this, though they lamented the fact that the U.S. opposed putting such promises into the written charter.⁴¹ This specific issue exemplifies a greater pattern of avoidance on the part of the U.S. While many members of the United States’ delegation supported the NAACP’s policy positions, they had no intention of writing such proposals in a legally binding international agreement. Negative domestic pressures on the State Department spearheaded their detachment from the colonial debate. Southern Democrats in attendance, like Texas Senator Tom Connally, were fearful that the UN Charter could provide new legal grounds for abolishing Jim Crow laws.⁴² This made the conversation of decolonization a nonstarter. The American delegation struggled to create an international institution that could protect civil and political rights abroad but not incite domestic change.

As tensions grew within the U.S. delegation, NNC President Max Yergan was among those most frustrated at the lack of progress. Yergan had been advocating for the NAACP to take a more pro-Soviet stance and encouraged it to join him in an anti-U.S. press conference. White opposed both propositions. Yergan’s frustrations with White culminated in a rousing event in which Yergan held White by his shirt collar as he detailed his strong negative opinions of White’s character in colorful language. Once composed, Yergan was embarrassed but had burned the bridge, nonetheless. Yergan and White would avoid one another for the remainder of their time in San Francisco. Though Yergan is an extreme example, his core sentiment was shared more broadly and

³⁹“Editorials: San Francisco,” *Crisis*, June 1945, 161.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 161.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 161.

⁴²Anderson, “From Hope to Disillusion,” 540

exemplifies the ways in which the conference was drawing divisions among the coalition of civil rights activists.⁴³

Following the conference, Secretary Stettinius asked White his opinion on the performance of the American delegation. White responded by explaining the detrimental effects the United States' colonial activities were having on their standing as a global power. White repeated such sentiments to President Truman days after Stettinius, though it seemed to have little practical effect on either of them.⁴⁴

The hypocrisies that lay within the U.S. wartime messaging and both its discriminatory domestic and colonial actions were infuriatingly obvious. This frustration was shared among many, which made the lack of progress following the UNCIO so difficult to process. In order to understand the NAACP's shortcomings at the conference, one must first carefully consider the political terrain they faced. It is clear that their failures are not the fault of a single individual or policy choice but rather a product of the environment surrounding them. The factors that created this environment included the lack of cooperation from the United States, the imperialist tendencies of the United States, and the Red Scare politics of the late 1940s that squandered any hope of notable human rights expansion abroad at the end of World War II.

The Cold War challenged the moral strength at the core of the United States' values of freedom and democracy. The fight between the "free world" and communism highlighted many inequalities not just globally but inside the United States. As author Carol Anderson writes:

The fight for colonial self-determination paralleled the battle to overturn the South's racist voting restrictions. The efforts to revise the UN's 'domestic jurisdiction' clause matched the assault on the states' rights philosophy of the South. And the dissatisfaction with a trusteeship plan that denied colonies the right to lay their grievances before an international tribunal mirrored the opposition to America's separate and unequal system of justice.⁴⁵

Leaders within the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People during the 1940s saw blatant hypocrisy in the U.S. advocacy for human rights and democracy globally while denying such rights to Black Americans domestically. The political terrain laid before the organization made it impossible for its leaders to bring about any

⁴³ Anderson, "*Eyes Off the Prize*," 51.

⁴⁴ Janken, "From Colonial Liberation to Cold War Liberalism," 1080-1081.

⁴⁵ Anderson, "*Eyes Off the Prize*," 57.

meaningful changes through their role as consultants at the foundation conference of the United Nations.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

- "Editorials: San Francisco" *Crisis* (June 1945): 161.
- "Formal Demand for Race Equity at San Francisco Parley" *Cleveland Gazette*, May 12, 1945.
- Pittman, John, "Frisco Conference Highlights." *People's Voice*, May 5, 1945.
- "Proposed Structure: The United Nations Congress on International Organization." *The Alliance Review*, April 30, 1945. 3.
- Bethune, Mary, McLeod. Papers of W.E.B. Du Bois. Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, Amherst, MA.
- Roberson, Mason. "Frisco Conference to Listen to Negroes on Colonial Affairs" *Chicago Bee*, April 29, 1945.

Secondary Sources:

- Anderson, Carol. "Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and The African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955." New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Anderson, Carol. "From Hope to Disillusion: African Americans, the United Nations, and the Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1947." *Diplomatic History*, no. 4 (1996): 531-63.
- Berg, Manfred. "Black Civil Rights and Liberal Anticommunism: The NAACP in the Early Cold War." *Journal of American History* 94, no. 1 (2007): 75.
- Buck, Pearl. "Where the People Stand." *Opportunity*, XXIII, (Fall 1945).
- Falcón, Sylvanna M. "Race, Gender, and Geopolitics in the Establishment of the UN." In *Power Interrupted: Antiracist and Feminist Activism inside the United Nations*, University of Washington Press, 2016. 32-62.
- Gaines, Rondee. "Rhetoric and a Body Impolitic: Self-Definition and Mary Mcleod Bethune's Discursive Safe Space." *Howard Journal of Communications* 27 (2016): 167-81.
- Hoberman, Robert "A Fighting Press?: The African-American Press and the Early Cold War, 1945-1955" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2008. New Brunswick, NJ.
- Janken, Kenneth R. "From Colonial Liberation to Cold War Liberalism: Walter White, the NAACP, and Foreign Affairs, 1941-1955" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21, No. 6 (November 1998).
- Martin and Sullivan. "Civil Rights in the United States: Double V Campaign." New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2000.
- Michals, Debra. "Mary McLeod Bethune 1875-1955" National Women's History Museum, <https://www.womenshistory.org/education-resources/biographies/mary-mcleod-bethune>.
- Roark, James L. "American Black Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 1943-1953." *African Historical Studies* 4, no. 2 (1971): 255.
- The United Nations. "History of the United Nations: The San Francisco Conference." <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/san-francisco-conference>.

The Implications of Ignorance: Discrimination, Prejudice, a Lack of Assimilation, and the Misunderstandings of Italian Socialism as it Relates to the Internment of Italian Americans during WWII

Cassie Ferraiuolo

“The principal on which this country was founded, and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of the mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry.”
– Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 1, 1943.

The World War II experience for Italian Americans, mainly those living on the West Coast was not a pleasant one. The era was stained with ethnic discrimination, imprisonment, loss of property, and an overall sense of confusion and betrayal. Many Italians living in America subscribed to a socialist political ideology. In Italy, Benito Mussolini (r.1922-1943) used a socialist “mask” to further his fascist agenda and gain popularity. Later, with grand betrayal, he abandoned the socialistic ideas and assumed his true form. Italians from both the United States and Italy felt betrayed; Mussolini led them to believe fascism *was* socialism. The ignorance of political ideologies plagued more than the Italian socialists. Americans viewed Italy as the enemy, one that was either socialist, communist, or fascist. The specifics did not matter because all those terms represented the “bad guy.” Furthermore, as the largest immigrant group of the time, the Italians lacked complete assimilation, a phenomenon which led to assumptions, prejudices, and ethnic discrimination. Even before Mussolini came to power, most Italians were socialists, and to Americans, this represented an existential threat to capitalistic democracy. The failure of Americans to distinguish between socialism, communism, and fascism painted all dictatorships with the same brush. The evacuation, restriction, and relocation of Italian Americans during World War II resulted from culminating prejudices, discrimination, and a misunderstanding of Italian Socialism.

Western democracy is not the pinnacle of government that all countries of the world should aim to achieve. Many Americans see their government as the best in the world even though change is hard to acquire and flaws are persistent. Furthermore, Americans hold an ingrained sense of repulsion towards socialism, communism, and

fascism.¹ Even today, Americans are raised to equate those words with an authoritarian dictatorship. The problem with these views is that socialism, communism, and fascism are not synonymous. In order to understand America's failure to define socialism accurately, one must first understand these terms and their relation to capitalism-- the economic system that takes preference in the United States. Its foundation rests upon the private ownership of economic capital with little governmental interference. It relies on a Darwinian approach to business in that the most fit will survive, the best business will prevail. Capitalism exists on the principles of supply and demand and the balancing power of the market.

The antithesis of capitalism is communism-- as theorized by Karl Marx.² Communism lies on the far left of the political spectrum and is designed to lessen the gap between the very rich and the very poor. According to Marx, the poor and the proletariat faced exploitation at the hands of capitalism. Marx believed in the inevitable, violent overthrow of capitalism by the fed-up exploited classes. In a true communist society, the people own everything with the help of a government that acts in their name. These ideas are similar to socialism, with some important differences.

Socialists believe that the means of production belong in the hands of the people, and that income needs a more equal distribution. According to the Independence Hall Association, in contrast to communists, socialists do not believe that the working class will violently overthrow capitalists with a sudden revolution, nor do they believe in the total abolition of private property. Socialists' main objective is not to completely eradicate the gap between the rich and the poor, but to narrow it. Socialists believe that the government must be responsible in managing the distribution of wealth to create a more fair and just society.³

Fascism lies on the far right of the political spectrum and differs significantly from the preceding ideologies. Fascism is perhaps the most difficult to define as "its characteristics have been subject to academic dispute."⁴ Fascism, which became popular during Mussolini's rule of Italy, can be defined in a collaborative way. By looking at the varying

¹ Please note: Americans were using these words interchangeably. It wasn't that they were repulsed to specifically socialism, it is that they did not see a difference between the various political descriptors.

² Economic philosopher/scientist, famous for the idea of Marxism and the Communist Manifesto

³ Independence Hall Association, "Comparative Political and Economic Systems," accessed April 12, 2017, <http://www.ushistory.org/gov/13b.asp>.

⁴ BBC, "What is a Fascist," assessed April 12, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8316271.stm.

definitions of fascism and assessing their common denominators, one may form a basic definition. Fascism is related to Nazism, but they are not complete synonyms. Fascism's characteristics include authoritarianism, militarism, nationalism, an appeal to lessening the gap between the rich and poor, as well as a desire to return to a former golden age. For example, Mussolini spoke of a desire to bring Italy back to what he considered the golden age of Rome when Julius Caesar (76-54 B.C.E) was in power. To connect himself to that golden age, Mussolini used symbols of ancient Rome, such as The Faces, a bundle of sticks, and an axe.⁵

Beyond the continual misunderstanding of Italy's politics, Italian Americans dealt with concepts lost to translation. While it can be argued that the United States is accepting of other peoples, historically, it has not been accepting of differing political ideologies. Italians first immigrated to America in the late 1880s.⁶ By 1901, 500,000 Italians had arrived. Within nine years, the U.S. Census showed 1,343,000 Italian immigrants, and by the next decade, the number of Italians in the U.S. reached 2,109,524.⁷ The Italians were "the last great immigrant group to arrive in the United States before the Second World War."⁸ America tends to oppose the newcomer, Italian immigrants without exception. Italians suffered indignities and injustice mainly based on their political preferences. An early 1920s trial for murder showed just how radical the discrimination of Italian Socialists would go.

In the early 1920s, socialist Italian immigrants Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were accused of murdering two men while robbing a bank. Even today, the verdict of this case is debated. Anti-socialist rhetoric reverberated around the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. The jury faced manipulation by the prosecution's appeal to fear toward "the left." Superior Court Judge Webster Thayer "begun the trial, comparing a juror's duty to that of a true soldier [who] responded to that call in the spirit of American loyalty ... [and he would make] oblique references to anarchism."⁹ Judge Thayer called Sacco and Vanzetti "'Reds' [and that] 'America must stand together against them.'"¹⁰ The defendants' attorney, District Attorney Frederick H. Moore, referred to

⁵ Antonella Merletto, "Mussolini." Lecture, Richmond University, Rome, Italy, January 2017.

⁶ Charles A. Willis, "Destination America," PBS, Last Modified September 2007. http://www.pbs.org/destinationamerica/usim_wn_noflash_5.html

⁷ Stephen Fox, *The Unknown Internment: An Oral History of Relocation of Italian Americans during World War II* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹ Bruce Watson, *Sacco & Vanzetti: The Men, the Murders, and the Judgement of Mankind* (New York: Penguin Group, 2007), 167.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 167.

the Red Scare in an attempt dissuade the jury from the anti-communists hysteria that flooded American newspapers, and that which the prosecution had set up.¹¹ “He cautioned the jury against linking murder, [draft-dodging], and anarchism. ‘You have got to be very careful that you don’t vibrate in unison with those words. They are fearful, they are potent, they are laden to the limit.’”¹² In other words, Attorney Moore told the jury that it should not base its verdict on arbitrary differences in political beliefs.

It did not help that Sacco and Vanzetti were anarchists who belonged to socialist groups and had collections of books to confirm this.¹³ Nonetheless, identifying as a radical socialist is not grounds to prove the crime of murder. For Italians, an *anarchist* believes in something that does not align with their country’s government. In America, anarchy has been linked to destruction, violence, and chaos created by those who oppose the government. Sacco and Vanzetti considered themselves anarchists not because they wanted to cause chaos to the American way of life but because they wished to improve it. Moreover, Sacco and Vanzetti were Socialists. Socialists do not believe in the aggressive overthrowing of the government. After reading through transcriptions from their court case, it is easy to see that Sacco and Vanzetti had far from perfect English, and much was lost in translation. Here is an excerpt from Katzmann’s interrogation of Sacco that highlights the weight Attorney Katzmann put on the defendants’ political ideology in the murder:

Katzmann: “And the books which you intended to collect were books relating to anarchy, weren’t they?”

Sacco: “Not all of them.”

Katzmann: “How many of them.”

Sacco: “Well, all together. We are socialists, democratic, any other socialistic information, socialists, syndicalists, anarchists, any paper.”

Katzmann: “Bolshevist?”

Sacco: “I do not know what that Bolshevism means.”

Katzmann: “Soviet?”

Sacco: “I do not know what Soviet means.”

¹¹ The Red Scare referred to by Attorney Moore took place in 1917-1920, right before the trial for Sacco and Vanzetti. The Red Scare was a time of fear against the rise of radical leftism.

¹² Draft-dodging, also known as draft evasion or draft avoidance, is the refusal of a person to comply with practices that do not involve law breaking; Watson, 164.

¹³ Watson, 157.

Katzmann: “Communism?”¹⁴

The significance of the Sacco and Vanzetti case lies in the anti-socialist rhetoric and appeal when convincing the jury. The Red Scare was not over.¹⁵ The jurors of the court were quick to jump on anything that opposed capitalism. Attorney Katzmann and Judge Thayer appealed to those fears, which ultimately led to the conviction and execution of the two Italian immigrants. Political discrimination of Italians in this became clear from the moment Judge Thayer referred to Sacco and Vanzetti as “Reds.” Ethnicism and anti-socialist rhetoric clouded the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. Many people spoke with a demeaning manner towards the defendants’ Italian origins, such as one editor from the *New York Call* who used derogatory language as he suggested that “there’s no story in it... just a couple wops in a jam.”¹⁶

Italian Americans would face more discrimination based on their political ideology and ethnicity in the ensuing years. Those holding dual citizenship also came under fire. Despite facing hostility, Italians continued to come to the U.S. As one immigrant explained, “I learn little English, and about the American government, and how the people can make change and progress by legislation without the force of revolution, and I like very much this idea.”¹⁷ Italians, like many other groups, crossed the seas in search of the American Dream. Many Italians of the early 1900s sought a better life than the one they had.¹⁸ However, they never fully assimilated to American ideals, owing to a strong national identity. Italian passports carry the following emigrant instructions: “Keep alive, at all times, the use of your mother tongue and the practice of your institutions... and even if you assume the nationality of the country in which you settled, never deny and never forget the sublime moral inheritance of your ancestors and transmit to your descendants the sacred flame of love of the distant fatherland... Long Live Italy, Forever.”¹⁹ How were Italians treated in these years of immigration? What were their calls to the homeland, and how, if at all, was Mussolini a leader to the Italians living in America?

¹⁴ Syndicalism is the transferring the means of production to the workers’ union; Watson, 157-158.

¹⁵ The Red Scare was fueled by the Bolshevik Revolution which led to a perceived communist threat. Also, it is important to note that there was a Red Scare from 1917-1920 and another occurring after WWII.

¹⁶ Watson, 56.

¹⁷ Joseph Lopreato, *Italian Americans* (Manhattan: Random House, 1970), 173.

¹⁸ Many of the Italian immigrants came from Southern Italy, a region of Italy that is most impoverished, even today.

¹⁹ Fox, 7-8.

Many Americans attached negative connotations to the word “Italian.” The Red Scare lingered, attached to the ethnic group--Americans saw no difference between Socialists and Communists. Italians “found their history in America to be one of continuous isolation, in which the immigrants sought comfort and prestige in ‘affectionate ties’ to Italy.”²⁰ Italians lacked complete assimilation into the American life because they held tightly to their ancestral roots. In 1919 and 1920, a national movement known as ‘One-Hundred Percent Americanism’ called for the celebration of all things American and opposed any idea or person considered to be anti-American or foreign. This wave of One-Hundred Percent Americanism further alienated the Italian Americans from the United States. As one academic noted, “An unwelcome stranger in a sometimes hostile land, the Italian-American looked almost desperately to his home country for personal solace and natural identity.”²¹ When Mussolini’s Fascist propaganda reached America, some Italians were fooled. The new leader’s promises to bring back the glory days of Italy led many Italians to feel a tug from the homeland.

The immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, also known as the Johnson-Reed Acts, placed a cap on the number of immigrants permitted into the U.S. with a national origins quota. This quota gave visas to two percent of each nationality. These acts were based on the numbers from the U.S. census of 1890.²² These measures helped push open the gates for Italian American Fascism. These acts psychologically affected Italians because they were “largely colored by the inferiority-superiority doctrines of Arthur Gobineau and Company, which labeled the Italians, along with several other peoples, as inferior.” The Immigration Acts caused great consternation among the Italian Americans for its “underlying discrimination.”²³ The nationalistic motif of such policies cast a shadow of inferiority on those of other origins, including the Italians. Italians started looking for a window in which equality was visible. Mussolini used propaganda as a mask to cover the truth about fascism. If one looked at the mask, the Fascist Doctrine had appetizing qualities. “...[It] gave them strength, endowed them with a sense of ethnic dignity and pride, by proclaiming the greatness of the Italian people and the contribution they had made to culture.”²⁴ Italians were regarded as second-string to many people, and they looked to fascism as

²⁰ Ibid, 6.

²¹ Ibid, 79.

²² US Department of State, *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act>

²³ Arthur Gobineau is known as the father of racial ideology; Schoener, Allon. *The Italian Americans* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 188.

²⁴ Ibid, 188.

a savior. “They turned to it simply as a means of recovering their sense of human importance.”²⁵

Part of the confusion in defining terms lies in the fact that many Italian Americans did not truly understand fascism. Their reactions to fascism were more of a “socially conditioned reflex than a politically conscious response.”²⁶ From an outside view, Mussolini’s propaganda portrayed fascism as working for the people. Of course, those who experienced fascism on Italian soil thought differently. “You can measure a man’s devotion to the democratic ideal by the attitude he takes toward Mussolini. If with some knowledge of what is actually happening in Italy, an American still prefers the Mussolini type of government, he is actually disloyal to our political principles.”²⁷ Mussolini deceived the Italians as he initially orchestrated himself as a socialist. It would take years for the façade to fall and the revelation of what Mussolini stood for.

Mussolini began his rise to power when the king of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III (r. 1900-1946) asked him to come to Rome and “talk ideas.” Italy lacked in many areas of public welfare. There was high unemployment, disease from mosquitos was rampant, and many people lived in sub-par conditions. Mussolini’s ideas on how to solve these problems seemed to match a socialist agenda. These ideas gained him the favor of the king, and through a rigged election, Mussolini was named the Prime Minister of Italy. Mussolini launched many plans which appealed to the strong social needs of the country.²⁸

Mussolini sought to solve both the unemployment and mosquito issues with one policy. He decided to hire his Italian people to work on the bonification of the marshlands. This transformed the marshlands into livable housing communities while simultaneously getting rid of the mosquitos. This act gained Mussolini popularity. The workers were happy to improve Italy and save their families from disease all while getting paid to do so. It was a nice return from the hard times that previously plagued them. Furthermore, many people still lived in very poor conditions, as they did in the 1700s: without running water and electricity. Mussolini had a program for these people where he sent them to safe, modern housing while their old dwellings were repaired. He also had many plans for the urban aspects of Italy including new

²⁵ Ibid, 188.

²⁶ John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 80-81.

²⁷ Diggins, 68-69.

²⁸ Merletto.

entertainment venues and beautiful buildings. He created roads that made transportation much easier on the Italian people.²⁹

All these plans benefited the people of Italy. There were more jobs, less poverty, and less disease. Moreover, Italians were primarily Catholic. One of Mussolini's goals was the "rapprochement between the Catholic Church and the Italian state in 1929 [which] also disposed Italian Americans to look more favorably on Mussolini."³⁰ All of these programs convinced Italians and Italian Americans to believe that Mussolini's *Fascismo* was in line with socialism.

Indeed, Mussolini initially claimed he was a new kind of Socialist and invented the term, Fascismo or Fasci, to describe it. From his paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia* (*The People of Italy*), "Mussolini would take with him from the [Socialist] party a certain number of left-wing extremists ... [who] were so far to the left that they were almost indistinguishable from the extreme right, the common ground being the irresponsible impulse to domination, action, self-assertion, noise, and violence, and the revulsion from agreement, debate, compromise, procedure, and tactics."³¹ As Mussolini's theatrics began to unravel, it became apparent that he was not on the side of the people. This can be seen with the last national general strike of the Italian Labor Alliance in 1922-- a response to the ever-tightening grip Mussolini had on the working class. If Mussolini had been a true socialist, he would have believed that the power should rest in the hands of the workers. With discontent of the movement, the dictator demanded that the governor get the strikers back to work within twenty-four hours, and when that was not accomplished, the Blackshirts were released.³² If Mussolini was a man of the people, a man of the workers, he would not have responded to the strikers with militant force. People started to realize that Mussolini was not a Socialist-- he was a fraud.

Mussolini used socialism as a means to power, and through that action, he contributed to some improvements for Italy. Nonetheless, the United States government and many of its people did not acknowledge any good done by Mussolini. They did not have to alter their ideas about Mussolini because to them, all socialists were the same, and all were the enemy—including Mussolini, despite his shift from socialism to fascism. The adoption of fascism by Italians in Italy and those in America was generated from Mussolini's web of deceit. When the façade crumbled, fascism was soon abandoned. The Director-General of

²⁹ Merletto.

³⁰ Fox, 23.

³¹ Wayland Hilton-Young, *The Italian Left: A Short History of Political Socialism in Italy* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co. Ltd, 1949) 79.

³² The Blackshirts were a militant squad of Mussolini's Fascist party; Ibid, 133.

Italian Fasci Abroad, Piero Parini, came to visit Italian Fascists in the United States. He exposed Mussolini to the Italian Americans and explained how Mussolini's fascism was not socialism. Parini explained that Mussolini was not a man of the people. Italian Americans all over the United States were enlightened to what dangers the full significance of fascism had and they withdrew from fascist affiliation.³³ Italians realized that fascism was "betraying Italy." Many Italians worked together to form anti-fascist groups that were strong supporters of *Democrazia Americana* (American Democracy).³⁴

As Mussolini's mask was removed and his façade in further ruin, Italian communities expelled such fascist beliefs; they knew that fascism was not socialism. Italians once again regained their sense of Americanism. Italians worked hard to achieve the American Dream. Some Italians even strived for total assimilation by means of marriage to blonde women or dropping the last vowel on a name.³⁵ It became clear that Italian Americans were proud of their new American home, or at least wanted to blend into the background. Italian Americans showed their loyalty to the United States in various ways including the practicing of good citizenship and enlisting into the Armed Forces. This sense of Italian American unity with the country would not last long, for disaster struck on December 7th when Japanese planes bombed the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor.³⁶

American forces were caught completely off guard by the attack. War was declared against Japan almost immediately. Three days later, Germany and Italy declared war against the United States.³⁷ Political leaders, the public, and people of all kinds were taken off guard by the outbreak of the war. Americans grew fearful and suspicious. Fingers began to point out of suspicion and blame. Any group whose country of origin was socialist, communist, or fascist became suspected of causing the war or aiding the enemies. Officials "also believed that the maintenance of dual citizenship -holding American and foreign citizenship concurrently- made for a prima facie case of disloyalty."³⁸ The United States government was in search of cases of espionage, or fifth-column activity, especially among Japanese, German and Italian

³³ Allon Schoener, *The Italian Americans* (New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1987), 189.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 189.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 170.

³⁶ Jones Borstelman, May, Ruiz, Wood. *Created Equal: A History of the United States*, Vol. 2: From 1865. 3rd Ed. Ed. Craig Campanella (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2011), Chapter 3.

³⁷ *Ibid*, Chapter 3.

³⁸ *Prima Facie* is based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proven otherwise; Fox, 7.

Americans. The United States government issued threatening propaganda posters depicting “enemy country” leaders. One such poster shows Mussolini declaring, “Bisogna distruggere la democrazia, (democracy needs to be destroyed)”. The poster also reads, “Don’t speak the enemy’s language! Speak American!”³⁹ Anti-Italian propaganda isolated the Italian American community and put them on edge. They became “enemy aliens.”

Many Italians were driven away from Italy during the time of Mussolini due to his oppressive regime. They came to America seeking “freedom from arbitrary domination.”⁴⁰ However, this freedom would be short-lived with the eruption of the Second World War and the accompanying wartime policies that vilified Italians. Federal policy of the war had three components: the expeditious detainment of enemy aliens who were considered potentially subversive, restrictions of travel, article surrender, curfews, and the removal of enemy aliens from places of strategic interest, including any type of oceanic port (particularly on the west coast), manufacturing plants, and military bases.⁴¹

Policies such as these gave the government power to restrict the rights of 600,000 Italian Americans-- 100,000 of these lived in California. Deeming them “enemy aliens,” the government made them carry identification cards and give up contraband items such as radios. Immeasurable numbers of “enemy aliens” had their homes turned upside down by authorities in an attempt to find radios and other items of contraband. Of those living in the prohibited zones of California, 10,000 were forced to move. Another 52,000 Italians had to follow dusk till dawn curfew orders. Hundreds of Italians were sent to internment camps. The majority of those came from what the FBI had deemed as “pro-fascist organizations.” The Italians on the list of so-called pro-fascist organizations had been under surveillance since 1939. Among them included the writers of Italian newspapers, teachers of Italian language schools, Italian WWI veterans, and those who maintained particularly close ties with Italy. These people “suddenly disappeared from the community, whisked away to places of internment that

³⁹ Lawrence DiStasi, “How World War II Iced Italian American Culture,” *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment during World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001), 307.

⁴⁰ Philip DiFranco, *The Italian American Experience*. (New York: RGA Publishing Group, Inc., 1988), 142.

⁴¹ Gloria Ricci Lathop, “Unwelcome in Freedom’s Land”. *Una Storia Segreta*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi. (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001), 162.

remained secret to all but their families (and for a time, even to them) for the duration of the war.”⁴²

If the United States administration, policymakers, and the public noted the difference between Italian Socialism and Mussolini’s fascism, they would have understood that the Italians had beliefs very similar to those espoused in America. In their fear-driven haste prompted by the war, Americans again linked all three political ideologies together: fascism, socialism, and communism. Not only were Italians targeted for their political beliefs, they were also targeted for simply being Italian. Under six charges, the federal government arrested an Italian American opera singer, named Ezio Pinza. These included owning a ring with a swastika; owning a boat with a radio for secret messages; he was a personal friend of Mussolini; and that he was nicknamed Mussolini. The bogus charges went so far as to say he sent out secret codes from the Opera house by changing tempos and that he sent a collection of gold and silver to the Italian government. In his defense, Mr. Pinza explained per charge that the ring was a tortoise shell with a primitive inverted swastika design; he sold the boat, and the radio didn’t work; he had never met Mussolini; he had never been called Mussolini, and perhaps they are getting him confused with another opera singer, Virglio Luzzarino, who bared a resemblance.⁴³ Pinza further explains that the tempo of a music piece is set by the conductor, not the singer, so it would have been impossible for him to send messages that way and that he donated one gold ring during Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia and later regretted it. Despite his innocence, the government detained Pinza for three months.⁴⁴

Many interned Italians who sought a fair trial were given the opposite. Prospero Cecconi, an Italian Veteran, was in a group called Ex Combattenti, which the FBI deemed ‘highly dangerous.’⁴⁵ He was arrested in his place of business for being an “enemy alien.” During his trial, he “...was considered guilty unless he could prove his innocence before a three-man hearing board. Like many others denied a lawyer or any knowledge of the charges, and lacking a thorough command of

⁴² Lawrence DiStasi, “Introduction.” *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001), XVII.

⁴³ Please note: the Swastika pre-dates Hitler.

⁴⁴ Lawson Fusao Inada., *On What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience* (San Francisco: California Historical Society, 2000), 198-201.

⁴⁵ Alberto Bronzini, “A Market Off Limits,” *Una Storia Segreta*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi. (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001), 4-5.

English, Cecconi failed to convince the board of his innocence and was ordered interned.⁷⁴⁶ This happened to hundreds of Italian Americans.

At the start of the war there were many Italians living well and up to the American standard. The Bronzini's were just such a family. The father, Guido, dreamt of America and immigrated to the country for his slice of the pie. "Lo trovata l'America!" he would say, "I've found America!"⁷⁴⁷ All the expectations of the United States had been confirmed for Guido and his family. They had a new 1939 Pontiac, a new Philco console radio, and even one of the first telephones in their neighborhood. Guido's son, Alberto Bronzini shared the story about the day everything changed: "One evening in early 1942—it could have been January or February—while we were all at the dinner table, there was a knock on the front door. Nobody knew it then, but the American dream was about to end."⁷⁴⁸ Two policemen were at the door, and they came to take the Bronzini's new radio. Their radio was much more to them than a means to listen to music; It was their one true connection to Italy. They could pick up signals carrying the Opera and news from the motherland. It was, to them, like a picture of a lost child. "...My mother pleaded with the policemen to not take the radio. I remember her crying hysterically, pulling on his uniform sleeve as they were taking it out of the house."⁷⁴⁹

The U.S. government classified Alberto's parents as enemy aliens, which subjected them to travel restrictions. Guido's place of business went only fifteen feet into a prohibited zone of strategic interest, but if he crossed the boundary by one step alone, he would be arrested. The Bronzini's lost their business due to these restrictions. The Father, Guido, became ill, and the mother, Clara, became so depressed over all that was happening that she was eventually admitted into a mental hospital. "They said that they had to restrain her to give the electric shock treatments. How ironic: she was the one whose basic civil rights were being violated, and she ends up in a strait jacket."⁷⁵⁰ What happened to the Bronzini's is but one story of one Italian American family. Variations of this story happened to countless others.

The United States restricted the rights of over 600,000 Italian Americans based on a presumption of their political loyalty and a faulty definition thereof. "Not a single case of fifth column activity on the West Coast could be documented, even in December and January when any

⁴⁶ DiStasi, "Morto Il Camerata," *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001), 4.

⁴⁷ Bronzini, 32.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 33.

⁴⁹ Bronzini, 33.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 32-35.

competent conspiracy's sabotage plan might reasonably have been expected."⁵¹ Giorgio Napolitano, a member of the Italian Socialist Party, explains their ideology during the years of 1944 and 1945, "We wanted a democratic regime open to further developments and transformation in a socialist sense- ... a regime of progressive democracy."⁵² Napolitano goes on to explain that the unification of the socialist party was due to its devastation by Mussolini's fascist party. It was in that struggle that they were able to determine future plans.

In the light of such historical experience (WWII) we have concluded that the only path that is realistically open to a socialist transformation ... lies through a struggle within the democratic process, a broadening of the alliances of the working class and its affirmation of hegemony, and, finally, a gradual modification of economic and social structures within the framework of a still further development of democracy. This is the only route that corresponds to the complexity of advanced capitalist societies.⁵³

The restriction, evacuation, and relocation of Italian Americans during World War II resulted from culminating prejudices, discrimination, and a misunderstanding of Italian Socialism. The conviction of Sacco and Vanzetti was not based on homicidal evidence but on their political belief in socialism and their Italian heritage. The era of One Hundred-Percent Americanism followed, which caused a disconnection of Italian Americans to the United States. The unassimilated Italians searched for acceptance: a desire that rendered them susceptible to Mussolini's propaganda. Italians believed that Mussolini was a socialist and that fascism was a new form of such. Once the truth was discovered, Italians revoked fascism. This would not help the Italians, for the American people still feared communism, fascism, and socialism and saw no difference among the three. The Italian people were linked to those words, which caused ethnic discrimination. World War II exasperated Americans' fear of "the reds" and drenched Italian Americans with the title "enemy aliens." Italian Americans were stripped of their rights due to fear of fifth column activity when not a single case of such was found.

⁵¹ Fox, 42.

⁵² Eric J. Hobsbawm and Giorgio Napolitano, *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview by Eric Hobsbawm with Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist Party* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Co, 1977), 7.

⁵³ Hobsbawm and Napolitano, 83.

Fear created misunderstanding, and misunderstanding created fear. Even today, we can see these effects.

Socialism is still seen as a threat to the American way of life. These remnants of fear stemmed from many decades of American propaganda, and they continue to keep a hold of many. If America had taken the time to listen to Italians speak about their political views, they would understand that Socialism is very similar to our government today. The United States does see great wealth disparities, but we have many programs that are socialist in manner. Public ownership can also be called “taxes.” Citizens of the United States pay into programs that help infrastructure such as roads and parks, as well as services such as planned parenthood, public education, and much more. Often, we forget that publicly funded institutions are, in their very nature, socialist. No government can be run entirely on one economic system. A variety of economic principles create a working environment. The United States government has yet to reach its pinnacle of greatness. There is more to learn, more to expand. For starters, we can learn what the word socialism *actually* means.

Bibliography

- BBC, "What is a Fascist," accessed April 12, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8316271.stm
- Borstelman, Jones, May, Ruiz, Wood. *Created Equal: A History of the United States, Vol. 2: From 1865*. 3rd Ed. Ed. Craig Campanella. New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2011.
- Bronzini, Alberto. "A Market Off Limits." *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi. Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001.
- DiFranco, Phillip. *The Italian American Experience*. New York: RGA Publishing Group, Inc., 1988.
- Diggins, John P. *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- DiStasi, Lawrence. "How World War II Iced Italian American Culture." *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi. Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001.
- DiStasi, Lawrence. "Introduction." *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi. Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001.
- DiStasi, Lawrence. "Morto Il Camerata." *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi. Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001.
- Fox, Stephen. *The Unknown Internment: An Oral History of Relocation of Italian Americans during World War II*. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990.
- Hilton-Young, Wayland. *The Italian Left: A Short History of Political Socialism in Italy*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. Ltd, 1949.
- Inada, Lawson Fusao. *On What We Could Carry: The Japanese American Internment Experience*. San Francisco: California Historical Society, 2001.
- Independence Hall Association, "Comparative Political and Economic Systems," accessed April 12, 2017, <http://www.ushistory.org/gov/13b.asp>
- Lathrop, Gloria Ricci. "Unwelcome in Freedom's Land." *Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and Internment During World War II*. Ed. Lawrence DiStasi Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001.
- Lopreato, Joseph. *Italian Americans*. Manhattan: Random House, 1970.
- Merletto, Antonella. "Mussolini." Lecture, Richmond University, Rome, Italy, January 2017.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. and Giorgio Napolitano. *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview by Eric Hobsbawm with Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist Party*. Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Co, 1977.
- Panunzio, Constantine. "Italian Americans, Fascism, and the War." *Yale Review* 31.4 (Charles Village: Johns Hopkins University Press for Yale University, 1942), 771-82.
- Schoener, Allon. *The Italian Americans*. New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1987.
- US Department of State, *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, [cchttps://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act).
- Watson, Bruce. *Sacco & Vanzetti: The Men, the Murders, and the Judgement of Mankind*. New York: Penguin Group, 2007.
- Willis, Charles A. "Destination America." PBS. Last Modified September 2007. http://www.pbs.org/destinationamerica/usim_wn_noflash_5.html

The United States' Severance from Fulgencio Batista

Hayley Tyson

Fulgencio Batista, the longstanding dictator of Cuba, enjoyed U.S. support for most of his time in office (1940-44 and 1952-59). However, when Fidel Castro began taking control of Cuba in the late 1950s, Batista's resignation was on the minds of many U.S. government officials. The United States eventually ended its support of his regime resulting in Batista's exile. Days later, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and the 26th of July Movement took control of Havana. By the middle of 1959, they had consolidated control and laid the foundation for the Cuban Revolution. Why did the U.S. cut off its longstanding allyship with Batista and essentially leave the door open to a takeover by rebels who promised to end U.S. domination of the island? This paper argues that the United States withdrew support due to political disorganization and social destruction under Batista's regime. Longstanding structural problems Cuba faced before Batista had first taken office were also a concern. A thorough recollection of Cuban and U.S. relations will help clarify where Batista stood politically regarding U.S. intervention.

Cuba's Background

The United States, since its founding, had long ruled under the notion of Manifest Destiny. Americans felt it was the country's responsibility to expand and take over new territories and make the United States more exceptional. Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis stated, "We may expand to include the world. Mexico, Central America, South America, Cuba, the West India Islands, and even England and France we might annex without inconvenience...this, sir, is the mission of this Republic and its ultimate destiny."¹ Thus, the United States began a wave of imperialism throughout Latin America. The Spanish-Cuban War was the perfect opportunity for the United States to gain a hold on Cuba. Spain decimated Cubans and their resources. This resulted in Spanish control of major cities while resurgents controlled the rural areas. U.S. President William McKinley used the Spaniards' brutal treatment of Cubans as a factor in gaining support for intervention from American citizens. Americans favored Cuban liberation from Spanish rule, and many volunteered to fight against the Spaniards. McKinley pushed for a declaration of war from Congress, and in 1898 the Teller Amendment was passed, which would supposedly give Cuba independence at the end of the war. U.S. commander Theodore Roosevelt used the group of volunteer soldiers wisely; the naval battle at

¹ Howard Zinn, *Howard Zinn on War* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2011).

Santiago de Cuba resulted in removing the Spanish fleet from the Santiago harbor.² After the war, the Treaty of Paris was signed, giving the U.S. control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. The Spanish initially controlled these countries, but they were ceded to the U.S. as war debts. While the Teller Amendment entailed Cuban sovereignty post-war, in 1901, the United States Congress passed the Platt Amendment. This amendment gave the United States the authority to intervene at any time in Cuban affairs.³ The amendment also allowed the United States to set up a naval base and replace the Cuban army with the Rural Guard (protection for rural landowners). The amendment also called for "...further assurance the government of Cuba [would] embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States."⁴ The U.S. removed tariffs on Cuban sugar, which helped U.S. investors and Cuban planters.⁵ The United States locked down profitable industries in Cuba, which weakened the economy due to a lack of a broad market.

As a result of the Great Depression, Cuba's weak, U.S.-dependent economy went into a tailspin, which led to Dictator Machado's overthrow in August of 1933. Subsequently, a military-led provisional government took control and was ousted almost immediately by a coalition group led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista and university professor Ramon Grau San Martin. This coalition group was named A.B.C. Each letter of the group was a "cell" controlled by a leader to avoid complete infiltration by enemy groups. Grau became president for a short time but was removed from office by the reactionary politicians of Machado's era. Part of Grau's downfall was that the United States refused to acknowledge his government's legitimacy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had enacted the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933, preventing U.S. intervention on Cuban soil even if it meant that chaos would occur in the country. The U.S. used this enactment to justify its lack of assistance to Cuba. Nonintervention meant that U.S. troops would not march in Cuba, nor would the U.S. interfere directly in local politics. However, nonintervention did not cover the economy, which the United States controlled even more effectively than in 1933. Despite saying the United States would not intervene, U.S. officials quickly entered Cuba. Appointed by FDR, Sumner Welles, the new Assistant Secretary of State

² Louis A. Perez Jr., *The War of 1898* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 21.

³ Virginia Garrard, Henderson Peter V N., and Bryan McCann, *Latin America in the Modern World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 248.

⁴ Nicola Foote, *Sources for Latin America in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 126.

⁵ Virginia Garrard, Henderson Peter V N., and Bryan McCann, *Latin America in the Modern World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 249.

for Latin American Affairs, was a crucial figure in developing policies between the United States and Cuba. Welles' goals were to remove obstacles to stability and improve relations between Cuba and the U.S. Welles did not want Machado removed from office because Welles believed a new government might not be up to the task of stopping potential anarchy. He worked hard on mediation efforts between opposition groups. Welles was able to quell the violence before his arrival and brought the different political groups to a counsel. However, the main opposition group, A.B.C., led by Batista and Grau, would not be satisfied until Machado had been removed from office. The U.S. refused to give this group political recognition until stability had been maintained.⁶ Eventually, Grau gained power in the presidency, but his nationalistic views were the main cause for concern for the U.S.

In 1934, after Grau resigned, Carlos Hevia took over as interim president. Batista's strong military leadership was a direct threat to Hevia's power, and he was able to have Hevia removed after only thirty-nine hours in office.⁷ Colonel Carlos Mendieta gained the power of the presidency after a short debate. Mendieta fought in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The U.S. recognized Mendieta's governmental legitimacy, and peace replaced political turmoil.⁸ Batista and Ambassador Caffery had supported Mendieta. Although initially supported by Batista, Mendieta began to lose control due to the power struggle from within the military and the waning support from the A.B.C. During Mendieta's regime, labor strikes radiated throughout Cuba. Opposition groups such as the Autenticos led by Grau supporters and the Communist Party worked to remove Mendieta. Meanwhile, labor strikes distracted and weakened his leadership; in fact, significant strikes with 200,000 participants led to Mendieta suspending the "...constitutional guarantees that he had recently sworn to maintain."⁹ There was a pattern between the suspension of civil rights and the president's eventual resignation.

Batista's power within the government and military initially stemmed from Mendieta's lack of control and support from Cuban citizens. A series of strikes led by student protesters took place in Havana. Mendieta publicly denounced them as unpatriotic acts. While Mendieta was placing blame and failing to fix the problems within the nation, Batista was exerting his power to protect Cuban citizens and direct soldiers during this indefinite strike. Mendieta failed to take action

⁶ Irwin F. Gellman, *Roosevelt and Batista: Good Neighbor Diplomacy in Cuba, 1933-1945* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), 50.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 91.

against the strikers, but Batista had no problem taking control and organizing brutality against them. Mendieta unleashed a strong wave of repression against the civilians and strikers with brutal enforcement from Batista's military. Ambassador Caffery endorsed the military for its solid and effective approach to the strikes while denouncing Mendieta's political government. Mendieta insisted that impartial general elections would occur under his presidency, but opposition groups believed that was a lie. Opposition groups refused to run with him as the incumbent and called for a replacement president that would be genuinely impartial to the election. This resulted in Mendieta's resignation. Author Irwin Gellman stated that "Batista strove to solidify his position by undermining Mendieta's presidential authority, and Caffery's critical opinion of Mendieta's leadership damaged the president's image even more."¹⁰ While Mendieta failed to intervene in the strikes and initiate effective reform that would satisfy his citizens, he faced challenges both inside and outside Cuba. Caffery continually shamed and criticized the Cuban government for upholding military brutality. He openly supported Batista's actions, although people died due to Batista's military moves. Caffery's actions show that the United States government was willing to support a possible dictator over someone who potentially could not govern effectively.

Cuba's next few presidents held short terms in office until former vice president Federico Laredo Bru took the oath of office due to the political succession system of the Cuban government. Previous Cuban presidents had failed to receive recognition and full support from the United States. Most had to surrender power after less than a year in office. Under the previous presidents, Batista gained much momentum politically but began to lose traction under Bru. President Bru planned on holding official national elections for the presidency. Batista surprisingly gained support from the Communist Party during his campaign, which had previously denounced him. Batista received money from American sugar companies, and loans were taken out to fund his campaign. Election results emerged in Batista's favor, with 805,125 votes cast his way.

Although Batista had won the election by a large margin (around a 300,000-vote difference), he immediately faced backlash from opposition groups. The army chief told him that the colonels no longer supported him, which led to Batista confronting them. Batista was able to stop the rebellion without bloodshed.¹¹ Batista continually met American economic prerequisites and was able to receive loans for

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 187.

agriculture and public works. Some of Batista's support stemmed from the fear of another country taking control of Cuba. For example, Ambassador Messersmith believed that "...the United States could not afford chaotic conditions on such a strategically located and economically important island."¹² Batista aligned well with the United States regarding his unwavering support during such a crucial time in U.S. history, considering his first regime occurred amid World War II.

Batista's Shortcomings

Batista ruled the country from 1940 to 1944 and enacted many of the reforms he and Grau had pushed for after they initially took control. These reforms helped bolster a national identity, and Batista used this increased nationalism to his advantage. He kept his coalition together and set out to divide the opposition groups against each other. After Batista's first term as president, he voluntarily exiled himself so as not to disgrace his country by refusing to leave. Batista feared embarrassing Cuba by not allowing a smooth transition of power. Batista claimed that his successor, Ramon Grau, blocked him from returning to Cuba during Grau's presidency from 1944 to 1948. Batista later stated that after Grau, "criminal activities and assassinations were even more prevalent under the Presidency of the disciple who succeeded him."¹³ This showed Grau's weakness by revealing that he sat back and watched his country struggle under other questionable authorities. Batista failed to come back to Cuba at a time when he was needed and did not use his successors' weaknesses against them as a way to push them out. Batista could have returned to Cuba to reinstall himself as president following his successors' many struggles.

Once he was back in power in 1952, Batista began a suspension of rights, namely censorship of rebel forces. In 1958 the *New York Times* reported that "newspapers and magazines received today from abroad reached the streets with articles disapproved by the censor deleted."¹⁴ This showed the United States government that Batista was trying to withhold information. An act of dishonesty coming from a leader that was experiencing rebellions against his regime does not appear to be a leader that can be trusted. Batista took these actions out of weakness and a severe lack of control over his country. In times of urgency, a weak leader further injures his citizens by denying them the rights they

¹² Ibid., 192.

¹³ Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: *Vantage Press*, 1962), 211.

