


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History Department



"Cautious, careful people, always casting about to preserve their reputation and social standing, never can bring about a reform. Those who are really in earnest must be willing to be anything or nothing in the world's estimation, and publicly and privately, in season and out, avow their sympathy and despised and persecuted ideas and their advocates, and bear the consequences."

- Susan B. Anthony
On the Campaign for Divorce Law Reform (1860)

Cover Art & Design

Photograph of Trinity Hall, ca. 1969. Constructed in 1933, today it is the home of the CSU, Chico History Department. In the foreground is the Peterson Rose Garden, planted in 1957. (Used with permission: "Trinity Hall," SC28564, Northeastern California Historical Photograph Collection, Meriam Library, California State University, Chico [ca. 1969]).

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The Chico Historian is an annual publication of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of the Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor Society and the California State University, Chico (CSUC) Department of History. It aims to provide students the opportunity to publish historical works, and to train editorial staff members in producing an academic journal. Issues are published at the end of each academic year. All opinions or statements of fact are the sole responsibility of the authors, and may not reflect the views of the editorial staff. The authors retain rights to individual essays.

Phi Alpha Theta's mission is to promote the study of history through the encouragement of research, good teaching, publication, and the exchange of learning and ideas among historians. The organization seeks to bring students, teachers, and writers of history together for intellectual and social exchanges, which promote and assist historical research and publication by our members in a variety of ways.

**We dedicate this volume to
John Boyle**

Retired CSUC professor of Asian history John Boyle, a scholar in the area of pre- and post-war Japan, taught courses in East Asian history at Chico State from 1968 until his retirement in 1997. He is the author of *Modern Japan: The American Nexus*. His generous support of *The Chico Historian* has made the publication of this and many other issues possible, a fact much appreciated by everyone involved with this journal.

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Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta
and the Department of History
California State University, Chico

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Introduction & Acknowledgements

On February 6, 1918, British Parliament signed the Representation of the People Act into law. The Act most notably granted suffrage to all men aged twenty-one and older and gave conditional voting rights to some women aged thirty and older. Although the Act left nearly 60% of women ineligible to vote, it served as the first official legislation in a movement that gave universal suffrage to all people in the United Kingdom. The people who fought for political reform, the politicians who formally enacted it, and the historians who preserved their actions, all contributed to this fight, and those that occurred in other countries, for universal suffrage.

In commemoration of the centennial of the Representation of the People Act, this edition of *The Chico Historian* addresses politics and reform. It includes historiographical studies of the events and people that created reform and shaped politics, top-down investigations of politicians who regulated political structures, and bottom-up examinations of the people who fought for political reform. The contributing authors are some of the most talented students in the CSU, Chico History department, and this volume consists of a mixture of offerings from extremely gifted graduate and undergraduate students.

The first three entries are historiographical examinations of politics and reform in Cuba, the United States, and China. Kellie Marie Lavin's "Historiography of the Cuban Revolution's Impact on Women in the Workforce" explores the historical literature on how political changes in Revolutionary Cuba impacted women's work. In "A Historiography of Northern White Women in the American Revolution" Jeanette Adame surveys the historical studies written on white women's agency, or lack thereof, during the American Revolution. Alison Saechao's "A Historiography of the Red Guard Movement in the Chinese Cultural Revolution" investigates the many ways that historians have researched the Red Guard in the context of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1968.

The next three articles employ a more traditional top-down approach when exploring the power structures associated with political change. In "Irreconcilable Core Values: Eisenhower's Failure to Build Up Saud as a Pro-Western Pillar," Michael Muraki argues that the same attributes that made King Saud attractive to the Eisenhower administration prevented the Saudi regime from acting as an effective pro-American regional alternative to Arab nationalism and communist influence. Using a similar methodology, Juan Vega, in "Profit Over Principle: U.S.-Argentine Relations During the 'Dirty War,'" contends that the United States intentionally overlooked widespread human-rights abuses in Argentina to facilitate its own economic interests in the region. In his article "Power of the People: The Influence of the Masses in Roman Politics," Troy Hunter cautions that reform does not always result in more representative societies. He asserts that while the plebian class wielded substantial policy-making

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power in the Roman Republic, the emergence of Augustus Caesar resulted in the diminution or termination of many republican structures.

The last three papers in this year's journal explore political change from the bottom up. These papers assess how common people and changing cultural attitudes affect society. In "Public Spectacles and Divine Justice: The Collapse of Public Executions in England 1730-1840," Christopher Fuqua writes about changing attitudes towards criminality and executions in England from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. He suggests that the values of the rising middle class led to the end of public executions. Next, Merrie Dowell reviews how accusations of witchcraft functioned as a form of control over the community as a whole, in "Witchcraft as an Example of Seventeenth-Century Community Control in Early Modern England." She argues that fears of witchcraft were a reaction to fears of change and upheaval and were not gender specific. Finally, Monica Jamero studies how and why women were mobilized to work in factories during World War II "Rosie the Riveter and the Mobilization of Social Change." She contends that this mass mobilization of women changed the social and cultural expectations around women's work. It also opened up opportunities for women of color and changed demographic patterns.

We the editors would like to thank all the students who sent in submissions for this year's volume, as well as the faculty members who financially and intellectually support the journal. In particular, Professor John Boyle's generous contributions made the publication of this volume, and previous ones, possible. The editorial board also owes a tremendous amount of gratitude to Professors Sinwoo Lee and Stephen Lewis. *The Chico Historian* depends upon a close relationship with the CSUC chapter of Phi Alpha Theta and the History Club, and Professor Lee and Lewis's outstanding work advising both of these student organizations plays a critical role in maintaining the department's academic culture. We would also like to thank Professor Lewis for his tireless work as the History Department Chair and the work of all the faculty, who mentor and inspire their students and foster the creative spirit essential to the historian's craft. Finally, we must thank the contributors themselves. Without their dedication, commitment, and passion, *The Chico Historian* could not exist.

The Chico Historian Editorial Board

Editor and Contributor Biographies

Editors

Jeanette Adame is a graduate student at CSU, Chico. She is currently working toward the completion of her M.A. thesis on race and gender in early New Orleans and is employed the History Department's History Writing Center. After graduation, Jeanette plans to pursue a career in anti-human trafficking efforts. She wrote this paper for Dr. Robert Cottrell's Historiography Seminar in Fall, 2017.

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Kellie Marie Lavin is a graduate student in history as well as an alumna of California State University, Chico, having previously completed a B.A. in Humanities as well as a teaching credential there. She has many interests in the field of history but is most fascinated by cultural and gender history. She intends to spend the next year delving into the history of West Coast Swing, a dance that originated in the state of California. Following that, she hopes to pursue teaching.

Juan Vega Ramirez is currently in his first year of graduate studies at CSU, Chico and is working toward earning an M.A. in History. He double majored in History and Latin American Studies as an undergrad and hopes to continue bridging these fields for the remainder of his academic career. After graduation, Juan wishes to teach at the high school or community college level and may pursue a PhD in History. In his time off, he enjoys hiking, bicycling, and spending time with friends. Juan originally wrote his paper for Dr. James Matray's Historical Research course in the spring semester of 2017.

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Alison Saechao is currently a graduate student in History at California State University, Chico. Her research interests include nineteenth and twentieth century East Asian and Asian American history, specifically,

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early Chinese immigration to the United States. Upon completing her M.A., she plans to teach at the community college level. Her ultimate goal is to receive her Doctorate's. She wrote her paper for Dr. Robert Cottrell's History 690, Historiography, course in Fall 2017.

Troy Hunter is an undergraduate student at California State University, Chico. As a Junior currently working towards his Bachelors of Arts in Social Sciences- Pre-Credential, Troy aspires to teach while simultaneously working towards a graduate degree. A Chico native, he is an avid film connoisseur, an aspiring body builder, and a lover of the outdoors. While he loves the prospect of teaching high schoolers, his ultimate goal is to teach at a college level. Troy's paper was originally written for Professor DeForest's Historical Methodology course in Fall 2017.

Christopher Fuqua is an undergraduate pursuing a degree in Social Sciences - Pre-Credential Option, with the goal of teaching history at the high school and college level. His areas of interest include twentieth-century military history, and American political and social history, particularly the intersection of politics and culture during periods of great crisis. Christopher originally wrote his paper for Dr. Nice's History 290 class.

Merri Dowell is an undergraduate student at California State University, Chico, pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in History and English Studies and a minor in Humanities. She will be graduating in Spring 2019. Merri Originally wrote this paper for Dr. Nice's class on Tudor-Stuart Britain. Her areas of academic interest include early modern English literature and history, specifically surrounding the rise and fall of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs. Merri's hobbies include reading, writing, and spoiling her four dogs. Her post-graduate plans are not set yet, but will hopefully involve travel, adventure, and graduate school with an eventual career teaching history or literature at the university level.

Monica Jamer is currently an undergraduate student at CSU, Chico working on her Bachelor of Arts in the Social Science, Pre-Credential program. Originally from Turlock, California, Monica plans to teach history and social sciences at the junior high or high school level. As an educator, Monica's goal is to provide a learning environment that is both exciting and rigorous, and one that empowers both teacher and student in pursuing learning. Her areas of interest in history include United States History and Post World War II. In her spare time, Monica enjoys traveling, painting, and spending time with her family and friends. She originally wrote this paper for Professor Robert Cottrell's *Historical Research and Writing Seminar* in the Fall of 2017.

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Articles

The Cuban Revolution's Impact on Women in the Workforce



A poster for the Federation of Cuban Women. (Image source: Edibob, "Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas," *Wikimedia Commons*, June 2012, Santiago de las Vegas, Cuba.)

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION'S IMPACT ON WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE

| Kellie Marie S. Lavin

The Cuban Revolution brought about significant changes for women, especially during the decades between Fidel Castro's ascension to power and the so-called "Special Period" that began around the early 1990s.¹ Of the many changes, historians have been especially eager to chronicle Cuban women's entrance into the labor force and to discuss this trend's significance. English-speaking researchers have documented these changes consistently over the years, beginning with articles published approximately a decade after the revolution began. The result is a collection of histories that generally articulate a common narrative but vary in approach and diverge in assessment.

The Narrative

The narrative employed by historians usually highlighted Cuban women's exceptionally low employment rate in the years preceding the revolution, with estimates ranging from nine percent² to seventeen percent of women employed.³ These women typically worked in a small selection of jobs that society traditionally cast as feminine, primarily as domestic servants or prostitutes. Historians noted that shortly after successfully ousting Fulgencio Batista from power, Fidel Castro and his government established mandatory reeducation programs for prostitutes, whom they viewed as backward and as representative of Cuba's history as an exploited country.⁴ Other early initiatives, such as the literacy brigades that sent young people into rural areas, began to draw young women into civic engagement projects. Historians specify that, initially, government programs encouraged girls and women to volunteer their labor. Meanwhile, Castro's government also set up schools that aimed to improve women's literacy alongside classes on topics like dressmaking, which were designed to persuade men "to allow their women to come to the capital."⁵ The majority of historians

¹ Historians disagree about exactly which year the Special Period began.

² Margaret Randall, *Women in Cuba: Twenty Years Later* (New York: Smyrna Press, 1981), 124.

³ Virginia Olesen, "Leads on old questions from a new revolution: notes on Cuban women, 1969," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 175, no. 1 (1970): 884.

⁴ Megan Daigle, *From Cuba with Love: Sex and Money in the Twenty-First Century* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015), 50-51, 146.

⁵ Margaret Randall, *Cuban Women Now* (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1974), 211.

emphasized that these early educational initiatives and volunteer labor programs successfully drew women out of the home and were steps toward eventual employment opportunities for women, although more critical writers claimed that these programs served the state at least as much as they served Cuban women. Furthermore, the types of volunteer work women did—helping at schools and in hospitals, for example—did not necessarily align with the jobs that awaited them in the labor market.⁶

Around 1964, Castro's government and the recently created Federation of Cuban Women (*Federación de Mujeres Cubanas*, FMC) began promoting full-time employment opportunities for women.⁷ Historians argued that motives for this shift likely included the fact that “economic expansion was rapidly transforming the nature of the problem of labor supply in Cuba from that of serious unemployment and under-employment to that of a growing labor shortage.”⁸ In 1965, Castro announced the goal of employing one million women in full-time positions by 1970.⁹ Although the initial wave of women entering the workforce was promising, historians noted that countless other women refused this opportunity, and many of those who began working left the labor force soon thereafter. In 1969, for example, seventy-six per cent of the women “dropped out...within the year.”¹⁰ In response, Castro's government established programs to support women in the workforce, including maternity leave, free day care centers, laundry services, and the Shopping Bag Plan, which helped working women collect their groceries efficiently.¹¹

Of the new laws created to promote women's entry into the workforce, historians writing from the late 1970s onward were most apt to highlight the Family Code of 1975. The Family Code addressed the issue of women's “double working day”—the combination of work

⁶ Nicola Murray, “Socialism and Feminism: Women and the Cuban Revolution, Part I,” *Feminist Review* 0, no. 2 (1979): 71.

⁷ Elizabeth Stone, introduction to *Women and the Cuban Revolution: Speeches & Documents by Fidel Castro, Vilma Espín & Others*, ed. Elizabeth Stone, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1981), 12.

⁸ Murray, “Socialism and Feminism: Part I,” 63.

⁹ Lois M. Smith and Alfred Padula, *Sex and Revolution: Women in Socialist Cuba* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 98.

¹⁰ Nicola Murray, “Socialism and Feminism: Women and the Cuban Revolution, Part II,” *Feminist Review* 0, no. 3 (1979): 99-100.

¹¹ Marjorie King, “Cuba's Attack on Women's Second Shift, 1974-1976,” in “Women and Class Struggle,” ed. Terry Fee and Rosalinda Gonzalez, special issue, *Latin American Perspectives* 4, no. 1 & 2 (Winter and Spring 1977): 107-108.

outside the home and within it¹²—and “decreed that men and women must share domestic and parental rights and responsibilities equally.”¹³ Cubans debated the merit of the Family Code before it became law, but with time, they grew more accustomed to the new expectations. Historians tended to agree that the Family Code was radical; however, some pointed out that the law did not include any means to enforce it.¹⁴ Under these circumstances, the Family Code could only have a limited effect. Nevertheless, historians acknowledged that the code advanced progressive attitudes about gender roles in that it encouraged men to participate in housework and promoted women’s ability to both work outside the home and get involved in political activities. According to the general narrative, this social progress continued until Cuba lost its primary trade partner with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Approach

The historiography of women’s labor in revolutionary Cuba coincided with several movements in historical writing that occurred in the latter part of the twentieth century. Most significantly, this historiography benefited from Marxist theory and the surge in interest about women’s histories. While these factors have been integral to the history of women’s employment, three other major trends in historiography have contributed as well.

First, oral history—part of the larger trend of history from below—was an intuitive approach for some historians seeking to understand the authentic experiences of women living in Cuba. Whether the women in question were revolutionary leaders—as in the case of Vilma Espín, a guerilla fighter in the revolution and the sister-in-law of Fidel Castro—or civilians living more common lives, interviewers offered them the opportunity to give voice to their experiences and concerns. Of those texts surveyed here, five centered on interviews with, or essays by, women from Cuban leadership.¹⁵ These sources provided

¹² Carolina Aguilar and Alicia Chenard, interview by Gaby Küppers, “Is There a Place for Feminism in the Revolution?” in *Companeras*, edited by Gaby Küppers, (London: Latin American Bureau [Research and Action] Ltd., 1994), 104.

¹³ Joseph de la Torre Dwyer, “Precarious Politics: Experiments in Market-Socialism and the Prospects for Cuban Women’s Unfinished Revolution,” *New Political Science* 33, no. 2 (June 2011): 214.

¹⁴ Johanna I. Moya Fábregas, “The Cuban Woman’s Revolutionary Experience: Patriarchal Culture and the State’s Gender Ideology, 1950-1976,” *Journal of Women’s History* 22, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 73.

¹⁵ Aguilar and Chenard, “A Place for Feminism?” 102-110; Asela de los Santos and Mary-Alice Waters, *Women and Revolution: The Living Example of the Cuban Revolution* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2013); Vilma Espín, “Women in Revolutionary

some insight into the perspectives of Cuba's leading women, but Cuban public relations goals clearly shaped their messages. Common citizens, on the other hand, tended to be less guarded and to share stories that were richer in detail. Three authors composed their books with significant reliance upon interviews with women from working-class backgrounds.¹⁶ Interviews with women whose agency was often elided, as in the case of former prostitutes, were especially illuminating.¹⁷ Although each woman could only speak to her own limited experience, together they contributed greatly to historians' knowledge.

Second, virtually all historians employed a quantitative approach, to some extent, to the topic of women's employment. This was partially due to the Cuban government's use of data to track and demonstrate its own progress, as well as a reflection of the particular moment in historiography. The effect has been, as academic Barbara Reiss put it, that "statistics have consistently been the measure of the success or failure of the revolutionary process vis-à-vis women in Cuba."¹⁸ While statistics certainly provided a sense of the changes in women's employment levels, their degree of accuracy is debatable. Fidel Castro's position as the strongman leader of Cuba for nearly fifty years, in a constant state of friction with the United States, did not promote transparency. Scholar Nicola Murray, writing in the 1970s, noted, "The statistical material is not always complete, sometimes tends to contradict itself, and is very difficult to obtain."¹⁹ In the 1990s, co-authors Lois M. Smith and Alfred Padula added that "categories and terms are left undefined and change frequently."²⁰ As such, despite the temptation to emphasize statistics in these histories, historians who continue to publish on this subject should follow the lead of the few skeptics who provided

Cuba," in *Women in Latin American History: Their Lives and Views*, edited by June E. Hahner, (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1976), 164-171; Vilma Espín, Asela de los Santos, and Yolanda Ferrer, *Women in Cuba: The Making of a Revolution within the Revolution* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 2012); Teté Puebla, *Marianas in Combat: Teté Puebla & the Mariana Grajales Women's Platoon in Cuba's Revolutionary War, 1956-58*, ed. Mary-Alice Waters (New York: Pathfinder Press: 2003).

¹⁶ Inger Holt-Seeland, *Women of Cuba*, trans. Elizabeth Hamilton Lacoste, Mirtha Quintanales, and Jose Vigo (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Co., Inc., 1982); Randall, *Cuban Women Now*; Daigle, *From Cuba with Love*. The final of these three texts employs interviews but not for the portion of the text that is most relevant to this project.
¹⁷ Randall, *Cuban Women Now*, 237-257.

¹⁸ Barbara Reiss, "Counting Women, Women Who Count: Measures of the Revolution within the Revolution," *Cuban Studies* 42 (2011): 116-118.

¹⁹ Murray, "Socialism and Feminism: Part I," 57.

²⁰ Smith and Padula, *Sex and Revolution*, viii.

disclaimers regarding the data before attempting to glean any information from it.

Finally, the shift from women's history to gender history has led to some of the most critical responses to the Cuban Revolution's handling of women in the workforce. Whereas historians who focused on women's history tended to concentrate on the number of women working full time and the types of jobs available to them, those employing gender as a lens began to ask how the government addressed gender roles. In one relatively early text published in 1974, renowned researcher Margaret Randall noted that "the Cuban woman today drives a tractor, hoes a field, and carries an AK-47 as part of her militia duty. She is very likely to do any or all of these with her hair up in curlers, so she will look attractive and feminine to her man at night." Randall further identified ways in which mothers encouraged femininity in their daughters, "which [tend] to perpetuate an obsolete model of woman," a trend Randall claimed was slowly changing in younger generations.²¹ Through these examples of continuing gender norms, Randall demonstrated that employed women carried more burdens than their more traditional peers, an issue that the Family Code later attempted to address.

About thirty years later, historian Johanna I. Moya Fábregas noted that Fidel Castro appealed to a history of Cuban women taking on "non-traditional roles amidst moments of crisis,"²² and that Vilma Espín employed rhetoric that employed accepted gender norms even when promoting change.²³ Some academics argued that this allowed Cuba's revolutionary leadership to ease the populace into the changes they sought to make, while others saw this reproduction of gender norms as deeply problematic. Randall was more willing to accept the compromised process than Moya Fábregas, who criticized "the national tradition of praising the self-sacrificing woman [whose] participation in the revolution was nationally embraced because it developed within the unquestionable boundaries of motherhood and marriage."²⁴ Overall, the turn to gender history allowed historians to more effectively analyze the sometimes-conflicting messaging that emanated from Cuban leadership.

Assessment

When historians have analyzed the results of the Cuban Revolution, there has been tension between the various assessments. For

²¹ Randall, *Cuban Women Now*, 23.

²² Moya Fábregas, "Cuban Woman's Revolutionary Experience," 72.

²³ *Ibid*, 74.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 69.

this reason, it is useful to consider some of the literature's typical themes and to evaluate the conflicting conclusions. One principal commonality was an interest in the role of the FMC, Cuba's official women's organization, established in 1960. Historians usually attributed its creation to either Vilma Espín²⁵ or Fidel Castro.²⁶ The FMC replaced all existing women's organizations, and historians generally gave it credit for empowering women and promoting their entrance into the workforce.

However, some historians cast the FMC in a more critical light. Since women had already begun to organize prior to the FMC's formation, historian Michelle Chase reasoned that "[c]learly, [the FMC] was not merely intended to mobilize women."²⁷ Latin America Scholar Tzvi Medin drew attention to the way that the FMC, like other mass organizations in Cuba, "permit[ed] the control, mobilization, and manipulation of the population, besides serving as barometers for the feeling and opinions of the masses."²⁸ Countering this, political scientist Candace Johnson argued that the FMC's connection with the Cuban state did not discount its positive impact.²⁹ Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute sociologist Julie D. Shayne's theory that harnessing women's energy for the revolution lessened the odds of a feminist uprising.³⁰ Furthermore, Randall's critique of "the FMC's continued disparagement of feminism and its inability or unwillingness to allow a gender analysis of Cuban society" is quite persuasive.³¹ As historians shifted their focus from sex to gender, reviews of the FMC became less forgiving. Although historians continued to credit the government-sanctioned FMC with the mobilization of Cuban women, they also began to consider what grassroots women's organizations might have accomplished if the FMC had not subsumed them. To follow this thinking too far might risk entertaining counterfactual history, but the question of what was lost in the disbanding of grassroots women's organizations is a worthwhile question.

²⁵ Daigle, *From Cuba with Love*, 51.

²⁶ Candace Johnson, "Women, Policy Development, and the Evolving Health Frame in Cuba," *Canadian Woman Studies* 27, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 63.

²⁷ Michelle Chase, *Revolution within the Revolution: Women and Gender Politics in Cuba, 1952-1962*, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 132.

²⁸ Tzvi Medin, "Mass Organizations and the Vanguard Party," in *Cuba: The Shaping of Revolutionary Consciousness*, trans. Martha Genzback (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1990), 156.

²⁹ Johnson, "Evolving Health Frame," 63.

³⁰ Julie D. Shayne, *The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 4.

³¹ Margaret Randall, *To Change the World: My Years in Cuba* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 144.

