


THE CHICO HISTORIAN

Special Edition

**Volume 30
2020 - 2021**

The Journal
of the Chico State
History Department



Cover Art & Design

Trinity Hall Illustration, 2021. Constructed in 1933, today it is the home of the CSU, Chico History Department. (Used with permission: “The Trinity Building,” Ricardo Vega, 2021).

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The Chico Historian is an annual publication of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of the Phi Alpha Theta National History Honor Society and the California State University, Chico (CSUC) Department of History. It aims to provide students the opportunity to publish historical works, and to train editorial staff members in producing an academic journal. Issues are published at the end of each academic year. All opinions or statements of fact are the sole responsibility of the authors and may not reflect the views of the editorial staff. The authors retain rights to individual essays.

Phi Alpha Theta's mission is to promote the study of history through the encouragement of research, good teaching, publication, and the exchange of learning and ideas among historians. The organization seeks to bring students, teachers, and writers of history together for intellectual and social exchanges, which promote and assist historical research and publication by our members in a variety of ways.

We dedicate this volume to Professor Stephen Lewis

Professor Lewis, a historian of Mexico and Latin America, served for many years as an advisor for the *Chico Historian* and has been a constant source of support for students at Chico State. We want to thank him for his hard work with Phi Alpha Theta and the history club on campus, and for all of the advising he provided to undergraduate and graduate students who have papers included in this volume.



The Chico Historian

Volume 30: 2020-21

The Annual Publication of the
Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta
and the Department of History
California State University, Chico

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Introduction & Acknowledgements

It is our pleasure to present to you this special edition of *The Chico Historian*, the student-run journal of the Chico State History Department. Now in its thirtieth volume, this double issue represents the exciting culmination of hard work in the face of adversity. While the onset of the pandemic in 2020 initially disrupted the editorial process, this volume is a testament to the resilience of its editorial team and student contributors. It presents the scholarship of fourteen CSUC students, current and alumni, all of whom drew upon a wide array of rich and productive avenues for research stretching from the late eighteenth century to the present.

Though thematically, geographically, and temporally diverse, the contributions in this issue of *The Chico Historian* all provide new perspectives on more familiar moments in history. Running roughly chronologically, the essays speak to this concept of reinterpretation. Beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, for instance, Brandon Finn's "Washington's Revolutionary Women" emphasizes the labor of those who accompanied the Continental Army, despite remarkable hardship, to contribute to the war effort of the American Revolution. Kayla Nicole Brown, in "California: Reconstruction, Race, and Religion," complicates our understanding of the opportunities—and limitations—of Reconstruction in post-Civil War California. Cordelia Ann Wilson's essay "Silencing the Black Voice: Disfranchisement in North Carolina, 1898 to 1900" emphasizes the revolutionary impetus of enfranchisement for Black Americans following the Civil War: and the tactics used by White Supremacists and Democrats in North Carolina to roll back progress.

Starting her analysis in the late nineteenth century, Emma Kirchhoff studies West Indian immigrants in Costa Rica in "West Indians, Labor Organization, and the Power of Place in Costa Rica," speaking to the complex legacy of the labor system surrounding banana production. Christopher M. Carroll's article "Race and Identity in the 20th Century: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Sides of José Vasconcelos and his 'Cosmic Race,'" reinterprets the Mexican author's conception of mestizaje and racial identity. In "Utilization and Treatment of the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* by the French Military during the First World War," Garrett Harrison studies the mobilization—and treatment—of West African soldiers throughout the course of World War I. Juan Vega Ramirez uses a new lens to analyze the Summer Institute of Linguistics in his "Proselytizing Modernity: Reexamining the Summer Institute of Linguistics' Tenure in Mexico."

Several essays focus on the period of the Cold War. Harrison Ross reframes the Truman Doctrine by addressing Turkey's influence on foreign policy in "The Truman Doctrine in the Middle East: Turkey's Entry into NATO to Defend Against the Soviet Union." Likewise, Ben Mount, in "Mr. Nixon Goes to Kabul: Modernization and Nation-Building in Afghanistan," assesses the contours of Nixon's diplomatic mission to Afghanistan in 1953. Anthony Meza's "The Space Race and Apollo-Soyuz: A Thaw in the Cold War" studies the cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union vis-à-vis space exploration.

The final four submissions move further into the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. Vivian Hernandez speaks to the transformative possibilities of family planning programs and access to birth control in "Women's Fertility and Social Transformation in Modern Mexico, 1968-1988." In "La Garra Charrúa in the Fight for Recognition: Indigenous Erasure in Modern Uruguay," Kelsi Snyder traces the removal of Indigenous Uruguayans from the country's historical narrative, and its modern-day implications. Jason Bohnert's "Increasingly Political Nature in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Two Case Study" addresses the politicization of the Supreme Court through *Baker v. Carr* and *Bush v. Gore*. Lastly, Maria Kogler reframes Morales' political strategy in "Evo Morales' Indigeneity: Personal Creed or Political Construct?"

We would like to express our gratitude for all those who made this special issue of *The Chico Historian* possible. We are grateful to the History Department, including department chair Dr. Robert Tinkler and Administrative Support Coordinator Alyssa Danielli, for the generous departmental support given to *The Chico Historian*. We also thank Dr. Alisa Wade, who served as the faculty advisor for the journal, along with History Club and Phi Alpha Theta co-advisor Dr. Sinwoo Lee and previous advisor Dr. Stephen Lewis. We also wish to extend our thanks to all Chico State faculty who mentored and advised students, helped craft their papers, and supported them in the submission process. We thank members of the History Club who participated in our workshop, and we are also deeply appreciative of all our contributors, who so willingly went through the editorial process with us. Lastly, the chief editors would like to thank the members of our editorial board, who volunteered their time to solicit submissions and edit papers, enabling us to present this issue.

The Chico Historian Editorial Board

Contributor Biographies

Jason Bohnert earned an M.A. in History from CSU, Chico in the Spring of 2020 and is currently working in the tech industry. His historical interests include, but are not limited to, political history, cultural history, and intellectual history. He wrote his essay for Dr. Livingston's HIST 600, Graduate Research Seminar, in the Spring of 2019.

Kayla Nicole Brown is a CSU Chico graduate finishing her master's degree with American Military University. She currently teaches at a local private school and spends her free time raising three children of her own.

Christopher M. Carroll is a graduating senior at CSU Chico studying History and International Relations. His goal is to represent the United States abroad as a Foreign Service Officer. This paper was written for Dr. Lewis' section of the capstone course, HIST 490W.

Brandon Finn graduated from Chico State in May 2021 with an M.A. degree in U.S. and Modern European History. He is currently working as a corporate trainer with the goal of becoming a junior college instructor next academic year. His major area of interest is in gender history, which he credits Dr. Transchel for inspiring in History 419, and Dr. Wade for encouraging in History 443, during which this paper was written.

Garrett Harrison is a CSU Chico graduate with an interest in 20th century conflicts military history, which is what led him to write about the Senegalese Tirailleurs during the First World War. He currently works as an outdoor activities guide at a Montana dude ranch, enjoying travel and new world experiences before committing to Officer Training School to become a pilot in the Air Force. He wrote this paper for Dr. Kate Transchel for HIST 490W in Fall of 2019.

Vivian Hernandez is a 4th year double majoring in History and Latin American Studies with minors in Spanish and Global Development Studies. Her research interests revolve around Latin American history, specifically women and gender studies in contemporary Mexico. Vivian wrote this paper in Fall 2021 for Dr. Lewis' HIST 490W class.

Emma Kirchhoff is a Chico State alum and currently teaches English in Spain. This paper was written for History 490 with Dr. Lewis, focusing on Latin American history and issues.

Maria Kogler completed her MA in History in May 2020 at Chico State after double majoring in Agriculture and History during her undergrad. She is especially interested in Latin American history & the history of agriculture. Her paper on Evo Morales was written for Dr. Lewis' class on Indians and Indigeneity in the Fall of 2018. Maria spent last summer working on a project chronicling the history of California agriculture before joining the teaching staff at Ukiah High School in August as an agriculture teacher. During her credential program, she completed all of the requirements to receive both an agriculture credential and a social science credential, and is looking forward to teaching her students about both of her passions!

Anthony Meza recently graduated from CSU Chico with a Bachelors in History and a Single-Subject credential. Since graduation, Anthony moved to Sacramento to pursue teaching at the high school level. Outside of academics, he enjoys recording music, video games, and walking his cat. This paper was written for Professor Matray's "U.S. History from 1945 to the Present" course.

Ben Mount grew up locally on a Ranch in Cottonwood, CA. He is currently in the Masters program to study the history of U.S. foreign relations in the Middle East. His contribution to the *Chico Historian* was originally written for Dr. Matray in HIST 600.

Juan Vega Ramirez graduated with an MA in History from Chico State in 2021. He originally wrote his paper for Dr. Stephen Lewis' "Indians and Indigenismo in Latin America" during the Fall semester of 2019. In 2020, his paper won 1st place in the graduate research category at the Phi Alpha Theta Northern California Regional Conference. Juan hopes to earn a PhD in History and then teach at the community college or university level. In his free time, Juan enjoys hiking, bicycling, and spending time with his wife."

Harrison Ross is a graduate student in the MA history program, currently finishing up his last semester at Chico State. He loves all aspects of history, but points to the "late antiquity" of the Mediterranean and Middle East as his current favorite period, with a particular interest in exploring how the Roman and Persian Empires changed over time,

and how monotheistic religions like Christianity and Islam arose. He hopes to make a career out of teaching history, and would love to one day read the Bible in the original Greek, and the Qur'an in Arabic.

Kelsi Snyder graduated from the departments of History, Latin American Studies, and Spanish at Chico State, and wrote this paper for her History 490W class with Dr. Lewis. The project was inspired by her semester abroad in Uruguay, and after graduating, she decided to feed her passion for education and travel by teaching English in Spain.

Cordelia Ann Wilson works as a department ASC at California State University at Chico and, as part of her Master's program in Political Science, wrote her paper for Dr. Robert Tinkler's "History of the American South" class. She has concentrated her studies and research on the enduring legacy of slavery in this country and its impact on social and political equality. She is planning on graduating in Spring 22 after defending her thesis, which examines the Republican use of restrictive voting legislation to suppress minority votes.

Articles

WASHINGTON'S REVOLUTIONARY WOMEN

| Brandon Finn

Women's responsibilities and contributions to the American Revolution both blurred the distinctly gendered social norms and reaffirmed those activities simultaneously. Their historic efforts to the rebel cause have many times earned them a spot under the blanket term "Camp Follower." These women cooked, cleaned, assisted injured soldiers on the battlefield, raised morale, and made and laundered clothing within a few hundred yards of where the battle raged for eight years. The women camp followers of the American Revolution—wives, mothers, daughters, nurses, washerwoman, scavengers, and patriots—risked their safety and suffered the same hardships of the eighteenth-century soldier, therefore, deserve recognition in the discourse of the American Revolution. Women camp followers of the Continental Army, specifically the wives of the average foot soldiers, were vital to the overall success and eventual victory of Washington's Amy in 1783.¹ The daily activity and participation of these camp followers have been either marginalized or systematically ignored by historians since the nineteenth century, a practice labeled as "gender amnesia," but it is in their daily activities that camp followers proved their usefulness and importance to Washington's forces.²

In the decades before the American Revolution, the notion of separate spheres for men and women, public and private, were hardening as the notion of Republican virtue swept colonial North America. However, in the mid-1760s women were increasingly called upon by their husbands, fathers, and sons to serve in a political and very public manner. In the 1760s, the British government began leveling taxes in the form of the Stamp and Coercive Acts as a means of raising desperately needed funds. In their role as a consumer of British goods, women held an important position in eighteenth-century colonial society, one that significantly expanded their economic and political identities. In boycotting British goods after the introduction of taxes, especially

¹ There are many published definitions of camp follower, but for this paper camp follower is a person, primarily female, who stayed with the Continental Army permanently. They provided a service, or chore, that was paid for either with a small salary or with food provisions. This excludes women who came to visit family members temporarily or in winter quarters, and sutlers, cooks, and washerwomen who only provided services intermittently.

² Gender amnesia is the term Carol Berkin gives to the manner in which women have been written out of the historic discourse of the Revolutionary War since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Her discussion on gender amnesia can be found in the introduction of *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence*.

European made tea and cloth, “women became crucial participants in the first organized opposition to British policy.”³ In addition to boycotting British goods, colonial women spearheaded a movement in domestic production. Women of all classes and marital status’, although as Carol Berkin highlights, primarily single women of the upper-class, participated in homespun production through spinning bees.⁴ Women became the leading figures in the self-sufficiency campaign to end America’s subservience on British goods and services. Additionally, women organized and participated in food riots to protest the rising food costs in the colonies and displayed their political presence in published declarations that outlined their political support for their husbands, fathers, and other prominent men in the colonies. By 1775, women in North America became political actors in a way that was unrecognizable to many in the British colonies and in a manner that continued throughout the Revolutionary War.

Women camp followers of the American Revolution represented every social class in colonial North America. Each class played a significant, albeit very different, role during the eight-year conflict. Every woman confronted extreme hardship during the Revolution, but each remained diligently at work to fight for American independence. The most visible class of women during the American Revolution “represented the poorer elements of American society.”⁵ These were primarily the wives of General George Washington’s enlisted men and included the mothers and daughters of the soldiers. Most of the women from this class did not have the financial or familial resources to remain home during the conflict and were forced into the Continental Army camp community, which provided them with food, shelter, and protection. Other destitute women who were not married to Washington’s foot soldiers also found their way into camp as the war tore through and disrupted towns and villages all over the countryside. These women, the “poorer segments” of the Continental camp, made the largest impact on the Revolutionary War’s outcome.

³ Carol Berkin, *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence* (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 2005), 13.

⁴ Berkin highlights on page 18 of *Revolutionary Mothers* how it was primarily unmarried women from the more prosperous families in the colonies that took part in the spinning bees. Most married women could not spare the time to participate in the bees while raising their children, and women of the lower class could not spare their time or valuable resources to contribute to this public activity. But Berkin does mention that some of these class and economic concerns still did not stop some women in these socio-economic groups from contributing.

⁵ Holly A. Mayer, *Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and the Community during the American Revolution* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 122.

The “Ladies” of the Revolutionary War, the upper-class wives of General Washington’s officers, constitute the second most visible group in the Continental camps, although they acted in a very different capacity from those lower-class women.⁶ As mentioned, these women were primarily the wives of Washington’s officers, but they also included other relatives such as sisters, sisters-in-law, and family friends. Historians such as Paul Engle, Walter Blumenthal, and Sally Smith Booth have contributed to the notion that the ladies were camp followers in the traditional sense, meaning they participated in the same manner as those lower-class women.⁷ However, the majority of these women stayed only seasonally in the Continental camp, and even those who stayed for an extended period never participated in the camp’s working life, and thus, should not be considered camp followers in any manner. In reality, it would have been a shock to the Republican ideals of womanhood for an elite lady to wash, cook, or tend to the injured soldiers. Nevertheless, a few ladies did spend the majority of the war years with their husbands in camp. As Holly Mayer states, “Economics and social rank defined which officer’s wives were in camp, when, and for how long.”⁸ The wives of officers who owned property or who could stay with extended family only visited and stayed in camp during the winter months. However, the officers who held no property or those women who did not have family members to rely on entered camp on a more permanent basis. Although these women were bound by necessity to the Continental Army, they were not expected, nor did they perform the lower-class women’s domestic tasks.

The upper-class ladies flocked to the Continental camp during winter quarters, often falling sometime between November and May, to visit their loved ones and attend the social gatherings thrown by high society women like Martha Washington, Catherine Littlefield Greene, and Lucy Knox. During winter quarters at Middlebrook, New Jersey, for example, one writer for the *New Jersey Journal* attended a gala thrown by Lucy Knox, commenting that “the power of description is too languid to do justice to the whole of this grand entertainment.”⁹ The ladies of the Continental camp spent their days calling on each other, conversing over tea and light refreshments, and planning social events enjoyed by men

⁶ Lady or ladies is used to distinguish the women of the upper-class, including the officer’s wives and the officer’s female kin that came to camp only occasionally.

⁷ Paul Engle, *Women in the American Revolution* (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1976), 213–214; Sally Smith Booth, *The Women of '76* (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1973), 181; Walter Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia: George S. MacManus Company, 1952), 57–60.

⁸ Mayer, *Belonging to the Army*, 146.

⁹ Nancy K. Loane, *Following the Drum: Women at the Valley Forge Encampment* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 83.

and women alike. General Nathaniel Greene mentioned in a letter that “His Excellency and Mrs. Greene danced upwards of three hours without once sitting down” during one soiree at Valley Forge.¹⁰

Studies of the American Revolution often preserve the notion of Martha Washington as a virtuous Republican motherly figure who tended to her sick and injured “children” in camp; however, as Nancy Loane highlights, there is simply no evidence to support this narrative.¹¹ The ladies of the Continental camp community were never required, nor did they offer any support or service to the thousands of foot soldiers of the American Revolution like the lower-class women did. They certainly provided a symbolic and spiritual boost to Washington’s Army, but even then, only during the winter months.

Another group that has been falsely identified as Continental camp followers and wreaked havoc on ordinary camp followers’ reputations is prostitutes. Over the last two centuries, many prominent historians have reduced the colonial women’s role in the Revolutionary camps and military community to that of a prostitute. However, a tiny number of prostitutes ever plied their female trade in camp; and fewer, if any, ever belonged to the camp community and could be deemed a follower. In fact, historian Walther Blumenthal accurately highlights how prostitutes were much more common in British camps because British soldiers had the means of paying for that particular service.¹² American soldiers were rarely paid on time or in the amount they expected. When they were, they often supplemented the provisions provided by the Continental Army. The British Army, however, had regular pay and enough rations that allowed them to purchase the services offered by prostitutes.

Additionally, George Washington was cognizant of the venereal diseases that prostitutes carried and worried about his army’s welfare and fighting strength. On at least a few occasions, Washington had these women rounded up and examined by the camp doctor, with those deemed prostitutes after his inspection drummed out of camp during the “whores march.”¹³ Prostitutes certainly found their way into the Continental camp on occasion, primarily when the camp was located

¹⁰ Nathanael Greene, et al., *The Papers of Nathanael Greene* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Published for the Rhode Island Historical Society by the University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 62.

¹¹ For an excellent account of the “Myth of Martha Washington,” see Nancy K. Loane’s *Following the Drum: Women at the Valley Forge Encampment*. Specifically, the Appendix where she traces the origins of the “Myth of Martha Washington.” She is successful at showing when and by whom the myth originated and adds, “I would argue that the story belongs to the nineteenth century, not the eighteenth” (page 164).

¹² Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution*, 25-27.

¹³ Engle, *Women in the American Revolution*, 67.

near a large city. However, these women were never considered followers by the men and women and never traveled with the Continental Army.¹⁴

By far, the most visible group of camp followers, both in terms of numbers and importance to the outcome of the American Revolution, were the lower-class, often destitute, wives of the enlisted soldiers. Soon after hostilities began in 1775, thousands of men volunteered to join George Washington's ragtag army leaving their women in a precarious economic position. These men and their wives faced the prospects of traveling far from home, without certainty of when or if they would be paid, and when or if they would return home. The majority of the men leaving were small business owners and farmers, both groups who did not have money for their wives to live off while they fought for Washington. Thousands of women faced the prospects of their husbands dying in far off colonies, uncertain if their husbands would return or be able to send money home to pay for daily necessities. These circumstances left many women with only one option, accompanying their husbands in the war.

The first wave of female followers was refugees and was small, but "as the months and years went by, [a] considerable number [*sic*] joined their patriot men in the camps."¹⁵ As the war continued raging into the 1780s, more women whose husbands, fathers, and sons joined Washington's forces joined the camp community proving to be an indispensable aspect of the Revolutionary War effort. As historian Holly Mayer states, "Camp followers were necessary to the success and survival of the military, just as the military, in turn, was necessary to the success and survival of the fledgling nation."¹⁶ In the struggle for the survival of the United States, these women performed the daily chores so vital to Washington's force, and it was in these daily duties that they proved their weight to the American cause.

Women camp followers were forced to flee their economic woes at home, but that was not the only reason thousands of women joined the Continental camp community.¹⁷ As the war continued without

¹⁴ For an excellent account of the "myth of camp prostitutes," see Nancy K. Loane's *Following the Drum: Women at the Valley Forge Encampment*. Specifically, chapters seven, eight, and the appendix cover the development of this myth and how it grew in the nineteenth century.

¹⁵ Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution*, 58.

¹⁶ Mayer, *Belonging to the Army*, 2.

¹⁷ There is a large discrepancy in the numbers of women who followed the Continental Army. The numbers range from hundreds on the low end to three percent of total American men who served, roughly 6,000, and up to 20,000 on the higher end. For an excellent account of women who served as camp followers see, John U. Rees, "The

an end in sight, higher “numbers of American women were rendered homeless, as always in localities overrun by enemy troops.”¹⁸ Women who remained at home, both soldier’s wives and many others, were in a risky position; the threat of violence was always a reality for them. Eliza Wilkinson of South Carolina exemplifies the terror women felt when she wrote, the British “entered [her] house with drawn swords and pistols in their hands. . . uttering the most abusive language imaginable, and making as if they would hew us to pieces with their swords.”¹⁹ It was not just death that could befall women whose men were away. As the British Army advanced further into the colonies and away from the coasts, more women lived with the reality of being raped by British soldiers and officers alike. In a period when most women did not report sexual misdeeds, even during a period of peace, these women faced the thought of being sexually humiliated by British soldiers with no options for recourse. The *Pennsylvania Evening Post* printed an account of a rape committed by a British soldier in New Jersey, and although it may be a little inflated, it shows what women in this situation faced:

Besides the sixteen women who had fled to the woods to avoid their brutality and were seized and carried off . . . one man had the cruel mortification to have his wife and only daughter [a ten-year-old child] ravished . . . another girl of thirteen years of age was taken from her father’s house, carried to a barn about a mile, there ravished, and afterwards made use of by five more of these brutes.²⁰

The men of Washington’s Army could not protect their women from these terrors, and many, by threatening desertion, forced Washington to permit their women’s presence in camp. General Washington grumbled numerous times about the growing number of women camp followers, going so far as to write upwards of twenty general orders pertaining to the women. More specifically, he took issue with women of the lower class, who at times ignored orders, rode on wagons when instructed against the practice, mixed in with soldiers during marches, and generally did not present themselves in the manner a Republican woman should. Nevertheless, Washington understood that

Proportions of Women which ought to be allowed...’ An Overview of Continental Army Female Camp Followers,” *The Continental Soldier* 8, no. 3 (Spring 1995).

¹⁸ Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution*, 58.

¹⁹ Eliza Wilkinson (Eliza Yonge), and Caroline Howard Gilman, *Letter of Eliza Wilkinson, During the Invasion and Possession of Charleston, S.C.* (New York: S. Coleman, 1839), 39. Accessed on April 2, 2020.

<http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=loc.ark:/13960/t9862zb6j&view=1up&seq=45>

²⁰ George Bickham, “Extract of a letter from an officer of distinction in the American army,” Published by the order of the Council of Safety, *The Pennsylvania Evening Post*, December 28, 1776.

if he barred his soldier's wives and other kin from camp and "did not supply them with rations or a way to provide for themselves he would lose their husbands and fathers as soldiers."²¹ The women were a necessity in camp, even if only to keep their men there. Washington understood that the women were "absolutely necessary" because, without the women, his army would "lose by Desertion, perhaps to the Enemy, some of the oldest and best soldiers in the Service."²² Washington's officers established a quota system to limit the number of women in the camp, but it was never applied army-wide. The Continental army was forced into a position of acceptance when it came to the lower-class wives and kin of soldiers who "became so significant to its [the Continental Army's] success in war."²³ Their ability to keep their husbands and kin in the camp was just one of their many contributions to Washington's Army.

The camp followers had a several essential duties that they were required to perform to earn rations, shelter, and protection. One duty required of them was cooking and foraging for food to supplement the army's meager rations. Many times, camp followers provided the only hot meals the soldiers ate during the Revolution, going as far as putting their safety in harm's way to serve Washington's men. "Jacob Nagle recalled his anticipation of a fine breakfast that one of the soldiers' wives was cooking in 'the camp kettle on a small fire about 100 yards in the rear of the Grand Artillery,' and his dismay when an enemy cannonball... bowled through the kettle and its contents."²⁴ Men certainly cooked for themselves at times, but the women in the camp provided much the cooking for the troops. Most of the time, women took it upon themselves to feed the smaller units of men. Sarah Osborn recollects cooking for soldiers behind the American tents at Yorktown in the final days of the war, commenting that when the food finished cooking, she carried the "beef, and bread, and coffee (in a gallon pot) to the soldiers in the entrenchment."²⁵ The men could not fight an eight-year war against such an overwhelming foe without enough sustenance. The camp followers provided that sustenance by seeing to their men's

²¹ Mayer, *Belonging to the Army*, 14.

²² George Washington, *George Washington Papers*, Series 4, General Correspondence: George Washington to Robert Morris. 1783. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mgw433425/>.

²³ Mayer, *Belonging to the Army*, 12.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 140.

²⁵ Sarah Osborn, *Application for Revolutionary War Pension*, Record Group 15, Records of the Veterans Administration, National Archives, Washington D.C.; in John C. Dann, ed., *The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War for Independence* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 244-249.

full bellies, blurring the lines between their traditional roles as women and military service.

In addition to cooking, women proved to be valuable scavengers. The Continental Army, and the United States, for that matter, were young creations. Washington had trouble providing the daily necessities that men in the army needed, stating in 1783, “The Army, as usual, are without pay; and a great part of the soldiery without shirt,” and Baron von Steuben writing, “The men were literally naked” and how he “saw officers mounting guard in sort of dressing gown made of an old blanket or bed cover.”²⁶ Uniforms and weapons were slow coming and were in tatters within weeks. The rations were rarely enough to fill a child’s stomach, let alone sustaining a force of thousands of men, women, and livestock. These conditions left women responsible for foraging for additional food and left them responsible for searching the field at that day’s battle in search of weapons and clothing for themselves and their men. The camp followers kept themselves and Washington’s soldiers clothed and fed as the Army struggled for resources.

The camp followers of the Continental Army proved beneficial to Washington by keeping his camps and his soldiers clean and respectable. As washerwomen, the female camp followers provided a service of utmost importance to life in an eighteenth-century military encampment. “Dirty uniforms were a pressing problem in every regiment . . . To accommodate their troops, American [sic] armies required camp followers to serve as washerwoman for both officers and enlisted men.”²⁷ Commanders at West Point, New York, in 1780, established the following practices: “the following Prices be paid for Washing; to the Women, who draw provisions, with their respective Companies; For a Shirt two Shillings; Woolen Breeches, Vest, and Overalls, two shillings, each; Linen Vest, & Breeches, one Shilling, each; Linen Overalls, one Shilling & Sic Pence, each; Stock, Stockings, & Handkerchief, Six Pence, each; The Women who wash for their Companies, will observe these regulations.”²⁸ Women could supplement their husband’s low and often missing pay while helping Washington’s forces appear more presentable. Keeping a professional appearance was extremely important during a period when Washington was courting professional European military alliances. Besides washing and mending

²⁶ George Washington, *George Washington Papers*, Series 4, General Correspondence: George Washington to John Armstrong. 1783. Manuscript/Mixed Material.
<http://www.loc.gov/item/mgw433295/>; and Mayer, *Belonging to the Army*, 157.

²⁷ Berkin, *Revolutionary Mothers*, 56.

²⁸ John U. Rees, “‘The proportions of Women which ought to be allowed....’ An Overview of Continental Army Female Camp Followers,” *The Continental Soldier* 8, no.3 (Spring 1995), pp. 51-58, at p. 5; Charles K. Bolton, *The Private Soldier Under Washington* (Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1976), 178-179.

uniforms, the lower-class women camp followers kept the parade grounds clean and clear of waste, leading to fewer disease outbreaks among the soldiers and a cleaner living environment.²⁹ More than either of these, the women gave General Washington's Army a sense of respectability, not on a military level, but a professional level. His camp was relatively clean and free from disease, especially in the later years, his soldiers were clean and decently fed, and their uniforms were constantly washed and mended. In this way, the sometimes-disorderly women were necessary, a useful tool that made his men appear as professionals, highly influential in providing legitimacy for Washington's Army.

The most common official role for women in the Continental camp was that of a nurse. Women camp followers who were employed as nurses were vital to the war effort because they freed men from this service who added numbers to Washington's military force. Washington said as much when noting if women camp followers could not be found to take on these duties, the army would be "under [the] necessity of substituting in their place a number of men from the respective Regiments," who would be "entirely lost in the proper line of their duty."³⁰ In addition to the limited medical help they provided to the sick and wounded soldiers, as Linda Kerber clarifies, the role of Revolutionary War nurse was close to "the modern orderly," the women were vital to the war effort in providing services that freed up men to fight.³¹ This is why at the outset of the war, "Washington had begged for premium pay for nurses."³² The women who filled the role of nurse for Washington, the lower segments of camp, were able to contribute to the military structure of the new United States while supplementing their husband's poor pay, even though their pay was just as limited. Furthermore, the camp followers embedded themselves with the structure of the military apparatus by nursing, cooking, and cleaning for General Washington. For women who before the war had no public identity, their contributions to the Continental Army made them active participants in the political and public sphere of warfare.