¹⁴ "Batista's Regime Suspends Rights; Cabinet Resigns: Cuba Again Imposes Curbs, Putting Election In Doubt -- Censorship Instituted Batista's Regime Suspends Rights." *New York Times* (1923-), Mar 13, 1958. Accessed Oct 29, 2021.

deserve. This show of corruption and weakness is only one reason why the United States no longer supported Batista's regime.

Before Batista's reelection in 1955, he pushed out all opposition and ran unopposed. He was re-elected President of Cuba, yet only fifty percent of eligible voters had gone to the polls. Not voting was against the law, which shows how deeply apathetic Cubans were to the election process. Their votes did not count because only Batista was for office. Opposition groups did not see the point in running against Batista because of almost certain election corruption. The *New York Times* called it "Cuba's Strange Election."¹⁵ Stating, "Cuba has just gone through one of the strangest and most potentially dangerous elections in its history."¹⁶ This was a turning point for the United States media. Until this point, Batista had a flourishing relationship with the United States and had not been attacked in the media. Even U.S. citizens backed the president of Cuba. Batista's reelection campaign stretched across the country, yet he faced heavy opposition after the election. Phillips states that "Batista had been successful for years in playing one group against another."¹⁷ Batista was skilled at uniting groups of people and, at the same time, skilled at turning them against each other. However, despite his skills, Batista could not force opposition groups to disagree on wanting him removed from office. This shows how faulty Batista's reelection was. He did not earn his presidential office by any means, and many people were upset with this. His opposition was now faced with the challenge of removing him from power. Since elections could not be trusted as a secure way to remove a Cuban president from office, armed struggles were the only mode of action left.

Another show of weakness was Batista's treatment of Fidel Castro. When Fidel Castro led a rebellion against the Moncada army camp, Castro was captured and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite him actively leading protest groups and insurgencies against Batista's government, Batista released him after serving only two years of his sentence. Batista himself wrote that "sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, he received an amnesty in May 1955, barely two years after the bloody events which led to his sentences."¹⁸ Here, Batista expressed disagreement about Castro's release yet agreed to this general amnesty at the time. Batista made this decision while knowing that

¹⁵ R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 2008), 274.

¹⁶ R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 2008), 275.

¹⁷ R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 2008), 280.

¹⁸ Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), 36.

Castro effectively utilized his bully pulpit to mobilize the masses against Batista's regime. After his release, Castro continued with his attacks against Batista's government and heavily influenced the Cuban people with his "History Will Absolve Me" speech given before his arrest. In *Latin America in the Modern World*, the authors state, "...Fidel Castro had become a nationally recognized figure and a hero not only to many poor Cubans but also to many members of the middle class."¹⁹ Batista was unwanted in Cuba and weakened by Castro's influence before and during his imprisonment. Similar to President Machado's downfall, Batista also granted partial amnesty to his opposition and was removed from office afterward. Batista had seen this happen before and had been a figure in the opposition against Machado. This was also why the United States failed to act in support of Batista. It was evident that his removal would occur quickly, and there was not much time left for him in office, mainly due to his poor decision-making.

Fidel Castro believed Batista's military would go against Batista and turn their loyalties his way. For example, *The Washington Post*, in March 1958, released an interview with Fidel Castro in which he predicted Batista's almost immediate downfall. Castro said, "Batista no longer controls his army...he controls only the top brass in the army."²⁰ Castro meant that Batista had an extreme lack of control over his military, and it was on the brink of failing. If a president could not control the military during this time, one could argue that he was politically frail and susceptible to possible Soviet invasion. Communism was rising in Cuba, and there was increased pressure on the U.S. during the Cold War from the Soviet Union. The United States government would not want a communist country so close to it. A popular political theory at the time called the "Domino Theory" proposed that political events in one country could cause similar events in neighboring countries, like a row of dominoes falling on top of one another. Geographically, Cuba could provide the Soviet Union with a close and optimal military base if the communists could take control of the United States. Plus, a president that was not in charge of the military was essentially a figurehead waiting to be removed from office. In *The Washington Post* interview, Castro also stated, "everybody in this country has felt the heavy hand of the Batista dictatorship."²¹ According to Castro, every social class had been affected by Batista; thus, it is not

¹⁹ Virginia Garrard, Henderson Peter V N., and Bryan McCann, *Latin America in the Modern World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 449.

²⁰ Charles Schuman. 1958. "Rebels' Leader Predicts Batista's Fall by April 15." *The Washington Post and Times Herald* (1954-1959), Mar 31, 1.

²¹ Charles Schuman. 1958. "Rebels' Leader Predicts Batista's Fall by April 15." *The Washington Post and Times Herald* (1954-1959), Mar 31, 1.

hard to imagine that he had little to no support from his citizens. Castro believed most people in Cuba were simply waiting for him to be ousted by the military, Castro, or the United States. On top of the chaos, Batista's military was unable to stop rebel forces. Even Batista admitted that "sabotage ran wild, people were slain and wounded by the rebels. Government forces were unable to stop them."²² His military was unable to protect their citizens successfully, and rebel forces were able to commit as many violent acts as they deemed necessary to overthrow Batista. Batista later wrote, "they would not continue fighting for a doomed government."²³ The military was extremely demoralized and lacked the support of a strong leader. Batista essentially said that his government was destined to fail and would not be able to withstand more fighting. Batista made this determination because Castro was continually gaining national support. Also, Batista himself had worked diligently in the past to overthrow weak leaders and could see the patterns in his regime.

Batista did not take responsibility for any of the disturbing acts that took place under his regime in 1958. For example, in his autobiography, he says, "atrocities were premeditated to represent the Cuban Government, slowly but surely, as a dictatorial and bloody regime."²⁴ His goal was to frame Castro for most if not all of the violent acts committed. Batista thought this strategy would help him escape from the weight of his actions against Cuban citizens. However, regardless of who was to blame for these events, they still occurred during his regime, and no solution from Batista came forward. The media also played a part in spreading the news about the unfortunate events. Batista wrote that police officers would be framed in a poor light when it came to these tragedies. For example, "...he would be made to appear as a man who used delegated authority to commit a crime."²⁵ Batista argued that every occurrence of police brutality or homicide was not a reflection of how he controlled his police forces but the reaction of a few officers under stress during the rebellions. This statement from Batista is false due to the incidents cited by Ernestina Otero. A group of nine boys were left alone in the Haitian Embassy and were killed by police. These boys were political exiles and were resting in different rooms when the police showed up. One young man was illegally armed and fired into an officer, wounding his stomach. It has never been determined who fired first, but the boys were massacred. Otero watched two of the wounded boys be taken to a hospital while she watched

²² Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), 80.

²³ Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), 80

²⁴ Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), 40.

²⁵ Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), 41.

Colonel Jose Maria Salas Canizares kill the others. Author Ruby Hart Phillips states that this colonel had been known as the “Butcher”²⁶ and “he had been a killer all his life.”²⁷ This revealed that the police under Batista were not just stressed due to rebellions and showed instances of careless police work and murder. The persona of the “Butcher” is important because this shows what type of person held power under Batista. Fulgencio Batista’s method of dealing with the rebels was to blame them for the downfall of the Cuban government while not taking proper actions against them. In the eyes of U.S. government officials, Batista lacked the strength to fight a rebel group and protect his citizens. According to Batista, the Cuban people were “...not only opposed to subversion but that they also opposed the violence and terror which, unscrupulously and criminally, were carried out by the Castro group.”²⁸ There would have been little to no support for Castro if this were true, and Batista’s military would have strongly backed him. Since Batista lacked support from his citizens, he eventually fled Cuba.

Due to Castro’s takeover of Cuba, Batista felt he needed to leave Cuba for his and his family’s safety. According to a telegram sent by the Dominican Republic Embassy, Batista had been trying to seek asylum there and in other countries, including the United States and Spain. Former Cuban Prime Minister Gonzalo Guell believed, “...there were more atrocities on Castro's side, violence breeds violence, it was impossible to control all individuals but what atrocities there may have been were not government policy.”²⁹ Guell’s argument is weak because violence under a government does not need to be the official policy to be wrong or considered an atrocity. If “violence breeds violence,” why did Castro start with violence? This analysis by Guell leads to the idea that Castro simply retaliated against what Batista had already begun. Eventually, Batista was denied access to asylum in the United States.³⁰ The government recommended he not apply for asylum because denial would further embarrass him and cloud his legacy.

Other countries’ governments believed that Castro would either turn to communism or dictatorship. It is possible that the United States government thought that Castro would turn into a dictatorship and become easier to control or engage. The ambassador for Costa Rica,

²⁶ R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 2008), 284.

²⁷ R. Hart Phillips, *Cuba: Island of Paradox* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 2008), 285.

²⁸ Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, *Cuba Betrayed* (New York: Vantage Press, 1962), 43.

²⁹ Spalding, “241. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State).

³⁰ John Foster Dulles, “245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic,” U.S. Department of State.

Whiting Willauer, wrote that ex-president Figueres said, "...he hoped things would go along well but if they went badly, he believed they would go in the direction of another dictatorship rather than in the direction of Communism."³¹ The U.S. government would prefer a dictatorship over a push to communism. The U.S. government had supported Batista's dictatorship and others previously, so one would not be an issue if Castro could keep the situation under control. Willauer also remarked that "...for obvious reasons, there was little that the United States could do at this point."³² There was nothing the United States could do to help Batista stay in power other than to assassinate Castro, and that still would not remove the threat of new insurgents. Batista's regime was too fragile to stop rebellions, whether Castro or others led them. Castro's direct defiance of U.S. military missions on Cuban soil created a lack of support for Castro by the Cuban military. At a joint chief of staff meeting, it was said that the United States government was "aware that the Cuban military by and large desire[d] the missions to remain but that their views had at the moment little effect on government policy."³³ This revealed a potential break in Cuba's system that would allow the United States to gain power and the ability to control Castro's presidency. This idea of military control over Cuba would be very promising to the United States due to the prime military base locations and the potential to ward off the Soviet Union.

Towards the end of his regime, U.S. support of Batista was conditional. Continuing support heavily depended on restoring civil rights and a guaranteed smooth transition of power after the upcoming election in 1959. The Director of Middle American Affairs wrote a letter to the Ambassador of Cuba stating that "until some further steps are taken by the President, such as a partial amnesty, we here feel we should go no further than the action which we planned together."³⁴ The U.S. government expected Batista to grant partial amnesty to the insurgents challenging him. This letter shows Batista's hesitation to follow through with what was expected of him and shows the United States' hesitation towards supporting him further. Like the presidents before him, Batista

³¹ Whiting Willauer, "242. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)," U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State).

³² Whiting Willauer, "242. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)," (U.S. Department of State).

³³ "244. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, January 30, 1959, 11:30 A.m.," (U.S. Department of State).

³⁴ "10. Letter From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)1," U.S. Department of State.

was challenged to fulfill prerequisites to have U.S. support, and like the others, Batista failed. His failure resulted in the United States pulling support for his regime.

Overall, Batista was a weak president during his second term and led an extremely disorganized regime. He was unable to adequately serve the Cuban people and faced mass opposition. Batista faced mass opposition due to his direct violation of his citizens' rights. The United States faced extreme risk in allowing Castro to rise to power, but ultimately, that was their decision. Before Batista, Cuba had faced political disorganization, violence, and economic instability. However, despite these issues, the United States only made major efforts toward the economic side of things and allowed the Cuban people to deal with their government. This, in part, was due to the Good Neighbor Policy created by FDR. The timeline of Castro's rise to power could have been prevented had the United States government worked on maintaining relations with former President Grau in 1933. The Cuban people wanted revolution and had the U.S. allowed the revolution to pan out under Grau, then years of violence would have been prevented. A successful revolution would have given the Cuban people a chance at satisfaction and contentment with the political climate of their country. Also, strict economic involvement forced Cuba to depend on the United States and prevented them from expanding their possible exports. Grau had wanted to reform Cuba with much support from the Cuban people yet did not satisfy the stability necessary to gain U.S. recognition. Castro's eventual rise to power was the United States' attempt at allowing the revolution to finally take its course. Based on the past relations between the United States and Cuba, revoking support for Batista's regime is not surprising. There is a noticeable pattern between what happened to Batista and many of the men he worked hard to remove.

Bibliography

Primary sources:

- "All Except 200 Invaders Taken, Says Cuba, Hinting Little Mercy: Rebels seem Doomed Extensive Soviet Aid." *The Washington Post, Times Herald (1959-1973)*, Apr 26, 1961.
<http://mantis.csuchico.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/all-except-200-invaders-taken-says-cuba-hinting/docview/141346276/se-2?accountid=10346>.
- "Batista Regime Opposed: Cuban People's Party Asks Court To Nullify His Government." *New York Times (1923-)*, Mar 25, 1952.
<http://mantis.csuchico.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/batista-regime-opposed/docview/112332021/se-2?accountid=10346>.
- "Batista's Regime Suspends Rights; Cabinet Resigns: Cuba Again Imposes Curbs, Putting Election In Doubt -- Censorship Instituted Batista's Regime Suspends Rights." *New York Times (1923-)*, Mar 13, 1958.
- Castro, Fidel. "History Will Absolve Me." Essay. In *Sources for Latin America in the Modern World*, ed. Nicola Foote. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Dulles, John Foster. "245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 15, 2021.
- "Few Ships Sunk by Axis U-Boats Off Cuba since Invasion of Africa, Batista Says: Agents of Spy Rings Punished, Visiting President Tells Press." *The Washington Post (1923-1954)*, Dec 10, 1942.
<http://mantis.csuchico.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/few-ships-sunk-axis-u-boats-off-cuba-since/docview/151479878/se-2?accountid=10346>.
- Filzigibbon, Russel H. Political Science Department University of California. "Guerrilla Chief Rallies Cuban Unrest." *The Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-1959)*, Jul 21, 1957.
<http://mantis.csuchico.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/guerrilla-chief-rallies-cuban-unrest/docview/148849796/se-2?accountid=10346>.
- "10. Letter From the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs (Wieland) to the Ambassador in Cuba (Smith)1." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 17, 2021.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d10>.
- "244. Memorandum of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, January 30, 1959, 11:30 A.m." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 15, 2021.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d244>.
- Spalding. "241. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 15, 2021.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d241>.
- Willauer, Whiting. "242. Letter From the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom)." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. Accessed November 15, 2021.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d242>.

Secondary sources:

Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio. "Cuba Betrayed" *1st ed. New York: Vantage Press, 1962.*

- Foote, Nicola. *Sources for Latin America in the Modern World*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Garrard, Virginia, Henderson Peter V N., and Bryan McCann. *Latin America in the Modern World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
- Perez Jr., Louis A. *The War of 1898*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
- Phillips, R. Hart. *Cuba, Island of Paradox* New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959.
- Thomas, Hugh. "Cuba: The United States and Batista, 1952-58." *World Affairs* 149, no. 4 (1987): 169–75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672109>.
- Zinn, Howard. *Howard Zinn on War*. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2011.

No Justice for the Outsider

Lukas Sandro

The interests and activities of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and American Nazis (ANP) linked together inextricably on November 3, 1979—the Greensboro Massacre. This was the day a group of Klansmen and Nazis went to a “Death to the Klan” rally organized by the Communist Workers Party (CWP), opened fire on the demonstrators, and killed five of them. As the years progressed, evidence was gradually released that proved the attack was premeditated—the Klansmen and Nazis went there planning to murder the protestors. Following the massacre, the perpetrators were put on trial three separate times: once in a state trial, once in a federal trial, and finally, a civil suit was raised against them. All three times, even after it was evident that the Klansmen and Nazis had planned to murder demonstrators, justice was not served and the perpetrators were acquitted. In the aftermath of those acquittals, George Simkins, the chief of the NAACP, said that “[t]he verdict is tantamount to giving the Klan and the Nazis a license to kill...”¹ However, he was a civil rights organizer. Not everyone in America has been so focused on civil liberties at the time or since.

In the aftermath of the massacre, journalists in high-profile newspapers were sympathetic to the slain CWP demonstrators. Though people in the community might have believed that the demonstrators brought the attack upon themselves for challenging the Klan, most written reports did not blame the demonstrators for their murders. Despite the public neutrality or support the protestors received, the Klan members and Nazis on trial were acquitted three times, to the shock of many reporters. This shock partially explains why the acquittals were able to occur in the first place and subsequently, why the white power movement was able to grow in strength and influence in the following decades. A common trend in American culture has been an unwillingness to confront prejudice and racism. After the Civil Rights Movement, there has been a widespread desire to believe that the fight for racial equality ended with that movement, and most instances of racism were dismissed for that reason. In the case of the Greensboro Massacre, an unwillingness to face the white power groups’ desire to cast out or kill those that diverged from the white, Protestant, capitalist identity and their desire to challenge the continued existence of those

¹ William H. Chafe, and American Council of Learned Societies. *Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 252.

groups led to the acquittals of the killers behind the massacre and the continued prevalence of white power groups.

The Ku Klux Klan has a long and complex history, beginning “as a private social club in the spring of 1866.”² From that inception in post-Civil War America, there had been periods where the Klan wielded immense power with high membership numbers, and there had been periods of abandonment shortly following. That cycle first occurred within five years of the Klan’s inception—President Ulysses S. Grant took on the Klan and suppressed “the formal order” by 1872.³ Despite originally being active for less than a decade, the Klan continued to resurrect itself. Upon deeper inspection, two trends explained the cyclical resurgences in the Klan’s power.

The 1920s resurgence and the Civil Rights Era resurgence were both triggered by defining events in race relations. For the 1920s, that event was the release of D.W. Griffiths’ film, *Birth of a Nation* in 1915.⁴ The film characterized the Klan as heroes who saved the South from dangerous Black people (who were portrayed by white actors in blackface). *Birth of a Nation* revolutionized the film industry, and by spreading this message through media, it had a massively compelling effect on Americans at the time. The defining event that led to the Civil Rights Era resurgence was the ruling of *Brown v. the Board of Education* in 1954, which began the period of desegregation in America.⁵ White Americans saw desegregation as an attack on their ways of life and escalated to extremist responses. They saw the Klan as a force that would fight for them because the American Government was not. However, as will be explored in more detail later, that perception was not accurate. Both local and federal authorities had members that were either active Klan members or policies that directly assisted the Klan.

Following the resurrections, the new eras of the Klan needed fuel to continue their activities. Therefore, the second trend was a surge in patriotism brought on by war. While America’s involvement in a war did not trigger the Klan’s resurrections, there was a massive resurgence in popularity and power *following* a war. After World War I, “... racial violence accompanied the spread of patriotic fervor,” and the early 1920s was a period where the Klan flourished.⁶ However, once again, that power did not last long. In 1930, the Klan had withered away once more, but not because of outside intervention. The violence of the 1920s “...

² Michael Newton, *The Ku Klux Klan: History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of America’s Most Notorious Secret Society* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2007), 6.

³ Newton, *The Ku Klux Klan*, 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 14, 15.

could only persist while FBI agents ignored it and local police sympathized with the terrorists.⁷ Instead, that violence was the Klan's downfall; people grew tired of the violence that the Klan enacted and subsequently abandoned it. In the 1970s, what sparked new life into the Klan was the bitter end to the Vietnam War. Veterans that felt abandoned and wronged by the American government and civilians turned to the Klan (and other white power groups).⁸ During this period, federal agencies took a more active stand against the Klan by involving them in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO). COINTELPRO was directed "[b]etween September 1964 and April 1971... against various Klan factions are their allies on the neo-Nazi fringe..." but it did not have a substantial impact on the Klan.⁹ Klan informants working on behalf of the FBI were involved in the Greensboro Massacre of 1979.

After the 1970s, the Klan did not entirely disappear the way that it had in prior incarnations. In 1988, their membership "... hit a record low of between 4,500 and 5,000 members," but Klan activity continued regardless.¹⁰ As a facet of the white power movement, the Klan had lagged in power but carried on to the 21st century.

The American Nazi Party (ANP) did not have a history as long and complex as the Ku Klux Klan. Naturally, it only formed after World War II; it "... was founded in 1959 by George Lincoln Rockwell as the first explicitly postwar American National Socialist group."¹¹ It was well known for two newspaper publications that it created: *The Stormtrooper* and the *Rockwell Report*.¹² Similar to the first two major periods in Klan history, the height of the ANP did not last for many years. The peak of its power was in 1966, and that power withered shortly after. With the assassination of George Lincoln Rockwell in 1967, the organized national party essentially died with him.¹³ A New York Times article from 1968 reported that it was effectively over after seven months as a

⁷ Ibid., 16.

⁸ Kathleen Belew, *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 23.

⁹ Newton, *The Ku Klux Klan*, 25.

¹⁰ Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right* (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000), 166.

¹¹ Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power*, 1.

¹² John George, Laird M. Wilcox, and Mazal Holocaust Collection, *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political Extremism in America* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1992), 355.

¹³ Frederick J. Simonelli, and Mazal Holocaust Collection, *American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 131.

national organization.¹⁴ However, the important word to focus on is 'national.' The groups that would make up the white power movement adopted a tactic known as independent cells. A branch of the ANP in one region would still operate even as the national organization was defunct.

The Communist Workers Party (CWP) underwent a series of identity changes before it became the CWP of the Greensboro Massacre. Unlike the Klan or the ANP, the CWP was very young by the time of the conflict. It was founded in 1973 by Jerry Tung, a Chinese-born American; it was "[o]riginally called the Asian Study Group and based in New York City, it became the Workers Viewpoint Organization in 1976," and in late 1979, it became the Communist Workers Party.¹⁵ This group often demonstrated publicly and was not shy about using violence to accomplish its goals. The CWP was a Maoist group, one that "... had hailed the deeds of Stalin, Mao, even Pol Pot, and applauded the Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini for giving the death penalty to fourteen Trotskyists (whom they referred to as 'counter-revolutionary dogs')."¹⁶ After the Massacre and the subsequent trials, the group changed identities again in 1985, becoming the New Democratic Movement (NDM) to work alongside the Democratic Party.¹⁷ By the mid-1980s, the membership of the CWP/NDM had fallen to a number between five hundred to 2,000 people; this means that all three groups, the KKK, the ANP, and the CWP, experienced a decline in active members around the same time.¹⁸

One of the major differences between the Klan and the CWP regarding continued recruitment over time was the focus on civic engagement. The CWP purposefully isolated itself. They went into communities to do activist work but were seen as exploitative by the local left-wing groups. As a result, "[m]any of the noncommunist leftists refused to have anything more to do with anyone associated with the [CWP]," and the CWP embraced that.¹⁹ Alternatively, "Klan recruiting successes owed much to the organizing strategies adopted by [the] core members. Often, local and national leaders were active in civic life, both inside and outside KKK circles."²⁰ They made friends, joined clubs, were active members of their churches, etc. By doing this, they became

¹⁴ Fred P. Graham, "Rockwell's Nazis Lost Without Him; Party is Moribund 7 Months After Leader's Murder," *The New York Times*, April 8, 1968.

¹⁵ John George et. al, *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe*, 189.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 184.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Elizabeth Wheaton, *Codename GREENKIL: The 1979 Greensboro Killings* (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 65.

²⁰ David Cunningham, *Klansville, U.S.A.: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-era Ku Klux Klan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 40.

familiar with their non-Klan neighbors. By becoming familiar, their ideologies became more tolerable and acceptable to those around them. Because the CWP was so isolated, people rejected them and their message further. They were outsiders while the Klan was integrated into their community.

Following the clash between the two groups, the response between national media reporting and the local response in the town of Greensboro differed. There was an attempt by city officials, law enforcement, and civilians to distance the town from the parties that were involved in the case. Most of the dead did live in Greensboro, though they were not Greensboro natives.²¹ Despite that fact, city officials framed the event “not as a ‘massacre’ of vulnerable citizens but as a ‘shootout’ between out-of-town radicals...” and that “[t]he city... was an ‘innocent victim’ caught between the equally unsavory radicalism of the CWP and the KKK.”²² In the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report, this same attitude was reported in the daily newspapers, but the weekly newspaper instead blamed the Greensboro Police Department.²³ Given the general emphasis on the victims’ status as CWP organizers, they would not have received the same amount of culpability from the city if they were not Communists.

Given that the shooting occurred during the later years of the Cold War, the American hysteria surrounding communism had died down, but being a Communist still made a person an outsider. During the first state trial, the defendants claimed that “the assault on the rally was motivated by patriotic anti-Communism rather than racial hatred” however, the argument was that civilians could murder people that went against the national hegemony if they decided that those individuals were a threat, whether those people were racial minorities or political ones.²⁴

The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission (GTRC) spent a large section of its final report analyzing the effect media reports had on the general public. The findings of this report indicated that the lack of consequences for the perpetrators of the shooting and a lack of impact on American culture were predictable based on the victims’ identities. In regards to the trends in media reporting after the shooting, “[t]he analysis of the news reports in Greensboro following Nov. 3, 1979, shows that citizens were left to

²¹ Nicholas Lemann, “Klansmen vs. Communists,” *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1980.

²² David W McIvor, *Mourning in America: Race and the Politics of Loss* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2016), 2.

²³ Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report* (Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2006): 324-325.

²⁴ Wayne King, “Defense to Begin in Klan-Nazi Trial”, *The New York Times*, March 19, 1984.

make sense of the event through the eyes of lawyers, government officials, police representatives, and to a lesser extent, the members of the CWP, Klan, and Nazis” but that more importantly, “[r]esearch demonstrates that when community conflicts erupt, the media most often reflects the views of local political and economic leaders.”²⁵ The Ku Klux Klan and American Nazis posed a threat to American minority groups and unity between Americans, but they were not a group that threatened the political and economic status quo in America. The CWP, and other Communists in America, did threaten American political and economic systems. The first trial in 1980 was interrupted by CWP activists with a stink bomb, and these activists “refused to participate in what they described as a ‘sham.’”²⁶ By refusing to participate in the American legal system and sticking to their revolutionary principles, they rejected public sympathies. The American public revoked their support for the friends and families of the victims once they refused to act like the ‘typical American victim.’

Regarding the national media coverage of the shooting, in one of the earliest articles released, both the Klan activity and the lack of police response were acknowledged as factors in the shooting. However, in the case of the lack of police involvement, it was reported that “Sally Bermanzohn, wife of the wounded protestor, charged that the police had known before the incident that the Klan was planning violence—a charge the police denied...” and it was not reported as a factual statement with evidence as it would be after a few years.²⁷ Instead, the article reported that the reason the police were not on the scene to protect the demonstrators in advance was that “... the department did not want to make a show of force.”²⁸ Additionally, the article did not mention the involvement of Nazis, instead, they focused solely on the Ku Klux Klan. The article spent much time focusing on who the victims were and their accounts of how the violence on November 3rd played out.

A week after the first murder trial began in 1980, another article was published that focused heavily on humanizing the victims of the shooting. While the article humanized them by mentioning their virtues and their families in statements like, “[t]he communists who died that day were, like those who survive, strong, intelligent, loving people,” the

²⁵ Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report* (Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2006): 326.

²⁶ David W McIvor, *Mourning in America: Race and the Politics of Loss* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2016), 2.

²⁷ Tom Stiles, “Four Shot to Death at Anti-Klan March,” *The New York Times*, November 4, 1979.

²⁸ Tom Stiles, “Four Shot to Death at Anti-Klan March,” *The New York Times*, November 4, 1979.

article also focused heavily on the theory of two extremist groups battling it out with the line, “[a]ll had given up promising careers to dedicate themselves to bringing about a violent revolution in America.”²⁹ While that was true, and that was the goal of the CWP, the language used revealed the negative attitudes towards such activism at the time. To the public, it was not admirable that these people had left their comfortable and traditional lives to fight for their beliefs. Instead, the public believed that the CWP members gave up on being productive members of society. Notably, the article did not clarify what revolution they were working towards, merely that it was ‘violent.’ Ultimately, what the CWP was working for in Greensboro was to unionize textile mill workers and improve their lives.³⁰ However, because they went against the culture of America that so valued capitalism, that was what mattered to journalists to convey to the American public. While the article was sympathetic toward the victims, it was clear that their rejection of the American status quo in life was enough to justify criticism of them in death.

Four years later, after the acquittal of the first state murder trial, a federal trial was held. In March 1984, it was reported in the *New York Times* that the previous trial had an all-white jury that believed the Klansmen and Nazis could have acted in self-defense.³¹ The article reported that a new, clearer interpretation of the video footage of the shooting proved that the shooting was not done in self-defense.³² However, the introduction of new information throughout the years served to confuse the population that was keeping up with the reporting. It could be difficult to keep track of trial proceedings, especially for casual observers, after years had passed and multiple trials were held.

In 1985, the third and final trial surrounding the Greensboro Massacre occurred. A later article by *The New York Times* acknowledged that American Nazis and Klansmen had worked together to commit that crime.³³ Additionally, an informer for the authorities and an agent of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were also on trial for their role in the shooting—both instigating it and failing to prevent the shooting while having forewarning of it.³⁴ A drastic change in the 1985 article that differs from the articles published before the first trial was

²⁹ Nicholas Lemann, “Klansmen vs. Communists,” *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1980.

³⁰ Nicholas Lemann, “Klansmen vs. Communists,” *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1980.

³¹ Wayne King, “Defense to Begin in Klan-Nazi Trial,” *The New York Times*, March 19, 1984.

³² Wayne King, “Defense to Begin in Klan-Nazi Trial,” *The New York Times*, March 19, 1984.

³³ “Klan Trial a Sharp Contrast with 2 Earlier Ones,” *The New York Times*, March 31, 1985.

³⁴ “Klan Trial a Sharp Contrast with 2 Earlier Ones,” *The New York Times*, March 31, 1985.

that the nature of the CWP as a radical activist group was not mentioned. Instead, the sole focus was on the perpetrators of the crime, their defense strategies, etc. That may have been because, by 1985, most people familiar with the case would have known what the CWP was and what its goals and methods were. Additionally, at the time of the shooting, having ‘Communist’ in the name spoke for itself for many Americans. People that believed the CWP got what they deserved did so because they were Communists, not necessarily because they were violent. Alternatively, that omission could have signaled a change in the framing of the event, taking some of the responsibility and focus off of the CWP to focus instead on the white power groups.

In 2005, the GTRC held its public hearings on the shooting. By that time, public perception of the event had largely shifted away from the idea that it was an even shootout between both sides.³⁵ This report provides further evidence for the theory that the media typically reflects the views of authority figures. The white power groups aligned more closely with authority figures not just because of their anti-Communist beliefs but because they made the active choice to. David Cunningham et al., wrote that “... over time, with 1980s claims of ‘police unjust’ disappearing, replaced by themes that highlight the ‘violent’ nature of the CWP and defensively reject the idea that the shootings involved any sort of official conspiracy. With this framing, the KKK effectively allied with institutional efforts to defend against a perception of a conspiracy by 2005...” which further explains why Americans have not actively remembered this incident.³⁶ Despite numerous instances of law enforcement corruption in America’s history, it is not comfortable for Americans to hold law enforcement accountable for their corruption. By aligning with the Greensboro Police, the KKK ensured that people would rather forget the incident than continue discussing it.

One might believe that law enforcement across America, on all levels, would oppose racist, violent, vigilante groups like the Klan and the ANP. Unfortunately, local and federal law enforcement had a far more pleasant relationship with those groups than they had with the victims of those groups. After all, the origins of the American police departments can be traced back to the slave patrols of the antebellum period. In one instance, “... by 1837, the Charleston Police Department had 100 officers whose primary function was to patrol slaves...” and many police tactics like ‘the police beat’ and ‘Stop and Frisk’ originated

³⁵ David Cunningham, Colleen Nugent, and Caitlin Slodden, “The Durability of Collective Memory: Reconciling the “Greensboro Massacre,” *Social Forces* 88 no. 4 (2010): 1533.

³⁶ Cunningham, et. al., “Durability of Collective Memory,” 1536.

with slave patrols.³⁷ With that racist framework, it is not surprising that local police and Klans had a favorable relationship. While the illegality of vigilantism never stopped the Klan from carrying out lynchings, beatings, or intimidations, there was the draw to some Klansmen to join the police so that they could do such things with legal authority.

Klan members often became informants for federal agencies. For a primarily secret society that opposed the activities of the federal government, that does not appear to make sense. However, Elizabeth Wheaton, author of *Codename Greenkil: The 1979 Greensboro Shootings*, offered a compelling theory:

... it may be symbolic of the needs of many, if not most, Klan members for power, prestige, and respect. Their day-to-day lives are characterized by poverty, ignorance, and violence. The Klan offers an outlet for their frustration and targets—blacks, Jews, Communists, homosexuals—for their hostilities, all under the banner of patriotism. But it is an illusion... they grab whatever measure of gratification they can find. It may be burning a cross or shouting racial epithets or assaulting someone. Or it may be becoming an informant, for the informant has not only a dual source of power but a dual illusion of patriotism...³⁸

The Klan members involved with the Greensboro Massacre were no exception. Most of them were manual laborers with families and without high school diplomas. Most of them worked at textile mills, which the CWP had attempted to unionize before the Death to the Klan rally.³⁹ If the allure of power drew them to the Klan and drew them to violence, it is no wonder they responded violently to the CWP. While the CWP was also a violent, extremist group, its members were made up of college-educated individuals.⁴⁰ They were proud Communists attempting to change lives in and around Greensboro in a way that threatened the status quo.

The fortieth anniversary of the shooting has come and gone, and it is clear that it has had a long-lasting and detrimental impact on American culture. The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation

³⁷ Marlese Durr, "What Is the Difference between Slave Patrols and Modern Day Policing? Institutional Violence in a Community of Color," *Critical Sociology* 41, no. 6 (September 2015): 875.

³⁸ Elizabeth Wheaton, *Codename GREENKIL: The 1979 Greensboro Killings* (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1987), 43.

³⁹ Nicholas Lemann, "Klansmen vs. Communists," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1980.

⁴⁰ Nicholas Lemann, "Klansmen vs. Communists," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1980.

Commission refreshed the memory of the events in the minds of those involved, bringing the impact of it to the forefront of public conversation as well. The GTRC's Final Report also made the study of the shooting more accessible to Americans that had not heard of it before. Condensing such a complex topic into one thorough resource ensured that it was not lost to time. As a result, the feelings surrounding it were not lost either. In one case, a student that was studying the shooting was discussing it in a public place when two unfamiliar men told her that "... 'Do you think you or anyone can change history? Those commies got what they deserved'" and "[w]hen the young woman left later, she found her car in the parking lot with the tires slashed."⁴¹ The reason why those men believed that the CWP members deserved to be brutalized is unknown. Whether they held sympathy for white power causes, hated communism, believed the CWP fired first, or thought that the CWP instigated it by holding the rally in the first place, all of those reasons have a common basis. The CWP was the other. Even if the clashing groups were equally violent and radical extremists (which they were not, the CWP had not murdered anyone prior or following), the thing that made the CWP intolerable and the white power groups tolerable was the fact that in a capitalist country, being anti-capitalist cast out a person. People would react as if that person was a traitor to the country, especially following the Vietnam War.

The GTRC acknowledged this in the Final Report, stating that "[w]hile the killings themselves and the hatred and divisions that prompted them illustrate how one group of people can dehumanize other groups, attitudes in Greensboro and elsewhere demonstrate how less obvious dehumanization allows people to rationalize injustice, then accept and ignore it"—that was one of the most important and unnerving revelations that came from the shooting.⁴²

The unspoken takeaway from the Greensboro Massacre was that if a person did not fit the accepted status quo of American culture, they could be justifiably killed for challenging the status quo, even if they challenged it in a non-violent way. When the connection between white power groups and local law enforcement was factored in, the epidemic of police brutality against minority groups took on a new lens. In recent years due to the prevalence of smartphones and their cameras, there has been an abundance of instances of unlawful death at the hands of the police. Despite photographic evidence, oftentimes, the police

⁴¹ Spoma Jovanovic, *Democracy, Dialogue, and Community Action* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2012).

⁴² Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, *Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report* (Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2006): 362-363.

faced no consequences for their actions. This lack of consequence, despite photographic evidence, mirrored the Greensboro Massacre because that was taped as well, and there were still no convictions. Even if people do not remember it, the event and consequences bear a striking resemblance to the violence that followed it.

The unlawful murder of five CWP demonstrators on November 3, 1979, was a case that demonstrated that to the American public, those that fell outside of or actively rejected the American status quo did not fully deserve protection, justice, or sympathy. This was not stated by individuals directly, but through the actions and sentiments held after the massacre and during the period that the trials were held, it was expressed. The CWP demonstrators did not fire the first shots, but they wished to revolutionize America, so they were dangerous. The Ku Klux Klan and American Nazis went to the “Death to the Klan” rally intending to kill, but they did not challenge American capitalist culture, so they faced no consequences.

Many Americans today lived through the Greensboro Massacre and subsequent trials, but few remember it. The lack of impact this event has had on current American culture is worth analyzing. A lack of response says just as much as a response would and reveals the true values the American people hold. The white power movement as it currently exists was formed during the Greensboro Massacre. Before that event, the Ku Klux Klan and American Nazis operated separately, but since they joined forces, they have had a powerful effect on America. White power members were directly involved in American activities in El Salvador and Nicaragua, including the Iran-Contra Affair. White power members orchestrated and carried out the Oklahoma City Bombing. White power members were present at the storming of the Capitol building on January 6, 2021. Not only were they storming the Capitol, but they also had police officers letting them in. Based on the sequence of events in the relationship between white power and law enforcement, that was not surprising. For decades it has not been a secret that members of white power groups had close ties with law enforcement, and “... the acceptance of far-right beliefs among law enforcement, [domestic terrorism researchers] say, helped lay the groundwork for the extraordinary attacks in the American capital.”⁴³ Violent members of white power groups had nothing to fear and were emboldened to act because they had ‘the law on their side.’

Despite the many arrests and condemnations from the American public, the white power movement has not backed down from its goal to take on the United States Government and create a white homeland.

⁴³ Levin, “US Capitol riot.”

They have millions of members and access to great collective wealth and weaponry by this point. If they had been challenged more effectively in the 1980s, perhaps they would not have grown to be so formidable.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

- Chafe, William H., Chafe, William Hendry, and American Council of Learned Societies. *Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- “Defense to Begin in Klan-Nazi Trial.” *The New York Times*, March 19, 1984. <https://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/19/us/defense-to-begin-in-klan-nazi-trial.html>.
- “Four Shot to Death at Anti-Klan March.” *The New York Times*, November 4, 1979. <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/04/archives/four-shot-to-death-at-antiklan-march-ambush-at-a-north-carolina.html>.
- Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. *Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report* (Greensboro, NC: Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2006).
- “Klansmen vs. Communists.” *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1980. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/06/22/klansmen-vs-communists/89714c73-6d1a-4cba-8b71-b9bc84d32582/>.
- “Klan Trial a Sharp Contrast with 2 Earlier Ones.” *The New York Times*, March 31, 1985. <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/31/us/klan-trial-a-sharp-contrast-with-2-earlier-ones.html>.
- Levin, Sam. “US Capitol Riot: Police have Long History of Aiding Neo-Nazis and Extremists.” *Guardian News & Media Limited*, January 16, 2021.
- “Rockwell’s Nazis Lost Without Him; Party is Moribund 7 Months After Leader’s Murder.” *The New York Times*, April 8, 1968. <https://www.nytimes.com/1968/04/08/archives/rockwells-nazis-lost-without-him-party-is-moribund-7-months-after.html?searchResultPosition=9>.
- Wheaton, Elizabeth. *Codename GREENKIL: The 1979 Greensboro Killings*. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1987.

Secondary Sources:

- Belew, Kathleen. *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Cunningham, David. *Klansville, U.S.A.: The Rise and Fall of the Civil Rights-era Ku Klux Klan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Cunningham, David, Nugent, Colleen, and Caitlin Slodden. “The Durability of Collective Memory: Reconciling the “Greensboro Massacre”.” *Social Forces* 88 no. 4 (2010): 1517-42.
- Durr, Marlese. “What Is the Difference between Slave Patrols and Modern Day Policing? Institutional Violence in a Community of Color.” *Critical Sociology* 41, no. 6 (September 2015): 873–79.
- George, John, Laird M. Wilcox, and Mazal Holocaust Collection. *Nazis, Communists, Klansmen, and Others on the Fringe: Political Extremism in America*. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1992.
- Jovanovic, Spoma. *Democracy, Dialogue, and Community Action*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2012.
- Kaplan, Jeffrey. *Encyclopedia of White Power: A Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right*. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000.
- McIvor, David W. *Mourning in America: Race and the Politics of Loss*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Newton, Michael. *The Ku Klux Klan: History, Organization, Language, Influence and Activities of America’s Most Notorious Secret Society*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co, 2007.

The Chico Historian

Simonelli, Frederick J., and Mazal Holocaust Collection. *American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999.

Conflict is an Opportunity for Growth: Evangelical Expansion During the Guatemalan Civil War

Sean Mellon

During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, Guatemalans experienced many distinct changes in their way of life. Protestantism experienced a shift from being persecuted by Guatemalan society to becoming one of the predominant religions in the country. The nature of the civil war in Guatemala also shifted; the conflict changed from a war against insurgents lurking underneath the radar in cities to a scorched earth campaign against the leftist guerillas which killed countless Indigenous Mayan people in the process. Their dictatorial president, Efraín Ríos Montt, utilized Protestantism and the rhetoric of the religious right to justify the massacre of countless people throughout Guatemala's countryside. Simultaneously, the administration of President Reagan and the newly formed religious right had a large stake in the new evangelical population of Guatemala and their fight against communism. How did the rise of American Protestantism and neo-Pentecostal evangelism influence Guatemala and its civil war?

The Rise of Protestantism in Guatemala

Before 1976 it was undeniably dangerous to be a Protestant in Guatemala. At the time of the ouster of the Arbenz administration in 1954, Protestants had major cause for concern. While the Catholics had generally supported Carlos Castillo Armas and his liberation army in their coup, the vastly outnumbered Protestants had been relatively loyal to the administration of Jacobo Arbenz. According to Virginia Garrard-Burnett, the Indigenous converts to Protestantism were the ones who bore the greatest punishment from villagers following the 1954 coup. These villagers accused them of being “communists, tricksters, and terrorists,” and greeted them with violence. For example, in the village of Kek'chi, villagers fired rockets from makeshift launchers to eviscerate one of the Protestant churches and the many patrons in attendance.¹ Under these circumstances, state-approved violence was bound to escalate right in front of the eyes of the Guatemalan Protestants. The Protestant population remained mostly divided by religious factionalism following the Arbenz administration, but the violence of the 1950s against these Guatemalans caught the eyes and ears of American evangelicals and the earliest incarnations of “religious right” for the first time. The evangelical sect of Protestantism is markedly different from

¹ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala: Living in the New Jerusalem* (University of Texas Press, 1998), 103.

the mainline sect on account of a few critical differences; they believe that the Bible is literal and without error, salvation is only possible through the belief in Christ, which makes religious pluralism near impossible for an evangelical to accept, they require born-again experiences in coordination with conversion, and most importantly evangelicals must proselytize, or spread the word of God to all.² Resources, material aid, and missionary expeditions would continue to endorse the mainline Protestants of Guatemala to the United States' conservatives and neo-Pentecostal evangelicals.

However, prior protestant growth was nothing compared to the growth that occurred following the earthquake of 1976. According to Lauren Francis Turek, "Twenty-three thousand people perished and more than seventy-six thousand suffered injuries. The earthquake exacted a staggering economic toll, leaving over a million homeless, with large swaths of Guatemala City and other towns reduced to rubble and critical infrastructure destroyed."³ The natural disaster showcased the rise in "global evangelism" as countless missionaries, and relief agencies flocked from the United States to Guatemala. The Guatemalan Protestant population skyrocketed. According to Turek, their numbers grew by fourteen percent in the two years following the earthquake. By 1982, twenty-two percent of Guatemalans identified as Protestant.⁴ The unprecedented rise in numbers was unsurprising. The Protestant efforts to provide aid to the people of Guatemala were far superior to what the Catholic church was able to offer them. In summation, the 1976 earthquake marked when Guatemala stopped resisting Protestantism. Nevertheless, a quote from Ruben Lores, a Guatemala City resident in 1976, brings much-needed clarity to the intentions of American Protestants during their efforts. "We have received from the Americans not only the imperishable legacy of the gospel message, but with it a body of attitudes, ethical stances, political postures, economic ideas, and relational loyalties that are more substantially linked to American Manifest Destiny than to the Gospel of Christ."⁵

The moralizing attitude present in missionary efforts was best represented by Billy Graham, a pronounced right-wing minister who was one of many evangelists to take a plane to Guatemala in the immediate wake of the disaster. He believed that material aid was not enough to truly help these people. He believed that in conjunction with their aid,

² John Green, "Evangelicals v. Mainline Protestants," Frontline (PBS, April 29, 2004), <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jesus/evangelicals/evmain.html>.

³ Lauren Francis Turek, "To Support a 'Brother in Christ': Evangelical Groups and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations During the Ríos Montt Regime," *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 4 (2015), 692.

⁴ Turek, "To Support a 'Brother in Christ,'" 695.

⁵ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 100.

the people of Guatemala needed Christian salvation to rebuild their society. Christianity was the ideology of the Guatemalan government even before the coup of 1982, as they hoped that the extraordinary expansion of the evangelic sect of Protestants would undermine the perceived solidarity between the leftist guerillas and the Indigenous people that lived in Guatemala's cities. But under the dictatorship of Efraín Ríos Montt, evangelicals became agents of the government in Guatemala's Highlands, where the brutality of the army went completely unchecked.

The Road to Efraín Ríos Montt

The stage set by the earthquake and the growing unease and tension makes it easy to assume that the Protestant beliefs of Ríos Montt were the reason he assumed power in 1982, but they played practically no role whatsoever. The coup against General Romeo Lucas García was more about the Guatemalan military project, sponsored by the United States, that had evolved since the coup of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954.⁶ The 1954 coup exemplified the qualities of extraordinarily sharp internal divisions, ones that began initially with the coup of Arbenz as a direct result of the CIA's patronage.⁷ In fact, the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz marked a dramatic increase in the United States' interest in Guatemala and preserving the attitudes of anti-communism within their borders. At a National Security Council meeting in 1953, Alan Dulles of the CIA, together with Henry Lodge Junior, went as far as to strongarm the representatives of Great Britain and France to keep the complaints of Guatemalans out of the eyes of the National Security Council and the United Nations.⁸ The role of the CIA in the coup against Arbenz initiated the persecution of Protestants in Guatemala and set the country on a course toward genocide. Historian Richard Immerman emphasized the heavy-handedness of the United States' operations in fulfilling their role as warriors against communism.