Another point of contention, especially in those texts written during the Cold War, was the value of socialist versus capitalist approaches to empowering women. Several of the historians interested in Cuba were socialists, pursuing the topic from a place of optimism about Cuba's efforts. United States citizen and author Margaret Randall even moved to Cuba and raised her children there for eleven years during this revolutionary period.³² Another esteemed scholar, Helen Safa, noted that researchers needed to collaborate with Cuban organizations because "US government restrictions...did not allow me to pay or otherwise compensate Cubans who helped with the research."³³ Given these conditions, it was unsurprising that the histories cultivated by Safa, Randall, and Cuban political leaders, among others, featured biased perspectives and unflattering appraisals of capitalism. For example, an article from a book Safa co-edited offered this assessment: "In contrast to capitalist underdevelopment, [Cuba's] process is not based on exploitation and inequality between the sexes, between different ethnic groups and the different parts of the country."³⁴ Sometimes writers made no attempt at impartiality.

Less common, but also featured in the literature, are criticisms of socialism, such as the following problem cited by Moya Fábregas: "The Marxist premise that collective interests should be prioritized over individual interests is somewhat responsible for leaving social problems unaddressed—such as racism or sexism."³⁵ Another writer, scholar Elizabeth Stone, observed problems often identified with socialist or communist states, noting, "There was also insufficient economic incentive to encourage women to work. More money was in circulation than there were goods that people could buy." However, this author shifted the blame to the United States for its blockade that limited Cuban access to goods.³⁶ In the polarized Cold War climate, ideological commitments seem to have impacted some historians' interpretation of the events.

Ultimately, perhaps the most revealing discussion is the one that sought to determine how successful the Cuban Revolution was in bringing women into the workforce. On this topic, the time in which the

³² *Ibid*, 6.

³³ Helen I. Safa, "Class, Gender, and Race in the Caribbean: Reflections on an Intellectual Journey," *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/Revue Canadienne Des études Latino-américaines Et Caraïbes* 37, no. 74 (2012): 226.

³⁴ Isabel Largaia and John Dumoulin, "Women's Equality and the Cuban Revolution," in *Women and Change in Latin America*, ed. June Nash and Helen Safa (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1986), 347.

³⁵ Moya Fábregas, "Cuban Woman's Revolutionary Experience," 67.

³⁶ Stone, introduction to *Women and the Cuban Revolution*, 15.

historians wrote was key. Those writing during the early years of the historiography tended to be more likely to take a celebratory tone, especially since some of the first writers were supporters of Cuba's Marxist efforts. This was true of Randall's 1981 book, *Women in Cuba: Twenty Years Later*, which pointed to Cuba's endorsement and support of working mothers.³⁷ Similarly, Marjorie King's 1977 article, "Cuba's Attack on Women's Second Shift, 1974-1976," praised Cuba because it "has given women the mechanisms, class solidarity, and sense of self-worth to participate equally with men in the struggle."³⁸ Others provided anecdotal evidence of men's changed attitudes towards women working, including cases of men feeling "ashamed" if their wives did *not* work.³⁹ Historians writing before 1990, importantly, recognized that Cuba had not yet managed equal employment, but they viewed Cuba's progress as likely to lead to eventual success.

Meanwhile, those writing after the start of the Special Period possessed the knowledge that progress made during the early years of the revolution faltered during Cuba's more economically challenging years and, therefore, tended to be less optimistic. One fairly sympathetic expert, Iberia and Latin America Scholar Salim Lamrani, acknowledged that Cuban revolutionaries were battling "a legacy of five centuries of patriarchal society" but noted the unfortunate "resurgence" of prostitution in Cuba during the Special Period.⁴⁰ Helen Safa, who tended to celebrate the changes in Cuba, also expressed dismay at the "resurfacing" of "gender, class, and racial hierarchies" during the Special Period.⁴¹ Although this shift did not appear to have changed her assessment of Cuba's successes, Safa did acknowledge the tentativeness of the future.

Additionally, the use of gender as a lens of analysis led to the identification of further flaws in Cuba's programs, as previously noted. Even Cuban leaders acknowledged some of the areas in which they still needed to create progress, although the problems they cited differed from those scholars identified. Carolina Aguilar, the former managing editor of a leading Cuban women's magazine and a leader within the FMC, indicated in a 1994 interview that Cuba needed "to create a gender-specific awareness in women" so that women would be more likely to

³⁷ Margaret Randall, *Women in Cuba*, 99.

³⁸ King, "Attack on Women's Second Shift," 118.

³⁹ Largaia and Dumoulin, "Women's Equality," 352.

⁴⁰ Salim Lamrani, "Women in Cuba: The Emancipatory Revolution," trans. Larry R. Oberg, *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 8, no. 1 (2016): 114.

⁴¹ Helen Safa, "Hierarchies and Household Change in Postrevolutionary Cuba," *Latin American Perspectives* 36, no. 1 (2009): 50.

seek equality.⁴² In contrast, historians writing from outside Cuba were harsher in their critiques. Moya Fábregas, publishing in 2010, claimed that Cuban society “reaffirmed pre-revolutionary gender identities,”⁴³ while scholar Megan Daigle went so far as to say that “the Revolution has changed only the language of this script. Cuba’s Revolution has not itself transformed, or even done much to challenge, the social production of raced women as sexual objects whose value lies in their bodies themselves.”⁴⁴ The latter statement not only judged Cuba’s progress but also, indirectly, suggested an area of further research.

At this point, there remains room for additional scholarship in two components of this historiography. First, as of yet, historians have devoted little attention to the intersection of race and sex—or of race and gender—in Cuba’s mobilization of women into the workforce. Second, historians have rarely discussed regional differences in Cuba. It is worth asking to what degree the changes discussed by historians to date are representative of rural regions of Cuba. In the future, historians will likely find that employing a more intersectional approach and considering Cuban women’s employment comparatively across regions will open the discussion to new critiques of Cuba’s labor programs, although, one can only surmise at this point.

⁴² Aguilar and Chenard, “A Place for Feminism?” 105.

⁴³ Moya Fábregas, “Cuban Woman’s Revolutionary Experience,” 76.

⁴⁴ Megan Daigle, *From Cuba with Love*, 232.

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A painting by Percy Moran depicting Betsy Ross and two young girls presenting an American flag to George Washington and three other men. (Source: Percy Moran, *The Birth of Old Glory* / print from painting by Moran, Philadelphia, reprinted photograph by Thomas D. Murphy Co., Red Oak, Iowa, 1917, retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/93515921/>. [Accessed April 3, 2018.]

A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF NORTHERN WHITE WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

| Jeanette Adame

The American Revolutionary War, or the American War of Independence, has sparked the interest of many historians. Alan Gibson's *Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the Origins and Foundations of the American Republic* examined the major historiographical trends that emerged from the academic interest in the American Revolution. Gibson outlined the major schools of thought concerning the Revolutionary period, which included the progressive interpretation, the liberal approach, the republican framework, the enlightenment analysis, and the multiple traditions interpretation. Many of the academics who used these constructs of analysis omitted the experiences of marginalized groups, such as women, non-whites, and the poor from their studies. As social and cultural histories became popular among academics, the "Bottom Up" framework emerged, which sought to include these marginalized demographics in historical scholarship. Gibson explored the histories of the American Revolution that utilized this framework at the end of his book. This section included just five pages on the relationship between women and the Revolution, which reflected the relative lack of scholarship on the topic in comparison to the extensive historiography of literature on the Revolutionary period.¹

This essay will examine the scholarship that western historians have written on white women in Northern colonies in the Revolutionary period. Nineteenth and early-twentieth-century authors mainly wrote biographies about women in the Revolution. In the 1970s, academics produced more women's histories, and by the 1980s, authors increasingly utilized gender as a construct of analysis. These historical studies influenced both the general historiography of the Revolutionary period, and the historiography of white women specifically. It further allowed historians to achieve a more inclusive and coherent understanding of the relationship between women and the American Revolution.

Elizabeth Ellet was the first author to seriously address the experiences of women in the Revolution in her 1848 three-volume collection of biographies, *The Women of the American Revolution*. Her series became an instant best-seller in the United States, as it revealed

¹ Alan Gibson, *Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates Over the Origins and Foundations of the American Republic*, 2nd Edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 66-71.

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the multiplicity of roles that females engaged in during the conflict. Historians throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries used Ellet's findings in their own works on Revolutionary women. Lincoln Diamant reinforced the value of these volumes when he edited Ellet's work into a one-volume book for public and academic audiences in 1998.²

Political, social, and cultural events in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries influenced scholarly attention to the relationship between women and the Revolution. Suffrage movements led authors such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Alice Morse Earle, Elisabeth Dexter, Carl Halliday, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Mary Beard, and Mary Sumner Benson to publish academic works on the topic. However, most of the books and articles they produced lacked either a discernable thesis or critical analysis. The conservative culture of the 1940s and 1950s reduced scholarly interest in historical subjects that academics perceived as "radical," such as women or minorities. One notable exception was Elizabeth Cometti's 1947 article, "Women in the American Revolution," which argued that late-eighteenth-century society limited women to solely domestic duties. Fortunately, the women's movements of the 1960s and 1970s prompted many academics to return to the topic of women in the Revolution. These authors produced biographies, women's histories, and gender histories.³

During the 1970s, some academics published biographical narratives of women in the Revolution. In 1973, Sally Smith Booth published *The Women of '76*, which described various women and their activities during the war. Booth concluded that these women had both direct and indirect influences on the Revolutionary period, which made their significance as a collective ambiguous. Paul Engle also took a biographical approach in *Women in the American Revolution*. Engle argued that men provided the physical force for the Revolution, while women gave the intellectual, spiritual, and material sustenance that drove the conflict. Elizabeth Evans combined biographical narratives with primary source material in *Weathering the Storm: Women of the American Revolution*. Each chapter included a brief introduction of a Revolutionary female, followed by a sample of written literature by that individual. Evans's book showed the paradox between Revolutionary

² Elizabeth Ellet, *The Women of the American Revolution*, 4 ed., vol. 1-3 (New York: Haskell House, 1969); Elizabeth F. Ellet, *Revolutionary Women in the War for American Independence: A One-Volume Revised Edition of Elizabeth Ellet's 1848 Landmark Series*, ed. Lincoln Diamant (Westport: Praeger, 1998); James H. Hutson, "Women in the Era of the American Revolution: The Historian as Suffragist," *The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress* 32, no. 4 (1975): 291-92.

³ Hutson, "Women in the Era of the American Revolution," 296; Elizabeth Cometti, "Women in the American Revolution," *The New England Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1947): 329-46.

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ideals and the subordination of women. The biographies produced by Booth, Engle, and Evans all showcased middle to upper-class women who had the economic and social ability to become literate and leave behind written records.⁴

While many academics turned away from biographies after the 1970s, some historians continued to utilize this style of writing, as exemplified by Carol Berkin's 2005 book, *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence*, Jeremy Stern's 2006 article, "Jane Franklin Mecom: A Boston Woman in Revolutionary Times," and Susan Casey's 2015 publication, *Women Heroes of the American Revolution: 20 Stories of Espionage, Sabotage, Defiance, and Rescue*. Biographical narratives remained important to the historiography of northern white women in the Revolution as they provided the context for more analytical and interpretive studies.⁵

Other authors in the 1970s addressed women in the Revolution more generally. Wendy Martin analyzed the experiences of middle and lower-class females in "Women and the American Revolution." Martin noted the paradox between Revolutionary expectations of white women and the hardships these individuals faced during the war. Mary Beth Norton examined the collective struggle of approximately 400 Loyalist women who submitted written and verbal grievances to the loyalist claims commission. In addition, Linda Grant De Pauw and Conover Hunt described the general experiences of women in the Revolution in "*Remembering the Ladies*": *Women in America 1750-1815*. This book captured the essence of material culture in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries and provided readers with a unique insight into everyday life during the Revolution by including a plethora of visual images throughout the book. All of these authors emphasized the importance of women's domestic roles throughout the late-eighteenth century.⁶

⁴ Sally Smith Booth, *The Women of '76* (New York: Hastings House, 1973); Paul Engle, *Women in the American Revolution* (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1976); Elizabeth Evans, *Weathering the Storm: Women of the American Revolution* (New York: Scribner, 1975).

⁵ Carol Berkin, *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence* (New York: Knopf, 2005); Jeremy A. Stern, "Jane Franklin Mecom: A Boston Woman in Revolutionary Times," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 4, no. 1 (June 1, 2006): 147-91; Susan Casey, *Women Heroes of the American Revolution: 20 Stories of Espionage, Sabotage, Defiance, and Rescue* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2015).

⁶ Wendy Martin, "Women and the American Revolution," *Early American Literature* 11, no. 3 (December 1976): 322-35; Mary Beth Norton, "Eighteenth-Century American Women in Peace and War: The Case of the Loyalists," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1976): 386-409, Norton does not capitalize "loyalist claims commission" in her

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During the late 1970s and early 1980s, historians increasingly studied the relationship between gender and the Revolution. A collection of essays that appeared in William M. Fowler and Wallace Coyle's 1979 book, *The American Revolution: Changing Perspectives*, signaled a paradigm shift for the historiography of the American Revolution. One of the articles by Carol Ruth Burkin, titled "Remembering the Ladies: Historians and the Women of the American Revolution," called for the need to produce more work about women and the Revolutionary period. Burkin reflected the emerging "history from below" method, as she called for more imaginative approaches to historical sources in order to illuminate the experiences of this marginalized demographic.⁷

In 1980, Linda Kerber and Mary Beth Norton each published a highly influential book on gender and the American Revolution. Kerber and Norton both engaged the separate spheres in their works, and generally argued that Revolutionary women had minimal influence on the public sphere, but that their roles in the private sphere changed during this period. In a 1976 article, Kerber coined the term "Republican Motherhood," which she then expanded upon in her 1980 book, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America*. She argued that the new Republic needed women to uphold the morality of the family and to pass on Revolutionary ideals and Republican values to the next generation. Norton similarly demonstrated society's changing perceptions of women's work in *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800*. She argued that the Revolution forced Americans to redefine domesticity in the aftermath of the war. This, she asserted, signaled the public sphere's growing consciousness of women's influence outside of the home and marriage. Both Kerber and Norton asserted that while the Revolution changed the domestic sphere, women remained subordinated to men in public and private lives. Furthermore, both authors drew a connection between the impact of the Revolution and the women's rights movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁸

Women's movements prompted various authors to associate the Revolution with the political consciousness of the twentieth century. In a 1987 article by Joan Hoff-Wilson, she stated that the same non-

article; Linda Grant De Pauw and Conover Hunt, "Remembering the Ladies": *Women in America, 1750-1815* (New York: The Viking Press, 1976).

⁷ William M. Fowler and Wallace Coyle, eds., *The American Revolution: Changing Perspectives* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1979).

⁸ Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980).

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gendered language in the Constitution of “people,” “peoples,” and “persons,” which intentionally excluded nineteenth-century females, liberated twentieth-century women and buttressed women’s rights movements. Hoff-Wilson traced the repercussions of the Revolutionary era to second-wave feminism and included a call to action for feminist leaders of the 1980s. While some academics celebrated historical connections to contemporary politics, others discouraged this practice and stated that it prevented objectivity in historical analyses.⁹

Most historians omitted contemporary politics from their academic research, and solely focused on the late-eighteenth century. Various scholars limited their scope even further and produced microhistories. Nancy F. Cott’s article “Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts” showed how Massachusetts women gained the ability to petition for divorce during the Revolutionary period, yet remained economically dependent on their husbands. Barbra Lacey produced similar findings in her exploration of one northern town in “Women in the Era of the American Revolution: The Case of Norwich, Connecticut.” Lacey concluded that the Revolution allowed women in Norwich to petition for divorce, limit their family sizes, gain inheritances, increase their educations, and protest grievances with other women in their community. While most females still aspired toward domestic lives of marriage and child rearing, Norwich reflected one location where some women pursued other lifestyles.¹⁰

Joan W. Scott’s ground-breaking 1986 article, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” enhanced discussions of gender and sex throughout the historical field. By defining gender as both a construct of social relationships and as a signifier of power, she demonstrated how history benefitted from using gender as a form of interpretation. While some academics had already examined the American Revolution through the lens of gender, this article caused more historians, and the historical field in general, to recognize its significance.¹¹

In 1990, Linda Kerber analyzed social perceptions of gender during the Revolution in “‘I Have Don...Much to Carrey on the Warr’:

⁹ Joan Hoff-Wilson, “The Unfinished Revolution: Changing Legal Status of U.S. Women,” *Signs* 13, no. 1 (1987): 7–36.

¹⁰ Nancy F. Cott, “Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (1976): 586–614; Barbara E. Lacey, “Women in the Era of the American Revolution: The Case of Norwich, Connecticut,” *The New England Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (1980): 527–43.

¹¹ Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1067.

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Women and the Shaping of Republican Ideology After the American Revolution.” She exemplified the “deeply gendered” community, in which white males had the political power, and maintained the position in her 1980 book that women had no political involvement during the conflict. Since Revolutionary society did not perceive gender as an issue, women shouldered the burden of proving their importance in the political community and public sphere.¹²

Mary Beth Norton’s *Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of American Society* examined gender in the context of public and private hierarchies of power during the Revolution. The Filmerian system present in colonial society used gender to signify relationships of power in both nuclear families and in the larger social order, thereby subordinating women in both spheres. Revolutionary leaders appropriated these social hierarchies to embolden white men in the struggle against Great Britain. In 2011, Norton expanded on her study of gender roles in pre-Revolutionary society and concluded that by the late-eighteenth century, gender determined who could act politically and who could not.¹³

As the historical literature on women and gender in the Revolution increased, some historians grew skeptical of the argument that women acted solely in the private sphere. By the turn of the twenty-first century, some academics attempted to demonstrate how women did participate in the public sphere, while others maintained the discourses put forward by twentieth-century scholars.

In 2000, Catherine Allgor published a major body of work, which contended that women actively participated in the public sphere. Allgor’s *Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government* examined the multiplicity of ways in which elite and upper-middle class white women used public and private events, such as dinner parties and parlor gatherings, to influence politics in Washington. Allgor boldly stated that elite white women in political families shared “identical” goals with their husbands, sons, brothers, and friends, of developing personal relationships to build U.S. politics and to legitimize the new country to national citizens and the world. In 2001, Susan Branson also argued for the political agency of white women in Philadelphia in *These Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women and Political*

¹² Linda Kerber, “‘I Have Don...Much to Carrey on the Warr’: Women and The Shaping of Republican Ideology After the American Revolution,” *Journal of Women’s History* 1, no. 3 (1990): 231–43.

¹³ Mary Beth Norton, *Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of American Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996); Mary Beth Norton, *Separated by Their Sex: Women in Public and Private in the Colonial Atlantic World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

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Culture in early National Philadelphia. Branson, who was personally unsatisfied with the scholarly concepts of the separate spheres and Republican Motherhood, set out to demonstrate that eighteenth-century women did not conform to the identities that twentieth-century historians created for them. Instead, she argued, the Revolution expanded the visibility of white women in the public sphere.¹⁴

While both Allgor and Branson changed historical perceptions of white women's political involvement, their works highlighted exceptional circumstances. Allgor examined elite white women in prominent political families, which constituted an extremely specific demographic. Likewise, Branson examined women in Philadelphia, a city that had a long history of Quakerism, a religion that traditionally included women in religious politics. This culture made women's transition to secular politics more readily acceptable to the larger society.

Since women's direct political agency could not be conclusively defined as typical, other historical studies demonstrated how gender indirectly influenced the public sphere. In 2002, Sharon Block published an article on the emergence of rape stories in late-eighteenth-century media. Block showed how print culture removed women from narratives of rape in newspapers, almanacs, pamphlets, novels, and plays, which made the accounts of sexual abuse more palatable to society. Revolutionary leaders used rape as a motif to reason why early American society needed to gain independence from oppressive British rule. Block argued that rape unified the budding nation against common political, religious, and racial enemies. The absence of women from these stories further signified relationships of power exclusively between men, thereby excluding women from the public sphere while simultaneously utilizing their traumatic experiences for propaganda. Block expanded on these findings in her 2006 book, *Rape and Sexual Power in Early America*. In addition to her analysis of the constructs of gender and rape, Block also showed how the legal dimensions of rape changed over the Revolutionary period. The new Republic racialized rape laws so that courts often deemed black men guilty and worthy of capital punishment, while white men rarely received the death penalty when convicted of rape charges. In addition, the personal diaries, biographies, histories, jokes, morality tales, and courtroom trials that included accounts of sexual assault all reflected

¹⁴ Catherine Allgor, *Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); Susan Branson, *These Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women and Political Culture in Early National Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

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how American society expected gender, social, and racial hierarchies to function.¹⁵

Ruth H. Bloch also demonstrated how white women indirectly pervaded politics in “The American Revolution, Wife Beating, and the Emergent Value of Privacy.” Bloch cited the positive and negative impact of the changing legal culture in the Revolutionary period. While women now had the ability to access divorce rights and education, the assertion of privacy rights allowed white males to rationalize wife beatings in a public court of law. The right to privacy, a right inherent to Revolutionary ideals, ultimately resulted in the concealment of the oppression of white women in the home.¹⁶

Various twenty-first-century historical works on women’s private lives resembled the scholarship produced in the 1980s and 1990s. Susan E. Klepp, Sarah Knott, and G. J. Barker-Benfield all examined the emerging value of sensibility and its intersection with gender. Both Klepp and Barker-Benfield maintained that while women’s roles changed during the Revolutionary period, females remained subordinated to males in the home. At the same time, ideas of sensibility allowed women to gain control over their reproductive lives. Knott, on the other hand, took a more cynical approach to the relationship between self-autonomy and sensibility, arguing that women did not have increased liberties as men continually deemed the sensibility of females as irrational.¹⁷

More recent studies returned to the examination of women’s direct involvement in the public sphere during the Revolution. In 2014, Emily J. Arendt published ““Ladies Going About for Money”: Female Voluntary Associations and Civic Consciousness in the American Revolution,” which examined how Pennsylvania’s elite population established the first female voluntary association in the U.S., the Ladies Association of Philadelphia. These women acted both in unacceptable roles as “female politicians,” by collecting money for the war effort in

¹⁵ Sharon Block, “Rape without Women: Print Culture and the Politicization of Rape, 1765–1815,” *Journal of American History* 89, no. 3 (December 1, 2002): 849–68; Sharon Block, *Rape and Sexual Power in Early America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

¹⁶ Ruth H. Bloch, “The American Revolution, Wife Beating, and the Emergent Value of Privacy,” *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 5, no. 2 (September 25, 2007): 223–51.

¹⁷ Susan E. Klepp, *Revolutionary Conceptions: Women, Fertility, and Family Limitations in America, 1760-1820* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); G. J. Barker-Benfield, “Stillbirth and Sensibility: The Case of Abigail and John Adams,” *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 2–29; Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

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public, and in acceptable roles as domestic housewives, by weaving fabric, making food, and healing men's wounds. As noted previously, Philadelphia presented an exceptional situation in the Revolutionary North. Susan Brandt showed how women with medical knowledge effectively gained public roles through homoeopathic entrepreneurship. Brandt studied various northern white women who started medicinal healing centers as a source of wellness and economic security for their families, which often expanded into community health centers. The author demonstrated how healers created substantial connections with other healthcare providers, and established reputations of medical legitimacy and economic sovereignty within their communities. These women acted squarely in the public sphere, yet did so in a profession that society deemed acceptable for females.¹⁸

The enlarged body of historical works on women and the American Revolution helped generate more attention among non-academic populations. For example, in 2004, U.S. historian Cokie Roberts published *Founding Mothers: The Women Who Raised Our Nation*, which she geared toward a popular audience. Another book written for the average consumer included *Daily Life During the American Revolution* by historians Dorothy and James Volo. Popular histories helped both the intellectual and general populations understand the significance of women in the Revolutionary period.¹⁹

Despite the increased attention to gender and the Revolution, the vast majority of scholarship has remained hyper-focused on the battle narratives and "Great Men" of the late-eighteenth century. In 2015, Tony L. Ditz reminded historians of the necessity of gender studies for a complete and coherent understanding of the Revolution. While historians have made significant achievements on the subject, the impact of the relationship between white women and the Revolution remains somewhat ambiguous. Ditz argued that more research needed to be done to reconcile the appearance of some women in politics with the simultaneous resistance against such women's agency in the public sphere.²⁰

¹⁸ Emily J. Arendt, "'Ladies Going About for Money': Female Voluntary Associations and Civic Consciousness in the American Revolution," *Journal of the Early Republic* 34, no. 2 (2014): 157–86; Susan Brandt, "'Getting into a Little Business': Margaret Hill Morris and Women's Medical Entrepreneurship during the American Revolution," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 13, no. 4 (October 30, 2015): 774–807.