It was not just in nursing, where women made an impact on the military of General Washington. Camp followers spent countless nights helping their men "make musket balls of their pewter dishes and molten

²⁹ Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 48-50.

³⁰ George Washington, *George Washington Papers, Series 3, Varick Transcripts, 1775 to 1785, Subseries 3a, Continental Congress, 1775 to 1783, Letter book 2: September 14, 1776*. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <http://www.loc.gov/item/mgw3a.002>.

³¹ Kerber, *Women of the Republic*, 59.

³² *Ibid.*, 59-60.

pellets of the leaden statues of Royal George” and wrapping their cartridges for the following days battle.³³ Women camp followers further inserted themselves in the military structure by taking up arms. Women like Mary Ludwig Hays, Margaret Corbin, and Deborah Sampson, the latter two earning military pensions for their service during the Revolution, and hundreds of others participated in direct battle, eliminating any notion that women were non-political actors during this period. They fired cannons and muskets when their husbands fell with injuries and distinguished themselves for the bravery they held in the face of death. Women in the eighteenth century did not have a public identity under the established gender norms of coverture. However, by the 1760s and 1770s, women were expanding their public personas by taking part in political acts like boycotting and publishing treaties, and many women continued acting in the public sphere for the duration of the war. If we reconsider the process by which women acted in a political and public manner during the Revolution, it provides historians with the foundation for reconceptualizing the broader history of women’s public self in the late eighteenth century. The women who followed the Continental Army took part in all aspects of the public sphere, and their behaviors and actions were politically charged, but they risked their lives only to be marginalized by nineteenth and twentieth-century historians.

The thousands of women who made their homes in the continually moving Continental Camp, sometimes for as long as eight years, proved valuable to the American victory over the British. They cooked, cleaned, nursed, and fought for themselves and their husbands, but they had an additional role among the men in camp. By their presence in the camp, both the lower- and upper-class women raised the morale of Washington’s foot soldiers, his officers, and himself. They loved and cared for their men, many birthing the next generation of Republican men right in camp. Camp followers provided a sense of regularity during a very irregular time. The spirit of the men who fought and died for the rebel cause was certainly lifted by women providing traditionally gendered services. They turned the humdrum of camp life into a thriving community that only grew stronger as the years passed. They plied their services in the heat and the cold, soaked in blood and tears, became patriots who helped create the military structure and kept it secure, and they earned recognition for their sacrifices that have often been marginalized or ignored altogether.

³³ Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution*, 57.

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CALIFORNIA: RECONSTRUCTION, RACE, AND RELIGION

| Kayla Nicole Brown

Historically, the Reconstruction Era has been viewed in binary racial and political perspectives—whites vs. non-whites, republicans vs. democrats. California, on the other hand, cannot be viewed through this simplistic paradigm. Uniquely a western treasure, California’s history of race relations is as unique as the state itself. Few historians have toiled specifically in understanding California’s history during Reconstruction, and while this paper will illuminate the struggles of understanding race in California history, it by no means is a grand conclusion. Rather, it is a beginning. Race, religion, and reconstruction in California was not a simple “us vs. them” ideology but rather a ladder through which the races moved up and down the proverbial rungs.

The limitation of freedom and equality to only former African slaves does injustice to the social reforms that were sweeping through the United States during Post-Civil War America. An untold story of Reconstruction lies thousands of miles from the famous battlefields of the Civil War and the marble halls of Congress. Reconstruction in California uniquely deviated from the eastern experience where simplistic racial prejudices were exasperated in entrenched ideologies either based on skin color or immigration patterns. California had only become a state in 1850, making most of its population emigrants and boasting a minority population of 1% African descendants and 10% Chinese in the 1860 census.¹ Reconstruction, the amendments passed, and the concept of equality meant far more than the Negro question. In short, California “exploded dichotomous, binary conceptions of both race and labor and forced delegates to embrace new categories—like ‘peon’—and attach new meanings to old categories—like ‘slave.’”²

CALIFORNIA: STATEHOOD AND CIVIL WAR

The “Golden State’s” diversity owes much of its experience to the many transitions of power. Prior to exploration and colonization, there were a plethora of Native American tribes in what would become California. After exploration, California was ruled and colonized by the Spanish who struggled with the ability to command the whole territory. When Mexico gained their independence from Spain their problems

¹ Eugene H. Berwanger, *The West and Reconstruction* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1981), 23.

² Stacey L. Smith, *Freedom’s Frontier: California and the Struggle Over Unfree Labor, Emancipation, and Reconstruction* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 16.

continued. The missions hemorrhaged life among the Native American populations due to disease and harsh conditions. The feuds between the Californios (Southern California), Mexicans (Mexico), and immigrants (Northern California) exasperated. J.M. Guinn, who founded the Historical Society of Southern California,³ summarized this complexity when he wrote on “the feud between the arribenos and the abajenos” and their loss “to the sons of the soil, to the hijos del pais” and that “under its new master California became the bone of contention between the North and South.”⁴

While the Compromise of 1850 admitted California as a single state, California soon found itself in political turmoil with the question of state division in part due to the sheer size of the state itself but also due to a culture war between the agrarian societies of Southern California and the mining societies of Northern California. In September of 1859, the southern counties of California voted overwhelmingly to break the state into no less than two states by a total of 2,477 for and 828 against.⁵ This desire for separation culminated with what was called The Pico Act of 1859 which eventually passed both houses of the state legislature. Congress ignored the Pico Act altogether, setting a precedence of the majority overruling minority self-determination which southerners would see turned on them with the lack of recognition of the Confederacy in 1861.⁶ Patrick Henry himself stated in June 5, 1788, “When has the oppressor let go of the oppressed? Was there ever an instance? Can the annals of mankind exhibit one single example, where rulers overcharged with power, willingly let go of the oppressed, though solicited and requested most earnestly?”⁷ He spoke about King George and Parliament, but the words rang true to Californians in 1859. They would later ring true during the bloody years of Civil War and the Reconstruction that followed. Where former slaves wanted freedom and

³ Elva E. Murray, “The Work of a Southern California Historian,” *Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California* 10, no. 3 (1917), accessed March 24, 2021, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41168749>.

⁴ J.M. Guinn, “How California Escaped State Division,” *Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California* 6, no 3 (1905): 225, accessed February 4, 2014, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41168593>.

⁵ Guinn, *California Escaped State Division*, 225.

⁶ Marion Fisher Murphy, *Seven Stars for California* (Sonoma, CA: Sonoma Print Shop, 1979), 62. She also stated that “The long-standing schism in California, which had been initiated by the rivalry between Los Angeles and Monterey for the capital, had been intensified by the Gold Rush. Southern California felt that its interests were being sadly neglected by a Legislature heavily dominated by northern members. As for the northerners, they felt that they would be just as happy without southern California to worry about.”

⁷ Ralph Ketcham, ed., *The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates* (New York, NY: Signet Classics, 1986), 208

equality, the people of California were fighting for regional identity and this “movement for the division of California in the first decade of the state’s history was a part of this struggle known as sectionalism.”⁸ Sectionalism was, and continues to be, a major aspect of California history and one that plays through Reconstruction as well with the debate of federal vs. state power and delegation of that power.

Despite being ignored, Californians overwhelmingly supported the Union cause as evidenced by newspaper articles of the time so that “by 1861, loyalty to the Union had superseded slavery as the vital issue before the state.”⁹ This was further exhibited by the election of the staunch Unionist, Leland Stanford, to California’s governorship with 49% of the votes in a three-way runoff.¹⁰

Though California sent men to fight in the Civil War, support for the war was not predominantly in blood or sweat but rather in treasure. It is estimated that “an average of \$1 million left on every steamer that went east,” and “at the apogee of the gold and silver shipments in 1864, the precious metals portaged over the Panamanian Isthmus to ports on the East Coast amounted to \$46 million.”¹¹ This sum would likely have been much greater if the transcontinental railroad been completed. Even so, connecting California to the east was vital during the war years to continue support for the war with ongoing communication about the armies in the east. That connection came from the establishment of the pony express, the completion of the transcontinental telegraphy line to San Francisco, and the signing of the bill for the construction of the railroad to the Pacific.¹² Each of these things connected Californians to a war which had little bearing on their current conditions in the west, and, arguably without them, the support for the war would have diminished quickly. Congress authorized a second congressional act in 1864 and between the two, the Union Pacific

⁸ William Henry Ellison, “The Movement for State Division in California, 1849-1860,” *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (October 1913): 101, accessed January 27, 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30234593>.

⁹ Agnes Arthur, “The Attitude of California toward Reconstruction between 1865 and 1871,” PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1927, 7, accessed September 8, 2019, <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/16435957>.

¹⁰ Winfield J. Davis, *History of Political Conventions in California, 1849-1892* (Sacramento, CA: Publications of the California State Library, 1893), 180, accessed October 12, 2019, <https://archive.org/details/politicalconventions00davirich>.

¹¹ Nicholas Sean Hall, “This Strange and Distant Land: Isolation, Problem Groups, and the Incorporation of California, 1846-1882,” PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2012, 104, accessed September 9, 2019, <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/12890657574>.

¹² Arthur, *Attitude of California*, 30.

and Central Pacific Companies were chartered which stimulated growth and helped to solidify California's support for the Union.¹³

Like the arribenos and abajenos¹⁴ during the Mexican era, the placement of a state capital in California was a hotly debated topic and one settled by eastern money and geography. Seven different capitals have existed in California history—three during the Spanish and Mexican Regimes and four after the Americans took over in 1846: Monterey (1774-1849), San Jose (1849-1851), Vallejo (1852-1853), Benicia (1853-1854), Sacramento (1852-1861), San Francisco (1861-1862), and then Sacramento again from (1863-Present).^{15 16} Sacramento solidified its position through the transcontinental railroad which would invariably connect not only the area of California with the rest of the nation but also politics during the Reconstruction Era.

However, as time passed, this public-private partnership would open the door to corruption and unease as “the Southern Pacific Railroad that controlled shipping and owned 11.5 percent of the entire state was a concentration of feudal power unmatched anywhere in the nation,” and it was ultimately this success that doomed public opinion.¹⁷ The railroads became viewed as a powerful corporation, independent from oversight, and beholden to no one except for their own interests which did not rest with the population groups that were currently residing in California.¹⁸

RECONSTRUCTION IN THE WEST

The west was not immune to the Civil War despite being thousands of miles from any major engagement. The sympathies of those residing in California came with them when they emigrated. These emigrants also left family back in the east when they came. Of those that came from the south, “The more fervent Confederate sympathizers joined the Knights of the Golden Circle” and “by the outbreak of war in 1861 the Knights of the Golden Circle was firmly established in California and was believed to have a membership of sixteen

¹³ Robert W. Patrick, *The Reconstruction of the Nation* (New York: NY, Oxford University Press, 1967), 219.

¹⁴ For more information on the arribenos vs. abajenos, see Professor Marissa Lopez’s blog at: <https://mklopez.humanspace.ucla.edu/seeing-the-past/socal-vs-norcal-the-mexican-history-of-californias-existential-crisis/>.

¹⁵ Murphy, *Seven Stars*, 6.

¹⁶ Sacramento was severely flooded by torrential rains in 1861 and 1862. The capital was moved during this time and a massive city project was undertaken to raise the city above the water level and to also create an underground framework for water runoff.

¹⁷ Walter A. McDougall, *Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era, 1829-1877* (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008), 323.

¹⁸ Theodore H. Hittell, *History of California* (San Francisco, CA: N.J. Stone and Company, 1898), 4: 496.

thousand.”¹⁹ Agnes Arthur, a Ph.D. student whose dissertation was published in 1927, suggests that the “Knights of the Golden Circle” and the “Knights of the Columbian Star” had close to 50,000 men under their control.²⁰ However, accurate numbers of those who had southern leanings, those who outright supported the Confederate cause, and those who actively engaged in insurrection in the State of California may never be known though “approximately one-third of the eastern-born white population had come from the slave states.”²¹ This lack of information is partly due to the fact that “the west has been accorded so little importance in Reconstruction politics.”²² It has been the “novelist and the script writer rather than the historian who have popularized western history,” and by doing so have created the personification of the Wild West with little care for eastern politics and social graces.²³

But California during this time was in fact “a transnational space” where “free-state northerners and slaveholding southerners replicated familiar systems of waged labor and slavery in the region.”²⁴ In essence, Californians had taken both northern and southern labor systems and married them to existing Spanish and Mexican traditions to form a uniquely south-western experience that transcended the Democrat/Republican divide. This mutation began the concept of an east/west divide where Republican views of the federal-state and territorial relations would have implications for the whole nation. Federal interference would not simply be limited to the geographical south as punishment for their insurrection, but rather would be a shift of power to a central government to use at their discretion even against a state or territory’s wishes.²⁵ This was a concept Californians at large did not support.

The Republicans in California tended to be less radical than those in the east. “Unlike true radicals who extolled suffrage as an inviolate human right, most western Republicans more quietly accepted equal suffrage in the South as the necessary vehicle by which freedmen might protect themselves from abuse.”²⁶ This was a popular differentiation as Republicans became divided in their methods of Reconstruction starting in 1869, and in California from the onset of Reconstruction itself. While Californians overwhelmingly supported

¹⁹ John, Boessenecker, *Badge and Buckshot: Lawlessness in Old California* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 133.

²⁰ Arthur, *Attitude of California*, 22-23.

²¹ Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 21.

²² Ibid., 7.

²³ Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 8.

²⁴ Smith, *Freedom's Frontier*, 17.

²⁵ Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 10.

²⁶ Ibid., 112.

freedom, “many white westerners who advocated equal suffrage for blacks in the South had no desire to extend the same generosity to blacks elsewhere in the nation.”²⁷ Even in the north where Radical Republicans had the strongest foothold, the “northern states wished to retain their own suffrage qualifications.”²⁸

Californians identified with northerners even during the Reconstruction Era. They did, however, tend to support President Johnson even through the Impeachment hearings as they saw the hearings as being petty when so much else needed to be done. While not all Johnson policies were supported, the west was not as concerned with his summary use of removing officials from office because “Johnson chose to appoint more inhabitants from within the territories themselves than had any previous president. Such deference pleased westerners, for they had long disliked eastern politicians being imposed as their leadership from Washington D.C.”²⁹ Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Act was also widely supported, because while “they sympathized with the plight of the freedmen, they were uneasy about its implications for the local Asian population.”³⁰

Even with favorable appointments and general support for Reconstruction, “by 1870 western representatives in Washington were among the most vocal advocates for ending Reconstruction.”³¹ As evidenced by voting patterns, speeches, and newspaper articles of the time, it can be assumed that many Californians had openly condemned secession and the peculiar institution. They supported the desire for the federal government to reestablish control over the former Confederacy, and they wanted to protect the rights of the freedmen. As Reconstruction progressed, however, Californians began to pull back their support. Radicals grew more powerful in Congress, and, because of that “...white Californians turned against Reconstruction and began to actively oppose it both at home, and through their elected representatives in Washington D.C.”³² To summarize their displeasure with Reconstruction and eastern politics, westerners were simply tired of so much time spent on the south and for African Americans. Specifically, they saw too many pieces of coercive legislation and as early as “1868 a number of westerners were

²⁷ Ibid., 250.

²⁸ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877*, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 2014), 447.

²⁹ Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 92.

³⁰ Ibid., 63.

³¹ Ibid., 240.

³² Donald Michael Bottoms Jr., “An Aristocracy of Color: Race and Reconstruction in Post-Gold Rush California,” PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2005, 17-18, accessed September 8, 2019, <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/305002431>.

complaining about the lack of federally sponsored improvements in the West, and they found their culprit in Reconstruction.”³³

THE THIRTEENTH, FOURTEENTH, AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS

Californians initially supported Reconstruction but quickly realized that the Radical Republicans would not stop at the south, and they meant to make sweeping changes not unlike those who supported the new Constitution in 1787 rather than the Confederation. Rebuilding the south was necessary following the American Civil War and constitutional provisions would be vital now that African Americans were no longer slaves, but California saw that “what happened in the South was by no means a matter of minor import, diminished by distance... [they] recognized from the beginning that Congressional efforts to rebuild the South might reach into their lives as well,”³⁴ and while Californians had been Unionists throughout the war, they felt distinct concern that a centralized government would erode state’s rights not only in the states that attempted to destroy the Union but also in those that had remained loyal.³⁵ Californians chaffed under this yoke.

The Thirteenth Amendment which prohibited slavery in the United States was generally viewed in California as the “natural outcome of the war, for the press, either democratic or republican, said very little about it”³⁶ in the papers. Further, the Thirteenth Amendment did not affect Californians in any grand way as slavery was already illegal as part of the Compromise of 1850. However, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would show the rebellious, prejudiced, and independent streak of Californians. Suffrage had long been denied to African Americans and equality was a word rarely even contemplated let alone uttered. Even among the freedom-loving westerners, their views were stilted with cultural influences and laced with prejudice developed from pseudo-science religious overtones. Some Republicans tried to soften the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, by arguing that the extension of equal suffrage to the South “would never be imposed in the states which had remained loyal during the war. Without specifically saying so, they implied that black suffrage was a form of punishment for southern whites.”³⁷

California dismissed the argument and, in turn, voted against the Fourteenth Amendment in February of 1868. The Fifteenth

³³ Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 247.

³⁴ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 77-78.

³⁵ Ibid., 90.

³⁶ Arthur, *Attitude of California*, 85.

³⁷ Ibid., 128.

Amendment fared no better when California voted eighty-one to sixteen to reject it as well. This break with Republicans in the east came not from a disdain for the African Americans but rather objection to the application of the amendments to the Chinese and the Native Americans in California. “California’s racial diversity had driven whites to align themselves, at least in terms of racial ideology, more closely with the South than with their former Union allies” and in a turn of irony, “California stood as the most ‘unreconstructed’ state.”³⁸ Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, in his book *The Anti-Chinese Movement in California*,³⁹ examines the era not in terms of whites against blacks but instead as an anti-Chinese movement and concludes that Democrats strongly condemned the Fifteenth Amendment on the grounds of opposition to Chinese citizenship and that both houses of the legislature rejecting the Fifteenth Amendment by large majorities was not surprising in light of this.⁴⁰

California’s ladder of racial hierarchy complicated matters beyond a simple anti-black or anti-Chinese designation especially with how each race could move up or down on the ladder dependent upon local politics and legislative action. The demographics of California were well summarized by California State Senator, John S. Hager, when he said that “we not only have the negro, but the Digger Indian, the Kanaka, the New Zealander, the Lascar, and the Chinese.”⁴¹ The Mexican Americans were left off this list because of the 1854 State Supreme Court Case *People v. Hall* which labeled Mexican Americans as white under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

California Democrats were particularly wound up with the phrase ‘previous condition of servitude’ in the Fifteenth Amendment because they believed that this could very well be applied to the Asians under coolieism. In the end, the Democratic campaign was more than successful in California. Not only had the Fifteenth Amendment been rejected by Californians, but the “depictions of slavish Chinese laborers, overreaching capitalistic masters, tyrannical woman traffickers, and brutalized Chinese women, [would] resonate with white voters” across

³⁸ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 120.

³⁹ Roger Daniels, in a forward to the book, wrote that “Sandmeyer’s book...was the first modern account of an important episode in the development of organized racism in the far western United States.” The University of Illinois Press writes that “this book was the first objective study of the anti-Chinese movement in the Far West...Some historians of the Asian American experience consider it to be, more than a half century, later, the most satisfactory work on the subject.”

⁴⁰ Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer, *The Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 46.

⁴¹ Joshua Paddison, *American Heathens: Religion, Race, and Reconstruction in California* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2012), 11, accessed September 11, 2019, <https://hdl.handle.net.ezproxy2.apus.edu/2027/heb.33063>.

the United States in the anti-Chinese campaigns of the 1870s and 1880s.⁴²

RACE AND RELIGION IN CALIFORNIA

Race and religion had an incestuous relationship in Victorian America because the two were often intertwined culturally. These cultural and religious dynamics allowed Antebellum Americans to both justify slavery and condemn it depending on which side of the Mason Dixon you resided. To further evidence that religious persons were doing as instructed in the Bible, those who bore prejudice to “inferior” and often “heathen” races, justified those prejudices through science which has since been thoroughly debunked and rightfully ignored. However, it was “during the years between the American Revolution and the Civil War, the varieties of Christianity that proliferated in the expanding United States responded in polarized ways to the increasingly entrenched and scientifically supported idea of race.”⁴³ Concepts such as Craniometry, Phrenology, and Darwinianism played important roles regarding race, and “racial prejudice in the nineteenth century was open, it was public, and its tenets held as commonly accepted truths.”⁴⁴ However, unlike the east, California’s diverse economy held far more depth than a traditional white vs. non-white argument where each race was paid and given freedoms according to their status on the hierarchical ladder. Race, religion, and even wages intertwined in California where terms used described a status similar to the bondage labor of American slaves.⁴⁵ This stratum of race permeated the political and social lives of Californians for which race was not simply white vs. non-white but instead a gradation of color. A local California paper at the time, *The Chronicle* observed that “there are classes for whom we have a stronger repugnance than Negroes.”⁴⁶ These classes were uniquely Californian where “antipeonism and anticoolieism quickly evolved into languages of race, gender, nation, and empire. The construction of Latino and Chinese laborers as unfree and degraded shored up racial boundaries around citizenship and helped to define both the nation and its citizenry

⁴² Paddison, *American Heathens*, 213.

⁴³ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁴ Jay Martin Perry, “The Chinese Question: California, British Columbia, and the Making of Transnational Immigration Policy, 1847-1885,” PhD diss., Graduate College of Bowling Green State University, 2014, 60, accessed September 10, 2019, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=bgsul1394761542&disposition=inline.

⁴⁵ David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, rev. ed. (New York, NY: Verso, 2000) 72. He expounded on terms such as “white slavery” and “slave wages.”

⁴⁶ Paddison, *American Heathens*, 46.

as white.”⁴⁷ It was the duty of the races labeled non-white to prove their whiteness through integration into American traditions such as clothing, language, and especially religion. The three that struggled for this identity during Reconstruction were the African Americans, the Native Americans, and the Chinese.

The leading accomplishment of the American Civil War was without a doubt the ending of slavery in America, but while “the war had liberated the slave...it became clear during Reconstruction that emancipation in itself provided no guarantee of humane treatment.”⁴⁸ California was more insulated from the violence of the KKK until closer to the turn of the nineteenth century. One of the major reasons for this was the lack of African Americans in the state itself. Even during the economic downturn of the 1870s, African Americans did not frequently move to California since they traditionally migrated to the north where industry jobs were available. However, those freedmen that were in California attempted to separate their race from the other non-white races by assigning “themselves a rank, if not equal to whites, then at least one higher than the Chinese [and Indian]” since California law in the 1850s and 1860s had classified the Chinese the same as the Native Americans.⁴⁹ The most notable example of this also came down from *People v. Hall* (1854) which amended Section 14 of the Act concerning Crime and Punishment originally passed in 1850. The ruling did not allow for non-whites to testify against whites in court, and it would not be until 1873 when this provision was invalidated.

In African American publications such as the *Elevator* and the *Pacific Appeal* the Chinese were demonized by the writers and editors in order to provide evidence that African Americans were not in favor of the Chinese.⁵⁰ When Congress discussed federal Reconstruction legislation, “black Californians...repeatedly and specifically limited Reconstruction’s beneficence to themselves” in order to receive approval from California’s legislature.⁵¹ Further study is important because “racial histories...do not explore the manner in which each non-white group understood and sought to define its place in California...Social histories of race in nineteenth century California actually recapitulate the binary racial relationships that California’s very racial diversity was in the process of dismantling.”⁵² Because African Americans had been Americanized through generational bondage, they wanted to separate

⁴⁷ Smith, *Freedom’s Frontier*, 81.

⁴⁸ Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 3.

⁴⁹ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 57-58.

⁵⁰ Paddison, *American Heathens*, 21.

⁵¹ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 155-156.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 15.

themselves from the “heathen” which would have been the Native American and the Chinese. As previously stated, the Mexican Americans were viewed as whites during this time, but that did not insulate them from struggles of their own. Their predominantly Catholic background allowed religious whites to be more forgiving of any cultural or language differences. Native Americans struggled immensely during this time and cannot be generally summarized because of the diversity of their tribes, geographical locations, and religious customs of their own. The Chinese, being the newest of the immigrants, were the easiest to define as the “other” and because of their lack of diversity throughout the United States they were easily painted in terms that they could not refute effectively.

The Chinese people in California were temporary slave labor and the competition between free and slave wages were a topic of contention. The Chinese historically had a lower standard of living and because of the economic, political, and social problems occurring in China at the time, they were willing to live in subpar housing and work in miserly working conditions.⁵³ Their European descended contemporaries, however, would not. In this way, race took on more than simple a notion of skin color. The “definition of race is expanded...to subsume customs, and habits, including standards of living.”⁵⁴ Because the Chinese had overcome adversity in their home country, traveled to America, and were willing to live and work in horrendous conditions, they were discriminated against. They were looked down on because it was assumed that they knew no better, could do no better, and were no better.

This animosity toward the Chinese began as soon as they arrived in California. Epidemics, job shortages, social diseases, and even fires were blamed on the Chinese and this caused a slow burning distrust of them as an immigrant group. This distrust bubbled at the surface until it exploded during Reconstruction. Democrats in general grumbled about the next step in the Republican agenda for Reconstruction, and California Democrat Franklin E. Felton minced no words when he said that Republicans “pretend affection for the black man...might soon seek to elevate and enfranchise [the] saffron hued Chinaman.”⁵⁵ Unlike Africans who had been assimilating into American culture, the perceived

⁵³ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 29-30.

⁵⁴ Patricia E. Roy, *A White Man's Province: British Columbia and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1917*(Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1989), VIII.

⁵⁵ Douglas R. Egerton, *The Wars of Reconstruction: A Brief, Violent History of America's Most Progressive Era* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2014), 219.

unwillingness of the Chinese to adopt American customs differentiated these two races.

This argument is fallacious though because the culture of the time created a vicious circle for Chinese immigrants, and this circle was perpetuated most willingly by state legislators and, later, federal congressmen. California had laws regarding anti-miscegenation and interracial marriage which confined the Chinese culture to the Chinese only. Wages were low because of their immigration status which limited their housing options. Few spoke English because of the nature of their employment contracts, and the two cultures had little in common otherwise. The Chinese were culturally ostracized, and in 1876 when California launched a Senate investigation regarding the mass migration Chinese into California, the question posed by Senator Pierson was whether the Chinese “have any particular love for our institutions?” The reply was that “the very fact of their retaining their own dress and customs, and keeping themselves so entirely separate as a people, shows that they have not.”⁵⁶

The lack of assimilation, however, was a two-way street, and the Chinese residents of California were not afforded the ability to assimilate due to the racial tensions brewing. “Chinatowns served as places where Chinese immigrants could find community and belonging, familiar institutions, and protection,” but the inhabitants of the Pacific Coast utilized these Chinatowns to keep the “Chinese society separate while providing circumstantial evidence confirming Chinese inferiority.”⁵⁷ This constant affirming of Chinese inferiority was no different than what had happened in the decades prior to Reconstruction regarding the racial inferiority of the African Americans and the Native Americans. This inferiority, once accepted as a fact on a social level, no longer fell into generic policy but turned to law passed by the legislature. These laws varied from taxes to migration, and for the Chinese, it would be immigration laws that were the longest running reminder of their subservience.⁵⁸ The working white population saw the Chinese as a threat and was instrumental in the proliferation of this anti-Chinese sentiment. In fact, working whites “based their national, racial, and class identity on their opposition to the Chinese” and Sinophobia. They often

⁵⁶ California State Senate, “Proceedings of the Commission,” in *Chinese Immigration: The Social, Moral, and Political Effect* (Sacramento, CA: State Office, 1878), 42.

⁵⁷ Perry, *Transnational Immigration Policy*, 72.

⁵⁸ Adam M. McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008), 126, states that “the 1852 miner’s tax accounted for nearly a quarter of state revenue up to 1870.” The U.S. circuit court eventually voided California’s foreign miner’s tax in 1871 and then guaranteed Chinese residents the rights to testify in court against whites—a right that African Americans had won in the state almost a decade before.

complained openly and loudly about threats to job security, living standards, and wages.⁵⁹

As the Radical Republicans in the east fought for the freedmen, California launched a campaign against the Chinese. The naturalization of the Chinese was a major issue in the 1867 campaign season and would worsen with the rise of the Workingmen's Party. Even when Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1870, it allowed citizenship for "African nativity and to person of African descent" but was not amended to include the Chinese because it would alter the voting demographics too much on the Pacific coast.⁶⁰ The exclusion of the Chinese was a priority for both Democrats and Republicans in California.⁶¹ "In a very real sense the year 1876 marked a crisis in the anti-Chinese agitation in California."⁶² This agitation reached the east coast quickly and "in 1882 the Congress of the United States voted overwhelming to close America's borders to any further Chinese immigration, and to exclude any Chinese residing in the United States from the benefits of American citizenship."⁶³ The prolonged campaigns of Anti-Chinese propaganda had finally succeeded and lowered the status of the Chinese below all other racial groups in California.