CIA Agents met with rebel high command. They arranged a Voice of Liberation broadcast, also to coincide with the Security Council vote, announcing the convergence of two divisions of Guatemala City. Simultaneously, Jerry DeLarm ... strafed the capital,

⁶ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982-1983* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 24.

⁷ Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit*, 26.

⁸ Richard H Immerman, *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 171.

blowing up the government's oil reserves. Appropriately frightened, Arbenz committed his ultimate error: he ordered his army officers to distribute arms to local peasants and workers. They balked, demanding instead that the president resign or come to terms with Castillo Armas.⁹

The United States-backed insurrection against the Arbenz administration was the tipping point that pushed the country into a period of right-wing leadership that culminated in the violence of the Lucas regime. Unfortunately for the residents of Guatemala, the man who was to replace General Romeo Lucas Garcia was not the answer to dissuading Guatemala's rapid descent into violence. To comprehend the effect of the United States' evangelicals on Guatemala from 1982 and onward, it is critical to understand the motives of Rios Montt and how his rule changed the tide of the civil war directly towards the Indigenous Mayan population.

Evangelicals and the Highland Indigenous Population, 1882-1884

Efraim Rios Montt's application of the strategies that he learned in the School of the Americas culminated in his plan titled Victoria '82. Rios Montt's counterinsurgent strategy scorched the guerillas and simultaneously attempted to solve what those surrounding Rios Montt referred to as Guatemala's "Indian Problem." Victoria '82 presented a dual-pronged plan that was the first to emphasize Rios Montt's policy of *Fusiles y Frijoles*, or Rifles and Beans. In an interview with Jennifer Schirmer, Rios Montt described *Fusiles y Frijoles* as follows, "Listen well: subversion or the guerrilla is not a military problem. It is eminently a political problem. And, as a consequence, every State apparatus must act where there exists a political vacuum. Knowing that, we addressed the entire problem in 1982: justice, beans, and bullets."¹⁰ Rios Montt's plan first called for a nationwide amnesty to the primarily Indigenous communities surrounding guerillas to destroy their base of support. Most problematic, his proposition placed Guatemala's Indigenous Mayans in a lose-lose situation. They either abandoned their homes and previous way of life or faced Rios Montt's scorched earth campaign head-on.¹¹ In a declassified document from the US Embassy in Guatemala sent to D.C., the embassy described *Fusiles y Frijoles* to suggest their affinity for Rios Montt's plan:

⁹ Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*, 174.

¹⁰ Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 35.

¹¹ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 148.

The Junta has announced a pacification campaign based on the two F's, 'Fusiles and Frijoles (Rifles and Beans).' It has announced instructions to the security forces to 'protect campesinos, not repress them.' It has arranged mass demonstrations of civilian militiamen in the war torn 'Ixil Triangle' of Quiché, and provides food and medical aid to Quiché refugees... The Junta has clearly embarked on a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the campesinos, and probably to improve the GOG's international image.¹²

Those who stayed behind on their native land were far from protected. The rifles involved in Rios Montt's plan wiped 440 villages off the map and initiated a genocide upon the Mayan people. The second part of Victoria '82 represented Rios Montt's nation-building aspirations for Guatemala. *The Comité Nacional de Reconstrucción*. (CNR), provided material aid and shelter to those seeking asylum during the war on Insurgent bases scattered throughout Guatemala's Highlands. Financial backing for the CNR came from US evangelical organizations, including Rios Montt's native church *El Verbo*, the "Church of the Word."¹³ Part of the committee was the *Fundación de Ayuda al Pueblo Indígena*, which allowed the evangelicals to aid the Indigenous people of the Highlands in the form of "model villages." These resettlement outposts served a dual purpose for the Rios Montt regime. The model village functioned not only as a location to resettle campesinos but also as security holdouts and monitoring stations for the Guatemalan military.¹⁴ The army simultaneously eliminated Indigenous cultural centers and replaced them with protestant churches and conversion centers. They had no choice but to accept the state-sanctioned option for survival; evidence of their choice was based on the growth of Protestant churches in the region. By the end of the conflict, Protestant churches numbered over ten thousand. These churches were placed strategically near active combat zones but far enough to remain clear of harm's way. The largest growth of these churches was in former Indigenous land.¹⁵ The alternative to model villages was often a harsh and unrewarding existence for the Indigenous that remained with the land. They had constant oversight and remained utterly under the control of the guerillas. They were forced to wash

¹² U.S. Embassy of Guatemala, "Guerrilla Activities Increase," Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1982).

¹³ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 149.

¹⁴ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 153.

¹⁵ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 154.

clothes, grow food, and pay the guerillas for their protection.¹⁶ The role of these model villages and churches is best examined through the lens of Tomás Guzaro, a mainline Ixil Protestant Pastor who left his loved ones behind with the guerillas in his pursuit of safety and military aid. Guzaro is only one of the countless Indigenous community members that embraced Protestant Pentecostalism after 1976. Even as a Protestant, Guzaro endured an intense journey to the militarized village of Aguacatán. He avoided both guerillas-in-pursuit as well as relentless shelling from the Guatemalan military, which did not discriminate in choosing victims. When asked by a relatively understanding military official, Major Tito, why the Mayans remained with the guerillas under horrible conditions, Guzaro demonstrated the lack of a choice given to the Mayan people, “It’s not because they want to stay; they’re forced to stay. The guerrillas gained control over us, and then the army turned against us. Army soldiers burned our homes and killed people because they thought we were guerrillas. But when we heard the president on the radio telling us to come out of the mountains, that there was amnesty for us, we knew it was time to leave. But we had to figure out a way.”¹⁷

The village of Quiché, as previously mentioned, was an excellent example of one of the “model villages” that infiltrated the Guatemalan Highlands in 1982. Situated on the outskirts of multiple bombed-out villages within the Ixil region, Quiché was an outpost where Rios Montt projected his ideas regarding “La Nueva Guatemala,” and forced countless Indigenous people to speak Spanish and act how one was expected to act under the will of a misguided civilizing mission. Unfortunately, the civilizing mission was not the most nefarious characteristic of the model villages.

Evangelical assumption of the informant’s role is an undeniable feature of the model village. As mentioned previously, these villages also acted as security outposts for the Guatemalan military. In order to liberate family members from the servitude of the guerillas, countless Indigenous pastors colluded willingly with Evangelicals and the Guatemalan army in informing of guerilla activity. Evangelical collusion was not limited to the reception of testimony but also through their participation in civilian patrols for the villages.¹⁸ Their self-policing role emphasized the trust shared between the Rios Montt regime and the Evangelicals and allowed for some of the greatest atrocities in one of the largest Indigenous genocides. The most critical aspect of military

¹⁶ Tomás Guzaro, *Escaping the Fire: How an Ixil Mayan Pastor Led His People Out of a Holocaust During the Guatemalan Civil War*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2010), 157.

¹⁷ Tomás Guzaro, *Escaping the Fire*, 157.

¹⁸ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 151.

collusion in these villages was informing, and through the eyes and ears of the Protestant population, the death squads of Rios Montt obtained countless lists of names and accusations pointed at suspected guerillas. Often, these suspected guerillas were Indigenous people, particularly those who resisted conversion to Rios Montt's cultural expectations.¹⁹ As shown in *Figure 1*, a dossier utilized by one of the death squads, a young woman was "Captured in zone 7 as a result of information provided by an Evangelical."²⁰ According to the National Security Archive, disappearances such as these were the fate of upwards of 40,000 Indigenous people. This was not the case for all instances of reports exchanged between the Mayan people and the army. Guzaro himself informed on the guerillas that he had lived under previously in order to liberate his family. Informing was often a necessary evil for liberating the loved ones of the Indigenous population, and it is unfair to blame them rather than those who gave them no other option. Many of the instances of informing were directed explicitly at the guerillas, with little thought regarding casualties and those inevitably caught in the crossfire.




Figure 1

The death squad's legacy of brutality further cemented the control Rios Montt exerted over the army while he spoke from the other side of his mouth and dismissed these squads as "run-off from the Lucas regime." As stated in Virginia Garrard-Burnett's *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit*, Rios Montt replaced the chaotic terror of previous regimes with a "predictable set of rewards and punishments" to maintain

¹⁹ Garrard-Burnett, *Protestantism in Guatemala*, 152.

²⁰ "Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier" (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1982).

law under his dictatorial oppression.²¹ The public more broadly accepted his mode of violence in Guatemala's urban centers than the constant firefight of the Lucas regime. While guerillas were allegedly the target of his campaign, in conjunction with his nation-building plans for a new, Protestant Guatemala, it is undeniable that dealing with what he called Guatemala's "Indian problem" was Rios Montt's primary goal. The Guatemalan Civil War eviscerated nearly four hundred thousand villages and left around 1.2 million Indigenous people in exile. In the wake of Rios Montt's destruction, 200,000 were left dead. 43% of those deaths resulted from the Rios Montt regime, and over 80% of them were Mayans, who had no other option than to witness the devastation of their rural culture.²²

Reagan, Gospel Outreach, and the U.S. – Guatemalan Evangelical Connection

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 changed the course of Protestantism in both the United States and Guatemala forever. Reagan mobilized the powerful "religious right" voting bloc, including countless fundamentalist organizations, with his pro-life stance on abortion to secure a decisive victory. The Reagan election, most importantly, also marked the resumption of US support, in the fashion of the Truman Doctrine, to Latin American governments fighting back against worldwide communism. The tenure of President Jimmy Carter exhibited a brief intermission from direct US involvement in Guatemala beginning in 1977 due to excessive use of both torture and rape against civilians accused of protecting guerillas. However, it would be a mistake not to acknowledge the role that the United States played predating the Carter administration.²³ Pre-Carter involvement in Latin America was most evident in the School of the Americas, a military training facility established in 1946 to train South American military officials to fight communist guerillas throughout the continent more effectively.

In Guatemala, for example, the military introduced a civic-action program in the late 1960s that accompanied massive government repression in the highlands and led to the deaths of five to ten thousand peasants. Modeled after the U.S. experience in

²¹ Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit*, 11.

²² Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit*, 6-7.

²³ Lou Cannon, "Reagan Praises Guatemalan Military Leader," *The Washington Post* (Fred Ryan, December 5, 1982),

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/12/05/reagan-praises-guatemalan-military-leader/2c0aab2a-d928-4dbc-b120-68f1f93cd936/>.

Vietnam and funded by the U.S. Agency of International Development, the civic-action program, called “Operation Honesty,” constituted the soft side of the military’s efforts to pacify local people, and it included graduates of the SOA among its operatives. Between 1966 and 1968, the Guatemalan army sent five people, including three officers, to the School of the Americas to learn about civic action and “civil-military operations.” It should come as no surprise that the program failed to convince peasants of the Guatemalan military’s good intentions, and a more hardline sector of the office corps began. This strategy reflected a similar transition in U.S. approaches that changed from efforts to win “hearts and minds” in the early 1960s to “coercive counterinsurgency,” that is, unrestrained power, at the end of the decade.²⁴

The legacy of the United States in Guatemala was unceasingly one that emphasized the pacification of international communist groups, and these groups often included Indigenous people and dissenting leftist guerilla factions. Simultaneously in the years leading up to the 1982 insurrection, Rios Montt was in the United States, establishing his evangelical roots. Just as the Guatemalan army had taken to the tactics used by the United States in Vietnam, Rios Montt took to the religious dictates of evangelism through *El Verbo*. The Church of the Word was a branch of Gospel Outreach, an evangelical church, and movement founded by pastor Jim Durkin in 1971. Established in Eureka, California, the church was built from the ruins of an old lighthouse and primarily functioned as a place to rehabilitate hippies and provide spiritual direction. Rios Montt was initially introduced to American Evangelicals in 1979 during a bible study meeting hosted by Gospel Outreach pastors who had initially entered Guatemala to provide aid and conversion following the 1976 earthquake. While the Gospel Outreach center offered mild ideological harm in the United States, it had a profoundly negative effect on the Ixil of Guatemala, as it was the prototype for “model village” conversion centers in 1982. Gospel Outreach had been one of the first churches to put boots on the ground in Guatemala in the wake of the 1976 disaster, intent to proselytize and expand Protestant churches following the 1982 coup. When asked about the long-term political goals he wished to achieve, Joseph Anuso, a director for Gospel Outreach, stated simply, “Gospel Outreach doesn't have a

²⁴ Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas*, Kindle Edition (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2007), 1007-1014.

political position; we are evangelical in the sense we believe the Bible is the word of God, but we recognize that authority is appointed by God."²⁵ Evidently, God's authority called for over ten thousand new churches throughout Guatemala, as stated previously. The connection between Gospel Outreach and Rios Montt regime politics was further proven by *El Verbo* elders Francisco Bianchi and Alvaro Contreras appointment to the position of executive secretary and secretary of public relations following Rios Montt's ascent to power,²⁶ These were top advisory positions and allowed the Evangelicals to exert notable influence in the politics of the Rios Montt regime.



Figure 2: Rios Montt and Ronald Reagan

Upon Reagan's return from a five-day excursion through many Latin American nations, including Guatemala, he remarked indignantly to reporters that "[General Efraim Rios Montt] got a bum rap, he is totally dedicated to democracy in Guatemala."²⁷ Tensions eventually boiled between the two governments in 1982 when congress pushed back against Reagan's best wishes to provide the Rios Montt regime with helicopter parts for their helicopters that would make waging war on the guerillas much less risky. These tensions led to some of the most direct meetings between the Reagan administration and the Rios Montt regime. In June of 1982, a meeting was arranged between Bianchi and William Middendorf, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States. Prominent American evangelicals arranged the meeting, and in attendance were Edwin Meese and James Watt of the Reagan cabinet, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell Sr.²⁸ These meetings between

²⁵ Robert Lindsey, "Church Denies It Has Political Goals in Guatemala," *The New York Times* (*The New York Times*, August 14, 1983), <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/14/world/church-denies-it-has-political-goals-in-guatemala.html>.

²⁶ Turek, "To Support a 'Brother in Christ,'" 705.

²⁷ Cannon, "Reagan Praises Guatemalan Military Leader."

²⁸ Turek, "To Support a 'Brother in Christ,'" 707.

government and secular entities maintained the singular goal of aiding Rios Montt in his evangelical conquest. The result was the plan to provide aid to the Protestant “model villages.” As stated by Meese in his correspondence with Robert Pittenger, a “Campus Crusade for Christ” member, “Aiding Guatemalan villagers whom the army had relocated with building materials, medical care, food, and other donated goods would buttress the counterinsurgency efforts and shore up support for the regime among people living in the rural highlands.”²⁹ Meese and Pittenger’s correspondence demonstrated the intentions of Evangelicals in aiding Guatemala’s “model villages,” but it was once again the helicopter parts that made another important meeting possible. During a December 1982 meeting with the United States congress, Rios Montt laid every one of his cards on the table. He defended his wish for helicopter parts, stating it would help him provide aid to Indigenous communities. He explained his counterinsurgency strategy in detail and pinned the reported human rights abuses on the guerillas, as he had countless times before.³⁰ In subsequent visits to “model villages,” US representatives noted the 6-10,000 Indigenous refugees present. Rios Montt once again blamed the guerillas’ scorched earth tactics rather than his own.³¹ Thankfully, congress held firm and continually denied Rios Montt the helicopter parts that he wanted. Their meeting results meant that virtually all aid from the United States to Guatemala came from the independent raising of funds by fundamentalist Evangelical groups.

It is unsurprising that Ronald Reagan and Rios Montt got along extraordinarily well. Upon returning to Guatemala from the United States, Rios Montt believed sincerely in the Bible and the family unit and that their prosperity was the root of all good or evil in a country. His belief undoubtedly increased the authoritarianism and repression of guerillas, as it was a necessary step to maintain a prosperous and God-fearing familial unit in the “New Guatemala.” The amnesty displayed in the *Fusiles Y Frijoles* counterinsurgent strategy demonstrates Rios Montt’s biblical leanings. Rios Montt stated, “The fatherland wants to pardon; it is extending its arm; your embrace, your lap that your children return to; homes await the presence of its members. We take advantage of the amnesty that wants to offer pardon. He that pardons is noble and the person who accepts it is a noble person: we make our patria something noble. We reconcile, we make our family the root of the country.”³² Rios

²⁹ Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,” 708-709.

³⁰ Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,” 711.

³¹ Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,” 714.

³² Miho Egoshi, “Evangelical Dictatorship Driving the Guatemalan Civil War: Reconsidering Rios Montt, the ‘Savior of La Nueva Guatemala,’” *CUNY Academic Works*, 2018.

Montt's statements clearly illustrated his intention to make ardent anti-communism an essential part of maintaining the traditional family unit. Ronald Reagan made statements aligned with Rios Montt's goal of making the family the root of the country in the context of the religious right and moral majority. While addressing the National Association of Evangelicals on March 8, 1983, Reagan stated, "While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith."³³ The evangelical connection empowered both Rios Montt and Ronald Reagan in their fight against communism because it changed the perception of the containment from maintaining the status quo of an imperialistic Truman policy to a spiritual struggle where communism represented Satanism and was the root of all evil. Falwell, who had attended the Middendorf meeting and was reportedly a close friend to Rios Montt, made identical assertions towards cementing the connection between satanism and communism as he capitalized on the ire that was stoked in the mid-1960s by the Civil Rights movement, the feminist movement, as well as the rise in promiscuous sexuality and perceived moral corruption of the masses.³⁴ As religious fundamentalists' indignation towards liberalism and tolerant mainline beliefs increased, so did the connection in their minds between communism and Satanism.

Conclusion

Protestantism offered the Ixil Mayans of Guatemala the basics for survival in the wake of an all-out war that turned countless into refugees. Additionally, it offered a religion that blended better with Indigenous spirituality than Catholicism had. While Protestantism had long existed in Guatemala, Evangelicals saw their window for conversion and influence after the 1976 earthquake and took it. As a result, Rios Montt, along with countless others, was exposed to Protestantism and continued to facilitate its growth in the country until the late 1980s through the "model villages" and the countless churches that sprung up around combat zones. While many Protestants possessed good intentions, it is essential to remember the role of Evangelicals as

³³ Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the the National Association of Evangelicals," ed. Michael E. Eidenmuller, *Top 100 speeches of the 20th Century - American Rhetoric*, 2001, <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/newtop100speeches.htm>.

³⁴ Stephen Kinzer, "Efraín Ríos Montt, Guatemalan Dictator Convicted of Genocide, Dies at 91," *The New York Times* (The New York Times, April 1, 2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/obituaries/efrain-rios-montt-guatemala-dead.html>.

informants who sold out countless Ixil people to the death squads of the Montt regime.

In truth, Efraín Ríos Montt lied to Ronald Reagan during their meeting in late 1982. When Ríos Montt went on trial on March 19th, 2013, the charges were haunting. According to *Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala's Ríos Montt*, human rights abuses perpetrated by the Ríos Montt regime were responsible for “The deaths of 1,771 Mayan Ixiles, the displacement of 29,000 and their subjection to sub-human conditions, their torture, and cruel and inhuman treatment, and the rape and sexual abuse of women.”³⁵ Throughout the trial, countless Ixil survivors were able to share the story of the horror they went through during the eighteen months that Ríos Montt was in power. These testimonies secured a conviction of an eighty-year sentence, of which Montt would serve only five years before passing away at 91 in 2018.³⁶ Ríos Montt’s sentencing represents the most honest legacy of the Evangelicals in Guatemala. Reagan, his cabinet, and American Evangelical figureheads such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell all helped Ríos Montt distort the truth about what was happening in Guatemala. They collected fundamentalist donations because they sought to benefit from the results of *Fusiles y Frijoles*. The United States Evangelicals, in coordination with the Reagan administration, used religious fundamentalism as their cover and aided the regime of Efraín Ríos Montt in what amounted to another anti-Communist campaign. Religion would eventually prove to be Ríos Montt’s downfall. When the military initiated the junta that ousted him from power, their reasoning was growing nausea with his “religious fanaticism” and tendency to “use the presidency as a religious pulpit.”³⁷ While they were undoubtedly correct, they grossly underestimated how powerful Christianity was as a tool for genocide.

³⁵ *Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala's Ríos Montt*. New York, Open Society Institute, 4.

³⁶ Kinzer, “Efraín Ríos Montt, Guatemalan Dictator Convicted of Genocide, Dies at 91.”

³⁷ Turek, “To Support a ‘Brother in Christ,’” 717.

Bibliography

- Cannon, Lou. "Reagan Praises Guatemalan Military Leader." The Washington Post. Fred Ryan, December 5, 1982.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/12/05/reagan-praises-guatemalan-military-leader/2c0aab2a-d928-4dbc-b120-68f1f93cd936/>.
- Egoshi, Miho. *Evangelical Dictatorship Driving the Guatemalan Civil War: Reconsidering Ríos Montt, the "Savior of La Nueva Guatemala."* CUNY Academic Works. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/733.
- Garrard-Burnett, Virginia. *Protestantism in Guatemala: Living in the New Jerusalem.* University of Texas Press, 1998.
- Garrard, Virginia. *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit: Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982-1983.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Gill, Lesley. *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003.
- Green, John. "Evangelicals v. Mainline Protestants." Frontline. PBS, April 29, 2004.
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/jesus/evangelicals/evmain.html>.
- "Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier," report, 20 May 1999, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 15, The National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
- Guzaro, Tomás, and McComb, Terri Jacob. *Escaping the Fire: How an Ixil Mayan Pastor Led His People Out of a Holocaust During the Guatemalan Civil War.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010. Accessed November 12, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Immerman, Richard H. *The CIA In Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982. <https://hdl-handle-net.mantis.csuchico.edu/2027/heb.05125>. E PUB.
- Judging a Dictator: The Trial of Guatemala's Ríos Montt.* New York, Open Society Institute.
- Kinzer, Stephen. "Efraín Ríos Montt, Guatemalan Dictator Convicted of Genocide, Dies at 91." The New York Times, April 1, 2018.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/01/obituaries/efrain-rios-montt-guatemala-dead.html>.
- Lindsey, Robert. "Church Denies It Has Political Goals in Guatemala." The New York Times. The New York Times, August 14, 1983.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/14/world/church-denies-it-has-political-goals-in-guatemala.html>.
- Reagan, Ronald. "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the the National Association of Evangelicals." Edited by Michael E. Eidenmuller. Top 100 speeches of the 20th Century - American Rhetoric, 2001.
<https://www.americanrhetoric.com/newtop100speeches.htm>.
- Schirmer, Jennifer. *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy.* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998.
- Turek, Lauren Francis. "To Support a 'Brother in Christ': Evangelical Groups and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations During the Ríos Montt Regime." *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 4 (2015).
- U.S. Embassy of Guatemala, "Guerrilla Activities Increase," report, April 30, 1982, *The Final Battle: Ríos Montt's Counterinsurgency Campaign: U.S. and Guatemalan Documents Describe the Strategy Behind Scorched Earth*, edited by Kate Doyle (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive).

The Antislavery Roots of the Women's Suffrage Movement

Kira Runkle

During the antebellum period, the United States witnessed an influx of political reforms that revolved around issues including abolition and women's suffrage. At the time, both historians and contemporaries viewed women's role within society as explicitly domestic. The system of coverture severely oppressed women, rendering their rights and possessions to their husbands. However, even without suffrage, they used the domestic sphere to mobilize for their rights. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, women did not get their political start solely as women's rights activists. In practice, these early women's rights activists were often prevalent in the abolitionist movement. This allowed them to cultivate a political culture that solidified their push for the women's suffrage movement in the mid-nineteenth century.

Early historians writing between the 1970s and 1990s often deem the abolition movement and the women's suffrage movement as separate entities; woman's roles were generally seen as solely domestic. Anne M. Boylan's 1990 article "Women and Politics in the Era before Seneca Falls," analyzes the perceived idea that women were not prevalent within political spheres before 1848. While Boylan argues that many women participated in politics and organized interest groups to push their agendas and gain political traction, she does not discuss specifically how the organization of antislavery societies cultivated the push for the women's suffrage movement. Jean Fagen Yellin and John C. Horne's *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women's Political Culture in Antebellum America* touches upon the formation of antislavery societies and how their organization provided them with skills necessary to organize within the women's suffrage movement. The spheres of abolition and women's suffrage are often intersectional; they draw off each other in regard to the organizational skills women gained from operating as abolition activists that allowed them to cultivate a successful push for women's suffrage. This paper recognizes that women's roles were not solely domestic, though they used their domestic duties to push their support of political movements. Women's activism within the abolitionist movement served as a bridge to secure their own political rights; they realized as they fought to secure the rights of others that they needed to accumulate their own autonomy to be successful politically.

Gender dynamics during the antebellum period contributed to a widespread belief amongst contemporaries that women were separate from the political sphere. "Politics [were] a public endeavor and as such belonged to the world of men. Women's world or 'sphere,'... was to

revolve around the private arena of home and family.”¹ This is because women were expected to act as mothers or wives before acting as individual members of society. Due to coverture, married women’s legal rights were subsumed by their husbands, which severely limited their political autonomy. This led to the belief that women’s roles in society were solely domestic; they were excluded from political spheres in the traditional sense. In the United States, men held all the political power. Women’s and minorities’ rights were undermined by this patriarchal model of government, which enabled an elective franchise composed solely of white men. However, despite the commonplace idea that women did not participate in political activities, women throughout the nineteenth century fostered a political culture that extended beyond the elective franchise.

The Bill of Rights guaranteed all United States citizens the inalienable right to petition the government within the premises of the First Amendment. It contains a clause that asserts, “Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”² Historically, people have addressed their government through petitioning to assert political influence and implement legislative change. This is significant because women increasingly used petitioning to exercise their rights as citizens as they were excluded from the political sphere. Congress brushed off many of these petitions circulated by abolition activists. Despite this, Abby Kimber asserts that “petitions to congress have effected much good by exciting discussion and calling forth some who have notably defended both the cause of Abolition and the right of petition.”³ Petitioning in itself was a way to formulate a collective political culture through the use of citizenship rights. This brought attention to pressing social issues that plagued antebellum America.

The abolition movement aimed to secure emancipation for enslaved populations. It emerged in 1830 under the leadership of both religious white people and freed Black people. Women also played a considerable role in the abolitionist movement as they acted as political canvassers who used petitioning as a way to gain political traction. The early to mid-nineteenth century saw a massive increase in contemporaries sending political petitions to the government to

¹ Anne M. Boylan, “Women and Politics in the Era before Seneca Falls,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, Autumn, 1990, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania, 1990), 363.

² United States Constitution, Amendment 1.

³ “Proceedings of the Third Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women...1839” (Philadelphia, Merrihew and Gunn 1839), 5.

implement legislative changes. In particular, this allowed for women to employ their rights of citizenship in order to advocate politically. Angelina and Sarah Grimké, two antislavery activists from South Carolina, delivered public lectures while also circulating political petitions. They encouraged other women to circulate petitions, which led to an increase in the number of women participating in antislavery canvassing.⁴ Subsequently, women fostered new connections while rallying around a common cause. According to Carpenter and Moore, “women’s experience in the . . . ethical persuasion required by antislavery petitioning . . . trained them in tactics of political rhetoric and, in a sense, campaigning.”⁵ Acting as political canvassers within the abolitionist movement allowed women to cultivate the skills necessary to ensure the success of the women’s suffrage movement.

Through the connections women made while canvassing, they formed antislavery societies throughout the North, which entirely supported the emancipation of those enslaved. The Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society was formed in 1833. It was formed by a combination of white and Black women of either Baptist or Congregationalist backgrounds.⁶ This was significant because, at the time, many other antislavery societies barred Black women from becoming members of their organizations, while the Boston Female Antislavery Society provided opportunities for Black women to hold office.⁷ While this organization was only active for seven years, the Boston Female Antislavery Society accomplished a lot in a short period of time. They organized mass fundraisers, and three national conventions, and engaged in civil suits that challenged slavery within Massachusetts.⁸ Despite the opposition this group of women activists faced, they played a pivotal role in coordinating the first Antislavery Convention of American Women. This grew from the influence accumulated through their roles as political organizers within the abolitionist movement.

The Philadelphia Female Antislavery Society (PFASS) was another notable women-run organization prevalent from 1833 until 1870 when the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified. Similar to the Boston Female Antislavery society, PFASS offered leadership

⁴ Daniel Carpenter and Colin D. Moore, “When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning and the Political Mobilization of American Women,” *The American Political Science Review*, August 2014, Vol. 108, No. 3 (August 2014), 480.

⁵ Carpenter and Moore, “When Canvassers Became Activists,” 481.

⁶ Debra Gold Hansen, “The Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society and the Limits of Gender Politics,” in *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women's Political Culture in Antebellum America*, ed. Jean Fagan Yellin and John C. van Horne, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), 46.

⁷ Hansen, “The Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society,” 47.

⁸ Hansen, “The Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society,” 45.

opportunities to African American women who helped found their organization. Though primarily created by Quakers, they sought to recruit members from an array of diverse backgrounds.⁹ Throughout the years this organization was active, PFASS employed the use of petitioning. However, their efforts waned as violence and government resistance emerged as a response to antislavery activism.¹⁰ In 1836, the House of Representatives introduced a series of Gag Rules under the Pinckney Resolutions that aimed to cut off debate discerning slavery and abolition within Congress. Essentially, these legislative measures “were procedural attempts to prevent petitions for the abolition of slavery.”¹¹ In turn, they tabled any antislavery petition without action or consideration on the grounds that Congress had no right to interfere with the business of slavery.¹² This legislation severely reduced the effectiveness of petitioning, yet antislavery activists did not waver.

A coalition of female delegates from various antislavery societies forged the first Antislavery Convention of American Women (ACAW) in 1837. Despite the resistance they faced at the time, the convention met three times. There were three meetings of this convention which spanned annually between 1837 and 1839. As the convention became more established, participation increased, and more delegates attended as time passed. Between 1837 and 1839, attendance at this convention increased by one hundred participants, demonstrating the growing popularity of the convention and antislavery feminist sentiment.¹³ Many of the resolutions passed by the ACAW were rooted in religious values and, in turn, condemned racial prejudice and the system of slavery as a whole. These women acknowledged the problematic nature of the consumption of goods produced through enslaved labor. Martha V. Ball of Boston proposed one of the resolutions passed that stated, “the consumers of the produce of slave labor, are offering the strongest incentive to the slaveholder to continue his system of oppression.”¹⁴ This is significant because it highlights the importance

⁹ Jean R. Soderlund, “Priorities and Power: The Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society” in *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women’s Political Culture in Antebellum America*, ed. Jean Fagan Yellin and John C. van Horne, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), 68-69.

¹⁰ Soderlund, “Priorities and Power,” 77.

¹¹ Daniel Wirls, “The Only Mode of Avoiding Everlasting Debate: The Overlooked Senate Gag Rule for Antislavery Petitions,” *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (Spring 2007), 115.

¹² Wirls, “The Only Mode of Avoiding Everlasting Debate,” 120.

¹³ Ira V. Brown, “Am I Not A Woman and A Sister?” The Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, 1837–1839,” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, January, 1983, Vol. 50, No. 1 (January, 1983), 4, 10.

¹⁴ “Proceedings of the Third Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women...1839” (Philadelphia, Merrihew and Gunn 1839), 7.

of cutting off the commercial success of the slave labor system. By boycotting the purchase of cotton products and other produce cultivated through the fruits of unpaid labor, the economic success that fueled chattel slavery could be rapidly diminished.

While it is often assumed that the Northern states were innocent in the business of slavery, these free states were still reliant upon the goods produced by slave labor. The thriving northern textile industry depended on cash crops such as indigo and cotton produced on plantations through the fruits of enslaved labor. Therefore, the Northern economy was just as reliant upon slave-produced commodities and raw materials. During the second annual Antislavery Convention of American Women (ACAW), women activists introduced several resolutions delineating the harmful nature of the consumption of slave-produced goods that were antithetical to the abolitionist movement. Abby Kelly proposed a resolution that articulated “a vast portion of the wealth of the North has accrued... either directly in the holding of slaves by Northern citizens, or indirectly by our social and commercial intercourse with slaveholding communities.”¹⁵ This is noteworthy because boycotting the use of products created through enslaved labor effectively limited the economic prosperity of the oppressive system of chattel slavery. Women participated in the boycott of such goods because they played a crucial role in household consumption at the time as they acted as the primary purchasers of domestic and consumer goods. Women involved in the abolitionist movement advocated for others to “abstain from the purchase of such goods.”¹⁶ This complicates the idea that women’s role within society was primarily domestic; they clearly employed their domestic duties for political means.

Despite their active participation in the American Antislavery movement, women still found themselves excluded from the abolitionist movement on a world scale. At the World Antislavery Convention in London during the summer of 1840, the convention barred women from participating as delegates. In turn, this caused discontent to fester surrounding the limited political rights they possessed. Despite the seemingly inclusive rhetoric proposed at the World Antislavery Convention, the British and Foreign Antislavery Society refused to seat American women named as delegates solely due to their status as

¹⁵ “Proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, held in Philadelphia. May 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th,” (Philadelphia: Printed by Merrihew and Gunn, 1838), 8.

¹⁶ “Proceedings of the Third Anti-Slavery Convention,” 7.

women.¹⁷ Many of these female delegates had already made the trip across the Atlantic; therefore, abolitionists like Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton were brought together despite the exclusive circumstances. These women recognized that through their exclusion from the World Antislavery convention, they must act as “equal” and “autonomous beings” in order to secure their political rights. Therefore, the woman’s question helped prompt the cultivation of the women’s rights movement as its own entity, rather than solely being rooted in abolitionist sentiment.¹⁸

As antislavery feminists shifted their focus towards securing their political rights within the women’s suffrage movement, they used different rhetorical strategies to garner support. Sarah Grimké wrote a series of letters to Mary S. Parker, the Boston Female Antislavery Society president, regarding the condition of women throughout the world and the United States in particular. This anthology of letters was heavily rooted in biblical sentiment. Grimké bases her argument on the idea that “Men and women were created equal; they are both moral and accountable beings, and whatever is *right* for man to do, is *right* for woman.”¹⁹ Religion held excessive influence within the nineteenth century. Many women’s suffrage and abolition activists held some sort of religious affiliation. Therefore, women’s suffrage activists drew from biblical rhetoric to argue why men and women should be equally represented within government because they were both created equally within the image of God.

The Declaration of Sentiments made its debut at the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848. As Elizabeth Cady Stanton constructed this political manifesto, she drew from enlightenment rhetoric reflected in The Declaration of Independence. By doing so, “she implied that the women’s demands [for equality and suffrage] were no more or less radical than the American Revolution.”²⁰ Essentially, the Declaration of Sentiments was an alternative version of the Declaration of Independence. Stanton declared, “We hold these truths to be self-

¹⁷ Kathryn Kish Sklar, “Women Who Speak for an Entire Nation”: American and British Women Compared at the World Anti-Slavery Convention, London, 1840,” *Pacific Historical Review*, Nov., 1990, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Nov., 1990), 462.

¹⁸ Donald R. Kennon “An Apple of Discord: The Woman Question at the World’s Antislavery Convention of 1840” *Slavery and Abolition*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1984), 246-247.

¹⁹ Sarah Grimké to Mary S. Parker, July 1837, “The Pastoral Letter of the General Association of Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts” in *Letters of the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women*, (Boston: I. Knapp, 1838), 16.

²⁰ The author has clarified the demands for the Seneca Falls Convention within the brackets. Linda K. Kerber, “From The Declaration of Independence to The Declaration of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic 1776-1848,” *Human Rights*, Winter 1977, Vol. 6, No. 2, 115.

evident: that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.”²¹ This framing is an exact parallel to the Declaration of Independence, which used gendered rhetoric that only applied to men despite its seemingly inclusive nature. Stanton acknowledged that the patriarchal framework of the United States government oppressed women as “He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise. He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had no voice.”²² This brings attention to the ways women were circumscribed by the legislation implemented by men. This denied them the ability to construct or vote upon legislation that benefited them within society. Therefore, the Declaration of Sentiments articulated women’s grievances against the United States government and women’s limited role within it, which provided the foundation for the women’s suffrage movement.

The Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 was the first women’s suffrage convention held in the United States. Elizabeth Cady Stanton primarily organized it, but other activists like Lucretia Mott, Mary Ann, and Elizabeth McClintock contributed to the planning of this event. It was held from July 19th to July 20th at the Wesleyan Chapel in Seneca Falls. Though, “many of those attending the Seneca Falls Convention felt that the two days were not sufficient for full discussion of all the issues raised.”²³ While men were present at the convention, they did not participate during the first day’s proceedings; instead, they acted as listeners. The discourse at the Seneca Falls Convention mainly revolved around the grievances laid out in the Declaration of Sentiments, such as women’s rights, suffrage, and equality.²⁴ There were a total of one hundred signers of the Declaration of Sentiments, which represented only one-third of those in attendance. Even though only a fraction of those in attendance signed the Declaration of Sentiments, the declaration was supported by both men and women, which proved that with time, equality and women’s suffrage could be accomplished. The Seneca Falls Convention played a pivotal role in forming the women’s suffrage

²¹ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions,” National Women’s History Museum, December 8th, 2021.

https://www.womenshistory.org/sites/default/files/document/2019-08/Day%203_0.pdf.

²² Stanton, “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions,” National Women’s History Museum. https://www.womenshistory.org/sites/default/files/document/2019-08/Day%203_0.pdf.

²³ Sherry H. Penney, and James D. Livingston. *A Very Dangerous Woman: Martha Wright and Women’s Rights*, (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), 76.

²⁴ Judith Wellman, *The Road to Seneca Falls: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the First Woman’s Rights Convention*, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 194.

movement. It articulated the goals for the movement as it progressed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, though the franchise would not extend to white women until 1920.

During the antebellum period, women became antislavery political canvassers, providing them with the skills necessary to succeed within the women's suffrage movement. These women acknowledged that the legislation put in place severely limited their political participation as the franchise only extended to white men. Despite this, antislavery feminists cultivated a political culture in which they advocated for the emancipation of the enslaved. Through their participation in antislavery societies, women became acquainted with the political process and used their skills to formulate women's suffrage as its own entity. Therefore, women's activism within the abolition movement served as a bridge to secure their political rights within the United States of America.

Bibliography

- Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women 1838: Philadelphia, Pa., Lucy Stone, and National American Woman Suffrage Association Collection. "Proceedings of the Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, held in Philadelphia. May 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th." Philadelphia: Printed by Merrihew and Gunn, 1838. Pdf. <https://www.loc.gov/item/33001926/>.
- Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women 1839: Philadelphia, Pa. "Proceedings of the third Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, held in Philadelphia, May 1st, 2nd, and 3rd." Philadelphia: Printed by Merrihew and Thompson, 1839. Web. <https://lccn.loc.gov/11011784>.
- Boylan, Anne M. "Women and Politics in the Era before Seneca Falls." *Journal of the Early Republic* Vol. 10, no. 3 (1990): 363–82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3123393>.
- Brown, Ira V. "Am I Not A Woman and A Sister?" The Anti-Slavery Convention of American Women, 1837–1839," *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1983): 1-19.
- Carpenter, Daniel, and Colin D. Moore. "When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning and the Political Mobilization of American Women." *The American Political Science Review* 108, no. 3 (2014): 479–98. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43654388>.
- Grimke, Sarah. *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women*. Boston: I. Knapp, 1838. <https://curiosity.lib.harvard.edu/women-working-1800-1930/catalog/45-990022060320203941>
- Hansen, Debra G. "The Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society and the Limits of Gender Politics," in *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women's Political Culture in Antebellum America*, ed. Jean Fagan Yellin and John C. van Horne, 45-67. New York: Cornell University Press, 1994. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv1nhkdd>.
- Hoffman, Nancy. "Teaching about Slavery, the Abolitionist Movement, and Women's Suffrage." *Women's Studies Quarterly*, Spring - Summer, 1986, Vol. 14, No. ½. 2-6. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25164255>
- Jeffrey, Joy R. "Permeable Boundaries: Abolitionist Women and Separate Spheres," *Journal of the Early Republic*. University of Pennsylvania Press. Spring, 2001, Vol. 21, No. 1. 79-93. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3125097>
- Kennon, Donald R. "An Apple of Discord: The Woman Question at the World's Antislavery Convention of 1840." *Slavery and Abolition*, Vol. 5, No 3. (1984): 244-266.
- Kerber, Linda K. "From The Declaration of Independence to The Declaration of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic 1776-1848," *Human Rights*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 1977), 115-124. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27879046>
- Maynard, Douglas H. "The World's Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Dec. 1960): 452-471. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1888877>
- Penney, Sherry H., and James D. Livingston. *A Very Dangerous Woman: Martha Wright and Women's Rights*. University of Massachusetts Press, 2004. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vk9hf.10>.
- Sklar, Kathryn K. "Women Who Speak for an Entire Nation": American and British Women Compared at the World Anti-Slavery Convention, London, 1840." *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4. Nov., 1990. 453-499. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3640236>
- Soderlund, Jean R. "Priorities and Power: The Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society" in *The Abolitionist Sisterhood: Women's Political Culture in*

- Antebellum America*, ed. Jean Fagan Yellin and John C. van Horne, 67-88. New York: Cornell University Press, 1994.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv1nhkdd>.
- Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. "Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions." National Women's History Museum, December 8th, 2021.
https://www.womenshistory.org/sites/default/files/document/2019-08/Day%203_0.pdf.
- Thompson, Carol L. "Women and the Antislavery Movement." *Current History*, Vol. 70, No. 416, Women in America (May 1976), 198-201.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/45313845>
- Wellman, Judith. *The Road to Seneca Falls: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the First Woman's Rights Convention*. University of Illinois Press, 2004.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/j.ctt1xcppp>.
- Wirls, Daniel. "The Only Mode of Avoiding Everlasting Debate: The Overlooked Senate Gag Rule for Antislavery Petitions," *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 27, No. 1. Spring 2007. 115-138. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30043477>
- Zagarri, Rosemarie. *Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early American Republic*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhq6d>.

Reproductive Commodification in Southern Antebellum Plantations: Economics and Agency of the Enslaved Female from 1800-1860

Emily Swanson

In 1807, the United States withdrew from participation in the transatlantic slave trade, which significantly impacted the domestic slave economy in America. Enslaved people were not being imported in droves from Africa, ready for purchase, as they had been during the eighteenth century. In fact, America was seeing a natural decrease in slavery's hold on the economy, leading to some politicians' assertion that given enough time, slavery would simply die a natural death. However, with the advent of Eli Whitney's cotton gin, southern plantations' need for workers took a sudden uptick.¹ With the increased potential for cotton production and planters no longer legally allowed to import a fresh workforce, how was this demand for labor satisfied? The logical answer was for plantation owners to augment their current property by reproducing the enslaved people they already owned. In essence, they became breeders of enslaved people.² Although enslaved men were not exempt from sexual and reproductive bodily appropriation, enslaved women experienced enslavement in unique ways. Whites labeled them as both a commodity and as a reproducer of commodity. Enslaved women's reproductive capacities were integral to the institution of slavery. Their bodies were the factories and fields that grew and created human property. Enslaved women and the duality of their labor helped build the American economy.³ Yet, these women were not merely pawns in their legal owners' economic ventures; their individual wills powerfully shaped the antebellum plantation economy.

The Enslaved Body

Before African women set foot in America, their bodies were written about and assessed through journals, letters, periodicals, and oral recountings. In forecasting their image this way, colonists pre-judged African women as "fallen outside the American ideal of womanhood."⁴

¹ Daina Ramey Berry, *The Price for Their Pound of Flesh: The Value of the Enslaved, from Womb to Grave, in the Building of a Nation* (United States: Random House Inc, 2018), 14.

² A. Leon Higginbotham, *In the Matter of Color: The Colonial Period* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 44.

³ Jennifer L. Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 3, 11.

⁴ Dorothy E. Roberts, *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), 10.

Their nakedness depicted in African travel narratives assumed their increased sexuality.⁵ Polygamy as a cultural norm assumed their "uncontrolled lust," while sacred dances "were reduced to the level of orgy."⁶ Thus, before even encountering black Africans, white purchasers in the colonies had fully formed opinions about their sexuality, fecundity, and femininity.⁷ The plantation way of life further supported this highly sexualized valuation of enslaved women. While perfect for growing cotton and rice, the Southern hot, humid climate was not as friendly to human workers. Working in these conditions required the least amount of skin covering to make conditions workable. Women often "reefed up" their skirts to cool off both in the house and while working the fields. Enslavers frequently removed women's clothing during whippings and on the public auction block.⁸ In whites' minds, these and many other practices solidified the idea of sexual degeneracy among black enslaved females.

The legal doctrine of *partus sequitur ventrum*, namely that the child will be subject to the same condition as its mother, realized the potential for property breeding. "Mother free, children free; mother slave, slave children" was not a new idea in early nineteenth-century America.⁹ It was a Virginia statute enacted in 1662. However, the statute's continuation capitalized on enslavement and became an economic boon by providing a reliable supply of enslaved people after the 1808 Act.¹⁰ Essentially, enslavers borrowed and rewrote old European lineage laws to shape enslaved women's reproductive capacities.¹¹ They considered African women naturally procreative. By inscribing enslaved women's reproduction and sexual identity in this way, planters satisfied their need and greed for more chattel slavery.

In the 1830s, Southerners felt the push to justify the virtue and necessity of enslavement. Whites, specifically planters, needed to prove enslavement was a "positive good." This is where the Mammy construct stepped in. The motherly "Mammy" image countered the enslaved female's promiscuous "Jezebel" image. The Mammy figure was

⁵ Jennifer Morgan, 29.

⁶ Deborah Gray White, *Ar'n't I a Woman?* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 29.

⁷ Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 55.

⁸ White, 32.

⁹ James Redpath, *The Roving Editor; or, Talks with Slaves in the Southern States* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 39.

¹⁰ Taunya Lovell Banks, "Dangerous Woman: Elizabeth Key's Freedom Suit - Subjecthood and Racialized Identity in Seventeenth-Century Colonial Virginia" (2008). Faculty Scholarship. 52., 41.