¹⁹ Cokie Roberts, *Founding Mothers: The Women Who Raised Our Nation* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Dorothy Denneen Volo and James M. Volo, *Daily Life During the American Revolution* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003).

²⁰ Toby L. Ditz, "'Masculine Republics and 'Female Politicians' in the Age of Revolution," *Journal of the Early Republic* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 263–69.

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The historiography of northern white women during the American Revolution experienced numerous changes throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Historians will inevitably continue to produce works on this demographic and debate the relationship between white women and the Revolution. The experiences of this group differed greatly from those of African, African American, and indigenous women. All of these demographics deserve more scholarly attention. Only through an understanding of the complex relations between race, class, and gender will historical studies of the American Revolution become more comprehensive and complete.

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Chairman Mao signaling his approval of Red Guard participation in the Cultural Revolution. (Source image: Shen Yaoyi, *Advancing Through the Storm in the Footsteps of Chairman Mao*, woodblock print, 1966 in Winnie Tsang, "Creating National Narrative: The Red Guard Art Exhibitions and the National Exhibitions in the Chinese Cultural Revolution 1966-1976," *Contemporaneity: Historical Presence in Visual Culture* 3, no. 1 (2004): 121, fig. 1.)

A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RED GUARD MOVEMENT IN THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

| Alison Saechao

Young adults, and more specifically students, played a significant role in shaping protests and activist movements throughout the world during the late Twentieth century. Students at the University of California, Berkeley, in particular, reflected this trend when they started the Free Speech Movement in 1964. In most cases, student protests occurred as a dissident response to their own governments. However, one group may not fit such a general mold so easily. A few years after the Free Speech Movement, in 1966, students in China participated in a campaign in support of their government. With Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong's encouragement, the educated youth, known as the Red Guards, played an extensive and quite violent role in China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Chairman Mao gave the Red Guards the task of assisting in cleansing the Communist Party of any political opponents against the ideals of the Party. Intellectuals, official party members, and even rural Chinese villagers suffered under both the Red Guard movement and the Cultural Revolution. On an international scale, Red Guards became the image of bullies and "hooligans" who all inflicted death and destruction on anything considered bourgeois and feudal. Western audiences learned about the activities of the Red Guard through sensationalized memoirs, autobiographies, and interviews with personal accounts of victims' traumatic experiences. This caused confusion among scholars and historians, and the interpretation of the phenomenon remained open to changes and debates.

The historiography of the Red Guard movement, especially in the early years from 1966 to 1968, revealed diverging interpretations from leading historians. After much research on various scholarly works, with publications since the beginning of the Revolution and to the present day, scholarship about Red Guards activity reflected two major phases. The first phase examined the Red Guard movement from a top-down approach in which Mao himself led and allowed the Red Guards to act in an anarchistic manner. This interpretation remained prominent in scholarly works about the Cultural Revolution from the 1970s to the late 1990s. However, by the late 1990s, a second phase occurred where scholars framed the Red Guard narrative with more emphasis on the bottom-up approach. With a history from below focus, a broader interpretation included evidence of the Red Guards' freedom of choice in participating in the movement. This history from the bottom up

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approach allowed historians to challenge older narratives, which claimed that Red Guards lacked awareness in their destructive behavior and simply followed Mao's orders.¹ Scholars today argue that Red Guards attained a force of agency that actually disrupted Mao and the Party's control over the students.² Overall, the historiography of the Red Guard movement reflected the complexity of how different actors influenced the Cultural Revolution, and the major trends of historical scholarship prevalent in a particular scholar's time.³

The Chinese Cultural Revolution, with its decade-long duration and diverse range of players participating in such event, unsurprisingly caught academic interests from all fields. And in the classic view of interpreting any revolution, a top-down approach initially occurred among scholars of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's declaration of the creation of the Cultural Revolution essentially led historians to focus only on the political powers at play. As a result, scholarly interpretation of the Red Guard movement began with a history from the top. Additionally, the extent of the violence prompted Western scholars and Chinese historians with Western-educated backgrounds to engage in a psychoanalytic focus on the Red Guard movement, as well as on Mao's influential powers over a whole nation. Scholarly work from the 1970s to 1990s heavily focused on psychological interpretations of the Red Guards and led to conclusions reflective of Western psychological theories. For instance, both Western and Chinese scholars found that Red Guard resistance to authoritative figures marked a case example of social tensions between the youth and society in general.

Scholars especially referred to works by Erik Erickson and Sigmund Freud to comprehend the extensive violence and brutality that young Red Guards inflicted on older, more powerful figures in Chinese

¹ Klaus Menhert, *Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad* (Berkeley: University of California, Center for Chinese Studies, 1969), 70.

² Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, eds, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 19-33.

³ The Red Guard movement was a smaller but influential force within the Cultural Revolution. As the movement occurred during the larger phenomenon of the Cultural Revolution, it is imperative to include both historiographical content about Mao's role in the Red Guard movement and the Cultural Revolution in general. Due to the extensive length of the Cultural Revolution, this paper mainly focuses on the historiography of the Red Guard movement, which occurred between August 1966 when Mao made his speech at Tiananmen Square warning the nation of potential opponents that needed to be caught and pushed out of the Communist Party, until the spring of 1968 when Mao announced a program to send youth, rather Red Guards in particular, to assist peasants with farm labor in the countryside. In short, historiography of the Red Guards necessarily includes information about the Cultural Revolution.

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society.⁴ For example, Jing Lin, a Chinese historian, used Western social learning theory to analyze Red Guard behavior. “The Red Guards,” Lin stated, “as human beings, had been under many tensions: in the family they were subject to their parents’ authority; in schools, to that of teachers and the student organizations; in the society, to that of the party and Chairman Mao. These tensions had to find a way to be released, and the energy that built up was converted to aggressing against the ‘class enemies.’” Additionally, Lin applied Freudian concepts and claimed that, “general essential assertiveness, moving to hostility and destructiveness – what Freud called aggression as instinctual drive – was turned into a vehemently reactive destructiveness in the context of ‘class struggle.’”⁵ Lin’s approach mirrored previous scholars, which essentially reflected a broader spectrum of the top-down approach in understanding Red Guards’ motivation and participation. Moreover, historians referred to China’s pre-Cultural Revolution education system in which the youth received constant teachings “to glorify Mao, be loyal to Party, love their country and people, and hate ‘class enemies.’”⁶ Such repetitive mantras, especially chanted by adults of respective and authoritative statuses, ultimately secured Red Guard obedience to follow Communist Party officials’ orders and requests. Class struggle and class ideology became an explanation behind the Red Guards’ readiness to follow Mao’s orders, destroy the four olds, and inflict physical attacks on others.⁷ Before the Cultural Revolution, Chinese students across the country and especially in urban dwellings competed for economic and educational security in elite institutions. In psychoanalyzing the tensions Red Guards held with their families, teachers, and peers, historians

⁴ W. Richard and Amy A. Wilson, “The Red Guards and the World Student Movement,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 42 (1970): 88-104, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/652032>.

⁵ Jing Lin, *The Red Guards’ Path to Violence: Political, Educational, and Psychological Factors* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 159. Further psychoanalysis on Mao and the Red Guards can be found in Martin Singer’s *Educated Youth and the Cultural Revolution* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1971). In his work, Singer evaluated how egoism led to Red Guard factionalism and disorganization within the movement as well as how psychological warfare between Red Guards themselves created further tension to other groups like factory workers and the army.

⁶ Yixin Chen, “Lost in Revolution and Reform: the socioeconomic pains of China’s Red Guards generation, 1966-1996,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 8, no. 21 (1999): 222.

⁷ Esherick, Pickowicz, and Walder, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 3-5. The four olds (old customs, culture, habits, and ideas) marked the symbols of China’s traditional, premodern society that reflected Confucian elitism. Mao gave the approval for the Red Guards to denounce these items, which led to the confiscation and destruction of paintings, books, and monuments – generally any item that resembled feudal and European bourgeois influence. Such definition as to what (and even who) may be considered bourgeois was virtually up to the Red Guards’ interpretation.

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argued that Red Guards used Mao's order to eradicate potential "class enemies" as a basis to essentially attack socioeconomic competitors within their class.

Early historiography works about the Red Guard movement, then, used class struggle and ideological motivations as the general and dominant narrative for the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution. Interestingly enough, the official Communist Party also reinforced such a narrative.⁸ As a result, both historians and the Chinese government (after Mao's death in 1976) constructed the Red Guard movement and the Cultural Revolution as one of the darkest phases in Chinese history. Demonizing Mao and denouncing his Cultural Revolution became the official and accepted narrative for Western and Chinese audiences.⁹ To elaborate further, after Mao's death in 1976, the Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping, reigned in control over the revolution and propelled the nation to meet Western standards of economic prosperity.¹⁰ By the 1980s, China implemented economic policies that mirrored Western market capitalism. The Communist Party, in hopes of attaining Western approval, unleashed the official statement denouncing Mao's Cultural Revolution as an economic travesty that led to financial stagnation for its peoples.¹¹ Western media and historians agreed to such statements and recognized the Chinese government in the 1980s, in comparison to the 1960s and 1970s, as "a more pragmatic regime," in which "the country is healing itself."¹² To show cooperation and unity after the tumultuous decade, Xiaoping and the Communist Party created a national framework that ultimately censored and prohibited dissident voices from sharing positive gains and benefits from the revolution. Scholars even admitted they lacked strong convictions about the Red Guard behavior, declaring "there is little scholarly work" regarding the "historiography of the Red Guard movement in Beijing."¹³ As a result, early scholars of the Communist Revolution relied on limited sources heavily laden with Communist Party propaganda.

⁸ Moby Gao, *The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008), 54. According to Gao, the ideological interpretation was officially presented by the CCP 1981 Resolution.

⁹ Gao, *The Battle for China's Past*, 31-21.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Amanda Bennet, "Mao's Orphans: In Today's New China, Red Guards of the '60s Are a Lost Generation --- Often Lacking an Education And Facing Resentment, Ex-Radicals Fall Behind --- Memories of a Heady Time," *Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition*, (January 4, 1985): ProQuest.

¹³ Andrew G. Walder, "Beijing Red Guard Factionalism: Social Interpretations Reconsidered," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 2 (2002): 441, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2700297>.

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During the 1970s, language barriers prevented Western scholars and historians from collecting published works for scholarly analysis, thereby limiting them from providing broader interpretations of the Red Guard movement. But by the 1980s, more English-based primary source publications gradually allowed scholars to gain more access in understanding the movement. Considered as a “publication phenomenon,” these personal accounts served as major sources of reference to narrate and denounce both Red Guard activities and the entire Cultural Revolution.¹⁴

These publications further brought confirmation to the Communist Party’s official statement in denouncing Mao and blaming the Gang of Four.¹⁵ Termed by historians as “‘literature of the wounded,’ or ‘scar literature’ (*shanghen wenxue*),” these “short stories and novels that portrayed the cruelty and violence of the period in unvarnished terms,” served as research material for many scholars.¹⁶ Moreover, quick and speedy English translations of these accounts “had the greatest early impact on outsiders’ view of the human toll of the Cultural Revolution.”¹⁷

In more recent times, however, historians started to use memoirs and biographies less and less as such perspectives revealed biased tendencies that represent only a small portion of the Chinese population. Most of these accounts came from wealthy Red Guards who grew up with close political connections to the Party. Some scholars, most notably, Mobo Gao, argued that memoirs, biographies, and autobiographies weakened objective accounts of the Cultural Revolution and of the Red Guard movement because the writers “use contemporary beliefs and perceptions to write about past history.”¹⁸ Gao especially criticized Jung Chang’s *Wild Swans* and its success as a narrative for the Cultural Revolution. He stated:

The most successful, that is the most popular and influential, memoir is surely that by expatriate Chinese Jung Chang. Chang naturally assumes that students of peasant

¹⁴ Gao, *Battle*, 49.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* The Gang of Four served as the four Communist Party officials who essentially took the fall for the atrocities and sufferings that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Both the Communist Party and public accused the four figures, Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen who were all arrested and convicted after the revolution.

¹⁶ Esherick, Pickowicz, and Walder, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Gao, *Battle*, 54.

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background are ‘semi-literate’ and had ‘little attitude’, while she was clever and served the best, including a generous Chinese government scholarship to study in Britain. Chang claims that she was the victim of a brutal regime but, in fact, as well as being a Red Guard, Jung Chang was the privileged daughter of China’s Communist elite.¹⁹

To Gao, Chang’s memoir reflected a top-down approach of Chinese history. He stressed that Chang’s fear of being reduced to a peasant called for Western sympathy and reinforced the general narrative that people like Chang went through extreme sufferings. The historiography of the Red Guard movement and of the Cultural Revolution for most of the century remained in a framework that reinforced the Communist Party’s official narrative as well as Western approval.²⁰

A break from this general acceptance about Red Guards, however, began in the late 1990s and early 2000s when historians delved further into the power struggles within the Red Guard student organizations. Internal division and factions developed within the Red Guards during the early years of the movement and prompted scholars to probe deeper into understanding what caused them. Many historians credited Hong Yung Lee for his pioneering work in changing the Red Guard scholarship. Published in 1978, Lee studied the power relations between the Red Guards and the Party and argued:

The Chinese students revolted, not because they were alienated from the prevalent value system, but because they wanted to conform with it. In their behavior they displayed what the regime had tried to instill in their minds, such as the ideas of ‘class struggle,’ ‘one dividing into two,’ participatory democracy, concern with the fate of collectives, and

¹⁹ Ibid, 43.

²⁰ In his work, Gao also claimed that modern Chinese historiography mirrored Western style of political and economic linear transformation. To be specific, Western European history largely encompassed detailed accounts of the changes from feudalism to current market capitalism. And this narrative became a major force in dictating Chinese history for both Chinese and Western audiences.

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above all, the demands of high-level self-consciousness.²¹

Lee made an interesting case that challenged traditional top-down narratives of the Revolution. Like other historians after him, Lee argued that complexity encompassed the Red Guard movement because of “the interests of various social groups at the mass level.”²² An approach that included more perspectives other than the ruling party ultimately provided for a better account of the event. “By restricting the focus of research to elite behavior,” Lee remarked, “this approach fails to relate to the actual process of the Cultural Revolution.”²³ Mirroring Lee’s thoughts decades later, Andrew G. Walder stated that “this new emphasis on the importance of social forces” became most visible with historian interests on the Red Guard. He claimed, “Hong Yung Lee synthesized the underlying conception that untied work in this vein: the Cultural Revolution created an opportunity for social groups to pursue their interests, and the conflicts expressed social differences that had emerged under Communist Party rule.”²⁴ He and other scholars elaborated further on Lee’s idea that Red Guards exhibited their own self-interests since the start of the movement.²⁵

Changes in historical interpretation of the Red Guard movement and, on a broader scale, of the Cultural Revolution, now focused heavily on individual agency and the amount of freedom the Red Guards maintained in making choices during the Revolution. The history from below approach, then, became prominent by the late-twentieth century as more scholarly works included a wider range of perspectives. Scholars like Frank Dikotter credited such changes to the increase in more primary sources released from the Chinese government. Dikotter stated that “over the past few years increasingly large amounts of primary material from the party archives in China have become available to historians.” Such accessibility provided scholars like Dikotter with research material that “draws on hundreds of archival documents, the majority of them used here for the first time.”²⁶ Compared to initial interpretations of the Red Guard movement and the Cultural Revolution,

²¹ Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 61.

²² Lee, *The Politics*, 323.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Esherick, Pickowicz, and Walder, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution*, 4.

²⁵ Alexander Russo, “The Conclusive Scene: Mao and the Red Guards in July 1968,” *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 13, no. 3 (2005): 535-552.

²⁶ Frank Dikotter, *The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962-1976* (London, UK : Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2016), vxiii.

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more recent accounts denounced notions that all Red Guards perpetuated violence. Historians also refuted the idea that Mao allowed violence and brutality to occur. Instead, they declared that the youth, and the Red Guards in particular, expressed much liberty in choosing to obey the Maoist leaders or not. In other words, most Red Guards revered Mao, but they never fully followed all of his orders and ideals.²⁷

Additionally, Richard Kurt Kraus made the argument that the accepted historiography of the Cultural Revolution painted Mao in a bad light, which reflected poor attempts in providing an objectionable interpretation. He claimed:

Mao had both heroic and demonic aspects, and he must occupy an important spot in any interpretation. But some popular accounts depict Mao forcing his way on a whole society. These resemble the Hitler-centric views of the Third Reich that left little room for German themselves to be imperialistic and anti-Semitic. Mao-as-monster perspectives are also potentially handy for current Chinese elites who avoid looking deeply into China's recent past. They comfort Western audiences, who often like to imagine the Chinese people as victims. But these approaches rest on bad scholarship, ignoring the complex relationships for the sake of a simple message.²⁸

Kraus proposed for a more complex view and less sympathetic attitude toward the Chinese people as victims from the Cultural Revolution. He believed Chinese elites' discomfort with accepting the atrocities of the phenomenon played a part in determining the overall narrative and attitude about the revolution. Furthermore, Western interpretations reinforced the narratives that depicted the revolution as calamities for the Chinese nation. These scholarly works, then, provided for the

²⁷ Dikotter, *The Cultural Revolution*, 111-288. Dikotter also made the argument that not everyone, especially ordinary people, followed or agreed with the Party ideals during the Cultural Revolution. His Chapter 22, "The Second Society," goes into more detail about underground groups that retained foreign and bourgeois cultural practices. He also discussed the development of the lucrative black market that catered to literature and banned books.

²⁸ Richard Curt Kraus, *The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 21.

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denunciation and denigration of both the Cultural Revolution and of Mao.

Gao, like other current scholars today, argued that such attitude about Mao and the Cultural Revolution illustrated a huge misconception and an unfair interpretation of Chinese history. Gao further claimed that this narrative catered to a bias and elitist perception, which ultimately silenced the voice of the Chinese majority – that of the rural peasants and urban factory workers. “It is important,” Gao declared, “to hear the voice that may resonate among the vast majority of the Chinese, who cannot be simply dismissed as ignorant and brainwashed.” Moreover, a majority of the peasants and urban workers “might not have a reason to dislike Mao.”²⁹ Compared to early historical works, the focus on a more balanced narrative that included various accounts of interest groups reflected current trends in Red Guard and Cultural Revolution historiography.

In conclusion, Red Guard scholarship encompassed history from below by the end of the twentieth century. More current publications revealed broader yet more inclusive interpretations about Mao and the Red Guards. Furthermore, newer voices continued to challenge the old notion that the Cultural Revolution remained as a dark past in China’s history. Some scholars, like Mobo Gao and Guobin Yang, addressed the limits of applying Western historical practices on a non-Western region.³⁰ And fortunately, Yang claimed that Chinese historiography of the Cultural Revolution grew in recent times.³¹ Such gradual increase possibly reflected the growing distance between the aging population that lived through the Cultural Revolution and the rest of the country. More talks regarding the decade-event became easier to share. Though the official Party refused to change its stance on the narrative, censorship lessened as people found easier ways to share their voices on the internet.³² And so scholars became hopeful that a more balanced account of this event would be granted and that the silences from the majority of those impacted by the Cultural Revolution, the peasants, would finally be heard. Such a step toward more inclusion, then, revealed the complexity of forces within the Cultural Revolution as well as the popular trend of a history from below approach that historians continue to practice.

²⁹ Gao, *Battle*, 3.

³⁰ Gao, *Battle*, 32-38. Further reading about Sinological orientalism, the identification with Western values about the view of oriental despotism, can be found in Chapter 2, “Constructing history: memories, values, and identity.”

³¹ Guobin Yang, *The Red Guard generation and political activism in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 1-70.

³² Gao, *Battle*, 117-158.

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President Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon are shown with their host, King Saud of Saudi Arabia, as they attended the regally-arranged dinner given by the Arabian monarch at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington D.C. King Saud was the guest of honor at a dinner given by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the previous night and at one given by President Eisenhower Thursday night. (Image and Caption Source: *Eisenhower and Nixon at Dinner with King Saud* by Hank Walker from The LIFE Picture Collection, 1957.)

IRRECONCILABLE CORE VALUES: EISENHOWER’S FAILURE TO BUILD UP SAUD AS A PRO-WESTERN PILLAR

| Michael Muraki

On January 30, 1957, a twenty-one-gun salute welcomed Saudi King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to New York City. Amid much fanfare, King Saud became the first sitting Saudi Arabian head of state to visit the United States.¹ Saud’s arrival in New York marked the apogee of King Saud’s special relationship with the United States under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In the few months surrounding the visit, King Saud presented himself as the most substantial Middle Eastern proponent that the Eisenhower Doctrine would ever have. Consequently, Eisenhower and Dulles received Saud with the lavish style that Saud enjoyed in Saudi Arabia.

Not all Americans, however, so enthusiastically welcomed the historic visit. The New York Council of the Congress of Industrial Organizations equated Saud to a “feudal despot” that “is the antithesis of everything that American Democracy stands for.”² Americans accused Saud’s state sponsored religious police, who were beholden to an extreme form of Islam, of perpetrating hostile Jewish and Catholic policies. Anti-Saud sentiment ran deeply enough that New York Governor Averell Harriman and city Mayor Robert Wagner refused to welcome Saud personally into their city and state.³ King Saud’s questionable record on human rights begs this question: Why did the United States choose to back a repressive Islamic monarchy that, in many ways, was and still is contradictory to core American values?

Most of the current literature regarding King Saud’s relationship with the United States treats the subject as a lesser topic within a conversation of Eisenhower’s keystone doctrine or a general examination of regional issues. This paper will focus on the U.S.-King Saud relationship with the purpose of illuminating U.S. policy regarding Arab nationalism, Soviet containment, access to petroleum resources, and decolonization. It will emphasize the comparison of core values of the Saudi kingdom under Saud in relation to those of the United States,

¹ United States Information Service, “King Saud Visits Eisenhower” Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, 1957, MPEG video. <http://susris.com/2013/07/19/history-king-sauds-1957-visit-to-usa-video/> (accessed November 12, 2016).

² Quoted in Robert Vitalis, *America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier* (Brooklyn: Verso, 2009), 163.

³ *Ibid.*

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), other Middle Eastern regimes, and Arab nationalism.