It was power that drove this need for exclusion. The Africans Americans to the south was what the Chinese were to California.⁶⁴ Some in the east saw this and spoke out against it similarly to the abolitionists prior to the Civil War. Others saw the injustice but did nothing. In truth, however, the Chinese question paralleled the Negro question, and "just as surely as national Reconstruction policy reached west to remake California's racial order, California's peculiar amalgamation of anti-Chinese and antislavery arguments stretched east to shape the contours of national racial policy in the 1870s and beyond."⁶⁵

The South trampled on the African Americans, westerners trampled on the Chinese, and all the while, the Native Americans in California had suffered under every government that set foot in California. With the missions of Spain, the peonage system of Mexico, and the removal policy of the United States, California politicians actually enjoyed relative peace during the Reconstruction era as the "the

⁵⁹ David Grouter, "Drawing Different Lines of Color: The Mainstream English Canadian Labour Movement's Approach to Blacks and the Chinese, 1880-1914" *Labor* 2, no 1 (Spring 2005), 57, accessed October 8, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1215/154767152-1-55>.

⁶⁰ Government of the United States of America, *Naturalization Act of 1870*, 16 Stat. 254.

⁶¹ Smith, *Freedom's Frontier*, 223.

⁶² Sandmeyer, *Anti-Chinese Movement in California*, 57.

⁶³ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 1.

⁶⁴ Earl Pomeroy, *The Pacific Slope: A History of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada* (1965; reprint, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 266.

⁶⁵ Smith, *Freedom's Frontier*, 229.

violent campaigns of the 1850s had killed, scattered, or driven into hiding most of those Indian groups not placed on reservations.”⁶⁶ The Native Americans being relegated to the reservations or outcasts could have a profound influence on the lack of conflict between Native Americans and the Chinese in particular.

The actions taken against the Native American tribes as well as the Chinese and African Americans in California were due in part to religious overtones. Indians and Chinese especially were “religious outsiders, unprotected and scorned by Republicans and Democrats alike,”⁶⁷ and the notion of suffrage for men of these groups was greatly frowned upon as it was “heathenism that rendered a man unfit for suffrage.”⁶⁸ Until those who were non-white could prove their whiteness, they would be shut out.

While Californians supported the Union during the Civil War, their lack of radicalism in the post-war years led to their withdrawing of support for Reconstruction. They did not support the infringement of states’ rights by the Radical Republican Congress and the encroachment of federal authority into California politics.

Californians found themselves in an interesting predicament as they desired freedom for the slaves of the south, resented the slaves of the north, and ignored the slaves of the west. In essence, California was a moralist without conviction. They, like many of their counterparts in the east at the time, did not believe in equality for the non-white people of the United States. Justification for the conditions of the Native Americans and the Chinese was found in their perceived heathenism while African Americans in California were relatively ignored. The result “was a complicated racial hierarchy, or scale, upon which California’s racial groups were ranked in relation to each other, and a scale which bore no resemblance to American society in the eastern part of the United States.”⁶⁹

“The black community in California grew very slowly, remaining about 1 percent of the total population until well into the twentieth century,”⁷⁰ which is why California focused their own Reconstruction efforts on stopping the rights of the Chinese. Like the southern democrats, Republicans and Democrats alike in California could not imagine a foothold of the Asiatic population. California knew

⁶⁶ Paddison, *American Heathens*, 59-60.

⁶⁷ Paddison, *American Heathens*, 30.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁹ Bottoms, *Aristocracy of Color*, 4-5.

⁷⁰ Julian Nava and Bob Barger, *California: Five Centuries of Cultural Contrasts* (Beverly Hills, CA: Glencoe Press, 1976), 275.

from the outset of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments that Reconstruction and black reformers would make regional issues a national crusade,⁷¹ so California reacted swiftly in their condemnation of the Chinese. Indeed, the gradation of Californian politics showed the animosity toward specific racial groups but nothing was stagnant. The Native American would, at times, be higher than the African American and at other times be lower than the Chinese, and each group moved up and down the proverbial ladder.

Because “Congress had not achieved all that it might...it had left a legacy of ill will between North and South.”⁷² Reconstruction had little chance of success, because, at the end of the day, morality and human kindness cannot be legislated with a stroke of a pen. Human hearts must be changed, and like the rest of the nation, California would spend the next hundred years dealing with not a Negro question but a minority one.

⁷¹ Egerton, *Wars of Reconstruction*, 162.

⁷² Berwanger, *West and Reconstruction*, 244.

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SILENCING THE BLACK VOICE: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1898- 1900

| Cordelia Ann Wilson

The ideal of democratic access in America has always done battle with the more pragmatic consideration of effective government. While the concept of all men being created equal was a compelling call for brotherhood against a corrupt tide of royalty and feudalism, the Founders understood that unrestricted access to the tiller of government could ground the new republic on rocky shoals. For a hundred years, democracy circumvented equality and remained firmly in the hands of white Anglo-Saxon landowners. In the South, this was especially poignant as slave populations denied even the remotest morsels of democracy came close to or exceeded those of whites.

The Civil War challenged larger issues of state rights and home rule. Slavery had made a prolonged relationship with the Union untenable, and forming the Confederate States of America seemed the only solution to preserve a way of life that held such economic rewards. Yet war led to defeat, and defeat led to Reconstruction, and Reconstruction for white Southerners was an ugly and horrific punishment.¹

North Carolina had stood at the devil's crossroads, but there was not much left to trade as a new century set to dawn. There had been no victory in war. Emancipation had created a threatening presence that could at a moment's notice justifiably turn to insurrection. Reconstruction harbored unfriendly forces in the small towns and cities of the state. The Fifteenth Amendment took power away from white elites and placed it in the hands of free Blacks. Poverty rose alongside urbanization. All who had been protected by paternalism were threatening to break out of sacred boundaries. Women ventured beyond the hearth and home to tackle societal ills. Children looked toward a New South that would turn away from the shame the war had wrought. Even the notion of masculinity changed in response to all those clamoring for access to once singular power.² Between 1898 and 1900, a cacophony of tension and fear rose like dust in a summer storm around

¹ Joel Williamson, *A Rage for Order: Black-White Relations in the American South Since Emancipation* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Kindle Location 580.

² For a deeper understanding of the social significance of changing gender roles in the New South, please look at Glenda E. Gilmore's *Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920*, and Gavin J. Campbell's *Music and the Making of a New South*.

those who considered themselves the once and future kings of North Carolina. If the devil would not place them back on the throne, then Southern white men would do the devil's work.

Known as the Great Nadir, or second slavery, the period between the 1880s and 1910s bore witness to extreme white resistance to Black empowerment. Unthinkable violence, wide-scale voter suppression, electoral fraud, and the only successful American coup d'état of an elected biracial government stripped the state of any pretense at equality; democracy would not return to North Carolina for nearly a century. Disfranchisement for Black Americans would come in many forms, systematically engineered to return them to the invisibility of bondage while reinforcing white privilege and power. Specifically, denying Blacks access to the vote was considered a legitimate pursuit of "good government," a balm that would quiet any internal or external criticism that rose from the execution of such malformed ideals.

Enfranchisement of the Black voice presented a serious problem for white elites. Slaveholding had accustomed Southern whites for generations to regard Blacks as intellectually incapable of anything much more than manual labor. That former slaves should have any part in governance was an intolerable situation: freedom, properly constrained by an enforced racial hierarchy and a white conservative legislature, might be tolerable, but Black participation in government was not. However much the South resented Black suffrage, it was now legal fact, guaranteed by the new state constitutions and the Fifteenth Amendment.

The North Carolina constitution of 1868 extended the right of suffrage to African Americans, and the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 enshrined this right at the federal level. Blacks were destined to make free use of the ballot for only two years. North Carolina was one of the first Southern states to be "redeemed" from Republican rule; in 1870, after two years of intimidation and force, the state legislature passed into the Conservatives' hands.³ On one level, such political chicanery as gerrymandering, poll taxes, literacy tests, election day intimidation, and outright fraud muted Black presence at the polls.⁴ On another much more frightening level was the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist network of the Democratic party that selectively targeted and punished both races to

³ William Alexander Mabry, "Negro Suffrage and Fusion Rule in North Carolina." *The North Carolina Historical Review* 12, no. 2 (April 1935), 80.

⁴ Michael Honey, "Class, Race, and Power in the New South: Racial Violence and the Delusions of White Supremacy." In *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy*, edited by David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 167.

such an extent that many stayed silent by staying home.⁵ For the next twenty-five years, the Democratic “white man’s party” reigned supreme.⁶

White men in the Democratic party remained politically unified until economic depression pushed some North Carolina farmers toward the Populist movement that was sweeping the South and West in the early 1890s.⁷ Crippled by dropping agricultural prices, the corrupt crop lien system, and exorbitant interest rates, the rural poor hoped the creation of a new political party would break the single-party rule that ignored their plight. For them, Redemption had promised a future where white farmers could prosper, not just a future in which they were white. As they faced hard times in the post-Reconstruction era, they grew increasingly skeptical of Redeemers’ claims that white supremacy was all that mattered; they proved willing to join opposition movements and even biracial coalitions, so long as those seemed to offer them some hope of economic independence.⁸ Although Populist leaders initially employed the rhetoric of white supremacy to lure white Democrats and independents back to sovereignty, they soon realized that this approach would not work in North Carolina as the Black voice was integral to success.⁹ African Americans had communicated their desire to be full citizens in earlier elections; only through unification could the Populists and Republicans hope to wrench institutionalized power away from the Democrats.

The statewide victory of these “Fusionists” in 1894 showed just how close the white kings were to losing the throne. Gaining control of the state legislature, Fusionists quickly changed county election laws to offer seats through a popular vote rather than appointment. The state legislature also loosened voter registration restrictions that resulted in a resurgence of Black political participation. In 1896, mainly due to Black voting, the Fusionist cause won every statewide race in North Carolina. Approximately a thousand Black men won elections, from justice of the peace up to congress, and white Republican Daniel L. Russell was elected governor.

⁵ Stephen Kantrowitz, "The Two Faces of Domination in North Carolina, 1800-1898." In *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy*, edited by David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 102.

⁶ Mabry (1935), 81.

⁷ Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum. "'The Vampire That Hovers Over North Carolina': Gender, White Supremacy, and the Wilmington Race Riot of 1898." *Southern Cultures* 4, no. 3 (1998), 7.

⁸ Kantrowitz, 104.

⁹ Kirschenbaum, 7.

African Americans constituted a majority in sixteen eastern counties of North Carolina and were thus capable of controlling the election of local officials indefinitely.¹⁰ The white elite believed there were very practical objections to giving this large population of ex-slaves the right to vote, many of them echo the Founding: illiteracy was high among Blacks; years of slavery had not prepared them for leadership; they could, in their ignorance, be easily pushed to vote against the ruling party. North Carolina's Democrats viewed the opening of the franchise to Blacks as a stupendous mistake.¹¹ One of the first steps taken to disfranchise Blacks was the passage of "An Act to Establish County Governments" that provided for appointment the "more important" county officials.¹² Not stopping there, the legislature also used the gerrymander, disfranchisement for petty crimes "commonly committed by Negroes," intricate election laws, and a liberal amount of "judicious cheating by election officials" to diminish the Black voice before the 1896 election.¹³

Black Republican success in the 1896 election horrified Democrats, and as the election of 1898 approached, it was all too clear that Blacks were going to demand and get offices in proportion closer to their numbers. Early in 1898, elements of the Democratic leadership recognized that danger and moved to translate it into a political issue.¹⁴

To recapture political power, the Democrats set upon a "White Supremacy Campaign" in 1898. Such campaigns swept across the South, but the one in North Carolina was especially vicious, in part because the Democrats had lost more ground than in other states.¹⁵ Choreographed by Democratic party head Furnifold Simmons, Raleigh's *The News and Observer* owner and editor Josephus Daniels, and prominent Democrat Charles Aycock, the campaign was a coldly

¹⁰ The counties were: Bertie, Caswell, Chowan, Craven, Edgecombe, Granville, Halifax, Hertford, New Hanover, Northampton, Pasquotank, Pender, Richmond, Vance, Warren, and Washington. United States *Census*, 1890 (Population), pp. 423-24 as quoted in Mabry (1935), 80.

¹¹ *The Semi-Weekly Messenger*, November 25, 1898 (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Library, Chapel Hill, NC),
<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn91068367/1898-11-25/ed-1/seq-3/#date1=1898&index=1&rows=20&words=suffrage&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=North+Carolina&date2=1898&proxtext=suffrage&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=earRange&page=1> (accessed October 31, 2019).

¹² Public Laws of North Carolina, 1876-77, Ch. XLI, p.227 (State Library of North Carolina),
<http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p249901coll22/id/196719/rec/1> (accessed October 20, 2019).

¹³ Mabry (1935), 81.

¹⁴ Williamson, Kindle Locations 1958-1963.

¹⁵ Catherine W. Bishir, "Landmarks of Power: Building a Southern Past, 1885-1915." *Southern Cultures*, Inaugural Issue (1993), 15.

calculated effort to defame Black men. The crusade split the opposition and effectively disfranchised Black voters without violating the letter of the state and federal constitutions. Simmons and Daniels concentrated on stories about the eastern Black-majority counties, which they strategically fed to the Piedmont, where white Democrats had recently voted Populist, and to western North Carolina, where whites most often voted Republican.¹⁶ By adding an element of psychosexual terrorism through the portrayal of vampiric Black men tormenting Southern white women, the hypermasculine “safety at home” mantra became a literal call to arms for Democrats. “Red Shirt” riders, acting as the party’s military arm, openly used intimidation and force to terrorize both white and Black voters. Col. Alfred M. Waddell, who would later lead the Wilmington Massacre, vowed in an address to the “white men of Wilmington” in the fall of 1898, “We will never surrender to a ragged raffle of negroes, even if we have to choke the Cape Fear River with carcasses.”¹⁷

Understandably, election day came and went without much of a stir. To avoid threatened violence, Black citizens stayed away from the polls. “Many Negroes either did not vote,” Daniels later recalled, “or made no fight in the affected counties on election day.”¹⁸ As a result, the Democrats won by a large majority, with only seven Fusionists returned to the senate and twenty-six to the House.¹⁹ The momentum of victory and its significance as a mandate for guaranteeing white supremacy drove the Democratic leadership inexorably toward constitutional disfranchisement.

The movement to disfranchise Blacks was part of a larger and longer process that historian Joel Williamson calls “(sic) depoliticization.” The political reduction of Black people —by persuasion if possible, by fraud and intimidation if necessary—was the central process of Redemption.²⁰ Blacks, once emancipated, enthusiastically embraced white Victorian ideals that would not only lift members of their race but all members of the South toward the democratic ideal captured in the Declaration of Independence.

¹⁶ Glenda E. Gilmore, "Murder, Memory, and the Flight of the Incubus." In *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy*, edited by David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 74.

¹⁷ *The Wilmington Messenger*, October 25, 1898.

¹⁸ Josephus Daniels, *Editor in Politics* (University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 294.

¹⁹ The Assembly of 1899-1900, *UNC Libraries*, <https://exhibits.lib.unc.edu/exhibits/show/1898/primary/assembly> (accessed November 7, 2019).

²⁰ Williamson, Kindle Location 2297

It is a true, and intriguing, and a revealing paradox that if every Southern white person had deserted the South after the war, if the whites had left the task of rebuilding on that land entirely and exclusively to Negroes, that a perfectly Black Reconstruction would have been, in cultural terms, very white.²¹

As threatening to whites as it was, Black voting in the South rarely presented a significant threat. When it did, as was the case in Wilmington, North Carolina, whites reacted quickly and viciously. For them, the threat was real and ever-present; only total disfranchisement could return the social balance so necessary to white supremacy. Reform, race, and politics acted as the girders supporting disfranchisement. For many, disfranchisement was reform; the fact that disfranchisement had been achieved and maintained by corruption, fraud, intimidation, and violence sorely pushed moral boundaries both in the North and at home.²² Racism was acted out either radically or conservatively by white Democrats. The “Radicals,” a term placed by Williamson on those who advocated extreme forms of racism at the time, supported disfranchisement of Black men because the right to vote also offered the right to equality. For these Radicals, race was the primary motivation; politics a strong second. Far from viewing disfranchisement as a way of pushing Blacks out of society, “Conservatives” saw it as a way to keep them in through the protection and preservation of place. For these softer Conservatives, the mantle of paternalism diffused the threat of race as long as it stayed where it belonged. Williamson notes that Conservative disfranchisement was “marked by a willingness to leave the best of the Blacks enfranchised and, conversely, to disfranchise the worst of the whites.”²³

The hesitation that other Southern states had in coming to grips with the question of the Black voter had momentarily seemed to disappear as they became more deeply involved with the agrarian revolt in the mid-1890s. Nevertheless, white Populists had begun to buy the Democratic argument that the elimination of the Black vote would open the door to constructive reform. There would always be those who feared that the literacy and understanding tests would, in the hands of scrupulous registrars, operate to disfranchise some whites, and thus, go far beyond the real intentions of disfranchisement; to preserve dominance, the Democratic party could not afford to alienate or remove any white voter.²⁴ The maintenance of white superiority in the social

²¹ Ibid., Kindle Locations 758-759.

²² Ibid., Kindle Locations 2362-2363.

²³ Ibid., Kindle Locations 2386-2387.

²⁴ John Hope Franklin, "Legal Disfranchisement of the Negro." *The Journal of Negro Education* 26, no. 3 (1957), 245.

hierarchy hinged on the assumption that while poor whites were poor, they were not Black; to the white conscience, there was nothing worse. Thus the Democrats found themselves in a quandary: throughout the White Supremacy Campaign, in its siren call to white voters for franchise reform, it had been made clear that illiterate whites would not be denied the ballot box.

The new Democratic majority in the 1898 legislature had the option to revert to old stratagems of partisan election laws and shameless cheating at the ballot boxes that had effectively curbed Black political power, but this solution had problems. There was no way to guarantee continued white solidarity in politics, and any serious political division among whites could shift the balance of power. Whatever the effective techniques were, only “legal” disfranchisement could give the entire trend respectability and allow the South to maintain the fiction that it was not running over the federal Constitution but living under it.

Three states, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana, had disfranchised African Americans through educational and property requirements by 1895. At the same time, Mississippi and South Carolina had protected the suffrage rights of their illiterate white citizens by inserting the “Understanding Clause” in their state constitutions, while Louisiana adopted the “Grandfather Clause” for the same purpose.²⁵ To determine which plan would work for North Carolina, the Democratic Executive Committee asked Josephus Daniels to find out. Daniels went to Washington, armed with copies of interviews and constitutional amendments that *The News and Observer* printed earlier. A special joint committee composed of the ablest lawyers in both houses and chaired by George Rountree of Wilmington was then called to frame a suffrage amendment for North Carolina. “Day by day and night by night,” Daniels recalls, “this committee wrestled with the problem.”²⁶

At first, there were two points of view. Some advocated the Mississippi plan in which election officials in each precinct would determine voter eligibility. The Understanding Clause provided that no man could vote unless he could read or competently interpret the state’s constitution. While this seemed a viable option in ensuring Democratic success, it left unprotected the reality that white poll holders could determine eligibility in any way they saw fit. Arguments against this plan focused on the previous “evils of suppressing the Negro vote by election officials not guided by justice” and would create an amendment

²⁵ William Alexander Mabry. "'White Supremacy' and the North Carolina Suffrage Amendment." *The North Carolina Historical Review* 13, no. 1 (January 1936), 3

²⁶ Daniels, 324.

based on individual whims rather than electoral principle.²⁷ Other committee members supported Louisiana's Grandfather Clause with a proviso of property ownership. An argument in favor of the Louisiana method that Daniels had printed in *The News and Observer* spoke of Lincoln's approval of the new constitution that admitted newly enfranchised Blacks only when they could demonstrate their capacity to vote by education or land ownership. Because this plan had received presidential approval, Daniels suggested it would have a better chance of standing up in the courts.

As the consensus moved to favor the Louisiana amendment, a date needed to be set so white men could gain the perpetual right to vote. Again, some members feared that one part of such an amendment might be declared constitutional and another part unconstitutional, leaving uneducated whites barred from the franchise alongside Blacks. "This was the crux of the matter," writes Daniels. "It was well understood that to submit an amendment to the people who, by any possibility, would disfranchise old white men, could not receive a majority of the votes."²⁸

In the original draft of the suffrage amendment, a person could register under the Grandfather Clause before December 1, 1906. Many Democrats from western North Carolina felt that a six-year limit would not allow enough time for all the white boys of the state to get a rudimentary education and thus face disfranchisement if they came of age after 1906. Out of consideration for the western counties, where illiteracy was comparatively high, the caucus agreed to extend the time limit by two years. With this change, the Democratic caucus adopted the suffrage amendment on February 8, 1899.²⁹ The two sections intended to disfranchise illiterate Blacks without disfranchising illiterate whites read:

Section 4: Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution in the English language; and in addition thereto, shall have paid on or before first of March of the year in which he proposes to vote, his poll tax, prescribed by law, for the previous year, and he shall exhibit his receipt therefor when he offers to vote. Poll taxes shall be a lien only on assessed property, and no process shall issue to enforce the collection of the same except as against assessed property.

Section 5: No male person who was on January 1, 1867, time prior thereto, entitled to vote under the laws of any United States wherein he then resided, and no lineal descendant of such person, shall be denied the right

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

to register and vote at any election in this State by reason of his failure to pass the educational qualification prescribed in Section 4 of this article: provided he shall have registered in accordance with the terms of this article prior to December and no person shall be entitled to register under this section after that date.³⁰

The amendment would take effect on July 1, 1902, but white men (whose ancestors could have voted) would not have to take the literacy test until 1908. This exemption inflicted the greatest insult on Black voters, even as it gave them hope. It was insulting because it meant that illiterate white men could vote unchallenged for six years, whereas college-educated African Americans would be required to pass a literacy examination. At the same time, it sparked hope because African Americans thought it unconstitutional.³¹ The U.S. Supreme Court had upheld poll taxes and literacy requirements in *Williams v. Mississippi* in 1898, but the constitutionality of the grandfather clause remained unchallenged; its inclusion could provide the Court an avenue to eliminate the amendment entirely.³² To cover the amendment's passage with the mantle of popular legitimacy and to prepare for the inevitable fight that would come from the left, North Carolina scheduled a special popular election for August 1900. Changing the date of the state election was a cunning move to avoid any federal interference that may have occurred during the national election slated for November.

The joint committee on constitutional amendments gave a hearing to a representative group of African Americans on January 13, 1899 as the suffrage changes were being considered. Led by Isaac Smith, a member of the legislature from Craven County, the Black delegation only made matters worse. Smith spoke little during the meeting.³³ Rev. R.H.W. Leake of Raleigh said he knew that the Fusionist legislation was vicious and that Blacks were partly to blame for electing such officers. Professor J.O. Crosby of Salisbury admitted that most Blacks were probably not good voters. Of an estimated

³⁰ The People's Party of North Carolina (The Populist Party), The Proposed Suffrage Amendment: The Platform and Resolutions of the People's Party, April 18, 1900, *Civil War Era NC*, <https://cwnc.omeka.chass.ncsu.edu/items/show/411> (accessed November 21, 2019).

³¹ Glenda E. Gilmore, *Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 120.

³² C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913*. (Shreveport: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 321–23.

³³ Mabry (1936), 6. Mabry claims that Smith was “saving his oratory for the House of Representatives so Leake and Crosby did most of the talking before the committee,” however Gilmore describes Smith as “outspoken … flamboyant, hot-tempered and often irrational,” 122.

125,000 Black voters in North Carolina, he said, only a fifth were qualified to form intelligent opinions on political questions; they would blindly vote the Republican ticket. “You want,” he said, “to disfranchise enough Negroes to make it certain that good government will prevail. Do that and stop. Do not go to the extent of persecution.”³⁴ Gilmore suggests that Crosby kowtowed to the white legislators, afraid that anything more would result in the removal of his Salisbury Normal School.³⁵

A few days after the committee hearing, a “Negro Council” of sixty-nine delegates met in Raleigh. In an address to the legislature, the council asked that no laws be passed because an amendment would “blunt our aspirations, ruin our manhood, and lessen our usefulness as citizens.”³⁶ Congressman George Henry White initially advocated for Black emigration should the Democrats make remaining intolerable, but Congress voted the resolution down. but this resolution was voted down. Instead, an address published in *The Charlotte Observer* on January 19 urged Blacks “not to be hasty in changing their present plans but to fulfill quietly and industriously all contracts with their landlords.” Later, in June, White advised Blacks to “create no disturbance and to strive to cultivate harmony and good feeling between the races.”³⁷ Republican governor Daniel Russell admitted that a Democratic “reign of terror” had targeted African Americans and that they remained “helpless” to register and vote down the amendment.³⁸ Whites demanded Black silence and acquiescence on all fronts, was demanded on all fronts, but even silence would not be enough.

The White Supremacy Campaign, having proved so successful for Democrats in 1898, was resurrected in late spring of 1900. Red Shirt Riders, who had made their first grim appearance at a rally held in Fayetteville in October of 1898, reappeared in even greater numbers before the August state election. Aycock, stepping up his gubernatorial campaign, was surrounded by Red Shirts everywhere he went in July; stump speeches and rallies were scheduled almost daily that month. White horses pulling white floats in which sat young white women all dressed in white, circled and hemmed by Red Shirts greeted Aycock in Pittsboro. The next day in Carthage, thousands lined the street as the Red Shirts passed, followed by an immense float filled with white women bearing such banners as “White Supremacy” and “Protect Us.”

³⁴ *The Charlotte Observer*, Feb. 10, 1899, 7.

³⁵ Gilmore (1996), 275.

³⁶ Mabry (1936), 7.

³⁷ White’s comments are quoted from Benjamin R. Justesen II, “George Henry White, Josephus Daniels, and the Showdown Over Disfranchisement, 1900.” *The North Carolina Historical Review* 77, no. 1 (2000), 23.

³⁸ Gilmore (1996), 123.

In addition to the pageantry these processions provided, a terrible reminder of past events was unveiled in Lumberton when the Red Shirts dragged in the “rapid-fire” gun so prominently displayed in Wilmington before the massacre on November 10, 1898.³⁹ In New Bern, the Democrats armed whites to the hilt. Random gunshots echoed throughout the day. There the Naval Reserves drilled every evening, concluding their activity by firing a volley late in the evening.⁴⁰ Mobs of Democrats attacked a rival speaker at Smithfield, prompting the Republican Chairman to telegraph Governor Russell for troops. Speakers from the opposition across the state were heckled and pelted with rotten eggs. On the night before the election in Wilmington, Waddell issued a final call for terror:

You are Anglo-Saxons. You are armed and prepared and you will do your duty. Be ready at a moment’s notice. Go to the polls tomorrow and if you find the negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls and if he refuses, kill him, shoot him down in his tracks. We shall win tomorrow if we have to do it with guns.⁴¹

The Red Shirts did indeed bring guns to the polls, but the following day passed with little incident. The days leading up to the election had been a source of high anxiety for both sides; they logically feared there would be trouble. With little opposition, the Democrats swept the election.

Even without fraud, the Democrats would most likely have won the election, but they took no chances in the August balloting. Charles Aycock was credited with a resounding victory over Republican Spencer Adams by 186,650 votes to 126,296. Aycock claimed just under 60 percent of the total statewide vote, carrying seventy-three of the state’s ninety-seven counties. Yet in many instances, the county returns were little short of preposterous: Edgecombe County by nearly 91 percent for Aycock, Halifax by 88 percent for him, with thousands of Black votes either ignored or “converted” to Democratic ballot boxes. In Halifax, the total vote counted exceeded the county’s entire population of adult males by more than two hundred votes, a physical impossibility that only Republicans seemed to appreciate. A remarkable 67 percent of the state’s Black voters made the courageous trek to the polls, although their votes were far too few to defeat Aycock or the constitutional amendment, even had they been fairly counted. Many

³⁹ Leon H. Prather. "We Have Taken a City." In *Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy*, edited by David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 181.

⁴⁰ Gilmore (1996), 123.

⁴¹ Daniels, 368.

Populists, on the other hand, and even some Republicans, appear to have voted Democratic or stayed home.