¹¹ Jennifer Morgan, 1.

maternal, asexual, religious, and deeply committed to her white enslavers. She fit in neatly with the cultural uplift theory that defended slavery as a divine gift to the enslaved. The Mammy image also fit in with the Cult of Domesticity, which firmly placed women within the home tending to their hearth and family.¹² Still, in defining womanhood as "chaste, pure and white," whites essentially exiled black women from true womanhood."¹³ These Mammy and Jezebel constructs allowed whites to frame arguments and draw conclusions about the enslaved female's personhood and body, further underscoring the legitimacy and justification for slavery and, more specifically, miscegenation.

Economic Value

If the future of the labor market rested on the enslaved female's body for its continuation, how did the economic value of the enslaved female change? In other words, did the market value of an enslaved female change after the 1807 statute? Auction documents and plantation records showing sale prices for pregnant or potentially breedable enslaved females varied before 1800. Some documents indicate that enslaved women were sold because they became pregnant too frequently. One advertisement read, "She breeds too fast for her Owner to put up with such Inconveniences." Another listed an enslaved woman as having "never had a child," presumably noting her infertility as a selling point.¹⁴ With the Atlantic slave trade, enslaved people were purchased easily from auction houses or traveling traders. However, with the 1807 Act, plantation owners had to find a way to expand their slave force domestically. Plantations could not flourish and function without replenishing their workers. During the mid-eighteenth century, enslaved females were cheaper to purchase than enslaved males. Enslaved females were also exempt from state and federal taxation. Interestingly, this did not make them more likely to be purchased by plantation owners. If purchasers valued their reproductive potential, we can assume their monetary value would reflect such.

So, when did this shift happen? Edmund Morgan argues that the profit margin between indentured servants and enslaved people did not close until the late eighteenth century. Further, he claims that the reproductive potential of enslaved females was a leading reason for this shift.¹⁵ Sentiments about slavery were changing as the colonies began to

¹² White, 59-61.

¹³ Roberts, 10, 11.

¹⁴ Steven Deyle, *Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27-28.

¹⁵ Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom, The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975), 295-315.

buck against their British oppressor. As early as 1774, with the Slave Trade Act, colonists were increasingly seeing the commodification of human property in a negative light.¹⁶ Plantation owners' recognition that they could circumvent the international slave trade and essentially grow their workforce shifted the way they valued enslaved women. In this way, "black women's bodies became the vessels in which enslavers manifested their hopes for the future" while whites fully realized enslaved women's reproductive potential."¹⁷

We can see how planters viewed enslaved females through farming records, personal wills, and probate documents. In his *Farm Book*, Thomas Jefferson famously stated, "a woman who brings a child every two years is more profitable than the best man of the farm, what she produces is an addition to the capital, while his labors disappear in mere consumption."¹⁸ Written documents such as these give insight into the increasing awareness of enslaved females' reproductive potential. It was not that enslaved women were not used as catalysts to increase enslavers' property during the eighteenth century. They had been. However, we do not see the kind of concentrated economic awareness of their reproductive capacities until after 1807.

Advertisements are another way to assess the shift in enslaved females' market value. Ads heralding enslaved females as "breeding" property frequently appeared in the South newspapers and periodicals leading up to the 1807 statute. An advertisement in South Carolina offered two "breeding wenches" ready to be "regularly bred," indicating plantation owners' desire to increase their property.¹⁹ One Virginia planter bragged about his "brood" of "uncommonly good breeders."²⁰ J.D. DeBow, the publisher of *DeBow's Review*, declared that a plantation "well-stocked" with enslaved females would multiply itself and become a "mine of wealth."²¹ From his travels around the South, Frederick Olmstead gathered that "a slave woman is commonly esteemed least for her laboring qualities, most for those qualities which give value to a brood-mare."²² DeBow began advertising the purchase and gifting of an enslaved female of childbearing age to be the "seed" in which to grow

¹⁶ The Slave Trade Act of 1794 was the first congressional regulation of slave trading. It banned American ships from participating in the international slave trade.

¹⁷ Jennifer Morgan, 83.

¹⁸ Jefferson, Thomas, and Edwin Morris Betts. *Thomas Jefferson's Farm Book: With Commentary and Relevant Extracts from Other Writings* (Princeton: Published for the American Philosophical Society by Princeton University Press, 1953), 2:46.

¹⁹ Berry, 19.

²⁰ Frederick Law Olmstead, *Journey in the Seaboard Slave States* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 57.

²¹ *DeBow's Review* (1857), 30:74.

²² Redpath, 266.

one's wealth.²³ One ex-enslaved person put it clearly, saying, "a white man start out wid a few womenfolk slaves, soon him have a plantation full of little n----- runnin' 'round... whilst deir mammies was in de field a hoeing and ... workin lak a man."²⁴ Whites increasingly saw enslaved women in light of their reproductive value and often purchased them as an investment for future property growth. Given this shift in value, parents and relatives began giving pregnant and childbearing age enslaved women as dowry gifts to new brides, to couples upon marriage, and even to babies at birth.²⁵

The price for an enslaved person dramatically increased over the nineteenth century. It was not a smooth rise in value. There were ups and downs in the market from month to month and year to year. Most enslaved people were purchased in the Upper South during the fall months and sold in the winter in the Lower South. International affairs also played into slave economics. Overall, southern enslaved people more than tripled in value between 1800 and the Civil War.²⁶ From 1800 on, the value of barren women became significantly lower than that of women who could potentially add to an enslaver's chattel.²⁷

When purchasing a woman for reproductive investment purposes, enslavers expected a quick return. If an enslaved woman was later found to be barren, she was often quickly sold.²⁸ Since barren women were so much less valuable, sellers frequently used unscrupulous routes to dispose of their infertile property. When an enslaver purchased a "breeder" who subsequently did not produce, the law backed the purchaser, who often got his money back from the person who had sold her dishonestly.²⁹ In *Seaboard Slave States*, Frederick Olmstead recounts that "a slave woman is commonly esteemed least for her laboring qualities, most for those qualities which give value to a brood-mare." Olmstead further observed that "a breeding woman [was] worth from one-sixth to one-fourth more than one that does not breed."³⁰

The fact that women's labor was malleable also increased their value. Women generally performed domestic tasks such as cooking,

²³ *DeBow's Review* (1857), 30:74.

²⁴ George P. Rawick, ed., *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*, 19 vols (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972), South Carolina, 2(1):173.

²⁵ See discussion by Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers in *They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave Owners in the American South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 3, 17, 27.

²⁶ Deyle, 56.

²⁷ Berry, 15.

²⁸ John W. Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South* (1972; rev. ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 24.

²⁹ Catterall, ed., *Judicial Cases*, 3:65, 204.

³⁰ Olmstead, *Seaboard Slave States*, 55.

spinning, sewing, and preserving. They also worked alongside enslaved men doing field and farm work. The gendered ideology that men were physically more capable of hard labor than women did not apply to enslaved peoples. A mid-eighteenth-century Georgia plantation owner stated that "in the planting and cultivation of fields ... a good Negro Woman" is equal to that of a man.³¹ Their labor could be adapted to the current needs. Their reproductive importance varied depending on a plantation owner's requirements and the location of the plantation. However, they were generally "bearing, nourishing, and rearing children whom enslavers needed for the continual replenishment of their labor force."³² In essence, they could perform nearly any task an enslaved male could, all while reproducing more of themselves.

Commodification and Reproduction

As property, the way enslavers treated enslaved women changed over time. Though always treated as commodities, the way enslavers carried out their care was complicated. Both their actual and potential fecundity value influenced the way enslavers fed, clothed, punished, and housed them: "Commodification--the act of being treated as a commodity--touched every facet of enslaved people's births, lives, and afterlives."³³ Enslaved people were often listed among the animal stock as possessions capable of production and reproduction. Robert Wilshire listed his enslaved female Judith alongside her children and a breeding mare:

Woman negroe named Judith and two young negroes one ages three years ye other ages three months; A breeding mare, one foale about two months old; a breeding Cow, one heifer with calf, and one calf about three months old.³⁴

William Browne listed the names of his producing property in the same ledger and had "Bessie" the woman alongside "Bessy" the

³¹ Johann Martin Bolzius, "Reliable Answers to Some Submitted Questions Concerning the Land Carolina," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 14 (April 1957): 223-61, 257. For a more thorough discussion involving enslaved female labor and farm or field work, see Marli Frances Weiner, *Mistresses and Slaves: Plantation Women in South Carolina, 1830-80* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 12 and Jennifer Morgan's *Laboring Women*, 144-165.

³² White, 59. For a more in depth look at the dual nature of enslaved labor among black women, see Jacqueline Jones, "'My Mother Was Much of a Woman': Black Women, Work, and the Family under Slavery," *Feminist Studies* 8, no. 2 (1982): 235-69.

³³ Barry, 2.

³⁴ Jennifer Morgan, 80.

cow.³⁵ Still, some historians have disagreed that enslaved people were seen as closer to animals than humans. Kirsten Fischer claims that enslavers "branded" enslaved people like animals "in order to humiliate" and keep their property in its place as "degraded but fully present humanity."³⁶ This suggests that enslavers understood enslaved people to be fully human but used their power to degrade and humiliate them to assert their dominance. However, this argument neglects a consideration of the ledger books and accounts that list all properties together. Nevertheless, this "tension between person and property" was complicated. Over time, their personhood was more and more devalued while their body increased in value.³⁷

Enslavers almost completely controlled enslaved peoples' reproductive capacities in the antebellum plantation system. They expected enslaved women to bear children as frequently as possible and used various routes to ensure that outcome. Though each enslaved women's experience of fertility, reproduction, and birth varied, general patterns have emerged from available primary sources. Ann Patton Malone suggests that the average age of the enslaved woman upon her first birthing was just over nineteen years. From then on, she bore a child roughly every two and a half years until about forty years old.³⁸

According to Catherine Clinton, "slave breeding" was more common during the early nineteenth century than historians previously thought. The fact that slave narratives frequently speak of "stockmen," 'travelin' n-----,' or 'breedin' n-----'... give credence to the commonality of such practices."³⁹ Frederick Douglass recounts in this autobiography the story of one enslaver who purchased a "breeder" named Caroline, bred her to another enslaved person, and rejoiced when twins resulted. According to Douglass, enslavers frequently bought enslaved people with the express purpose of "raising stock from [them]" just as they

³⁵ Jennifer Morgan, 87.

³⁶ Jennifer Morgan, 105. For additional discussion on the theory behind these ideas, see Kirsten Fischer, *Suspect Relations: Sex, Race, and Resistance in Colonial North Carolina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

³⁷ Barry, xi.

³⁸ Ann Patton Malone, *Sweet Chariot: Slave Family and Household Structure in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana* (University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 232-233; White, 114. Malone used records from fifteen plantations in the South to achieve her statistics. These are consistent with other findings by Richard H. Steckel in *The Economics of U.S. Slave and Southern White Fertility* (New York: Garland, 1985) and Fogel and Engerman in *Time on the Cross* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 1:137. For a discussion of pregnancy frequencies, see Fogel and Engerman, *Time on the Cross*, 137-138.

³⁹ Paul Finkelman, *Women and the Family in a Slave Society* (New York: Garland Pub., 1989), 23.

would buy a cow and raise stock from it.⁴⁰ A formerly enslaved man, Jephtha Choice, recalled being “in demand for breedin’” with “healthy n----- gals.” Another ex-enslaved person, Elige Davison, believed he had sired more than one hundred children through about fifteen enslaved women.⁴¹ Nevertheless, the subject of forcibly using enslaved studs is controversial, with insufficient research to back it up. It is important to note that there is no debate about whether or not enslavers utilized this practice, but instead how frequently and to what extent.

Enslavers regularly controlled the mating and marriage of the people they enslaved. Marriage between enslaved people was a complicated matter. According to William Goodell in *American Slave Codes*, marriage between enslaved people was not legally recognized since “the slave is a chattel, and chattels do not marry ... things are not married.”⁴² Regardless, enslavers often joined two of their enslaved people in a kind of “marriage.” Sometimes they paired men and women together and forced them to cohabit. A master from Texas told his enslaved person, Rose, she must change her accommodations and move into a cabin with another young enslaved person named Rufus. When she refused, her master threatened her with beatings and separation from her family. In the end, she gave in but later confessed that after the experience, she never wanted to be with a man again.⁴³ One enslaver forced a newly purchased enslaved man to leave his wife and family and marry another enslaved woman. After having eight children with his second wife, he was sold again.⁴⁴ Though there were enslavers who encouraged virtuous and monogamous attachments between their enslaved men and women, most believed Africans were incapable of chastity.⁴⁵ The encouragement and sometimes insistence that two enslaved people marry was a subtle form of breeding. Though not outright rape, the two selected partners were rarely free to turn down the proposal. It is important to note that when marriages did occur, they were very different from non-slave marriages. Thus, calling this practice “marriage” is practically a misnomer. Occasionally women did choose

⁴⁰ Frederick Douglass, *Life and Times of Frederick Douglass* (New York: Crowell, 1966), 118-119.

⁴¹ Quoted in Rawick, George P. *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972, 88.

⁴² Emphasis mine. William Goodell, *The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice: Its Distinctive Features, Shown by Its Statutes, Judicial Decisions, and Illustrative Facts* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 105.

⁴³ Benjamin Albert Botkin, *Lay My Burden Down: a Folk History of Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), 160-162.

⁴⁴ Finkelman, *Women and the Family in a Slave Society*, 63.

⁴⁵ Weiner, 117 as quoted in “Plantation Life--Duties and Responsibilities,” *DeBow's Review* o.s. 29, n.s. 4 (Sept. 1860): 362.

their partners. When enslaved women entered into such arrangements willingly, they saw them as partnerships and usually celebrated with family customs and traditions. However, traditional marriage benefits, such as physical protection and the chance to build an autonomous household, were absent. Pre-marital sex was rarely an issue. Frederick Olmstead recounted how enslaved men and women would often “[try] each other out” to see if they were compatible before moving in together or marrying.⁴⁶ Herbert Gutman has researched cohabitation and partnership patterns among the plantation enslaved and contends that intercourse and marriage (or official partnership) were not tied together in the same way they were for whites. In fact, having a sexual partner outside of an official partnership was normal and not considered promiscuous or shameful.⁴⁷

According to historian Paul Escott, even more common than forced breeding between enslaved people was impregnation by an enslaved person’s master.⁴⁸ Madison Jefferson, a former enslaved person, testified that “women who refuse to submit themselves to the brutal desires of their owners, are repeatedly whipt.”⁴⁹ White males had complete impunity when raping black women. As long as the man did not kill the enslaved woman while raping her, he was free to do as he wished. It was not just enslavers who felt at liberty to rape their enslaved property. Former enslaved person Harry McMillan testified that “white males in slave society were at liberty to exploit slave women” whenever they desired, whether they owned them or not.⁵⁰ Mary Chestnut, a Civil War diarist, wrote that “like the patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines . . . the mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children” and everyone “pretends to think” they have dropped “from the clouds.”⁵¹ Catherine Clinton points out that, though slaveholders were at liberty to, and did, exploit the sexual lives of their slaves, they often “went to considerable lengths” to keep the progeny from their white family’s notice.⁵² Miscegenation was at once known and understood yet covered up in

⁴⁶ Olmstead, *Back Country*, 169. Note that the term “married” is used in a loose sense as marriage was not officially legal.

⁴⁷ Herbert G. Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925* (New York: Pantheon, 1976), 14, 31-33, 67.

⁴⁸ Paul Escott, *Slavery Remembered: A Record of Twentieth Century Slave Narratives* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 43.

⁴⁹ John W. Blassingame, *Slave Testimony: Two Centuries of Letters, Speeches, Interviews, and Autobiographies* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), 221

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 382.

⁵¹ C. Vann Woodward, ed., *Mary Chesnut's Civil War* (New Haven, CT, 1981), 29

⁵² Catherine Clinton, *The Plantation Mistress: Woman's World in the Old South* (1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 211.

polite society. Still, sexual relations with enslaved females remained both profitable and accepted.⁵³ By the 1860s, over 10 percent of the enslaved population was mulatto (having both white and African blood), indicating just how prevalent miscegenation was.⁵⁴

As Angela Davis points out in *Women, Race, and Class*, it is essential to note that economic motivation was not always the reason enslavers forcibly raped their enslaved people. Enslavers were violating enslaved women both physically and psychologically. By systematically removing sexual personhood and reproductive autonomy, slaveholders used rape as a “weapon of terror that reinforced whites’ domination over their human property.”

Treatment During Pregnancy

Enslavers’ treatment of pregnant enslaved females varied. Workload reduction sometimes occurred in the later stages of pregnancy. Enslaved women were often placed in the “trash gang” to weed or tidy around the plantation. Frederick Law Olmstead observed while traveling through the South that pregnant enslaved women were generally considered only a half or quarter hand in terms of workload.⁵⁵ One Virginia enslaver admonished his overseer to “be Kind and Indulgent” and not “force them when with children upon any service or hardship that will be injurious.”⁵⁶ Despite these testimonies to lighter workloads during pregnancy, Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch estimate that around ninety percent of enslaved females over sixteen labored for at least eleven hours a day during the mid-nineteenth century.⁵⁷

The idea that African women had easy and painless labors spoke to their commodified characterization as animalistic and subhuman.⁵⁸ Enslavers saw the fact that the African women supposedly gave birth with such ease as a boon. In the Bible, God bestowed Eve with pain in childbirth, signaling her rise from animalistic existence to womanhood. Both maternal death and infant mortality were high in early America. The potential for a piece of property to die in childbirth was a significant drawback in the economy of chattel slavery. In most cases,

⁵³ White, 43.

⁵⁴ Roberts, 29.

⁵⁵ Olmstead, *Back Country*, 152. This is also corroborated by Eugene Genovese in *The Political Economy of Slavery, Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave South* (New York: Putman’s Sons 1907), 33.

⁵⁶ White, 99 as quoted from Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, ed., *Plantation and Frontier Documents, 1649-1863*, 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H Clarke, 1909), 1:109.

⁵⁷ Roger L. Ransom and Richard Sutch, *One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of Emancipation*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 233.

⁵⁸ Jennifer Morgan, 48.

enslaved women were attended to by their fellow female plantation mates. Sometimes a plantation mistress would step in to assist at a birth. Assuming that African women birthed more easily and quickly than white women, slavers generally deemed it unnecessary to hire a midwife or doctor. Frederick Law Olmstead observed that women of African descent “were not subject to the difficulty, danger and pain which attended women of the better classes in giving birth to their offspring.”⁵⁹ In fact, enslaved women were subject to the same complications as white women. More common difficulties included breech presentations, premature labor, placental abruption, and hemorrhaging.⁶⁰

Reproductive Agency and Resistance

“Black in a white society, slave in a free society, woman in a society ruled by men,” declares historian Deborah White. “Female slaves had the least formal power and were perhaps the most vulnerable group of antebellum Americans.”⁶¹ Examining the reproductive autonomy of the enslaved woman is challenging since few primary sources such as journals or letters exist. One primary source we have are the *WPA Narratives*. These oral interviews were conducted in the 1930s as part of the Federal Writers' Project and consist of more than 2,300 first-person narratives of life in slavery. The challenge with these narratives is that they often center on what the enslaved person *experienced* rather than what they felt or thought.⁶² Even given the lack of sources, we know that enslaved females on plantations throughout the antebellum period exerted sexual autonomy and reproductive agency.

Resistance was often individualistic and intransigent. According to Eugene D. Genovese, large-scale revolts were uncommon and “faced hopeless odds.”⁶³ In his 1851 article published in *DeBow's Review*, “Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race,” Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright called this kind of intransigent behavior “rascality.” He denied that this behavior was intentional on the part of the enslaved,

⁵⁹ Olmstead, *Back Country*, 78 for a more thorough look at birthing practices on antebellum plantations. See also Kemble, *Journal of a Residence on a Georgian Plantation*, 76-77 and 114; Carolyn Michell's “Health and the Medical Profession in the South,” *Journal of Southern History* (1944); Catherine M. Scholten's “On the Importance of the Obstetric Art: Changing Customs of Childbirth in America, 1760-1825,” *William and Mary Quarterly* (1977).

⁶⁰ Todd Lee Savitt, *Medicine and Slavery: The Diseases and Health Care of Blacks in Antebellum Virginia* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 115, 119-120.

⁶¹ White, 15.

⁶² Barry, 5.

⁶³ Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), 594.

claiming they were “too torpid to meditate mischief.”⁶⁴ In *Roll, Jordan, Roll*, Genovese contends that resistance and accommodation went hand in hand. Accommodation disguised sedition and was, in fact, resistance. Accommodation as resistance meant “accepting what could not be helped without falling prey to the pressures for dehumanization, emasculation, and self-hatred.” In this way, the enslaved affirmed their rights by rejecting the idea that they were helpless.⁶⁵

Deborah White contends that feigning illness, especially of a reproductive nature, was a powerful way women could exert resistance. Women’s ailments and diseases were still “shrouded in mystery” during the nineteenth century. It was difficult for enslavers to confidently know whether an enslaved female was actually suffering from a female or reproductive-related issue. Enslavers depended on enslaved people’s healthy reproductive capacity for their very wealth. If they guessed wrong and an enslaved person got sick or died, they lost a valuable piece of property. On the other hand, they lost a day or more’s worth of labor if they yielded.⁶⁶ Some enslavers and overseers set rules to avoid what they felt were too frequent female complaints. James Mercer, a plantation owner, declared that “no woman was allowed to ‘lay up’ unless a fever accompanied her illness.”⁶⁷ However, Deborah White cautions against too hastily generalizing about feigning illness. Without first-hand records of the enslaved women’s intentions and the genuine possibility of actual disease, pegging claims of illness as “feigned” can be tricky.⁶⁸

The avoidance or termination of pregnancy is another way enslaved women exerted agency; however, it is a complex subject to study. The information we have comes from plantation owners and their hired physicians, which are hardly unbiased sources. John H. Morgan, a Tennessee physician, was convinced that the enslaved people he treated used abortifacients. Another slaveholder suspected that “whole families of barren women” on his plantation used plant medicine to terminate pregnancies.⁶⁹ Interestingly, these “barren” women went on to have *multiple* children after emancipation.⁷⁰ Was there a reason for enslaved

⁶⁴ Paul Finkelman, *Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South: a Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003), 169.

⁶⁵ Genovese, 597-598.

⁶⁶ White, 80.

⁶⁷ Gerald W. Mullin, *Flight and Rebellion, Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 55.

⁶⁸ White, 82-83.

⁶⁹ John H. Morgan, “An Essay on the Production of Abortion Among Our Negro Population,” in *Nashville Journal of Medicine and Surgery* (August 1860), 19:117-118.

⁷⁰ White, 85; Catterall, Helen T., ed., *Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro*, 5 vols. (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1936) 2:475.

women to attempt terminating their pregnancies? Strenuous labor and poor nutrition could have been responsible for miscarriages that appeared to unsympathetic and ignorant enslavers as deliberate terminations. As a form of resistance and an exertion of agency, it was logical that some women would want to hamper their enslavers' and abusers' profits in slave reproduction.

Enslavers frequently cited infanticide as a form of resistance. According to Eugene Genovese, infanticide was extremely uncommon and not a usual form of resistance.⁷¹ Its titillating nature is perhaps responsible for its overemphasis. Still, infanticide did happen. One enslaved woman from South Carolina lost several babies to the slave trade soon after their birth. Finally, when her next baby was born, she poisoned it.⁷² In Virginia, an enslaved woman named Letty was indicted for murdering her day-old baby. She "crushed the skull, wrapped her in a petticoat, and left the infant for dead in a wooden area." Interestingly, she told her examiners that had the baby been of her race, she would not have killed it.⁷³ By taking the life of a white person, even one grown in her own body, Letty exerted some of the most mind-boggling yet powerful retribution. Even in exercising arguably the most profound agency documented, the jury questioned whether the enslaved had "sufficient mind or information" to understand the crime.⁷⁴ Despite these instances, Deborah White agrees with Genovese that these occurrences "represent atypical behavior" on the part of enslaved women.⁷⁵

Statistically, enslaved females attempted escape far less than their male counterparts. An enslaved woman between sixteen and thirty-five was very likely to be pregnant, breastfeeding, or actively caring for young children. Deborah White surmises that women would probably have been more active in running away if they were not the primary caregivers of children; "motherhood structured the slave woman's behavior."⁷⁶ Having children in tow made a successful escape much harder.

Some enslaved women did fight back in more overt and daring ways. In Alabama, an overseer tied an enslaved woman named Crecie to a stump to whip her. When the overseer began to strike, she tore the stump out of the ground and "whipped him and the dogs both."⁷⁷ A

⁷¹ Genovese, 497.

⁷² Rawick, George P., ed., *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*, Oklahoma Narrative, VII (1) (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972), 302.

⁷³ *The Commonwealth v. Letty*, Negro Slave, 182.

⁷⁴ Wilma King, "'Mad' Enough to Kill: Enslaved Women, Murder, and Southern Courts," *The Journal of African American History* 92, no. 1 (2007): 44.

⁷⁵ White, 88.

⁷⁶ White, 75.

⁷⁷ Botkin, 175.

witness recounted a story in the Arkansas WPA narratives of an enslaved person named Lucy who jumped on her master “like to [tear] him up” as he attempted to whip her.⁷⁸ Another WPA narrative, this time from South Carolina, tells the story of two women who, given the choice of resisting or succumbing to rape, bravely chose the former. They waited until the overseer had taken his clothes off and was vulnerable before they attacked him, and he ran away.⁷⁹ Still, it is essential to remember that “not everyone was a Sojourner Truth or a Harriet Tubman”; resistance was hard work.⁸⁰ Sometimes simply the heroic “attempt to maintain the integrity of family life” was an “act of protest.”⁸¹

It is challenging to judge the psychological effects of having enslaved women’s reproduction almost entirely circumscribed by their enslavers. The connections between production, commodification, and reproduction were variable and often blurred.⁸² Exerting agency did not always look like physical resistance. Many enslaved women chose the lesser of two evils and offered their bodies for favors or better treatment. This, of course, “breathed life into” the Jezebel image of a highly sexualized being.⁸³ What can be ascertained is that the enslaved were keenly aware of being “cogs in the plantation regime’s reproductive machine.”⁸⁴ Fanny Kemble, in her Georgia plantation journal, writes, “they have all of them a most distinct... knowledge of their value as property.” Kemble claimed an enslaved woman was aware that “the more frequently she add[ed] to the number of her master’s livestock by bringing new enslaved people into the world, the more claims she [would] have upon his consideration and goodwill.”⁸⁵ Tempe Herdon, a formerly enslaved woman, corroborates this, saying, “I was worth a heap...kaze I had so many chilluns. De more chillun a slave had de more dey was worth.”⁸⁶ Often, plantation owners rewarded women for each new baby they successfully carried and birthed. Fanny Kemble wrote in her journal that, though it was a small thing, she often gifted new mothers additional weekly rations and sets of clothing. She felt these “act as powerful inducements” to procreate as frequently as possible.⁸⁷

⁷⁸ *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*, ed. George P. Rawick (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972), *Slave Narrative* 10(7): 193.

⁷⁹ Rawick, *The American Slave*, *South Carolina Slave Narratives* 2(2): 65-66.

⁸⁰ White, 119.

⁸¹ Finkelman, *Women and the Family in a Slave Society*, 237.

⁸² J. Morgan, 6.

⁸³ White, 34.

⁸⁴ White, 103.

⁸⁵ Kemble, 60.

⁸⁶ Rawick, *The American Slave*, *North Carolina Narratives*, 288.

⁸⁷ Fanny Kemble, *Journal of a Residence of a Georgian Plantation in 1838-1839* (African American Press, 1969), 90, 127.

In *More Than Chattel*, Brenda Stevenson argues that enslaved black women saw themselves as morally superior to their male enslavers and their female enslavers, no matter how well they treated them. Enslaved women saw themselves as heroines in a “fundamental quest for... survival, humanity, and freedom (in spirit if not body).”⁸⁸ According to Stevenson, this identity as morally superior beings was “founded on the perpetuation of black life, humanity, and femininity through good works and service within and opposition to those without who threatened this perpetuation.”⁸⁹ Enslaved peoples did not see aggression towards enslavers and visible resistance as anti-feminine but, instead, saw it as rising up to defend their claims to womanhood.⁹⁰ Enslaved women frequently exercised resistance collaboratively. We have ample evidence that enslaved women formed tight community bonds and frequently aided each other during pregnancy, birth, and when exerting their autonomy.

Historians have explored the experience and role of the enslaved female from the enslaver’s or abuser’s perspective and the perspective of agency. However, historians have not yet examined how enslaved women’s physical, emotional, and psychological abuse diminished their ability to resist. Jennifer Morgan emphasizes that treating “resistance as a factor integral” to the study of slavery “demands a focus on the personhood of the enslaved and to resist the dehumanizing legacy of enslavement.”⁹¹ Understanding the effects of abuse on enslaved peoples does not rob them of agency; it understands it in a new light. We might think of passive resistance as resistance at its most potent in light of psychological barriers. Both Nell Painter and Deborah Gray White agree that “more attention needs to be paid to the psychological costs of enslavement.”⁹² This is the next step in the examination of the enslaved female. Indeed, research centering on the psychological dimensions of abuse with the capacity for active agency during the pre-Civil War era would be a huge step forward in the historiography of the enslaved female.

The “systematic, institutionalized denial of reproductive freedom” has marked black women’s lives from the beginning of the Atlantic slave trade and continues today. In large part, America’s economy was built upon enslaved women’s bodies. It is essential to

⁸⁸ Barry David Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine, *More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 77.

⁸⁹ Gaspar and Hine, 183.

⁹⁰ Brenda E. Stevenson, *Life in Black and White: Family and Community in the Slave South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 236.

⁹¹ Morgan, 11.

⁹² White, 9.

understand where systematic oppression comes from in order to make changes and fight for rights and autonomy. In *Killing the Black Body*, Dorothy Roberts identifies white interests and agendas throughout history as the leading instigators in the regulation and “brutal domination” of black women’s reproductive lives. Reproductive liberty is not just a matter of personal rights; it is a social justice issue for all humanity.⁹³ For this reason, we must go to the very bedrock of black reproductive history to understand the reproductive regulation that is happening still today.

⁹³ Roberts, 2-6.

Bibliography

- Banks, Taunya Lovell. "Dangerous Woman: Elizabeth Key's Freedom Suit - Subjecthood and Racialized Identity in Seventeenth-Century Colonial Virginia" (2008). Faculty Scholarship. 52.
- Berlin, Ira, and Philip D. Morgan. *Cultivation and Culture Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas*. University Press of Virginia, 1993.
- Berry, Diana Ramey. *The Price for Their Pound of Flesh: The Value of the Enslaved, from Womb to Grave, in the Building of a Nation*. United States: Random House Inc, 2018.
- Blassingame, John W. *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South*. 1972; revised edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Blassingame, John W. ed. *Slave Testimony: Two Centuries of Letters, Speeches, Interviews, and Autobiographies*. Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
- Botkin, Benjamin Albert. *Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery* Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1945.
- Brown, Kathleen M. *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia*. Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
- Catterall, Helen T., ed., *Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro*, 5 vols. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1936.
- Clinton, Catherine. *The Plantation Mistress: Woman's World in the Old South*. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982.
- Clinton, Catherine. *Half Sisters of History: Southern Women and the American Past*. Duke University Press, 1994.
- Deyle, Steven. *Carry Me Back: The Domestic Slave Trade in American Life*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Douglass, Frederick. *Life and Times of Frederick Douglass*, New York: Crowell, 1966.
- Engerman, Stanley L. Review of *The Slave Community*, in *Journal of Political Economy* 81 (November–December 1973): pp. 1476–1477.
- Finkelman, Paul. *Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South: a Brief History with Documents*. Bedford/St. Martin's, 2003.
- Finkelman, Paul. *Women and the Family in a Slave Society*, New York: Garland Pub., 1989.
- Fischer, Kirsten. *Suspect Relations: Sex, Race, and Resistance in Colonial North Carolina* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Fogel, Robert William., and Stanley L. Engerman. *Time on the Cross*. 1st ed., Little, Brown, 1974.
- Gaspar, David Barry, and Darlene Clark Hine. *More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- Genovese, Eugene D. *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. New York: Vintage Books, 1976.
- Greenblatt, Stephen. *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Gutman, Herbert G. *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925*. New York: Pantheon, 1976.
- Herndon, Tempe. *Slave Narratives, North Carolina Narratives 14*, No. I, Washington, DC:LOC/WPA, 1941.
- Higginbotham, A. Leon. *In the Matter of Color: The Colonial Period*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

- Jefferson, Thomas, and Edwin Morris Betts. *Thomas Jefferson's Farm Book: With Commentary and Relevant Extracts from Other Writings*. Princeton: Published for the American Philosophical Society by Princeton University Press, 1953.
- Jones-Rogers, Stephanie E. *They Were Her Property: White Women as Slave Owners in the American South*. Yale University Press, 2019.
- Kemble, Fanny. *Journal of a Residence of a Georgian Plantation in 1838-1839*, African American Press, 1969.
- King, Wilma. "Mad' Enough to Kill: Enslaved Women, Murder, and Southern Courts." *The Journal of African American History* 92, no. 1, 2007.
- Malone, Ann Patton. *Sweet Chariot: Slave Family and Household Structure in Nineteenth-Century Louisiana*. University of North Carolina Press, 1992.
- Michell, Carolyn. "Health and the Medical Profession in the South" from *Journal of Southern History*, 1944.
- Morgan, Edmund S. *American Slavery, American Freedom, The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*. New York: Norton, 1975.
- Morgan, Jennifer L. *Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
- Morgan, John H. "An Essay on the Production of Abortion Among Our Negro Population," in *Nashville Journal of Medicine and Surgery*, August 1860.
- Morton, Patricia. *Discovering the Women in Slavery: Emancipating Perspectives on the American Past*. University of Georgia Press, 1996.
- Mullin, Gerald W. *Flight and Rebellion, Slave Resistance in Eighteenth-Century Virginia*, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Olmsted, Frederick Law. *The Cotton Kingdom*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
- . *A Journey in the Back Country* New York: Schocken Books, 1970.
- . *A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States*, New York: Dix and Edwards, 1856.
- Patterson, Orlando. *Slavery and Social Death a Comparative Study* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Phillips, Ulrich Bonnell, ed., *Plantation and Frontier Documents, 1649-1863*, 2 vols. Cleveland: Arthur H Clarke, 1909.
- Postell, William Dosité. *The Health of Slaves on Southern Plantations*. Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1951.
- Ransom, Roger L., and Richard. Sutch. *One Kind of Freedom : The Economic Consequences of Emancipation* 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Rawick, George P., ed., *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*, 19 vols. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972.
- . Alabama.
- . Arkansas.
- . Georgia.
- . North Carolina.
- . Oklahoma.
- . South Carolina.
- . Tennessee.
- . Virginia.
- . *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co., 1972.
- Redpath, James. *The Roving Editor: Or, Talks with Slaves in the Southern States*. New York: A. B. Burdick, 1859.
- Roberts, Dorothy E. *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1997.
- Savitt, Todd Lee. *Medicine and Slavery: The Diseases and Health Care of Blacks in Antebellum Virginia*. University of Illinois Press, 1978.

Reproductive Commodification in Southern Antebellum Plantations

- Scholten, Catherine M. "On the Importance of the Obstetric Art: Changing Customs of Childbirth in America, 1760-1825" in *William and Mary Quarterly*, 1977.
- Steckel, Richard H. *The Economics of U.S. Slave and Southern White Fertility*. New York: Garland, 1985.
- Stevenson, Brenda E. *Life in Black and White: Family and Community in the Slave South*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Weiner, Marli Frances. *Mistresses and Slaves: Plantation Women in South Carolina, 1830-80* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997.
- White, Deborah Gray. *Ar'n't I a Woman?* New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.
- Woodward, C. Vann. ed., *Mary Chesnut's Civil War*. New Haven, CT, 1981.

Compañeras: Roles of Women in Latin American Leftist Revolutions

Hannah Williams

What were the roles of women in the leftist revolutions of Latin America? What were they promised, and what did they actually get? In the second half of the twentieth century, Communist, Socialist, and other leftist movements were springing up all across Latin America in response to economic hardships and injustices. Women took on important roles in some of these movements. One notable example is the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, which began in 1979. Understanding how women took part in these movements creates a better understanding of women in general, as well as a better understanding of the leftist movements. This paper will examine how women contributed to, influenced, and participated in these movements and what they received in return if and when these movements achieved power. Male leaders of these movements promised women more rights and better treatment, attracting more women to the causes, but the promises were not kept in many cases.

Women can be a powerful force, yet their achievements have historically been overshadowed by those of their male counterparts. The Latin American women of the later twentieth century challenged this pattern, as their outstanding participation in the revolutions and political movements shook the region. A significant factor that drew women to social change was the widespread poverty and economic hardships that plagued the region during this time.¹ This affected women in particular, as they were responsible for buying food to feed their husbands and children.² These women felt the brunt of the poor economies in their countries, as they were the ones worrying about being able to afford to feed their families any given week. These women were especially prominent in leftist movements, which tended to offer them more rights in a time that was lacking in gender equality. Some of the most noteworthy goals these women had included equal pay, legal abortion, and putting an end to domestic violence and its normalization.³ The revolutions they signed up for with the hopes to achieve said goals often raised unrealistic expectations of expunging sexism.⁴ This gave these women higher expectations of their movement than what it was capable

¹ Elizabeth Maier and Nathalie Lebon, *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering Social Justice, Democratizing Citizenship* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010), 8.

² Maier and Lebon, *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 6.

³ Maier and Lebon, *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 5-6.

⁴ Maier and Lebon, *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 7.

of delivering, setting them up for disappointment. The aftermath of these movements saw positives for women as well. The most prominent is that in the present-day, most Latin American countries now see girls going to school for more years than boys.⁵ There has also been a large increase of women in professional, technical, and clerical fields compared to men.⁶ There is no doubt that this is remarkable progress; however, the question still remains if this satisfies what women were fighting for when they joined the leftist movements from the 1950s to the 1990s seen in Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

Cuba has received a very famous, or to some infamous, reputation for its leftist movements in the later twentieth century. Preceding the Castro-led revolution in the late 1950s, Cuba had a significant class imbalance.⁷ This manifested itself in the exploitation enacted by the upper class of landholders, prominent farmers, and industrial capitalists.⁸ The middle class of small farmers, small entrepreneurs, and white-collar workers, as well as Black people and mestizos, fell victim to this exploitation and became second-class citizens.⁹ Black people and mestizos were particularly vulnerable, having little authority compared to the country's white citizens.¹⁰ These factors are known to be ingredients for recipes of civil unrest. Sure enough, the exploited and oppressed groups began to create conflicts in the years leading up to the revolution.¹¹ These groups sought to create profound change in Cuba, generally to abolish the oppression and exploitation of said groups.¹² The younger generations heavily backed this.¹³ Soon, Fidel Castro became the leader of this revolution and after taking power, shaped it after Marxist, Leninist, and Communist models, officially making it a far-left movement.¹⁴

Women played important roles in the Cuban Revolution. The 1950s were the peak for women as nothing more than housewives with full-skirted dresses, but that did not mean they were not capable of getting their hands a little dirty. Some women in Cuba found these skirts useful for concealing weapons, their houses good for hiding guerrillas, and their status as wives good for deterring suspicion of their militant

⁵ Maier and Lebon, *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 13-14.

⁶ Maier and Lebon, *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean*, 13-14.

⁷ Nelson R. Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," in *Cuban Communism*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 13.

⁸ Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 13.

⁹ Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 13.

¹⁰ Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 13.

¹¹ Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 16.

¹² Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 18.

¹³ Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 23.

¹⁴ Amaro, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," 30.

husbands.¹⁵ According to author Julie Shayne, an assistant professor of women's studies, women were able to play such crucial roles in the Cuban Revolution due to the fact that their femininity often led others to underestimate and overlook them and their actions.¹⁶ Sexist ideas that women are innocent, lacking in intelligence, or weak, allowed Cuban women to get away with more revolutionary activities than perhaps they would have if they were men. This scenario was one of the rare cases where sexism backfired and actually benefitted the women. Other women had more direct roles in the Cuban Revolution. For instance, students were extremely prominent and active during the 1950s in the resistance movement against Batista, Cuba's dictator pre-revolution.¹⁷ One woman named Angela Elvira Díaz Vallina was a student leader of the Federation of University Students, or FEU, during the anti-Batista movement and coup.¹⁸ Another woman by the name of Nimia Menocal was a member of the rebel air force during this time.¹⁹ In 1952 the Martí Women's Civic Front, an all-women's resistance group against the dictatorship, was founded by a woman named Aída Pelayo.²⁰ Two women, Haydée Santamaría and Melba Hernández followed Fidel Castro in the attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba in 1953.²¹ These ladies did not fight in the attack, but their job was tending to the wounded of those who did.²² These are just a few good examples of how women were involved in this movement firsthand. However, there was relatively much less participation of women in Cuba's guerilla movement when compared to the guerilla movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador.²³ It is clear that women had a variety of roles to choose from when they decided to join the Cuban Revolution, and they shared very similar reasons for doing so.

These women had goals and desires that motivated their contributions to the Cuban Revolution. Sexism and misogyny were deeply rooted social problems women faced in Cuba.²⁴ This made the socialist revolution in Cuba attractive to women, as it promised them

¹⁵ Julie Shayne, *The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 115.

¹⁶ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 115.

¹⁷ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 117.

¹⁸ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 117.

¹⁹ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 117.

²⁰ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 117.

²¹ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 118.

²² Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 118.

²³ Karen Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 118.

²⁴ Elizabeth Quay Hutchinson, "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution: Conversations with Margaret Randall," *Radical History Review* 136, (2020): 190.

equality.²⁵ Many women simply joined and helped start the revolution in order to remove Batista and his dictatorship, turning their support towards Castro instead.²⁶ Much of this was due to Batista making empty promises of new social programs.²⁷ These programs were meant to help protect women, but the funding for these was used for corrupt purposes instead.²⁸ This turned many women from supporting him to supporting his removal. Of course, Cuban women could not foresee what the revolution would lead to or if their efforts would actually pay off. At the time, all they had to rely on was their willpower and hope.

The reasons why women joined the Cuban Revolution may not have lined up with what they received in return. According to writer and Latin American and women's activist Margaret Randall, a single revolution by itself cannot make profound and lasting change.²⁹ Although women were promised equality from the Cuban Revolution, the revolution did not completely deliver on that promise. Randall notes that a significant reason for this is a misinterpretation of Marxism.³⁰ This misinterpretation put working-class unity above all other issues, including women's rights.³¹ She also offers her opinion that the last several decades in Cuba have lacked progress towards gender, sexuality, and the sharing of power with women.³² From this evidence, one can see that Cuban women did not necessarily get what they signed up for from the Cuban Revolution. On the other hand, since many women joined the revolution because they wanted to get rid of Batista, these women certainly got what they wanted there, as they ensured he fled the country, and Castro took his place.³³ Several years later, southwest across the Caribbean Sea, Nicaraguan women experienced similarities as well as differences with a leftist movement in their own country.

Nicaragua is famous for its leftist movement known as the Sandinista Revolution, as it had no shortage of women's participation. It stemmed from a guerilla war and lasted from 1979 to 1990.³⁴ The Sandinistas were named after Augusto Sandino, a guerilla warfare hero

²⁵ Hutchinson, "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution," 190.

²⁶ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 118.

²⁷ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 116.

²⁸ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 116.

²⁹ Hutchinson, "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution," 191.

³⁰ Hutchinson, "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution," 194.

³¹ Hutchinson, "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution," 194.

³² Hutchinson, "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution," 196.

³³ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 121.

³⁴ Karen Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), 19.

of the 1930s.³⁵ The revolution had both male and female participants.³⁶ The women who comprised the Sandinistas came from all backgrounds, including the peasant, working, professional and bourgeois classes.³⁷ In the years before the revolution, Nicaraguans endured harsh conditions, extreme poverty, foreign interference, and a brutal dictatorship.³⁸ Women were especially motivated when it came to finding solutions to these issues, and they quickly found that radical problems like these required radical actions.³⁹ It began very similarly to the Cuban Revolution, as this movement as well sought to remove the overpowering dictator. In July of 1979, the Sandinistas were successful in overthrowing the Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza.⁴⁰ Somoza was immediately replaced by Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) leader Daniel Ortega.⁴¹ Straight away, the Sandinistas began implementing their leftist reforms, many of which focused on gender equality issues.⁴²

Nicaraguan women had countless roles as participants in the Sandinista Revolution. They went to meetings and rallies, put on political skits, organized committees, held seminars, made reports, and took part in demonstrations, campaigns, and strikes.⁴³ This revolution saw a vast number of women participating in armed guerilla warfare as well.⁴⁴ Numerous women took part in the revolution and explained exactly what they did and what it was like. In *Sandino's Daughters* by Margaret Randall, Lea Guido recounted her challenging role of trying to recruit women from all backgrounds, from the rich to the poor, to join the FSLN.⁴⁵ A role like this was crucial in recruiting the large number of women that joined the movement. Guido later described how she and other women provided lessons in first aid, supplied women and their neighborhoods with medicine and medical equipment, and set up medical clinics and groceries for basic foods.⁴⁶ Any important political movement that wants to be successful also needs some form of

³⁵ Margaret Randall, *Sandino's Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), xii.

³⁶ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, xii.

³⁷ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, xii.

³⁸ Karen Kampwirth, "Women in the Armed Struggles in Nicaragua," in *Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right*, ed. Karen Kampwirth and Victoria González-Rivera (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 79.

³⁹ Karen Kampwirth, "Women in the Armed Struggles in Nicaragua," 79.

⁴⁰ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 21.

⁴¹ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 21.

⁴² Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 21.

⁴³ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 15-17, 20-23.

⁴⁴ Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 21.

⁴⁵ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 2.