In his essay “National Security,” Melvin Leffler argues that a state’s actions are determined by its imperative “to protect domestic core values from external threats.”⁴ Leffler defines core values as “the goals worth fighting for” that “fuse material self-interest with more fundamental goals like the defense of the state’s organizing ideology. . . the protection of its political institutions, and the championing of its honor and autonomy.”⁵ He further argues that power is central to the “protection and pursuit of core values.” Furthermore, “power may be an end in itself as well as a means toward an end.”⁶ This paper will use Leffler’s national security approach as a framework to examine U.S.-Saudi relations following the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Examination of the core values of the states involved will provide answers to two principal questions. First, why did Eisenhower and Dulles select King Saud as their proposed regional leader following the 1956 Suez Crisis? Second, why did this reliance on King Saud fail by the spring of 1958? King Saud’s core values included preserving his personal domestic power, using oil revenues to maintain the lifestyle of the Saudi royal family, cultivating his regional prestige, and upholding Wahhabism. These core values made Saud a natural rival of Arab nationalism and communism and a logical ally to the United States. Due to their over-simplistic vision of the Middle East, Eisenhower and Dulles resolved to transform King Saud into a pro-Western regional leader. Ironically, the same core values that made Eisenhower and Dulles regard King Saud as their best option also resulted in Saud’s failure to fulfill the role the Eisenhower administration planned for him. These values made King Saud fundamentally incompatible with many of the prevailing sentiments sweeping the Arab world.

The formal relationship between the United States and the Saudi Kingdom developed within the context of the post-World War II world. In the decades following the victory over the Axis powers, the United States and its Western allies had two keystone goals—rebuilding a war-torn Europe and combating the spread of communism worldwide. They viewed healthy economic recovery and growth as the most effective way to achieve both of these ends. The United States was convinced that economically, as well as politically, stable nations were much less likely to be vulnerable to Communist influence. A steady and

⁴ Melvin P. Leffler, “National Security,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd ed., eds. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

increasing supply of petroleum was indispensable to foster post war recovery and maintain economic growth. In his infamous speech that enunciated the Eisenhower Doctrine on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower noted that the Middle East possessed “roughly two thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world.”⁷ Because of its vast oil reserves, the Middle East became a top priority of U.S. foreign policy.

The Suez Crisis constituted a pivotal moment in a shifting balance of power in the post war Middle East. In anticipation of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the British and French signed a secret arrangement, called the Sykes Picot agreement, that carved the Middle East into European controlled spheres of influence. Consequently, these two European powers emerged as the dominant colonial powers in the Middle East. The British, French, and Israeli joint invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in the fall of 1956, however, permanently tarnished the participating European powers’ image in the region.⁸ Although the Sykes Picot power arrangements had been in decline for several decades, the Suez Crisis acted as a catalyst for a major restructuring of Middle Eastern alliances and power structures. As a result of these geopolitical shifts, the United States, as well as the USSR, acquired much of the waning French and British regional influence. The U.S. rise to prominence was, in large part, attributable to its immediate condemnation of the actions its allies took in the Sinai campaign.⁹

The Suez Crisis also emphasized a new prominent geopolitical rival of the United States—Arab nationalism. The events leading up to and culminating in the Suez Crisis marked the ascension of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as the leader of the postwar Arab nationalist movement. Western leadership feared that Arab nationalism would pose two major threats to its interests. First, it could threaten the lucrative hegemony that Western oil companies possessed in the Middle East. Second, Western officials feared that the movement’s leftist tendencies would provide a fertile breeding ground for Communist sympathies and therefore provide an avenue for growing Soviet influence. As Nasser was the previously preferred U.S. option for a pro-

⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East,” January 5, 1957, The Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/president-eisenhowers-speech-us-role-middle-east-eisenhower-doctrine-1957/p24130> (accessed November 13, 2016).

⁸ Memorandum of Discussion at the 304th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 15, 1956, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*, with appropriate year], *1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 16: 1127-32.

⁹ Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 13: 403-404.

Western regional leader, the Suez Crisis prompted a frantic search for a viable alternative.¹⁰

In addition to Nasser, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles had been considering the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq and Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (King Saud) of Saudi Arabia to serve as a pro-Western regional leader.¹¹ The fallout from the Suez Crisis forced Eisenhower and Dulles to identify a leader that could ensure Western access to Middle Eastern oil reserves, and provide anti-Communist leadership, as well as combat Nasser's nationalism. U.S. policy makers sometimes referred to this effort as the OMEGA plan or the OMEGA memorandum.¹² The United States was reluctant to directly support the British managed Baghdad Pact because it had lost favor in several key member countries. Also, both the Saudis and the Israelis viewed it unfavorably due to regional rivalries for power. Moreover, it was associated with Britain's tarnished imperialist image. Consequently, in the midst of the Suez Crisis in the fall of 1956, Eisenhower and Dulles began to consider King Saud as their best option for a regional leader. This strategy ultimately failed to produce its intended results. By the spring of 1958, Saud had fallen from power. As will be discussed further, this fall was primarily due to the Saudi monarch's paradoxical core values.

Eisenhower and Dulles correctly assumed that the domestic structure and power politics within the Saudi regime made it a natural ally of the West and enemy of the USSR. By the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956, the sale of oil to western powers shaped much of the Saudi internal structure. An informal U.S.-Saudi relationship had begun when Saudi ministers granted Standard Oil Company of California a concession to drill for oil in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 1933.¹³ In 1944, multiple U.S. oil companies amalgamated to form the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). In 1950, ARAMCO and the Saudis agreed to a mutually lucrative fifty-fifty profit sharing agreement that would last until the 1970s.¹⁴ This flow of oil was indispensable to postwar recovery and continued economic growth in the West. William

¹⁰ John Foster Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 28, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 15: 419-21.

¹¹ Paper by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Russell), August 4, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 16, pp. 140-44.

¹² Dulles to Eisenhower, March 28, 1956, pp. 419-21.

¹³ Wallace Earle Stegner, *Discovery!: The Search for Arabian Oil* (Portola St. Vista, CA: Selwa Press, 2007), 27.

¹⁴ J.C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*, Vol. II: 1914-1956 (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 314-21.

Rountree, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, stressed this importance when he stated that “a supply of oil from the Middle East in a steadily increasing volume is essential to the economic progress and the strategic strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries.”¹⁵ Rountree later stated that “in this context, relations between the West and Saudi Arabia are of particular importance.”¹⁶ Saudi petroleum exports not only provided a primer for formal U.S.-Saudi relations, it also bound the countries together in a relationship of mutual need once they had established that rapport.

In addition to playing an integral role in the evolution of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, ARAMCO also contributed to the development of the Saudi state and its self-preservationist core values. In 1957, ARAMCO reported that the Saudis were guaranteed an annual allowance of at least \$150,000,000.¹⁷ In the spring of 1957, James Richards, Special Assistant to the President, produced a damning report on the distribution of Saudi oil royalties. According to Richards:

Saudi Arabia in contrast to Iraq appears to be devoting undue proportion major effort to showy edifices rather than basic development projects. Oil revenues seem to benefit principally and ostentatiously royal family and its retainers while only trickling down to people.

He further stated that the major beneficiaries of oil royalties are the “prestige of the king” and the “custodianship” of holy places. Finally, Richards concluded that “while these assets will be important in next few years, I doubt they will suffice make SA long term leader of Arab world.”¹⁸

Richard’s critical report demonstrates that, though beneficial for Western oil interests, these oil royalties perpetuated a system of governance not conducive to establishing Saudi Arabia as a regional leader. King Saud used this source of income to consolidate his hold on the Saudi throne and preserve his personal prestige. Saud distributed

¹⁵ William Rountree to Secretary of State, March 14, 1958, *FRUS, 1955–1957, Foreign and Economic Defense Policy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 10: 680-88.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ George V. Allen to Robert D. Murphy, March 3, 1955, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 13, pp. 251-54.

¹⁸ James Richards to Secretary of State, April 11, 1957, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 13, pp. 491-94.

excessive allowances throughout the Saudi royal family to ensure loyalty and to preserve his hold on power. Access to Western markets for Saudi oil became so deeply integrated into Saud's form of leadership and the Saudi state that it constituted a core value in itself. By 1957, allowances to the extensive royal family bureaucracy, Nathan Citino reports, "constituted 40 to 60 percent of state expenditures."¹⁹ By his fall from power in 1958, King Saud's foreign and domestic adversaries had become harsh critics of his lavish lifestyle and self-preserving policies.

In addition to funding Saud and the royal family, ARAMCO served in place of certain functions of a state bureaucracy. The oil company built and staffed schools and hospitals, funded and constructed infrastructure projects, and developed an agricultural research program.²⁰ These bureaucratic functions increased Saudi dependency on Western institutions and encouraged King Saud's rapacious spending. Although this dependent relationship allowed Saud to build a self-serving system of governance, it ultimately impeded his ability to repel domestic reformist factions or appeal to progressive Arab sentiment.

Saud's reliance on Western oil corporations, as well as U.S. aid, encouraged Saud to appear staunchly anti-Communist in the eyes of American officials. He played on legitimate U.S. fears of growing Soviet influence in the Middle East. The Czech arms deal in 1955 and the Suez Crisis in 1956 exacerbated these concerns. American officials viewed these developments in Egypt as "markedly to the Soviet interest."²¹ Saud consistently used U.S. fears of Communist infiltration to extract arms deals and further his own interests and core values.²² Religious reasons aside, King Saud would have never endorsed Communist principles that were antithetical to the domestic policies on which he relied.

These core domestic values of preserving his own power and maintaining the opulent lifestyle of the Saudi royal family made King Saud a natural rival of the rising tide of Arab nationalism. King Saud was abundantly aware that this movement constituted a serious threat to the security of his regime. Several core values that Saud's regime held were antithetical to the comparatively left leaning principles Arab nationalism espoused. First was the extravagant lifestyle of the Saudi royal family that neglected the needs of the majority of Saudi Arabians

¹⁹ Nathan Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 122.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²¹ Special National Security Estimate, November 29, 1956 *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 16, pp. 78-93.

²² Embassy in Saudi Arabia to Department of State, July 25, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 263-65.

as James Richard's report illustrated.²³ Second was the intimate relationship that Saudi Arabia shared with the West and its private interests.

In *America's Kingdom*, Robert Vitalis makes a convincing case that past scholarship has understated the impact of labor unrest and leftist popular sentiment within Saudi Arabia.²⁴ In an effort to distance King Saud from Nasser, American officials continuously reminded Saud of the "dangers of too close association with Egypt and Nasser."²⁵ By highlighting the threat that Arab nationalism posed to the Saudi core values, American officials hoped to emphasize the fundamental differences between King Saud's style of governance and the principles of secular nationalism. Driving a wedge between Saud and Nasser would fulfill three core goals of the United States—undermining Nasser's regional influence, providing Saud as an alternative leader, and securing Saudi oil for the West.²⁶

The same internal attributes that made Saudi Arabia appealing to the West as a counter to Arab nationalism also made it fundamentally unfeasible for King Saud to reconcile his vision for the Saudi regime with the popular forces of Arab nationalism. This inability to accommodate reformative sentiment greatly weakened Saud's position of power in the Arab community and therefore his ability to serve as a uniting force against International Communism as well as Arab nationalism.²⁷ King Saud's fall from power in the spring of 1958 was not a reactionary event that his alleged assassination attempt on Nasser had caused. Rather, it was the result of his inability to adapt to a changing perception of the role of the state that Arab nationalism characterized.

This conflict in style of governance manifested itself in the power struggle within the Saudi royal family between King Saud and his brother Crown Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Faisal). The Saud-Faisal dispute started when Saud assumed the crown in 1953 and played a considerable role throughout the course of Saud's rise and fall from prominence in 1958. Faisal was an adamant critic of Saud's profligate treatment of Saudi finances and subtly sought to subvert Saud's power in relation to the royal family and the Saudi Council of Ministers. Faisal preferred that the Saudi regime embrace certain elements of the Arab nationalist development process to modernize and slightly liberalize

²³ Richards to Secretary of State, April 11, 1957, pp. 491-94.

²⁴ Vitalis, *America's Kingdom*, pp. 140-42.

²⁵ Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 351-52.

²⁶ Dulles to Eisenhower, March 28, 1956, pp. 419-21.

²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, March 26, 1958, *FRUS, 1958-1960, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 12: 720-23.

Saudi Arabia's economy and political structure. Saud, by contrast, sought to maintain his hold on power and ensure the continued dominance of the royal family by his progeny. The threat Faisal posed prompted Saud to increase his domestic spending, further exacerbating the nation's financial struggles.²⁸

Eisenhower and Dulles were cognizant of this internal power struggle. American diplomats regularly extended "courtesy" conversations to Faisal in an effort to safeguard their "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia in the event of a change of leadership.²⁹ Surprisingly, some correspondence between American officials showed a slight preference towards Faisal, one cable declaring that he "better understands western mentality."³⁰ This preference shows that Eisenhower and Dulles were aware of the paradox that Saud's domestic policies created. Saud's conservative policies proved to be an effective deterrent to influence from both communism and Arab nationalism. Paradoxically for American interests, these same policies served to reduce Saud's effectiveness as a regional leader moving into the latter half of the twentieth century.

Leffler's national security approach accounts for these domestic struggles. He argues that perceptions of "one's own strength and cohesion" heavily influence "views of a potential adversary."³¹ Indeed, this internal instability and perceived weakness pushed Saud to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the United States as well as his regional rival, Gamal Abdel Nasser. King Saud attempted to walk a fine line between appeasing Arab nationalist sentiment and maintaining Saudi Arabia's lucrative relationship with Western powers. Saud's attempt to distance himself from the United States as a Western power was a constant impediment to Eisenhower's plan to establish the Saudi king as a pro-Western leader of the Arab world.

Although Saud did sign onto the Eisenhower Doctrine informally, American officials were disappointed when Saud refused to take up arms against Arab neighbors during the Syrian Crisis in 1957. Additionally, by the end of 1957, Saud began denying that he ever had endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine officially.³² During the midst of the

²⁸ Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, p. 122.

²⁹ Richards to Department of State, April 4, 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, p. 490; Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, February 27, 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957, Near East: Iran; Iraq* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 12: 23-5.

³⁰ Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, September 15, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 269-71.

³¹ Leffler, "National Security," p. 27.

³² Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, p. 133.

crisis Eisenhower implored Saud to exert his “great influence to the end that the atheistic creed of Communism will not become entrenched at a key position in the Moslem world.”³³ Saud failed to intercede effectively. This lack of positive action highlighted Saud’s prioritization on maintaining his image within the Arab world. Saud was aware of the popularity of the nationalist movement and unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile his own favorable image with nationalist principles.

In some cases, Saud’s correspondence showed resignation toward the nationalist sentiment. Late in 1957, Saud remarked to an American official that “western powers must accept the fact of Arab nationalism” and that it was “his firm policy. . . to guide and restrain this nationalism within reasonable limits and to bring all Arab states to friendly cooperation with the west.”³⁴ Judging by his actions, Saud’s statement was largely rhetoric. Saud’s plot to assassinate Nasser in March 1958 explicitly indicated that the king still viewed nationalism as a fundamental rival.

Although in some cases Saud outwardly embraced Arab nationalism, his core values of preserving the traditional role of the king and the royal family still firmly dictated his domestic policies. Vitalis provides a revealing account of the Saudi government’s treatment of an ARAMCO labor dispute that resulted in a royal decree outlawing strikes.³⁵ This close coordination between a foreign corporation and the Saudi royal family in an effort to suppress a popular movement was contrary to Arab nationalist principles.³⁶ Indeed, calls for reform ultimately played a large role in Saud’s fall from power. Late in 1957, the economic crisis Saud’s domestic spending had created compelled Saud to accept austerity measures in exchange for loans from the International Monetary Fund. Finally, economic crisis curtailed Saud’s sumptuous spending habits. These austerity measures caused dissension within the royal family, causing Saud’s base of power to dwindle. Ironically, the dissenting members of the royal family aligned themselves with Faisal and the reform movement. By the time of the March crisis, internal Saudi forces were poised to replace Saud.³⁷

Another major impediment to establishing a pro-western presence in the Middle East was the anti-colonial sentiment imbedded not only in Arab nationalism but throughout the region. The United

³³ Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia, August 21, 1957, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 13, pp. 645–46.

³⁴ Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, October 16, 1957, *Ibid.*, pp. 508–509.

³⁵ Vitalis, *America’s Kingdom*, pp. 176–83.

³⁶ Joel Beinin, “Labor, Capital, and the State in Nasserist Egypt, 1952–1961,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21, no. 1 (1989): 71–90.

³⁷ Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, p. 138.

States and Saudi Arabia both carefully avoided association with the former colonial powers of France and Britain. This anti-colonial sentiment greatly intensified following the Suez Crisis and the tripartite invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated the U.S. intention to avoid being “tarred in Arab eyes with the same brush as the UK and France.”³⁸ The most significant impact of this deliberate distance between the two western powers was the U.S. refusal to endorse the Baghdad Pact openly.

The Baghdad Pact was a British sponsored alliance that included Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Also known as the Northern Tier, it was Eisenhower’s other major alternative to Saud. Although Eisenhower and Dulles designated Saud rather than Prime Minister Nuri al-Said of Iraq as their primary regional leader, Saud’s cooperation with the Northern Tier alliance was paramount to the success of their strategy. The U.S. policy on the Baghdad Pact as a separate entity, Dulles told Eisenhower, was one of clandestine support without “actually adhering to the Pact or announcing our intention of doing so.”³⁹ While U.S. goals aligned closely with the British, American officials were careful to avoid public association with their Western ally. To provide overt public endorsement for the Baghdad Pact, the United States would need to convince King Saud to support the organization.

The U.S. endeavor to persuade Saud to join the Baghdad Pact was unsuccessful for two major reasons. First, not only was King Saud hesitant to adhere to an agreement associated with a colonial power, the Saudis also had an ongoing border dispute over the Buraymi oasis with British-backed gulf sultanates. The Buraymi dispute began in 1952 and persisted throughout Saud’s reign. By the time that Saud’s enemies deposed him in the spring of 1958, the associated parties still expressed frustration regarding the situation in the Buraymi oasis.⁴⁰ The dispute strained Washington’s relationship with Riyadh, as well as with London. Because it was acting as a mediator between two key regional allies, the United States was unable to appease both sides fully.

The Buraymi dispute was seemingly three nations contending for their own geopolitical interests. Upon closer examination however, it is evident that the dispute represented the clash between three separate sets of core values. The British were seeking to ensure western access to Middle Eastern oil reserves, but more importantly, they were struggling to maintain a foothold in a region where they had significant influence

³⁸ Memorandum of a conversation in the Department of State, November 5, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 16, pp. 998-99.

³⁹ Secretary of State to the President, March 28, 1956, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 15, pp. 419-20.

⁴⁰ Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 13, pp. 724-25.

only a decade earlier. Similarly, the United States was preserving Western access to oil reserves and trying to clear an impediment to presenting Saud as a regional leader. Additionally, Eisenhower was simultaneously trying to distance the United States from, as well as appease Britain. King Saud was contending for Saudi regional prestige and the preservation of Saudi oil royalties crucial to maintaining his power and the royal family's allowances. These often-conflicting core values served to cripple Eisenhower's efforts to establish Saud as a pro-western pillar in the Middle East because they undermined the West's endeavor to unite Saud with the Northern tier strategy.

The second major reason Saud's acceptance of the Baghdad Pact was unlikely was that the al-Saud royal family had persistent feuds with the governing parties of several Northern Tier members. The intricate network of preexisting alliances and rivalries between various factions within Arab states culminated in a complex system of relationships. Furthermore, there was no consistent traditional balance of power within the Middle East owing to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the dissolution of the Sykes-Picot power sharing agreement following World War II. Considering the endlessly convoluted system of relationships within the Middle East, it was no surprise that an over-simplistic vision, such as the one Eisenhower and Dulles championed, failed to unite Arab states under one leader.

The rivalry between the al-Saud family and the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq provides the most compelling example of a rivalry based on conflicting core values. Although they continuously served to thwart Western efforts to persuade Saud to join the Baghdad Pact, the two countries' core values were largely the same. Both sought to preserve connections to Western oil markets and enhance their regional prestige. One major divergence in the values of the two Arab states was that Saud more carefully avoided overt association with a Western power than did the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. Considering each other geopolitical rivals, both countries hesitated to cooperate and continued to engage in proxy confrontations throughout the Middle East.⁴¹

When the Northern Tier states first announced the Baghdad Pact in 1950, then king Ibn Saud, Saud's father, saw it as a sign of British support of a Hashemite ploy to unify the Arab world under Iraqi leadership. In an effort to counter the perceived Hashemite scheme, Ibn Saud bolstered his relations with Egypt.⁴² King Saud retained his father's suspicion of Hashemite involvement in the Baghdad Pact. Like

⁴¹ Memorandum of Conversation in White House, January 30, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 20-21.

⁴² Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, p. 23.

his father, Saud intermittently courted Egyptian leadership as a counter to Hashemite power. American officials regularly attempted to assuage Saudi suspicions.⁴³ The Saud-Hashemite feud's effects on U.S.-Saudi relations demonstrate the naïve nature of Eisenhower's plan to establish Saud as an anti-Communist leader in the Arab world. Eisenhower and Dulles were unable to account for the deeply ingrained power politics that dominated the Middle East.

The ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute also constituted a hindrance to Eisenhower and Dulles' plan. The conflicting core values of the Saudis and U.S. support of Israel discreetly existed in relative harmony. Eisenhower and Saud willingly overlooked this inconsistency in an effort to preserve higher priority core values, most notably, the security of oil exports to the West. Eisenhower's response to the British, French, and Israeli forces invading the Sinai Peninsula contributed to the ability for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, for the most part, to disregard this blatant conflict of intentions. By denouncing the tripartite aggression of his allies, Eisenhower bolstered U.S. prestige in the Middle East regarding the Israeli issue.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Eisenhower applied the American aid policy to Israel in an austere manner. Consequently, Saudi officials typically addressed issues regarding U.S. support to Israel with a restrained approach.⁴⁵ This tacit amicable arrangement, however, was not always the case.

Although the United States and Saudi Arabia frequently omitted reference to the Arab-Israeli dispute in their correspondence, the conflict was omnipresent in Middle Eastern politics. As a result, the conflict exacerbated Eisenhower's difficulties to establish Saud as a pro-Western leader. In the spring of 1957, just months after Saud's historic visit to New York, such an altercation emerged in the Gulf of Aqaba. The dispute concerned Israeli maritime rights in the waterway during the ongoing resolution of the Suez Crisis. On March 8, 1957, Saud proclaimed Aqaba to be a "closed Arab gulf, having no international characteristics" in response to the continued Israeli presence in the Tiran Strait.⁴⁶ Saud's declaration effectively barred Israel from using the gulf. In the ensuing deliberation, Eisenhower, on the one hand, demanded the

⁴³ Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 13: 317-21.

⁴⁴ Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, p. 118.

⁴⁵ Peter Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 37.

⁴⁶ Memorandum of Conversation in White House, January 19, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 17: 498-99.

withdrawal of Israeli forces through the threat of sanctions.⁴⁷ On the other hand, to the dismay of King Saud, the U.S. president declared that the gulf had “international characteristics,” thereby denying Saudi Arabia’s sole claim to maritime rights.⁴⁸ This effort at evenhandedness in policy antagonized U.S.-Saudi relations and threatened to push Saud closer to Nasser.