The victory of the constitutional amendment was somewhat less impressive but still monumental in its own right. Sixty-six counties gave a majority to the amendment, and thirty-one opposed it; the statewide vote was 182,217 votes for the amendment to 128,285 against it. Across the state, only three eastern counties, none with Black majorities, voted the amendment down: Brunswick, Camden, and Sampson. Only two votes opposing the amendment were counted in New Hanover County — the scene of the Wilmington massacre two years earlier — out of nearly three thousand cast. The figures were slightly better in the “Black Second”⁴² counties, where voters came closest to defeating the amendment, garnering 43 percent of the vote for disfranchisement.⁴³

That the Democrats had stolen the election was obvious, even to some Democrats who nevertheless defended the tactics as necessary for the greater good of the state. For the thousands of Black voters who had braved Red Shirt threats and made it to the polls, the loss was disheartening enough. However, the fact that most of their votes were not even counted or handed off to the opposition was a depressing reminder of just how far down the political ladder they had fallen. Four years earlier, they had played a key role in electing North Carolina’s governor. Four years in the future, most would not even be allowed into the polling booth.

Through this victory, North Carolina’s Democrats, like their compatriots throughout the South, gained control of the political process itself. To many of them, it seemed that a long chapter that began in defeat had finally ended in triumph; for some, the very violence of their victory was an essential catharsis of old defeat. As promised in the campaign, young Democratic leaders inaugurated an era of economic progressivism that emphasized public education, transportation, and the encouragement of business. They promoted segregation and disfranchisement as a modern, rational remedy to past ills, a reform essential to redeem public life and promote peaceful social and economic advancement. At the dawn of a shining and new century, the devil’s work had been done, and Southern whites reclaimed their throne.

⁴² North Carolina’s Second Congressional District became the state’s first Black-majority district in 1872 and was widely known as the “Black Second.”

⁴³ All voting statistics were taken from Benjamin R. Justesen II, “George Henry White, Josephus Daniels, and the Showdown Over Disfranchisement, 1900.” *The North Carolina Historical Review* 77, no. 1 (2000), 25–26.

George Henry White, who had made history with his election to Congress out of the Black Second in 1897, would retreat into self-imposed exile far from his native state. After his departure, no other African American would serve in Congress until 1929. No African American was again elected to Congress from North Carolina until 1992.

In his final address to the House on January 29, 1901, White prophesied:

This is perhaps the negroes' temporary farewell to the American Congress; but let me say, Phoenix-like he will rise up some day and come again. These parting words are in behalf of an outraged, heart-broken, bruised, and bleeding, but God-fearing people, faithful, industrious, loyal people--rising people, full of potential force.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ George H. White, "Defense of the Negro Race--Charges Answered." Speech given in the House of Representatives, January 29, 1901. <https://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/whitegh/whitegh.html> (accessed December 4, 2019).

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WEST INDIANS, LABOR ORGANIZATION, AND THE POWER OF PLACE IN COSTA RICA

| Emma Kirchhoff

Costa Rica's black sand beaches, luscious jungle, and vibrant wildlife make it a popular tourist destination and vacation hotspot. Though praised for its ecological approach to carbon emissions and an effective healthcare system, the reality for many Costa Ricans is one that is less positive.¹ Hidden to tourists are the adverse effects of the country's intimate relationship with banana plantations. While Costa Rica might be improving some of its environmental practices to meet the needs of a changing global climate, its people face high levels of manganese in their drinking water in towns surrounding plantations and possible sterilization from having been exposed to the pesticide DBCP while working.² These struggles are not limited to the 35,000 employed in the banana industry, as many Costa Rican citizens have faced difficulties in their ability to organize as laborers and in their health because of the strength and influence of the banana industry. By examining the cultural development of *limonenses*, or those living in the largely Afro-Caribbean province of Limón, and the presence of West Indian workers in labor movements, one can better understand that the country has work to do in ensuring the safety and wellbeing of its people, despite its good reputation.

These issues stand as a testament to the complicated legacy of the banana plantations after their emergence in the late 1800's. West Indian immigrants forged this *limonense* identity both independently and with the indirect influence of these plantations. Because of the impact of the plantation and the Costa Rican government on the *limonense* place in Costa Rican society, many workers faced vulnerability that put them in a tight spot when organizing for political rights. However, these workers were invaluable to early efforts to organize and should not be left out of Costa Rican historiography.

This essay aims to find answers to the following questions: how influential were banana plantations in the development of a distinct *limonese* identity? What was the impact of West Indian involvement in labor movements? How has the banana industry impacted Costa Rica's

¹ Robert Fletcher, "Costa Rica- a 21st Century Environmental Leader," *BBC*.

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/2WjxnLkpwDY9dKLYPf7X6q/costa-rica-a-21st-century-environmental-leader>.

² Berna van Wendel de Joode, et. al, "Manganese concentrations in drinking water from villages near banana plantations with aerial mancozeb spraying in Costa Rica: Results from the Infants' Environmental Health Study (ISA)," *Environmental Pollution* 215 (May 2016): 256.

dedication to environmental causes? How has this shifted over the years, and are plantations still as central to conversations in these three sectors? For the sake of clarity, the group of workers being examined in this essay may be referred to as West Indian, Jamaican, or *limonense*. To do this, a variety of resources need to be consulted. Some, like official documents from the Costa Rican government, provide demographic information. Newspaper articles, on the other hand, provide insight into modern manifestations of Afro-Caribbean identity, including pieces on musical and linguistic-cultural patterns. Though this is an issue historical in nature, the ramifications of the banana industry are relevant in today's world. As a result, this research will incorporate many present environmental studies, lawsuits, and cultural signifiers to draw new connections between the plantations, national identity, organization of labor, and organization of environmental groups.

However, the most vital sources are secondary sources and analyses presented by historians. Namely, Aviva Chomsky's *West Indian Workers and the United Fruit Company in Costa Rica 1870-1940* and Ronald N. Harpelle's book titled *The West Indians of Costa Rica: Race, Class, and the Integration of an Ethnic Minority*. To provide sufficient background on each of the three pillars of this issue—cultural identity, organization, and environment-- it will be crucial to draw connections between the labor organizations and increased attention to environmental problems. Additionally, this background will help clarify ties between the beginnings of the labor movement within plantations and the solidification of a distinct *limonense* cultural identity.

To truly comprehend the complex relationship Costa Rica has with banana plantations, one must first understand the history of the Costa Rican province of Limón, the banana, and labor in Costa Rica. Before Minor Keith converted it to plantations prime for cultivating bananas, the dense rainforests of the Costa Rican eastern coast lay untouched.³ Various aboriginal groups, such as the Bri Bri, had inhabited this coast up until European contact in the 1600s.⁴ While contact with Europeans remained limited compared to other countries in the Latin American world, many native tribes moved inland to avoid the diseases brought by the foreigners. Spanish colonizers attempted to utilize the region to grow cacao but soon ran into issues marketing and shipping the product. Between this issue and an inability to maintain a steady stream of laborers despite attempts to utilize African slave labor,

³ Aviva Chomsky, *West Indian Workers and the United Fruit Company: 1870-1940* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 1.

⁴ Ronald N. Harpelle, *The West Indians of Costa Rica: Race, Class, and the Integration of an Ethnic Minority* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 4.

cacao production did not become as much of a stronghold in Costa Rica like it did in other Central American countries.⁵⁶ Banana production, however, would create an entirely different narrative.

Initially, settlers focused their resources on the west coast, which brought infrastructural and agricultural developments that helped Costa Rica begin to open up to world trade on a limited scale. This lopsided arrangement limited Costa Rica's ability to tap into many distant markets via the Caribbean Sea. Because of the attention given to the west coast, the east coast of Costa Rica lacked the infrastructure needed to transport goods to ports on the country's western side and vice versa.

An American businessman, not the Costa Rican government, attempted to fix this problem to take advantage of the monetary opportunity presented in Costa Rica. In the early 1870's, many years before he founded the United Fruit Company (UFCO), Minor Keith had made it his mission to make his fortune developing a system of railroads to connect the more productive west coast with the untapped potential and coastline of the eastern portion of the country.⁷ This was very opportune for the Costa Rican government, which also desired to develop a shipping system to take advantage of the west coast's coffee production.⁸ With support from the Costa Rican government, Keith broke ground on his railroad project in 1872. However, building this railroad was a trying and dangerous endeavor, making it exceptionally difficult to find workers. As noted earlier, native peoples sparsely populated the eastern coast of Costa Rica and the labor-intensive, dangerous work of building the railroads did not entice the few inhabitants living there. To solve this problem, Keith began to look outwards for labor. Initially, he focused on bringing laborers from the United States.⁹ However, the dangers posed by the Costa Rican environment made this a deadly environment for North American workers. Between Italian-Americans and former prisoners, Keith's efforts to import American labor bore little fruit. Of the seven hundred prisoners brought to work on the promise of a pardon once they

⁵ Cabildo of Cartago, "Free Blacks, Mulattoes, and Mestizos Seek Legitimacy," in *The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture and Politics*, ed. Steven Palmer and Iván Molina (Durham Duke University Press, 2004), 29.

⁶ Harpelle, *West Indians of Costa Rica*, 4.

⁷ Dan Koeppel, NPR, "Reframing History: Bananas," Interview with Ramtin Arablouei and Rund Abdelfatah, *Northstate Public Radio Presents: Throughline*, podcast audio, August 27, 2020.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Dan Koeppel, *Banana: The Fate of the Fruit That Changed the World* (New York: Hudson Street Press, 2008), 59.

completed the railroad, only twenty-five survived.¹⁰ Eventually, he turned his attention to workers from the Caribbean. Afro-Caribbean workers, many of them descendants of slaves imported to work on sugar cane plantations, made up a significant portion of the workforce on both the railroad and later plantations.¹¹ With this infrastructure laid, transporting goods from coast to coast and faraway markets could be done with ease. All Keith needed to secure an economic empire were the goods.

During the construction of the railroad, Keith struck the gold that would solidify his fortune. His discovery was not a precious metal but rather something more accessible and sustainable: the banana. In order to provide food for his workers at the smallest cost possible, Keith began to encourage workers to plant bananas alongside the railroads.¹² Bananas thrived in the tropical environment and inspired Keith to cultivate the fruit commercially. In 1899, Keith joined forces with Andrew W. Preston, the owner of Boston Fruit Company, to create the banana cultivation and shipping company United Fruit Company. Between Keith's experience in shipping and Preston's familiarity with fruit and connection to American markets, the enterprise became one that enveloped the Atlantic side of the country. Centered in Limón, this company worked around issues the Spanish settlers could not. By utilizing Keith's infrastructure and maintaining connections to the United States, the UFCO could ensure returns on their investment in the plantations so long as they had workers available. Keith's years of experimenting with different forms of labor allowed him to take advantage of the most reliable labor market he had found: Afro-Caribbean laborers. The legacy of the fruit company, therefore, is not limited to economics. The UFCO's firm establishment of the banana industry in Limón, development of infrastructure, and reliance on imported labor have had a transformative influence on the Costa Rican cultural identities, labor systems and rights, and environmentalism in Costa Rica.

One key aspect of West Indian workers' ability to organize was the establishment of a cultural identity in Costa Rica. This identity, that of the *limonenses* rather than of the *ticos* native to the Costa Rican highlands, celebrates blackness in a country that continues to harbor racist ideologies. In her study of Costa Rican Reggae as a means of black *limonenses* surpassing oppressive stereotypes and institutions, assistant professor Sabia McCoy-Torres comments on the "othering" that occurs in Costa Rica because of this distinct identity. As McCoy-

¹⁰ Ibid, 59.

¹¹ Aviva Chomsky, *West Indian Workers*, 33.

¹² Koeppl, *Bananas*, 60.

Torres notes, “many people who call this country home respond to me that black Costa Ricans are ‘not really ticos’-casting them outside the term Costa Ricans use to refer to their national identity.”¹³ This idea that black residents of Costa Ricans do not fit under the term *tico* resembles the tendency in the United States to classify many non-white citizens simply as “immigrants” rather than considering them to be “Americans.” In doing so, one is able to deny birthright citizenship based on colorism rather than national origin.

Ticos have done this historically, causing workers imported from West Indian countries to hold little social status because of their blackness. This point of view was not limited to more conservative Costa Ricans. Racial “othering,” or creating in-groups and out-groups based on race or ethnicity, found its way into liberal points of view during the 19th century. This ideology became incredibly useful politically, as it helped politicians appeal to the desire of the people to paint themselves as a homogenous society. Standing in the way of their ideal society, however, were West Indian immigrants. Alonso Rodríguez Chaves describes the desire of liberals to highlight “racial unity” and diminish cultural diversity, writing,

This occurred because the liberals considered in their imagination some territories of the country as true “exiles submerged in the most deplorable abjection,” but more than that, was the socio-cultural reason that was forged by the interaction of the indigenous populations and the migrants of non-European origin.¹⁴

Without specifying in this text, the “territories” being referenced here by Chaves can be none other than the eastern portions of the country that became strongholds for new immigrants, particularly Limón. To reach this conclusion, one must examine the demographic information for the area. According to David P. Adams, from 1801-1891, “the population of Limón Province increased at a considerably slower rate than that of the other six Costa Rican regions.”¹⁵ However, due to the new industry and infrastructure, the population began to swell. In 1892,

¹³ Sabia McCoy-Torres, “‘Cien porcieno tico tico’: Reggae, Belonging, and the Afro-Caribbean *Ticos* of Costa Rica,” *Black Music Research Journal* 36 no. 1 (2016), 2.

¹⁴ Alonso Rodríguez Chávez, “Blancos perfectos: obsesión y delirio de la Costa Rica del siglo XIX,” *Vínculos de Historia* 5 (2016), 264. Original text reads: “Lo anterior se dio porque los liberales consideraban en su imaginario algunos territorios del país como verdaderos “destierros sumidos en la más deplorable abyección”, pero más que eso, privó el hecho, que la razón socio-cultural se forjaba alrededor de la interacción de poblaciones indígenas y de migrantes extranjeros de origen no europeo que habían arraigado en esos lugares.”

¹⁵ David P. Adams, “Malaria, Labor and Population Distribution in Costa Rica: A Biohistorical Perspective,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 28 no 1 (Summer, 1996), 81.

Limón had 541 black *ticos* living among 6,928 Costa Ricans and 1,273 foreigners; by 1927, these numbers increased to 18,003 black *ticos*, 9,970 Costa Ricans, and 22,308 foreigners.¹⁶ The statistic for foreigners includes the Jamaican immigrants, constituting the most considerable demographic shift in the area. Because Jamaican immigrants often decided to live in Limón, the region gained a reputation for its high population of immigrants. These demographics stood in direct opposition to the desire of many Costa Ricans to have a homogeneous society, as mentioned earlier. *Ticos*, therefore, were able to paint the territory as a threat to their society and, in effect, ostracize and segregate these communities.

What essentially became geographic segregation reinforced social perceptions of how black people, particularly Jamaican immigrants, fit into Costa Rican society. Because the UFCO preferred West Indian labor and the immigrants settled near their work, the importation of these workers created a Costa Rican identity particular to the banana plantations in Limón. In “Language and Identity: the Black Minority of Costa Rica,” Anita Herzfeld characterized the impact this had on the cultural makeup of Costa Rica. The author maintained that black migrants “have lived mostly in the Province of Limón, while Costa Rican society and culture tends to be considered as existing only in the highlands.”¹⁷ Their limited ability to travel solidified the creation of West Indian residential communities and fueled the “othering” felt by *ticos*. Jamaican immigrants developed distinct communities for other reasons as well. As noted by Harpelle, “The railway was the only transportation link with Limón and the sole means by which people of African descent travelled to the highlands.”¹⁸ Because of this, many West Indians traveling to San José ended up settling by the train stations. These geographic patterns reinforced the creation of community occurring through the plantations and helped to spread it to small communities throughout the country. The ability of these settlers to forge community and culture in specific areas of Costa Rica made it easier for *Ticos* to discriminate and make generalizations about them. Interestingly, some aspects of *limonense* culture derived from the UFCO itself, rather than directly from the people. From the beginning, the UFCO attempted to create cultural divisions between laborers to discourage unionism. For example, Harpelle writes,

¹⁶ Chomsky, *West Indian Workers*, 47.

¹⁷ Anita Herzfeld, “Language and Identity: the Black Minority of Costa Rica,” *Filología y Lingüística* 20 no. 1 (1994), 119.

¹⁸ Harpelle, *West Indians of Costa Rica*, 129.

The company recognized that island allegiances were strong and sought to maintain them. For example, the use of company buildings was given to particular groups like the Jamaica Burial Association, the St. Kitts Sports Club Committee, or any of several other “West Indian” organizations that could be found in every locale in Limón.¹⁹

These efforts to reinforce “island allegiances” were not particularly novel in Costa Rica by the time the UFCO attempted to implement them. In fact, a 1676 decree from Cabildo of Cartago reads similarly: “...we see that it is in the interest of the Crown that the mulattoes, free coloreds, and lower-class mestizos come together and settle so that their lives might be overseen by regular justice and they might live in Christian community.”²⁰ Encouraging these workers to live in proximity to people of the same national origin helped to solidify a distinct identity within immigrant communities that bound them together. On the flip side, though, these groups would continue to be in conflict with each other and with native *ticos* specifically because of the formation of enclaves. These island conflicts would later come into focus while creating labor organizations, particularly in the 1910 strike.

The UFCO also encouraged community organization indirectly. Because of the conditions laborers were working in, both formal and social groupings of West Indian workers formed. The formal grouping of West Indian workers is particularly evident in the healthcare sector. The UFCO drove workers to develop alternative means of achieving medical care by segregating their medical practice.²¹ In resistance to insufficient care and racist practices, the West Indians developed systems of alternative medicine by calling on “Alternative healers [who] were closely tied to the culture and religion of the workers.”²²

In addition, the English-speaking overseers of the plantations pushed West Indians to adapt their language to attempt to communicate with monolingual bosses. Out of this came Limonese Creole (LC), or *Mekatelyu*, a compromise between Jamaican, English, and Spanish that became a legitimate dialect, not to be marked as simply “bad English.”²³ Though linguists continue to debate whether or not LC is a dialect or a standalone language, one thing is certain: the banana plantations in Limón created the need for it. *Mekatelyu* managed to create a formal system of communication within the plantations, as well as unite West

¹⁹ Ibid., 26.

²⁰ Cabildo of Cartago, “Free Blacks, Mulattoes, and Mestizos Seek Legitimacy,” 29.

²¹ Aviva Chomsky, *West Indian Workers*, 140.

²² Ibid., 142

²³ Ginneth Pizarro Chacón and Damaris Cordero Badilla, “Limon Creole Phrases: A Vehicle for Linguistic and Cultural Preservation,” *Letras* (January 2017): 98.

Indian workers through a common, adapted language. LC has since become an important signifier of community, even as it declines in use and is used only in intimate circles.²⁴ However, despite its decline, the West Indian cultural legacy stands firm, since “few other elements involve the emotional attachment that oral communication does in members of an ethnic group; however, the death of a language does not inevitably mean the total disappearance of a group's identity.”²⁵ As this quote indicates, LC is not the sole signifier of West Indian community. However, it stands as a testament to the adaptability of West Indian workers in their attempts to forge relationships in the hopes of feeling more comfortable in their new environment.

These relationships would prove to be incredibly important in fighting for improved labor conditions as well. However, the history of the organization of black workers in Costa Rica is one that is complicated and often contradictory. As a whole, organizers often excluded West Indian workers from many efforts to strike for better pay, reliable pay schedules, and improved working conditions. To add insult to injury, historical accounts of labor in Costa Rica continued to neglect to mention these West Indian laborers. In the words of Aviva Chomsky, “Standard Costa Rican historiography has virtually ignored the presence of blacks in the country, perpetuating the myth of Costa Rican racial homogeneity and social peace.”²⁶ However, the exclusion of Caribbean workers in Costa Rican historiography does not diminish the role they had to play in organizing throughout the history of the banana plantation. Starting in the railyards and continuing through the plantations, this marginalized group had an important influence in the development of Costa Rica and did not quietly take the injustices doled out by the United Fruit Company.

The common understanding held by historians regarding Jamaican workers being left out of labor movements is one grounded in some truth. This complicated legal and social perception of West Indian workers also influenced the documentation of labor history in Costa Rica. The collective disregard for black folks in Costa Rica played a large role in this. West Indian workers in Costa Rica were at a social disadvantage because of their race. As mentioned earlier, the West Indian workers could only use the train system for travel because of social and legal restrictions placed on their movement. The Costa Rican government was also involved in restricting the movement of West Indians into the country beginning in 1925 with limitations placed on

²⁴ Ibid., 101.

²⁵ Anita Herzfeld, “Language and Identity,” 132.

²⁶ Chomsky, *West Indian Workers*, 147.

hiring foreign labor.²⁷ Not only was there an inherent social hierarchy that caused West Indian laborers to be left out of Hispanic labor movements, their lack of voice, legal restrictions on their ability to travel through Costa Rica, and the few jobs available to West Indian workers outside of the plantation prevented them from feeling comfortable enough to make many demands.²⁸ With West Indian workers so restricted, their only source of upward mobility would have been through the plantations.²⁹ These factors compounded with the West Indian workers' British citizenship status (rather than legal citizenship status in Costa Rica) and made it seem much less practical for West Indians to make demands on the Costa Rican government for change. On this topic, independent international development consultant Elisavinda Echeverri-Gent writes, "Together these factors shaped the West Indians' relation to their employers and to the host country different from their Chinese and Italian counterparts."³⁰ Where native Costa Ricans may have felt comfortable making demands, the West Indians struggled to do so.

The documentation of these workers is similarly restricted. In some instances, authors and organizers found it opportune to pander to audiences by invoking their blackness. According to Dr. Russell Leigh Sharman, "blackness proved a powerful symbol of bourgeois capitalist oppression in the arsenal of communist propaganda, inextricably linking the histories of the Communist Party and Black migrant labor."³¹ However, in the piece "Red, White, and Black: Communist Literature and Black Migrant Labor in Costa Rica," Dr. Sharman doubles back on this statement, pointing out that many communist authors do not properly characterize West Indian workers in Costa Rican life, and used blackness as more of a literary tool than a purposeful inclusion of these folks in labor liberation.³² In practice, many of the writers invoked in Sharman's piece stereotype Chinese laborers, such as *Mamita Yunai*, forming a critique of the province of Limón as an uneducated backwater.³³ Because immigrants made up the majority of the plantation workforce, this "othering" would prove useful in continuing to deny their demands.

²⁷Harpelle, *West Indians of Costa Rica*, 90.

²⁸Elisavinda Echeverri-Gent, "Forgotten Workers: British West Indians and the Early Days of the Banana Industry in Costa Rica and Honduras," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 no. 2 (May 1992): 282-283.

²⁹Harpelle, *West Indians of Costa Rica*, 86.

³⁰Echeverri-Gent, "Forgotten Workers", 284.

³¹Sharman, "Red, White, and Black," 138.

³²Ibid., 138.

³³Ibid., 141

On the flip side of the coin, media sources mentioned black workers in ways that diminished their presence in labor movements at all. Even popular fictional accounts of labor organization represent the West Indian workers as a separate, independent entity uninterested in striking. For example, Quince Duncan includes this excerpt in his piece *La rebellion pocomia-* “And the Jamaicans continued working, indifferent to everything. Faithful to Mr. Keith.”³⁴ Published in 1986, *La rebellion pocomia* spoke critically of the plantation’s organization, touched on the culture surrounding the plantations, yet relegated West Indian workers to passive participants at best when it came to labor unionism. By the time this short story gets around to including the Jamaican workers in the protests, they are silent sufferers unable to ignite an uprising until the French immigrant protagonist, Jean Paul, steps in to organize the rebellion.³⁵

Duncan’s piece, though well-intentioned, misrepresents and distorts the narrative of black involvement in labor organization in Costa Rica. In reality, West Indian workers often lie at the heart of organizational efforts. For example, The Artisans and Laborer’s Union founded in 1910 was the work of angry and overburdened Jamaican workers.³⁶ Jamaicans had attempted to organize in years prior only to have the UFCO easily break independent strikes.³⁷ Jamaican workers organized in 1910 in particular to celebrate a cultural holiday, only to be denied a day off work by the UFCO. To effectively begin to unionize during this strike, Jamaican workers needed to set aside prejudices to strike alongside men imported from St. Kitts to replace them.³⁸ Putting prejudices aside in order to problematize the treatment of workers in Costa Rica became a tactic employed in future strikes, including the largest Costa Rican strike in 1934.

Costa Rica’s history of unionism, particularly of those at the margins of Costa Rican society, continues to impact aspects of Costa Rican life today. In Costa Rica, the labor organization that emerged in response to the conditions of the banana plantations laid major groundwork to organize in order to address environmental issues. Not only this, but attention to environmental issues and health concerns were among some of the original objectives in striking. The presence of harsh chemicals, particularly 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP), is a

³⁴ Quince Duncan, *La rebellion pocomia*, p. 22. Original text reads "Y los jamaicanos siguieron trabajando, indiferentes a todo. Fieles a Master Keith."

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁶ Chomsky, *West Indian Workers*, 153.

³⁷ Aviva Chomsky, “Afro-Jamaican Traditions and Labor Organizing on United Fruit Company Plantations in Costa Rica, 1910,” *Journal of Social History* 28 no 4. (Summer 1995), 839.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 840.

controversy that has bridged the gap between 1934 and 2020. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, this chemical historically used on banana and pineapple plantations can cause moderate depression of the Central Nervous System, pulmonary congestion, and irritation of the skin and eyes in the short term, with consequences for long term exposure resulting in decreased sperm count.³⁹ An article published in *Revista de Biología* (Journal of Biology) claims that these negative effects go much deeper, stating that “later studies carried out on Costa Rican banana plantations show an increase in the incidence rate for melanoma and penile cancer in men, as well as cervical cancer and leukemia in women.”⁴⁰

In a study completed on social movements and risk perception, “interviewees regularly referred to the ‘general banana strike’ in 1934 and the use of the pesticide 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP).”⁴¹ For the plantations and the workers on them, health concerns and environmental issues, particularly concerns about DBCP, stood at the heart of everything organizers attempted to improve. *Foro Emaús*, a coalition started in the late 1990’s by a broad coalition of labor unions, theologians, non-governmental organizations, and environmentalists, modeled itself off of the social organization practices used in the early 1900’s to garner support for strikes against the UFCO.⁴² More recent organizations have modeled the efforts of the 1934 strikers, but that is not the only way this organized strike has seen a reprise. Despite the United States understanding the connection between DBCP and sterilization of men, the US continued to drive the market for bananas produced by companies using the pesticide. As a result, a class-action lawsuit on behalf of plantation workers in various Latin American countries (including Costa Rica) has been making its way through the American court system since 1992.⁴³ This ongoing fight has implications for both labor organization and environmentalism in Costa Rica and demonstrates the connection between these two issues.

³⁹ “1,2-Dibromo-3-Chloropropane (DBCP),” Environmental Protection Agency, last modified January 2000. <https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/1-2-dibromo-3-chloropropane.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Vanessa Ramírez and Patricia Cuenca, “Daño del AND en trabajadoras bananeras expuestas a plaguicidas en Limón, Costa Rica,” *Revista de Biología Tropical* 50 no. 2 (Jun 2002). Original text reads “Estudios posteriores realizados en plantaciones bananeras costarricenses muestran un incremento en la tasa de incidencia estandarizada para melanoma y cáncer de pene en hombres, así como para cáncer de cervix y leucemia en las mujeres.”

⁴¹ Douglas Barraza et. al, “Social movements and risk perception: unions, churches, pesticides and bananas in Costa Rica,” *International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health* 19, no. 1 (2013): 11.

⁴² Ibid, 19.

⁴³ Anonymous, “Costa Rica: The price of bananas,” *The Economist*, March 12, 1994, 48.

It is also evident that the *limonese* identity prevalent in the province of Limón is one borne of cultural separatism as a result of the banana plantations. As mentioned earlier, the plantation's structure mixed with colorism in Costa Rica to mold Limón into the cultural community it is today, which is still viewed with distaste by many *ticos*. The cultural divide between *ticos* and *limoneeses*, however, is currently evolving. McCoy-Torres indicates that because of the rising popularity of Reggae music produced by Black Costa Ricans, "black ticos are being acknowledged as legitimate bearers of nationally celebrated culture."⁴⁴ Having a positive presence in popular culture has had a positive impact on the perception of Black Costa Ricans. *Ticos* appear to be growing more comfortable with the idea of not being an entirely homogenous group.

With these gains currently being made, it is even more clear that the need for these changes stem from a Costa Rican legacy contrary to its pristine reputation. While some issues, like the prevalence of DBCP, can be partially credited to the involvement of other nations, the country's issues with racism and colorism is a malady native to Costa Rica. The reckoning that needs to happen involves understanding the impactful *limonenses* that laid the groundwork for these gains to be made. As of now, the credit for the prosperity of the banana industry still lies with Minor Keith. The official United Fruit website fails to mention any union or labor demands made upon the company in its entire chronology.⁴⁵ The failure to acknowledge the past needs to be remedied in the present. The foundational role of black immigrants in building some of the most important transportation and organizational infrastructure in the country should not continue to be willfully ignored. It is imperative to continue to study the West Indians of Costa Rica to fully recognize their impact in the development of the country.

⁴⁴ McCoy-Torres, "Cien porcientos Tico Tico," 24.