⁴⁶ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 23.

propaganda. Gloria Carrion took part in this, using the nursery school she oversaw as a cover for a crucial propaganda system.⁴⁷ A few women, like Julia Garcia, had to sacrifice taking care of their children and seeing their husbands in order to fight for the movement.⁴⁸ Some women even sacrificed more than that. There were unfortunate cases of women taking on the tragic role of the martyr. Luisa Amanda Espinosa was twenty-one years old when she became a martyr.⁴⁹ She was the first female militant fatality to perish in battle fighting for the Sandinista Revolution.⁵⁰ The women's association in Nicaragua became named after Espinosa.⁵¹ Before her death, her role in the movement was to protect a safehouse used for the refuge of comrades.⁵² Like many leftist movements, this was the term used for members of the FSLN.

In *The Country Under My Skin*, poet Gioconda Belli tells the story of her involvement with the Sandinistas in a series of memoirs. She describes how her apartment during this time was an important location used by the Sandinistas, with people constantly coming and going.⁵³ Belli adds that she, along with others, organized task forces to help construct the government's new policies that would replace Somoza.⁵⁴ She also met with and was interviewed by journalists and politicians about what this new government was planning and how it would change things.⁵⁵ When Belli returned to Nicaragua once Somoza was defeated, she was part of a group that distributed newspapers announcing the country's new freedom.⁵⁶ Her countless other duties included being in charge of the Sandinistas' first newscast, working for the Ministry of Planning and the Media Department, checking newscasts before air to make sure there was nothing to endanger national security, attending militia training sessions, completing night watches, and attending many meetings in Washington D.C. with the head of the Sandinista Foreign Information Office.⁵⁷ These examples provide a glimpse into the endless roles women had in the Sandinista Revolution, and their motivations for such participation were popular ones.

⁴⁷ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 8.

⁴⁸ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 20.

⁴⁹ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 24.

⁵⁰ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 24.

⁵¹ Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 24.

⁵² Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 27.

⁵³ Gioconda Belli, *The Country Under My Skin: A Memoir of Love and War* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 233.

⁵⁴ Belli, *The Country Under My Skin*, 234.

⁵⁵ Belli, *The Country Under My Skin*, 236.

⁵⁶ Belli, *The Country Under My Skin*, 246, 247.

⁵⁷ Belli, *The Country Under My Skin*, 254, 293-295, 299.

The women of the Sandinistas had clear objectives as to what they wanted from this revolution. As previously mentioned, this revolution was similar to Cuba's because both had the important goal of removing a horrible dictator. Many of the women of this movement came from rural areas, and the majority of Nicaragua's rural population faced poverty.⁵⁸ This also largely contributed to the desire for revolution. The Sandinista Revolution stood out from others as the FSLN had very early made the promise that this revolution would bring about the cultural, economic, and political equality of women and men, including the transformation of gender roles.⁵⁹ This was a general goal shared among the Sandinistas; it meant many different specific changes in the law and how the law and society treated women. For example, women wanted to see increases in childcare availability, paid maternity leave, more paid time off, higher pay, the availability of running water everywhere, and more representation of women in leadership.⁶⁰ These minor changes varied in priority from woman to woman. Nevertheless, this promise of gender equality was a definite attraction for women as a whole to join the movement. Other reasons women joined the Sandinistas included wanting to improve Nicaraguan literacy rates, health care, and neighborhood safety.⁶¹ One of the strongest forces that motivated the masses to join the movement was the idea of undermining the foundations of the country's traditional authority, whatever that meant to the individual.⁶² Everyone who became a Sandinista wanted to change their society in some way or another. Ultimately to all, that meant changing Nicaraguan tradition. Whether or not these Sandinista women achieved their goals from this revolution, the answer varies from goal to goal as well as woman to woman.

As there were so many Sandinista women with many different specific goals in mind, whether or not the Sandinistas achieved their general goal, it would be inaccurate to say that each woman had all of their needs completely met and satisfied. As previously mentioned, the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza in 1979, making that goal of the movement a success. This is another similarity this revolution had with the Cuban Revolution. Almost immediately after Somoza's removal, the Sandinistas started making legal changes, including providing increased access to education, nationwide healthcare, daycare centers, and more opportunities for women.⁶³ The month after Somoza's defeat, The

⁵⁸ Karen Kampwirth, "Women in the Armed Struggles in Nicaragua," 83.

⁵⁹ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 21, 30.

⁶⁰ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 32.

⁶¹ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 26.

⁶² Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 27.

⁶³ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 21.

Statute of Rights and Guarantees of August 1979 declared the equality of rights and responsibilities between men and women.⁶⁴ Of course, this law by itself did not magically change Nicaraguan society overnight, so the Sandinistas made additional, more specific laws to help get them there. Some of those established included the prohibition of using women as sex objects for advertising, the suppression of prostitution (which was assisted by programs that trained former prostitutes for alternate jobs), the promotion of breastfeeding, the allowance for single people to adopt without a marital status, the removal of status difference between children of married and unmarried parents, the right to investigate paternity, the equal rights of mothers and fathers over their children, the assurance of equal pay for equal work, and the right for mothers to take paid breaks from work to breastfeed.⁶⁵ In the present day, Nicaragua is near the top of international gender equity ranks, as it has very high numbers of women elected to office.⁶⁶ Clearly, many women's goals were met with these welcomed changes, but this still did not cover all that had to be done.

Nicaragua's current president, FSLN member Daniel Ortega, has pushed back against women's equality since he came to office in 2007.⁶⁷ His presidency has seen the persecution of feminist organizations, a total ban on abortion, and protection of the family structure over women who are victims of domestic violence.⁶⁸ While his former collaborators debate the reasons why the current Sandinistas under Ortega make such an abrupt turn away from their prior commitment to gender equality, the fact remains that the years of the revolution saw the most gains for women in Nicaragua's troubled history. As the Sandinista Revolution shook Nicaragua, not too far northwest, the revolution in El Salvador simultaneously rocked the small country.

The tiny nation of El Salvador had its own passionate leftist movement in which women again did not shy away. This revolution differs significantly from those we have seen in Cuba and Nicaragua. Unlike the two previously mentioned countries, the revolution in El Salvador did not begin with the intention of overthrowing an overpowering individual dictator.⁶⁹ Instead, the nation was dealing with several short-term juntas.⁷⁰ These military groups ruled the country after

⁶⁴ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 22.

⁶⁵ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 23.

⁶⁶ Elisabeth J. Friedman, *Seeking Rights from the Left: Gender, Sexuality and the Latin American Pink Tide* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 235.

⁶⁷ Friedman, *Seeking Rights from the Left*, 235.

⁶⁸ Friedman, *Seeking Rights from the Left*, 235.

⁶⁹ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 19.

⁷⁰ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 19.

forcefully seizing power.⁷¹ Starting in 1980, the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation, or the FMLN, declared war against the government and military running El Salvador at the time.⁷² During the next twelve years, the war that raged was particularly bloody, with most of the deaths being caused by the actions of the Salvadoran military.⁷³ However, in 1992, the same military, the National Republican Alliance, or ARENA, cut their losses when FMLN victory was apparent.⁷⁴ The United Nations stepped in at this point and negotiated the end of the war.⁷⁵ This unprecedented negotiation upheld human rights and reconstructed El Salvador's society generally in the FMLN's favor.⁷⁶ However different this revolution compares to Cuba's and Nicaragua's, the consistent factor remains that women had important roles to play.

Salvadoran women continued the trend their Cuban and Nicaraguan sisters began as they carried on with the various roles they participated in for their movement. The FMLN had five armies, and women made up about one-third of combatants in those armies.⁷⁷ Some roles women had as army members besides guerillas were to make explosives, coordinate the press and propaganda, operate radios, work as cooks, deliver messages and medicine, work in hospitals, or even have the rank of captain.⁷⁸ Along with women participating as army members, several organizations had a high composition of women that partook in the movement.⁷⁹ These included the teachers union known as the National Association of Salvadoran Educators, or ANDES, the human rights organization known as the Committee of the Mothers of the Disappeared, or CO-MADRES, and the Christian Committee for the Displaced Peoples of El Salvador, or CRIPDES.⁸⁰ Like the Sandinista movement, this movement also saw women taking on the role of the martyr.⁸¹ Dr. Mélida Anaya Montes was the most notable of this sort as she was the founder of ANDES, was second in command of the Popular Forces of Liberation, or FPL, which belonged to the FMLN, and the position she held was one of the two highest-ever held by a woman in the FMLN.⁸² She was assassinated in 1983 and was recognized as a

⁷¹ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 19.

⁷² Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 19.

⁷³ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 19.

⁷⁴ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 20, 24.

⁷⁵ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 20.

⁷⁶ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 24.

⁷⁷ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 35.

⁷⁸ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 36, 37.

⁷⁹ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 24, 25.

⁸⁰ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 24, 25.

⁸¹ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 26.

⁸² Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 26.

heroine for her work.⁸³ Dr. Montes was one of the hundreds of Salvadoran teachers assassinated in the early 1980s, and many of those not assassinated were kidnapped, interrogated, tortured, and forced into exile.⁸⁴ Members of the CO-MADRES experienced similar fates.⁸⁵ Some of the luckier teachers were able to fight alongside the guerrillas and during this time, helped them learn to read and write.⁸⁶ Members of CRIPDES, who were predominantly women as well, contributed to the movement by organizing petitions for food, health, medicine, and literacy training, as well as helping to relocate refugees.⁸⁷ Clearly, these women were willing to endure these harsh conditions for a good reason.

Salvadoran women believed they had much to gain from their participation in this revolution. Like the women participants of the Cuban and Nicaraguan movements, these women were also fighting for their equality.⁸⁸ Some of these women also joined the movement with the same intentions as their male counterparts.⁸⁹ These included the goals of ending ARENA's reign, implementing a new democratic government, improving social justice, and having new opportunities in their lives.⁹⁰ One significant and uniting reason for the revolution was the widespread and reoccurring violence ARENA regularly displayed, and many became interested in joining after the murder of a family member.⁹¹ Military corruption and tremendous economic inequality were additional motives for women in the movement.⁹² Other smaller contributing factors that led to women's participation included the increase in the exportation of their agriculture, increased landlessness, the separation of rural households, an increase of women in paid labor, and more emigration out of the country and to urban areas.⁹³ These factors specifically affected and motivated women in rural areas and were not necessarily the reasons women from urban areas had.⁹⁴ It is fair to say that overall, Salvadoran women joined the movement because they wanted radical solutions to extreme problems.⁹⁵ Similar to the Sandinista movement, this movement had women with varying reasons

⁸³ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 26.

⁸⁴ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 27, 28.

⁸⁵ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 30.

⁸⁶ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 28.

⁸⁷ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 31.

⁸⁸ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 75.

⁸⁹ Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 45.

⁹⁰ Kampwirth, *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution*, 76.

⁹¹ Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 51, 60.

⁹² Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 59.

⁹³ Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 52.

⁹⁴ Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 52.

⁹⁵ Kampwirth, *Women & Guerrilla Movements*, 45.

for participating in El Salvador's revolution. This would have made it difficult for each woman to have been satisfied by the time the movement came to an end in 1992.

When the United Nations helped negotiate an end to this civil war, they generally settled things in the revolutionaries' favor. The most noteworthy of the changes made were mandated demilitarization, establishing the FMLN as an official party, constitutional amendments, reformation of the electoral and judicial systems, and identifying the individuals responsible for the major human rights abuse violations.⁹⁶ The movement was also responsible for birthing El Salvador's feminist movement.⁹⁷ The feminist movement has brought on in recent years political reforms on the issues of domestic violence, education, child support, labor rights, and women's political involvement.⁹⁸ Much of this can be credited to El Salvador's case of not only a relatively strong presence of both left-wing and right-wing women in its Legislative Assembly but also the exceptional fact that these two groups of women are often able to work together to create legislation that further increases gender equality.⁹⁹ Of course, women continued to face their challenges. After the 1992 victory, the FMLN did not like its members forming their own autonomous feminist groups and often refused to fund female-centered projects such as the advocacy for sex workers.¹⁰⁰ FMLN hostility made post-revolutionary advocacy of Salvadoran feminism difficult as even the country's leftist party presented obstacles. Despite this, Salvadoran feminism has still been able to stand its ground and exceed expectations considering what it took to get there.

To conclude, women's participation in the leftist movements of Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador have created a diverse unit of late twentieth-century history. In each case, the women had several roles to choose from when participating in their respective movements. Their motivations for joining each movement were very similar to each other, and the most significant diversity can be seen in what these women actually ended up being rewarded with. The women of the 1950s Cuban Revolution participated in roles ranging from hiding weapons in their skirts to being in the rebel air force. They wanted to remove Batista from power and gain equal rights, among other things. They successfully got Batista to flee the country and made some progress in gender equality,

⁹⁶ Shayne, *The Revolution Question*, 46.

⁹⁷ Patricia Hipsher, "Right- and Left-Wing Women in Post-Revolutionary El Salvador," in *Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right*, ed. Karen Kampwirth and Victoria González-Rivera (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 133.

⁹⁸ Hipsher, "Right- and Left-Wing Women in Post-Revolutionary El Salvador," 133.

⁹⁹ Hipsher, "Right- and Left-Wing Women in Post-Revolutionary El Salvador," 133.

¹⁰⁰ Hipsher, "Right- and Left-Wing Women in Post-Revolutionary El Salvador," 144, 145.

but that ultimately became a secondary priority to Castro's prime concern of Marxism. In the Sandinista Revolution of Nicaragua from 1979 to 1990, women's participation notably increased as women held the reins of much of the movement, including a significant number of women fighting as guerillas. They wanted Somoza out of office, the equality of men and women in all senses of the phrase, as well as an improved economy, healthcare, safety, and literacy rates. With Somoza's defeat, many of the revolutionary women's needs were met. The Statute of Rights and Guarantees of August 1979 declaring equal rights between men and women passed almost immediately. Today, the country has a high international gender equity ranking. Presently, Nicaragua's future is uncertain as the Sandinistas backing current President Daniel Ortega are unrecognizable to the Sandinistas and what they stood for in 1979. In El Salvador's revolution from 1980 to 1992, many women participated as members of the ANDES, CO-MADRES, or the CRIPDES, having roles that mirrored what we saw in the Sandinistas, although many times on a more violent scale. These women joined due to various motivations, with gender equality and a democratic government at the forefront. This revolution was so brutal that the United Nations had to step in, which was a remarkable victory for the left as it reorganized the country in their favor. El Salvador currently sees its women in government on both sides coming together to create positive steps in feminist reform. Regarding the question as to what women from these movements got for their troubles, Nicaragua shines brightest, with El Salvador in a respectable second place and Cuba with the least to offer from these revolutions. The same can be said for women's involvement and the diversity of their roles in each movement. These two findings have allowed the additional conclusion that when more women participate in more roles in leftist movements with an intention for greater gender equality, they are more likely to be successful in that territory.

Bibliography

- Amaro, Nelson R. "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution." In *Cuban Communism*, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, 13-36. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987.
- Belli, Gioconda. *The Country Under My Skin: A Memoir of Love and War*. New York: Anchor Books, 2003.
- Friedman, Elisabeth J. *Seeking Rights from the Left: Gender, Sexuality and the Latin American Pink Tide*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2019.
- Hipsher, Patricia. "Right- and Left-Wing Women in Post-Revolutionary El Salvador." In *Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right*, edited by Karen Kampwirth and Victoria González-Rivera, 133-164. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.
- Hutchinson, Elizabeth Quay. "Women, Gender, and Sexuality in the Cuban Revolution: Conversations with Margaret Randall." *Radical History Review* 136, (2020): 185-197.
- Kampwirth, Karen. *Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004.
- Kampwirth, Karen. *Women & Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
- Kampwirth, Karen. "Women in the Armed Struggles in Nicaragua." In *Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right*, edited by Karen Kampwirth and Victoria González-Rivera, 79-109. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.
- Maier, Elizabeth and Nathalie Lebon. *Women's Activism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Engendering Social Justice, Democratizing Citizenship*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2010.
- Randall, Margaret. *Sandino's Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995.
- Shayne, Julie. *The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004.

The Pill and its Impacts on American Society, 1960-1980

Vivian Hernandez

The end of World War II brought with it the “baby boom,” which increased the birth rate of the United States between 1946 and 1964. World War II and the lasting impacts of the Great Depression led many married couples to delay having children. The war’s end and the period of economic prosperity that followed contributed to this surge in population. By 1960, the baby boom was taking a toll on American society. Feminist Betty Friedan, author of *The Feminine Mystique*, believed that “by the end of the fifties, the United States birthrate was overtaking India’s.”¹ In 1960, Enovid became the first birth control pill approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration and ultimately tackled the population problem. The introduction of the pill allowed American women to separate sexuality from childbearing, which they had been unable to do previously. They were also able to enter the workforce in numbers like never before and participated in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s freely. Consequently, the introduction of modern contraception enabled women to participate freely in society without the constraints of motherhood. With the implementation of the Family Planning Services and Public Research Act of 1970, or Title X Family Planning Program, a US federal law passed to provide federal government funding to low-income or uninsured families; underrepresented women were also given access to birth control. Nevertheless, the introduction of the birth control pill liberated white middle- and upper-class women from constant childbearing and enabled them to participate in American society like never before. However, it is important to note that there continued to be discrepancies in birth rates and the distribution of oral contraceptives among women of color and low-income women.

Beginning in the 1970s, feminist historians started to study the history of birth control in the United States. In 1976, Linda Gordon published *Woman’s Body, Woman’s Right: The History of Birth Control in America*. Gordon chronicled the rise of the birth control movement during the first half of the twentieth century and the controversy that followed the pill’s approval into the 1970s.² Gordon also released *The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in*

¹ Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company), 1963.

² Linda Gordon, *Woman’s Body, Woman’s Right: Birth Control in America* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 1990) 55.

America, nearly 40 years after *Woman's Body, Woman's Right*, which is considered the most complete history of birth control in the United States. It covers the entirety of the birth control movement and the controversies surrounding the creation and distribution of birth control. *America and the Pill: A History of Promise, Peril, and Liberation* by Elian Tyler May explores the science behind the birth control pill and the problems that many hoped it would solve but ultimately did not. The research for the study at hand relied heavily on these three monographs to formulate my argument. Conspicuously lacking in these monographs was an understanding of the class discrimination and inequitable distribution of birth control in the United States among marginalized communities, low-income individuals, and women of color. This paper will add to the broader historiography created by both Gordon, May, and other feminist historians by analyzing the impacts the introduction of the oral contraceptives had on middle- and upper-class white women while simultaneously acknowledging and addressing the disadvantages and obstacles low-income individuals and women of color faced when trying to obtain access to birth control.

Birth Control Pioneers and the Science Behind the Pill

Two women's rights activists led the birth control movement in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. Margaret Sanger and Katherine McCormick's efforts made the creation of the birth control pill possible. In the nineteenth century, natural forms of contraceptive practices were widespread and effectively reduced the birth rate in the United States. In 1800, American women had an average of eight children. By 1900, this number had dropped to half this.³ Margaret Sanger and Katherine McCormick's work built off what their predecessors had accomplished.

One of eleven children, Margaret Sanger, came from an Irish Catholic immigrant family. Credited with the term "birth control," which she coined in 1915, she advocated heavily for the rights of laboring-class women and centered her efforts on advocating for contraception. Sanger blamed the "premature death of her mother on constant childbearing and the lack of access to contraceptives."⁴ Her time as a nurse allowed her to interact with many women who were ill or dying from illegal abortions or from just having too many children. Sanger believed that contraception was necessary to ease the fears of pregnancy and allow women to enjoy sex freely. Her birth control advocacy was crushed by legal restrictions, specifically, the Comstock Act of 1873. The act made

³ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁴ Elaine Tyler May, *America and the Pill* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010), 17.

it illegal to sell, give away, or possess an obscene book, pamphlet, picture, drawing, or advertisement about birth control. Sanger was arrested for the first time in 1914 after promoting the use of contraceptives in her feminist magazine, *The Woman Rebel*. In 1916, Sanger went to prison for opening the first birth control clinic in the United States. After she was released from prison, Sanger began to challenge the law that prohibited the distribution of information on birth control.⁵ The opposition that Sanger encountered as she tried to make contraceptives accessible reflects the purposeful attempts to limit women's access to birth control in the early twentieth century. Society reinforced the belief that women's sole purpose in life was to become mothers and raise their children; the idea of a woman taking control of her fertility threatened this traditional ideology.

Soon, a judge allowed physicians to administer birth control when needed to cure and prevent diseases. This prompted Sanger to establish birth control clinics across the United States that physicians would staff. These physicians could legally prescribe birth control to women and provide them with information about family planning. In 1921, Sanger founded the American Birth Control League at the First American Birth Control Conference in New York City. In 1942, the Birth Control Federation of America changed its name to the Planned Parenthood Federations of America (PPFA). The name change came with new goals, including "strengthening the family by making it possible to plan the timing and spacing of children and by liberating female sexuality in marriage, leading to happier couples and greater domestic contentment."⁶ Sanger's ultimate goal of developing an effective birth control method became a reality with the help of Katherine McCormick.

Katherine McCormick came from an affluent family and was the second woman to graduate from MIT. She was a fervent women's rights activist and participated in the women's suffrage movement. In the early twenties, she became involved in the birth control movement and smuggled diaphragms into the United States from Europe to Sanger's clinics. Unlike Sanger, McCormick had the means to fund research on the potential development of a birth control pill. In 1950, McCormick reached out to Sanger, asking how she could provide financial support to research on contraception. With the funds provided by McCormick, Sanger employed Gregory Pincus. "Pincus then hired fellow scientists Chang Min-Chueh, and John Rock, a Catholic physician who did the first human testing, using just-developed synthetic progesterone, the two showed that it could suppress women's

⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

ovulation.⁷ The combined efforts of these individuals and many others working in various settings and capacities led to the discovery of the synthetic hormonal compound that suppressed ovulation.⁸

Gregory Pincus' intention was not to develop a contraceptive when he first conducted his research which experimented with hormonal compounds in the hopes of finding an infertility treatment. In 1951, Sanger and McCormick gave Pincus his first research grant to specifically develop an oral contraceptive. Those involved in the project truly believed that creating a birth control pill would solve the problems plaguing the world in the second half of the twentieth century, such as overpopulation and poverty. Sanger stated that "science must make women the owner, the mistress of herself. Science, the only possible savior of making, must put it in the power of woman to decide for herself whether she will or will not become a mother."⁹ Pincus was only able to conduct testing on animals and not humans. The team enlisted the help of gynecologist and obstetrician John Rock in order to help conduct clinical trials on humans. Rock researched infertility among women and advocated for the importance of family planning. Many doctors during this time were beginning to embrace the idea of family planning, and one even stated, "every child should be a wanted child. Those who want them should be able to have them; those who don't should be able to prevent them."¹⁰ Rock agreed to work with Pincus and test the potential for the hormone progesterone to inhibit ovulation in humans. The team found a group of women to test the hormone on, and the results were promising. The drug was able to suppress ovulation. However, the test pool was too small, and the researchers had to continue looking for a larger group to study. In 1956, Pincus and Rock decided to take their experimental trials to Puerto Rico and have women there test the effectiveness of their new creation. During these trials, researchers realized the pill's adverse side effects on Puerto Rican women. The doses the women were given caused a myriad of side effects, including dizziness, headaches, and nausea. The pill was also tested in major cities such as Los Angeles and Mexico City. Despite the pill's obvious side effects, the FDA approved the synthetic hormone Enovid in 1960.

Although the efforts of Margaret Sanger helped accelerate the creation and approval of oral contraceptives, her motives and beliefs were largely eugenicist and racist. Sanger's stated mission was to encourage and empower women to make their own reproductive choices,

⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁰ Linda Gordon, *The Moral Property of Women* (Baltimore, MD: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 177.

but this only applied to a select few women who tended to be white. She focused on assisting marginalized communities because their socioeconomic statuses made them the most vulnerable to the impact of unplanned pregnancies. Sanger stressed that birth control was a fundamental women's right; however, this did not apply to women of color at the time. Her beliefs aligned with those of the eugenicist movement, which aimed to improve the health and fitness of humankind through selective breeding. Sanger's racist and eugenicist beliefs were exemplified in 1921 when she stated in an article that "the most urgent problem today is how to limit and discourage the over-fertility of the mentally and physically defective."¹¹ It is important to note that Sanger was not alone in this viewpoint. In the 1920s and 1930s, doctors, scientists, and the masses widely supported Eugenics. In 1920, Sanger publicly stated at a birth control conference that "birth control is nothing more than the facilitation of the process of weeding out the unfit of preventing the birth of defectives."¹² It is this mentality that allowed for forced sterilizations to occur among low-income women and women of color. Many eugenicists believed that minorities would not be able to use contraceptives properly; sterilization was preferred as it was irreversible. This raises the question: was the birth control movement truly about liberating women through access to birth control, or was it a disguise to promote eugenicists' ideas and control the population growth? Historians continue to tackle this controversy.

Concerns About Population Growth and the Government's Response

Developed during the Cold War, many believed the birth control pill had the ability to solve problems that plagued the world. Additionally, the twentieth century saw an increase in population growth worldwide. In the United States, it was a direct result of economic prosperity and the end of World War II. American officials feared that communism might take hold in the developing world as a result of widespread poverty, due in part to the rapidly rising global population.¹³ This led the United States to fund family planning programs and distribute oral contraceptives in developing countries in hopes of preventing the spread of communism.

The beginning of the Cold War also saw the emergence of the nuclear family in the 1950s. The Cold War linked survival and security to traditional family values, which disrupted family dynamics in the United States. Not only did Americans see a return to traditional family

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 176.

¹² *Ibid.*, 180.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 185.

roles, but they also reinforced women's traditional roles as homemakers. By politicizing motherhood, the United States reiterated the belief that women's ultimate mission in life was to be mothers. They believed that overpopulation, caused by poverty, would lead to war and unrest in impoverished countries.

Family planning programs and the distribution of contraceptives were thought to be the solution to the United States' poverty and population boom problems. Social demographers claimed that "the planned spacing of children was intended to strengthen the nuclear family and, thereby, increase social stability."¹⁴ President Lyndon Johnson and President Richard Nixon stressed how family planning programs would promote opportunities for children and families and thus drive economic growth. President Johnson's War on Poverty program gave the first federal subsidies to help low-income families gain access to birth control. In 1969, President Nixon introduced a bill that would provide family planning services to low-income families. The following year in 1970, the Senate passed Title X which was a government-funded program that would focus on making contraceptive and reproductive health services accessible to low-income families who otherwise would have difficulty accessing them.

Opposition from the Catholic Church and Acceptance from Christian Denominations

The introduction of the birth control pill was met with backlash from the Catholic Church. For some time, it seemed as if the Catholic Church was loosening its stance against artificial contraceptives. A few months after the FDA's approval of the pill, the United States elected its first Catholic President, John F. Kennedy. As opposed to his predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Kennedy supported family planning and insisted that it was a matter of public policy. Additionally, Historian Elaine Tyler May chronicles that "in 1964, a physician from the Alliance for Progress went to Rome to discuss South American population programs with the Pope, where he received a 'warm reception.' The Church appeared to be on the verge of approving the use of contraceptives."¹⁵ Although Catholics made up a quarter of the American population in the 1960s, they were divided regarding birth control. As church leaders debated the moral and theological questions surrounding contraception, Catholic women and men struggled to

¹⁴ Shapiro, Thomas M. *Population Control Politics: Women, Sterilization, and Reproductive*

Choice (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1985), 9.

¹⁵ Elaine Tyler May, *America and the Pill*, 119.

reconcile their faith with their personal needs and desires.¹⁶ The church advocated for natural family planning through the “rhythm method.” This calendar-based contraceptive method relied on keeping track of a women’s menstrual cycle and predicting when she was most likely to ovulate. May goes on to tell the story of Colin S. and his wife’s experience with the rhythm method. Colin S, a devout Catholic, met his wife in college during the late 1950s. His girlfriend became pregnant during their junior year, and so they decided to get married. Unfortunately, she miscarried but they did not use birth control and instead opted for the rhythm method. This resulted in the couple becoming pregnant again and having their first son. Colin S spoke on the controversial topic of birth control for a class project and took the Catholic Church’s stance: “God created sex for the primary purpose of reproduction; artificial contraception prevents that primary purpose and is therefore against the will of God.”¹⁷ After lots of discussion, Colin’s wife went on the pill because it was economically and socially favorable for them.

John Rock was a conservative gynecologist and obstetrician who participated in the creation of the birth control pill. He advocated for couples to use modern oral contraceptives and openly critiqued the Catholic Church’s stance on birth control. Rock argued that “the pill didn’t obstruct the union of egg and sperm because there would be no egg available to fertilize. Nor did the pill block, harm, or destroy the human seed.”¹⁸ Rock claimed that the pill was not inherently “artificial” because it worked on the same principle as the rhythm method by extending the “safe period” throughout the woman’s cycle.¹⁹ Rock was not a lone radical, but his beliefs went completely against those of the Catholic Church. He went as far as publishing a book that directly attacked the Church’s beliefs under the title *The Time Has Come: A Catholic Doctor’s Proposals to End the Battle over the Catholic Church*.

In July 1968, Pope Paul VI released *Humanae Vitae (On Human Life)*, which reinforced the Catholic Church’s stance on artificial contraceptives and referred to them as “intrinsically wrong.” However, this did not mean that people strayed away from using birth control. Despite the Catholic Church’s outspoken opposition to birth control, “by 1965, three out of four Catholics believed that anyone who wanted contraceptives should have access to them, and more than half had used them.”²⁰ This shows that Catholics switched from the Church’s preferred

¹⁶ Ibid., 120.

¹⁷ Ibid., 120.

¹⁸ Ibid., 123.

¹⁹ Ibid., 123.

²⁰ Ibid., 125.

natural contraceptive, the rhythm method, to an alternative option much more reliable such as the pill. The Catholic Church continued to voice its negative sentiments about the pill, but this did not stop Catholics from taking advantage of its liberating benefits.

As opposed to the Catholic Church, many of America's major Christian denominations supported most forms of contraception. Patricia Goodson, a professor of health education, states that "as many Protestant groups began to abandon procreation as the main purpose of marriage and perceive sexual intercourse as they would 'other kinds of pleasure,' they slowly began to lend support to birth control and the spacing of children."²¹ By the 1950s, an overwhelmingly large number of Protestants favored the use of birth control. The Episcopal Church, United Methodist Church, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints all believe that women and their partners have the moral right to decide when and if they want to have children.²² Strikingly, some of the most traditionally conservative churches, such as the Pentecostal Assemblies of God, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the Seventh Day Adventists, all believed in contraception and acknowledged the importance of family planning. Many protestant denominations accept birth control because it is not explicitly prohibited in the Bible.²³ Goodson mentions that despite Protestants practicing family planning at higher rates than Catholics, "conservative Protestants tend to use methods of contraception less frequently than their non-conservative counterparts."²⁴ Nonetheless, Protestants embraced birth control much more compared to Catholics.

The Women's Liberation Movement, Increased Access to Education, and Entrance into the Workforce

The advent of the pill separated the act of sex from procreation. Consequently, this set the stage for the women's liberation movement, which was a collective struggle for women's equality and sought to free women from patriarchal oppression and subjugation.²⁵ One feminist who participated in the women's liberation movement of the late 1960s and 1970s stated that women advocated for "complete control over our own reproductive destiny-whether and when to have children-and options to pursue a full range of lifestyles: homemaker, bricklayer, astronaut."

²¹ Patricia Goodson, "Protestants and Family Planning," *Journal of Religion and Health*, vol. 36, no. 4 (1971): 355.

²² *Ibid.*, 356.

²³ *Ibid.*, 359.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 363.

²⁵ Sadjia Goldsmith, "Birth Control and the New Woman," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1971): 64.

Women were actively advocating and pursuing jobs and careers outside of the home, which broke the patriarchal norms put in place by society. The feminists that arose during this movement agreed that oral contraceptives were crucial to their full liberation. These feminists were also “suspicious of the possible coercive implications of population control.”²⁶ They recognized the problematic nature of associating the terms “birth control” and “family planning.” Used together, these terms implied that contraception was only for married women. This was a problem because it caused many single young women to fear asking for birth control because of the judgment they would inevitably receive.²⁷ The Supreme Court case *Griswold v. Connecticut* in 1965 allowed married couples to buy and use oral contraceptives without the government’s intervention. This clearly excluded young girls and single women who were sexually active but not married. *Eisenstadt v. Baird* in 1972 established the right of unmarried women to also buy and use birth control on the same basis as married couples.²⁸

As the feminists of the women’s liberation movement began to fight for women’s equal access to the workforce, the birth control pill enabled women to do just that. College enrollment was 20 percent higher among women who could access the birth control pill legally in the 1970s. Women began to pursue professional careers at higher rates as well. The 1970s saw a huge increase in the number of women working towards degrees in the medical and dentistry fields, law, and graduate degrees overall. Between 1969 and 1980, the dropout rate among women with access to the pill was 35% lower than women without access to the pill.²⁹ Young women’s legal access to the pill before age 21 led to a significant 2.3% increase in the number of women who were college graduates. Young women with legal pill access were able to both have children and pursue higher education.³⁰ This was truly a significant change because prior to the legalization of oral contraceptives, women could not choose between attaining an education or becoming mothers. Between 1955 and 1970, fewer than 10% of women were entering professional programs but by the 1980s, that rate had doubled. Access to birth control is estimated to account for more than a 30% increase in the

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, “The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions,” *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 110, no. 4 (2002): 748.

²⁹ K.A. Moore and L. J. Waite, “Early Childbearing and Educational Attainment,” *Family Planning Perspective*, vol. 9, no. 5 (1977): 223.

³⁰ C.F. Muller. “Feminism, Society and Fertility Control.” *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 6, no. 2 (1974): 71.

proportion of women in skilled careers between 1970 and 1990.³¹ The women's liberation movement not only helped make oral contraceptives more accessible to women, but in doing so, it also helped women seek careers outside of the domestic sphere and work towards a college education.

Due to women's higher educational attainment rates beginning in the early 1970s, women's participation in the labor market dramatically increased. Research done by economists Claudia Golding, Lawrence F. Katz, and Martha Bailey has shown that one of the major factors contributing to this increased participation was the creation and legalization of the pill. Prior to the introduction of oral contraceptives, women were often not able to join the workforce because of the constraints of motherhood. They were forced to stay home to raise their children and tend to the needs of their husbands. Women's labor participation increased significantly because the birth control pill enabled them to decide when and if they wanted to have children. Not only did more women start to work, but there was an explosion of women in professional fields because they were also able to further their educations. The states who legalized the use of birth control sooner saw an increase in female professional education and labor force participation rate. The pill lowered the potential opportunity cost for unmarried women interested in pursuing careers, before the pill, young women in college had to factor in the cost to their social life and their prospects.³² By taking control of their own reproductive choices, women were able to stay in school, train for professions, and gain credentials allowing them to break into professions previously closed to them.³³ Despite the fact that the women's liberation movement opened doors of opportunity for women, those who participated and benefitted from their fight were overwhelmingly white. Nonetheless, the introduction of the birth control pill enabled women to take control of their bodies and participate in social movements, and better their lives by obtaining an education and professional careers.

Government-Sponsored Family Planning Programs and Title X

Government-sponsored family planning programs were crucial to the distribution of not only contraceptives but also sex education and reproductive health services for women. Federal grants for family

³¹ *Ibid.*, 70.

³² Bailey, Martha J, "Reexamining the Impact of Family Planning Programs on US Fertility: Evidence from the War on Poverty and the Early Years of Title X," *American Economic Journal*, vol. 4, no. 2 (2012): 83.

³³ K.A. Moore and L. J. Waite, "Early Childbearing and Educational Attainment," 230.

planning began with the Economic Opportunity Act of (EOA) 1964 during Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. As part of his strategy to address the "War on Poverty," Johnson implemented the EOA with the goal of creating a variety of social programs that aimed to fund the education, health, employment, and the general welfare of impoverished American citizens. Family planning programs fell under the EOA's health umbrella. President Richard Nixon continued to allocate funding to family planning initiatives. In 1970 under President Nixon's administration, the Title X Family Planning Program was founded with the purpose of providing individuals with comprehensive family planning and reproductive health services. Title X specifically targeted low-income families and uninsured people. The services Title X provided were at little to no cost. Nixon enacted Title X as an amendment to the Public Health Services Act of 1944. The Act also created the Office of Population Affairs under the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The federal government regulated Title X funds, and clinics had to abide by their regulations and guidelines. Additionally, the clinics "receiving Title X funds had to provide services for all women, regardless of age, race, marital status, income, or health insurance status."³⁴ Moreover, the federal grants significantly increased availability, reduced wait times, and increased the supply of free or low-cost contraceptives in affected communities.³⁵

By subsidizing contraception, family planning programs would promote greater economic opportunities for disadvantaged women who did not want more children than families with higher incomes but did not have the education or the resources to plan their families as they wished.³⁶ Martha Bailey's research suggests that family planning programs indeed had the potential to disrupt the cycle of disadvantage among lower-class families. Between 1969 to 1983, annual family planning service use increased more than four times over, in large part due to strong federal support and rising support from state and local governments.³⁷ By 1973, federally supported family planning programs existed in over 650 U.S. communities and served 1.9 million patients

³⁴ Martha J. Bailey, "Reexamining the Impact of Family Planning Programs on US Fertility: Evidence from the War on Poverty and the Early Years of Title X," *American Economic Journal*, vol. 4, no. 2 (2012): 65.

³⁵ Martha J. Bailey, Olga Malkova, and Johannes Norling, "Do Family Planning Programs Decrease Poverty? Evidence from Public Census Data," *CESifo Economic Studies*, vol. 60, no. 2 (2014): 316.

³⁶ A. Torres, "Organized Family Planning Services in the United States," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 11, no. 6 (1976-1977):343.

³⁷ Joy G. Dryfoos, "The United States National Family Planning Program, 1968-74," *Studies in Family Planning*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1976): 86.

annually. A decade later the number had grown to almost five million annually. Seventy percent of patients were white, and roughly twenty-five percent were Black. This proves that even though access was being granted to lower-income women, white women were being aided disproportionately in comparison to women of color. In addition, the federal government did not monitor these government-sponsored family planning programs. Therefore, very little is known about their day-to-day operations.³⁸ Regardless, these family planning programs opened doors for opportunities to most women who sought them.

Class Struggles and Discrimination with the Distribution of Contraception

Class status and race played a role in the accessibility of contraception. Upper- and middle-class white women were more likely to use the pill than poor women of color. The birth control pill was expensive to purchase, and prior to the implementation of government-sponsored family planning programs, low-income women could not afford to go on the pill. Therefore, the pill at first primarily benefitted the women who could afford it: often middle and upper-class white women. As stated by Shapiro, “in the United States, the use of contraceptive devices often varies according to class, gender, and race, indicating that broad social conditions, cultural traditions, and structural inequalities play a large part in shaping a woman’s birth control experience.”³⁹ Even the leading pioneer of the birth control movement in the United States, Margaret Sanger, believed that after the 1950s:

Our civilization for the next twenty-five years, is going to depend upon a simple, cheap, safe, contraceptive to be used in poverty-stricken slums, jungles, and among the most ignorant people. I believed that now, immediately there should be a national sterilization for certain dysgenic types of our population who are being encouraged to breed and would die out were the government not feeding them.⁴⁰

This elitist and racist mentality displayed by Sanger was very much prevalent in American society after the introduction of the birth control pill. Population control programs were often disguised by affiliating

³⁸F.S. Jaffe, "Family Planning, Poverty and Development," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1975): 2.

³⁹ Elizabeth Siegel Watkins, *On the Pill* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 90-91.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 120.

themselves with the birth control movement. For white women, the term birth control was used to encourage them to take control of their fertility and bodies. However, for women of color, population control was used to refer to their increasing fertility rates, which were believed to be a huge problem in American society

The distribution of contraceptives in the United States was not equitable. For example, "middle-class women were encouraged to use methods, such as the diaphragm and the pill, that allow individual control."⁴¹ However, poor women were encouraged by the U.S. government to use methods such as intrauterine devices and sterilization, both controlled by physicians.⁴² Middle-class women could control the contraceptive techniques they used, but lower-class women were prevented by their socioeconomic status from having that option. Many women of color, including Native Americans, African Americans, and Latinas, were the victims of forced sterilization in the 1960s and 1970s. Forced sterilization began in 1909 but reached an all-time peak during the 1960s and 1970s. For example, the Indian Health Service (HIS) and various physicians misled Native American women into thinking their sterilization procedure was reversible when in reality, it was not. This grotesque and inhumane attempt at population control occurred at alarming rates to women of color. Women of color were viewed by their white counterparts as "unfit" to procreate, and many U.S. eugenicists believed that they were the root cause of the population problem. California was the leading state in the number of sterilization procedures performed often without the knowledge or consent of both men and women. Anti-Asian and anti-Mexican prejudice fueled the forced sterilizations that California's eugenics programs supported. Approximately 20,000 sterilizations took place in California state institutions, and they made up one-third of the overall number of sterilizations performed in the 32 states that allowed it.⁴³ One example of this tragic phenomenon can be seen among the Mexican American women sterilized under duress while giving birth at Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1978 Supreme Court Case *Madrigal v. Quilligan* sought to bring justice to the women sterilized at Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center. The court ruled that there was no deliberate intent by the doctors to hurt the women. Although the hospital won the case, some progress was made. California state law was amended to require Spanish translations of the sterilization packets, and the California Department of Health created a seventy-two-

⁴¹ C. F. Westoff and E. F. Jones, "Contraception and Sterilization in the United States, 1965-1975," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 9, no. 4 (1977): 153.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 154.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 156.

hour waiting period for sterilization. For Black women, sterilization rates rose as desegregation got underway.⁴⁴ The backlash from desegregation saw the reassertion of white supremacist control and racial hierarchies. Doctors and lawmakers promoted eugenics and segregation by controlling Black women's reproduction and their offspring through sterilization.⁴⁵ These are just some of the instances in which women of color were subjugated to eugenicists' population control agenda and refused the right to take control of their bodies.

The introduction of the birth control pill in American society dramatically impacted the lives of women. Women were able to participate freely outside of the home and take control of their bodies like never before. Linda Gordon expressed that "the rights to plan a family, without losing the freedom to enjoy a full sexual life, and to control decisions over one's body are dependent on the ability to regulate fertility by contraception."⁴⁶ This is extremely important because birth control allowed for the separation of sex from procreation, a monumental step toward women's liberation. Through the creation of government-sponsored family planning programs, oral contraception became available to low-income women and women of color who previously did not have access to it. The creation of the birth control pill allowed women to participate in the women's liberation movement. This social movement also advocated for women's education and participation in the workforce. The pill liberated women from the confines of the domestic sphere by opening new avenues and career paths. Although the pill had liberating effects on the lives of women, it primarily impacted middle and upper-class white women. Women of color and low-income women continued to be institutionally oppressed through different modes of contraception, such as, sterilization and eugenicists beliefs fueled by population control rhetoric. Nonetheless, the birth control pill opened many doors of opportunity for women that they previously did not have in American society.

⁴⁴ Simone M. Caron, "Birth Control and the Black Community in the 1960s: Genocide or Power Politics?" *Journal of Social History*, vol. 31, no. 3 (1998): 557.

⁴⁵ Dorothy Roberts, "Black Women and the Pill," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2000): 92.

⁴⁶ Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: Birth Control in America*. 25.

Bibliography

- Bailey, Martha J. "Reexamining the Impact of Family Planning Programs on US Fertility: Evidence from the War on Poverty and the Early Years of Title X." *American Economic Journal*. vol. 4, no. 2 (2012): 62-97.
- Bailey, Martha J, Malkova, Olga, and Norling, Johannes. "Do Family Planning Programs Decrease Poverty? Evidence from Public Census Data." *CESifo Economic Studies*. vol. 60, no. 2 (2014): 312-37.
- Caron, Simone M. "Birth Control and the Black Community in the 1960s: Genocide or Power Politics?" *Journal of Social History*. vol. 31, no. 3 (1998): 545-69.
- Dryfoos, Joy G. "The United States National Family Planning Program, 1968-74." *Studies in Family Planning*. vol. 7, no. 3 (1976): 80-92.
- Friedan, Betty. *The Feminine Mystique*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1963.
- Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz. "The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women's Career and Marriage Decisions." *Journal of Political Economy*. vol. 110, no. 4 (2002): 730-770.
- Goldsmith, Sadja. "Birth Control and the New Woman." *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1971): 64-66.
- Goodson, Patricia. "Protestants and Family Planning." *Journal of Religion and Health*. vol. 36, no. 4 (1971): 353-66.
- Gordon, Linda. *The Moral Property of Women*. Baltimore, MD: University of Illinois Press, 2002.
- Jaffe, F.S. "Family Planning, Poverty and Development." *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 7, no. 1 (1975): 2-3.
- May, Elaine Tyler. *America and the Pill*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010.
- Moore, K.A, and Waite, L.J. "Early Childbearing and Educational Attainment." *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 9, no. 5 (1977): 220-25.
- Muller, C.F. "Feminism, Society and Fertility Control." *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 6, no. 2 (1974): 68-72.
- Roberts, Dorothy. "Black Women and the Pill." *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 32, no. 2 (2000): 92-93.
- Shapiro, Thomas M. *Population Control Politics: Women, Sterilization, and Reproductive Choice*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1985.
- Torres A. "Organized Family Planning Services in the United States." *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 11, no. 6 (1976-1977):342-7.
- Watkins, Elizabeth Siegel. *On the Pill*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Westoff, C.F, and Jones, E.F. "Contraception and Sterilization in the United States, 1965-1975." *Family Planning Perspectives*. vol. 9, no. 4 (1977): 153-57.

The Feminist Movement and its Evolution in Modern Mexico, 1970s-2000s

Anahí Martínez

The mid-1970s was a crucial moment for the women of Mexico, as the second wave of feminism took off throughout the country. Finally, women were ready to make their agenda known and stand for their rights. Conversations over sexual abuse, domestic violence, contraceptives, pregnancy, and marital choice finally made it to the forefront in Mexico. As the decades went by, more waves of feminism came about and introduced more in-depth, nuanced topics like reproductive rights, political participation/representation, education, *machismo*, sexual orientation, and sexism. The evolution of these topics from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s in Mexico brought about modern change and established rights for women. This all happened in a socially conservative country heavily influenced by the Catholic Church's cultural influence on women and the traditional gender norms that tagged along. The feminist movement continues in Mexico today and has created a new age of women who aim at protecting and fighting for the political, economic, social, and cultural equality of women. From the mid-1970s through the early 2000s, significant progress was made regarding violence against women, political participation, and sexual orientation. But actual policy and social change did not come for the women of Mexico until the late 1980s when women took it upon themselves to push for change.