Eisenhower’s firm assertion subjecting the Gulf of Aqaba to international law prompted a unified response from Arab nations. In deliberations, Secretary of State Dulles met with a united Arab front consisting of delegates from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.⁴⁹ In intent, this delegation was not aligned against the United States, but rather, against the emblematic partnership of the West and Israel. As Eisenhower and Dulles were aware, this close symbolic alignment posed a problem for the United States. Dulles expressed concern that “Nasser appeared to be trying to get King Saud back in his camp as a result of the Gulf of Aqaba issue.”⁵⁰ U.S. officials attempted to distance themselves from this close association, emphasizing their firm stance on Israeli withdrawal from Tiran.⁵¹

The Gulf of Aqaba incident exhibited the insurmountable obstacles to presenting King Saud as a unifying Arab agent that was also amiable to the West. Implicit Western support of Israel resulted in an inescapable conflict of interest between Saud and the United States. To be viewed as a true Arab leader, Saud needed to maintain his prestige within the Arab community which required being staunchly anti-Zionist. This dilemma was inevitable for any Arab leader that the West could have promoted for its favored role, which exposed a flawed Western strategy. Separate from other potential leaders, King Saud held the exceptional position of being the “keeper of the [Islamic] holy places.”⁵² Saud claimed that conceding in the Aqaba dispute he would lose regional

⁴⁷ Ibid; Editorial Note, *ibid.*, pp. 659-60; Memorandum of Conversation in White House, January 19, 1956, *ibid.*, pp. 498-99; Editorial Note, *ibid.*, pp. 659-60; Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, October 16, 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 508-509; Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 17, pp. 625-26; Memorandum of a Conversation, January 11, 1957, Department of State, *ibid.*, pp. 21-25.

⁴⁸ Circular Telegram from Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, February 13, 1957, *ibid.*, pp. 151-52.

⁴⁹ Editorial Note, *ibid.*, pp. 625-26.

⁵⁰ Memorandum of Conversation at the 331st Meeting of the National Security Council, July 18, 1957, *ibid.*, pp. 694-96.

⁵¹ Telegram from Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, February 13, 1957, *ibid.*, pp. 151-52.

⁵² Douglas MacArthur II to the Acting Secretary of State, November 20, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 16, p. 1165.

prestige because he failed to protect the Islamic holy sites that Israeli activity in the gulf potentially threatened.⁵³

As early as March 1956, Eisenhower expressed interest in Saudi Arabia's conservative religious views as a counter for atheistic communism. On March 28, Eisenhower stated that

Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader.⁵⁴

Towards the end of the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower's tone became more confident as he continued to stress the unique religious importance of King Saud in the Islamic community. Following a meeting with Eisenhower on November 20, 1956, Douglas MacArthur II, the Counselor of the Department of State, told Herbert Hoover, the Under Secretary of the State, that the "President said he thought the person to build up was King Saud, who was a great spiritual leader and keeper of the holy places, etc."⁵⁵ Saudi rhetoric may have played a role in the assumed importance of religion as a tool against communism.

King Saud and his diplomats regularly bolstered this preconception with statements such as "Islam hates Communist principles."⁵⁶ "In opposing communism," Saud stated in a telegram from Riyadh to the Department of State, "we do so on basic religious belief and Islamic principle."⁵⁷ In *Containing Arab Nationalism* and *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC* respectively, Yaqub Salim and Nathan Citino disagree on whether Eisenhower and Dulles' assumptions regarding Islam's relationship to communism constitute what Edward Said describes as "Orientalism." While Salim asserts that the administration's policies "seem to owe little to anti-Arab prejudice," Citino counters that Orientalism very well could have contributed to these assumptions.⁵⁸ It is clear that these assumptions, or at the very least hopes, that the Eisenhower administration held, relied on a relatively monolithic view of Islam.

⁵³ Embassy in Lebanon to Department of State, October 16, 1957, pp. 508-509.

⁵⁴ Diary Entry by the President, March 28, 1956, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 15, p. 424.

⁵⁵ MacArthur to the Acting Secretary of State, November 20, 1956, p. 1165.

⁵⁶ Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, September 15, 1955, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 269-71.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Yaqub Salim, *Containing Arab Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 13; Citino, *From Arab Nationalism to OPEC*, p. 95.

While many of Islam's holy sites are located in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi monarchy was, and still is, fundamentally tied to the strict branch of Sunni Islam called Wahhabism. Although Wahhabism constituted a major pillar in Saudi culture and political power, it does not receive a single mention in the ten volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series for 1955-1957 regarding the Middle East. Nor does it appear in volumes twelve or thirteen of the 1958-1960 series. In addition to omitting Wahhabism from their discussions, American officials mention the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam by name only once in the 1955-1957 series and twice in volumes twelve and thirteen of the 1958-1960 series.⁵⁹ Citino notes that the Eisenhower administration did consult with scholars of the Middle East regarding the potential vulnerability of Islam to Communist influence. Despite the emphasis that Eisenhower and Dulles placed on Islam as an anti-Communist tool, it is clear that they operated with little concern for the theological divisions that existed within the Islamic community. King Saud appealed to the Eisenhower administration as a potentially effective pillar against the spread of communism because of the Saudi royal family's reliance on conservative Islamic values. In practice, these same values served as a barrier to the unification of the Middle East under Saud.

On March 5, 1958, the United Arab Republic accused King Saud of sponsoring an assassination attempt on Nasser. The event rocked Saud's position of power within Saudi Arabia and in the greater Middle Eastern world. On March 6, Dulles stated that "Nasser was now fully engaged in an all-out battle with the remaining pro-Western Arab leaders," and the "situation was extremely grave."⁶⁰ Although the incident devastated Saud's prestige in the Middle East, William Rountree reported that "there is little evidence that the impact has been great enough to threaten seriously the King's present position."⁶¹ He was wrong. On March 22, Saud ceded his power to Prince Faisal. Although Saud temporarily resumed control under the guise of a reformer two years later, Eisenhower and Dulles' plan to make him a pro-Western pillar in the region had failed. "Saud's prestige was intimately associated

⁵⁹ Embassy in Syria to the Department of State, January 26, 1957, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, 13, pp. 610-12; Memorandum for the Record: Meeting of Special Committee for Iraq, June 1, 1959, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 12, pp. 460-63; Memorandum of the Discussion at the 440th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 7, 1960, *ibid.*, pp. 671-73.

⁶⁰ Editorial Note, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, 12, p. 307.

⁶¹ Memorandum of Conversation, March 26, 1958, *ibid.*, p. 720.

with our own,” the New York Times reported on April 5. “Like Humpty Dumpty’s carcass, it can never be put together again.”⁶²

Saud’s fall and failure as Eisenhower’s envisioned leader was not a reactionary event that his alleged assassination attempt of Nasser had caused. Instead, it was the result of geopolitical context and irreconcilable core values. King Saud’s core values did not necessarily conflict with those of the United States in the Middle East. Rather, Saud’s core values were incompatible with Eisenhower’s impractical vision of a leader that could unite the Middle East as an anti-Communist barrier to Soviet expansion. Eisenhower and Dulles underestimated the complexities of the power politics within the Middle East. Furthermore, preferring to view the Arab world as relatively monolithic, U.S. officials failed to account for intricate distinctions within the Islamic faith. Though important, the insensitivity of U.S. officials was not the greatest factor leading to the failure of Eisenhower and Dulles’ plan.

This paper affirms that Melvin Leffler’s National Security framework, particularly its emphasis of core values and power as both a means and an end, is an effective approach to analyze U.S. and Saudi actions following the Suez Crisis. Contradictions between Eisenhower’s vision of Saud and the King’s core values and goals constituted the decisive factor in Saud’s failure. Saud’s core values were fundamentally incompatible with the values and political structures that communism as well as Arab nationalism espoused. Saud’s desire to preserve his own personal power and maintain the royal family’s lavish lifestyle irrevocably bound him to Western oil interests. This profligate use of ARAMCO oil royalties and the cozy relationship Saud shared with Western powers resulted in a style of governance that ran contrary to values held by many in the Arab world. Abundantly aware of these contradictions, Saud sought to distance himself from the United States and to propagate a staunch anti-colonial image. Saud’s failure to reconcile his prestige abroad with his domestic agenda resulted in his fall from power.

⁶² C. L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs: Confusion in the Middle East,” *New York Times*, April 5, 1958, 14, <http://search.proquest.com.mantis.csuchico.edu/docview/114439070/fulltextPDF/F090E52DF9FA4B6CPQ/1?accountid=10346> (accessed November 11, 2016).

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The Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo are an independent activist group whose objective is to locate and return all the children disappeared by the Argentine dictatorship that terrorized the country from 1976 to 1983. The sign at the center of the photo reads “Where are the hundreds of babies born in captivity?” (Image source: Las Abuelas comienzan con su lucha from Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, *Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo: fotografía de 30 años de lucha*. (Buenos Aires: Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2007).

PROFIT OVER PRINCIPLE: U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS DURING THE “DIRTY WAR”

| Juan Vega Ramirez

Argentina experienced decades of political strife beginning with the military coup that overthrew Hipolito Yrigoyen in 1930. The military staged a total of six seizures of power from 1930 to 1976. Each individual coup overthrew a civilian government to correct the supposed incompetence of the Argentine state, usually exacerbating the chaos that facilitated the emergence of increasingly volatile protest movements. After the extraordinary success of the Cuban revolution in 1959, the United States began to view the political and social conflicts that plagued Argentina as evidence of communist subversion. By 1976, Argentine cooperation with the United States resulted in the country’s final coup of the twentieth century. It also produced a brutal policy of repression under the National Security Doctrine that manifested itself in the creation of the infamous Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (Triple A) and the perpetuation of human rights abuses during the so called “Dirty War” from 1974 to 1983.

Existing scholarship on U.S. involvement in the “Dirty War” focuses on the political implications of Communist containment in Latin America. Scholars working within this framework argue that U.S. support for the suppression of Communist activity in Argentina was an extension of the ant-Communist policies Washington implemented after World War II in Europe and Asia.¹ To defeat the Kremlin’s expanding influence in the world, the United States had to distribute aid for developing countries faster than the Soviet Union.² In 1947, President Harry Truman proclaimed in his infamous Truman Doctrine Speech that it was the obligation of the United States to support “free peoples who [were] resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities.”³ To advance this policy, the United States cultivated potent relationships with military regimes in Latin America.⁴ Through Operation Condor,

¹ Raymond L. Garthoff, *A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 21-23.

² Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 58.

³ Harry Truman, “Our Documents - Transcript of Truman Doctrine (1947),” <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=81&page=transcript>, (accessed March 11, 2017).

⁴ William Michael Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 48.

the anti-Communist effort intensified in Argentina because of the country's key position as a leader in Latin America.⁵

U.S. policy makers believed that the successful eradication of the Communist presence in Argentina would facilitate smoother anti-insurgent operations in the rest of the region.⁶ In the early 1970s, the United States shifted its strategy in Argentina, adopting an indirect approach when combating communism to avoid potentially negative public perception of its actions at home. Author Colin Dueck, an American government specialist and scholar of Cold War politics, attributes the latency of U.S. intervention during this decade to the indifference of President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger to the success of left-leaning Latin American democracies.⁷ David Pion-Berlin argues that the Argentine military dictatorship following the coup of 1976 practiced selective vision when dealing with the national security doctrine. He contends that the military wholeheartedly learned the methods of counterinsurgency but disregarded the indirect strategies the Nixon administration prescribed to influence public perception at home and abroad. It also expanded the definition of "subversive" to mean any enemy of the state which subsequently led to unchecked state-sponsored terror.⁸

Historian Melvyn P. Leffler argues that national security "involves more than national survival." Rather, what propels it is a nation's core values and "how it perceives external dangers."⁹ Countries will integrate material self-interest with more fundamental values to justify the pursuit of material goods, thus assuring national security and protecting their respective way of life. During the Cold War, the national security of the United States revolved around meeting the ongoing perceived threat from the Soviet Union and implementing the Communist containment policy. U.S. policy makers believed that it was the U.S.'s obligation to prevent countries from embracing the false promises of communism. Communist ideology stood in direct

⁵ Colin Dueck, *Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 169-73.

⁶ C. William Walldorf, *Just Politics: Human Rights and the Foreign Policy of Great Powers*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 99-105.

⁷ Colin Dueck, *Hard Line*, 183.

⁸ David Pion-Berlin, "The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 3 (October 1988): 402-404.

⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 123-36.

opposition to U.S. interests because it undermined American institutions and ultimately threatened their democracy and freedom. The authoritarian style of government that characterized the Communist regimes of Cuba and Russia immediately gained infamy in the United States because of the elimination of what Americans considered unalienable rights.

Ironically, the U.S.-prescribed anti-communist agenda in Argentina and Latin America encouraged the suspension of unalienable rights and the use of “special techniques” that blatantly denied human freedom. Michael E. Latham, a specialist in the history of U.S. foreign relations, explains that U.S. policy makers believed “counterinsurgency warfare and the deployment of repressive internal police forces . . . were essential to create the conditions” necessary to facilitate political and economic stability.¹⁰ The United States linked counter-insurgency and the need to ensure national security against Communist infiltration with the material self-interest of economic prosperity.

Still, many historians minimize or overlook the influence that the need to maintain and enhance U.S.-Argentine economic relations exerted. U.S. policy in Argentina from 1973 to 1976 provides a powerful example of how the protection of U.S. economic interest overshadowed the value of human life. Washington favored the brutal military junta that seized power in 1976 because their neoliberal ideology promised better economic compensation. The United States, as the following pages will demonstrate, neglected the violation of human rights in Argentina to guarantee the vitality of its economy, and thus ensure its national security. Henry Kissinger and Robert C. Hill, U.S. ambassador to Argentina, were at the forefront of this relationship. They possessed knowledge of Government-sponsored human rights abuses yet continued to work closely with the Argentine government.

Argentina experienced an abundance of political and social conflict throughout the Twentieth Century and especially in the decades leading up to the 1976 coup. In the 1940s, Juan Domingo Perón, a lieutenant general working as the head of the Department of Labor under the dictatorship of Pedro Ramirez, successfully passed legislative reforms aimed at alleviating the plight of the *descamisados*.¹¹ His populist ideology and natural charisma garnered him a cult-like following that manifested itself in the creation of the Perónist party and the formation of several grassroots movements, notably the Perónist

¹⁰ Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution*, 124.

¹¹ Alexander Dawson, *Latin America since Independence: A History with Primary Sources* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 171.

Youth.¹² In 1946, Perón's popularity secured him the Argentine presidency, until the coup from the *Revolucion Libertadora* overthrew and exiled him in 1955.¹³ Notwithstanding the governmental effort to suppress Perónism, many supporters formed cooperative groups that engaged in increasingly violent protest against the government.¹⁴

Within the growing chaos of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Montoneros quickly emerged as the largest of these anti-government groups after abandoning its previous affiliation with the Perónist Youth and incorporating militant members of other social movements.¹⁵ The resulting Perónist resistance caused the military dictatorship to reinstate once again civilian elections, scheduling them for 1973. Héctor José Cámpora, a Perónist puppet candidate, won the subsequent presidential election and promptly facilitated the return of Juan Perón to the presidency. The majority of working class Argentines elected Cámpora with the confidence that a Perónist restoration would reinvigorate the economy and enhance their financial situation.¹⁶ Perónists nevertheless struggled to coalesce, which further polarized the already fragmented movement.¹⁷

On June 20, 1973, ten million Perónist supporters travelled to Ezeiza International Airport to welcome Juan Perón upon his return from exile. Although the reports remain inconclusive, observers generally believe that the Perónist left occupied key positions around the stage where Perón was to speak. The right wing of the Perónist movement that also attended the gathering included members of the Triple A and trade union *mafiosos*, who allegedly capitalized on the gathering to eliminate the Perónist Left. Jill Hedges, a specialist in the Argentine history, reports that gunfire initially erupted near the stage as a "column of Perónist Youth" neared the platform, which prompted a violent response from the rightist faction that in turn caused "panic as the crowds tried to flee."¹⁸ The ensuing chaos resulted in the deaths of thirteen people, while 365 more sustained injuries from the shootings and the trampling that occurred as the crowd dispersed. Perón, who traveled with his wife

¹² Jill Hedges, *Argentina: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 59-60.

¹³ Daniel K. Lewis, *The History of Argentina*. The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 94-95, 111.

¹⁴ Hedges, *Argentina*, 168-170.

¹⁵ Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 46.

¹⁶ Hedges, *Argentina*, 192-195.

¹⁷ Paul H. Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 51.

¹⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 200

Isabel and Héctor Cámpora, meanwhile diverted his flight to a nearby military airport to avoid the violence.¹⁹

The Ezeiza massacre provided insight into Perón's position regarding his divided followers. He explicitly favored the right wing over the left during his final presidential term. Although Peronism boasted an extensive left wing in 1973, the movement itself never had been left-leaning. Many of these leftist Perónists failed to remember the "glory days" of Perónism or had misunderstood what the party originally represented.²⁰ Juan Perón had served as an officer in Benito Mussolini's fascist Italy during the 1930s.²¹ After World War II had ended, the sympathetic Perónist administration offered Nazi war criminals asylum in Argentina and may have even paid for their travel and paperwork.²²

Perón in fact, was a staunchly right-leaning politician throughout his career, even though he relied on the Montoneros and the Perónists Youth to demonstrate Perónist strength during his exile.²³ At a May Day rally in the Plaza de Mayo in 1974, fifty-thousand upset Perónist Youths and Montoneros chanted "there is only one Evita," alluding to their love for Eva Duarte, Perón's deceased first wife.²⁴ Perón responded to the chants against his new wife Isabel, who was on stage with him as his running mate, with insults and epithets. He further disavowed the Montoneros and the rest of the leftist protesters, dismissing them as useless and stupid.²⁵ Soon thereafter, on May 13, Perón accused the Perónist left of attempting to incite a civil war and advocated for the intensification of collective action against the guerillas and protesters. Argentine government officials interpreted this as advocacy for the Triple A death squads that were already operating within the country.²⁶

Juan Perón suffered a heart attack and died on June 19, 1974. A week earlier he had threatened to resign and consequently incited a general strike that led to a rally in the Plaza de Mayo. On June 12, Perón suddenly appeared on television in a live broadcast where he outlined the problems in Argentina. He contended that the solution would take time, but that he would resign if he did not have the support of the people. The

¹⁹ Ibid, 201-202.

²⁰ Ibid, 199.

²¹ Lewis, *The History of Argentina*, 96.

²² Christopher Minster, "Why Argentina Welcomed Nazis," *ThoughtCo*, <https://www.thoughtco.com/why-did-argentina-accept-nazi-criminals-2136579>, (accessed March 1, 2017).

²³ Hedges, *Argentina*, 203.

²⁴ Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 72.

²⁵ Hedges, *Argentina*, 207.

²⁶ Ibid, 208.

demonstration that followed made it clear to Jose Lopez Rega, the Minister of Social Welfare, and Isabel Perón that public support for the Perónist regime still existed.²⁷ After Juan Perón's death, the Perón administration decided against holding elections, opting instead to transfer power to Vice President Isabel Perón.

During Juan Perón's final term, Lopez Rega had become increasingly more important to the aging politician. He consistently appeared at the side of Perón during his final days and it was Rega who attempted CPR when Perón collapsed.²⁸ Lopez Rega easily exerted a similar influence on Isabel Perón once she took office. She designated him as her personal secretary and cemented his position as Minister of Social Welfare.²⁹

Isabel Perón's lack of experience in politics doomed her presidency from the start. The Montoneros used terrorism to undermine the Argentine government, which further exacerbated the problems facing the novice president. With Lopez Rega as her main adviser, Isabel Perón revamped the brutal suppression of leftist groups that resulted in more human rights violations and the further decay of the economy. In an attempt to control the guerrillas, right-wing terrorism targeted anyone sympathetic to the leftist cause and often focused its attention on innocent students, union officials, and congressmen.³⁰

From 1973 to 1975, Jose Lopez Rega used his position as Minister of Social Welfare to form the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance.³¹ Lopez Rega oversaw anti-narcotic operations in Argentina and had direct access to over \$65 million in military aid from the United States that was supposed to fund Argentine anti-narcotic operations.³² In reality, Lopez Rega, Colonel Jose Manuel Osinde, and Alberto Villar, the Chief of Federal Police, formed the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance to combat the increasing prevalence of leftist-guerrilla activity in the country. A 1976 correspondence between Ambassador Robert Hill and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shows that they understood the ferocious pursuit of subversive activity was a result of the urgent need to suppress leftist guerillas. Hill nevertheless lamented that the Triple A

²⁷ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 95.

²⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 208.

²⁹ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 97.

³⁰ "Political Violence in Argentina," June 15, 1975 "Virtual Reading Room Documents Search Results: U.S. Department of State - Freedom of Information Act," https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?collection=ARGENTINA&searchText=*, (accessed April 16, 2017).

³¹ Hedges, *Argentina*, 198-99.

³² "U.S. Military Assistance in Historical Dollars: Argentina 1973-1977," Quandl, <https://www.quandl.com>. (accessed March 18, 2017).

had gained infamy among the Argentine populace for its reputation as a state sponsored death squad.³³ Indeed, throughout the “Dirty War,” the Triple A orchestrated the unlawful detainment and disappearance of at least ten-thousand people.³⁴ Human rights groups contrarily have estimated the number of disappeared to be about thirty-thousand because they take into consideration the foreign nationals that disappeared as well.³⁵

The terrorist state that characterized the “Dirty War” denied its victims the agency of identity and voice, which violated sacred rights of autonomy.³⁶ By 1975, Ambassador Hill confirmed the prominence of state-sponsored right-wing terror in official communications with the U.S. Department of State and Secretary Kissinger. In “regard to right-wing terrorism,” Ambassador Hill wrote on February 11, “it [was] widely suspected that some of these actions [were] directed by certain [Argentine government] officials.”³⁷ Furthermore, Hill concluded that it would be impossible to obtain solid information because officially, the Argentine government publicly condemned the use of torture and assassination.³⁸ Yet, in late March, Hill wrote that “the bodies of young leftists turn up. . . twice as frequent as the victims of leftist-terrorists.”³⁹

Robert C. Hill’s tenure as U.S. ambassador to Argentina began in November 1973, late in the first year of Nixon’s second term as president. Within the first week of Hill’s arrival in Buenos Aires, he witnessed guerillas dumping a body from a moving car. He also was in the capital when the Triple A bombed the office of a nearby leftist newspaper.⁴⁰ The U.S. ambassador detailed the latter incident in a telegram to Secretary Kissinger. Hill explained that Jose Lopez Rega ordered up to sixty Triple A members to target the printing press of the

³³ Robert C. Hill to the Department of State, August 27, 1976 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Part 2, vol. 11, South America 1973–1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 150-157.

³⁴ “Argentine Army Apologizes for ‘Dirty War.’,” *Washington Post News Feed* 118, no. 142 (April 26, 1995): A26.

³⁵ “Argentina’s History and The Dirty War,” *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*, October 1, 2012, <https://madresdemayo.wordpress.com/the-dirty-war/>. (accessed April 3, 2017).

³⁶ Mirta Alejandra Antonelli, “State Terrorism, Clandestine Language: Notes on the Argentine Military Dictatorship,” *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 124, no. 5 (October 2009): 1794–99.

³⁷ “Human Rights Violations in Argentina,” February 11, 1975, “Virtual Reading Room Documents Search Results: U.S. Department of State - Freedom of Information Act.” (accessed April 16, 2017).

³⁸ “Virtual Reading Room Documents Search Results: U.S. Department of State - Freedom of Information Act.”