⁴⁵ "Chronology," United Fruit, last modified 2001, accessed December 12, 2020, <http://www.unitedfruit.org/chron.htm>

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RACE AND IDENTITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY SIDES OF JOSÉ VASCONCELOS AND HIS “COSMIC RACE”

| Christopher M. Carroll

José Vasconcelos' writings regarding race were influential in the formation of an inclusive form of Mexican nationalism and a greater pan-American identity in the post-colonial Americas. His most famous work, *La Raza Cómica* (The Cosmic Race), published in 1925, put forward the idea of a fifth race forming in the new world through mestizaje, a term for interracial and/or intercultural mixing that was used to denote the positive qualities of the mixed-race population forming in the Americas.¹ He made contributions to Mexican society that are indisputable, being instrumental in educational reform as Secretary of Public Education under Obregón. He provided the motto for the National Autonomous University of Mexico “Por mi raza hablará el espíritu” ('Through my race, the spirit will speak'), alluding to his vision in *La Raza Cómica* and its role in Mexican education. In modern Mexico, Vasconcelos is responsible for making the state education-conscious, exemplified by the fact that the government's budget for education is still higher than that of the military.² However, later in life, he would come to reject his philosophy and spend time working for the Nazi Party as a propagandist in the Second World War, as well as espousing Francisco Franco of Spain and Benito Mussolini of Italy. People may cherry-pick what they like out of Vasconcelos' life, as he was a man full of contradictions and changes of opinions who should be read conscious of the context of his time in Mexico during and after the Revolution. However, there is no denying that Vasconcelos engaged in racialized thinking, even if it was relatively progressive compared to the thinking in 1920s society. This may make his work on *La Raza Cómica* uncomfortable to some regarding his strong racial focus and fascist sympathies in his late-career; however, his original ideas regarding mestizaje helped bring together the ethnically diverse people of Latin America into a common racial identity.

Vasconcelos argued in *La Raza Cómica* that the fifth race would emerge in the future as an agglomeration of the positive qualities of the four core races of the world: Caucasian, African, Asian, and Indigenous. He referenced the colonial domination of the world by whites as temporary in history, but important in acting as a bridge,

¹ José Vasconcelos, *The Cosmic Race* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 403.

² José Vasconcelos, *A Mexican Ulysses* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), 9.

writing, “The white race has brought the world to a state in which all human types and cultures will be able to fuse with each other.”³ The civilization organized by whites, according to Vasconcelos, led to the conditions necessary for the creation of the fifth race. He noted that the two most daring branches of the European family, the Spanish and the English, each achieved success colonizing large swaths of the known world. He believed that the English overtook the Spanish due to Napoleon Bonaparte’s sale of Louisiana, handing over the New World to the Anglo-European United States and cutting Spain out of complete control of the Americas. Vasconcelos considered this an important point because he saw the attitude of the Anglo and the Iberian as different when faced with the idea of miscegenation. The Spanish mixed with the native people, resulting in Mestizos while the English tended to mix only with other whites and exterminate the native people in the land they conquered, rather than bring them into the national community. “Only the Iberian part of the continent (of Europe) possess[ed] the spiritual factors, the race, and the territory necessary for the great enterprise of initiating the new universal era of Humanity,” he wrote. “All the races that are to provide their contribution are already there.” The Iberian people possessed a “spiritual factor” vital to the creation of the fifth race through personal choice, which Vasconcelos referred to as esthetics through selection of beauty, rather than the Anglo method of force and extermination.⁴

Vasconcelos was not the first to discuss these ideas, however, as many important figures before him referenced mestizaje in the formation of a common identity in the Americas. Simón Bolívar of Venezuela influenced greatly the formation of national identity in postcolonial Latin America. Nicknamed the “Great Liberator,” he saw the demands of the people in Spain’s colonial empire for autonomy and a growing sense of nationality which would sow the seeds of revolution. He used the themes of liberty and equality as the basis for his revolution, giving Spanish-American independence its “intellectual underpinning” and overseeing the transition of several Spanish colonies into countries of their own.⁵ Two statements made by Bolívar, the “Carta de Jamaica” in 1815 and the “Address at the Congress of Angostura” in 1819, are known by many as the “anchor documents” of mestizaje.⁶ First, his letter to the governor of Jamaica described the problem of identity felt by the Spanish colonies showing signs of emergent nationalist and

³ Vasconcelos, *Cosmic*, 405.

⁴ Ibid, 406-411.

⁵ John Lynch, *Simón Bolívar: A Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 284.

⁶ Marilyn Grace Miller, *Rise and Fall of the Cosmic Race: The Cult of Mestizaje in Latin America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 8.

revolutionary thought. “Americans by birth, they were neither Indian nor European, but in the ambiguous position between usurped and usurpers...not only deprived of their rights but kept in a state of political infancy.”⁷ He again referenced the mixed-race identity that would become the basis for the new republics when he became president of Venezuela, saying “we are not Europeans; we are not Indians; we are but a mixed species of aborigines and Spaniards. Americans by birth and Europeans by law, we find ourselves engaged in a dual conflict.”⁸

With Bolívar birthing the idea of mestizaje as the basis for a pan-American identity, Cuban José Martí successfully built upon it decades later. His admiration for Bolívar is exemplified by his words written during a trip to Venezuela, where he noted: “all Americans should love Bolívar as a father-Bolívar...[who] fought so that America would belong to the American man.”⁹ Martí was the founder of the Cuban Revolutionary Party and is known as an apostle among the Cuban people. He advocated for a Cuba based on racial equality as he explicitly stated in his essay “Mi raza,” saying “Cuban [means] more than white, more than mulatto, more than black,” recognizing the role of Afro-Cubans who were brought to the island as slaves to be an equal and valid part of the emerging mixed identity.¹⁰ He additionally warned of the greatest threat to Cuban independence that was not Spain, but the “seven-league giant” of the United States in his “Nuestra América.” To protect Cuba and survive cultural, political, and economic subjugation as a newly independent nation, Martí believed the only option was for Cubans to form policy based on the “needs and aspirations of their own peoples. To act in mere imitation of the United States or otherwise submit to its imperatives in the governance of their own countries was to invite disaster.”¹¹ His warnings of the United States were prophetic given its role in Cuban history since independence, and reminiscent of Vasconcelos’ rhetoric against the “Yankee imperialists,” a consistent theme in his work. The combined work of Bolívar and Martí imagined a mixed people with a common language and law system as the basis of identity for the new nations Spain had birthed. These ideas formed the intellectual framework that Vasconcelos later drew from in his writing of *La Raza Cósmica*, which dealt with the question of race relations in heterogeneous republics.

⁷ Lynch, *Bolívar*, 93.

⁸ Simón Bolívar, “Address at the Congress of Angostura,” *Brown University Library*, Accessed November 24, 2020.

<https://bit.ly/3lMAV9u>

⁹ Alfred J. López, *José Martí: A Revolutionary Life* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 206.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 269.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 248.

Vasconcelos' prediction of the cosmic race in the Americas transformed mestizaje ideology into its fully developed form. The political need for unity through the foundation of national and regional identity led to racialized thinking that became intertwined with Vasconcelos' idea of eugenics based on aesthetics. The slogan for the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México "Por mi raza hablará el espíritu" encapsulated his dream of bringing people together through common blood and language. "Raza es, en suma, todo lo que somos por el espíritu"¹² ('race is, in short, all that we are by spirit'), a spirit formed through the combined aspects of Catholicism and the Spanish language/blood, as he would further emphasize the Christian character of the mestizo by identifying the spirit in his slogan as the Holy Spirit itself.¹³

Born in the city of Oaxaca, Mexico in 1882, Vasconcelos attended school in Eagle Pass, Texas, and became bilingual in English and Spanish. His early life experiences in such a diverse border town contributed to his attitudes towards miscegenation and Anglo-American culture. Vasconcelos discussed in his autobiography, *A Mexican Ulysses*, the ethnic tension prevalent in his childhood, writing "The independence of Texas and the war of 1847 divided the class into rival camps. We Mexicans in the class were not numerous, but we stood our ground."¹⁴ A product of mestizaje himself (half indigenous and half Portuguese), his experience as an outsider in his upbringing led to his contradictory views toward himself, the relationship between Mexico and the "Yankee" United States, and the idea of mestizaje he would expound upon in his *La Raza Cósmica*.¹⁵

Vasconcelos graduated from law school in Mexico City in 1905 with his thesis, *Dynamic Theory of Law*, and became the founding member of the group Ateneo de la Juventud (Athenaeum of Youth) four years later. Many important Mexican intellectuals, including muralist Diego Rivera and writer Alfonso Reyes, joined this group that sought to find a "spiritual alternative for the excessively materialist and scientific positivism, the official ideology of the Díaz regime."¹⁶ The Ateneo instead sought a cultural creation through the humanities and Mexican culture, while at the same time rejecting U.S.-influenced materialism. Many standard histories of Mexico see the Ateneo as the

¹² Alfonso Taracena, *José Vasconcelos* (Ciudad de México: Editorial Porrúa, 1982), 32.

¹³ Grace Miller, *Cult*, 28.

¹⁴ Vasconcelos, *Ulysses*, 25.

¹⁵ Ilan Stavans, *José Vasconcelos: The Prophet of Race* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 29.

¹⁶ Luis A. Marentes, *José Vasconcelos and the Writing of the Mexican Revolution* (New York City: Twayne Publishers, 2000), 2.

intellectual precursor to the Mexican Revolution.¹⁷ Writing in his autobiography, Vasconcelos noted, “But even in that period of love of science, I remained antiscientific without knowing it, in the sense that what interested me were not the details of investigation nor what was later called ‘behavior in the animal realm,’ but rather what science cannot explain in the meaning of the zoological in relation to the fate of man.” This mindset was at odds with Díaz’s positivism, which he described as strangling the imaginations of the people by insisting that one shouldn’t give “credence to anything but the evidence of [the] senses.”¹⁸ His stance led him to make unscientific claims regarding genetics that helped form the basis of his argument in *La Raza Cósmica*. His brash assertions, which included calling all genetic traits simple dominants or recessives and judging all dominants as good and all recessives as bad constitute questionable assumptions at best. He also failed to bring up the possibility of the recurrence of traits selected against through mutation, which challenges his idea that the best of all the races would be selected for.¹⁹

Nancy Leys Stepan touched on the role of the rising eugenics movements in influencing Vasconcelos’ thoughts on mestizaje. She noted that the anticlerical and socialist elements of the revolution of 1910-1917 made the country “receptive to new developments in science and social thought” that included eugenics policy which lasted into the 1930s.²⁰ Procreation regulated “for the benefit of society” drew from Darwinist thought to encourage a healthy populace while integrating the Indian population into the nation. Vasconcelos drew from eugenics when he “imagined that the hybrid subject was to become the strongest of all races.”²¹ The influence for his genetic thinking came from the theory of heredity formulated by Gregor Mendel, known as Mendelism. The concept demonstrated that in some plants and animals, the crossing of two inbred strains results in a vigorous stock. Vasconcelos applied this thinking to the human species. The mestizo, according to Vasconcelos, is the hybrid stock that forms “the dominant element of the Latin American continent,” with a mixture of the best characteristics of the Spanish and the Indigenous.²²

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Vasconcelos, *Ulysses*, 34, 38.

¹⁹ Gabriella De Beer, *José Vasconcelos and His World* (New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1966), 301.

²⁰ Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 55.

²¹ Linnette Manrique, “Dreaming of a Cosmic Race: José Vasconcelos and the Politics of Race in Mexico, 1920s-1930s,” *Cogent Arts & Humanities* 3:1 (2016): 3, doi: 10.1080/23311983.2016.1218316.

²² De Beer, *World*, 308.

Vasconcelos' strong racial focus in this work reads as outdated to modern ears. The thesis shows his eurocentrism, with a heavy emphasis on the importance of the qualities of the white Iberian race in highlighting the positive qualities of mestizo people. This is contrasted with the minor emphasis given to the qualities of the other three races (the Black, the Indian, and the Mongol). His words in his autobiography help spell out his views regarding the Indian population in his home state of Oaxaca:

One day in Oaxaca, while I was looking at the old houses with their noble coats of arms and the patios with their beautiful stone arcades, I noticed how small the white population was, and how many Indians from the surrounding highlands were invading the streets, wrapped in their blankets, silent and impassive. And I understood the whole tragic process of the history of Mexico; it lies in this displacement, in the exhaustion of the conquering and civilizing Spanish blood. In the time of Juarez and the reform movement, Oaxaca contained a nucleus of Mexican-born people of Spanish blood that could not have been better. This group fought for the improvement of the country and the defeat of Santa Ana, fought against the Empire, and later spread throughout the Republic, taking all kinds of managerial positions. The city was drained of its white citizens and the houses that remained deserted were slowly taken over by Indians. The unifying bonds, the educational work necessary if the racial change was not to be a landslide were lacking. The racial mixture, which is indispensable and can be our salvation, has not had time to bear fruit. And the result is that, with the departure of the old families, Oaxaca has returned into a manor house in ruins.²³

Vasconcelos often credits the aspects he deems positive to Mexican culture as deriving from the blood of Spanish Europeans. He imagines a Latin American community, white in character with the Indian element being pushed to the sidelines, its culture viewed with ambivalence at best. The mestizaje that Vasconcelos envisions sees the Indian having to choose either becoming modern or disappearing, with non-European traits devalued in his ideals based in eugenic-inspired esthetics.²⁴

This attitude would lead to Vasconcelos trying to expand education to Mexico's rural poor, a forward-thinking aspect of his career notwithstanding his prejudicial motivations. During his career as Minister of Education (1921-1924), Vasconcelos expanded education across the country into three branches: Schools, Libraries, and Fine Arts. He additionally set up "auxillary and provisional departments, to supervise teachers who would follow closely the methods of the

²³ Vasconcelos, *Ulysses*, 191.

²⁴ Manrique, *Dreaming*, 10

Catholic missionaries of the Colony among Indians who still do not know Spanish.”²⁵ These “Indian Departments,” as Vasconcelos called them, attempted to continue the “civilizing work” of the Spanish missionaries, as he wrote that “the inspiration for teaching the Indians came to us, as was natural, from the Spanish tradition.”²⁶ Education did not include Afro-mestizo and indigenous cultures, and Vasconcelos often battled with Mexico’s *indigenistas* over the formation of a nationalist idea rooted in the indigenous people. Nevertheless, his work included some aspects that would help bring the indigenous into the national community. His funding of the three great muralists of Mexico (David Alfaro Siqueiros, José Clemente Orozco, and Diego Rivera) helped form the artistic representation of the indigenous and the dark-skinned mestizo in the creation of an identity, easy to present to the masses in an artistic format.²⁷

The cosmic race theory in Latin America enjoys a mixed legacy, akin to that of Vasconcelos himself, with positives and negatives depending on how identities are prioritized in each society. The idea of *lo mestizo* as a unifying idea is a useful one in creating an image of a nation that binds people together. In the Caribbean, Cuba’s port at Havana made it a hub for traffic that resulted in high levels of miscegenation and a diverse ethnic makeup that Vasconcelos noted positively when discussing their racial relations in comparison to the “Yankee” United States.²⁸ It is this status as a “crossroads of the world” between the new world and the old that makes the Caribbean a “privileged space for mestizaje.”²⁹ The Cuban poet Nicolás Cristóbal Guillén Batista, a product of African and European ancestry, wrote in his 1931 “mulatto verses” about the races of the island who were dissimilar but joined together to bridge the gap between them. He concluded that “the spirit of Cuba is mestizo,” meaning that mestizaje/mulataje formed the national identity of the island.³⁰

Brazil is another clear example of a society marked by racial mixing, due to the nation’s history with slavery. Brazil received the most African slaves in any nation during the history of the Atlantic slave trade to work the numerous Portuguese sugar plantations. In the time

²⁵ Vasconcelos, *Ulysses*, 152.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 169.

²⁷ Augustin Palacios, “Multicultural Vasconcelos: The optimistic, and at times willful, misreading of *La Raza Cómica*,” *Macmillan Publishers* (2017): 418, doi:10.1057/s41276-017-0095-6.

²⁸ Vasconcelos, *Ulysses*, 132.

²⁹ Grace Miller, *Cult*, 52.

³⁰ Lourdes Martinez-Echazabal, “Mestizaje and the Discourse of National/Cultural Identity in Latin America, 1845-1959,” *Latin American Perspectives* 25, no.3 (1998): 22-23.

after Brazil won independence from Portugal, Frenchman Gustave Aimard described the face of the nation as a “festival of colors,” referring to the mulatto identity of the tropical nation.³¹ This makes Brazil an ideal case study for Vasconcelos’ advocacy of the hybridity of dissimilar races. The detractors of Brazilian mestizaje saw the mulatto population as empty of positive qualities, an idea fought against by Brazilian intellectuals who praised the nation for its mixed identity and privileged space for mestizaje, similar to that of Havana. The ideas of Vasconcelos’ *La Raza Cósmica* can be seen through this movement, especially in Gilberto Freyre’s famous work *The Masters and the Slaves*, which “shifted the focus from miscegenation as racial mixture, from hybridity as a pathology, to [mestizaje] as productive of a rich, multi-accented culture.”³²

The United States during the 1960s and ‘70s saw the rise of “Chicano/a” identity for Americans of Mexican descent in opposition to assimilation into Anglo-American society. The actors in the Chicano movement flipped the pejorative term into a positive identity based on the notion of “la raza unida” (the united people/race) and “carnalismo” (brotherhood and sisterhood), inspiring a “political and cultural renaissance among Mexican American youths of the Southwest [United States].”³³ Vasconcelos’ idea of *La Raza Cósmica* became a highly appealing concept to the students in this movement during the ‘60s. The concept became bigger than the book or Vasconcelos himself, inspiring the slogan “La Raza.” No evidence exists that the leaders (Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, Reies López Tijerina, etc.) were directly familiar with Vasconcelos’ work. Nonetheless, the ideas in *La Raza Cósmica* were the intellectual foundation for the flipping of “brownness” from subservient to ascendant.³⁴

So much of Vasconcelos’ thesis is based on the preconception that “Indian” and “mestizo” are clearly defined biological concepts. This should not just be taken at face value to be true, even if individuals and societies today and in Vasconcelos’ time behave as though it is. In his chapter on Mexico in *The Idea of Race in Latin America*, Alan Knight stated “The supposed genetic bases of ‘racial’ differentiation have never been proven and, in consequence, the very category ‘race’ has been rightly questioned.”³⁵ “Racial purity” in the time of Latin

³¹ Grace Miller, *Cult*, 97.

³² Ibid.

³³ David Montejano, *Quixote’s Soldiers: A Local History of the Chicano Movement, 1966-1981* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 2.

³⁴ Stavans, *Prophet*, 43.

³⁵ Alan Knight, “Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940” in *The Idea of Race in Latin America*, ed. Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 72.

American independence movements was virtually nonexistent due to the generations of ethnic mixing that had occurred. An “Indian” was identified by ethnographers through ethnic terms such as that of language and culture. Aspects that are far from static, and therefore non-reliable for biological identification. In this sense, race has been used in Latin America as a “common but genetically unsound shorthand for ethnicity.”³⁶

These ideas can lead mestizaje to be used negatively, devaluing the identity of indigenous people. A narrative rooted in ideas of white supremacy, “‘Mejorar la raza’ is a common phrase in Latin American countries, which means ‘improve the race.’”³⁷ The phrase implies that individuals of Indian or African ancestry, as well as mestizos with darker skin, should seek a partner with lighter skin. The goal of this pursuit is to have children with more European characteristics. European standards of beauty are used as a pretext for racism, a notion so ingrained in the culture that many in Latin America see nothing wrong with such an idea.³⁸ This concept of racial “whitening,” also known as “blanqueamiento,” intertwines with the idea of mestizaje in Latin America. Margarita Chaves noted in her study on the subject that “Latin Americanists - generally from the United States - saw mestizaje as a problematic ideology that created inequality, sustained racial hierarchies and sought homogenization and blanqueamiento.”³⁹

Official *indigenista* ideology of the state may endorse the idea of “Indianness” as connected to the identity of the nation. However, throughout Latin-American society, “Indianness” is treated as a negative trait. The Indian identity is associated with a lack of material possessions, education, and a poor grasp of the Spanish language, aspects not associated with the white elements in society. This pedestal that society places “whiteness” on can be seen in the form of blanqueamiento “reinforced by film, television, and advertising stereotypes” in standards of beauty across Latin America.⁴⁰ Mestizaje as a myth of national unity in Latin America is useful for the creators of a nation because it serves to distract from a reality of divisions in all aspects of society. But this denial of race, racism, and blanqueamiento in everyday life leads to an aspiration of whiteness that otherizes indigenous peoples. Put another way, mestizofilia or the cult of

³⁶ Ibid., 73-75.

³⁷ Maria Alejandra Casale-Hardin, “‘Mejorar la Raza’: An Example of Racism in Latino Culture,” *Huffpost*, June 15, 2015.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Margarita Chaves and Marta Zambrano, “From blanqueamiento to reindigenización: Paradoxes of mestizaje and multiculturalism in contemporary Colombia,” *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 80, (2006): 7.

⁴⁰ Knight, Racism, 100.

mestizaje sidelines these concerns; it constructs unity for most at the expense of some.⁴¹

Vasconcelos would come to distance himself from his work on *La Raza Cómica* and in the end reject his findings altogether. His unsuccessful Presidential campaign in 1929 against Pascual Ortiz Rubio marked a turning point in his thought regarding the Mexican nation. Before, he spoke critically but ultimately defensively of Mexico and her people. Afterward, he became sour and resentful. When asked about his opinion regarding Mexico and her people, he said that he felt “more nausea than admiration” and that Mexicans “are a people made up overwhelmingly of cowards.”⁴² He would denounce his ideas of mestizaje fully in a speech he gave in 1944, calling it “one of my silly notions....[P]erhaps one of my most notorious mistakes, was the idea that I drew from my adolescence in the tropics, the idea that proclaimed my faith in our mixed race and potent future.”⁴³

Vasconcelos’ later life saw him adopting fascist sympathies. His support of Benito Mussolini and Francisco Franco derived from his ideals of Iberian supremacy. Siding with Franco’s troops in opposition to the Republican government led by the Popular Front, he saw the Republicans as anticlerical and a threat to the “Catholic order in Spain.”⁴⁴ His lesser-known but likely more consequential support for Adolf Hitler is seldom discussed. In 1940, Vasconcelos worked as the editor for the magazine *Timón* and accepted \$5,000 a month from the Nazi party’s propaganda machine to agitate in favor of Germany and against the Allies. The magazine included cartoons that persuaded Mexico to stay out of the war and highlighted the skills of the German people. He portrayed the U.S., the U.K., and France as greedy imperialists and Jewish “double-crossers.”⁴⁵ In many issues, Vasconcelos painted Hitler as a democratic leader who used strong leadership to raise and lead Germany, something Mexico should strive to emulate. Germany was shown as the likely winner of the war and would come to help liberate Latin America from the influence of a defeated United States. Anti-Semitism was used frequently to paint Jews as part of a cabal trying to manipulate world affairs. Vasconcelos’ work on *Timón* makes it clear he was no defender of multiculturalism

⁴¹ Manrique, Dreaming, 5.

⁴² Stavans, *Prophet*, 39.

⁴³ Grace Miller, *Cult*, 40.

⁴⁴ Marentes, *Writing*, 49.

⁴⁵ “The Nazi Fifth Column and Communist Allies are Active in Mexico,” *Life*, June 10, 1940, 51-54.

and did not favor racial diversity despite his advocacy for mixing in *La Raza Cómica*.⁴⁶

Vasconcelos published *Timón* from February to June 1940, totaling seventeen issues before the Mexican government censored it for violating Mexico's neutral stance in the war. President of Mexico Lazaro Cardenas had just expropriated oil from North American and British companies in 1938, his justification for doing so marked by a nationalist strategy based on an anti-Anglo stance. This made Mexico a petri dish for "Germanophilia" and formed the basis for Mexico's readiness to accept anti-British propaganda. Mexico's oil and proximity to the United States were strategically important to the Nazis, so they recruited many local supporters to assist the Nazi effort. Vasconcelos, with his role as editor of *Timón*, was the most important.⁴⁷ Vasconcelos' work for the Nazis should be seen in the context of his "anti-Yankee" rhetoric that influenced much of his thinking throughout his life.

Given Vasconcelos' drastic ideological turn in his later life, his portrayal as a champion of multiculturalism seems curious. Gabriella de Beer's study, *José Vasconcelos and His World* was one of the first and most well-known studies of the man which includes praise for Vasconcelos' work as advocating the premise of "equality of all the races of man and their inalienable rights to equal opportunities."⁴⁸ The writings of European-American philosopher John H. Haddox even more bluntly painted Vasconcelos as a theorist of racial equality. In his 1967 book, *Vasconcelos of Mexico: Philosopher and Prophet*, Haddox stated that Vasconcelos believed "no race is inferior or superior to another in any general sense. Different races and nations develop strengths in different areas. Yet no race exists that is inherently lacking." In reference to *La Raza Cómica* Haddox wrote "This theory that emphasizes the compatibility of racial diversity and human unity contains a significant message for a world torn with racial strife."⁴⁹ Both Haddox and de Beer fail to include a reference to his fascist sympathies, neglecting to mention his work on *Timón*. Additionally, the image painted of Vasconcelos as a champion for equality ignores his views regarding indigenous peoples, his belief in racial hierarchies, and the emphasis he placed on Spanish exceptionalism in *La Raza Cómica*. It seems, then, that the reading of his work by these authors as nonracist

⁴⁶ Palacios, Multicultural, 423-424.

⁴⁷ Mauricio Pilatowsky, "El acercamiento de José Vasconcelos al nazismo y su dirección de la revista El Timón," *Estudios* 110, vol. XII (2014): 163-164.

⁴⁸ De Beer, *World*, 384.

⁴⁹ John H. Haddox, *Vasconcelos of Mexico: Philosopher and Prophet* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 68.

and multicultural denies, willfully or otherwise, Vasconcelos' ideas of Hispanic exceptionalism.⁵⁰

The dream of a fifth race in the new world certainly inspired a common identity for the people born in the Americas. The prophet who spoke of this cosmic race was progressive when taken in the context of the racial thinking of the 1920s, but his thinking is still rooted in ideas of racial supremacy. A man full of inconsistencies and contradictions, he rejected any progressive findings he had in the latter part of his career, sympathized with fascist leaders, and even collaborated with the Nazi party. One might find the reading of *La Raza Cósmica* as an antiracist work ironic given the views and motivations of the author even in the time he wrote it. The work is not in itself a model for an inclusive nationalism in the Americas. However, the idea of a cosmic race has transcended Vasconcelos' work on *La Raza Cósmica*. The identity he helped bring forward exists for many who have never even heard of the man, let alone those who have read his work. He helped form the intellectual foundation for identity in Latin America. Like his intellectual predecessors, Vasconcelos is remembered for the positive and forward-thinking message that *La Raza Cósmica* is often portrayed as, not his contradictions and ideological misgivings. This common identity of *lo mestizo* foretold as "the cosmic race" is marked with imperfection, and its misgivings should be called out, but is helpful nonetheless in the pursuit of bringing diverse people together in a national mythos.

⁵⁰ Palacios, Multicultural, 436.

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UTILIZATION AND TREATMENT OF THE SENEGALESE TIRAILLEURS BY THE FRENCH MILITARY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

| Garrett Harrison

Over the course of the First World War, France mobilized 600,000 soldiers from its vast overseas empire to fight and die in a horrific war in a foreign land and culture. Men from Madagascar, Indochina, Equatorial Africa and even Tahiti braved the call to serve in the defense of their colonial overseers, but one group stood out among all the rest: the 140,000 West Africans of the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* that served in the gruesome trenches of the Western Front and participated in the infamous battles of Verdun and the Somme.

This paper is an exploration of the role these Africans played while serving under the French banner from 1910 to 1919. The goal of this paper is to examine how racial preconceptions about Africans, prior to their use as soldiers in the French military, affected how they were utilized throughout the course of the war and how the French High Command, officers, metropolitan army and civilians treated African soldiers.

Who were the *Senegalese Tirailleurs*?

Black African military service got its roots in 1857 when the Governor of French Senegal, Louis Faidherbe, successfully converted numerous unconnected West African military companies into the First Regiment of *Senegalese Tirailleurs* or Senegalese Rifles.¹ These soldiers served as the foundational colonial combat force for French imperialism, serving under commanders in Madagascar, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Indochina and anywhere else the French believed was ripe for integration into their empire over the next fifty years.² If these soldiers needed any more evidence to prove their worth to the French Empire, they found it in the 1908 Moroccan campaign. In order to cement France's political presence in North Africa, they needed to turn their imperial eyes on Morocco. The state was engaged in a civil war after the ruling Sultan in 1908, Abd al-Aziz, abdicated the throne to his brother, Abd al-Hafiz, who in turn bankrupted the country.³ Al-

¹ Myron J. Echenberg, "Paying the Blood Tax: Military Conscription in French West Africa, 1914-1929." *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 9, no. 2 (1975): 171-92.

² Echenberg, "Paying the Blood Tax," 173.