The Women Behind the Movement

The women responsible for all these efforts came from various backgrounds; urban, university-educated, and middle-class women were at the forefront of the feminist movement in the 1970s. Middle-class women shared their stories and formed feminist groups to practice different forms of activism. Working-class women in the 1980s used the second wave of feminism as an opportunity to advocate within their unions and influence the platforms of political parties. For example, in 1986, during the first International Women's Day march, low-income and working-class women joined together with college-educated, professional, and middle-class women. All things considered, female students and educators were at the forefront of the feminist movement. They educated, advocated, and initiated a dialogue among the younger generations and their families on the issues that impacted women. For instance, advocate and educator Marta Lamas supported the feminist movement through her academic work and activism. Lamas was the daughter of Argentinian immigrants, attended the *Escuela Nacional de*

Antropología e Historia, and received her master's degree in anthropology at the *Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*. She joined an organization called *Mujeres en Acción Solidaria* (MAS) in 1971, where she helped organize public workshops on abortion, sexuality, and voluntary motherhood. She then formed a new organization called the *Movimiento de Liberación de la Mujer* (MLM) in 1974. In a 1982 article written for *Fem*, the feminist journal Lamas was a part of, Lamas discussed the importance of the United Nations inviting feminist groups to discuss long-time issues impacting women. That year, the United Nations held a roundtable discussion on feminism with media information directors of Latin America. The United Nations had invited representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Chile, Perú, México, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic.¹ However, the only woman representative was Esperanza Brito de Martí, the director of *Fem*. Nonetheless, Lamas saw it as a great first step for the feminist movement. As stated by Lamas, "Invitar a una publicación feminista es reconocer al feminismo como movimiento político con peso o influencia."² Overall, this roundtable event showed how the United Nations acknowledged the influence and political importance of the feminist movement.

Violence Against Women Takes Center-Stage, Mid-1970s

Women faced an array of violence, whether domestic, sexual abuse, sexual, or generally violent in nature. Throughout history, women were generally only seen as a form of property. Their husbands often controlled what these women did. The greatest difficulty for women was getting their agenda across in the political sphere.³ Women began to create autonomous groups to discuss and act on issues of violence against them in the mid-1970s.⁴ Women were influenced by international women's conferences that discussed major issues that affected them socially, politically, and economically. For example, the World Conference on Women in 1975, held in Mexico City, was the first international conference hosted by the United Nations and spotlighted the Mexican feminist movement. The World Conference on Women in 1975 was made possible after the United Nations Commission on the

¹ Marta Lamas, "Naciones Unidas invita a fem Marta Lamas." *Fem: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Jan. 1982.

² Marta Lamas, "Naciones Unidas invita a fem Marta Lamas." *Fem: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Jan. 1982. ("By inviting a feminist publication, it is recognizing feminism as a political movement with major influence.")

³ Amrita Basu and Elizabeth McGrory, *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 329.

⁴ Darren Hawkins and Melissa Humes, "Human Rights and Domestic Violence." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 253.

Status of Women pushed for it. The conference was a major stride, as it introduced the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace in 1975. The resolution focused on equality between women and men and advanced the status of women at the national and international levels.⁵

President Luis Echeverría Álvarez, who served in office from 1970 until 1976, took the opportunity to host the United Nations World Conference on Women in 1975 in Mexico City when Colombia could not receive the funding to host the event. Echeverría did this because his administration embraced population management which coincided with some of the topics of the feminist movement. He also introduced a constitutional amendment to grant women equal rights to align with the priorities of the United Nations. Furthermore, it supported Article Four of the Constitution of Mexico, which had been amended and passed in 1974. The article mandated equality and equal provisions under the government's reproductive policy.

In addition, the formation of the Coalition of Feminist Women in 1976 allowed for a broader and more consistent message for the women's movement. The coalition had three major demands: voluntary maternity, justice against acts of sexual violence, and freedom of sexual orientation.⁶ It also pushed for Mexican non-governmental organizations to assist women in their advancements for women's rights. For example, in 1979, the *Frente Nacional por la Liberación y los Derechos de las Mujeres* was established as the first united feminist group that included women from labor unions, homosexuals, and leftist political party members.⁷ The Coalition of Feminist Women initiated intense activities of cultural criticism and accomplished the denunciation of sexism in society. This was a huge turning point for women as it created a dialogue and led to policy regulation in later decades.

Mexican non-governmental organizations prioritized reforms on sex crimes and introduced new policies. These organizations wanted to broaden the definition of rape, increase punishment against offenders, and provide services to survivors of sexual assault.⁸ In 1977, a center was created to give services to women who were victims of rape.⁹ In the

⁵ Natalie K. Hevener, *International Law and the Status of Women* Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1983.

⁶ Amrita Basu and Elizabeth McGrory, *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 332.

⁷ Marta Lamas, "De La Protesta: El Feminismo En México a Finales Del Siglo XX," in *Historia de La Mujeres En Espana Y America Latina* (Madrid: Catedra, 2006), 906.

⁸ Darren Hawkins and Melissa Humes, "Human Rights and Domestic Violence." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 254.

⁹ Amrita Basu and Elizabeth McGrory, *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 332.

1980s, more and more groups and centers were established throughout Mexico with the assistance of women. For instance, by 1986 the *Centro de Apoyo a la Mujer Margarita Magón* was established in Mexico City. It was a national organization that provided medical, legal, and mental health services to victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Women groups would not achieve actual policy reform in violence against women until the late 1980s.¹⁰ Nonetheless, Mexico's second wave of feminism proved how little legislation was on the book to protect women in the realms of domestic violence, sexual assault, and violent acts in the 1970s.

Testimonies on Violence Against Women

Women shared their stories and sentiments over the violence brought on them and the injustice they faced in newspaper publications. Testimonies and articles produced anonymously by women made their rounds throughout the country. Women were filled with fear and frustration over the lack of protection they encountered and the injustice they received. To illustrate this, in the pioneering feminist journal *La Revuelta*, a woman anonymously shared her fears and paranoia of even walking the streets in 1977. She elaborated how no matter if it was day or night, she had an overwhelming fear of someone jumping out to hurt her. The woman stated that she had to stay conscious of her surroundings and be hyper vigilant, “Siempre estoy pendiente, cruzó la calle de un lado a otro, miles de veces, apresuré el paso o me detengo.”¹¹ She added that she was not the only woman who had felt paranoia and frustration out of only ever being seen as a sexual object in the patriarchal system she lived in created by men. As stated by the anonymous woman, “la mujer ya no solo es objeto de un hombre, sino de TODOS.”¹² Her testimony showcased the sentiments she and other women felt being continuously harassed by men.

In another article published in 1978, in the feminist journal *Cihuat: Voz de La Coalición de Mujeres*, called “*Estadísticas sobre violación en México: 85,000 mujeres violadas al año 3,000 denuncias solamente*,” displayed the statistics of sex crimes against women every year in Mexico and the low number of women who actually reported the crime. As stated in the article, “aproximadamente 4,000 violaciones

¹⁰ Darren Hawkins and Melissa Humes, “Human Rights and Domestic Violence.” *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 254.

¹¹ “De la violencia cotidiana...” *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Spanish (United States), April 1977. (“I am always on the lookout, I cross the street from one side to another, over a thousand times, I either walk very fast or hold back a bit.”)

¹² “De la violencia cotidiana...” *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Spanish (United States), April 1977. (“A woman is no longer the sole object of a man, but of EVERYONE.”)

fueron reportadas a la policia cada uno de eso años. Si éstas, como se ha dicho, representan apenas el 5% del total de las que se cometen, resultaría que cada ano deben realizarse unas 80,000 violaciones en la República, de las cuales más o menos 10,000 tienen lugar en la Distrito Federal.”¹³ The article also discussed how the majority of women who were victims of sexual assault were typically between the age of fifteen and nineteen and represent about a quarter of all complaints. Victims of sexual assault also went as low as the age of ten and fourteen and approximately 6,500 young girls were sexually violated each year between 1970 and 1975.¹⁴ The article also elaborated how 54% of sex crimes were done by two or more people and about 52% of the time the victims knew their assailant. Many of these assailants used physical violence, threatened their families or children, or used forms of intimidation and psychological manipulation. A study conducted in 1974 by Valle de México on *machismo* and analyzed by a *Cihuat* journalist, examined how approximately 53% of women were fine with their romantic partner hitting them if they had done something wrong.¹⁵ All in all, these young women and girls were harassed, abused, and assaulted in a time when legislation had yet to catch up with these crimes.

Domestic violence coincided with the abusive cycle set by the patriarchal system in Mexico. There were no real protections for married women against their husbands as they were considered their "rightful" property. In an anonymous article written in 1978 in the feminist journal *La Revuelta*, the author discussed the normalization of violence between married couples and how it created a cycle of violence that would pass down to future generations.¹⁶ The author then conceptualized the varied reasons a woman would stay in an environment of violence. Many of the conclusions came down to economic difficulties, lack of employment, the care of their children, shame, and fear. As stated by the author, “Los golpes son una manifestación del poder, una expresión más de una sociedad altamente represiva y manipuladora que usa a los hombres

¹³ “Estadísticas sobre violación en México: 85,000 mujeres violadas al año 3,000 denuncias solamente.” *Cihuat: Voz de La Coalición de Mujeres*, Spanish (United States), March 1978. (“...approximately 4,000 violations were reported to the police for each prospective year. They represent only 5% of the total of actual incidents committed. As a result, about 80,000 violations happen in the Republic, and about 10,000 take place in the Federal District.”)

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ “Estadísticas sobre violación en México: 85,000 mujeres violadas al año 3,000 denuncias solamente.” *Cihuat: Voz de La Coalición de Mujeres*, Spanish (United States), March 1978.

¹⁶ “Mujeres golpeadas, ritos modernos...” *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, July 1978.

como su instrumento.”¹⁷ These sentiments also coincided with the traditional gender norms set in place, especially by the Catholic Church. Divorce was not always an option, and the blame was placed on the woman if there were conflicts. Looking specifically at the 1980s, women workers, peasant women, and poor urban women focused largely on national conferences as popular feminism took hold. Feminism became appealing to low-income women as it combined the feminist demands of the 1970s with their own.¹⁸ Although major urban, middle-class, educated, and low-income women groups had reached a consensus, certain topics went unaddressed in the public eye. Efforts against domestic violence and sexual assault would be placed on hold and not addressed in Latin America's public agenda until the 1990s.¹⁹

Legislative Progress in the 1990s

The United States State Department initiated a study on domestic violence issues in the Americas in the 1990s. Human rights reports became available. These reports tracked domestic violence issues since 1992.²⁰ The 1998 report compared the similarities between the United States and the rest of the Americas regarding domestic violence issues and what mandates were created. The reports showed how the United States and the rest of Latin America had established national criminal legislation for domestic violence. For example, Peru in 1993, Argentina in 1994, Chile in 1994, the United States in 1994, Bolivia in 1995, Ecuador in 1995, Panama in 1995, Uruguay in 1995, Costa Rica in 1996, Mexico in 1997, and Venezuela in 1998 had all created laws and protections for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault/harassment, and other sex crimes.²¹

Looking more specifically at Mexico, it implemented its law against domestic violence in 1997, following suit with the rest of Latin America and the United States. Domestic violence and sexual assault were able to make the public agenda again in Mexico after international norms were created and socialization factors pressured Mexico. The United Nations International Conference on Women in Beijing was also held in 1995, setting women's NGOs activities in motion.²² In addition, legislative elections were in action, and multiple NGOs and feminist

¹⁷ Ibid. (“The hits are a manifestation of power, an expression that more than one repressive and manipulative society uses where men are the instrument.”)

¹⁸ Amrita Basu and Elizabeth McGrory, *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, 335.

¹⁹ Darren Hawkins and Melissa Humes, “Human Rights and Domestic Violence.” *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 236.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid, 254.

groups recruited representatives to push legislative goals for women's issues and provided direction for specific policies. The biggest demand was intrafamily violence due to the high rate of domestic violence and other issues that extended into the realm of sex crimes.²³

Violence against women evolved dramatically after the 1970s as the United Nations acknowledged the issues that affected women internationally while placing pressure on other countries such as Mexico. Legislation on domestic violence was finally passed in 1997 in Mexico, allowing for protection and justice for women. Nonetheless, there was a rise in femicides in Mexico (killing of women based on their gender). This issue especially caught international and national attention in 1993 as *machista* violence increased. However, even with the development of policies to protect women from different forms of violence, it was still an issue women were facing and putting pressure on to reform. Violence against women was not the only platform that evolved since the 1970s. Women's participation and representation in politics in Mexico evolved, coinciding with the issues women pushed during the feminist movement.

Women's Early Involvement in Politics

For the longest time, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) was wary of granting women the right to vote. The political party believed that if they granted women the right to vote, they would abandon their homes and families, have superficial or conservative views on politics, and no longer take the traditional role of a mother or caregiver.²⁴ However, political leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas supported women's suffrage and believed women were an underutilized resource. After countless debates and movements by women coalitions and groups, women were allowed to take municipal positions in all states in 1947.²⁵ In 1953, women were granted the right to vote in federal elections and serve as congressional representatives. However, political groups such as the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) limited women's political participation and representation because their platform focused on women's traditional roles.²⁶ The PAN's political platform took the conservative route and aligned with the values of the Catholic Church and its members, who believed that women had no interest in politics.

²³ Darren Hawkins and Melissa Humes, "Human Rights and Domestic Violence." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 255.

²⁴ Sonia Hernández, "Women in Mexican Politics since 1953." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History (Oxford University Press, 2018), 3.

²⁵ Sonia Hernández, "Women in Mexican Politics since 1953." Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History (Oxford University Press, 2018), 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

PANistas also believed that "women are content to stay confined to their roles as mothers, homemakers, and wives, leaving politics to men."²⁷ Even so, in 1957, Orfelinda Villarreal became the first female appointee to a mayoral office in Higuera, Nuevo León. The following year Victoriana Martínez was elected mayor of Doctor González in Nuevo León. A rush of women took on local government seats throughout Mexico, and entering the 1970s, women began to get their message across to the federal government over their political influence.

Women's Voice

Women shared their sentiments on representation and having their voices heard in the feminist journal *La Revuelta* in the 1970s. In an anonymous article published in 1976 titled, "Las mujeres tomamos la palabra," a woman shared how she did not want to be contained by society's standards of what a woman could and could not do. She then expressed how there can be no real change unless women themselves push for it. The woman stated, "Para nosotras no habrá ningún cambio real si no participamos con nuestras propias demandas y si no luchamos desde ahora por alcanzar la liberación de la mujer..."²⁸ Although she was fully aware of the obstacles that faced women, she believed they could bring change and have their ideas and demands heard.

In another anonymous article published in *La Revuelta* in 1978 titled, "Ahora que todas juntas hemos roto el silencio," the writer discussed the solidarity within the feminist movement and how they would not back down and be silenced. She stated how she felt comfort and security when she participated in a political demonstration with other women. The woman recalled "la presencia de los compañeros, de la masa, seguridad de ser tantas...estaba ahí como yo misma, para decir mis problemas y tenía miedo. Sabía bien que alrededor había millones de mujeres con los mismos problemas."²⁹ She continued to share how now more than ever, they needed to have consistency and solidarity within the movement in order for their demands to get across and be heard. Furthermore, the woman chronicles that, "...sentía la cercanía, la "solidaridad" con las otras mujeres...a descubrir nuestras propias

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ "Las mujeres tomamos la palabra." *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Sept. 1976. ("For us, there will be no real change if we do not participate with our own demands and if we do not fight from now on to achieve women's liberation...")

²⁹ "Ahora que todas hemos roto el silencio." *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, March 1978. ("The presence of my fellow companions, of the masses, the security of being around so many...I was there as myself, to say my problems and I was scared. I knew that there were millions of women around me with the same problems...")

necesidades y deseos.”³⁰ She then expressed how she no longer wanted to abide by social norms and instead wished to become the type of woman she wanted to be. She went on to state, “No quiero sólo bailar con rabia y alegría, no quiero exhibir mis ser mujer con todas sus desarticulaciones, quiero construir en mí una mujer diferente.”³¹ These women revealed how strongly they felt about getting their demands and voices heard and no longer sitting on the sidelines.

By the 1980s, feminist groups such as the Feminist Women's Coalition in Mexico worked on legislation for abortion, "voluntary motherhood," and sex education.³² By 1988, many leftist feminists participated in Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's presidential campaign. They also joined the political party, *Partido de la Revolucion Democrática* (PRD), where they were able to advance their demands. At this point, feminists forged new political alliances, promoted gender issues, and lobbied for political representation. When feminists mobilized for the 1988 election, it taught feminists groups to lean on and work with political parties to have their demands met. For example, they attempted to organize a special agency through the attorney general's office focused on sex crimes.³³ By 1989, many feminists advised government officials and members of the Mexican Human Rights Commission on the severity of sex crimes and the treatment of women. This brought a major win to feminist women and significant strides in legislation entering the 1990s.

Women's Role in Politics & Gender Quotas

In the 1990s, feminist activists advocated for women's advancement in politics, especially in political parties. Many of these women leaned upon the PRD due to their leftist agenda and support for gender quote requirements within political parties. For example, in 1993, feminists pushed for gender quotas for candidacies and political party leadership roles. The PRD heavily criticized the PRI and PAN for their lack of involvement in addressing issues that concerned women. However, the other political parties followed suit after pressure was placed by women who pushed their party leaders to adopt gender quotas. In 1994, the PRI elected its first woman president, Maria de los Ángeles Moreno.³⁴ In 1992 she had taken up the role of

³⁰ Ibid. (“I felt the closeness, the “solidarity” with the other women...to discover our own necessities and wishes.”)

³¹ Ibid. (“I do not want to just dance with rage and joy, I do not want to exhibit my being a woman with all the disarticulations, I want to build in me a different woman.”)

³² Marta Lamas, “The Feminist Movement and the Development of Political Discourse on Voluntary Motherhood in Mexico.” *Reproductive Health Matters* 5, no. 10 (1997), 58.

³³ Victoria E. Rodriguez, *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics* (UT Press, 2003), 4.

³⁴ Victoria E. Rodriguez, *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics* (UT Press, 2003), 4

president of the Mexican Chamber of Deputies Directive Board. By 1996, the PRI adopted a gender quota initiative similar to the PRD, although it took a long while to be fully enforced. Women in the PAN pushed for their own form of gender quotas to at the very least include women as alternates for candidate lists.

Gender quotas were essential and beneficial for more gender parity in politics. Before introducing gender quotas, women were discriminated against and faced higher expectations than their male counterparts.³⁵ For example, women had to be far more qualified than their male peers even to be considered as options on the candidacy list or as alternate candidates.³⁶ Women usually attempted to make close connections with political elites to combat this. In 1993, the Federal Electoral Code ordered political parties to increase the participation of women, and by 1996 they recommended that no more than 70% of candidates should be of the same gender.³⁷

Entering in the early 2000s, the *Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales* (COFIPE) initiated reforms on gender quotas to enact placement mandates and sanctions upon political parties. This was enacted after parties attempted to undermine gender quotas and find loopholes. Parties would try to comply with the gender quota initiative through alternates until, in 2002, a reform was instated that the quota could not be met through alternates.³⁸ Another way to maneuver around the quota was the introduction of "Juanitas" in 2008. Women called "Juanitas" would run for candidacy but drop out immediately for a male alternate to take their spot. For example, in 2009, eight female deputies resigned from their position immediately after the election to allow their male alternates to take their spots.³⁹ The COFIPE initiated another reform to combat this and required that the alternates be of the same gender as the lead candidate.⁴⁰

Although political parties attempted to find loopholes within gender quotas, it did allow a gateway for women to have more representation in politics. It showed how women could highly succeed in politics if they were given equal opportunities as men. As stated by Caroline Beer and Roderic Ai Camp in "Democracy, Gender Quotas, and Political Recruitment in Mexico," "women are more likely than men to have state and federal legislative experience, and the transition to democracy and

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Caroline C. Beer and Roderic Ai Camp, "Democracy, Gender Quotas, and Political Recruitment in Mexico," *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4, no. 2 (2016), 180.

³⁷ Ibid, 186.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Caroline C. Beer and Roderic Ai Camp, "Democracy, Gender Quotas, and Political Recruitment in Mexico," *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4, no. 2 (2016), 186.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

introduction of gender quotas has brought in more women from rural and lower-class backgrounds."⁴¹ Overall, more gender parity came about through gender quotas. Today, more and more women are seen in congressional seats in Mexico.

The Inclusion of Lesbians

Just as women, in general, struggled to gain representation, so did lesbian women within society and the feminist movement. In 1978, the first two lesbian organizations emerged during the feminist movement along with expanded language on lesbian sexuality under the concept of voluntary motherhood. For example, the *Frente Homosexual de Accion Revolucionaria* opened up public discussion over homosexuality in Mexico.⁴² However, there was still a stigma surrounding the inclusion of lesbian women into the movement. Some heterosexual women believed that if they included lesbians in the movement, it would be labeled as a "lesbian movement" rather than a feminist movement. Although Mexico was steering away from the Catholic Church having power in the nation, it still heavily influenced societal norms. For example, there was still a cultural aspect of gender roles and sexuality due to the influence of the Catholic Church. Hence, it would cause a stigma around one's sexual orientation and even deep-rooted homophobia. Nonetheless, the late 1970s was a time lesbians began to organize and mobilize in Mexico as they contributed to the feminist movement.

Lesbian Perspective

Women shared their sentiments towards their own experiences as lesbian women and the societal norms placed upon them through the feminist journal *Fem* in the 1980s and 1990s. An article titled, "Una perspectiva lesbiana del lesbianismo" by Claudia Hinojosa in 1980 was published and discussed her perspective on lesbianism in Mexico. Hinojosa talked about how being lesbian is not the problem, rather the society lesbians have to put up with. Hinojosa stated, "No existe el problema del lesbianismo; el problema es la sociedad en la que vivimos las lesbianas," she wrote.⁴³ She continued elaborating on how the concept of sexuality has to be redefined in order for change to happen and to strip away the stigma around homosexuality. As stated by

⁴¹ Ibid, 192.

⁴² Ángela Ixkic Bastian Duarte, "From the Margins of Latin American Feminism: Indigenous and Lesbian Feminisms," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38, no. 1 (September 2012), 154.

⁴³ Claudia Hinojosa "Una perspectiva lesbiana del lesbianismo" *Fem: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, June. 1980. ("A problem with lesbianism does not exist, the problem is the society that we live in as lesbians.")

Hinojosa, “Si se ha de asumir socialmente el lesbianismo como una posibilidad de relación auténtica y válida, tendrán que cambiar el concepto mismo de sexualidad.”⁴⁴ Overall, she felt this frustration towards what is considered “normal” in terms of sexuality and the stigma set upon them.

The 1990s saw an increase in violence against the LGBT community in Mexico due to the AIDS crisis in the 1980s. As a result, activists began to protest the murders of homosexuals and advocated for the diversity of sexual orientations. In 1992, a lesbian feminist group called *El Clóset de Sor Juana* in Mexico City promoted the protection of women's rights and denounced discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. At the 1995 World Conference on Women held by the United Nations in Beijing, China, *El Clóset de Sor Juana* was accredited as a non-governmental organization.⁴⁵ At that same conference, South African lesbian activist, Beverley Ditsie, addressed LGBT rights and how lesbian rights coincided with women's rights.⁴⁶

In 2003, Mexico's Congress passed the *Ley Federal Para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminación*, which prohibited the discrimination of a person based on sexual orientation, age, sex, disability, religion, and social status. By 2013, Mexico's Supreme Court ruled that anti-gay slurs were not protected under freedom of expression under the Constitution. Although there is still a stigma surrounding homosexuality, legislation is set in place to combat homophobia. Thus, the normalization of different sexual orientations took the stage in later years.

Conclusion

Mexico's second wave of feminism expanded on issues women faced and opened discussion and opportunities for women internationally. The introduction of women's conferences held by the United Nations allowed women to become more involved in politics and gain recognition for their work. Although in the 1970s, there was not much legislation being passed, women still rose up. They expressed their frustrations and fears on topics that affected them, such as violence

⁴⁴ Caroline C. Beer and Roderic Ai Camp, “Democracy, Gender Quotas, and Political Recruitment in Mexico,” *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4, no. 2 (2016), 192. (“If lesbianism is to be socially accepted as a possibility of an authentic and valid relationship, they will have to change the very concept of sexuality.”)

⁴⁵ Ángela Ixkic Bastian Duarte, “From the Margins of Latin American Feminism: Indigenous and Lesbian Feminisms,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38, no. 1 (September 2012), 154.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 155.

against women, political participation/representation, and sexual orientation. Not until the 1990s do we see this transition in the feminist movement where women collaborate with political parties, government leaders, and non-governmental organizations to push forward their demands. There was an expansion of domestic violence laws, sexual assault and harassment laws, the introduction of gender quotas, and the inclusion of lesbians in the feminist movement. This was made possible due to the efforts of the women behind the feminist movement, who took it upon themselves to be heard and seen. The testimonies left behind showcase the strength and determination these women had to bring about social and political change for women in Mexico.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

- "Ahora que todas hemos roto el silencio." *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, March 1978.
- "De la violencia cotidiana..." *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, April 1977.
- "Estadísticas sobre violación en México: 85,000 mujeres violadas al año 3,000 denuncias solamente." *Cihuat: Voz de La Coalición de Mujeres*, March 1978.
- Hinojosa, Claudia. "Una perspectiva lesbiana del lesbianismo" *Fem: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, June. 1980.
- "Las mujeres tomamos la palabra." *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Sept. 1976.
- Lamas, Marta. "Naciones Unidas invita a fem Marta Lamas." *Fem: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, Jan. 1982.
- "Mujeres golpeadas, ritos modernos..." *La Revuelta: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, July 1978.
- "Para Disipar Una Confusión." *La Boletina: Archivos Históricos del Feminismo*, April 1984.

Secondary Sources:

- Bastian Duarte, Ángela Ixkic. "From the Margins of Latin American Feminism: Indigenous and Lesbian Feminisms." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 38, no. 1 (September 2012): 153–78.
- Basu, Amrita, and C. Elizabeth McGrory. *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.
- Beer, Caroline C., and Roderic Ai Camp. "Democracy, Gender Quotas, and Political Recruitment in Mexico." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 4, no. 2, 2016, 179–95.
- Bruhn, Kathleen. "Whores and Lesbians: Political Activism, Party Strategies, and Gender Quotas in México." *Electoral Studies* 22, no. 1 (2003): 101–119.
- Hawkins, Darren, and Humes, Melissa. "Human Rights and Domestic Violence." *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (2002): 231–57.
- Hernández, Sonia. "Women in Mexican Politics since 1953." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Hevener, Natalie Kaufman. *International Law and the Status of Women*. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1983.
- Lamas, Marta. "De la protesta: el feminismo en México a finales del siglo xx." In *Historia de La Mujeres En Espana Y America Latina*. Madrid: Catedra, 2006.
- Lamas, Marta. "The Feminist Movement and the Development of Political Discourse on Voluntary Motherhood in Mexico." *Reproductive Health Matters* 5, no. 10 (1997): 58–67.
- Rodriguez, Victoria. *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics*. UT Press, 2003.

Fatality Beyond Battle: The Role of the Smallpox Epidemic in the Revolutionary War

Bryn McFarren

Disease is known as one of the deadliest killers in history. Illnesses can take out entire civilizations swiftly, leaving few survivors. Smallpox or variola is one of the most infamous diseases in history. According to the American Museum of Natural history: "smallpox is estimated to have killed more than 300 million people since 1900 alone."¹ Smallpox is an acutely infectious disease that ravaged the entire world for hundreds of years. It tore through Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe well before touching the Americas. Europeans first introduced the disease to the Americas in the fifteenth century. Smallpox is responsible for killing millions of indigenous peoples across the Americas at the dawn of colonialism. Historian James C. Riley touches on the reaction of the European colonists when they first came to the Americas, writing that "Europeans who saw smallpox in epidemics among New World Indians were shocked by how much more lethal this disease was in the Americas than what they had known at home."² The smallpox epidemic lasted through the eighteenth century into the nineteenth century and played a little-known yet immense role in the American Revolutionary War. Smallpox affected the Revolution by posing a threat far more deadly than the highly trained British soldiers. As a result, the Continental Army suffered greatly during the war. The Army lacked organization and the thorough training the British Army had. Nevertheless, the Continental Army continued to fight through intermittent outbreaks of the disease. Smallpox posed an extreme threat to the Continental Army's chances of winning the Revolutionary War; however, through the efforts of General George Washington to have all of the soldiers inoculated, the Army did not fall victim to the epidemic.

Historian and author of *Pox Americana*, Elizabeth A. Fenn, describes the connection between smallpox and humans as "both parasitic and paradoxical... To thrive and multiply, the virus must have a host. But for the host species—unlucky *Homo sapiens*—Variola is the most unruly of guests...in the end, it also confers either immunity or death."³ To survive, the virus must have a large population of hosts. The budding urban areas to which many immigrated in the mid to late 18th

¹ "Smallpox," American Museum of Natural History, accessed May 5, 2021, <https://www.amnh.org/explore/science-topics/disease-eradication/countdown-to-zero/smallpox>.

² James C. Riley, "Smallpox and American Indians Revisited," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 65, no. 4 (2010): 445.

³ Elizabeth A. Fenn, *Pox Americana*, New York: Hill and Wang, 2001: 5.

century proved to be perfect environments for the virus to thrive and spread. Many regions of the Americas were already familiar with the disease well before the Revolutionary War.

A famous example is the terrifying and infamous smallpox epidemic that coincided with Hernán Cortés's conquest of the Aztecs, one of the indigenous peoples of modern-day Mexico. Along with the introduction of European peoples to indigenous Americans also came an abundance of diseases. A variety of conditions such as: "Measles, influenza, mumps, typhus, cholera, plague, malaria, yellow fever, scarlet fever, whooping cough, and diphtheria all wreaked havoc in the two and a half centuries between Cortés's conquest and the American Revolution."⁴ Smallpox was highly deadly, which set it apart from other diseases.

Throughout the American Revolutionary War, the threat of smallpox always concerned military leaders. Symptoms of smallpox are brutal and unpleasant. The incubation period for the disease can last up to fourteen days. It is common for no signs to be detected within this time, which means the victim could unknowingly spread the disease before realizing that they are infected. As a result, symptoms are often undetected early on. The early signs are very similar to a case of influenza or a case of the common cold. Early symptoms include: "headache, backache, fever, vomiting and general malaise."⁵ Severe anxiety can also be an early symptom. Some patients can die within a few days, even before the disease can develop its signature rash, from the tremendous and crushing feeling of pure anxiety alone. By the fourth or fifth day of exhibiting early symptoms, the victim's fever will spike, and sores will appear around their mouth, throat, and nasal passages. The beginning of the rash marks when the victim becomes the most contagious. Anyone who comes near the victim at this point can become easily infected. The rash spreads quickly around the body after it first appears. In some circumstances, the inflammation can turn inward, and hemorrhaging can occur, leading these victims to die swiftly. Typically, "the rash turns outward, covering the victim in raised pustules that concentrate in precisely the places where they will cause the most physical pain and psychological anguish."

The blistering welts can appear in the neck, the soles of the feet, the back, the forearms, and the palms of the hands. If these blisters merge and start to ooze puss, then the outcome will most likely be detrimental to the victim, and chances of survival become slim. When the pox enters

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

the throat, dehydration will likely ensue, weakening the victim further. After two weeks of enduring the blistering rash, if the victim is somehow still alive, the blisters will scab over. Fenn describes the scabs in her book *Pox Americana* as encrusting “most of the body, making any movement excruciating.”⁶ After ten to sixteen days of suffering, death commonly occurs. If the victim is lucky enough to survive, the scabs will scar, leaving an everlasting reminder on their body of the time they suffered from this horrible disease. Up until the early eighteenth century, smallpox had no known cure. Physicians introduced inoculation to combat the disease by the early to mid-eighteenth century.

Pre-established immunity was an essential factor separating Americans and the British. Most British people who grew up in Europe had an immunity to smallpox since the disease tore through Europe centuries before. However, many American-born colonists, indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans did not share the same immunity. This circumstance made war precarious. The "smallpox blanket" episode is a famous incident during Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763.

During the summer of 1763, a confederation of indigenous tribes brought together by Ottawa war leader Pontiac began a series of attacks on the British people residing near the Great Lakes and the Midwest of what is now known as the United States. By the end of May of that year, Pontiac's Army attacked Fort Pitt, located in western Pennsylvania. The officer in charge, Simeon Ecuyer, reported to Colonel Henry Bouquet in Philadelphia that the situation at Fort Pitt took a drastic turn for the worse.⁷ Indigenous forces began to burn down nearby houses, forcing residents to take refuge in Fort Pitt. In a letter to Bouquet, Ecuyer stated that he became quite worried about the spread of disease within the fort. By the middle of June of that year, smallpox had taken a tight hold on the fort. In his diary, trader William Trent recorded that "two Delaware dignitaries Turtle's Heart and Mamaltee, visited Fort Pitt late that night to speak with post officials."⁸ Turtle's Heart and Mamaltee urged the British to abandon the fort at this meeting. The British declined their advice and refused to leave the fort. At that point, the two native dignitaries needed to leave and asked for supplies for the journey back to their tribe. That was when fort officials handed the native dignitaries two blankets and a handkerchief that had both been previously used and contaminated by smallpox victims. Trent did not disclose who devised

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁷ Elizabeth A. Fenn, "Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery

Amherst," *The Journal of American History* 86, no. 4 (2000): 1554.

⁸ *Ibid.*

and carried out the plan. However, his diary clarified that handing over the blankets to spread disease to the indigenous dignitaries was intentional. He reported that; "we gave them two Blankets and an Handkerchief out of the Smallpox Hospital. I hope it will have the desired effect."⁹ Historians have found no evidence that the Continental Army contracted smallpox through biological warfare like the incident at Fort Pitt.

The possibility of a smallpox outbreak threatened the Continental Army and, therefore, the outcome of the Revolutionary War. If one soldier contracted smallpox, it was likely that many more would follow, leaving the Army weak and disease-ridden. Doctor James Thacher was a military surgeon who traveled with the Army from 1775 to 1783. He kept a thorough journal in which he described several circumstances when the Army struggled with smallpox. In his diary, Thacher recounted an instance of a smallpox outbreak on a ship: "I happened unfortunately that a few days after we left York, four of our soldiers were seized with the smallpox, and having aboard about eighty men who were liable receive the infection, they were with several officers put on Virginia shore, to march round by land."¹⁰ The Army separated regiments to keep as many soldiers as safe as possible. The eighty men mentioned by Thacher in the previous quote became susceptible to contracting the disease through close contact with the four infected individuals. Due to the severity of the illness, most of the regiment was forced to detach from the doctor and the infected men due to the toll it could take on the group. The disease's deadliness forced the Army to be highly cautious when an outbreak of smallpox occurred. The significant risk for smallpox infection did not only affect the Army; it also affected the lives of the colonial civilians.

Many men who left home to fight in the war came home with smallpox immunity either through contracting smallpox during the war or becoming inoculated under the direction of the Army. The article titled "Carrying Home the Enemy: Smallpox and the Revolution" by historian and author Sarah Schuetze explains how Revolutionary-era civilians felt about the smallpox epidemic: "during the early years of the American Revolution, outbreaks of smallpox, or variola, were treated as an enemy more subtle and often more feared than British soldiers."¹¹ Although many soldiers became immune to smallpox, their spouses and

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ James Thacher, *A Military Journal during the American Revolutionary War, from 1775 to 1783*, Boston: Richardson and Lord, 1823, 362.

¹¹ Sarah Schuetze, "Carrying Home the Enemy: Smallpox and Revolution in American Love and Letters, 1775–76," *Early American Literature* 53, no. 1 (2018): 98.

families left at home did not share the same immunity with their soldiers. Unfortunately, the lack of civilian immunity led soldiers and families alike to share a genuine concern for men who could have possibly brought home the disease. For example, Mary Bartlett sent a letter to her husband Josiah Bartlett, who served in Congress in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In her letter, she noted her concern for his health. In the previous few letters he sent to her, Bartlett expressed that he had contracted an unknown illness that left him confined to bed.¹² Mary's primary distress came from her husband's planned trip home. She did not want to acquire the illness from her husband out of concern for her health and advised him that he take precautions so he did not risk bringing home the disease. She even made an effort to send him a concoction from a healer to help him recover before his return. By this time, inoculation was rare, so many people, like Mary Barlett, opted for home or healer-made remedies. Despite the risk, many civilians still yearned to see their loved ones again, and many became willing to jeopardize their health to make that happen.

Thacher recounted an unfortunate instance of the spread of smallpox in March of 1776 in his diary. Upon the arrival of soldiers to an unnamed town, many friends and family of these soldiers flocked to the town to greet their loved ones. Thacher noted his interest to see the "tender interviews" and warm embraces of the people reunited with their families and friends again.¹³ On an ominous note, Thacher wrote, "it is particularly unfortunate on this occasion that the smallpox is lurking in various parts of the town; which deters many from enjoying the interview with their friends."¹⁴ Despite the threat of smallpox infection, many people, desperate to see their soldiers, took the risk.

Unfortunately, no concoction of the time from any healer like Mary Bartlett sent to her husband could help prevent smallpox infection. During the Revolutionary War Era, the only action to combat smallpox was inoculation. The significant threat of smallpox made it necessary for the Continental Army to inoculate all its soldiers. At the start of the war, General George Washington stood highly reluctant to have any of his soldiers inoculated. Yet, he feared that mass exposure to the virus would hinder the war efforts. Schutze notes, "[Washington's] only recourse was quarantine and censure against those who violated his prohibition of

¹² Mary Bartlett. Mary Bartlett to Josiah Bartlett, Kingston, NH, October 8, 1776. In *Josiah Bartlett Family Papers, 1710-1937*, 1.

¹³ Thacher, *A Military Journal during the American Revolutionary War, from 1775 to 1783*, 50.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

inoculation among the soldiers."¹⁵ This anti-inoculation policy had detrimental effects on the Army at the beginning of the war.

The Northern Army, composed mainly of New Hampshire militiamen, became ravaged by smallpox when they marched to Quebec to secure the northern border against British invasion in 1775. Three-quarters of the soldiers had not already been exposed to smallpox because they came from regions where the disease had not previously broken out, meaning that they had no immunity to it. "Without access to safely administered inoculation, thousands became sick and died in Quebec between September 1775 and January 1776, significantly reducing the number of soldiers fit for battle."¹⁶ The particularly harsh winter of 1776 did not contribute positively to the efforts to contain the disease. More men became infected, which led to more and more people becoming alarmed with the deadly situation.

By March of 1777, Washington saw the destruction the disease inflicted on the soldiers and ordered the immediate inoculation of all soldiers. Soldiers who previously contracted smallpox did not need inoculation due to natural immunity. In a letter sent to the military headquarters at Morris Town in March of 1777, Washington ordered all recruits who had previously contracted and survived smallpox to join the Army immediately; all others were to report to Philadelphia to get inoculated promptly. Washington stated in the letter, "you are hereby required immediately to send me an exact return of your regiment, and to send all your recruits, who have had the smallpox to join the Army."¹⁷ Those previously infected with smallpox reported for duty immediately to fight while the others waited out their quarantine period after inoculation.

At the time, the inoculation procedure was a somewhat new practice in America. It first became introduced in Boston in 1721 by Zabediel Boylston and Cotton Mather. "The medical procedure of inoculation deliberately introduced the infection to the patient, resulting in a mild case of smallpox and lifelong immunity to the disease. After undergoing inoculation, the patient became contagious at the end of the twelve-day incubation period and remained so for two weeks."¹⁸ Inoculation was controversial in New England and the northern colonies

¹⁵ Schuetze, "Carrying Home the Enemy: Smallpox and Revolution in American Love and Letters, 1775–76," 103.

¹⁶ Schuetze, "Carrying Home the Enemy: Smallpox and Revolution in American Love and Letters, 1775–76," 103.

¹⁷ George Washington, George Washington to Head Quarters Morris Town, March 12, 1777, 1.

¹⁸ Ann M. Becker, "Smallpox in Washington's Army: Strategic Implications of Disease during the American Revolutionary War." *The Journal of Military History* 68, no. 2 (2004): 386.

because it was not always successful. If not adequately quarantined for twelve days, the procedure carried many risks, including spreading smallpox to others. In addition, the method and procedure of inoculation were brutal and quite unpleasant. The procedure took the puss from the blisters of an infected individual and then inserted the puss into an incision in the skin of a healthy individual. This procedure seemed gross, crude, and brutal, and many people understandably turned away from wanting the procedure done.

Soon, people flocked to Philadelphia for inoculation. Not only did Washington order his non-inoculated soldiers to report to Philadelphia for the procedure, but many affluent civilians also journeyed to the city to gain immunity. Thomas Jefferson and Martha Washington, George Washington's wife, were among those affluent civilians inoculated in Philadelphia.¹⁹ Philadelphia became the central hub people went to receive inoculations for a few reasons. First, physicians in the city advocated for the operation, as they believed it could effectively slow the spread of the disease. Second, smallpox was very prominent in Philadelphia, a highly-populated area. Fenn affirms, "Nowhere in North America was smallpox more prevalent than in the city of Philadelphia. By the time of the Revolutionary War, Pennsylvania's thriving commercial hub may well have been the only place on the continent where Variola had become endemic."²⁰ Although smallpox became endemic in Philadelphia, the prevalence of the disease remained. When a disease becomes endemic, it means that the infection rates neither rise nor fall. Inoculation helped the smallpox epidemic in Philadelphia become endemic. However, there were few regulations on the procedure. Fenn lends this to the disinclination of Philadelphia authorities to regulate inoculation. Fenn states: "quarantines were rare, and restrictions on variolation were virtually nonexistent."²¹ This led the virus to spread quickly.

One of the most significant problems with inoculation in Philadelphia was the economic inequality that impaired inoculation access for people of lower socioeconomic classes. American polymath Benjamin Franklin decided to address this issue and advocate for inoculations for all, even the poor and working class. Only the wealthy upper class could afford the procedure. Poor and working-class individuals could not simply afford immunity. The biggest problem was the practicality of inoculation. When inoculated, one needed to correctly quarantine themselves for twelve days after the procedure. The working

¹⁹ Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 83.

²⁰ Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 82-83.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 83.

class could not afford to quarantine themselves for that long—many fresh inoculates had to refuse the quarantine period to work. Unfortunately, unquarantined inoculates continued to spread the virus around Philadelphia. The civilian demographic with the most significant number of victims was children. Inspired to help the poor due to the death of his own son, Francis, from smallpox in 1774, Franklin helped gather donations dedicated to the free inoculation of the poor Philadelphians. Even though there is no way to determine how effective the program was, historians believe it was at least somewhat successful. Fenn asserts: "On May 29th, 1776, according to the Pennsylvania Gazette, the charitable 'Inoculating (or Small Pox) Hospital' housed twenty poor children, 'all happily coming through the Disease under Inoculation, and several in the natural Way.'"²² This positive report shows how the program helped at least a few children.

Smallpox concerns existed throughout other parts of the colonies. In May of 1776, friends of Thacher urged him to get inoculated since he was to be traveling and serving in the Continental Army as a doctor. Thacher noted, "though contrary to general orders, I was accordingly inoculated by my friend Dr. John Homans and have passed through the disease in the most favorable manner, not suffering on days confinement."²³ By July of that year, a letter sent to Thacher ordered him to begin mass inoculation. He recalled his experience inoculating people during the war in his journal, "Orders are given to inoculate for the smallpox, all the soldiers and inhabitants in town, as a general infection of this terrible disease is apprehended. Dr. Townsend and myself are now constantly engaged in this business."²⁴ This order to inoculate people was not exclusive to soldiers or others working for the Army. Thacher and Townsend also inoculated common inhabitants of the town. Thacher did a large portion of smallpox-related work during the Revolutionary War. He either cared for the ill or prevented the spread of the disease through inoculation. In his journal, Thacher also wrote of the outcome of smallpox inoculation: "Colonel Whitcomb's regiment, consisting of five hundred men, has now gone through the smallpox in this town by inoculation, and all, except one negro, have recovered."²⁵ From this quote, it is clear that the recovery rate from inoculation was very positive.

It was not until 1778 that the Continental Army had a good handle on inoculation, and the spread of smallpox began to slow. By

²² *Ibid.*, 84.

²³ Thacher, *A Military Journal during the American Revolutionary War, from 1775 to 1783*, 53.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 62.

October of 1777, the inoculation program was working well, and according to historian Ann Becker, "returns indicate over thirty-three thousand soldiers on active duty with only 17.7 percent reported ill."²⁶ In the winters of 1779 and 1780, officials in the Continental Army of North Virginia reported minimal sickness, a drastic contrast from the winters before. Officials for the Army and doctors such as Thacher attributed the decline of smallpox cases to the inoculations of recruits and new sanitation regimes the Army had put in place. By the early 1780s, the smallpox epidemic was under control. With this fatal enemy under control, the Continental Army turned their focus to the primary foe at hand: the British.

Although the efforts to slow the spread of the illness worked for the Continental Army, smallpox would continue to devastate the world until its official eradication in 1977.²⁷ Though the disease posed an extreme threat to the Continental Army's chances of winning the Revolutionary War, the efforts of General George Washington and other military officials proved successful. In 1781 when the United States of America had successfully won independence from Great Britain, smallpox became just a memory and a factor of the war that faded into the past as the fledgling nation began to grow and establish a prominent position globally.

²⁶ Becker, "Smallpox in Washington's Army: Strategic Implications of Disease during the American Revolutionary War." 428.