³⁹ Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 47.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 44-46.

newspaper called *La Voz del Interior*. The newspaper had previously blamed the Argentine government for the attack and criticized its attempt at suppressing free speech.⁴¹ Immediately upon arrival, Ambassador Hill thus faced the political instability of Argentina that pitted the right-wing government against the leftist guerrillas in a war where each side employed brutal tactics against the other.

On September 10, 1975, Ambassador Hill cabled the U.S. Department of State to provide an analysis of the political situation in the wake of the ongoing military crisis. He explained that the death of Juan Perón had created a power vacuum that a militant force would inevitably fill. Although a right-wing coup seemed most likely, leftist guerrilla groups enjoyed widespread influence and thus still constituted a threat to Argentine and U.S. national security. Ambassador Hill contended that the Argentine military had changed and no longer was bonded to the previous notions of authoritarian repression that characterized the military juntas of the past. Hill deduced this transformation after observing that the military had yet to act against Isabel Perón's ineffective government, even though it possessed greater solidarity than did the factions in the Perónist movement.⁴²

The ensuing violence perpetuated social and economic instability, which caused inflation, massive wage reductions, and greater economic disparity in Argentina. In December 1975, Argentine inflation was estimated to have peaked at one thousand percent, the economy grinded to a halt as farmers boycotted, workers went on strike, and employers locked their facilities. The emergence of black markets and illegal smuggling further facilitated the deterioration of the economy because the Argentine government could not collect taxes from these informal systems.⁴³

By March 24, 1976, a military junta consisting of Jorge Rafael Videla, Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Orlando Ramón Agosti overthrew Isabel Perón, instituted martial law, and further intensified the repression of leftist guerrilla groups through the implementation of the *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (the *Process of National Reorganization, el proceso*). From 1976 to 1983, the Argentine government committed severe human rights violations as it disappeared more than eight thousand civilians it suspected of subversive activity. The United States knew that Isabel Perón's government was doomed to collapse over a year

⁴¹ "Newspaper Bombed," January 27, 1975, "Virtual Reading Room Documents Search Results: U.S. Department of State - Freedom of Information Act." (accessed April 16, 2017).

⁴² Hill to the Department of State, September 10, 1975 *FRUS 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 85-91.

⁴³ Hedges, *Argentina*, 213.

before the 1976 coup. The economic and political turmoil that dominated her tenure in office invited revolution. A U.S. interagency intelligence memorandum stated on March 19, 1975 that it was unlikely for Perón to remain in office “for the remainder of the year” because of Argentina’s “deteriorating economic and political conditions.”⁴⁴ Ambassador Hill similarly lamented in September 1975 that “political power no longer [resided] with the President” and that it was plausible for any group to fill the power vacuum, but the military was most likely to seize power.⁴⁵ By December, Hill reported that several of his military contacts began to describe the coup as inevitable.⁴⁶

The military junta that replaced Perón in 1976 justified its actions in the legislation that instituted *el proceso*. The goals for the junta were to “eradicate subversion and promote economic development.” The military succeeded at eliminating thousands of suspected subversives because it had U.S.-sponsored anti-communist training.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, Ambassador Hill believed that the junta’s conservative economic ideology promoted U.S. economic interests and ultimately ensured the vitality of U.S. national security. Secretary Kissinger and Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers decided that it was in the best interest of the United States to become financially involved with the junta. On June 10, 1976, Kissinger assured Alberto Juan Vignes, the Argentine Foreign Minister, that the United States could help Argentina in the economic field.⁴⁸

To be sure, the military had no reason to intervene during the initial return to civilian rule nor at the time of Juan Perón’s death. It had developed its national security doctrine in tandem with the evolving strength of the leftist guerrillas. The military consisted of hardliners proclaiming that Argentina stood at the frontlines of the ensuing war between “western civilization” and communism.⁴⁹ In the mid-1970s, the Triple A coordinated state-sponsored terrorist attacks against leftist subversives under the authority of this doctrine to facilitate economic development in Argentina that correspondingly benefited the core values of U.S. economic interest and Communist containment.

⁴⁴ “Interagency Intelligence Memorandum DCI/NIO No. 671-75,” March 19, 1975 *FRUS, 1973-1976*, part 2, 76.

⁴⁵ Hill to the Department of State, September 10, 1975 *FRUS*, 85-91.

⁴⁶ “Telegram 8233 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State,” December 18, 1975 *FRUS*, 97-99.

⁴⁷ William Michael Schmidli, “Human Rights and the Cold War: The Campaign to Halt the Argentine ‘Dirty War,’” *Cold War History* 12, no. 2 (May 01, 2012): 358.

⁴⁸ “Henry Kissinger conversation with Foreign Minister Vignes,” May , 1975 *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 79-84.

⁴⁹ Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 41-53.

The Montoneros were a violent terrorist organization that regularly sought to destabilize the Argentine government through highly coordinated offensive action. They were not useless or stupid, as Juan Perón had characterized them in 1974. The group organized bombings to spread terror and ransomed kidnapped corporate executives. A string of kidnappings in 1973 empowered the Montoneros to receive ransom money from Coca-Cola, Exxon, Firestone, and Kodak, to name a few. By the mid-1970s, the Montoneros had amassed a treasury of over \$100 million and numbered as many as thirty-five thousand individuals within their ranks.⁵⁰

Donald M. Kendall, the Chief Executive Officer of PepsiCo called Secretary Kissinger on the morning of January 9, 1974 to express concern about U.S. citizens kidnapped in Argentina. A valuable Pepsi employee working in Argentina had suffered abduction the day before, and the kidnap of an employee from Exxon occurred around the same time. Kendall told Kissinger that PepsiCo would no longer pay the ransoms to free its employees “even if [the guerillas] kill[ed] someone,” opting to pull out of the country instead of perpetually losing valuable assets.⁵¹ The following year, a representative from within the Triple A sent a letter to Norman Heller, a PepsiCo executive, to warn him of the dangers of travelling to Argentina. The Triple A, alluding to Heller’s planned visit to the PepsiCo headquarters in Buenos Aires, said that they did “not want [Heller’s] safety affected . . . by guerrillas of the left.” Accordingly, he should cancel the trip. In the letter, the Triple A also emphasized the need to maintain good relations with the United States, which were sure to deteriorate if the kidnappings continued. Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes warned Ambassador Hill of a terrorist plot to kidnap to him on March 8, 1975. The U.S. embassy responded to this threat with increased security for Hill and recommended the ambassador decrease his public presence until the danger subsided.⁵²

The Montoneros found greater success abducting less prominent U.S. officials. On February 26, 1975, they kidnapped John Patrick Egan, volunteer consular agent of the United States, from his home in Cordoba at approximately 7:00 p.m. Egan’s wife immediately

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 57-58.

⁵¹ “Telecon with Donald Kendall and Kissinger,” January 9, 1973, National Security Archives: Freedom of Information Act, https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?collection=KISSINGER&searchText=* (accessed April 18, 2017).

⁵² “AAA Warning to PepsiCo Executive,” February 19, 1975, National Security Archives: Freedom of Information Act, https://foia.state.gov/Search/Results.aspx?collection=ARGENTINA&searchText=* (accessed April 17, 2017).

called the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires to report the kidnapping.⁵³ A bilateral investigation consisting of Federal Police and local Cordoba Police used composite sketches of the two men and women who entered the Egan home during the kidnapping in an attempt to uncover a lead. Although they identified one perpetrator and featured the composite sketches prominently in local newspapers, the investigation did not come across anything of significance until the discovery of Egan's body. The Montoneros kidnapped Egan alongside Paraguayan and Uruguayan consuls to offer in exchange for the release of four captured guerillas.⁵⁴ The Montoneros released the Paraguayan and Uruguayan consuls unharmed, while Alfred Laun, the director of the U.S. cultural center in Buenos Aires, sustained injury from gunshot fire while resisting a kidnap attempt.⁵⁵ The Cordoba police found Egan with a bullet hole in his left eye and in his throat, wrapped in a Montoneros flag shortly after the release of the consuls. The guerillas had executed Egan and subsequently dumped his body from a moving vehicle on the side of the road.⁵⁶ The guerrillas further proved their ability to punish any government official regardless of their position with the kidnapping of Jacobo Nasif, the commander of the Argentine National Gendarmerie.⁵⁷

Aside from kidnappings, the Montoneros effort to undermine the Argentine government resulted in the assassination of several political officials including Alberto Villar, the Chief of Federal Police and one of the founders of the Triple A. Its ability to spread terror, coupled with the assassination of Villar, culminated in the declaration of a "state of siege" on November 6, 1974, which suspended the right of habeus corpus and allowed the Argentine government to move detainees to undisclosed locations.⁵⁸ The ensuing violence resulted in greater resistance from the Montoneros who used tried and proven methods of terrorism and kidnapping to continue combatting the government. The Montoneros also stole the skeletal remains of General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, one of the main actors of the *Revolucion Libertadora* and a previous Argentine dictator, in October and held it hostage until the return of Evita's corpse from Spain in November. The stunt was

⁵³ "Kidnapping of U.S. Official," February, 26 1975 "Virtual Reading Room Documents Search Results: U.S. Department of State - Freedom of Information Act." (accessed April 17, 2017)

⁵⁴ "Kidnapping of U.S. Official" (accessed April 17, 2017).

⁵⁵ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 56.

⁵⁶ "Egan Murder," February 28, 1975 "Virtual Reading Room Documents Search Results: U.S. Department of State - Freedom of Information Act." (accessed April 17, 2016.)

⁵⁷ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 56.

⁵⁸ Hedges, *Argentina*, 213.

especially macabre, considering that the Montoneros had kidnapped and assassinated Aramburu in May 1970, a mere four years earlier.

The United States overlooked the human rights violations the Argentine government committed to maintain its profitable economic relationship with Argentina. It viewed this as a vital core value worth defending regardless of the consequence. The 1974 declaration of a state of siege instituted a policy of brutal suppression of leftist ideology that became increasingly more violent. By December 1975, the ensuing political chaos forced the United States to pursue a “low profile” in the country.⁵⁹ Kissinger stated that the United States did “not wish to become recipients of detailed information concerning plans for unconstitutional changes of government.”⁶⁰ The subsequent communications between military members and U.S. officials employed hypothetical language to avoid breaking this rule.

When Ambassador Hill met with Admiral Emilio Massera a week before the coup, he commented that Massera “scrupulously placed all his comments in the conditional sense, and . . . emphasized that he was only speaking of [the] hypothetical possibilities” of a coup. Fearing that his presence in the country would associate the United States with the impending takeover, Hill decided it was best to leave Argentina immediately in case the military was to take power suddenly.⁶¹ In doing so, he ensured that the economic relationship between Argentina and the United States did not suffer because of the junta.

Henry Kissinger similarly ensured the continuity of U.S.-Argentine relations. He advocated a policy of indifference toward Argentine government-sponsored human rights abuses. An investigation into the Argentine government’s policy against subversive action was sure to discover rampant human rights abuses. Kissinger called Harry Shlaudeman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, after intercepting a demarche urging an investigation into Argentine human rights. He scolded Shlaudeman for allowing this to happen, insisting on the transfer of the person responsible from the department. Furthermore, Ambassador Hill requested the U.S. government to consider sympathetically any Argentine request for assistance because the 1976 military junta promised to solve quickly the problems hindering further U.S. private investment in the country.⁶²

⁵⁹ Hill to the Department of State, December 16, 1975 *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 95-96.

⁶⁰ Henry Kissinger to U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires, March 19, *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 112-113.

⁶¹ Ambassador Hill to Department of State, March 19, *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 113-115.

⁶² *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 114.

Even though Ambassador Hill had knowledge of the military's intent to stage a coup over a year in advance, he persisted in advocating for private investment in Argentina and for the continuation of military aid for the country. During the tumultuous two years of Isabel Perón's inherited presidency from July 1974 to March 1976, U.S. imports to Argentina dropped 3.72 percent while Argentine exports to the United States decreased 39.2 percent.⁶³ The economic decay inside Argentina was far more extensive and adverse. Inflation increased an estimated seven-hundred percent and in 1975 total economic productivity declined by one-half.⁶⁴ Even so, U.S. private investment in Argentina totaled about \$1.5 billion in 1975. Hill's position on the coup stemmed from the perception that the Argentine military's conservative ideology made it better equipped to protect U.S. private investments. Healthy U.S. relations with Argentina, he believed, offered an "enormous bread basket . . . if [Argentina's] resources were utilized properly."⁶⁵

The 1976 coup managed to reinvigorate trade with the United States. At the end of 1977, imports from the United States to Argentina had increased 31.48 percent, and exports from Argentina to the United States increased 48.08 percent. The Argentine military advocated for expanded foreign investments in the Argentine economy. Even before the coup occurred, Kissinger campaigned for greater U.S. private investments in Argentina. Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes asked Kissinger for help in obtaining \$600 million in small loans from private banks in the United States. Kissinger immediately instructed William Rogers to call David Rockefeller, chief executive of Chase Manhattan Corporation, while Kissinger promised to phone Robert McNamara, the president of the World Bank, to secure funding for Argentina.⁶⁶ Although economic recovery following the coup did not occur for the Argentine populace, friendly relations between the United States and the military junta produced lucrative U.S. investment opportunities in Argentina.

The economic partnership that connected the United States to Argentina therefore strengthened U.S. national security as identified through Leffler's broader national security definition. This relationship

⁶³ "Products That Argentina Imports from the United States (1974-1977)," The Observatory of Economic Complexity, <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/stacked/sitc/import/arg/usa/show/1974.1977/> (accessed March 8, 2017).

⁶⁴ Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 48.

⁶⁵ Hill to the Department of State, December 16, 1975 *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 95-96.

⁶⁶ "Henry Kissinger conversation with Foreign Minister Vignes," May 8, 1975 *FRUS, 1973-1976*, 11, part 2, 79-84.

motivated the United States to neglect the rampant human rights violations in Argentina in an effort to ensure economic prosperity. Undoubtedly, the government of Argentina-sponsored suppression of leftist guerrilla activity was successful at eliminating whole populations at a time. In 1975 alone, the Argentine government detained or disappeared as many as five hundred members of the Montoneros.⁶⁷ Washington's maintenance of a stable economic relationship with Argentina for better or worse coincided with the Argentine military's desire to eradicate possible subversives.

Beginning with the overthrow of Hipolito Yrigoyen in 1930, the Argentine military organized five additional coups, with the 1976 coup being the last in the twentieth century. These takeovers occurred because civilian governments failed to promote solidarity and economic stability. However, military intervention did not guarantee political stability, as these coups often added to the chaos instead of alleviating it. The 1976 takeover did manage to reinvigorate trade with the United States at the expense of growing government of Argentina-sponsored human rights abuses. This ultimately led to the severing of diplomatic ties with the country in 1977 because the U.S. public increasingly demanded transparency on the international human rights issue.⁶⁸

Prominent historical scholarship on U.S. foreign relations with Argentina in the context of the Cold War contends that the official foreign policy regarding Argentina paralleled the official policy directed toward Europe. This policy consisted of Communist containment through the suppression of subversive activity. However, the use of Melvyn Leffler's national security framework demonstrates that the United States neglected the human rights abuses in Argentina to maintain a profitable economic relationship. This relationship guaranteed U.S. national security and overshadowed the country's moral core value of human life.

⁶⁷ Lewis, *Guerrillas and Generals*, 100.

⁶⁸ Schmidli, *The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere*, 89-92.

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
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Power of the People



An image of the modern-day ruins of the Roman forum, the location in which Romans assembled for public meetings and other public events. (Image Source: Andreas Tille, "The Roman Forum: the Temple of Saturn," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-Forum>.)

POWER OF THE PEOPLE: THE INFLUENCE OF THE MASSES IN ROMAN POLITICS

| Troy Hunter

The Roman Republic remains as a quintessential example for early republican governments. Its structures ensured that the masses of Rome had the opportunity to influence legislation rather than leave power to the upper classes. However, the *plebs* found this power diminished by the rise of the Augustus Caesar, whose claims to supremacy not only usurped much of the influence the people previously held, but ended Rome's republican government as well. Though the effectiveness of the Republic had been declining for some years, it is important to note that this significant shift in power took away many of the liberties once enjoyed by the *plebeian* class.

While the political influence of the *plebs* eventually waned under Augustus, the original power they wielded in Roman politics merits still merits investigation. Fergus Millar's book *The Roman Republic in Political Thought* revealed the political processes the people could use. The assemblies of the Roman people in particular significantly influenced the government. As Henrick Mouritsen asserted in *Plebs and the Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, it was these assemblies that made them a noteworthy body in Roman politics.¹ These practices suggested a level of power which would be unknown to Roman *plebs* in the Empire, yet historians have speculated as to whether or not this power truly existed to begin with. Alexander Jakobson argued that while popular assemblies could create change in the Late Republic, *plebs* had quite limited power in their government. His article "Traditional Political Culture and the People's Role in the Roman Republic" contended that even in the Republic, the elites had sole power over the government while controlling the common people.² This argument more accurately demonstrated how the political influence of the Roman *plebs* declined from Late Republic to early empire.

The Triumvirs, as Appian recounted in *The Civil Wars*, had had a great deal of military success in their rule, which also resulted in the acquisition of new political influence, particularly for Octavian.³ The methods that Octavian employed in this period are further explored by Fergus Millar in "Triumvirate and Principate." This article examined

¹ Henrick Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.

² Alexander Jakobson, "Traditional Political Culture and the People's Role in the Roman Republic," *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte* 59, no. 3 (2010): 283.

³ Appian. *The Civil Wars Book V*. [Thayer, Bill, Loeb Classical Library, 1913], 375.

how the Triumvirs addressed specific institutions within the *res publica*.⁴ Octavian's actions towards the general Roman public seems to have also been driven by a disregard of the *plebs* by his advisors. The historian Cassius Dio elaborated on this idea by recounting a conversation between Agrippa and Octavian which illustrated various plans to be implemented once the Octavian established the Empire.⁵

The end of the Triumviral period would also bring about the beginning of the Augustan era, and consequently the establishment of the new Roman Empire. This brought about significant changes for not only the elites, but for the *plebs* as well. While changes implemented by Augustus would affect the ways in which social classes interacted with each other, many were instated that would limit the influence that Roman citizens would have in their government. Geoffrey Sumi covered many of these legislative alterations in his book *Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics between Republic and Empire*.⁶ The rule of Augustus eradicated many of the rights that the *plebs* previously enjoyed in the Republic. His policies severely damaged the ability of the *plebs* to create meaningful change in government and eventually led to the loss of free speech. Roman citizens gradually turned into subjects of a new autocracy, a point which Greg Rowe explored in *Princeps and Political Cultures: The Tiberian Senatorial Decrees*.⁷ Despite the loss of liberty and political involvement, most Roman citizens remained content with the new monarch. However, the *plebs* did not welcome Augustus' rule, which may be explained by various factors of Roman culture. In addition to the fact that Augustus fed his citizens and provided them land, Sabine Grebe also emphasized the importance of religion in politics in her article "Augustus' Divine Authority and Vergil's 'Aeneid.'" Her article revealed the significance of documents such as the Aeneid in creating a divine figure in Augustus.

In addition to religion, Augustus asserted control over the state with his firm understanding of public rhetoric, as can be observed from the construction of monuments such as the *Ara Pacis*. Kathleen Lamp explored the importance of these structures in her article, "The Ara Pacis

⁴ Fergus Millar, "Triumvirate and Principate," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 63 (1973): 53.

⁵ Cassius Dio, *Roman History Book LII* (Thayer, Bill, Loeb Classical Library edition, Vol. VI, 1917), 125.

⁶ Geoffrey Sumi, *Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics in Rome between Republic and Empire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), 225.

⁷ Greg Rowe, *Princes and Political Cultures: The New Tiberian Senatorial Decrees* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 98.

Augustae: Visual Rhetoric in Augustus' Principate."⁸ Furthermore, the new empire brought about new values within the city. John Lobur's *Consensus, Concordia, and the Formation of Roman Imperial Ideology* examined how political relations within the Late Republic led to the creation of a new imperial ideology. This text addressed many of the shifting values that encouraged complacency amongst Romans at this time.

To better understand how the rise of autocracy affected the common people of Rome, this paper will begin by analyzing the role of the *plebs* in government at the height of the Republic. Though the political structures in place did not afford all members of the *plebeian* class the luxuries of political participation, those who were saw an unprecedented level of influence in their government. The institutions of the *plebs* possessed the abilities to control legislation, declare war and appoint state officials. Without direct election from the people, magistrates attempting to attain office and pass legislation failed without the approval of the *plebeian* body.⁹ In addition, various leaders of the government consulted those who participated in politics and kept them informed via public meetings.¹⁰ The liberties that the *plebs* held were dependent upon the principle of direct participation, which required attendance at assemblies during particular times at particular locations. This subsequently limited the number of Romans who were able to participate in politics, effectively leaving the *plebs* to be led by a vocal minority.¹¹ This minority, however, still retained a great deal of influence within the government. And while the Republic may have possessed many oligarchic characteristics, the upper classes still had to rely upon the desires of the *plebs* in various instances. Despite the influence that these citizens held, they did not have a significant influence over Roman politics even before the reign of Augustus.

While the power of the assemblies gave the *plebs* the ability to influence legislation, some historians have suggested that this power may have been an illusion at best. Alexander Yakobson argued this case by claiming that upper class citizens amongst the *patricians* and the senate retained full control over the legislative powers of the government while providing the *plebs* with but a semblance of political influence.¹² Though the Republic could still be viewed as an entity with democratic

⁸ Kathleen Lamp, "The Ara Pacis Augustae: Visual Rhetoric in Augustus' Principate," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (2009): 2.

⁹ Fergus Millar, *The Roman Republic in Political Thought*, 144

¹⁰ Mouritsen, *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, 1

¹¹ Mouritsen *Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, 16

¹² Yakobson, "Traditional Political Culture and the People's Role in the Roman Republic," 282.

elements, much of its power still resided with the elites of the social hierarchy. Furthermore, cultural factors within Roman society that glorified upper class citizens were already present. Monuments in the Forum of leading families and depictions of upper class citizens upon coinage gave the elites an image of superiority. It is also noted that the assemblies, being hosted by upper class citizens, may have been subtle ways in which the elites could earn greater respect from the public or inconspicuously spread their own political ideals. Yakobson noted that, "The Roman citizen was thus systematically educated and conditioned to respect the authority of the Senate, to defer to nobility, to venerate the *mos maiorum* and to believe that the Roman state was in good hands when it was run by the descendants of those who made it great."¹³ Conditioning citizens to respect power in this way could very easily weaken democratic values within the *plebeian* class, and seeing as only a small percentage of the *plebs* were politically active, this made the rise of a monarchy possible.

The Second Triumvirate facilitated the rise of the monarchy, as this institution gave various opportunities for Octavian to exploit in his early political career. The exile of the third Triumvir, Lepidus, additionally eased the process of usurping political power, as only Antony and Octavian would remain to wield the immense power of the Triumvirate.¹⁴ Even if Lepidus had remained in his position, however, the authority that the three Triumvirs held superseded the *plebeians* influence almost immediately. Magistrates and other public officials could now be selected at the discretion of the Triumvirate for a period of five years without the consent of the people. And while it is possible that many of the appointments of public officials may have been carried out by the *plebs*, there appears to be abundant evidence revealing arbitrary implementation of power as well as "gross affronts to Republican custom in certain years."¹⁵ The Triumvirs had begun to establish a system that rewarded public officials on their patronage rather than their merit. However, this did not seem to outrage the public in any particular way. While actions such as these disregarded the authority of the *plebs*, the influence of the Triumvirs deemed them necessary. Furthermore, the only attested formal definition of the Triumvirs' power at this time was in relation to the Republican magistrates. In this regard, a push was made by the political elites to ensure that the power dealing with magistrates

¹³ Yakobson, "Traditional Political Culture and the People's Role in the Roman Republic," 284.