³ Sarah Zimmerman, "Mesdames Tirailleurs and Indirect Clients: West African Women and the French Colonial Army, 1908—1918." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 44, no. 2 (2011): 299-322.

Hafiz, desperate for money, took out a loan from the French government. This gave the French an avenue to intervene politically and militarily in the country.⁴ From there, the French deployed two units of *Senegalese Tirailleurs* to Casablanca to defend the port from local raiders and used the murder of a French doctor the previous year as justification for rapid military escalation.⁵ This incident resulted in a campaign to pacify the Moroccan interior with the *Tirailleurs* at the center of the operation. Just a year later, the first scheme geared toward transforming the small West African fighting force into an army large enough to be used in Europe was hatched.

Tirailleurs as a European Army?

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mangin, Commander of the French West African Troops from 1907 to 1911, argued in favor of the efficacy of adopting a policy that sought to bring Africans to Europe should war ever erupt between France and Germany.⁶ In 1909, Mangin began formulating a series of arguments that would demonstrate why the French military and the French government would benefit from having such a policy in place.⁷ Shortly after in 1910, Mangin published his arguments in a book titled *La Force Noire* or the “Black Force,” stating that in order to solve the growing demographic imbalance between France and Germany, an African reserve was to be created for use in the event of a European war.⁸ Three key military premises were cited by Mangin: Firstly, West Africa contained sufficient numbers of young men to create such a reservoir; secondly, military recruitment there was feasible; and lastly, such troops, once raised would make good soldiers.⁹ Mangin also outlined a series of traits that made Africans outstanding soldiers. He argued that once trained properly, these men were able to survive in harsher climates than other races -- they possessed the ability to carry heavier loads over great distances thanks to their history as porters. An underdeveloped nervous system compared to whites that afforded them greater resistance to pain. He noted they had a fundamental sense of discipline and hierarchy present in African society was easily transferable to military life. And lastly Africans were

⁴ Zimmerman, “Mesdames Tirailleurs and Indirect Clients,” 305.

⁵ Ibid., 305-306

⁶ Joe Lunn, "'Les Races Guerrierès': Racial Preconceptions in the French Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 4 (1999): 517-36.

⁷ Lunn, "'Les Races Guerrierès,'" 519.

⁸ Ibid., 519.

⁹ Ibid.

naturally suited to be soldiers because Africa had been a constant battlefield for centuries.¹⁰

Mangin was not alone in his defense of Africans' natural affinity for soldiering. Prominent military leaders, such as General Hippolyte Langlois and General Joseph Gallieni, contended that the warrior qualities of the *Senegalese* made them ideal shock troopers that would be proud to serve under the orders of French leaders and that their bloody and fatalist temperament rendered them terrible foes to go against in battle.¹¹ General Henri Bonnal further argued that in the coming war "black troops will have no rivals when it is a matter of delivering the final shock, their savage impetuosity in attacks with the bayonet" would strike fear into the hearts of France's enemies.¹² In the debate over the efficacy of African troops in Europe, the German press launched attacks that berated the French for even considering the use of the uncivilized and barbaric black race as European recruits.¹³ This German hostility towards the program however did not lessen the resolve of French proponents, rather it further reinforced French officers who supported the program because the German response only reflected their own soldiers' fears making Africans value to defending the motherland that much better.¹⁴

Not all French officers considered these points sufficient enough to justify the creation of a European African reserve. Heated debate continued in the French military with many other officers still on the fence about the feasibility of deploying these troops to Europe and their utility. Two prominent critics of Mangin's proposals included the former commander of the French forces in Madagascar, General Louis de Torcy and the *commandant* of the expeditionary corps in Morocco, General Charles Moinier.¹⁵ The two men cited three reservations they had with the plan: one was that colder climates made African troops more susceptible to disease and could equally spread tropical contagions to European troops.¹⁶ Secondly, because training camps would be both isolated from metropolitan areas and segregated there would be increased costs to train Africans in Europe.¹⁷ Lastly, despite their best efforts to keep Africans out of contact with the white populations,

¹⁰ Ibid., 521.

¹¹ Ruth Ginio, "French Officers, African Officers, and the Violent Image of African Colonial Soldiers." *Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques* 36, no. 2 (2010): 59-75.

¹² Ginio, "French Officers," 64.

¹³ Ibid., 63.

¹⁴ Ibid., 64.

¹⁵ Lunn, "Les Races Guerrieres," 525.

¹⁶ Ibid., 525.

¹⁷ Ibid.

mingling between the two would still occur if the *Tirailleurs* were stationed in France.¹⁸

Detractors of Mangin's plan further cited concerns about whether Africans would retain their special organization within the French colonial army which allowed African soldiers to take along their wives and children to military camps and whether or not they could operate within a modern, highly technical army that relied on strict discipline and a shared language.¹⁹ In the end these concerns would be overlooked. Mangin and his supporters, who were not afraid to exploit European fears regarding the perceived brutality of African soldiers, won the day.

Recruitment, Organization and Perception of the *Senegalese*

France's expansive empire in Africa and South East Asia had been achieved by effectively using indigenous populations and Europeans as soldiers. These colonial troops were divided into two branches: the *Armée d'Afrique* (Army of Africa) which included the Zouaves (an all-white unit with continental Frenchmen and those born in Algeria), the Foreign Legion, *Batallion Afrique* (African Battalion) and Algerian and Tunisian *tirailleurs*; the second branch was the *Armée Coloniale* (Colonial Army) which included some white units but contained the *Senegalese* and Vietnamese *Tirailleurs*.²⁰ At the outbreak of the war in 1914, the number of *Senegalese Tirailleurs* in the Colonial Army numbered around 30,000.²¹ Extensive enlistment of West Africans had not begun thus attributing to their relatively small number, but French High Command's belief that the war in Europe would end quickly also meant that African troops would not be needed. Instead they opted to use the majority of them as garrison troops in North Africa or in the periphery outside of France.²²

There were however seven battalion sized units of West Africans grouped under the name *Batallion Tirailleurs Senegalese (BTS)* that came from garrisons in North Africa and were deployed to France at the end of September 1914.²³ Most of these men were combat veterans from the campaign in Morocco, but these men were hastily sent to France with no time to prepare or adapt to the new front and were

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Janos Riesz and Aija Bjornson. "The "Tirailleur Sénégalaïs" Who Did Not Want to Be a "Grand Enfant": Bakary Diallo's "Force Bonté" (1926) Reconsidered." *Research in African Literatures* 27, no. 4 (1996): 157-79.

²⁰ William Dean. "Morale among French Colonial Troops on the Western Front during World War I: 1914–1918." *Scientia Militaria* 38, no. 2 (2011): 44-61.

²¹ Dean, "Morale among French Colonial Troops," 44.

²² Lunn, "Les Race Guerrierès," 526.

²³ Dean, "Morale among French Colonial Troops," 45.

subsequently placed in the most dangerous posts available.²⁴ Additionally, these *BTS* units had no black officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) or machine gunners; all of these positions were filled by white cadre.²⁵ Despite these setbacks, the *BTS* units performed well except for one case of a unit apparently panicking during combat and becoming the scapegoat the French High Command needed to discredit the use of black troops on the Western Front.²⁶ This, along with a casualty rate of 67% of the black infantrymen and 18% of their white cadre by November, attributed to the subsequent removal of *BTS* units on the Western Front and their relocation to warmer climates in Southern France and Northern Africa and their redeployment to the Dardanelles in 1915.²⁷

These *BTS* units constituted a small minority of West African troops that saw deployment in the early stages of the war. It was not until the French government understood after military disasters in 1915, that the war would not be quick and easy but would rather be a bloody war of attrition. With this now in mind, French policy toward *Senegalese* recruitment took a dramatic turn with high command authorizing massive recruitment waves in late 1915 that would begin in the summer of 1916.²⁸ These new formations were raised and combined with pre-existing units to be deployed *en masse* on the Western Front during the same year and notably took part in the Battle of the Somme and Verdun.²⁹ During the Verdun counteroffensives, the *Tirailleurs* recaptured Fort Douaumont, which was largely considered the strongest defensive position on the western front from the Germans.³⁰ These two key events solidified the usefulness of the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* on the Western Front and their deployment from 1916 on to be used extensively in France.

With the *Tirailleurs* now predominately based in France thanks to their successes in 1916, their usage on the battlefield was slightly altered. From mid-1917 onwards, African units were now dispersed along the entire Front to serve as tactical spearheads for larger French units and did so at Reims, Villers-Cotteret, and St. Mihiel until the armistice.³¹ Acting as the vanguard for white French army groups

²⁴ Ibid., 45.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Lunn, "Les Races Guerrières," 526.

²⁹ Ibid., 526.

³⁰ Joe Lunn, "Remembering the "Tirailleurs Sénégalaïs" and the Great War: Oral History as a Methodology of Inclusion in French Colonial Studies." *French Colonial History* 10 (2009): 125-49.

³¹ Lunn, "Les Races Guerrières," 526.

came as no surprise as earlier discussions about the efficacy of Africans in Europe from French officers pointed to the fact that Africans possessed natural savage qualities that complemented traits desired in shock troopers.³²

The *Tirailleurs*' attachment to white units is also unsurprising as many French officers, like Captain Emile Nolly, viewed the *Senegalese* as *grand enfant* or "grown children." Often reiterating that every positive or negative quality of the *Senegalese*, their sensitive reactions to injustices suffered and their unquestioning obedience to their superiors could be explained through the lens of a grown child.³³ Two other French officers, Leon Bocquet and Alphonse Seche, stress similar themes regarding the Africans they commanded. Bocquet describes the *Senegalese* as being in a state of primitive humanity that allowed for passionate, gentle, severe, loyal and trustworthy personalities that resulted in them being implacable foes of the Germans while Seche notes their simple spirits and an absolute loyalty to France and her officers that required the French's benevolent paternalism to guide them.³⁴ The *Senegalese* units' apparent reliance on white French officers permeated into official French combat doctrine from 1916 to 1917 and was finally codified during the last year of the war.

The tactical use of the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* was written in the "Notice sur les *Senegalese et leur employ au combat*" or the "Notice on Senegalese and their employment in combat" and distributed to all French officers commanding African units.³⁵ This field manual essentially synthesized earlier preconceptions held by French commanders and officers and made it the *de facto* piece on how African *Tirailleur* units should be run. "Senegalese infantry battalions should be composed of races whose dialects permitted intercommunication via African NCOs and whose natural fighting qualities complemented each other" like Wolofs, Serers, Tukulors and Bambaras who all shared regional dialects and were classified as African warrior races under a racial hierarchy constructed by Mangin.³⁶

Paternalism also found its way into the field manual by emphasizing that despite conducting fierce attacks, African soldiers

³² Nicole M. Zehfuss, "From Stereotype to Individual: World War I Experiences with 'Tirailleurs Sénégalaïs,'" *French Colonial History* 6 (2005): 137-57.

³³ Riesz and Bjornson, "The 'Tirailleur Sénégalaïs' Who Did Not Want to Be a 'Grand Enfant,'" 170.

³⁴ Joe Lunn, "'Bons Soldats' and 'sales Nègres': Changing French Perceptions of West African Soldiers during the First World War," *French Colonial History* 1 (2002): 1-16.

³⁵ Richard, Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 27.

³⁶ Lunn, "Les Race Guerrierès," 529.

were childlike, unpredictable and unreliable.³⁷ This meant they required supervision and leadership from white officers in order to maintain discipline and avoid routs while under fire.³⁸ French tactical doctrine further embraced the idea of Africans as shock troops but recognized that in order for their assault to be properly conducted, two *Tirailleur* battalions had white battalions to their sides or behind them.³⁹ In effect, French High Command was trying to negate casualties suffered by the white metropole army under the guise that African units needed to make up the vanguard of the attack while white units should act as reserve or support units until the *Senegalese* troops either broke through German lines and allowed the entire regiment through or were routed by enemy guns.

Treatment of the *Senegalese*

After being fully deployed to the Western Front, the *Senegalese* received rather poor treatment from French High Command. At the Battle of the Somme in 1916, mediocre *ad hoc* housing was built for the West Africans as well as deplorable barracks and camps.⁴⁰ The major *Senegalese* camp of Corneau was in such poor condition that the first African member of the Chamber of Deputies, Blaise Diagne, called for the camp to be closed.⁴¹ This request was denied as the Camp Commandant, Colonel Fonnsagrives wrote in a report to the Director of Colonial Troops, General Famin, that the quality of the camps was improving and they just needed time to get better.⁴² Commandant Fonnsagrives report grossly misrepresented the real conditions of the camp to French High Command.

Thanks to mild weather before the harsh winter of 1916 and 1917, Fonnsagrives believed that it was unnecessary to distribute winter clothing to the *Senegalese*.⁴³ This oversight directly affected the combat readiness of the *Senegalese* in the Nievelle offensive of 1917 as the winter came to be one of the coldest on record. Twenty-four of the thirty-four *Battalion Tirailleurs Senegalese* (BTS) were placed in combat under General Mangin during the offensive and numerous *BTS* soldiers became sick with pulmonary problems.⁴⁴ *BTS* sent into combat were also inadequately equipped for assaults against German positions. Soldiers noted that they often went into combat with no grenades, signal

³⁷ Fogarty, *Race and War in France*, 57.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 531.

⁴⁰ Dean, "Morale among French Colonial Troops," 52.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

guns and machineguns and instead were given a few rifle cartridges, bayonets and a long African machete called a *coupe-coupe*.⁴⁵ These inadequacies were not remedied until the offensives in July of 1918 and ultimately cost the *BTS* sixty-two and a half percent of its men in the Nievelle offensive alone, effectively earning General Mangin the nickname “Butcher.”⁴⁶

Not only were the troops not issued the necessary equipment for the winter and the Nievelle offensive, West Africans supposedly received an upgrade in their living conditions in the form of prefabricated Adrian barracks. These barracks however, failed to regulate temperature properly and caused them to get too hot during the day and too cool at nighttime.⁴⁷ This caused more issues with heating as there was already an administrative backlog on fuel and no electricity throughout the camps which forced the soldiers to use unsafe oil lamps.⁴⁸ These concerns hampered the effectiveness of the *Senegalese* but, there were a surprising number of privileges afforded to the camps. An abundance of food supplies, a cinema, Sudanese musical instruments, a theatre, and soccer were all made available to the troops, but most importantly the French also allowed Islam to be practiced in the camps.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the overall treatment of the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* at the hands of French High Command was horrendous.

Yet after all the misgivings from high command, the *Tirailleurs* faced far better treatment from the white officers that commanded them. Initially, French officers subscribed to the pre-war image that described the African as animalistic, sexually lustful, lazy, religious degenerate.⁵⁰ Leon Gaillet, a metropolitan lieutenant serving in an African battalion, first characterized black soldiers as grotesque, savage-like people.⁵¹ Captain Emile Nolly expressed that many French officers treated the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* with disdain:

I have known officers who ... showed an obvious aversion to the unfortunate Senegalese, one too much in evidence and so much more so regrettable because these officers were at the head of Senegalese companies. Every day they would find, after studious research, a new motivation for disliking their men and they would create a sensation by listing them, as if with the blare of a trumpet, with a joy they could not hide, one that was almost venomous.... Go

⁴⁵ Ibid., 53-54.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 53.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Gino, “French Officers,” 61.

⁵¹ Zehfuss, “From Stereotype to Individual,” 148.

on, then, teach discipline to those brutes.... Oh, yes, such nice soldiers. And so pleasant to command!⁵²

Many West African soldiers faced experiences of humiliation and unjust treatment thanks to those officers' early views of them. One of those who encountered French racism firsthand was Bakary Diallo. Diallo, an African from M'Bala, Mauritania, joined the French army in 1911 and served with the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* in Senegal, Morocco and on the Western Front.⁵³ During his early years with the *Tirailleurs*, he depicts numerous occasions where he was subject to degradation because he was a black African. A French officer once put Diallo under arrest for eight days because he had been practicing writing French on a freshly whitewashed wall and another time he was jailed for eight days for requesting softer food after fracturing his jaw.⁵⁴

This treatment began to subside however as officers, like Gallet, began to view them as big children instead of savages after training them to fight, watching them play games and dance during time off.⁵⁵ Many more officers further came to praise their African soldiers' courage under fire and a mutual respect for one another's bravery grew after experiencing the traumatic reality of battle together. Captain Nolly later applauded the soldiers for their stamina and tenacity in battle saying "those men are made of iron" and that they were "Nice guys, all the same—superb soldiers!"⁵⁶ Diallo himself saved an officer by the name of Captain Coste from falling into a ditch during battle and a French officer named Captain Paris returned to his troops covered in the blood of one of Diallo's fellow *Senegalese* after rescuing the soldier from the enemy.⁵⁷ Kande Kamara, a Susu West African that joined the French army when war broke out, relays a story about how combat, although hellish, served as an opportunity for Africans to demonstrate their personal courage to the Europeans who denigrated them as racial inferiors and denied them their right to be accepted as men:

One of my younger brothers . . . was shot in the thigh . . . and he cried out ... 'Brother, they've shot me.' But I didn't look at him—I didn't help him—because during wartime, even if your friend is shot dead, you would continue facing the enemy to save your own life ... Soon [after he was shot] the doctor came with the ambulance to

⁵² Riesz and Bjornson, "The 'Tirailleur Sénégalaïs' Who Did Not Want to Be a 'Grand Enfant,'" 169.

⁵³ Ibid., 160.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 169.

⁵⁵ Zehfuss, "From Stereotype to Individual," 148.

⁵⁶ Riesz and Bjornson, "The 'Tirailleur Sénégalaïs' Who Did Not Want to Be a 'Grand Enfant,'" 170.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 170.

look in the gutters. And they found my brother there, and ... they picked him up, and my brother said, 'I'm not going back in that vehicle.' And he asked [the French officers], 'Why did I come here?' And they answered, 'You came to fight.' And he said, 'I'm going to [continue fighting], just come tie my wound'. And the doctor came and tied his leg and gave him some medicine.... Then my brother said, 'let me go ... that's my [older] brother down there, and wherever he dies, I will die there too.' And that's when they said to him, 'You have a really strong heart.' . . . And because he wasn't going to stop fighting, and he was already wounded, and he was going to stay with me, he was promoted to a sergeant for his bravery.⁵⁸

Often in warfare, in the hand-to-hand and life-or-death struggle, the prospects of equality can be seen while the differences in race and military rank seem to vanish. Kamara provides another example of this being seen in the war “[When] you see a black sergeant ... and a white corporal comes ... and he doesn’t salute the black sergeant, and the black sergeant would arrest him ... [then you know you have] equality with the white man.”⁵⁹

French citizens’ treatment of the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* followed the same path the white officers did. Initially viewing black soldiers in the terrifying images that labeled them as “retarded sexually depraved savages driven by bestial rage” but then transitioning to a form of appreciation and respect.⁶⁰ French authorities attempted to expedite this transition through two different means. In the public realm, they embraced the paternalistic imagery embraced by supporters of African recruitment, like General Mangin, and disseminated pro-Senegalese propaganda through the French press for domestic consumption.⁶¹ The second way the French government attempted to promote more congenial stereotypes about black soldiers was to minimize contact between metropolitan civilians and African troops in Europe.⁶²

In order to maintain minimal contact between the two groups, the French government imposed numerous constraints. Segregated units were common practice with mixing between French and Senegalese battalions happening immediately before an attack or chance encounter, mixing was never systematically practiced.⁶³ African training camps at Midi and Gironde were isolated from French civilians and in March of

⁵⁸ Joe Lunn, "Male Identity and Martial Codes of Honor: A Comparison of the War Memoirs of Robert Graves, Ernst Jünger, and Kande Kamara." *The Journal of Military History* 69, no. 3 (2005): 713-35.

⁵⁹ Lunn, "Male Identity," 732-733.

⁶⁰ Lunn, "'Bons Soldats,'" 2-3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶² Lunn, "Remembering the 'Tirailleurs Sénégalaïs' and the Great War," 127.

⁶³ Lunn, "'Bons Soldats,'" 5.

1916 the Military Health Service recommended the creation of segregated hospitals with no civilian personnel working in them at all.⁶⁴ Military authorities regulated or limited any potential opportunity for exchange with French civilians by seldom giving soldiers furloughs or allowing them to leave base frequently.⁶⁵ Contact however could never realistically be fully regulated and many of the *Senegalese* interacted with the metropolitan population.

According to some *Senegalese* veterans, French citizens were often afraid of them as they had “never seen black people before” and literally believed they ate human meat.⁶⁶ A *Tirailleur* veteran, Sera Ndiaye, remembered:

Some of the French who had never seen a "black" man used to pay to come and see us. [And the European soldiers] were making money selling tickets. [They] used to take us to a hidden place and told us: "Stay here. We are going to bring some Frenchmen who have never seen 'black' people before." [But] we didn't know they were making money in that way. [And after they] got the money, they used to bring the *Tubabs* to look at us. And [they] said: "This one is a Senegalese, this one is a Somalian, [and so forth]." And the *Tubabs* were touching us, and peeking, creeping very close to us because we [looked so different].⁶⁷

These reactions subsided thanks to the press and popular wartime literature like the memoirs of Lieutenant Leon Gallet who had two books that stressed African soldiers’ loyalty, bravery and intelligence, *Coulibaly* and *Deux ans avec les Senegalese*, published by the French press.⁶⁸

In *Deux ans avec les Senegalese*, Gallet acknowledges that he too believed the major stereotypical images of black soldiers but they began to fade especially after developing a personal relationship with one of his soldiers Osumane Kamara.⁶⁹ When Osumane’s best friend dies, Gallet delivers a touching eulogy and asks Osumane to become his orderly, which Osumane happily accepts.⁷⁰ Osumane accompanies Gallet to a temporary assignment with a European battalion where he is treated kindly by other white soldiers while Gallet comforts him when news of his older brother dies and Gallet even visits him in the hospital when he catches pneumonia.⁷¹

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 3-4.

⁶⁹ Zehfuss, “From Stereotype to Individual,” 149.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Coulibaly and *Deux ans avec les Senegalese* had an effect on French citizens. Gallet evidently gave Ousmane's name to a schoolteacher in the town of Meilhan because she had written to him to say that her students were captivated by excerpts she had read to them from his books and that her class of thirteen girls wanted to adopt a *Tirailleur*.⁷² This example shows the idea that *Tirailleurs* were seen as grown children to French citizens and shows how Gallet developed personal relationships with the men he served with and was able to extend that relationship to French civilians. In the end, initial fear and curiosity about the *Senegalese* subsided with only minority populations retaining earlier racial prejudices. Many French citizens developed a more tolerant and genial image towards the soldiers with most ordinary French metropoles being genuinely grateful for their contribution to the nation's defense even shouting cheers like "Vive les *Tirailleurs Senegalese!*" (Long live the *Senegalese Tirailleurs*!) as the soldiers marched towards the frontlines.⁷³

The First World War saw the French Empire mobilize 600,000 soldiers from its overseas empire to fight in its defense against the Central Powers. Of those men marshaled, 140,000 of them hailed from West Africa to form the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* and serve with distinction along the Western Front at Fort Douaumont and Reims. These black soldiers not only faced a torrent of gunfire and artillery shells but had to grapple with racial preconceptions that affected how they were utilized and treated by the French military and French citizens. French High Command exploited West Africans perceived savagery and simple mindedness by assigning them as shock troops that augmented white French units in offensive assaults against the German lines. They also treated the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* poorly by not outfitting units with proper combat equipment or sufficient cold weather gear. French officers and civilians also treated black troops in an inferior manner but subsequently changed their tune as the war progressed. The white officers that served in the trenches with them developed a mutual respect for one another as their resolve was tested in the crucible of war and civilians started to view black soldiers as grown children who deserved to be appreciated as they defended their homes from the Germans. Hereafter, the *Senegalese Tirailleurs* live on as a testament to those who make the ultimate sacrifice.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Lunn, "Bons Soldats," 11.

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PROSELYTIZING MODERNITY: REEXAMINING THE SUMMER INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS' TENURE IN MEXICO

| Juan Vega Ramirez

The Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) is currently one of the largest and most well-funded missionary institutions in the world. In 2019, it employed over 6,000 people, had new and ongoing projects in 1,700 languages, and had served over 7,000 languages total.¹ Although the organization claims that over 4,000 of their staff originate from 84 countries, the SIL has never moved its headquarters out of the United States and has historically recruited the majority of its volunteers from U.S.-based evangelist and fundamentalist Protestant congregations. Since its official founding in 1942, the SIL has operated in tandem with the Wycliffe Bible Translators (WBT) whose goal is to spread the word of God by translating the Bible into every language that needs one.² Their founder, William Cameron Townsend, pragmatically established both as separate organizations to secure funding from Protestant communities in the United States and to mask the group's ties to missionary work abroad. He and his team carefully differentiated between the SIL and the WBT by emphasizing the "scientific" approach of the former and the religious aspects of the latter. While this strategy allowed the SIL to secure financial support and, more importantly, gain the trust of antireligious Latin American governments, it simultaneously made the SIL vulnerable to criticism. In 1979 for example, the Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropólogos Sociales, A.C. (CEAS), persuasively argued that the SIL served U.S. imperialism. They explained that its tenure and continued presence in Mexico undermined indigenous autonomy because its members proselytized indigenous communities and propagated the capitalist ideologies of the United States. Furthermore, they asserted that the government's reliance on the SIL undermined national security since all SIL members were foreigners who worked unsupervised in remote locations, where they engaged in the ideological domination of the groups they encountered, and potentially also spied for the CIA.³

Regardless of the validity of the accusations levied against the

¹ "SIL Annual Update: 2017 Review," SIL Annual Update (Dallas, Texas: SIL International, 2017).

² "About Bible Translation | Christian Missionaries | Wycliffe Bible Translators," accessed April 26, 2019, <https://www.wycliffe.org/about>.

³ Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropólogos Sociales A.C. (CEAS), *Dominación ideológica y ciencia social. El I.L.V en México* (Mexico: Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropólogos Sociales A.C., 1979), <http://archive.org/details/CEASDominacionIdeologica1979>.

SIL, its dual identity often permitted its staff of missionary-linguists to compromise the efficacy of their aid in favor of proselytization. Furthermore, the symbiotic relationship it enjoyed with the Mexican government meant that the SIL championed official indigenista policy.⁴ This connection consequently influenced the SIL's overall impact on indigenous communities despite Townsend's insistence that his group offered apolitical philanthropic aid. As a result and in the context of modernization and Western material progress, individual converts often benefitted from contact with the SIL while indigenous communities and their culture at large often suffered. Thus, although many of the criticisms levied against the SIL are undeserved and often ideologically motivated, the organization's intent was primarily to convert indigenous people and facilitate their transition into Western culture, which ultimately constituted cultural imperialism at best and ethnocide at worst.

Since its inception, the SIL has carefully cultivated good relationships with national governments in Latin America. Its connection with Mexico and Mexican officials set the tone for the future of the SIL's involvement in the region. In Mexico, Townsend and the SIL successfully ingratiated themselves with the federal government by playing upon the state's interest in national integration in the 1930s.⁵ Mexican intellectuals, such as Moisés Sáenz, hoped that the U.S. based SIL could help the Mexican government incorporate marginalized and often exploited indigenous communities through linguistics research and bilingual education. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the ruling political party in Mexico, and the SIL consequently developed a mutually beneficial relationship that remained largely undisputed until 197.⁶ Ultimately, the goal was not to increase indigenous autonomy. Instead, the Mexican government hoped that the SIL would promote modernization in indigenous communities through the proliferation of the national language and the eventual adoption of non-indigenous beliefs and traditions. When he arrived in Mexico in 1933, Townsend "quickly learned to identify himself and his organization" with the emerging ideology of indigenismo, which at the time appeared to be the solution to Mexico's centuries old "Indian

⁴ Todd Hartch, *Missionaries of the State: The Summer Institute of Linguistics, State Formation, and Indigenous Mexico, 1935-1985*, First edition (Tuscaloosa, Ala: University Alabama Press, 2006), 85-88.

⁵ Soren Hvalkof and Peter Aaby, "No Tobacco, No Hallelujah," in *Is God an American?: An Anthropological Perspective on the Missionary Work of the Summer Institute of Linguistics* (Copenhagen : London: Survival International, 1981), 183.