²⁷ "Smallpox," American Museum of Natural History, accessed May 5, 2021, <https://www.amnh.org/explore/science-topics/disease-eradication/countdown-to-zero/smallpox>.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

- Bartlett, Mary. Mary Bartlett to Josiah Bartlett, Kingston, NH, October 8, 1776. In *Josiah Bartlett Family Papers, 1710-1937*.
<https://www.nhhistory.org/object/352708/letter-from-mary-bartlett-tojosiah-bartlett-1776-october-8>.
- Thacher, James. *A Military Journal during the American Revolutionary War, from 1775 to 1783*. Boston: Richardson and Lord, 1823.
- Washington, George. George Washington to Head Quarters Morris Town, March 12, 1777.
<https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-sources-2/article/smallpox-inoculationletter/>.

Secondary Sources:

- Becker, Ann M. "Smallpox in Washington's Army: Strategic Implications of Disease during the American Revolutionary War." *The Journal of Military History* 68, no. 2 (2004):381-430. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3397473>.
- Fenn, Elizabeth A. "Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond JefferyAmherst." *The Journal of American History*86, no. 4 (2000): 1552-580. doi:10.2307/2567577.
- Fenn, Elizabeth A. *Pox Americana*. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001.
- Riley, James C. "Smallpox and American Indians Revisited." *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 65, no. 4 (2010): 445-77.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24631803>.
- Schuetze, Sarah. "Carrying Home the Enemy: Smallpox and Revolution in American Love and Letters, 1775-76." *Early American Literature* 53, no. 1 (2018): 97-125.
- "Smallpox." American Museum of Natural History. Accessed May 5, 2021.
<https://www.amnh.org/explore/science-topics/disease-eradication/countdown-to-zero/smallpox>.

American Gay Soldiers of World War Two: A Performance in Gender and Sexuality

Benjamin Robertson

From the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 until the end of World War II, the United States military drafted or enlisted approximately sixteen million men and women. Although an exact number is difficult to calculate, American historian Alan Bérubé estimates that of the sixteen million members, between 650,000 to 1.6 million were homosexual.¹ That means that between four and ten percent of those in the United States military during the Second World War were queer. On top of the typical dangers of war, being a gay soldier was perilous for several reasons: soldiers could be outed, given a Section Eight Discharge, ostracized by comrades, or could become victims of physical violence and rape. Even with these risks, they were still compelled to fight for their country, both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Although the war was filled with danger for gay soldiers, there were also ways that they could benefit from their experiences. The Second World War placed gay soldiers alongside straight ones, allowing them to address stereotypes regarding gender identity and sexuality on a grand stage. Homosexual soldiers performed their gender and sexuality in ways that enabled them to display their masculinity and debunk gay stereotypes. Performing their sexuality also made it possible for them to build gay social networks. Furthermore, by serving in “effeminate roles,” gay soldiers aided the United States military effort in numerous ways. However, they did so within the parameters of what the military deemed to be acceptable behavior of soldiers, and pushing these boundaries by being overtly queer could result in perilous consequences, both in the short and long term.

Currently, World War II scholarship regarding homosexual soldiers is limited at best. Allan Bérubé’s 1990 release *Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II* hones in on the experiences of gay and lesbian soldiers in the Second World War, and his work is comprehensive, lucid, and an original piece of historical scholarship. However, Bérubé’s work is lonely in this field, and few histories have been completed since its publication in 1990 that focus exclusively on the experiences of gay men or lesbian women in the Second World War. More often than not, when gay World War II

¹ Vicki L. Eaklor, *Queer America: A GLBT History of the 20th Century* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008), 68.

soldiers are discussed in scholarship, it is merely in a few passing sentences within an entire article or book.

This paper aims to revive the work of Bérubé and a field of history that has been understudied. This research relied heavily on *Coming Out Under Fire*, but it also takes the topic in a somewhat different direction. Bérubé's book focused on both gay men and lesbian women, but this research will have a narrower focus. By not incorporating the experiences of lesbian women, this project will allow us to instead gain a deeper understanding of the experience of gay World War Two soldiers. The exclusion of lesbian women from this work is intentional and is designed to keep the focus of the research clearer, as lesbian women had extremely different experiences in the war than homosexual men. To present homosexual soldiers as a monolith would only serve to muddle and confuse the separate histories of both gay and lesbian women.

The military policy for homosexuals in the armed forces took a dramatic shift from World War One to World War Two. Before the twentieth century, the policy for prosecuting gay soldiers focused solely on the act of sodomy instead of being directed toward the homosexual as an individual. This policy correlated with the public perception in America that viewed the act of sodomy as a sin that was separable from the sinner. Homosexuality was still viewed negatively by society, but it was seen as an individual transgression as opposed to being a personal defect.² Therefore, military law that prohibited sodomy could only be enforced if the gay soldier was caught in the act.³ If a soldier was court-martialed and found guilty of sodomy, they could be sent to prison with hard labor for a period of five to ten years.⁴

Such practice—to catch soldiers engaging in homosexual acts in order to punish them—was not efficient in keeping the military purely heterosexual. An embarrassing and questionable instance with the Navy during the Interwar Period shows just how ineffectual this tactic was. In 1919, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and future president Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the Navy to send decoy men into the cities to catch gay sailors. In order to do so and still follow the laws of the military, the decoys literally had to have sex with their suspects in order to prove their guilt as sodomists. When the Navy prosecuted the entrapped sailors and the public became aware of the tactics used in apprehending them, a

² John D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 4.

³ Allan Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II* (Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*

scandal for the Navy broke out.⁵ This ridiculous act of entrapment illustrates the lengths the military would go to remove gay soldiers from its ranks and shows the inefficiency of the United States' sodomy laws.

The ineffectiveness of the previous sodomy laws and the impact of psychiatry during the Interwar Period led military policy to shift its focus from the act (sodomy) to the individual. The majority of psychologists stressed that homosexuals were not criminals but were instead psychologically disturbed.⁶ They argued that prison was not the answer, but homosexuals should instead be sent to psychological wards in order to receive treatment. Even though they believed that the past policy of sending homosexuals to prison was archaic, they still asserted that gay soldiers had no place in the armed forces. Psychologists argued that barring homosexuals from joining the military would protect them from certain ridicule and shame while also maintaining positive morale in the military units.⁷ Furthermore, a large portion of United States government officials believed homosexuality was an innate condition that could be awoken by other homosexuals. This gave the perception that queerness was an infectious disease, and made it even more important in the eyes of the government to keep gay men out of the military.⁸ Based on the recommendations of the leading psychologists, the government began surveying and screening recruits in an attempt to weed out homosexuals before they could enlist.⁹

The military screenings designed to bar gay men from enlisting were mostly ineffective. Even though most homosexuals were acutely aware that the military did not want them, they registered in droves. Most of them enlisted for the same reasons the straight men did: out of patriotic duty.¹⁰ Charles Rowland, a soldier from Phoenix, Arizona, claimed to have had many gay friends, and all but one of them was determined to fight for their country. He went on further to claim that he and his friends refused to be denied the "privilege of serving our country in a time of great national emergency by virtue of some stupid regulation about being gay."¹¹ This case and many others show that most young gay men would do whatever they could to join and serve in the United States military, even though the government was doing all that it could to bar them from enlisting.

⁵ Aaron Belkin, *Bring Me Men: Military Masculinity and the Benign Façade of American Empire: 1898-2001* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 21-22.

⁶ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 19.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics*, 15.

⁹ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 19.

¹⁰ Eaklor, *Queer America*, 67.

¹¹ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 25.

Similarly, many men were contemptuous of those who used their homosexuality as a means to avoid the draft. Ernest Cole, a World War Two sailor, maintained that his friend who professed his homosexuality to avoid combat had lost all of his respect. He claimed, "I thought this guy was a traitor, in a sense."¹² However, few men willingly declared their homosexuality to skirt serving, as the patriotic fervor following Pearl Harbor was too great to keep most of them out of the military.¹³ Furthermore, if one were afraid to join but did not want to declare their sexual identity, being a conscientious objector was not necessarily an appealing option. Those who refused to fight often faced ridicule, physical abuse, ostracization, and potentially prison.¹⁴

Even though many refused to confess their sexuality in order to avoid service, there were many risks that came with serving in the military as a homosexual. The effects of being outed in the military could impact soldiers' lives in both the short term and the long term. One immediate risk for homosexual soldiers was the potential for long-term imprisonment. The 93rd Article of War stated that "soldiers ascertained to be sodomists were subject to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor in a federal penitentiary for five years."¹⁵ Even though the typical policy of the military shifted from incarceration to Section Eight discharge, gay men could still technically be sent to prison with hard labor if discovered as homosexual.¹⁶ The threat of imprisonment was a cloud that always hung over the head of gay soldiers.

Perhaps the most perilous consequence soldiers experienced in the immediate aftermath of being outed was being held in the "queer stockades" by the Military Police (MP). The military would often hold outed gay men in cells and they were typically kept in isolation. Following their time in solitary confinement, the soldier's superiors would ruthlessly interrogate them in a humiliating fashion. The MP repeatedly grilled the imprisoned soldiers about their sexual past and demanded they give the names of any fellow homosexuals they knew or were aware of in the unit. The MPs often forced them to strip naked during questioning.¹⁷ Following their interrogation, the soldiers were often physically and sexually abused. To make matters worse, the men that were sent to the queer stockades were often betrayed by a trusted

¹² Ibid.

¹³ D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics*, 24.

¹⁴ "John H. Abbot Interview" conducted by Studs Terkel, from *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II*, 168.

¹⁵ John Costello, *Virtue Under Fire: How World War II Changed Our Social and Sexual Attitudes* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1985), 110.

¹⁶ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 33.

¹⁷ Ibid., 201.

superior, such as a military doctor or psychiatrist.¹⁸ Approximately 10,000 gay men were subject to these brutal queer stockade policies.¹⁹

John McPherson, an army soldier, received cruel treatment from the military during his time in the queer stockades. McPherson was reported as gay after patting a sailor on the shoulder and propositioning him. The propositioned sailor immediately shouted rape, and McPherson was quickly detained by Military Police. During his isolation, McPherson was attacked and raped by a guard.²⁰ Following the rape and his time in the queer stockade, McPherson was sent to a psychiatric center. However, McPherson was not sent due to the trauma of being sexually assaulted while in his cell. He was instead hospitalized for being homosexual. Tony Isaac witnessed a fellow sailor who was detained by Military Police and escorted to a queer stockade. He initially panicked when the gay “witch hunt” began and assumed that the military was searching for him instead. Isaac watched as the sailor was escorted away in chains and claimed that he had “never [seen] such a sad looking boy in my whole life.” He stated the event “strengthened my resistance to playing around in the Navy.”²¹

There were also long-term consequences of being outed as a gay soldier. Many soldiers received Section Eight discharges, or “Blue Discharges,” after being outed as a homosexual.²² Section Eight discharges were originally reserved for soldiers with psychiatric problems or substance abuse issues. However, during World War Two the government utilized them to expel gay soldiers from the military. There was a preference for using Section Eight discharges because they did not require an actual court-martial hearing. Receiving a “Blue Discharge” could make it extremely difficult to find employment in the future. The government did not conceal or seal the “Blue Discharges” from the public, so it was easy for potential employers to discover why a soldier had been less-than honorably discharged from the military. Furthermore, the Section Eight discharges were unclear in whether they were honorable or dishonorable discharges. As one soldier described it, they were “somewhere in the ambiguous middle.”²³ On top of the employment issues faced with “Blue Discharges,” one of the biggest

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ “John McPherson Interview” conducted by Marry Ann Humphrey, 1988, from *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*, 33.

²¹ “Tony Isaac Interview,” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985, from *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*, 198.

²² Soldiers often referred to the Section Eight Discharges as a “Blue Discharge” because of the color of the paper they were printed on.

²³ “John McPherson Interview,” 34.

potential blows to an outed soldier was the loss of the World War Two GI benefits. Losing these assistances meant that they missed out on access to favorable home loans, college tuition aid, unemployment benefits, cheaper life insurance, pensions, and access to job placement programs.²⁴ At least 9,000 soldiers received discharges due to their homosexuality, which meant they lost out on all these potential advantages.²⁵

Even though there were perilous risks for gay men who wanted to serve their country, they still enlisted in high numbers. One tantalizing aspect of fighting in the war, at least for some, was that it offered men the chance to prove their worth and virility. Many soldiers felt like they especially had something to prove, both to themselves and to the world. Military leaders, public opinion, and leading psychologists considered homosexuals to be sexual deviants that were too feminine to provide a valuable service.²⁶ Psychologists played a large role in this social perception, as their analyses based on social stereotypes were popular and well-received by the American public, which further reinforced homosexual stereotypes. They asserted that the prevalent issues of homosexuality were rooted in gender differences, reinforcing the idea that gay men were womanly and lesbian women were mannish.²⁷

The common misunderstanding that all gay men were feminine catalyzed many to join the military to dispel this stereotype. Will Whiting claimed that although he was gay, he was definitely a “macho straight-acting guy.”²⁸ Richard Berg echoed similar sentiments in his interview, claiming that he was extremely confident in his masculinity and that he was “very butch.”²⁹ George Buse went on to argue that the public perception of all gay men being effeminate was untrue and further claimed that this typical misconception spurred him on to join the military. He joined the Marine Corps, because, after all, the “Marine Corps makes men.”³⁰ For these men, the war provided them with an opportunity to show to the world that gay men were not a feminine monolith.

²⁴ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 229.

²⁵ *Coming Out Under Fire*, by Arthur E. Dong, produced by Arthur E. Dong, directed by Arthur E. Dong, DVD, 53:30.

²⁶ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 19.

²⁷ D’Emilio, *Sexual Politics*, 17.

²⁸ “Will Whiting Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985, from *Quite Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*, 59.

²⁹ “Richard Berg Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985, from *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*, 74.

³⁰ “George Buse Interview” from *Before Stonewall: The making of a Gay and Lesbian Community*, 19:00.

United States Marine Ted Allenby also enlisted to prove his “ruggedness” and to hide his sexuality. He claimed that “after all, homosexuals are sissies and pansies. You’re not a man. You’re not a female. You’re nothing. I chose the Marines for that reason.”³¹ Allenby’s testimony further reinforces the idea that American stereotypes concerning sexual orientation compelled many men to join the military. He also stated that the other gay men he met in the Marines joined for similar reasons, to prove their virility and conceal their sexuality.³² Allenby further felt the constant need to prove his masculinity after joining and typically found himself engaged in fights with his comrades. When Allenby was assigned the flute as a Marine bandsman, he was dejected due to society’s perception that it was an effeminate instrument. Allenby claimed that this assignment led him to pick even more fights with his fellow soldiers to defend his masculinity. This story illustrates the assertion of gender historian Aaron Belkin that military men often felt the best way to secure their masculinity was through the constant disavowal of what is feminine.³³ Allenby was willing to do this even if it required him to respond violently.

David Bowling, a sailor in the Navy, also found himself overcompensating in order to appear more masculine. When Bowling first enlisted, he was averse to homosexual propositions from fellow sailors, and at times he even responded to these requests with violence. In one instance, Bowling broke a sailor’s arm in two places because he propositioned him.³⁴ Others tried to preserve and perform their masculinity in the ways they had sex with other men. Some military men felt that if they were penetrating their partner, as opposed to being the “passive participant,” they would maintain their manhood. This led some to go as far as to make sure they were never penetrated when sleeping with other men.³⁵ Although this may seem counterintuitive, the cultural history behind this type of mindset helps to explain the perspective. According to Belkin, “in almost every cultural and institutional context imaginable, penetration is associated with masculinity and dominance while penetrability is a marker of subordination.”³⁶ The concept of refraining from being penetrated was so dominant in the minds of World

³¹ “Ted Allenby Interview” conducted by Studs Terkel, from *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II*, 179.

³² Ibid.

³³ Belkin, *Bring Me Men*, 27.

³⁴ “David Bowling Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985, from *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*, 133.

³⁵ “Paul Hardman Interview” conducted by Marry Ann Humphrey, 1988, from *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*, 21.

³⁶ Belkin, *Bring Me Men*, 83.

War Two soldiers that they often joked that the key to survival depended on “keeping a tight asshole.”³⁷ The mindset that being penetrated equated to femininity or subordination was pervasive for both gay and straight soldiers.

Although many gay men joined to prove that they were masculine, others joined hoping that the military experience would toughen them up. This could be done to cover one’s sexuality from others, or because they were insecure about their femininity due to social stigma and stereotypes. Tony Isaac grappled with his sexuality throughout school, struggling with the idea of being an effeminate “sissy.” When he saw a sign that read “Men Make the Navy, and the Navy Makes Men,” he felt compelled to join in the hopes that the service would turn him into a “real man.”³⁸ However, Isaac found that the ostracization and ridicule he experienced in grade school only persisted in the Navy. In order to assuage the torment, he began mimicking the sailor he deemed to be the “roughest and toughest” member of the crew. He got a tattoo, copied the sailor’s spitting habit, and “learned how to say ‘fuck’ like a trooper.”³⁹ Isaac’s story shows how gay men joined the military due to homosexual stereotypes and societal pressure and how these pressures were not always alleviated after enlistment.

Some were compelled to join the war effort to debunk the idea that gay men would make poor soldiers. These men felt that they would be just as good of soldiers as heterosexual men, if not better.⁴⁰ Archibald Wilson claimed that he joined partially from a fear of missing out, but also to prove that he was anything but inferior to straight men.⁴¹ He asserted that his time in basic training only vindicated his preconceptions and argued that he often felt more masculine than his heterosexual counterparts. When recounting a story of a straight soldier who could not handle the emotional toils of basic training and eventually broke down, Wilson claimed that he felt nothing but contempt for the man. Viewing the straight boy’s failures only made him tougher.⁴² He further claimed that it was not just himself outperforming the straight soldiers, but other homosexuals were extremely successful in their troops as well. According to Wilson, they carried themselves with more pride and strength than the straight men.⁴³ While there may certainly be a bias in

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 85.

³⁸ “Tony Isaac Interview,” 197.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁴⁰ “Nicolai Interview” from *Coming Out Under Fire*, 1:00.

⁴¹ “Archibald Wilson Interview” conducted by Mary Ann Humphrey, 1988, from *My Country My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to Present*, 55.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 58.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

Wilson's recounting of his time in basic training and his military experiences overall, his account still shows that gay men often felt compelled to perform their masculinity in a way that would prove their intrinsic value.

If a soldier wanted to perform and defend their masculinity, the battlefield was viewed as an ideal location to do so. The majority of military men viewed the field of combat as a purely masculine space. It was where the action took place and where one's decisions carried life or death consequences. Therefore, combat was the preferred avenue in which to prove one's masculinity. For marine Ted Allenby, getting to the front lines was always his main objective. His homosexuality and the stereotypes of gay men compelled him to constantly demonstrate his virility; there was nowhere better to do that than in the heat of combat.⁴⁴

However, feminine men also proved their value in combat, defying gender-based stereotypes that defined them as too weak for the front lines.⁴⁵ Robert Fleischer, a soldier who produced and performed in drag shows for the military, was awarded the bronze star for his bravery on the front lines.⁴⁶ Fleischer was not the only gay soldier to serve with honor on the front lines of course. Homosexuals served in multiple positions on the battlefield that proved to be vital for the United States.⁴⁷

One aspect that was critically different for gay men on the front lines than for heterosexual men was the potential of seeing one's lover killed in action. Although losing one's partner in battle would be traumatizing enough on its own, homosexual soldiers also had to be mindful of the way they reacted to the terrible news in front of their comrades. Some soldiers who received word that their boyfriend had been killed on the front lines reacted as one might expect, with immediate grief.⁴⁸ When Jim Warren held his boyfriend's hand as he died, he was outwardly emotional. Tears rolled down his face, but nobody said a negative word to him.⁴⁹ Similarly, Ben Smalls could not hide his reactions when he saw his boyfriend killed in action. After he witnessed his boyfriend's death in the Philippines, he completely broke down in front of his comrades. He was surprised that his highly emotive response was only met with kindness and understanding from his fellow soldiers.⁵⁰ Still, others were compelled to hide their true feelings, fearing that being overly reactive would let others know that they were gay. When Ernest Cole thought his boyfriend died and was shocked to see

⁴⁴ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 178.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 178.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

him later that night, he was too afraid to approach him out of fear that he might sob from relief. Instead, he waited until the next day to reunite with his boyfriend, claiming that it gave him enough time to compose himself.⁵¹

Even if one did not have to deal with immediate grief in front of his fellow soldiers, losing lovers in battle could be extremely difficult. Hank Villas claims that after a particularly distressing string of days, he and two other men had a drunken night that led to sex among the three of them. Within a week, Villas was the only one of the three men still alive.⁵² During the war, psychologists began to understand that gay men were at risk for different traumas than straight soldiers. Military psychologists came to realize that men who lost lovers on the battlefield were particularly vulnerable to emotional breakdowns and traumas.⁵³

Although some men enlisted in the military to prove their masculinity or to dispel common stereotypes, there were also gay men in the military that did not care to appear masculine. For the most part, if these effeminate men were careful to not be deemed too queer by the other soldiers, they could be highly respected and regarded members of their crews. Hank Villas understood that he did not fit the mold of the stereotypical manly figure when he joined the military. He was bad at sports, rather uncoordinated, but he did not try to overcompensate. In one instance, Villas dropped a grenade on his toe during grenade throwing practice and claimed that it was a rather embarrassing moment for him. However, according to Villas, he was able to play to his naturally feminine side, laugh it off with his crew, and everyone still respected him. Villas went on to say that even though he was more feminine and somewhat different than his peers, he became something like the “company’s mascot.”⁵⁴ Jerry Watson, an army soldier, had a similar experience in his troop. Watson claimed that he and his “swishy” (overtly feminine) friend were highly regarded in their company. He further stated that they were so well-liked that the others affectionately referred to the two of them as “dear” and “girls.”⁵⁵ Undoubtedly there was a place for less masculine men in the military, and being a feminine soldier did not necessarily lead to being disliked by one’s peers.

Effeminate men had an even easier time earning the respect of their peers when they were proficient or irreplaceable in their fields. Stuart Loomis claimed that he had a sergeant who was a “real queen.”

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁵² “Hank Villas Interview” from *Before Stonewall: The Making of a Gay and Lesbian Community*, 22:30-23:20.

⁵³ Costello, *Virtue Under Fire*, 118.

⁵⁴ “Hank Villas Interview,” 19:00-20:00.

⁵⁵ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 55.

However, because the sergeant was such an effective leader, “nobody messed with him.”⁵⁶ Robert Gervais had a similar experience with one of the officers in his troop. He described a torpedo officer in his crew as a real “Nellie Queen.” Although the officer would “walk around the ship in a bathrobe, hair net, and slippers,” he was highly regarded by the crew’s captain. The captain revered him so much that he decorated him with the Silver Medal.⁵⁷ These examples illustrate that a valuable soldier could get away with being more flamboyant amongst his peers.

Leaning into one’s feminine nature despite negative stereotypes could provide soldiers with multiple job opportunities in the military. Work that was deemed by other soldiers as too feminine included being a secretary, typist, stenographer, or chaplain’s assistant.⁵⁸ Many avoided these jobs, including both heterosexual and homosexual men, because they did not want to appear to be feminine or gay. Still, many soldiers reaped benefits from taking on these jobs. One advantage for many soldiers in these fields was that it gave them the chance to meet other homosexuals and form friendships with like-minded men.⁵⁹ Furthermore, some were able to apply skills they had developed in gay spaces from their civilian life. Frank Jacober became a chaplain’s assistant because he had a great deal of experience playing piano in his local gay bar.⁶⁰ Moreover, working in “feminine” jobs where one was more likely to thrive was much more appealing than remaining in areas where soldiers were less likely to be successful. As noted earlier, when effeminate men made themselves truly indispensable, they could let their hair down and be wilder.⁶¹ On top of the previously listed benefits, those “gay jobs” could prevent one from seeing combat, and they could also help soldiers receive more frequent promotions.⁶² The main downside of these assignments was their potential to signal to other soldiers that one might be a homosexual.⁶³

Even though the soldiers described above were successful in performing their natural feminine nature and were nevertheless both well-liked and free from harassment, this was not the case for every soldier. If soldiers were too effeminate, and especially if they were replaceable in their fields, there was always potential for ostracization or being reported as a homosexual by one’s peers. When Jonathon West was placed in a rugged Navy construction crew, his effeminate

⁵⁶ “Stuart Loomis Interview” from *Coming Out Under Fire*, 27:45-28:30.

⁵⁷ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 185.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 66.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 65.

disposition led him to be reported to an admiral for suspected homosexuality. Although they found no proof of him being gay and he was eventually left alone by his superiors, the close call still scarred him. The event led West to become even more vigilant in hiding his homosexuality from his comrades and superiors, and he even went so far as to marry a childhood friend and impregnate her to appear straight.⁶⁴

Gay men could also perform extremely feminine roles in productive and helpful ways for the military by producing and starring in drag shows. Soldiers like Tom Reddy, Frank Jacober, and Robert Fleischer helped put on all-male productions that almost always featured a soldier in drag.⁶⁵ This phenomenon of GI drag was not only accepted by the military but was actively encouraged. Drag shows were extremely successful in boosting soldier morale, and the military could draw on their precedence from World War One.⁶⁶ Although many soldiers played roles in these shows, with straight men often joining in the productions, they were mostly run by gay men.

Getting the public on board was not an easy task for the military as Christian advocacy groups pushed back against drag culture during the Interwar Period.⁶⁷ Therefore, the government felt extreme pressure in portraying the shows as purely masculine ventures.⁶⁸ This is especially evident in the traveling production that was eventually made into a successful film, *This is the Army*. The show always portrayed the men in drag as willing and wanting to experience military action, which was intended to show the audience that even the soldiers dressed in drag were itching to fight for their country.⁶⁹ To go even further in depicting the actors as masculine men who wanted to serve their country, each production ended with the crew marching off to join the front lines.⁷⁰ The performances were especially persistent in belaboring the idea that those in drag were qualified and masculine men that were ready to defend their country, and they would do so by presenting their ranks and qualifications as soldiers during the shows.⁷¹ The military and the United States press had worked together to allude to the show's patriotism and to prove that the productions were anything but feminine.⁷²

⁶⁴ "Jonathon West Interview" conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985, from *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*, 122.

⁶⁵ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 75.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 74.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 68.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 77.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 74.

Because the shows were a major boost to soldier morale, the military was willing to look past the homosexual undertones that were typical in these productions.⁷³ The artistic freedom that the military allotted to the performers gave many an outlet to express themselves and to let their hair down (both figuratively and literally). One way drag could serve as a vent for soldiers was in the way they utilized their platform to covertly express gay culture. Drag shows would often contain slang in the songs and dialogue that would sail over the heads of the straight audience but would be easily detected by queer attendees.⁷⁴ Putting on drag shows for their comrades could also serve as an emotional outlet and a means for dealing with the traumas of war. Frank Jacober claimed that drag was “the way I kept my sanity” and that it was one of the few times he felt that he could “get away with venting my feelings.”⁷⁵ Similar to the way feminine men could more easily network in the military cities drag also provided a means for soldiers to make other gay friends. The shows could lead to cherished friendships amongst homosexual comrades that would have been otherwise unlikely without the drag productions.⁷⁶

However, dressing in drag did not prevent soldiers from shifting back to performing a more masculine role, especially when it came to defending themselves. When Tom Reddy discussed his time as a drag artist for the Marines, he claimed that it took guts and nerve to put on a dress in front of a bunch of soldiers. Furthermore, Reddy had no problem defending himself as an artist. He quipped that “if you wanna call me a faggot, go ahead. But you better watch your teeth when you do it.”⁷⁷ Still, it was rare for drag soldiers like Tom Reddy to get enough flak from their comrades that they would have to physically defend themselves. The shows were typically accepted, encouraged, and greatly appreciated by fellow soldiers, both gay and straight. It was evident that the shows were lighthearted and typically put on to brighten the mood and make the audience laugh. On top of that, as Reddy notes, most men were far too preoccupied with their survival to worry too much about sexuality.⁷⁸ This was especially true on the front lines or near combat, where drag shows were often the only source of entertainment for soldiers.⁷⁹

Although it was rare to be attacked or harassed for performing in drag, there were still risks gay soldiers assumed when they performed.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷⁴ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 72.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁷⁷ “Tom Reddy Interview” from *Coming Out Under Fire*, 1:03:30.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 30:00.

⁷⁹ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 185.

Even though the shows boosted morale, they still had to be done in a manner that was acceptable to the heteronormative standards of the military. It was especially pertinent that the soldiers in drag understood just how far to push the envelope in their performances and to be skilled in reading the room.⁸⁰ If he could make the soldiers in the audience laugh, the artist would probably be safe. However, if the soldier performed an act that was too queer in nature, or if the production contained too many homosexual innuendos, he could find himself in trouble.⁸¹ If the act went too far for the mostly heterosexual audience, performers could be reported for homosexuality to their superiors.

Another potential negative consequence of performing in drag could be receiving unwanted sexual advances from other soldiers. For Robert Fleischer, his shows eventually led to the rougher guys in the company teasing him often. It escalated to a point for Fleischer where he could no longer tell if their advances were a joke or if they were truly coming onto him. This was not unthinkable for Fleischer to believe, as many gay men were aware that straight soldiers also slept with men during the war.⁸² It was not rare for straight soldiers to experience “deprivation homosexuality,” or when naturally straight men would have homosexual sex due to a prolonged lack of available women.⁸³

But military men were not always on base, working, or performing in drag shows. Servicemen occasionally received the chance to venture into military cities with a format that let them live a bit more at ease, and for many, this provided them with their first real opportunity at having other young gay friends.⁸⁴ Openly effeminate soldiers that journeyed into military cities typically had an easier time making gay friends and building social networks, as they were often easier for other soldiers to distinguish in a crowd.⁸⁵ Therefore, the more effeminate men were more likely to be sought out by other homosexuals seeking friendship than were more masculine gay soldiers.

Similar to other military spaces, being too effeminate and outwardly queer in military cities could be disastrous for soldiers. Military Police often patrolled the cities and attempted to restrict the overindulgence of vice, which included gay sex. If one was caught having sex with another man, it could lead to harsh punishment from the MPs, including imprisonment or a less-than-honorable discharge.⁸⁶ Furthermore, “queer bashers” often hung out near gay cruising spots

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 92.

⁸³ Costello, *Virtue Under Fire*, 106.

⁸⁴ *Coming Out Under Fire*, by Arthur E. Dong, 19:00.

⁸⁵ Bérubé, *Coming Out Under Fire*, 100.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

searching for potential victims.⁸⁷ It was not rare for gay men to be attacked in well-known hookup spots. On top of this, being too public about one's sexuality could lead to the closing of local gay bars. More masculine men often blamed the "swishy" soldiers for the closing of their favorite bars.⁸⁸ Although it was not necessarily their fault, this could lead to overtly feminine and queer soldiers being ostracized by other servicemen. Still, although there were risks for gay men in military cities, many were able to build social networks and bonds that would persist past their time as American soldiers in the Second World War.

Gay soldiers' performance of their gender and sexuality allowed some to thrive in the military, whereas others did not have the same experience. It also led to many gay men meeting other homosexuals for the first time, which helped many soldiers build social networks that would last even after the war. The result of so many gay men serving in World War II and the relationships they formed by serving in the military produced at least one major long-term effect for America. Due to the international dynamics of the war and the number of gay servicemen, the exposure from befriending fellow homosexual soldiers catalyzed the gay-rights movement in a way that could never be undone.⁸⁹

When the war ended, the new relationships made by the soldiers encouraged them to move to the urban areas that already had flourishing gay subcultures. Cities like New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, which already had thriving queer scenes before 1941, experienced an increase in their homosexual population after the war. But this growth in the gay population was not limited to just the major metropolises in America. Even smaller cities like Denver, Cleveland, and San Jose experienced immediate increases in the total number of gay bars, indicating that the number of homosexuals increased.⁹⁰ Being in the company of other young gay soldiers helped men and women "forge a group existence" and both during and after the war an "urban gay subculture took shape."⁹¹ Ironically, the anti-homosexual United States military provided the catalyst for the construction of a gay identity in America, and the march toward gay rights, therefore, began soon after World War Two.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁸⁹ "George Buse Interview" from *Before Stonewall*, 30:00.

⁹⁰ D'Emilio, *Sexual Politics*, 31-32.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 39.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

- “Archibald Wilson Interview” conducted by Marry Ann Humphrey, 1988. From *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*.
- “Charles Schoen Interview” conducted by Marry Ann Humphrey, 1988. From *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*.
- “David Bowling Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985. From *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*.
- “George Buse Interview” from *Before Stonewall: The Making of a Gay and Lesbian Community*. DVD.
- “Hank Villas Interview” from *Before Stonewall: The Making of a Gay and Lesbian Community*. DVD.
- “John H. Abbot Interview” conducted by Studs Terkel. From *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II*.
- “John McPherson Interview” conducted by Marry Ann Humphrey, 1988. From *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*.
- “Jonathon West Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985. From *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*.
- “Nicolai Interview” from *Coming Out Under Fire*. DVD
- “Paul Hardman Interview” conducted by Marry Ann Humphrey, 1988. From *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*.
- “Richard Berg Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985. From *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*.
- “Stuart Loomis Interview” from *Coming Out Under Fire*. DVD.
- “Ted Allenby Interview” conducted by Studs Terkel, 1984. From *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II*.
- “Tom Reddy Interview” from *Coming Out Under Fire*. DVD
- “Tony Isaac Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985. From *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*.
- “Will Whiting Interview” conducted by Keith Vacha, 1985. From *Quiet Fire: Memoirs of Older Gay Men*.

Secondary Sources:

- Before Stonewall: The Making of a Gay and Lesbian Community*. Directed by Gretta Schiller. United States, 1984. DVD.
- Belkin, Aaron. *Bring Me Men: Military Masculinity and the Benign Façade of American Empire: 1898-2001*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
- Bérubé, Allan. *Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II*. Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
- Cervini, Eric. *The Deviant's War: The Homosexual Vs. The United States of America*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2020.
- Coming Out Under Fire*. By Arthur E. Dong. Produced by Arthur E. Dong. Directed by Arthur E. Dong. DVD.
- Costello, John. *Virtue Under Fire: How World War II Changed Our Social and Sexual Attitudes*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1985.
- D’Emilio, John. *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Eaklor, Vicki L. *Queer America: A GLBT History of the 20th Century*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008.

Humphrey, Mary Ann. *My Country, My Right to Serve: Experiences of Gay Men and Women in the Military, World War II to the Present*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1988.

Jarvis, Christina S. *The Male Body at War: American Masculinity During World War II*. Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004.

Creating the Liberator

Patrick Blinkinsop

A young man rests upon the scattered ruins of Rome. Into wealth and privilege, he was born. His parents were members of the aristocratic elite of Caracas and established his privilege at the moment of his birth. Despite the guaranteed comfort and easy life his birth gives him, something within him stirs. Something his family's money and prestige cannot tame. Standing amidst the fallen structures of the Great Republic, the precursor of all the West, he prepares himself and, in a few words, announces to those present his intentions. Inspired by the writings of the Enlightenment and his tutelage under Simón Rodríguez, this young man swears an oath in the birthplace of republican tradition to see his homeland of Venezuela freed from the archaic rule of the Spanish crown. So begins the illustrious and controversial career of Simón Bolívar, "*El Libertador*" of Latin America.¹

Simón Bolívar is immensely popular with public figures and social movements in Latin America. Since he is considered the founding father of the nations of South America, his popularity does not come as a surprise. What is intriguing is the total embrace of Bolívar in the political sphere of many Latin American countries. This is not simply limited to those that claim him as the founding father of their nation but to lands like Cuba, an ocean away from his homeland. Throughout his life, Bolívar was in a near-constant state of contradiction between his idealistic beliefs and actions. As an ardent liberal versed in the writings of the Enlightenment, he governed as an authoritarian and became the prototypical *caudillo* political leader that would plague institutional development throughout the post-independence period. However, to these groups, Bolívar's history holds little, if any, controversy. The widespread utilization of his image provokes minimal critical thought into the actual receptivity of Bolívar's ideals to their movements. Around the image of Simón Bolívar, a cult personality was born, molding him into a Latin American icon and reconciling the contradictory history of the man with the political positions of their movements. Bolivarianists can reject or conform to the conflicting nature of their idol to meet their political agenda. Through apologetic arguments, they recreate their history around Bolívar by using imagery and anecdotes that draw comparisons to perceived or invented similarities between themselves

¹ Simon Bolivar, "Oath taken in Rome," in *El Libertador: Writings of Simon Bolivar*. Translated by Frederick H. Fornoff. Edited by David Bushnell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 113-114.

and their hero. These machinations are aided by the contradictory nature of Simón Bolívar, supplying a pool of qualities and writings to elevate above the rest, conveniently losing or re-imagining other less applicable traits in the process.

In writing about the cult surrounding the image of the Liberator, it is essential to properly define the mentality and disposition that forms the cult. Bolivarianism is a Latin American movement that seeks to hold up the popular memory of Simón Bolívar as a pinnacle of Pan-Latin American virtue. The movement is present in many Latin American countries within Spanish America. At the national level, Bolívar's image is used to invoke nationalistic fervor, often in support of the state. While Bolivarianism has acquired many separate nationalist elements from its several host countries, the focus of the movement trends towards transnational issues such as anti-imperialism and anti-corruption among Latin American states. Many socialist governments in the region, particularly Cuba and Venezuela, utilized the international qualities of Bolivarianism to reinforce their ideologies in their states and broadly export it throughout Latin America. While stricter definitions would help identify particular strains of the cult of Bolívar, the movement has been reinvented a number of times and, as a rule, is highly malleable.

The Life of the Liberator

Many failings can be attributed to Simón Bolívar throughout his life, but sloth and idleness are not among them. Few can compete with the raw vitality Bolívar brought to his writings and ambitions. In fulfilling his oath, he twice crossed the Atlantic, visited the United States, and sought refuge in the Caribbean several times. In war, he led his armies in campaigns covering much of Northern South America, from Colombia and Venezuela's coastal plains and jungles to the Peruvian Andes. Between Western Europe and the settled lands of the American continent, Bolívar's travels spanned a hefty swath of the map. He kept in his correspondence several notable men of the age; the Marquis de Lafayette, a French hero of the American Revolution, and Alexandre Petion, the first president of an independent Haiti, both famed in their time, received and responded to letters from the Liberator. Bolívar, through his avid correspondence and travels, was able to weave a network of notable people that would support his efforts toward independence. In the process, he created an audience to engage with his ideas and beliefs that stretched beyond the reach of his distant corner of the nineteenth-century world.²

² Lynch John, *Simón Bolívar: A Life*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 119-130.

Bolívar did not earn renown from his well-traveled and well-connected life. He was instrumental as the military commander of the revolution, and from his deeds on the march, he made his reputation as a determined and resilient soldier. In 1811, under Francisco de Miranda and in defense of the fledgling First Venezuelan Republic, Bolívar led forces against a counter-revolution. This proved he was vital to the defense of the beleaguered state. Despite his efforts on the battlefield, the rapid collapse of the First Republic was not far off. With Miranda's surrender of the country to Royalist commander Monteverde, Bolívar carried his ambitions into neighboring New Granada, where he continued to fight for independence against the Spanish.³ His surrogate country granted him a commission and, with some persistent lobbying by Bolívar, commanded him to liberate Venezuela. With these orders, he began the *Campaña Admirable*, striking successfully at Caracas, where he established the Second Venezuelan Republic. However, his success betrayed him. Overextended and undersupplied, Bolívar battled against the inevitable as the weight of Spanish power in South America crushed the meager defenses of the Second Republic. Again routed from Venezuela, Bolívar returned to New Granada to lead a swift campaign against the rebelling state of Cundinamarca. Though victorious against the rebels, the revolution hung perpetually on the edge of collapse. Under renewed Spanish assaults and internally divided, New Granada shared the same fate as Venezuela and succumbed in 1815.

Bolívar left the failing country and drifted around the Caribbean, where he found a patron in the president of Haiti, who funded his next military campaign. Landing on the Venezuelan coast in 1816, he fought a short-lived campaign that left his forces scattered and forced him to return to Haiti. Undeterred, Bolívar regrouped and rearmed before again landing in Venezuela. Linking with the remnants of his previous invasion and the larger Venezuelan resistance, his forces finally cleared the country of Spanish troops in 1821 with his victory at Carabobo and the subsequent securing of Caracas in 1821, a decade after the inauguration of the First Republic.⁴

Bolívar's campaign to liberate his homeland did not stop with the surrender of the last Spanish forces in Venezuela. Aware that Spain could use any of their other colonies on the continent as a staging ground

³ Before moving to New Granada Bolívar would turn on his superior and mentor Francisco Miranda. Believing that Miranda betrayed the Revolution to the Spanish by capitulating the young commander arrested Miranda before he could flee the country and surrendered him to the Spanish. Miranda would die in a Spanish prison in Cadiz in 1816.

⁴ Gerhard Masur, *Simón Bolívar*, (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1948), 126-154, 171-184, 425-443.

for a new effort to reclaim the liberated country, Bolívar embarked on a new campaign to break away the remaining Spanish holdings on the South American Continent. Before the victory of Carabobo, Bolívar recognized the importance of New Granada to the security of an independent Venezuela and opened a second front to liberate the sister colony. In 1822, while Bolívar battled against Royalist holdouts in Southern Granada, his lieutenant Antonio Jose de Sucre liberated the country of Quito (Modern Day Ecuador) surrounding the Royalists facing Bolívar, inciting their surrender to the general. The last holdouts of Spanish authority within Bolívar's reach were the vice-royalties of Peru and Upper Peru. The year 1823 put the armies of Bolívar on the march as he began a two-year campaign to drag the mountainous country of Peru to independence. When reviewing the events of the wars of independence for South America, Bolívar's central role is clear, and his persistence is vital to the movement's success. At times it seemed his resilience in the face of the near-constant stream of defeats and setbacks prevented the failure of the revolution, and his rebounding invasions maintained the momentum needed to eventually overwhelm the depleted Spanish empire.⁵

While playing his part as General of the revolution, Bolívar also fulfilled duties as a statesman and in the game of politics, he was no less bold than when he set out on campaign. Early in the revolution, Bolívar joined a diplomatic mission to secure British support for the Supreme Junta of Venezuela, the precursor to the First Republic. While in London, he and others in the party convinced Francisco de Miranda to return from exile and lead the coming struggle. Before his third invasion of Venezuela, Bolívar decreed the emancipation of the enslaved people. With the revolution's eventual success, his decree would free not just the enslaved of independent Venezuela but those held in all of Gran Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Bolívar wrote the constitution of Bolivia and was central in the formation of the unified nation of New Granada, Venezuela and Quito named Colombia.⁶ As president of Gran Colombia, Bolívar's first step toward his vision of a great united American state, was to institute the Panama Congress.

Because of the political ideas he put forth and the powerful impact of his life, Bolivarianists revere Bolívar as a near saintly figure, a man who never strayed from the righteous path of South American liberation. In contrast, this Bolivarian image of the Liberator is a more critical review of his actions. This perspective reveals a figure of history

⁵ Lynch John, *Simón Bolívar*, 133-142, 167-196.

⁶ Known as Gran Colombia by historians to distinguish it from a successor state which holds the same name.

who carried grand ideas onto the political stage; but whose actions constantly compromised his espoused beliefs or demonstrated a double-sidedness between his private dealings and the front he gave to the public. Bolívar freed the slaves of Latin America, and this act upholds his reputation as the great Liberator. However, in a letter to his lieutenant, Bolívar justified his decree not on the grounds of the Enlightenment or the Rights of Man but by freeing them and placing them on the battlefield. During his tenure as president of Colombia, Bolívar was criticized for his assumption of dictatorial powers. In his defense, he stated that his usage of these powers was embedded in the Constitution created by the people. Therefore, his authority was not arbitrary like a tyrant but rested on the will of the people. His control of the army, whether he intended it or not, played a role in his political power. His defense of dictatorial powers overlooks the basic fact that Bolívar was instrumental in the drafting and passing of the constitution of Colombia, making the powers he assumed from it a concealed self-empowerment. Bolívar's life was filled with controversies and contradictions that, to the critical eye, turns the Bolivarian image into a caricature of the living man.⁷

An Image Reforged

Before his death, Bolívar expressed his frustration with how the events of his life played out, famously noting, "America is ungovernable... those who serve revolution plow the sea."⁸ On his deathbed, racked by tuberculosis, Bolívar believed the fruition of his life to be a failure. His constitutions in the countries he liberated had been rejected. His appointed successor Antonio Sucre was assassinated. The political landscape had become dominated by *caudillo* figures he detested (ironically wielding political power in much the same way he did) and rising regionalism. The notion of a Gran Colombia that he hoped would unite all Latin America under a single cause dissolved. It would never come to be. To himself, his life seemed wasted on fruitless ambitions, and he died believing himself a failure in his most important goals. But around the memory of his life sprung the beginnings of the cult of Simón Bolívar, and to them, the labors that built his misery would come to mean so much more.

Those present at his initial burial in Cartagena, Colombia, felt the impact of his death. Even those who opposed him went to the "altars

⁷ Bolívar, *Writings of Simon Bolivar*, 137-138, 141-142.

⁸ Bolívar, "Letter to General Juan Jose Flores: 'Ploughing the Sea,'" in *Writings of Simon Bolivar*, 145-149.

to honor his memory and raise his vows to the most high for the public tranquility in the orphanhood... his death [had] left the homeland [in].” A monument erected in the Cathedral of Santa Marta for Bolívar’s funeral consisted of an obelisk forty-five feet high in a Tuscan Style (a tie to the homeland of republicanism and his youthful oath) where his portrait hung flanked by two statues representative of America, the land he adored and religion, a dominating institution in Hispanic society. Further aside his body flew the flags of the member states of Colombia and friendly countries.⁹ Despite the flare of the initial funeral, the revival of his image did not come about immediately because regardless of his status as the Liberator of Spanish America, many in the countries he liberated hated him. While still alive, speeches in the National Assembly of Gran Colombia often attacked Bolívar’s character, and though his sister wrote to him as he set off to exile that the people and the clergy supported him (which the funeral could undoubtedly be evidence of) many Liberals called for the execution of the entire Bolívar family along with Simón to prevent any conservative attempt to establish a monarchy at the head of the state. To these individuals, his immediate death did not yield an ounce of pity. “Bolívar ‘... the spirit of evil, the author of all misfortunes, the oppressor of the fatherland ... ‘ had died.”¹⁰ The public’s opinion of Bolívar in Venezuela had sunk so low it would be over a decade for his body to be exhumed and returned to Caracas as he had wished for in his Will. This is not to imply that at the time of his death he had been completely abandoned by public officials. In fact, quite the opposite had been the reality. He kept correspondence with Urdaneta, the new president of Gran Colombia, and his supporters in the government and the military constantly beseeched him to return to politics because, they argued, the nation needed and still supported him. Weathered, tired, and losing to tuberculosis that bore throughout his lungs, no appeal, no cry for his return could sway Bolívar away from his intended exile. From these devoted supporters, we see the beginnings of the salvaging of his reputation. Most fervent was his mistress, Manuela Saenz. Outspoken as always, she wrote and spoke in defense of Bolívar despite his growing disapproval. She would never lose her zealous admiration for her dead lover. Through her writings, the mentality which would form the basis of the cult of Bolívar can clearly be seen. “I loved the Liberator when he was alive; now that he is dead, I worship him.”¹¹

⁹ A.P. Reverand, “*La Ultima Enfermedad Los Ultimos Momentos Y Los Funerales De Simon Bolivar Libertador De Colombia Y Del Peru Por Su Medico De Cabecera El Doctor A.P. Reverand*,” (Paris: 1866), 69-74.