¹⁴ Appian, *The Civil Wars Book V*, 377.

¹⁵ Millar, "Triumvirate and Principate," 53.

was consular rather than Triumviral.¹⁶ Electoral assemblies reemerged after 27 BC, though it is generally understood that these forms of political competition were limited in their resurgence.

Octavian likely did not carry out these tactics to limit the powers of political competitors in the *plebeian* body with any malice. He understood the power of the masses were useful in one's political career if harnessed properly, and his efforts to bring more grain, entertainment, and public works projects surely showed some degree of concern for their wellbeing. This attention may not have been sustained amongst the Triumvir's advisors, however. Agrippa in particular seemed to have some deal of contempt towards the masses of Rome, as much of his advice on the matter of dealing with the *plebs* involved suppression. One consultation between Octavian and Agrippa addressed this issue by stating that "...we shall at a later time examine more carefully the question of what measures should be taken to prevent our granting the people every privilege at once."¹⁷ This statement seems to insinuate that while there may have been plans to expand upon the rights of the people, the ideal situation would be to draw these privileges out to diminish feelings of independence amongst the masses. Furthermore, Agrippa stated that in regards to appointing political office, "make all the appointments yourself and do not any longer commit the filling of one or another of these offices either to the *plebs* or to the people, for they will quarrel over them..."¹⁸ This statement revealed not only the disrespect of a high ranking political advisor, but also demonstrated how many of Augustus' policies may have been predisposed to views of an unruly public. The council of Agrippa in situations such as these could have had disastrous effects upon the political participation of the *plebs*, and whether or not Agrippa is a primary influencer in this regard, the end of the Triumviral period began the erosion of political influence for the *plebeians*.

As the new Roman Empire began to emerge with the rise of the newly named Emperor, Augustus Caesar, the Roman *plebs* found themselves facing a situation that eventually limited their involvement in government. Prior to his full consolidation of power, Augustus did make efforts to involve the *plebs* in matters of legislation. Additionally, he employed the tribunes of the *plebs* to act as intermediaries between himself and the people in order to explain the contents of proposed legislation.¹⁹ His ability to influence the *plebs*, however, grew steadily

¹⁶ Millar, "Triumvirate and Principate," 59.

¹⁷ Cassius Dio, *Roman History Book LII*, 123.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Sumi. *Ceremony and Power*, 225.

over the years. While he may not have exerted the same amount of influence over the *plebeians* as he did the senate, his influence at elections was incomparable. He followed Republican customs by asking the people for their support, though simply by being at electoral assemblies to support a candidate vastly increased their chances of winning. The more candidates that won through these elections, the more he was able to consolidate loyalty and power throughout the government.²⁰ Furthermore, the creation of the *Lex Valeria Cornelia* in 5 A.D. facilitated the creation of ten new centuries, which formed a select assembly that "destined" candidates for the highest offices. This process effectively gave voting influence to those loyal to Augustus. While public elections under Augustus typically ended with the election of his proposed candidate, this law further solidified the power he held over the *res publica*.²¹ The *plebs* were thus at the whim of the upper classes for these political decisions. While the government still held demonstrations and assemblies, they were notably defective at this point due to background and organization. Violent demonstrations caused by famine, floods, and fires, became the most effective assemblies the *plebs* held, though the conventional methods of political assembly were largely lost under the early Principate.²²

Violent assemblies throughout this period were not particularly common, however. As Augustus continued his reign, it seemed the general Roman populace was content with his rule, despite his usurpation of control in government. There may be a variety of explanations that may clarify the complacency amongst Romans. Foremost is the deeply religious nature of Roman society and how this factor played into their politics. The deeds of one's ancestors played an especially significant role in preserving and increasing the foundation of Roman politics. According to Sabine Grebe, "the ancestors exhibited a model for rulers. Their institutions and acts bound future generations."²³ Early rule within the Principate could thus carry additional authority for Augustus as his adopted father, Caesar, had been deified. In a model that emphasized the importance of ancestry, kinship to the divine allowed one to carry extraordinary influence. In addition, the construction of monuments in public temples and the spread of propaganda such as Vergil's *Aeneid*

²⁰ Sumi, *Ceremony and Power*, 230.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 234.

²² Greg Rowe, *Prices and Political Cultures*, 98.

²³ Grebe, Augustus' Divine Authority and Vergil's 'Aeneid', 38.

helped cast Augustus as a divine figure with roots that tied him not only to Romulus, but to the Roman Pantheon as well.²⁴

In addition to the role that religion played, one must also take into account the shifting dynamics of Roman ideology during this time. Violence and disorder mired the Triumviral period, yet Augustus brought stability to the public once his monarchy began. As the emperor himself claimed, "My pre-eminence rested on the influence people freely conceded to me more than to any other, as the most authoritative person in political questions."²⁵ This suggested that Roman values of democracy had slowly conceded to more patriarchal views in which the *plebs* were willing to defer matters to those they deemed more qualified.²⁶ This abdication of power may have also been influenced to some degree by Augustus' skillful implementation of rhetoric in his speeches and the public monuments he created. Monuments such as the *Ara Pacis* further revealed that Augustus held tremendous influence over the people of Rome through state-sponsored propaganda as displayed upon his public works and coinage.²⁴

Though the *plebeian* class were once a significant force within Roman politics, cultural idolization of the elites and subtle political ploys quickly removed this power from the masses. While they once had the ability to elect officials, influence legislation, and direct political change through their assemblies, the patricians, the Triumvirs, and their advisors began to scrutinize these rights. By the beginning of the Principate, there now existed a culture within Rome that glorified the newly named Augustus Caesar based upon not only his divine ancestry, but his political aptitude as well. Therefore, these factors led to the dissolution of political rights amongst the *plebs*, as their apathetic attitude towards political involvement allowed Augustus to more easily consolidate his power.

²⁴ Sabine Grebe, "Augustus' Divine Authority and Vergil's 'Aeneid,'" *Vergilius (1959-)* 50 (2004): 37.

²⁵ John Lobur, *Consensus, Concordia, and the Formation of Roman Imperial Ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 59.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 61.

Power of the People

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Public Spectacles and Divine Justice



An engraving showing the execution of an apprentice found guilty of idleness, as well as the raucous crowd surrounding the event. (Image source: William Hogarth, "The Idle Prentice executed at Tyburn," *Industry and Idleness*, 1747.)

PUBLIC SPECTACLES AND DIVINE JUSTICE: THE COLLAPSE OF PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN ENGLAND, 1730-1840

| Christopher Fuqua

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, plebeian Londoners shared a common experience of gathering together to watch a condemned prisoner dance at the end of a rope in a show of judicial force. Public executions have a long history in England, stretching back centuries. The state delivered justice in front of a crowd, out of a sense of fairness and transparency. As personal wealth and property began to concentrate during the pre-industrial and industrial era in England, the severity of the criminal justice system rose in response to newly-found fears of a plebeian underclass with a criminal element. The number of crimes considered capital offenses in English law greatly increased, and executions increased correspondingly. This would never be the deterrent that the elite class desired, and instead became a form of popular entertainment, and a social gathering of the lower-class in London. The instances of public executions continued to skyrocket during the late-eighteenth century, spurred on by massive popular support among the underclass, as well as backing by one of the most influential segments of society, the Church of England, but eventually collapsed under societal pressure from the newly-formed middle class.

The spectacle surrounding public hangings in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has drawn the attention of researchers to the social sensibilities and class tension during the period. James B. Christophe linked the growth of the public execution with steadily rising capital offenses in Britain, and to the rise in poverty associated with the growth of the city of London and its quickly industrializing economy.¹ Christophe noted the many gruesome scenes of 'justice' that led to unease with public executions among the powerful in England, including the execution of children as young as seven. According to Christophe, however, certain influential segments of society during the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries supported the use of public executions to enforce societal rules and norms, including the Church of England, the judicial system and its judges, and moralists groups in England.

Building upon Christophe's research on the support for public execution, David D. Cooper explored the support for public executions among various classes in England. Cooper connects the popularity and

¹ James B. Christophe, *Capital Punishment and British Politics: The British Movement to Abolish the Death Penalty 1945-57* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), 14.

staying power of public executions in England to widespread support among all classes of society, not just the lower- and working-class plebeians for whom the executions were ostensibly being performed.² Cooper argued that the factors that caused the end of public executions, although related to movements to abolish capital punishment entirely, had “an identity and history of its own.”³ Cooper also tied together the idea that the continued existence of capital punishment in Britain until 1964 was largely tied to the decision by the legislators and judicial system to move executions to private venues in the mid-nineteenth century.⁴

Harry Potter, a former prison chaplain and scholar in the fields of history, theology, and law, focused on the Church of England as a major supporter of capital punishment and public execution in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Potter argued that the teachings and practices of the Church lined up well with the political and social ideas about sin and punishment. Potter, arguing in agreement with Christophe and other scholars, also noted a sharp rise in property crime that led to public support for the usage of more draconian punishments during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England. Potter traced the origins of this increase in executions to a newly found fear of crime held by the emerging bourgeoisie created by the economic growth of the early industrial revolution in England.⁵ This ‘Bloody Code’ as it came to be known, supported the use of capital punishment for crimes as small as petty theft, leading to a huge increase in public executions.

Moving away from the broader overviews of public executions, V. A. C. Gatrell instead shifted the focus to individual accounts and the English public’s feelings about execution during the period surrounding the industrial revolution. A major piece of social history, Gatrell’s work focused on the contrasting social ideas about execution based in class differences exacerbated by the growing economy. Gatrell found support for public execution within the masses of working-class Englishmen, as well as support within the highest classes of society, such as the judicial leaders and the former noble families. Gatrell argued that the support for ending public executions, and those in society who felt most distraught about the systems of punishment, belonged to the nascent middle class,

² Ibid., ix-x.

³ David D. Cooper, *The Lesson of the Scaffold: The Public Execution Controversy in Victorian England* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974), ix.

⁴ Ibid., x.

⁵ Harry Potter, *Hanging in Judgment: Religion and the Death Penalty in England* (New York: Continuum, 1993), 2-5.

and the growing idea about the sense of ‘humanity’ in society.⁶ This desire for a more gentle judicial system proved to be more powerful than continued support by the lower-class and the Church of England.

Most recently, historians Tim Hitchcock and Robert Shoemaker explored the justice system and the criminal world of London in the eighteenth century. Hitchcock and Shoemaker investigated the possibility that England’s elite class, having realized that public executions were no longer working as a deterrent against crime, and in fact had become an extremely popular form of entertainment, led directly to the end of the public display of capital punishment. They also note the changes in public executions that occurred during the time leading up to the end of the practice: speeding up the process of execution, introducing ‘drop’ hanging, and moving the executions from Tyburn to directly outside Newgate prison.⁷ This precipitated the eventual collapse of the public execution system, and showed the societal shift towards a more humane and less gruesome judicial system.

Although the use of public executions in England far predates the institution of the ‘Bloody Code’, the expansion of capital crimes during this period directly led a sharp increase in the number of executions in England. Andrea McKenzie, in her studies of Tyburn, the location of a great majority of public executions of London criminals in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, wrote, “the eighteenth-century English criminal code was notoriously harsh, with approximately two hundred capital statutes, most of them property offenses, on the books.”⁸ This massive increase in the number of capital crimes obviously led to a corresponding increase in the number of executions taking place in front of throngs of entertainment-seeking lower and working class citizens. From a low of ninety-six criminals sentenced to die between 1700 and 1710, citizens of London would watch the number of public hangings increase each decade, until the period from 1810-1820, which saw sixteen hundred and seventy-three people sentenced to hang at the gallows, an average of one person every two days (see Table 1). Although nowhere near all of these criminals would be executed, as most would either be pardoned or have their sentence reduced, the prominence

⁶ V. A. C. Gatrell, *The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People 1770-1868* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), viii-ix.

⁷ Tim Hitchcock and Robert Shoemaker, *London Lives: Poverty, Crime, and the Making of a Modern City, 1690-1800* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 364-365.

⁸ Andrea McKenzie, *Tyburn’s Martyrs: Execution in England, 1675-1775* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 3.

of death sentences in the English criminal justice system would cause wide-ranging effects on class relations and English society.⁹

Table 1. Criminals sentenced to death in London, 1700-1860.¹⁰

Decade	Criminals Sentenced to Death
1701-1710	96
1711-1720	491
1721-1730	530
1731-1740	474
1741-1750	393
1751-1760	508
1761-1770	515
1771-1780	770
1781-1790	1111
1791-1800	687
1801-1810	810
1811-1820	1569
1821-1830	1673
1831-1840	776
1841-1850	64
1851-1860	54

The increase in the number of criminals sentenced to death correlates with the increase in the number of crimes considered capital offenses under the ‘Bloody Code’. Between 1700 and 1770, the number of capital offenses tripled to nearly 150, leading to a corresponding rise in executions. More offenses would be added until in 1810, 220 crimes were considered eligible for capital punishment, sending the number of executions skyrocketing. Later, the dismantling of the bloody code in the 1840s and 1850s would see the immediate decline of executions,

⁹ Gatrell, *The Hanging Tree*, 29.

¹⁰ Tim Hitchcock, Robert Shoemaker, Sharon Howard and Jamie McLaughlin, et al., *London Lives*, 1690-1800 (www.londonlives.org, version 1.1, 24 April 2012).

until only a handful of crimes (such as murder) were considered capital offenses. Public opinion, particularly among those in the legislature and judiciary, would eventually shift against the use of executions, leading to the abolition of public hangings in 1868.¹¹ The role of public executions as a form of criminal deterrence is noted in many scholarly works about this period, with historian V. A. C. Gatrell opining on the ever-present spectre of public execution, “gallows hangings were more than a symbolic device of justice. Until the collapse of the capital code in the 1830s, no ritual was so securely embedded in metropolitan or provincial urban life.”¹² In the eighteenth century there is clearly a great deal of support for executions among all classes of society, not just among the audience of lower class, and later working class, Englishmen who so willingly attended these regular public displays of judicial power.

Of all the power structures in England supporting the continued use of the death penalty, of note is the unwavering support for capital punishment by the Church of England. During this period there was a growing sense of a lost morality in society as a whole, and an attempt to enforce traditional morality was a large part of the ‘reformation of manners’ movement among the religious sects of English society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹³ For many in the English elite, the use of public execution was integral to the bringing of religious and moral discipline back to England’s lower classes. Gatrell agreed, writing, “there is no doubt that executions had the capacity to implant the law’s presence, power, and moral messages in the collective mind.”¹⁴ The Ordinary’s accounts collected by Tim Hitchcock and Robert Shoemaker lend even more credence to the intended effect of these executions, with the Ordinary and the condemned often innately tying hangings to religious and moral failings and the need to warn the rest of society.¹⁵ This lesson was unabashedly aimed at the lower-class, and the Ordinaries often made note of this during the introduction to their accounts. One account, from May 27, 1772, speaks directly about this aim, “it is humbly hoped, that all of the lower class...will profit by the intention of it; and SERVANTS in particular will here see the fatal effects of [moral failings].”¹⁶ It is obvious that the intent to deter crime and increase moral behavior was present in the gross increase in the

¹¹ Cooper, *Lesson of the Scaffold*, 75.

¹² Gatrell, *The Hanging Tree*, 29.

¹³ Hitchcock and Shoemaker, *London Lives*, 34-37.

¹⁴ Gatrell, *Hanging Tree*, 90.

¹⁵ Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 7.2, 22 April 2017), Ordinary of Newgate’s Account, July 1772 (OA17720708).

¹⁶ Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 7.2, 22 April 2017), Ordinary of Newgate’s Account, May 1772 (OA17720527).

number of prisoners sentenced to die; whether or not this deterrent was effective is another issue entirely.

Despite the obvious intentions of the criminal justice system in putting on public hangings in England to deter crime, the executions themselves never truly served as a deterrent in the way many English elites hoped. Instead, the executions became community events, public spectacles, described by scholars as a “Roman-circus atmosphere”,¹⁷ and “an age old plebeian festival, always rowdy, often cruel, and increasingly shocking.”¹⁸ The public execution of English citizens in the eighteenth century, far from being a dire warning to those with criminal intent in their hearts, had become a spectacle that drew the masses together in a search for entertainment. This was spurred on by the newspapers, who quickly found a market for sensationalist accounts of both the crimes committed by the condemned prisoner as well as the execution itself.¹⁹ The increasingly literate English lower class consumed these stories and increased the circulation of the newspapers, which in turn led to even more coverage of the criminal justice system as a popular form of amusement. Gatrell stated that crowds for executions could range from a few thousand spectators up to a hundred thousand, and that execution crowds “matched or exceeded those attending famous political meetings.”²⁰

Those in the judicial system were not blind to this lack of effectiveness, and as the initial fears of increased criminality in the industrial age began to wane, legislators made changes to the form and standard protocol of public hangings in England. First, the judiciary eliminated the procession of the condemned through the city the morning of execution day in an attempt to prevent the creation of martyrs and to end public sympathy for the condemned.²¹ Then the judiciary introduced the “drop hanging”,²² a newer method of execution that led to the neck of the condemned prisoner snapping immediately, replacing a much more gruesome and slower method that was turned into a show of ‘dying game’ by the prisoner.²³ Eventually, executions in London would be moved from Tyburn, the traditional execution ground, to a location just outside of the Newgate prison, in an attempt to make the

¹⁷ Cooper, *Lesson of the Scaffold*, 178.

¹⁸ Gatrell, *Hanging Tree*, 590.

¹⁹ Cooper, *Lesson of the Scaffold*, 75.

²⁰ Gatrell, *The Hanging Tree*, 56.

²¹ Hitchcock and Shoemaker, *London Lives*, 365.

²² *Ibid.*, 365.

²³ Andrea McKenzie, “Martyrs in Low Life? Dying ‘Game’ in Augustan England,” *Journal of British Studies* 42, no. 2 (April 2003): 167-205.

executions less accessible to the masses that usually attended the events at Tyburn.²⁴ The public executions would continue to take place outside the Newgate prison until their eventual abolition in 1868, when an Act of Parliament shifted executions to private affairs, and “the death penalty was essentially restricted to murder and memories of the Bloody Code receded.”²⁵ Never again would plebeian Londoners gather together to watch the spectacle of a convicted criminal hanged.

As the Industrial Revolution marched on and society as a whole in London began to modernize, the sense of the underclass as a dangerous and criminal element began to subside in favor of a softer view. Ideas about humanism and justice began to overtake traditional notions of crime and punishment, and the public execution was simply no longer a viable means of deterring criminal activity, and was instead causing public safety issues. Despite support by the Church of England, Londoners began to move away from such brutal shows of criminal justice, and the days of wild circus-attraction executions were put behind them, with new forms of private execution and imprisonment taking their place.

²⁴ Hitchcock and Shoemaker, *London Lives*, 365.

²⁵ James Gregory, *Victorians Against the Gallows: Capital Punishment and the Abolitionist Movement in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2012), 33.

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Witchcraft



Photo Citation: An English woodcut from the cover of *A Most Certain, Strange, and True Discovery of a Witch, etc.* printed by John Hammond, 1643.

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WITCHCRAFT AS AN EXAMPLE OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY COMMUNITY CONTROL IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

| Merri Dowell

In mid-seventeenth-century England, accusations of witchcraft primarily targeted women who lived outside the accepted social norms of the day. Historians have theorized that the rise in witch persecutions may be related to the Reformation or relations between genders, suggesting that periodic increases in witch-accusations were related to the increased prevalence of Puritans or patriarchal control over women. However, as historians Robert Bucholz and Newton Key point out in their book *Early Modern England, 1485-1714: A Narrative History*, “puritans were no more afraid of witches than other Christians [and] at least half the witnesses and accusers were other women.”¹ This information suggests that accusations of witchcraft were not gender-specific or gender-related phenomena but a by-product of a society still reeling from the religious upheaval of the Reformation and dealing with women and their already precarious situation in society. Together these reasons justified community control in which accusations of witchcraft against men and women could be used to maintain the status quo and safety of the whole neighborhood.

Historian Anne Barstow viewed the witch-hunts of the seventeenth century as a gender-specific problem that can be understood as a form of patriarchal control of women. Barstow argued in her book *Witchcraze: A New History of the European Witch Hunts*, that “women were accused primarily by men, tried by male juries, examined by male searchers, sentenced by male judges, tortured by male jailers, and burned to death by male executioners—all while being prayed over by male confessors.”² Using statistics, Barstow demonstrated that the violence and death perpetuated upon the victims of the witch craze was an attempt by patriarchal societies to control woman who did not fit within the social parameters of the status quote designed by the dominant male authority figures in their community.

Barstow’s claim that the witch trials were a gender-specific problem and a war on women was supported by Malcolm Gaskill, historian and author at the University of East Anglia. His article “Witchcraft, Politics, and Memory in Seventeenth-Century England”

¹ Robert Bucholz ad Newton Key, *Early Modern England 1485-1714” Narrative History*. (Chichester, The U.K: Riley-Blackwell, 2009) 190.

² Anne Llewellyn Barstow, *Witchcraze: A New History of the European Witch Hunts*. (San Francisco, California: Pandora, 1994) 9.

claimed that while the list of victims killed as witches did include men, the witch trials were mainly an attack on women who chose to defy patriarchal authority. According to his article, the few men who were persecuted as witches were “often seen as threats to the order of state, class and masculinity.”³ Gaskill’s argument is based on the theory that the perceived threat against patriarchal authority and power, mainly from women who defied that authority resulted in accusations of witchcraft.

Unlike Barstow and Gaskill who contended that accusations of witchcraft were used to maintain patriarchal authority, Marianne Hester, professor of the University of Bristol, argued that witch-hunts were a specific example of the forced repression of female sexuality. While she does not deny that male dominance played a distinct role during the witch craze in England, Hester argued that witch trials were more sexual in nature, rather than an attempt to maintain patriarchal authority. By objectifying women as sexy or erotic [it] put them in a position of subordination, and when they did not conform to that role, men had to actively maintain and perpetuate their power as the accused were nearly all women, tending to be older, unmarried or widowed, and almost always poor.⁴ According to Hester’s claim, by targeting women who were in a vulnerable position socially, men objectified and eroticized those women specifically. Because they denied men’s sexual advances, the women were then accused as witches, socially ostracized, and executed as criminals to set an example for other women who might try to deny a man’s right to her body.

Although the argument for witch accusations as patriarchal control of women is a strong one, researcher and author Annabel Gregory differed in her opinion regarding the debate surrounding the gender specificity of the witch trials in seventeenth-century England. According to Gregory, the witch-craze was a community-instigated social problem designed to deal with people who did not conform to the social standards set by the neighborhood. Gregory claimed that “truism and witch-beliefs represent a direct invasion of the values of society in which they [were] held; neighborliness was the principal value at issue, but suggest that they represent a wider factional division within the community [as] a whole.”⁵ In maintaining order in a close knit society that depended on each other for survival, accusations of witchcraft were

³ Malcolm Gaskill, “Witchcraft, Politics, and Memory in Seventeenth-Century England,” *The Historical Journal* 50 (June 2007): 289-308.