⁶ Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropólogos Sociales A.C. (CEAS), *Dominación ideológica*, the report is not paginated but referenced info can be found in section "Orígenes del instituto."

problem.”⁷

After gaining their independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, Latin American countries struggled to form nations as they attempted to overcome the legacy of the Spanish caste system they inherited. The centuries of racism against the native inhabitants of the Americas proved a considerable hinderance to Latin American countries’ ability to modernize in the twentieth century. In Mexico specifically, the issues stemming from this division interfered with the country’s economic prospects and national cohesion. In response, the federal government initiated or sponsored several programs that they hoped would help stitch a national identity out of the country’s mythical indigenous past.⁸ Nevertheless, the oppression of contemporary indigenous people did not cease despite the increased focus on indigenous communities and their culture. To correct this, Mexican intellectuals sought to redeem living Indians (who they perceived to be backwards and superstitious) by incorporating them into mestizo culture. They inaugurated the Indigenista Movement at the momentous Pátzcuaro Conference of 1940 to accomplish their goal and subsequently received international praise for “bringing the varied Indian groups into harmony with the lives of their respective nations.”⁹

During the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934 - 1940), Townsend shrewdly gained favor with the Mexican government by placing his organization in the same ideological category as indigenismo. He introduced aspects of indigenista policy to his training program and wrote a flattering report on the Mexican Revolution which he presented to Josephus Daniels, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico.¹⁰ To be sure, the relationship between Cárdenas and Townsend was one of mutual necessity. For one, Townsend understood that he could not launch the institute that would help him achieve his vision of bringing the word of God to all the people of the world without the approval of academics and state governments. To address this understanding, Townsend decided to make his support of the Mexican Revolution explicit, describe his organization as academic rather than missionary, and explain that its funding came from individuals in the United States rather than acknowledge its affiliation with the Pioneer Mission conduit.¹¹ At the same time, Cárdenas’ populist, arguably socialist,

⁷ Hartz, *Missionaries of the State*, 52.

⁸ Elena Jackson Albarrán, *Seen and Heard in Mexico: Children and Revolutionary Cultural Nationalism* (University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 227.

⁹ *The New York Times*, April 14, 1940.

¹⁰ David Stoll, “Words Can Be Used In So Many Ways,” in *Is God an American?: An Anthropological Perspective on the Missionary Work of the Summer Institute of Linguistics* (Copenhagen : London: Survival International, 1981), 26.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

political platform painted him as a potential threat to the paranoid eyes of the United States. According to David Stoll, many critics believed that Cárdenas was “supported by Communists, and in the opinion of some, a worthy precursor of the Antichrist” despite Cárdenas’ insistence that “communism [did] not exist in Mexico.”¹² Townsend’s favorable reports on Mexico in general, and Cárdenas specifically, therefore worked to ease the fears of U.S. foreign policy advisers.

Indeed, Townsend played a critical role during Cárdenas’ effort to nationalize Mexico’s oil fields. In a telegram dated March 4, 1938, Daniels informed the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, that “some of the companies’ managers and officials [in Mexico] anticipate rioting and possibly bloodshed in the oil fields next week.”¹³ However, two weeks later, after Cárdenas announced the expropriation of U.S.- and British-owned oilfields in a national radio address, Daniels indicated that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt lamented the situation but agreed with President Cárdenas’ decision because of “the alleged rebellious attitude of the companies and their injurious attitude and actions toward the [Mexican] Government” in the events leading up to the expropriation.¹⁴ Despite Roosevelt’s sympathetic opinion, capitalist interests and complacent media outlets in the United States maintained their opposition to Cárdenas and his potentially communist schemes. To help his cause, President Cárdenas asked Townsend and his wife, Elvira, to undertake a publicity tour through the United States in 1938. The Townsends spent six months traveling thousands of miles, writing countless articles to sway public opinion, and giving lectures where they defended Mexico’s social revolution and Cárdenas’ decisions.¹⁵ Although their efforts did not go unnoticed on both sides of the border, they were also barred from speaking with Roosevelt or other high-ranking U.S. officials and faced hostility from certain journals, newspapers, and organizations such as the Oilman’s Club in Dallas.¹⁶ The frosty reception Townsend received in the United States juxtaposed

¹² David Stoll, *Fishers of Men or Founders of Empire?: The Wycliffe Bible Translators in Latin America* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 62; and “Denies Communism in Mexico,” *The New York Times*, February 8, 1936, quotes Cárdenas as he attempts to ease fears of communist subversion.

¹³ Josephus Daniels, “The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. V, *The American Republics, 1938* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 4, 1938), Document 680, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1938v05/d683>.

¹⁴ Josephus Daniels, *FRUS*, Document 687, March 23, 1938
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1938v05/d683>.

¹⁵ James C. Hefley, *Uncle Cam: The Story of William Cameron Townsend, Founder of the Wycliffe Bible Translators and the Summer Institute of Linguistics* (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1974), 105-11.

¹⁶ Hartch, *Missionaries of the State*, 36-39.

sharply with his experience in Mexico where government officials and Mexican intellectuals warmly welcomed him into their country.

The SIL's dual identity came to fruition during this time as a result of Townsend's combined experience in Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States.¹⁷ After returning from his assignment in the States, Townsend consciously began to identify with Mexico in light of the hostility he faced in his home country. Todd Hartch argues that this mental and emotional realignment pushed Townsend to ingrain what were originally provisional tactics into established principles of his organization.¹⁸ From 1938 onward, the SIL portrayed itself as an apolitical "scientific" institution that organized summer courses, arranged field work, and established secular contact with indigenous communities while dealing with foreign governments. It simultaneously secured funding in the United States by emphasizing the religious side of Bible translations, recruiting personnel from conservative Protestant churches, and making the WBT the primary contact between its staff and the wealthy Protestant individuals, entire churches, religious foundations, and business organizations that supported them.¹⁹ Townsend now ardently believed that cooperation with national governments and their secular academic institutions was crucial to the SIL's ability to translate the Bible and spread the word of God.

The SIL's new commitment to working with the Mexican government and its scholars happily coincided with Mexican indigenistas' increasing belief that linguistics was the key to the incorporation of indigenous communities. In 1933, Mexico established the Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Lingüísticas (IMIL). Its director, Mariano Silva y Aceves, published the institute's first journal titled *Investigaciones Lingüísticas* the following year.²⁰ Silva y Aceves believed that the IMIL's goal was to study vernacular languages so that it could preserve them and use them "as tools for education and progress." The hope was to use an indigenous person's own language "as a means of gaining his confidence" and then to "communicate to him what we want him to learn."²¹ Silva y Aceves first met Townsend in 1935 at the indigenismo section of the Seventh Inter-American Scientific Conference where he asked Townsend to work with his linguistics institute. In 1936, Silva y Aceves, in collaboration with the Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP) published a Nahuatl primer that

¹⁷ Hefley, *Uncle Cam*, 112-15.

¹⁸ Hartch, *Missionaries of the State*, 38.

¹⁹ Soren Hvalkof and Peter Aaby, eds., *Is God an American?*, 10.

²⁰ Doris Bartholomew, "La Serie de Vocabularios y Diccionarios Indígenas 'Mariano Silva y Aceves,'" SIL Mexico, accessed April 20, 2019, <http://www.mexico.sil.org/es/publicaciones/e-vimsa>.

²¹ Hartch, *Missionaries of the State*, Mariano Silva y Aceves' quote on page 54.

Townsend wrote. This added focus on indigenous languages contrasted sharply with the SEP's previous attempts at educating indigenous communities. In rural Chiapas for example, SEP teachers only spoke Spanish and thus exclusively employed the "direct method" of teaching the language. Moreover, they often held anti-indigenous biases that stemmed from their perceived superiority as educated-urban mestizos.²² Nevertheless, Silva y Aceves and Townsend agreed that literacy in a vernacular language facilitated learning Spanish because "a person who can read one language will easily learn to read another."²³ By the late 1930s, Townsend and Silva y Aceves managed to convince a large number of indigenistas and educators that the bilingual method could solve their "Indian problem." Mexican policy makers thus grew to believe that linguistics was necessary to incorporate indigenous communities into the nation and consequently into modernity.

Over the years, critiques against the SIL/WBT emerged from diverse places including indigenous organizations, government agencies, anthropologists, and rival churches. The most damning criticisms included charges of conspiring with the CIA and spying for the United States, allegations that the SIL carried out forced sterilizations, and, of course, that it propagated ethnocide.²⁴ The reality for individual indigenous communities as well as SIL linguists was fairly nuanced. For example, although Townsend believed it was his God-given mission to spread the Word to communities that needed it most, by 1976 and in spite of Townsend's staunch devotion to proselytizing, some SIL members maintained "careful impartiality in regard to religious doctrines."²⁵ Moreover, despite Townsend's original missionary objective, his pragmatism in attempting to disassociate the SIL from the WBT not only helped the organization obtain the financial and governmental support it needed, but also inspired its most influential missionaries to excel at linguistics. Kenneth Pike, one of the first five students of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, argued that Townsend's "plan of action" in Mexico forced students at the SIL to acquire more education in order to do an adequate job translating the Bible because they did not want to "masquerade as linguists." Instead they wanted to "become linguists, in fact, not theory."²⁶ Pike and Eugene Nida, who joined the SIL in 1936 and later pioneered the

²² Stephen E. Lewis, *Rethinking Mexican Indigenismo: The INI's Coordinating Center in Highland Chiapas and the Fate of a Utopian Project* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018), 5.

²³ Hartz, *Missionaries of the State*, 55.

²⁴ Soren Hvalkof and Peter Aaby, eds., *Is God an American?*, 12-14.

²⁵ David Stoll, "Words Can Be Used In So Many Ways," in *Is God an American?*, 37.

²⁶ William L. Svelmoe, "'We Do Not Want to Masquerade as Linguists': A Short History of SIL and the Academy," *Language* 85, no. 3 (2009): 631.

translation theory of “dynamic equivalence,” ran Townsend’s training facility, Camp Wycliffe. There, they developed and implemented university level courses to ensure that the SIL would not become “just another mission, with only pretensions toward serious scholarship.”²⁷

While Townsend courted the Mexican government and its intellectuals in the 1930s, Kenneth Pike busied himself with managing the SIL’s Camp Wycliffe and expanding his knowledge in the field of linguistics. After spending the fall of 1935 in Mexico studying the Mixtec language, Townsend invited Pike to teach phonetics at his newly established Summer Institute of Linguistics, which was at the time located in Sulfur Springs, Arkansas. Pike’s commitment to seeing the SIL succeed in its linguistic mission moved him to pursue a PhD in Linguistics from the University of Michigan, which he obtained in 1942. Pike undoubtedly became an exceptional linguist; he taught at his alma mater from 1942 to 1977 and chaired its linguistics department from 1975 to 1977. As a result, Townsend also named Pike president of the SIL in 1942 where he remained until 1979.²⁸ Pike transformed the SIL training camp at Sulfur Springs into a crash course on linguistics that rivaled university level classes. As soon as he started teaching at Camp Wycliffe, Pike implemented a grading system that was based on college standards instead of the standards of traditional Bible institutions. As William Svelmoe points out, Pike ensured that SIL students were properly trained in linguistics because they did not want their organization to be a generic religious mission.²⁹ Although Townsend was apprehensive about the SIL’s new direction, Pike was adamant in his belief that producing mediocre linguists meant abandoning Townsend’s vision. By 1940, Pike’s exceptional teaching methods caught the attention of Della Bransteter, a linguist from the University of Oklahoma. Bransteter met Pike at Michigan in 1940 and subsequently attended an SIL training session. She asked Pike to demonstrate the SIL’s techniques at the University the following year. Pike and the SIL must have made an impression on Bransteter because she persuaded the University to invite the SIL to move Camp Wycliffe onto its campus, where it remained until 1987.³⁰

Townsend, ever the pragmatist, was initially reluctant to align his organization so closely to a secular university, especially since this

²⁷ Ibid., 632.

²⁸ “Kenneth L. Pike (1912-2000),” SIL International, March 7, 2013, <https://www.sil.org/about/klp/kenneth-l-pike>.

²⁹ Svelmoe, “‘We Do Not Want to Masquerade as Linguists,’” 632.

³⁰ “About SIL Training,” SIL International, October 3, 2012, <https://www.sil.org/training/about-sil-training>; Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropólogos Sociales A.C. (CEAS), *Dominación ideológica*, section “Orígenes del Instituto Linguístico de Verano”.

academic realignment had the potential to dissuade his evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant supporters. Nevertheless, he agreed to transplant Camp Wycliffe to the University because they were “so insistent that [they began] to think that perhaps God [had] a purpose in it.”³¹ Regardless if God supported the move or not, it benefitted the SIL tremendously. The University of Oklahoma offered SIL students “of collegiate standing” access to its housing, dining, and classroom facilities as well as college credit for participating in the SIL’s courses. It also provided valuable publicity for the SIL and helped recruit adequate students for its intensive programs. In exchange, SIL teachers offered three hundred hours of instruction to the University’s regular student body. Notwithstanding its newfound connection to the University of Oklahoma, the SIL maintained its religious appearance in the United States by omitting the name of the secular school in its publications until the president of the University explicitly asked Pike to add it in 1949.³²

Despite the tremendous boost the SIL received from academics after 1941, the earliest students of the Summer Institute of Linguistics had already experienced success in establishing communications with indigenous groups in Mexico. This was undoubtedly a direct result of the training they received from Pike coupled with the SIL’s still developing utilitarian approach to securing trust and organizing contact between its linguists and the indigenous communities they were to serve. Eunice Pike and Florence Hansen became the first women to work for the SIL when they joined the group in 1936. After graduating from the Massachusetts General Hospital School of Nursing, Eunice decided to follow in the footsteps of her brother, Kenneth Pike. Hansen joined the SIL after graduating from UCLA as a Phi Beta Kappa language major.³³ Pike’s background in medicine and Hansen’s knowledge of languages made the pair an ideal team. Although SIL missionaries had faith that God would protect them and show them the way, the SIL still needed practical methods of establishing contact with indigenous communities and the benefits of western medicine quickly proved effective in this cause.³⁴ At the very least, the fact that Hansen could treat ailments and provide rudimentary care added to the missionaries’ prestige when they entered Mazatec communities in Oaxaca, Mexico.

³¹ Svelmoe, “‘We Do Not Want to Masquerade as Linguists,’” 633

³² Ibid, 633-34.

³³ “Unlikely Heroes: Women in Bible Translation,” Wycliffe Bible Translators, accessed May 10, 2019, <https://www.wycliffe.org/blog/posts/unlikely-heroes-women-in-bible-translation>.

³⁴ “Eunice Pike and Eugene Nida Remembered,” SIL International, September 15, 2011, <https://www.sil.org/about/news/eunice-pike-and-eugene-nida-remembered>.

Such was the case in the 1940s when SIL missionaries Mariana Slocum and Florence Gerdel gained the trust of the Tseltal community of Oxchuc, Chiapas. Although the introduction of Western medicine into Oxchuc forced indigenous people to break with their traditions, Isaac Guzmán argues that the SIL's success was contingent on its ability to promote the well-being of indigenous communities because they were accustomed to receiving no help at all.³⁵ In fact, Slocum and Gerdel were so successful at converting Tseltal Indians to Protestantism that Alfonso Fabila, an investigator from the Mexican government, proclaimed the community they founded "the Mecca of Protestantism."³⁶ The advancement of health and hygiene subsequently became staples of the SIL's missionary work. In 1947 for example, SIL missionary James Russell provided reports that detailed health problems within the Chontal communities of Tabasco.³⁷ In a follow up report, Russell recommended that the SIL implement several possible solutions to combat, what he perceived to be, the "five basic causes" of "poor health conditions among Chontals. . . namely: ignorance, their lack of adequate medical care, economic weakness, swampy terrain, and adverse climatic conditions." Of these, Russell identified ignorance and superstition as the foremost causes of poor health among the natives. He blamed "untaught practitioners" and "quack" doctors for promoting fake remedies and charging for their services even though they "know no more of the basic fundamentals of disease prevention than the people themselves." To alleviate the Chontal's health problems, Russell prescribed doctor-led public awareness campaigns because "few if any [Chontals] have anything more than a vague idea as to what a germ actually is."³⁸

Documents from the SIL International digital archive suggests that by 1950, the SIL was collaborating with the Mexican government on several national campaigns promoting indigenous health and hygiene. Specifically, the SIL developed pamphlets with information on goiters, where they outlined the medical causes of an enlarged thyroid

³⁵ Isaac Guzmán Arias, "Misioneros Al Servicio de Dios y Del Estado. Presencia Del ILV En Oxchuc, Chiapas" (Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, 2012), 61.

³⁶ Alfonso Fabila, "Fragmentos del informe del investigador Alfonso Fabila, referentes a la intervención de los misioneros protestantes norteamericanos en la zona de Oxchuc," Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, Biblioteca Juan Rulfo (Mexico City).

³⁷ James E. Russell, "Some Health Problems Among the Chontals of Tabasco, Mex.," (1947), 515, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/515>.

³⁸ James E. Russell, "Health Solutions among the Chontals of Tabasco" (Unpublished Draft, 1947), 53566, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/53566>, 1-4.

gland as well as treatment and prevention methods.³⁹ The Camp Wycliffe linguists also produced a pamphlet that aimed to increase indigenous people's understanding of typhus fever, its causes, and how it spreads. It promoted hygiene by advising indigenous communities to segregate bathing and laundry areas from potable water sources. Furthermore, it urged indigenous people to bathe frequently with DDT soap and wash their clothes with the specified insecticide-infused detergent.⁴⁰ Moreover, the typhus document detailed the cost of DDT-laced products and mentioned that indigenous people could buy them through Mexico's Ministry of Health (Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia). Nevertheless, the most important aspect of these documents is that the SIL intended for each to be translated and reproduced in every indigenous language in Mexico.

In Chiapas, Mariana Slocum and Florence Gerdel successfully established Corallito, "the Mecca of Protestantism," by promoting health education among Indians and by expanding indigenous people's understanding of agricultural science. Slocum argued, in a 1960 speech for SIL students and colleagues, that indigenous communities became more receptive to Protestant ideals after the SIL helped alleviate some of the socioeconomic misery they experienced on a regular basis.⁴¹ Like James Russell, Slocum maintained that indigenous people lived in destitution because of their ignorance and superstitions. Nevertheless, she believed that the SIL could help them abandon their backward ways because although "ignorance is a supreme enemy," it is "not an invincible one."⁴² She offered her own experience working with Tseltal Indians as an example of how education encouraged indigenous people to seek out SIL missionaries. Slocum recalled that the indigenous communities of Oxchuc, Chiapas were initially reluctant to take her advice. She reasoned that she could gain their trust by establishing an experimental garden to demonstrate the utility of modern agricultural techniques, such as fertilizing the soil with "*ceniza de madera*" and manure. To do so, she asked Tseltal children to collect manure and give it to her in exchange for a small monetary award. Soon enough, Tseltal men began to arrive with nets overloaded with manure. With some help, Slocum formed, tilled, and fertilized a terraced field. According to her, the increased yields spoke for themselves. After the first harvest, Slocum triumphantly proclaimed that from then on, she "had convinced

³⁹ "Campaña Nacional Contra El Bocio" (Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, 1950), 11625, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/11625>.

⁴⁰ "Campaña Nacional Contra El Tifo" (Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia, 1950), 11774, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/11774>.

⁴¹ Marianna C. Slocum, "Hacia Una Nueva Vida" (Chiapas, Mexico, 1960), 58492, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/58492>.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 3.

[Tseltal peasants] that she knew more about agriculture than they did” and that “she was willing to share her knowledge with them.”⁴³ Furthermore, she maintained that the newly established trust between herself, the SIL, and indigenous communities allowed her to solicit the collaboration of “the children of the land” while preparing educational pamphlets.⁴⁴

To be sure, alleviating the misery of the Tseltal communities Slocum encountered in Chiapas also meant transitioning them into the modern world regardless if her initial goal was religious, moral, or simply philanthropic. This byproduct of SIL work coincided with the objectives of the Mexican government. *Tiempo*, a Mexican periodical, argued that Slocum’s work in Oxchuc was not only beneficial to the socioeconomic standing of indigenous communities but worked to civilize them. The periodical published an article titled “*Una mujer los civilizó*” in 1957, where they praised Slocum and Florence Gerdel for improving the lives of Tseltal Indians by introducing literacy and Western medicine into their communities. Furthermore, although the author does not explicitly mention Slocum’s religious affiliation, they contend that the ideals she promoted also helped to improve the lives of the Indians she worked with. According to the author, Slocum was able to persuade Tseltal Indians against consuming alcohol, moving to immoral urban areas, and believing in superstitions.⁴⁵

Once SIL linguists established healthy relationships with the indigenous communities they studied, they got to work proselytizing and promoting modernization and mestizaje. Alongside its translations of the Bible, the SIL produced several primers that summarized the SEP-approved history of Mexico. For example, in *Héroes de México y cuentos*, published in 1947, the SIL informed readers about the key figures in Mexico’s history, such as Cuauhtémoc, Benito Juarez, and Father Miguel Hidalgo.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the 1961 primer titled *Moctezuma y Cortés*, painted a nuanced picture of the Spanish conquest of Mexico. In it, the Spanish conquistador is not demonized and the defeated Aztec king is not portrayed as weak. Instead, both are courageous warriors who undeniably influenced the creation of Mexico and its people.⁴⁷ The SIL hoped that the primers would instill a sense of nationalist pride within indigenous communities and encourage them to continue learning and reading. To be sure, the SIL also believed that

⁴³ Ibid., 5-8.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ *Tiempo. Semanario de la Vida y la Verdad* (Mexico City), December 9, 1957.

⁴⁶ “Héroes de México y Cuentos” (Instituto Lingüístico de Verano, 1947), 11566, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/11566>.

⁴⁷ “Moctezuma y Cortés” (Instituto Lingüístico de Verano, 1961), 11482, SIL International, <https://www.sil.org/resources/archives/11482>.

literacy in one language aided literacy in another and as such produced history and religion-based primers in native languages to facilitate learning Spanish.

Nevertheless, some indigenistas working in Mexico's Instituto Nacional de Indigenismo (INI) argued that SIL personnel hindered the government's ability to implement INI programs. Several reports from the Directorate of Education in the Tzeltal-Tzotzil Coordinating Center detail the distrust between administrators of the Corralito community and INI officials. According to these reports, SIL missionaries like Mariana Slocum objected to sending children from their communities to INI schools and actively sought to prevent this from happening. An INI cultural promoter working in the Pachtontikjá municipality of Oxchuc reported that several of his students' parents failed to take their kids to school on Wednesdays. Although they excused their children's absence by "alleging illness," the promoter believed that they did not participate on Wednesdays because they went to church instead. He went on to conclude that the leaders of Corralito were the ones influencing this behavior. Moreover, the promoter suggests that these leaders also took advantage of the indigenous people's newfound piety by exploiting them for work. According to him, the Protestant leaders convinced Indians to work without pay in order to please God and essentially held them hostage by arguing that disobeying commands meant damning their souls to eternal suffering.⁴⁸

The INI tried to convince indigenous parents to continue sending their children to school several times. Each time, religiously devout parents argued that "the activities performed at the school went against their religious beliefs."⁴⁹ In at least one instance, the parents of Paulina Santis accused INI promotor Martín López of raping their daughter. However according to the report, Mariana Slocum "advised the parents and the daughter to make the accusation" so that they could justify removing Paulina from school.⁵⁰ Alfonso Fabila also points to Slocum as the instigator of bad relations between the INI and the SIL. According to him, Slocum prevented indigenous girls from the Punchontijá ranchería from attending INI schools with male teachers because she feared that doing so would expose them to "things that

⁴⁸ Otilio Vazquez Olivera, "Informe Del Mes de Julio de 1957," Informe del Centro Coordinador Indigenista Tzeltal-Tzotzil.

⁴⁹ Reynaldo Salvatierra, "Informe sobre el caso especial del sector evangélico de la región de Oxuc y del reclutamiento de las alumnas del Internado. Actividad realizada del 28 de enero al 3 de febrero," Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, Biblioteca Juan Rulfo.

⁵⁰ Otilio Vázquez, "Informe del mes de julio de, 1957," Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas, Biblioteca Juan Rulfo.

would damage them.”⁵¹

By 1979, the multiple denunciations from professional organizations, political parties, indigenous organizations, and even state agencies throughout Latin America prompted the Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropolólogos Sociales, A.C. to launch an investigation on the SIL’s activities in Mexico. In *Ideological Domination*, the report summarizing the indictment, the CEAS acknowledged that “capitalism, social science in general, and anthropology had been an instrument of neocolonialism, imperialism, and . . . U.S. expansion.”⁵² Nevertheless, they argued that the SIL was the most egregious and damaging facet of northern encroachment because it was the oldest and most developed imperialist institution. Thus, they charged the SIL of promoting missionary and political ideology via their “supposedly apolitical linguistic and anthropological practices.”⁵³ Although the report recognized that the SIL’s philanthropy contributed to the improvement of indigenous communities, the authors argued that SIL members only reluctantly provided aid to facilitate the efficacy of their proselytization. Moreover, the CEAS report contends that SIL content as well as its actions “in the political, economic, and social sphere conform to a coherent system whose ideological structure is of a religious character, although it also responds to a clearly defined political conception.”⁵⁴ For example, by using paid indigenous informants to enter poor communities, converting some of the people there, and then importing material goods to distribute to their new converts, SIL missionaries promoted the belief that moral improvement was required before economic improvement. Thus, the SIL’s ideology and actions replaced its strictly religious aspects with political considerations that introduced and reinforced the conviction that the “American way of life” was right way of life.

In Chiapas, where Mariana Slocum established “the Mecca of Protestantism,” the authors of the CEAS report allege that SIL missionaries worked to dismantle indigenous culture by teaching that indigenous people lived in destitution as a result of their lifestyle which forced them to live in sin. The remedy was, of course, converting to Protestantism and embracing the capitalist spirit of the United States. SIL missionaries in the region also disavowed collective land occupation and community cooperation because they presumed that these activities were driven by greed or satanic worship. The CEAS

⁵¹ Fabila, “Fragmentos del informe del investigador Alfonso Fabila, referentes a la intervención de los misioneros protestantes norteamericanos en la zona de Oxchuc.”

⁵² Colegio de Etnólogos y Antropolólogos Sociales A.C. (CEAS), *Dominación ideológica*, “Introducción”.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., section “Los orígenes del ILV.”

report goes on to accuse the SIL of propagating mestizaje by encouraging indigenous people to eat, dress, and talk like their acculturated countrymen. To be sure, the latter denunciation was the Mexican government's goal from the start of its involvement with the SIL. Nevertheless, the authors of the report have no doubt that the SIL's presence in the country marked a clear case of subordination to U.S. imperialism. For them the conclusion was obvious, "the SIL [was] a cog in the machinery of oppression that operated in plain view alongside the political agenda of the dominant class."⁵⁵

Contemporary historians go even further with their criticisms and accusations against the SIL. For example, Richard Chase Smith argues that the SIL's work with the Amuesha people of Peru constitutes "ethnocide disguised as a blessing" because of the various ways their proselytizing forced individuals and entire communities to abandon their culture and traditions.⁵⁶ Jan Rus and Robert Wasserstrom contend that the SIL's primary objective was securing Indian converts. They argue that "in their quest for Indian souls," the SIL intentionally and unintentionally "exploited political and social tensions" that "precipitated a state of crisis" within the indigenous communities they were supposed to help. Furthermore, Rus and Wasserstrom also charge the SIL with propagating cultural imperialism and ethnocide by providing "services which impel indigenous children to identify native life with backwardness and inequitable development with progress."⁵⁷ Moreover, one of David Stoll's most damning accusations against the SIL is that they were spying for the United States or at least working in tandem with U.S. intelligence agencies.⁵⁸ Other critics, namely Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, accuse the SIL of helping the CIA, destroying indigenous identity, and ignoring genocide in order to secure beneficial relationships with right-wing dictatorships in Latin America.⁵⁹

Spokespeople for the SIL and William Cameron Townsend himself ardently denied the existence of such connections and downplayed the potentially adverse consequences of their missionary work. In a 1979 article from *The Washington Post*, Townsend maintained that his "institute [had] no relation with the CIA" and that

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, section "Conclusiones."

⁵⁶ Richard C. Smith, "The Summer Institute of Linguistics" Ethnocide Disguised as a Blessing," in *Is God an American?* ed. Peter Aaby and Soren Hvalkof.

⁵⁷ Jan Rus and Robert Wasserstrom, "Evangelization and Political Control: The SIL in Mexico," in *Is God an American?* ed. Peter Aaby and Soren Hvalkof.

⁵⁸ Stoll, *Fishers of Men or Founders of Empire?*, 104.

⁵⁹ Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil* (New York, NY: Harpercollins, 1996).

“if any member cooperated with the CIA he would be dismissed.” He also blamed communists and the World Council of Churches for the criticisms that troubled the SIL but acknowledged that “there was a time when the CIA would come to Oklahoma and try to get people to answer questions.” Notwithstanding the implications of this revelation, Townsend invited criticism against the SIL since its inception. Even as late as 1979, Bud Hancock, the director of the SIL’s government liaison office in the United States, struggled to disassociate the SIL from missionary work. He described the institute as a “scientific, educational organization” dedicated to providing “educational materials of a high moral order” to the peoples of the earth. Although Hancock stresses that “in no way do [they] proselytize,” they do “believe the Scriptures themselves provide a philosophy of life that motivates people to change their ways.”⁶⁰ Therein lies the problem of the SIL. Instead of promoting indigenous autonomy to combat the socioeconomic misery, exploitation, and the general inequity indigenous people faced, the SIL convinced indigenous communities that their culture and traditions were backwards and that only SIL missionaries could help them overcome their ignorance and superstition.