¹⁰ Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, 683-684, 693.

¹¹ Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, 693.

Less than a year after Bolívar's death, his passion project of Gran Colombia dissolved, splintering into the three countries: New Granada (renamed Colombia after the dissolution), Ecuador, and Venezuela. Much like their predecessor, these countries remained chronically unstable. In his final proclamation to the citizens of Gran Colombia, Bolívar aspired "to no other glory than the consolidation of Colombia" and if his death could ensure the unity of his country then he would "step peacefully into the grave."¹² These words went unheard by the politicians of the newly independent states. This prompted the politicians to organize an event designed to use Bolívar's image to build public support and mask the condition of their countries with the pomp and flair that came with the return of the hero liberator to his hometown. Since his passing in 1830, the Liberator laid in state in the Church of Santa Marta in Colombia. In 1842, Paez, the president of Venezuela, a political peer and often opponent of Bolívar, pushed through legislation that ordered his remains to be repatriated to Venezuela. His government grew unpopular, and in reclaiming the body of the Liberator, Paez sought to acquire some legitimacy that still radiated from the hero of South America. In the hopes of realigning the popular image of the hero Bolívar with their own public personas, the politicians of the city, many of whom opposed Bolívar's ambitions in life and dissolved Gran Colombia after his death, now lauded the vision and glory of the Liberator as he was reburied in Caracas. Paez's intentions for the repatriation of Bolívar's body and the speeches given by public figures as his remains were interred in Caracas show the earliest redefinition of the image of Bolívar and the formal beginnings of his cult.¹³

From the masses below comes another redefinition of Bolívar as he is tied to an institution of significant importance to a majority of the populace of all Spanish America at the time, the Catholic Church. The Catholic faith has a practice of elevating recognized, devotedly pious individuals to sainthood as guides and protectors of the faithful. Officially, the individual must be confirmed to have performed miracles after their death before being considered for canonization. It is not uncommon for great public figures, whose memory is well respected, to be adorned in similar manners as saints though they lack the official touch of the Church Canon. Relics of a saint are often kept to be prayed on and give a holy connection between the supplicant and the saint.

¹² Simon Bolivar. "Final Proclamation of the Liberator," in *El Libertador Writings of Simon Bolivar*, 150.

¹³ Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, 693; Fermin Toro. "Description of the Funeral Honors," in *The Liberator, Simon Bolivar: Man and Image*, Edited by David Bushnell, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1970), 114-121; John Lynch, *Simon Bolivar: A Life*, 300.

Bolívar, in this one specific aspect, was imprinted with this notion of sainthood. After his body was removed from Colombia, the country requested to keep his heart, where it remained in the Cathedral of Santa Marta. Though the remains of Bolívar no longer rested in Colombia, the story that the heart of Bolívar was held in the first country he Liberated kept the glory and legitimacy of the Liberator present in Colombia, where it remained accessible to the prayers of the people. As pointed out by historian Mary Watters, the revolution of Latin America did not array itself against the Catholic faith, though the church hierarchy supported the continuance of Spanish rule. She identifies Bolívar as indifferent to religious convictions with political beliefs that focused on the religious freedom of the community over any one faith. Though religiously liberal, he believed in state protection and control of the church, though not total domination of the institution by the state.¹⁴ His apathy in his private practice of the faith brings a degree of irony and a definite conflict with his elevation to unofficial sainthood by the people of Colombia and Venezuela. Coupled with the saddened religious statue that observed his first funeral, it is clear the Catholic Church and the people saw their hero derived and devoted to the Catholic faith, regardless of Bolívar's more liberal opinion of the Church and its intended role in Bolívar's society.

To a newly independent Latin America, Simón Bolívar was the great man, the hero of independence. All great men require a source of legitimacy for their greatness. As John Chasteen says, "In an important way, great men were replacements for the hereditary monarchs ousted by republican revolutions." Where the monarchs drew their legitimacy from the dynasty, a great man in a republican system, lacking the long resume of a royal line, became reliant on their deeds and actions for legitimacy and prestige. In Chasteen's opinion, the popularity of Bolívar stemmed from his leadership status, his vision of independence, and the people's need for a heroic liberator. This last point must be expanded on. Bolívar, the man, merely provided the framework for Latin American legitimacy with his life, while Bolívar, the myth, forged in the minds of the people of Latin America a history complete with a set of values, morals, and tenets for their independence. In line with Chasteen's thinking on the nature of legitimacy and rulers, where a country with a monarchical form of government has a ruler with a long familial tradition as a monarch to provide the country its source of legitimacy, in a republican revolutionary government, like those of Latin America after the 1830s, it seems logical to contend that the people of the country

¹⁴ Watters, Mary. "Bolívar and the Church". *The Catholic Historical Review*. 1935. 21. No 3. 299-313. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25013385>.

require a great individual to provide for their own legitimacy. For the newly independent states of Latin America, the myth of Bolívar provided a glorious origin story that tethered the people to a distinct history separate from North America and Europe. Bolívar became, as Masur puts it, "... an essential element in their development."¹⁵

Socialism and the Liberator

With the introduction of Socialism to Latin America came a new iteration of the Bolivarian Cult, along similar lines as the old. Initial socialist writings on Bolívar constructed him as a false prophet.¹⁶ Karl Marx's description of him in the 1858 *New American Encyclopedia* made Bolívar a conniving and cowardly man, and for a time, this view of Bolívar held in socialist literature. However, to make socialist ideas palatable to the masses of Latin America, writers worked to reconcile Bolívar with Marx's ideas. In some socialist writings, Bolívar no longer sought "to take advantage of the popular masses for the political elevation of the creole landowners and for his own career" for now, he was "an outstanding figure of an emancipation movement."¹⁷

The interaction between Socialism and the Bolivarian Cult is unique because Socialism changed the dogma established by Marx to better accommodate the Bolivarian identity. The unessential nature of Marx's opinion on Bolívar held to the whole of Socialist ideology, and the need to capitalize on the success of Castro in Cuba to expand other socialism in Latin America allowed Socialist intelligentsia to "correct" Marx on the Liberator's role in the global class struggle. For Latin Americans, the aligning of Bolívar with Socialist movements represented a desire to rip the Liberator away from the national pantheons of the states to better utilize his image in the elevation of their goals. In the end, Bolivarianism adopted aspects of Socialism beyond Soviet control as Socialist revolutionaries, especially in Venezuela, began to view with suspicion the influences of European socialism. Instead of tying themselves to the Internationalism of the Soviets, many socialist groups in Latin America explored their own history of slavery

¹⁵ John Chasteen, "Simon Bolívar: Man and Myth," in *Heroes and Hero Cults* edited by Samuel Brunk & Ben Fallaw, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 22. Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolívar*, 694.

¹⁶ Though they would never use so religious a word.

¹⁷ M.S. Al'perovich, V.I. Ermolaev, I.R. Lavretskii, and S.I. Semyonov, "The Bolívar of Marx Corrected," in *The Liberator Simon Bolívar Man and Image*, 188-189. Karl Marx, "Bolívar y Ponte" in *The New American Encyclopedia* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1858).

and class struggle creating a new style of Socialism incorporating Bolivarianism and Liberation Theology.¹⁸

Venezuela, Chavez, and a new Bolivarian Identity

Revolutions do not happen in stable times. To Venezuelan political elites and the broader world, Venezuelan democracy in the latter twentieth century was a stable, exceptional institution immune to the political shocks of upstarts and revolutions. Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian movement forced a reexamination of this notion. The stability in Venezuela throughout the twentieth century had been grossly misunderstood. The tensions slowly simmered throughout the century until they frothed over in the last decade of the twentieth century. Historians before Chávez's victory wrote of Venezuela as an exceptional democracy among Latin American states believing it benefited from a lack of racial tension and democratic instability which plagued the country's neighbors at the time. Two theories were presented to explain this: first came the role of Venezuela's oil wealth in weakening the national oligarchy and creating a relatively small working class. This eased the creation of inter-class political parties. Second, came a system referred to as "pacted democracy" with the involvement of a grand political coalition of multiple parties to support the state and ensure its stability. Both traits claimed to have enabled a robust democracy to exist in Venezuela despite the third-world status of the country.¹⁹

These prevailing beliefs ascribed to Venezuela's success overlooked the growing tension and clear signs of political instability present throughout the working and lower classes of twentieth-century Venezuela. The political dominance of *caudillo* figures put a constant strain on the nation's politics since before the passing of Bolívar. Although the militancy and civil wars of the nineteenth century had passed, politics in the country still centered around grandiose political figures and their loyal supporters. Atop the authoritarian trend, the Latin American democracy admired by the West showed clear signs of systemic abuse and suppression that added to the stress on the system. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the government violated civil rights, especially of the working class, where Chávez would find the majority

¹⁸ George Ciccariello-Maher, "Venezuela Bolivarianism and the Commune," in *Rethinking Latin American Social Movements: Radical Action From Below*, edited by Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden and Marc Becker. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 253-254.

¹⁹ Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, "The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis: Separating Myth from Reality," in *Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"*, edited by Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2007), 4-7.

of his support. The governing party took over unions not affiliated directly with the current government and brutally crushed any resistance to the takeovers. At the same time, the government often worked against the reformist desires of the people overturning elections of pro-reformist or leftist candidates in favor of centrist or conservative ones, like those ordered by President Betancourt in the 1967 *Acción Democrática* party elections.²⁰

While accepted as a model democracy due to its decades without large-scale political strife, the idea of Venezuelan exceptionalism was an incorrect view of the country. The applauded stability resulted from a pacted democratic system that ensured all legitimately organized political parties supported the actions of the state. Excluded or actively suppressed were dissenting groups and opinions that did not disappear and hid under the mainstream to escape persecution. From the pacted democratic system, a large percentage of the population went years unrepresented and frustrated at the politics of the nation. 1989 brought the Venezuelan system to its ultimate culmination with the *Caracazo*. Following an economic downturn, subsequent debt crisis, and a government solution that privatized several public sectors of the economy, a protest erupted in Guarenas. It quickly spread to neighboring cities, including the capital of Caracas. The heavy-handed crackdown of security forces on the protesters sparked riots that claimed hundreds to over a thousand lives and left an entire generation and class of people open to change in the clearly hostile system.²¹

From stage left of the political world, enter Chavez. Elected president in 1998, he was first introduced to the public as the ringleader of an attempted military coup six years prior. He organized among junior officers of the army a Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement that vowed to bring the ideals of the Liberator to the administration of the country. Though the coup failed, and Chávez was imprisoned with his accomplices for two years, the people of Venezuela would not forget this officer and his espoused reformist beliefs.

After the coup's failure, there was one goal on the mind of Chávez; his intentions were expressed in a brief response to the question "And where are you going now?" presented upon his release from prison, "to power."²² The political campaign that followed his release in 1994 introduced to every corner of Venezuela the Bolivarian agenda. Though the candidates his movement put forth in various gubernatorial and mayoral elections were arrested or otherwise prevented from partaking,

²⁰ Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, "The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis," 8.

²¹ Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, "The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis," 8-10.

²² Interview with Chavez, 12-13.

the movement had expanded beyond the ability of the government to suppress it. Bolivarianism rhetoric across the country linked together revolutionary movements previously isolated and reformed them into a unified national Bolivarian front that eventually achieved sweeping electoral victory in 1998.²³

Hugo Chávez lived his political career at the focal point of the most modern iteration of the Cult of Bolívar. With control of the presidency, Chávez became a lens to focus the vast popular reform energy embedded in the populace into political action. In practice, Chávez's form of Bolivarianism was both remarkably traditional and yet revised from earlier iterations. He maintained a strong centralized state reliant on military participation in politics to maintain stability. With malice towards American or European influences, Chávez initiated efforts for a more united Latin America on the world stage. The military was often used to subvert the opposition in Congress and began the direct implementation of "Project Bolívar," an act that would have brought a pained grimace to the dead Liberator, who made his negative opinions on *caudillos* and a civilian-military blend of governance clear in his writings (pardoning himself from such criticism). Chávez's contempt for the fourth republic and its constitution can easily be felt in his presidential oath: "I swear before this waning constitution that I will do everything in my power to give our people a true magna carta worthy of their dreams."²⁴ Throughout his time in office, Chávez battled conservative opponents using vague constitutional language, the military, and popular politics to push forward his Bolivarian agenda.²⁵

Chávez's battles to reassert government control over the now mostly privatized Venezuelan oil company PDVSA (Petroleum of Venezuela) is the clearest example of his traditional Bolivarian movement in practice. Bolívar is often touted as an anti-imperialist figure because of his long war against imperial Spain and his post-independence efforts to unify Central and South America against the expanding interests of North America and Europe. In the prior three decades before the Chávez presidency, but most intensely in the 1990s, Venezuelan governments allowed the national oil company to open to private investors, many foreign venture capitalists. Chávez considered this a tragedy: "Economic interests are what count to capitalists-sovereignty... a few deaths, none of this is important. They care about

²³ Interview with Chavez, 18-22.

George CiccarIELlo-Maher, "Venezuela Bolivarianism and the Commune," 253-254.

²⁴ Aleida Guevara, *Chavez and the New Latin America: An Interview with Hugo Chavez* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2005), 35.

²⁵ Guevara, *Chavez and the New Latin America*, 14-42.

how much is in their wallets.”²⁶ In his interview with Aleida Guevara, Chávez paints his struggle against the PDVSA as a fight to liberate the Venezuelan company, which represented Venezuela's most valuable natural asset from foreign interests that owed no loyalty to the country. The economic shutdown and military coup of 2001-2002 extended this struggle to the broader economy as foreign moneyed interests influenced Venezuelans to work against themselves by sabotaging production and withholding economic participation. Chávez claimed, “The April coup was a coup for oil,” and it only confirmed his need for Venezuela to be rid of these extraneous interests and for the PDVSA to be brought back under the control of the state because of its central role in the national economy.²⁷ Chávez clearly saw among the greatest woes of Venezuela the influence foreign companies had on the economy and sought to follow in his idol's footsteps in working to secure his country against that threat.

Another definite expression of the Liberator's anti-imperialist influence on the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement is Chávez's disgust with and refusal to enter the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). It was, as implied in the name, a treaty between American states to establish free trade between signatories. Chávez contested the treaty, “We cannot sign an FTAA agreement without violating our constitution.” He believed the agreement to be “an abuse of sovereignty; it is a colonial, imperialist plan.”²⁸ At negotiations and meetings between potential member nations, he lambasted the agreement as Washington's attempt to subvert the national defenses. He instead sought out a Latin American organization that would promote development in South America without the overt influence of the United States, proposing the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). The FTAA failed in no small part due to Venezuela's concerns about Washington's influence. For Chávez ALBA became a pet project, not unlike Bolívar's Panama Congress, a dream which his hope spurred on that Latin America could unite under one monetary zone like Europe and potentially open the way for a great alliance of Latin American states that would defend

²⁶ Guevara, *Chavez and the New Latin America*, 44-45.

²⁷ Guevara, *Chavez and the New Latin America*, 43-47.

Dick Parker, “Chavez and the Search for an Alternative to Neoliberalism,” in *Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an 'Exceptional Democracy'* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 64-67.

²⁸ Guevara, *Chavez and the New Latin America*, 101.

against military incursions as well as the economic dominance of the United States.²⁹

With the death of Bolívar, his image became detached from the reality of his life, free to be utilized by those that survived him for whatever purpose they required. To his supporters, Bolívar was the great Liberator that freed Latin America from Spanish rule. His detractors, no longer in need of a demon to rally against, adopted his models of a centralized state and *caudillo-style* government to secure their own political power in the example of the Liberator. To the people of Latin America and to the writers later in the nineteenth century, he became the great father of all Latinos to be adored and held in high regard. Socialism attempted to attach itself to the character of Bolívar, but many socialists by the late 1970s suspicious of European and American economic and political models instead created their own movements beyond Soviet and Western forms. When Chávez arrived on the scene in Venezuela at the turn of the twentieth century, the reformist and socialist movements present in the country joined under his vision of a Bolívarian nation and propelled his ascendance to the presidency. None of these iterations of the cult hold a perfectly accurate historical image of their idol. What they maintain are reflections of the man throughout the waves of history muddled with the image of themselves in the water.

²⁹ Guevara, *Chavez and the New Latin America*, 101-1Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, ed., *Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an 'Exceptional Democracy'* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 10, 26-27, 67, 90.

Bibliography

- Bolívar, Simon. *El Libertador Writings of Simon Bolívar*. Translated by Frederick H. Fornoff. Edited by David Bushnell. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Reverand, A.P. *La Ultima Enfermedad Los Ultimos Momentos Y Los Funerales De Simon Bolívar Libertador De Colombia Y Del Peru Por Su Medico De Cabecera El Doctor A.P. Reverand*. Paris, 1866.
- Guevara, Aleida. *Chavez Venezuela and the New Latin America an Interview with Hugo Chavez*. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2005.
- The Liberator, Simon Bolívar: Man and Image*. Edited by David Bushnell. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1970.
- Watters, Mary. "Bolívar and the Church". *The Catholic Historical Review*, 1935. 21. No 3. 299-313. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25013385>.
- Masur, Gerhard. *Simon Bolívar*. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press. 1948.
- Essays on the Life of the Liberator*. Edited by David Bushnell and Lester D. Langley. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008.
- Ciccariello-Maher, George. "Venezuela Bolivarianism and the Commune" in *Rethinking Latin American Social Movements Radical Action From Below*. Edited by Richard Stahler-Sholk, Harry E. Vanden and Marc Becker. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 251-265.
- Chasteen, John. "Simon Bolívar Man and Myth" in *Heroes and Hero Cults in Latin America*. Edited by Samuel Brunk & Ben Fallaw. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006. 21-39.
- Venezuela Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy."* Edited by Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007.
- Lynch, John. *Simon Bolívar: A Life*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2006.
- Marx, Karl. "Bolívar y Ponte" in *The New American Encyclopedia*. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1858.

The Politics of Redemption: Lessons from the Life of George C. Wallace

Samuel Ruttenburg

Fifty-six years after the end of *de jure* racial segregation in the United States, former Vice President Joe Biden was called upon to apologize for having once had friendly working relationships with segregationists. “Apologize for what?” Biden balked at reporters, “There’s not a racist bone in my body.”¹ Over the course of the next several days, Biden’s remarks caused an outcry as they made their rounds on social and mainstream media platforms. Then, at a rally in South Carolina, the Democratic candidate for the presidency reversed himself. “I regret it,” he said, “and I am sorry for any of the pain or misconception that I may have caused anybody.”² Biden, who was elected President in 2020, presented the latest case of a high-profile politician using the politics of redemption to win an election. He was far from the first.

George C. Wallace, arguably the most notorious segregationist of the 20th century, utilized several political strategies throughout a long and tumultuous career in order to gain power. In the early 1960s, Wallace rode the wave of “massive resistance” to become the Governor of Alabama. As a presidential candidate, Wallace adopted “law and order” to gain a broader base of support. And finally, after suffering the unimaginable, Wallace turned to the politics of redemption in the hopes of not only winning an election but of rewriting his legacy in the history books. After fighting harder than almost anyone else in history to maintain racial segregation and causing untold harm to thousands of Black people, Wallace sought to win Alabama’s 1984 gubernatorial election with the outright support of the Black community. What caused him to want to do this? Was he successful? Why or why not? The answers to these questions provide the key to understanding why the legacy that George Wallace tried so hard to leave behind is so radically different from the one that he currently enjoys today.

Before George Wallace became the face of American demagoguery, he had a reputation for being a liberal, a fighter, and a good man. After returning from World War II, Wallace pursued a career in politics with the same tenacity and grit that made him a formidable boxer. Stephan Leshner, a biographer of Wallace, wrote that as a member of Alabama’s House of Representatives from 1946 to 1952, Wallace’s

¹ ABC News, “Biden not apologizing amid segregationist backlash,” June 20, 2019, YouTube.

² NBC News, “Joe Biden Apologizes for Comments About Working With Senate Segregationists.” July 6, 2019, YouTube.

main objective was to “firmly establish his reputation as a man of the people” by sponsoring progressive legislation “that would help Blacks as well as whites.”³ In accordance with these values, Wallace requested that Governor Folsom appoint him to the board of trustees of the Tuskegee Institute, the historically Black college founded by Booker T. Washington. As a judge on Alabama’s Third Judicial Circuit, Wallace distinguished himself for his impartiality. J.L. Chestnut, one of Alabama’s only Black lawyers at the time, remembered him being “quite different from the rest of the judges in Alabama” in that he showed deference to African Americans and required others in his courtroom to do the same.⁴ Above all else, Wallace was motivated by a voracious appetite for power. “Nothing—not personal safety, his family, or interracial tranquility—was more important,” Leshner wrote.⁵ In his first run for governor in 1958, Wallace positioned himself as the heir-apparent to Alabama’s outgoing governor, “Big Jim” Folsom, a New Deal-era Democrat adored by the working class. In soaring oratory that befitted his nickname, “The Fighting Little Judge,” Wallace promised to build new public schools, improve highways, entice more industry, and root out corruption.⁶ However, in a break with Folsom, Wallace promised to maintain racial segregation at all costs, calling it the “sensible and non-hypocritical manner by which the races [had] lived in peace and harmony for many years.”⁷ It was a point of no return for the up-and-coming politician, and it confirmed his willingness to compromise his values in return for political capital. And yet, the question remained as to whether or not George Wallace’s Faustian bargain would pay off.

Like many southern politicians at the time, Wallace recognized that to espouse racially liberal views in the late-1950s was akin to political suicide. Ever since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, the white backlash against federally mandated school integration had encouraged a radicalization in southern politics not seen since the White Supremacy Campaign of 1898.⁸ In 1956, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina introduced a document to Congress colloquially referred to as the “Southern Manifesto.” The manifesto claimed that the *Brown* decision ran

³ Leshner, Stephan. *George Wallace: American Populist*. 81.

⁴ *George Wallace: Settin’ the Woods on Fire*, produced and directed by Daniel McCabe and Paul Stelker, aired April 23, 2000, PBS.

⁵ Leshner, 76.

⁶ Leshner, 120.

⁷ Leshner, 115-116.

⁸ Tinkler, Robert, “White Supremacy Campaign North Carolina, 1898,” *History 446: The American South* (class lecture, Chico State University, Chico, CA, October 19, 2021).

“contrary to the Constitution” in that it encroached upon the rights of States to operate their schools as they saw fit. It advised States to “resist forced integration by any lawful means” to “bring about a reversal” of *Brown*, a strategy that became known as “massive resistance.”⁹ In a stunning display of solidarity, 101 out of Congress’ 128 southern legislators signed the manifesto. In 1957, Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas demonstrated the allure of massive resistance politics after he enlisted the Arkansas National Guard to help prevent nine Black students from entering Little Rock Central High School. Although the stunt ultimately failed to prevent the school’s integration, it catapulted Faubus into the national spotlight by placing him in a direct showdown with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In the years to come, Wallace would use a similar tactic to further his political ambitions. However, in 1958, Wallace was not the same politician he would become in later years. In fact, it was Wallace’s seeming lack of conviction for massive resistance that caused him to lose his first gubernatorial election.

In the days before the 1958 election, two very different organizations offered their endorsements for their respective candidates. Wallace gained the endorsement of Alabama’s NAACP, ostensibly because of his reputation as a racial moderate. Wallace’s opponent, Attorney General John Patterson, earned the support of the Ku Klux Klan. When the votes came back, it was Patterson who claimed victory. In the South’s new post-*Brown* paradigm, politicians were scrutinized solely on how strongly they opposed federally mandated school integration. Thirty years after the 1958 election, Patterson himself admitted as much. “If you happened to be a politician or somebody running for public office and you were perceived by the white majority to be weak on the Black question, then you wouldn’t be elected,” Patterson said.¹⁰ In a letter written to Democratic Senator Herbert Lehman of New York in 1961, liberal Alabama resident Virginia Durr expressed her concerns regarding this very same issue. “The law itself is lawless,” Durr wrote, “the elected officials are elected on the basis of defiance of the law of the land, and the one who is the most inflammatory and the most defiant often gets elected.”¹¹ George Wallace’s ensuing transformation into a fire-breathing segregationist can therefore be understood as a fervent attempt to attain higher office in a newly radicalized political environment. In 1962, when Wallace ran for governor again, he recruited White supremacist Asa Carter to be his

⁹ *Declaration of Constitutional Principles* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956): 4469-4460

¹⁰ Leshner, 126.

¹¹ Virginia Durr to Senator Herbert Lehman, Montgomery, 25 April 1961, Alabama Department of Archives & History.

speechwriter, albeit covertly. The tone of these speeches resonated more strongly with Alabama's white residents, and Wallace won the election handily. While Wallace may have found the avenue by which he would gain political success, his full-throated support for massive resistance caused alarm among some of his more pacifist-minded supporters. "We urge you to begin immediately a program of preparation which will prevent lawlessness, discord, violence, and bloodshed," pleaded Pastor Jerry Tanton of the Pine Grove Methodist Church on November 4, 1962. He continued: "Every public statement you make is setting the tone for what is to come."¹² Unfortunately, Pastor Tanton's prophetic warning failed to be heeded by the ascendant governor.

On January 14, 1963, Governor Wallace stood on the steps of the State Capitol in Montgomery, the former headquarters of the Confederacy, and delivered his inaugural address. In his typical bombastic fashion, Wallace vowed to maintain segregation "now," "tomorrow," and "forever."¹³ James L. Poe, Jr., the then-president of the NAACP chapter in Montgomery, remembered hearing Wallace's speech for the first time. "To hear the governor of a state get up and make the kind of comments that you would expect that someone in the back alley, with their sheets on and burning crosses would make—that was the thing that really caught us," Poe said.¹⁴ As the Governor of Alabama during the height of the civil rights movement, Wallace's inflammatory rhetoric worked to heighten racial tensions and ensured that violence was all but inevitable. John Lewis, a chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee who took part in the historic Selma to Montgomery marches of 1965, later blamed Wallace personally for the outbreak of civil rights-related violence. "Governor Wallace never pulled a trigger," Lewis said, "but in his speech, he created the environment for others to pull the trigger, in the days, the weeks and months to come."¹⁵

Just a few months after Wallace's inauguration, the city of Birmingham, which Martin Luther King Jr. called "the most segregated city in the United States," became the locus of the civil rights movement. A series of sit-ins, marches, mass demonstrations, and protests resulted in hundreds of arrests and, at times, acts of extreme violence. On May 3, Birmingham Public Safety Commissioner Eugene "Bull" Connor authorized the use of high-powered fire hoses and police dogs to attack

¹² Pastor Jerry Tanton to George Wallace, November 4, 1962.

¹³ Wallace, George. Inaugural Address, January 14, 1963.

¹⁴ Radio Diaries, "'Segregation Forever: A Fiery Pledge Forgiven, But Not Forgotten,'" January 10, 2013, All Things Considered, NPR.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

peaceful protestors. Eight days later, two bombs exploded at the Gaston Motel, where King and other civil rights leaders had been staying. Three people were injured. When police cars arrived, angry Black residents threw rocks, bricks, and bottles at them and set fire to two white-owned grocery stores. The following day, President John F. Kennedy ordered federal troops to help restore the peace, a decision that, to Wallace, stank of federal overreach. “I feel you have disregarded the sovereignty of the State of Alabama,” Wallace complained in a May 13 telegram to the President.¹⁶ Throughout the horrifying ordeal, Wallace never wavered from his role as the protector of state’s rights, even when it came at the cost of endangering his constituents. As a result, Wallace became a universal target for both ridicule and praise, which, as Leshner writes, “demonstrated that the Alabama governor had, depending on one’s view, struck a vein filled with political gold or opened a vein spilling moral blood.”¹⁷

Wallace wasted no time in exploiting his newfound political niche for personal gain. Like Governor Faubus before him, Wallace decided to utilize the politics of massive resistance to force himself into the national spotlight. In June, Wallace orchestrated a publicity stunt in order to showcase his talent for public speaking and his commitment to the sanctity of state’s rights. Defying federal orders, Wallace physically blocked US Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach from escorting James Hood and Vivian Malone, two African American students, onto the premises of the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa. “It is not defiance for defiance sake,” Wallace said to the crowd in defense of his actions, “but for the purpose of raising basic and fundamental constitutional questions.”¹⁸ The nationally televised event, broadcast into the homes of millions of Americans, turned Wallace into a national figure overnight. As historian Dan Carter notes, Wallace’s rhetoric was “nothing like the raving demagoguery most Americans expected to hear” from a die-hard segregationist.¹⁹ As a result, Wallace simultaneously expanded his appeal outside the Deep South and cemented his reputation as a backward, bigoted demagogue for many years to come.

George Wallace remained a staple and pariah of American politics for the next two decades. As a presidential candidate, Wallace transcended the politics of massive resistance to become the figurehead for a broader-based populist movement. Drawing on the fear and

¹⁶ George Wallace to President Kennedy, May 13, 1963.

¹⁷ Leshner, 191.

¹⁸ George Wallace, “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” speech, June 11, 1963.

¹⁹ Carter, Dan. *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution*, 5.

disillusionment caused by the chaos of the 1960s, Wallace presented himself as a strongman who could bring stability back to the nation. As the person best known for his brutal suppression of civil rights protests, it was easy for Wallace to adopt the moniker of the “law and order” candidate. Much like Wallace’s embrace of massive resistance, his pivot towards law and order was a politically motivated decision aimed directly at the ballot box.

In 1968, Wallace ran as the candidate of the American Independent Party in defiance of the Democratic Party’s pro-civil rights agenda. Besides winning five Deep South states, Wallace also won the support of a significant number of white working-class voters in the Midwest. It was a sign that Wallace’s appeal was growing beyond just the Deep South. In the eyes of the establishment, Wallace’s rise was simultaneously awe-inspiring and horrifying. “No one seemed to notice the mystical communion Wallace was developing with thousands, then millions, of quietly panicked Americans,” wrote Joseph Cumming of *Newsweek*.²⁰ By the early-1970s, Wallace’s supporters could no longer be written off as simply a minute bunch of backwoods racists, although many ostensibly still were. Leshner writes that “antipathy to Blacks was not central to Wallace’s growing popular appeal.”²¹ Instead, it was his ability to make people feel heard in an era of unprecedented change and disorder that made Wallace so appealing. Even so, Wallace never shied away from race-baiting when it suited him. In 1970, during a particularly hard-fought gubernatorial race, Wallace ran ads in several Alabama newspapers that pictured a white girl seated on a bench surrounded by seven menacing Black boys. The caption read: “This Could Be Alabama Four Years From Now. Do You Want It?”²² Wallace’s lowball tactics won him the race, but he came dangerously close to losing due to the growing number of Black voters. It was a lesson he remembered well and undoubtedly influenced his political decisions going forward.

Wallace’s path toward rehabilitation began with a tragedy. In 1972, while on the campaign trail in Maryland, a would-be assassin reached out from a crowd and fired five bullets into George Wallace’s torso. The attack left him paralyzed from the waist down and confined him to a wheelchair for the rest of his life. For many, the shooting seemed karmic. “There was no rejoicing among Black Alabamians that George Wallace had been shot,” said J.L. Chestnut, “but there was a lot of ‘the chickens have come home to roost.’ You heard that everywhere.”²³

²⁰ Leshner, *George Wallace*, 417.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 422.

²² Leshner, *George Wallace*, 441.

²³ *Settin’ the Woods on Fire*.

Despite the persistent pain caused by his wounds, Wallace's tenacious appetite for politics, and the support of his second wife, Cornelia, encouraged him to keep fighting. In 1976, Wallace became the first presidential candidate to openly run for office from a wheelchair (Franklin Roosevelt had kept his paralysis hidden from the public). As a result, he suffered from constant media speculation regarding his physical fitness. "I can understand that people can question about my health," Wallace said defiantly at a rally, "but you don't need an acrobat to be president."²⁴ Deprived of his quintessential ability to command a podium, Wallace's support dwindled considerably. After losing the Democratic primaries in both Florida and North Carolina, Wallace gracefully exited the race and put his support behind another southern governor, Jimmy Carter. He returned to Montgomery a defeated man. Shortly thereafter, Cornelia filed for divorce. To the outside observer, it seemed Wallace's political career had come to an inglorious end. In fact, his most significant political transformation and triumph still lay ahead of him.

During his time out of the national spotlight, Wallace claimed he underwent a religious reawakening. According to his son, George Wallace, Jr., his father came to the realization that "some things he had done and said could have caused others to suffer [and that] concerned him as a Christian."²⁵ In 1979, Wallace made an impromptu visit to the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, the same church where a young Martin Luther King, Jr. once preached. At the pulpit, Wallace made his pitch for redemption. "I have learned what suffering means in a way that was impossible," Wallace spoke with an unusual softness, "I think I can understand something of the pain Black people have come to endure. I know I contributed to that pain, and I can only ask your forgiveness."²⁶ With one eye on Alabama's 1984 gubernatorial election and the other on his legacy, Wallace attempted a political hail-Mary: convince Black people that he was genuinely sorry for his past actions, deeply repentant, and most importantly, that he deserved their vote.

Wallace's speech at the Dexter Baptist Church highlights two major elements that infused his particular brand of redemption politics: sympathy and religion. Paralyzed, nearly deaf, and suffering from chronic pain, 63-year-old George Wallace evoked more sympathy in 1984 than at any other time in his career. For the first time in his life, Wallace looked like a victim of hate rather than its perpetrator. Sympathy, then, was a critical tool in Wallace's bid for redemption;

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *Settin' the Woods on Fire*.

²⁶ McCarthy, Colman, "George Wallace—From the Heart," *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1995

religion was the other. In a television interview during the 1984 campaign, Wallace claimed to have forgiven his would-be assassin. "I have no bitterness, anger, or hatred to him at all," he said politely.²⁷ This shocking confession of love from a man whose name was synonymous with hate seemed to display Wallace's deep-seated conviction for Christian values, especially forgiveness. Perhaps Wallace hoped that by showcasing his capacity for forgiveness, he could inspire a similar capacity in others. Perhaps he was sincere. In either case, Wallace went about seeking forgiveness in a manner not unlike that of a repentant sinner. "It was almost like a confession, like I was his priest," recalled John Lewis, who received an unexpected phone call from Wallace. "He kept saying to me, 'John, I don't hate anybody.'"²⁸ Unsurprisingly, Wallace's pleas for forgiveness were accepted most readily by the Christian community. "He said he was wrong," said Reverend Kelvin Croom of College Hill Baptist Church. "He asked for forgiveness. It was up to us to do that once he asked."²⁹ For others, Wallace's extraordinary turn-around seemed too good and politically advantageous to be true. "To see an old hard-shell sinner like Wallace come into the fold is every preacher's dream," said Atlanta mayor Andrew Young, "Whether it's really happening or a farce, we won't know for a while."³⁰

In the Democratic primary runoff, Wallace narrowly defeated his challenger and received only one-third of the Black vote. However, in the general election, Wallace won resoundingly and with ninety percent of the Black vote.³¹ It was, without a doubt, the most stunning victory of Wallace's career and one in which he took great pride. While it can be interpreted as Black people choosing the better of two evils, Wallace's victory also reflected the appeal of a man whose deep regret for his past could potentially be translated into him becoming a champion for Black interests. As his fourth term as governor progressed, this appeared to be the case. Not only did Wallace appoint a record number of African Americans to state positions, but he also endorsed a plan to more than double the number of Black voting registrars throughout the state. In 1985, Wallace experienced the "proudest" moment of his life when Tuskegee University awarded him an honorary degree in recognition of his services to the historic institution.³² By the time he left office in 1986, Wallace's pitch for redemption seemed to be

²⁷ "Behind the Story: Mike Talks to George Wallace after Assassination Attempt," May 6, 2015, YouTube video.

²⁸ *Settin' the Woods on Fire*.

²⁹ Wayne Drash, CNN, "Black preacher: Why I Forgave Wallace," 2011.

³⁰ Harris, Art, "George Wallace's Visions &," *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1982

³¹ "George Wallace Picks Up On a Different Note," *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1983.

³² Carl T. Rowan. "The Rehabilitation of George Wallace," *The Washington Post*, Sep. 5, 1991.

making headway. However, for many, the trauma caused by him in the past far outweighed the good deeds of his later career, which largely went under the radar. “If you ask me ‘Has George Wallace paid back his debt to Blacks?’ the answer is no,” said Joe Reed, chairman of Alabama’s Democratic Black caucus.³³ Throughout the 1990s, although Wallace experienced constant pain and frequent hospitalizations, his quest for redemption continued to be his driving motivation.

Wallace struggled to overcome the barriers to national rehabilitation due in large part to his failure to adequately atone for his heinous history. Rather than offer unequivocal apologies for his past behavior, Wallace provided interviewers with grade school-like excuses that, at times simply did not add up. “I didn’t write those words about segregation now, tomorrow and forever,” Wallace told *The Washington Post* in 1991, “I saw them in the speech written for me and planned to skip over them. But the wind-chill factor was five below zero when I gave that speech. I started reading just to get it over and read those words without thinking. I have regretted it all my life.”³⁴ Needless to say, such an excuse rings hollow when one rehears Wallace’s passionate delivery of those infamous words. Likewise, Wallace blamed the biased and malicious press for his persistently poor national reputation and accused it of picking favorites. “The media has rehabilitated [Lyndon] Johnson,” Wallace whined, “why won’t it rehabilitate me?”³⁵ In spite of his bungling behavior, Wallace succeeded in convincing a number of prominent figures that his bid for redemption was sincere and that his legacy should be revised.

In 1996, Vivian Malone Jones accepted the Lurleen B. Wallace Award for Courage at a banquet hosted by the Wallace Foundation. Thirty-three years earlier, George Wallace had prevented her from enrolling at the university in Tuscaloosa due to his infamous “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door.” In her speech that night, Jones offered her take on the Wallace legacy. “I’ve always maintained that I felt [what Wallace did] was not right,” Malone said, “but the part that is so good... is that Governor Wallace also recognized that this was not the right thing to do and extends tonight a hand of friendship to say that ‘I was wrong, but let’s do better next time. Let’s learn from our past mistakes.’”³⁶ In his *New York Times* op-ed released the same week as Wallace’s death in 1998, John Lewis, now a congressman from Georgia, wrote eloquently

³³ William E. Schmidt. “A New Wallace For the South,” *The New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1984.

³⁴ Carl T. Rowan, “The Rehabilitation of George Wallace.”

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ “The 1996 Lurleen Wallace Award of Courage—Vivian Malone Jones,” February 4, 2015, YouTube.

about his opinion regarding the legacy of his former nemesis. “George Wallace deserves to be remembered for his effort to redeem his soul and in so doing to mend the fabric of American society.”³⁷ Wallace certainly hoped that he would be remembered as a symbol of racial reconciliation. However, that is not the way it turned out.

In June of 2020, college students at the University of Alabama in Birmingham petitioned to have George Wallace’s name removed from the school’s physical education building. Wallace once used this building for physical therapy following his assassination attempt. For the students, Wallace’s reputation as a segregationist mattered more than his later attempts to redeem himself. Ashley Henton, a 21-year-old fashion design major, said that people her age view Wallace as “this extreme segregationist,” and someone wholly unworthy of having a building named after them.³⁸ The quest to redeem Wallace “makes no sense,” agreed Josh Moon, a columnist from Alabama. “George Wallace is the embodiment of everything that is wrong with the state of Alabama, with the state of Alabama’s government, and with the state of Alabama’s continued embarrassing problems with race and racism.”³⁹ For these and many other Americans, George Wallace remains a symbol of bigotry and hate who can never be forgiven due to the ongoing problems of racism in America today.

In the full scope of American history, George Wallace stands out as one of its fiercest and most formidable antagonists. Through his words and actions, Wallace damaged the American social fabric in ways that still resonate to this day. More than any other twentieth-century politician, Wallace aided the expansion of racially-charged politics from being a regional state of affairs to becoming a national pastime. As this paper has shown, Wallace’s political ambitions outweighed any concern he may have had for the welfare of his Black constituents. That is until their numbers constituted a voting bloc too significant to ignore. Was Wallace sincere in his apology to the Black community? Or was it simply another political stunt used by Wallace to win power? Ultimately, the answer is irrelevant. The more important question is, what do we as a society gain from refusing to accept George Wallace’s apology, and what do we lose?

It is truly terrifying to imagine what the country would be like if Wallace’s early campaigns had been successful and segregation

³⁷ Lewis, John, “Forgiving George Wallace,” *The New York Times*, September 16, 1998.

³⁸ Sharp, John, “What’s in a name? Push is on to erase George Wallace from Alabama buildings, roads, tunnels,” June 22, 2020.

³⁹ Moon, Josh. “There is no redemption for George Wallace,” *Alabama Political Reporter*, June 12, 2020.

remained the law of the land. In such a scenario, forgiving Wallace makes no sense. But in the present, forgiving Wallace is not only possible, as Vivian Jones and John Lewis have shown, but necessary for the healing of the nation. The key is to decouple the act of forgiveness from any sort of condonement of Wallace's actions or beliefs. To understand this, let us return to the words of John Lewis. "I can never forget what George Wallace said and did as governor," Lewis wrote, "but our ability to forgive serves a higher moral purpose in our society...Through genuine repentance and forgiveness, the soul of our nation is redeemed." Has the time come to forgive George Wallace? The author argues that it has. Like Lewis, the author believes that societies that promote and value forgiveness are more likely to be happier and healthier in the long run. In that respect, the life of George Wallace provides an opportunity for all of us to exercise our ability to forgive and thereby help heal the wounds of the past. It is an opportunity that, in our current cultural and political atmosphere, we would be wise to take.

Bibliography

- ABC News, "Biden not apologizing amid segregationist backlash," June 20, 2019, YouTube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oRi87zV6uA8>
- "Behind the story: Mike talks to George Wallace after assassination attempt," May 6, 2015, YouTube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAEoCioMZs&t=48s>
- Carter, Dan. *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution 1963-1994*. Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 1999.
- "George Wallace Picks Up On a Different Note," *The New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1983, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/23/weekinreview/george-wallace-picks-up-on-a-different-note.html>
- George Wallace: Settin' the Woods on Fire*, produced and directed by Daniel McCabe and Paul Stelker, PBS, aired April 23, 2000.
- Harris, Art, "George Wallace's Visions &," *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1982, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1982/09/01/george-wallaces-visions-38/e6ea6741-0338-48f1-ac38-44b20182213d/>
- Leshner, Stephan. *George Wallace: American Populist*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994.
- Lewis, John, "Forgiving George Wallace," *The New York Times*, September 16, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/16/opinion/forgiving-george-wallace.html>
- McCarthy, Colman, "George Wallace—From the Heart," *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1995, www.washingtonpost.com
- Moon, Josh. "There is no redemption for George Wallace," *Alabama Political Reporter*, June 12, 2020, <https://www.alreporter.com/2020/06/12/opinion-there-is-no-redemption-for-george-wallace/>
- NBC News, "Joe Biden Apologizes For Comments About Working With Senate Segregationists." July 6, 2019, YouTube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgryUEyUvmM&t=15s>
- Radio Diaries, "'Segregation Forever:' A Fiery Pledge Forgiven, But Not Forgotten," January 10, 2013, All Things Considered, NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2013/01/14/169080969/segregation-forever-a-fiery-pledge-forgiven-but-not-forgotten>
- Rowan, Carl T. "The Rehabilitation of George Wallace." *The Washington Post*, September 5, 1991.
- Sharp, John, "What's in a name? Push is on to erase George Wallace from Alabama buildings, roads, tunnels," June 22, 2020. al.com
- Schmidt, William E. "A New Wallace For the South," *The New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1984.
- Tinkler, Robert, "White Supremacy Campaign North Carolina, 1898," History 446: The American South, class lecture, Chico State University, Chico, CA, October 19, 2021.
- "The 1996 Lurleen Wallace Award of Courage—Vivian Malone Jones," February 4, 2015, YouTube video. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPGKWTDTLFc>
- U.S. Congress, Senate. *Declaration of Constitutional Principles* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956): 4469-4460.
- Virginia Durr to Senator Herbert Lehman, Montgomery, 25 April 1961, Alabama Department of Archives & History, <https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital/collection/voices/id/12708/rec/3>
- Wallace, George, "Statement and Proclamation of Governor George C. Wallace," (speech, University of Alabama, June 11, 1963), Alabama Department of Archives & History, <https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital/collection/voices/id/2050/rec/2>

Wallace, George, "The Inaugural Address of Governor George C. Wallace" (speech, Montgomery, Alabama, January 14, 1963), Alabama Department of Archives & History, <https://digital.archives.alabama.gov/digital/collection/voices/id/2952/rec/286>

*Phi Alpha Theta 2021-2022
Initiates*

It is with great pride and enthusiasm that the Editorial Board of *The Chico Historian* welcomes into the fold this year's new members of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta:

Kelli Armstrong

Patrick Blinkinsop

Corina Bowman

Maggie Farlow

Caleigh Harden

Hannah Hart

Anahí Martínez

Ryan Powers

James Roberts

Kira Runkle

Emily Swanson

Hayley Tyson

Hannah Williams

Sage Young