⁴ Marianne Hester, *Lewd Women and Wicked Witches: A Study of the Dynamics of Male Domination*. (New York: Routledge, 1992) 1-2.

⁵ Annabel Gregory, “Witchcraft, Politics and ‘Good Neighborhood’ in Early Seventeenth-Century Rye,” *Past and Present* 33 (November 1991): 31-66.

a way of curbing behaviors of certain individuals that had the potential to threaten the well-being of an entire community.

Clive Holmes, professor at the University of Oxford, agreed with Gregory, by focusing his attention on the judicial practices of the seventeenth-century witch trials, particularly the witnesses who came forward to convict the victims. In his article, "Women: Witnesses and Witches," Holmes admits that most of the initial accusations of witchcraft came from men, but the witnesses who supported them were women. According to Holmes, "the role of the legal system, the dynamic interweaving of elite theology and the concerns of the populace" all contributed to the large numbers of witches persecuted.⁶ Similar to Hester and Gregory, Holmes's argument can be interpreted as patriarchal authority and neighborhood concerns regarding those outside the rule of societal expectations. However, while the legal system was a product of upper-class control and popular opinion, Holmes' article maintained that the large numbers of female witnesses were not enough to support the general consensus that the witch trials were purely a war on women, largely disproving the claim that gender was the main factor when persecuting witches.

While women were the primary victims of the witch trials in seventeenth-century England, witchcraft was not a gender specific problem. Rather, these accusations resulted from changes happening to English men and women during this time, and the fears those changes brought. The Protestant Reformation and religious concerns were major issues that helped to encourage witch accusations in England. As the upper-class increasingly embraced Protestantism, the power of Catholicism waned. Consequently, Catholic remedies for social fears concerning the unknown or the unexplainable disappeared as well. Robert Burcholz and Newton Key argued that the "Catholic religion had provided consolation for the ever-present disasters and high death rate in re-modern England, while that of the Reformation did not."⁷ With the rise of Protestantism came the fall of Catholic rites meant to protect and save the average Englishman from the terrors of the world they lived in. Gone were the prayers, rituals, patron saints, and exorcisms to fight the evil that both religions preached was prevalent through the world. As there were no other ways of protecting themselves, accusations of witchcraft became the means of fighting back against the things that weren't always easy to understand.

⁶ Clive Holmes, "Women: Witnesses and Witches," *Past and Present* 140 (August 1993): 45-78

⁷ Robert Burcholz and Newton Key, *Early Modern England, 1485-1714: A Narrative History*. (Chichester, The U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 190.

With the shift from Catholicism to Protestantism people turned to their new pastors to debate and understand the things that could not be explained, such as sickness, drought, and perhaps even just bad luck. However, many Catholic beliefs and rituals were discouraged by Protestant clergymen while fears of witchcraft were allowed and encouraged as a way of explaining the ineffable mysteries of the world. Historian Stuart Clark in his essay “Protestant Demonology” argued that witchcraft was encouraged by the Protestant clergy because it presented evidence of the devil’s existence and work in the world of men, and provided consequences for those who chose to consort with him. Clark claimed that “the spiritual and moral significance of witchcraft was total. At the heart of the crime was the demonic pact, but not so much for the feats which subsequently enable individuals to achieve, as for the act of apostasy itself—a kind of allegiance [that was] linked to treason and rebellion against ‘the kingdome and Citie of God.’”⁸ Even while the Protestant church denied the rites and rituals of the Catholic Church, it allowed and encouraged the prevalence of witch accusations to counter evil and root out treason and rebellion. By relating witchcraft to treason, for those not in the religion mindset, it still asserted a measure of control by encouraging obedience to the Crown and state religion so as not to be considered in league with the devil, and therefore a threat to the State.

Although religious concerns often caused witchcraft accusations, accusations brought against women in early modern England were also based on a woman’s already precarious situation within society at the time. Anne Barstow attributed a woman’s uncertain position in society to “the greater value placed on men as workers in the increasingly wage-oriented economy and a greater fear of women as inherently evil.”⁹ With more value placed on men as productive members of society, women in poverty, single or possessing medicinal knowledge often became scapegoats for frustrated community members who had suffered from illness, poor crops, or any number of incidents with a detrimental effect on individuals or the community as a whole. Already facing social ostracism, women who stood out as different, dangerous, and a drain on neighborhood resources, these women stood as easy targets for other members of their society who wanted to get rid of them. When similar accusations were brought against men, it was often “proved” false, as men demonstrated a potential asset to the

⁸ Stuart Clark, “Protestant Demonology,” in *Early Modern European Witchcraft: Centres and Peripheries*, ed. Bengt Ankarloo and Gustav Henningsen (Oxford, U.K: Clarendon Press, 1990) 58.

⁹ Anne Llewellyn Barstow, *Witchcraze: A New History of the European Witch Hunts* (San Francisco, California: Pandora, 1994) 25.

community and women maintained closed religious associations with the Devil.

Demonologist Reginald Scot noted several times in his book *The Discoverie of Witchcraft* that the typical woman accused by her community of witchcraft often met a specific set of requirements. According to Scot, those women who were most often the center of the witch trials were “women which be commonly old, lame bleare-eied, pale, fowle, and full of wrinkles. [They are] poore, sullen [and] go...from doore to doore for a pot full of milk...or some such releefe; without which they could hardlie live.”¹⁰ The women Scot describes as being the most vulnerable to accusations of witchcraft were clearly poor, old, disfigured, and a drain on resources. These women, who already stood out as outsiders were accused of witchcraft by their community as a way to eliminate or exclude single women in a society that that not know what do with them; witchcraft accusations also provided a reason for the bad luck that a man in his ability to provide for his family. In executing a witch, a community could successfully rid themselves of someone they could not afford to support and provide a reason for unexplainable events. Additionally, burning a “witch” at the stake set an example for other women who might be guilty of living in poverty, being different, or defying the patriarchal authority of the upper-class men who held power in their community. Killing witches not only put the blame for bad luck on something tangible that could be dealt with, but also served as a form of poor relief—the poor can’t ask for relief if they are dead.

While religion and a woman’s position in general were some of the causes of witchcraft accusations and persecutions in England during the seventeenth century, the safety of the community and the maintenance of the status quo was the main reason men and women were accused of witchcraft. A community that depended on its members for survival would have put a stop to anyone or thing that threatened the strength of the neighborhood. Women were more likely to be accused as witches by their neighbors, but it was not unheard of for a man to be accused of being a witch as well. Historian Brian Levack theorizes that while women were more likely to be persecuted of witchcraft because “they were believed to be morally weaker than men and more likely, therefore, to succumb to diabolical temptation,” men were often among those persecuted as witches when the issue at hand was a matter of heresy or treason. Levack points to statistics that suggest the Spanish Inquisition, while not seventeenth-century England, “persecuted and killed more men than women due to the theory that the Inquisition was more interested in crimes of heresy and treason than that of

¹⁰ Reginald Scot, *The Discoverie of Witchcraft*. (London, 1584) 4.

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“maleficium.”¹¹ Men who flirted with treason or women who had sexual relations outside of marriage could bring the attention of church officials to a town or village and a general community would not have wanted officials searching through an entire town looking for other activities that would be grounds for punishment. Using witches as scapegoats and presenting them in place of the entire town not only demonstrated to people what would happen if society’s rules were broken, but also showed government and church officials that the town was vigilant in their religious and state fight against those who would undermine God and the Monarchy.

One example of a community executing a woman who threatened community well-being and were otherwise a nuisance to the general population as a whole is the detailed account of “The Witch of Wapping” in 1652. According to the pamphlet published shortly after her execution, Joan Peterson used witchcraft to murder her husband, but not before she performed a number of other “magical” feats around the town, including curing headaches, removing a spell from a cow that had been bewitched, and transforming herself into a cat. Evidently, however, Peterson and her husband had not had a happy marriage; the document inferred that Peterson’s husband may have been prone to drinking excessively and then beating her. Not only would this have caused a public nuisance and a threat to the community’s dynamic, a woman who killed her husband would have clearly demonstrated her defiance of patriarchal authority. In fact, the pamphlet describing Peterson’s stabbing of her husband and her death told readers that her death would benefit the community as “she might be a warning to all women, that they attempt to do nothing rashly, especially against their husbands.”¹² In this instance it showed the social consequences of defying the status quo, of a woman moving above her social position, and how the community dealt with that sort of crime.

Participating in thievery or prostitution constituted another way a person could be accused of witchcraft. Both activities, seen by the Catholic and Protestant Churches as sinful, could suggest to the people of a community that a person was a witch. Witchfinder General Matthew Hopkins wrote in his pamphlet on the identification of witches that “if they be at any time abused by being called Whore, Theefe, &xe, by any where they live, and they are ready to cry and wring their hands and shed tears...when they are accused of this horrible and damnable sin of

¹¹ Brian P. Levack. *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*. (Essex, U.K.: Longman Publishing, 1995) 125.

¹² Anonymous, *The Witch of Wapping, Or an Exact and Perfect Relation of the Life and Devilish Practises of Joan Peterson* (London, 1652) N.p.

witchcraft, they never alter or change their countenance.”¹³ Hopkins detailed the idea that people who participated in prostitution or thievery, as well as other sins against God, were those who were likely consorting with the devil and were unable to be saved or brought back to religion. Consequently, the only way to save the community from further contamination of these people would be to execute them by burning them at the stake.

Witchcraft as a gender-specific problem is easy to accept. Presently, the common image of the witch is that of an ugly, reclusive, and oddly behaved woman who can use magic to curse her neighbors and potentially kidnap or lures away the neighborhood children. When students are taught about the Salem witch trials, they are taught the people killed were women. The word “witch” is even used in today’s language as a feminine term, with men most often referred to as “wizard” or “warlock”. It is easy to imagine that the people of seventeenth-century England would have had the same gender-specific connotations as present day people. Additionally, religious explanations that women were easily tempted and corrupted by the Devil, as influenced in the Bible story of Adam and Eve, was a more common and accepted truth that would have influenced rulings on women sentenced to death. However, preconceptions aside, historians like Levack and Gaskill convincingly argued that male witches were persecuted as a result of treason, heresy, or challenging traditional masculine social mores. As the term “patriarchal control” suggests, men were seen as the breadwinner and head of a family or community; it is no wonder that men were the least likely members of a community to be accused of witchcraft. As a person who already has a measure of power is not likely to make ill-advised pacts with devilish forces by submitting themselves to a force greater than themselves. Citizens in seventeenth-century England easily recognized that women normally did not have power and religious doctrine taught they were a weak and easily tempted gender. With this social and religious doctrine firmly in place, the claim that a woman was practicing witchcraft became an easily believable and understandable truth to a community that was fearful of devilish influence and close inspection from church and state officials investigating misconduct.

Local communities, encouraged by Protestant clergymen, used witchcraft accusations to rid a community of a person or persons who endangered the neighborhood, whether from real or imagined threats. In the end, the threat of witchcraft accusations served as an example to those who might deliberately or inadvertently pose a threat

¹³ Matthew Hopkins, *The Discoverie of Witches: In Answer to Severall Queries*. (London, 1584) N.p.

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to the survival of the collective group and eliminated people who posed a general problem to societal unity. In this way, community control was used by community members to lessen the strain of those who did not contribute and helped to maintain the status quo of male control and patriarchy by executing men and woman whose only crimes were poverty, odd behavior, independence, or speaking and acting out against traditional patriarchal and community control.

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Rosie the Riveter

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An example of World War II propaganda depicting a “real life Rosie” working in an airplane factory. (Image Source: Alfred T. Palmer, “The more women at work the sooner we win!”, U.S. Government Printing Office (c. 1943), Washington D.C., <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/95504675/>).

ROSIE THE RIVETER AND THE MOBILIZATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

| Monica Jamero

The day following the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the thirty-second President of the United States of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt, addressed the nation in his “Day of Infamy” speech. Sixty million Americans across the country watched as President Roosevelt declared war against the Empire of Japan and its allies. At the time, many Americans did not realize what would take place in the days or years to come. As the entire nation mobilized, more men became eligible for the draft and the need for workers rose drastically. This meant substantial change in the daily lives of women as they became an essential source of labor. To mobilize these women, the government faced the challenge of changing society’s perception of women in the workplace. During World War II, women of all backgrounds, ethnicities, and class saw a substantial amount of social change as they migrated and entered new industries. As millions of women entered male-dominated jobs, they soon proved that they were capable of much more than tending to children and carrying out domestic tasks. The social changes that took place during World War II extended women’s roles and positively affected women’s lives and women’s work for subsequent generations.

Seemingly overnight, businesses converted and built new factories to meet the wartime demands. New well-paying jobs attracted people from across the country, but as the military recruited more men it became essential for women to enter the workforce. Prior to the war, many of these women never experienced the use of a rivet gun. They had never seen landing gear, or the inside of a plane. After years of economic hardship and low employment due to the Great Depression, newspapers began advertising the need for war workers. Women across the nation vacated their positions at colleges, kitchens, and other industries for government jobs as well as jobs at shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing plants. Military production became a crucial part of the war effort and women became essential to victory.

To mobilize these women, propaganda emphasized the need for women workers and the importance of civic duty in relation to the war efforts. The government initiated various forms of propaganda including magazine and poster images, radio ads, as well as movie roles that displayed women as patriotic and glamorous. Berger Gluck described in her book, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited*, how movies illustrated women such as the Hollywood actress Ginger Rogers “dressed in slacks and with

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a snood on her head tooling around the aircraft plant on a forklift.”¹ Norman Rockwell’s “Rosie the Riveter” and J. Howard Miller’s “We Can Do It!” displayed two of the most popular images of women. As described in Gluck’s book, Norman Rockwell’s image of “Rosie the Riveter” depicted in the *Saturday Evening Post* on May 29, 1943, showed an enthusiastic muscular young woman with a rivet gun draped across her lap. This image revealed a double message: “Her loafer-clad foot was planted on *Mein Kampf*- symbolizing her role in stamping out fascism- but she could still remain feminine, as the powder puff and mirror peeking out of her coverall reminded.”² J. Howard Miller designed the “We Can Do It!” image for Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company but it soon became a popular depiction of women during World War II. This image showed a woman in her riveting uniform flexing her muscles, which symbolized the strong and capable women contributing to the war effort. Rosie the Riveter became the ideal image of what the government wanted in a women war worker: “loyal, efficient, patriotic, compliant, and even pretty.”³ The government emphasized the need for women to sacrifice their own needs in order to support the war effort and bring men back safely. These forms of propaganda had such a profound impact that many women identified themselves as real life Rosie the Riveters, fulfilling their civic duty by integrating into previously male-dominated jobs.

The war effort, and the propaganda associated with it, initiated the mass migration of thousands of Americans to urban cities, especially to California. The United States Census Bureau estimated that 21.5 percent of civilians moved between 1940 and 1947.⁴ A high percentage of these people moved to the Pacific Coast where wealthy business-men built numerous shipbuilding and airplane manufacturing plants. According to Susan H. Hartmann, “California alone gained two million new inhabitants, as San Diego County grew by 43.7 percent and the Los Angeles area added 440,000 to its population.”⁵ Richmond, California, also saw a huge increase in population from under 24,000 to well over

¹ Sherna B. Gluck, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited: Women, the War, and Social Change* (Boston: Twayne, 1987), 11-12.

² *Ibid.*, 12.

³ Maria Cristina Santana, “From Empowerment to Domesticity: The Case of Rosie the Riveter and the WWII Campaign,” *Frontiers in Sociology* 1 (December 23, 2016), 3.

⁴ “Before and After 1940: Change in Population Density,” *U.S. Census Bureau*, 1 Mar. 1994, Accessed October 21, 2017.

⁵ Susan M. Hartmann, *Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s* (Farmington Hills, MI: Twayne Publishing, 1998), 6.

100,000 after the war.⁶ At first, a high portion of the jobs were only available to white women. However, this changed when thousands of African-Americans threatened to march on Washington, and Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which banned discrimination in defense plants as well as government offices and services. According to Karen Anderson, “the wartime system of labor priorities enabled women to escape the low-paying-female-dominated fields of domestic and personal service and to obtain jobs in the burgeoning war industries or in the government.”⁷ This mass migration and drastic increase in women workers forever changed the cultural landscape of the United States. It forced social change for women workers and even shifted the way women saw themselves.

Nearly six million women participated in wartime industries between 1942 and 1945.⁸ Every section of defense production experienced the presence of a woman. Doris Weatherford described how Convair Aircraft employed ninety-percent women within its eleven feeder factories. These real-life Rosie’s exhibited a substantial amount of motivation, which led to the feeder plants out-producing the home plant.⁹ These highly motivated women prevailed in wartime industries throughout the urban cities of California and dominated nearly “14 percent of all production workers in the Richmond, California shipyards.” This included 63 percent of women African-American workers who worked as welders or welder trainees.¹⁰ Many of these women believed for the first time that they had a purpose and a chance at a brighter future. For Betty Jeanna Boggs, being an aircraft worker showed her that “a young woman could work in different jobs other than, say, an office, which you ordinary expect a woman to be in. It really opened another viewpoint on life in general.”¹¹ Many other young women workers also had this feeling such as Bonnie Overton, who stated, “I wouldn’t have missed the experience for anything, it broadened my life and I met people I never would have met otherwise.”¹² These

⁶ “History & Culture,” National Parks Service, May 31, 2017, The World War II Home Front, Accessed November 27, 2017.

⁷ Karen L. Anderson, *Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations, and the Status of Women during World War II* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 6.

⁸ Anderson, *Wartime Women*, 1.

⁹ Doris Weatherford, *American Women and World War II* (New York: Facts on File, 1995), 133.

¹⁰ Nick Veronico, *World War II Shipyards by the Bay* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 2007), 14.

¹¹ Gluck, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited*, 103.

¹² “Rosie the Riveter, WWII, American Homefront Project,” Regional Oral History Office, October 09, 2015, accessed September 18, 2017.

experiences ignited optimism within women and thousands became inspired by these new changing roles.

Unfortunately, many women received unequal treatment and often became victims of hostility as society adjusted to these new roles. Many male coworkers and supervisors did not adapt to the new roles so easily. Some women found that their male coworkers resented their presence, seeing them as temporary intruders in a male-dominated field. According to Marilyn Johnson, within the Bay Area, “a mere 9 percent of women defense workers occupied skilled positions, compared with 46 percent of men.”¹³ However, women shipyard workers also received accusations of being prostitutes who operated in abandoned ship compartments and warehouses. Rumors of shipyard prostitution became so widespread throughout West Coast defense centers that it reinforced men’s “right” to harass female coworkers and diminished their legitimacy on the job. These rumors, combined with the male assumption that women workers were temporary, made employers more likely to only educate women in a single operation. However, some women found workplaces that promoted recreational activities with male coworkers to boost morale. The sense of a common purpose that these workers shared drove them to achieve production goals that ultimately helped lead to victory.

For the African-American community, the war years opened new job opportunities and encouraged mobility. During this time, the employment of African-American women increased from 1.5 to 2.1 million.¹⁴ By 1945, African-American women performed industrial work in all Los Angeles aircraft plants, including North American Aviation which single-handedly employed two-thousand women.¹⁵ One of these women included Tina Hill, who described the war as a major turning point during which she vacated domestic service permanently and earned money during the war years that provided her a better future. Tina worked at North American Aviation for almost forty years. However, despite her own accomplishments, she understood that not all women had this luck.¹⁶ Often, employers segregated African-American women and only allowed them to do certain tasks. In fact, Karen Tucker Anderson reported that an aircraft parts company in Los Angeles declared that it “could not hire black women because it separated

¹³ Marilyn S. Johnson, *The Second Gold Rush: Oakland and the East Bay in World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 61.

¹⁴ Hartmann, *Home Front and Beyond*, 78.

¹⁵ Karen Tucker Anderson, “Last Hired, First Fired: Black Women Workers during World War II,” *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 1 (1982): 87.

¹⁶ Gluck, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited*, 48.

workers by sex as well as by race and could not further complicate its managerial and supervisory difficulties.”¹⁷ This type of prejudice became prevalent in other industries throughout California and surrounding areas. Nevertheless, the war brought African-American women the opportunity to leave the poverty of the rural south and gain better possibilities in a more urban and industrialized economy.

No matter their race or what industry these women worked in, the majority still faced the double burden of working and fulfilling their domestic duties. The mass migration of people to urban cities caused a major shortage in housing forcing families to live together or cram into crowded trailers. Mothers not only faced cramped living quarters, but Sherna Gluck also described how “after eight or ten hours of riveting, or welding, or soldering, these wives and mothers had to stand in long lines in the stores and cope with rationing.”¹⁸ These hard-working women reached the market at the end of a long workday only to find resources depleted. To meet the needs of these women workers and their families, some areas initiated special wartime programs. The Lanham Act, as described in an article printed in the *Los Angeles Times* on February 21, 1943, “authorized nursery schools along with roads, bridges, buildings and other essentials needed for our expanding war program.”¹⁹ These nursery schools solved a nation-wide problem and helped ease the stress of mothers and fathers working in wartime industries. Unfortunately, for some women, these resources were not accessible because they did not live near defense-impacted communities. Overcrowded transportation systems made getting anywhere extremely difficult and forced women to fulfill these demanding dual roles by sacrificing sleep and leisure.

Many of these women wanted to continue working in their chosen industries after the war. Instead, a new type of propaganda for women began in the form of magazine ads that promoted household appliances. Just like the ads that brought them into wartime industries, these new ads served a dual purpose. They demonstrated how women could spend their hard-earned money while also reminding women of their “proper” domestic roles. In the years following World War II, the percentage of women workers who worked in the Los Angeles aircraft industry fell drastically. “From a high of over 40 percent of workers during the peak war production years to less than 18 percent by 1946; the figure continued to decline to a low of 11.9 percent in 1948.”²⁰

¹⁷ Anderson, “Last Hired, First Fired,” 88.

¹⁸ Gluck, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited*, 17.

¹⁹ Davison, Eloise, “While Mother Works,” *Los Angeles Times* (1923-Current File), February 21, 1943.

²⁰ Gluck, *Rosie the Riveter Revisited*, 17.

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Although this number decreased, many of these women experienced major economic advancements. The jobs women held during the war years provided them the extra money, experience, and confidence to go after future employment opportunities.

The stories of some of these women are now exhibited at the Rosie the Riveter, World War II Home Front National Historic Park in Richmond, California. The experiences of the Rosie the Riveters varied, but regardless of their background, age, race, or class, their wartime work dramatically shaped the remaining years of their lives. Many women continued to work in non-traditional jobs while some chose to return to their domestic roles. Regardless, the social world of working women dramatically changed, and the boundaries of women roles extended. Although the sexual division of labor returned, the empowerment that women felt during the war years lived on in many of the Rosie's hearts and continued for future generations. Today, Rosie the Riveter serves as a symbolic reminder for subsequent generations to attempt new things, test their boundaries, and have faith in themselves and others.

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Appendix

2018 Phi Alpha Theta Initiates

It is with great pride and enthusiasm that the Editorial Board of *The Chico Historian* welcomes into the fold this year's new members of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta:

Emily Ahlers

Carol A. Celic

Amy Foster

Ben Friedman

Luciano Gonzalez

Eric Jopson

Joseph Knadler

Jacob McDonald

Sebastián Loza

Dana G. Moot II

Melissa Pipkin

Marina Sánchez