On July 25, 1979, indigenous leaders from Mazahua, Tlahuica, Otomí, and Matlatzinca communities unsurprisingly demanded the dismantling of the Summer Institute of Linguistics’ operations in Mexico. They singled out the SIL in their criticism of indigenista ideology as a whole because of the SIL’s inability to aid their communities and strengthen indigenous identity. Furthermore, the leaders called upon the Mexican revolutionary government to deliver the political and social reforms that they deserved, such as the redistribution of land and the creation of autonomous indigenous communities.⁶¹ On July 29, *El Día* reported that the Secretaría de Educación Pública launched a series of investigations into the SIL’s involvement in indigenous agricultural production to determine its legality.⁶² By September 1979, *Uno Mas Uno* announced that Mexico dissolved its association with the SIL altogether. The director of the SEP, Salomón Nahmad, reasoned that “given the religious character of that institution,” splitting from the SIL would allow “indigenous Mexicans to recapture their identities and find their own cultural path.”⁶³ Thus, although SIL linguists helped indigenous people by promoting literacy, introducing Western medicine, encouraging better hygiene, and advocating for the use of modern agricultural techniques,

⁶⁰ *The Washington Post*, July 20, 1979.

⁶¹ *El Día* (Mexico City), July 25, 1979.

⁶² *Ibid.*, July 29, 1979.

⁶³ *Unomásuno* (Mexico City), September 22, 1979.

the SIL's missionary origin made its linguists unlikely to compromise opportunities for proselytization in favor of impartial philanthropy. The missionaries at the Summer Institute of Linguistics propagated cultural imperialism, but perhaps not ethnocide, because they believed that indigenous people were backwards and that converting to Protestantism would not only save their souls but facilitate their transition to modernity.

Proselytizing Modernity

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THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO NATO TO DEFEND AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

| Harrison Ross

Twelve countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and implemented it on April 4, 1949. The purpose of NATO was to organize a regional defensive coalition to guard against a potential Soviet invasion into Western Europe. The idea of NATO built on the United States Truman Doctrine that emerged after the Second World War. The strategy was meant to counter the threat from the Soviet Union. The original members of NATO were mainly Western European countries and those bordering the Atlantic Ocean. Initially, this was because the Atlantic and Western European orbit was the main emphasis of U.S. defense interest.¹ However, it was apparent by early 1946 that the United States could only accomplish proper containment against Soviet expansion if it also secured the Middle East as well. The loss of the Middle East to Soviet communism was a serious threat. The Truman Doctrine strategy thus sought not only to protect Western Europe from the Soviets, but the Middle East.² Perhaps the most important Middle Eastern country that was crucial to the formation of NATO was Turkey. While not part of the original Atlantic pact established in 1949, Turkey became a key link in implementing the Truman Doctrine strategy. Besides Israel and Saudi Arabia, Turkey would become the most vital country to U.S. national security in the Middle East and would profoundly shape the course of the Cold War era.

What has been less understood about the U.S.'s history with NATO is how Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries influenced its Truman Doctrine era foreign policy. Turkey's entry into NATO would secure NATO's southeastern flank and be integral to the containment of the Soviets. Turkey's entry into NATO also paved the way for future developments and treaties between Ankara and Washington, such as the U.S.'s right to establish airbases at Incirlik and Iskenderun.³ Despite this, however, the Turks' entrance into NATO was a complicated

¹ Stanley Sloan, *Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union, and the Transatlantic Bargain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), 5-21.

² George McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 19-35.

³ Ibid., xiii-xvii, 178-180.

process that is indeed related to post-World War Truman Doctrine politics. It was also somewhat controversial, mainly because of Turkey's assistance to the Axis powers in World War II. Some would argue that Turkey's acceptance into NATO was a mistake because it escalated Cold War tensions. Why did Turkey fall into the western orbit in the post-war years? What were the factors and processes that culminated in Turkey gaining admission into NATO in 1952? Despite Turkey's strategic location and its anti-communist stance, the original members of NATO were reluctant to allow Turkey to join. Why was this the case? This paper will explore and address the reasons why Turkey's accession to NATO was delayed for three years and explain why NATO members reluctantly agreed to allow the Turks entry into the pact.

What made the nation of Turkey unique, and how and why did it gain admission into NATO? One must consider several factors when answering these questions. The most obvious of these factors was Turkey's geographic location in relation to the Soviet Union, Europe, and the Middle East. The Bosphorus Strait and Turkey's mountainous eastern border were the strategic gateways to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Historically, Russian troops in previous wars, such as the First World War and the Russo-Persian wars, would penetrate deep into the Caucasus mountains and occupy Armenia and Northern Iran.⁴ Therefore, by the end of the Second World War, the Turks understood the importance of defending their eastern border along the Caucasus mountains from the Russian threat. Not only the Turks, but the British and Americans were also keen on Turkey's unique location in relation to the Soviet Union after the Second World War.⁵ This was because both countries recognized the strategic situation, and if Soviet troops were successful in penetrating the border in the Caucasus and Zagros mountains, then Red Army troops would also be in position to overrun most countries in the Middle East. In the event of a Soviet attack, a considerable portion of Turkey's forces would have to hold this frontier in the hopes that other United Nations or NATO forces would come to their defense.⁶ Turkey's strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East was a crucial factor in explaining how Washington incorporated Ankara into the U.S. orbit, but that was not the only factor. Despite the recognition from the U.S. and Great

⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37-38, 49-51, 77.

⁵ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests: 1947-1952: The First Enlargement of NATO* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 39-63.

⁶ Ibid., 22-32.

Britain on the strategic importance of Turkey, it still took three years until the Turks were granted entry into NATO.

In addition to Turkey's vital geographic location and its animosity towards Russia historically, it also had a unique Western-style government and political culture, such as the Turkish constitution that was modeled on Western European nations. The Republic of Turkey evolved out of the previous Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. Despite being on the losing side of the war, the Turks rallied behind Mustafa Kemal, a young and distinguished army officer, and continued fighting against the Allies. The Turks fought their war of independence from 1919 to 1923, mainly against the French and Greek forces. They reversed the Sykes-Picot Agreement that the victorious allies had imposed on them in 1918. This treaty carved up Anatolia's Turkish heartland and divided it amongst the Greeks, Italians, and French.⁷

After they secured their independence, the Turks forced the allies to sign a new agreement, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. This treaty gave the Turks all the Anatolian heartland to be part of a new nation-state.⁸ Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was now the de-facto leader of Turkey and ushered in a new and unprecedented era of reforms. The new nation rejected its Islamic identity as an Ottoman Caliphate and embraced Western European liberal values, including parliamentary government, secularism, women's suffrage, and replacement of the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet.⁹ The reforms were part of an ongoing modernization process that stretched back over a century. Despite Turkey's Western-style neo-liberal reforms, such as women's voting rights, there was still ill will and somewhat damaged relations between itself and Western European countries after World War II. Not only was this because of Turkey's persecution of Christian minorities, notably the Armenians, but also the controversial policies that Turkey followed during World War II.

After World War II, Turkish foreign relations with the Western allies (mainly Britain and France) were strained, even though technically speaking the Turks were not part of the alliance at the beginning of the war. This discord was because Turkey did not honor the Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of 1939 during the war with Germany.¹⁰ Not only that, but the Turks also had established a lucrative

⁷ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 247-56.

⁸ Ibid., 257-285.

⁹ Ibid., 285-95.

¹⁰ G.L. Bondarevskii, "Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939." from <https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Anglo-French-Turkish+Treaty+of+1939> (Accessed 13 November 2020)

trade deal with Germany, supplying the Nazi regime with chromium. The Turkish government even had a positive response to Germany's Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 when it invaded the Soviet Union.¹¹ This was because the Turks regarded the Soviets as an ideological threat, and because they were intimidated into cooperation with Germany. The Turks were not in a good position to reject the Axis powers during the early phases of the war.

After Mustafa Kemal Ataturk died in 1938, Ismet Inonu became the new Turkish president and was anxious to uphold the ideals of Ataturk's secular republic alive by keeping it out of another potentially disastrous war. In its defense, the Turkish government believed that it was not militarily capable of standing up to the German threat at the time. However, this changed drastically in a few years as the Axis powers were losing the war. Despite German pressure on the Turks to allow its vessels free movement through the Dardanelles Straits, the Turks refused, and eventually declared war on the Axis powers in 1945.¹² This was because the Axis powers were practically defeated by that time. This then allowed Turkey to join the United Nations, which started the process of it escaping the cycle of isolationist neutrality.

The Turks indeed have a history of playing off various Western and Eastern groups and nations against one another. Perhaps this was the result of Turkey's unique geographic position? A better answer lies in the diplomatic isolationism. By the end of the Second World War, the Turks were anxious to abandon their over twenty year long controversial neutral isolationist policy, which left the country vulnerable against a powerful Soviet Union and left it isolated diplomatically. This was because their diplomatic approach left them quite vulnerable, with an angry Soviet Union right at their doorstep, and the British and French hesitant to greet the Turks as allies, given the fact they did not uphold their side of the 1939 treaty during the war. The Turks were in a rather precarious position.

The Cold War era politics that emerged after the Second World War were pivotal not only for European nations, but countries in the Middle East as well. Many of these nations were anxious to secure their territorial security and participate in global affairs, particularly Turkey. Historically, there had been much mistrust among the Middle Easterners towards the Western Europeans, but this wariness also existed against the Russians. This was mainly because of the exploitative effects of colonialism. Not only were there cultural and religious rivalries between Turks and Russians dating back centuries, but the Soviet Union

¹¹ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests*. 36-38.

¹² Ibid., 35.

had also pressured the Turks after World War II, which threatened the Turks' national security.¹³ The Soviet government wanted more rights to use the Dardanelles Straits for shipping and the region known as Karabakh on Turkey's eastern Caucasus border.¹⁴ The Soviets calculated that this would give them greater leverage in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. With possession of Azerbaijan and Karabakh, the Red Army would be in a better striking position against Iran and Turkey. If Turkish and Iranian forces were not able to hold the mountainous barrier of the Caucasus mountains, then Soviet troops would be able to invade the rest of the Middle East virtually unopposed. Furthermore, the military strength of the Arab countries was quite weak, with only the Turks possessing a reasonably large army. The Turks rejected Soviet demands in late 1946 as they sought protection from Britain and the United States.

In a memorandum dated January 8, 1947, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Bedell Smith communicated to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes a description of the current dispute between Ankara and Moscow:

We doubt that Soviet dislodgement from Azerbaijan indicates a likelihood that the Kremlin may abandon its search for strategic lodgment with Turkey. We have no doubt that the Kremlin will resume attempts to encroach on Iranian sovereignty and that it will continue attempts to encroach on Turkish sovereignty. Soviet policy with respect to Turkey is motivated not only... by considerations of security, but also by urge to gain independent access to Mediterranean and Arab world and by determination to sever the British Empire jugular at the Suez. To the Kremlin, Turkey represents both a corridor of attack on the USSR and an obstacle to achievement of Soviet objectives. USSR will therefore not feel that it has either achieved security for its southwestern frontiers or made a solid advance on its course of Near Eastern aggression until it dominates Turkey. Confronted by this chill menace Turkey has little hope of independent survival unless it is assured of a solid long-term British and American support. It can seek that support through a regional agreement involving U.S., U.K., Turkey, and USSR or within framework of the U.N.¹⁵

The British and Americans understood that even though the location of an Atlantic alliance was outside the Middle East, defending Middle Eastern countries (like Turkey) from Soviet meddling was key to enforcing the Truman Doctrine. It was during this tense early Cold War

¹³ Ibid., 76-77.

¹⁴ Ibid., 38-50.

¹⁵ *The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, January 8, 1947*, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS, with appropriate year], 1947: *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, DC, 1971), 5: 2-3.

period in 1947 that the American and Turkish governments began the process of negotiations of how to “contain” the Soviet communist threat to Turkey. However, despite the necessity of trying to bring the Turks into the Western orbit, there were concerns about officially guaranteeing or accepting Turkey into an “official” pact.

1947 was a crucial year for U.S.-Turkish foreign relations. Edwin C. Wilson, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and President Harry S. Truman began a discussion about how to strengthen the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries with economic assistance.¹⁶ The economic and military aid were central to the U.S. policy known as the Truman Doctrine. The economic element of this policy was crucial for the containment of the Soviet Union. This funding for economic aid began mainly as a way to promote recovery in ravaged Western European countries after World War II. By 1946-1947, money and equipment from the U.S. channeled into Western Europe, but funds were also allocated for Turkey.¹⁷ However, the economic assistance programs granted to Greece and Turkey were the only non-Western European nations to be aided before the Marshall plan was officially implemented.¹⁸

The official name for the economic assistance program for Greece and Turkey was Public Law 75.¹⁹ Congress passed it on May 22, 1947. It was the first step in admitting Turkey into the Western orbit and, though unintentionally, towards entry into NATO. That same day, President Truman gave this statement in Congress regarding the new legislation:

THE ACT authorizing United States assistance to Greece and Turkey, which I have just signed, is an important step in the building of the peace. Its passage by overwhelming majorities in both Houses of the Congress is proof that the United States earnestly desires peace and is willing to make a vigorous effort to help create conditions of peace. The conditions of peace include, among other things, the ability of nations to maintain order and independence, and to support themselves economically. In extending the aid requested by two members of the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining these conditions, the United States is helping to further aims and purposes identical with those of the United Nations. Our aid in this instance is evidence not only that we pledge our support to the United Nations but that we act to support it. With the passage

¹⁶ The United States Economic and Military Aid to Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, January 10, 1947, FRUS, 1947*, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁷ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, pp. 37, 44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-30.

¹⁹ Public Law 75, May 22, 1947, *FRUS, 1947*, 5, pp. 103-105.

and signature of this act, our Ambassadors to Greece and Turkey are being instructed to enter into immediate negotiations for agreements which, in accordance with the terms of the act, will govern the application of our aid. We intend to make sure that the aid we extend will benefit all the peoples of Greece and Turkey, not any particular group or action.²⁰

“The Greek-Turkish act, aided to a considerable extent by Josip Broz Tito’s rift with Soviet Premier Stalin, launched the Truman Doctrine with a great victory,” according to George McGhee, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey. “By 1949, fewer than 2000 guerrillas were fighting in Greece and assisted Turkey in rearming and restoring its economy,” McGhee concluded.²¹

The State Department was to administer the aid program, but it also incorporated other civilian and military sectors. Public Law 75 allocated a total of \$500 million in several \$100 million payments, lasting two years from 1947 to 1949, with most of the money going towards modernizing the Turkish military.²² This strategy worked well in Turkey. For example, its 500,000 strong land army was able to demobilize to around 300,000, while also significantly increasing its modern infantry and artillery equipment and overall capabilities.²³ Turkey was also able to construct building projects, such as modern military highways and airfields under close U.S. supervision.²⁴

The U.S. aid packages went not only to Turkey, but Greece too, especially since the Greeks were fighting in a civil war from 1945 to 1949, battling internal communist forces.²⁵ At the time, Washington believed that the civil war in Greece was part of Moscow’s secret plot to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean region. This was because of the recent Soviet threats towards Ankara and Yugoslavia supporting Greek communist guerrillas on behalf of the Soviets in 1946.²⁶ However, with the rift between Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, many of these aggressive prospects against Greece and Turkey were not as severe as they initially appeared. In McGhee’s opinion, however, the Truman Doctrine policy at the time emphasized the seriousness of the situation. So, the relief action that the Truman

²⁰ Harry S. Truman, "Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Endorsing the Truman Doctrine, May 22, 1947," *Truman Library*.

<https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/100/statement-president-upon-signing-bill-endorsing-truman-doctrine>

²¹ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, pp. 33.

²² *Ibid.*, 41.

²³ *Ibid.*, 44-49.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 17-18.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

administration took saved those two countries from communism.²⁷ The aid programs to Greece and Turkey went a long way toward strengthening those nations and were crucial in protecting Western Europe and the Middle East from Soviet attack. However, despite American and British recognition of Soviet-threatening strategic situation, and the need to “prop up” Turkey and Greece economically, there was still problems in incorporating the Turks into a new formal Atlantic defense alliance.

As the U.S. aid program continued into 1949, the Turkish government sought out new objectives in its relations with the United States and Britain. According to Turk Ambassador Huseyin Baydur in a memorandum to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the most pressing matter for the Turkish government was to secure some official guarantee from the United States or Britain to defend it in case of a Soviet attack.²⁸ It was not enough for the Turkish government, under President Ismet Inonu, to accept British and American aid and gestures of friendship. Inonu and his political party, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), was the traditional secular-right party established under Kemal Ataturk.²⁹ What Inonu and the RPP desired was an official declaration or treaty from the Western powers to accept Turkey officially as an equal partner in any Atlantic or Middle Eastern command alliance.³⁰ The Turkish government not only was concerned about its border security with the Soviets, but also the rival Turkish Democrat party, which had criticized the RPP for its failure to achieve a pact with the Western allies.³¹ This was one of the reasons why the RPP lost the election of 1950. Instead, the Democrat party (under the leadership of Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar) assumed power in Turkey's first real and stable democratic election.

The new Menderes-Bayar government's foreign policy objectives were the same as its predecessor, which was securing entry into NATO. Apparently, Turkey's isolationist past was seen as a big problem from all political factions. Additionally, it also had identical reasons why it could not enter into an official alliance with the Western powers.³² This raises an interesting question about whether or not, with the large amount of funds Washington was providing to strengthen their military, the Turks needed an alliance or official guarantee from Britain or the United States. One can speculate that they wanted the security

²⁷ Ibid., 171.

²⁸ Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, May 11, 1948, *FRUS, 1948: Eastern Europe; Soviet Union* (Washington, DC, 1974), 4: 83-85.

²⁹ Ibid., 83.

³⁰ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests: 1947-1952*, 136-39.

³¹ Ibid., 140.

³² Ibid., 135.

guarantee from Washington, especially since British-Turkish relations were not cordial regarding other issues in the Middle East, especially because of the raging debate about the idea of a “Middle Eastern command” pact, similar to NATO.³³ There was also the prospect that an alliance with the United States actually might be detrimental, and that neutrality was really the best way forward for Turkey. However, unlike the RPP government under Inonu, the new Democrat government under Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes would get their chance to join in 1950.

By 1949, as previously noted, the main foreign policy objective, was to get some sort of guarantee of a protection alliance from the United States. However, there were reasons why London and Washington had rebuffed the Turks before 1952. The most apparent strategic reason had to do with the fact that British and U.S. forces in Western Europe during the late 1940s were much fewer in number. U.S. Generals, like Omar N. Bradley, drew this conclusion about the situation:

The army had almost no combat effectiveness... Half of the 552,000 officers and men were overseas on occupation duty, serving as policeman or clerks. The other half were in the states performing various administrative chores. In theory, there was an ‘Army reserve’ in the United States for emergencies. On paper, it consisted of two and a third divisions. But in truth, only one division could be described as combat ready. The army was thus in no position whatsoever to backstop a get-tough policy of containment vis-à-vis the Soviets. Actually, the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag.³⁴

Perhaps the previous world war had wearied the allies and they were not in a mood to antagonize the Soviets. The Western powers understood Turkey's strategically important location. However, they were apprehensive because they did not have sufficient strength in the late forties to guarantee Turkish security completely.

There was another reason explaining Washington's and London's rejection of a formal alliance with Ankara. It had to do with the nature of the NATO pact. The U.S. and British governments and military theorists at the time believed that NATO was for nations located along the Western European Atlantic arc; however, this changed in 1949 when Italy gained admission into the pact.³⁵ The acceptance of Italy into the alliance was to serve the interests of securing the

³³ Ibid., 217-222.

³⁴ Omar Bradley, *A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair* (Lexington MA: Plunkett Lake Press, 2019), 475.

³⁵ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 61-62.

Mediterranean Sea. The Italians were neither in Western Europe, nor did they share a border with the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, the fact that Italy secured admission and not Turkey offended the Turkish government.³⁶ In a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Turkish Minister of Affairs Necmettin Sadak complained at length about how he and his countryman were shocked and annoyed at how Italy was able to join NATO, but not Turkey, and that this rejection looked like a “negative statement” about its supposed European identity.³⁷

In Italy’s defense, neither Sadak, nor Menderes, nor Bayar understood that even though the Italian army was much weaker than Turkey’s, Italy was not in a strategically precarious position like Turkey was. The Turks simply thought that NATO members were insulting them and not treating them as “equals.” This was actually part of larger ongoing debate in Turkey about how European the nation really was. After all, Turkey was, and still is a heavily Islamic country, whose territory is mostly on the Asian continent. Also, the extent to which the Turks had embraced Western European values was still questionable. Many people from the conservative religious establishment were at odds with treaties with the Western Europeans or modernization programs. Additionally, countries like Denmark and Norway were hesitant to allow the Turks into NATO because they believed the alliance should be for the protection of nations in the Atlantic and Western Europe, not part of a potential military theatre that also encompassed the Middle East.³⁸ This was also part of a larger debate between the NATO countries among themselves about how to utilize NATO. Was it merely a European defensive alliance? Or was it an alliance that was part of the Truman Doctrine strategy targeted at the containment of the Soviet Union?

Turkey emphasized cooperation with U.S. and not Britain. The Turks were sympathetic to the plights of Arab nationalists, who fought against Britain’s colonial territory in Egypt.³⁹ This was because the Turks saw themselves as potential guardians of other Muslim nations. This goes back to the old order of the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate, where Muslim lands were supposed to be guarded by the Ottoman Sultan. The Turkish republic was also aware of the history of British imperialism in the area. This incensed the British in particular, because the Suez Canal in Egypt was integral to British regional hegemony.

³⁶ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests: 1947-1952*, 130.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 145.

³⁸ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, pp. 87

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

There was also the issue of Zekeriya Sertel, a popular Turkish journalist who was known for his communist sympathies. Not exactly sympathetic to the Soviets, but rather supportive of his country's previous decision to remain neutral. For Sertel, and others like him in Turkey, this was part of a complicated debate that questioned the reliability of the Western European nations and the United States as allies.⁴⁰ According to former Ambassador McGhee, there were also other sources of friction within U.S.-Turkish relations, such as stopping the flow of Turkish opium, the Cyprus issue, and a dispute over the U.S. desire to use Incirlik and Iskenderun airbases.⁴¹

However, the Turkish requests did not fall on deaf ears, because in Truman's memorandum to President Inonu, he stressed that Turkey and the Middle East were very much a priority for U.S. security interests.⁴² Truman immediately recognized Turkey's special strategic location as key to containing the Soviets. Eventually, the Turks would have a new chance to make the case for admission into NATO in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War.

Despite frequent rejections, the new Turkish government continued to appeal for a formal admittance into the alliance throughout 1949 and 1950. Things changed in Turkey's favor with the onset of the Korean War and the country's role in the conflict. On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea. Two days later, the UN Security Council declared a resolution calling on other UN members to come to the defense of the South Koreans. The Turks were one of the first UN countries to send troops to Korea. The new Turkish government under Menderes saw this crisis in Korea as a potential opportunity to persuade Western nations to allow it to join NATO. Although, Ankara was concerned about potential reprisals from Moscow.⁴³ However, according to a memorandum from Turkish generals Yusuf Egeli and Nuri Yamut, Yusuf claimed that, "it will be the greatest crime in Turkish history if we fail to take advantage of this opportunity."⁴⁴ The Turkish government saw its opportunity to prove itself to the members of NATO that it was a reliable nation in the fight against communist expansion.

"Turkey was the first nation, after the United States, to respond to the U.N. appeal," McGhee notes, "Scattered opposition was soon overtaken by pride in the fighting qualities of Turkish troops, which

⁴⁰ Ibid., 86-87.

⁴¹ Ibid., 33, 42-44.

⁴² Memorandum of Conversation to President Inonu, April 26 1949, *FRUS. 1949: The Near East and Africa*, Vol. 6: 1657.

⁴³ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests: 1947-1952*, 163.

⁴⁴ The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State, July 24 1950, *FRUS. 1950: The Near East and Africa* (Washington, DC, 1978), 5: 1282.

achieved worldwide recognition.”⁴⁵ A Turkish cabinet meeting convened on July 18 and announced that it would deploy a full brigade of approximately 5,000 troops in Korea. The Turkish government jumped on this chance to appease the international community and decided to send the troops on July 30, 1950.⁴⁶

The Turkish brigade consisted of 5,190 troops, divided into three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and several support companies.⁴⁷ It arrived at Pusan on October 12, 1950. Unlike other UN units, the Turkish brigade was at full military strength and participated in direct combat. The brigade performed exceedingly well in the battle of Kunuri-Wawon from the 27 to 29 November 1950:

At 0800 hours on November 28, the Wawon Battle of the Brigade began. That day all of the attacks of the numerically superior enemy forces first against the Pass Axis and then against the Pass' Points of Shoulder were broken. In the fore-noon the close enveloping operations were defeated with our counter offensives. The bayonet of the Turkish infantry had once again asserted its rule and had opened the Sunchon Pass where the 2nd Division had come upagainst a stone wall. Thus the battles of the brigade which were given the name Kunuri came to an end in a successful conclusion. The Turkish brigade had succeeded to provide the necessary time and space for the withdrawal by preventing the encirclement of the Eighth Army and the IXth Army Corps and the destruction of the 2nd U.S. Division, through the battles it fought on the dates of 27-30 November. The Turkish brigade, which had no war experience, was affecting a great battle from its roots, was saving the friendly army, which was starting to roll down a dangerous cliff, by stopping the superior numbers of enemy forces. Thus the brigade was achieving fame in the world by playing an important role in the course of the war in its first battle.⁴⁸

The Turkish brigade continued fighting for three more years, right up to the cease-fire in 1953.

The courageous efforts of the Turkish troops in Korea greatly improved Ankara's chances of entering NATO. The Turkish brigade performed well, guarding the U.S. Eighth Army's flank as it retreated southward, but it also took a beating in combat, with 3,000 confirmed casualties by the war's end.⁴⁹ However, some have argued that this force was "green and ineffective" and perhaps even contributed to the

⁴⁵ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 77.

⁴⁶ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests: 1947-1952*, 164.

⁴⁷ Ed Evanhoe, "The Turkish Brigade," Korean-War, accessed November 13, 2020, <https://web.archive.org/web/20080917031845/http://www.korean-war.com/turkey.html>.

⁴⁸ "The Battle of Kunuri," *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴⁹ "The Turks in Korea," *Ibid.*, 2.

eighth army's slow advance.⁵⁰ According to Douglas Macarthur, however,

the military situation in Korea is being followed with concern by the whole American public. But in these concerned days, the heroism shown by the Turks has given hope to the American nation. It has inculcated them with courage. The American public fully appreciates the value of the services rendered by the Turkish Brigade and knows that because of them the Eighth American Army could withdraw without disarray. The American public understands that the United Nations Forces in Korea were saved from encirclement and from falling into the hands of the communists by the heroism shown by the Turks.⁵¹

Ankara's decision to send a brigade of troops to Korea to assist the United Nations certainly impressed President Truman, the State Department, and other members of the United Nations who participated in the war.⁵² Under President Menderes, the new Turkish government was anxious to show that it could be trusted.⁵³ Was the decision to send a brigade into Korea the final factor in answering how and why Turkey was able to gain entry into NATO? Or was the Truman administration simply just sick of constant Turkish demand for a security guarantee? Eastern Mediterranean historian Ekavi Athanassopoulou concludes that, "had the Korean War not erupted, it is hard to imagine what means the new government would have employed in its wish to outdo the previous one in pushing the matter ahead."⁵⁴ One can conclude that indeed it was the final factor that allowed Turkey to join NATO.

The Turkish government's decision to send troops to Korea was the final step towards initiating entry into NATO. After a few years of debate, Washington, London, and the other NATO nations were ready to begin discussions on how Turkey would join. McGhee was in contact with Turkish Ambassador Behic Erkin and Secretary of State Dean Acheson regarding Turkey's negotiations. McGhee recalled, "In late March 1951 Secretary of State Acheson, using my earlier conversation with Bayar about a reconsideration of a security commitment to Turkey, I approached General Marshall on the issue, his memo began the process by which a presidential decision would be reached in May."⁵⁵

⁵⁰ "The Turkish Brigade," *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵¹ "The Turks in Korea," *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵² McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, pp. 82-83.

⁵³ Athanassopoulou, *Turkey Anglo-American Security Interests: 1947-1952*, 165-168.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁵⁵ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 85.

At the same time this conference was taking place, U.S. officials were completing a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The purpose of the NIE was to assess Turkey's strength and ability to maintain its alliance with the West in the event of a war against the Soviets.⁵⁶ It was the final calculation that determined whether or not to allow the Turks admission to NATO.

The NIE assessed the Turkish military's ability to guard the Dardanelles Straits and its Eastern Caucasus border, in case of a Soviet attack. The NIE concluded that the Turks were in a capable position to delay or even halt a potential Soviet invasion, and that their steadfastness in answering the UN call in Korea further contributed to this judgment, which was important evidence in allowing the Turks into NATO.⁵⁷ It should also be noted, that U.S. military capabilities were greatly improved with the advent of the Korean War. This was because President Truman authorized an increase in military defense spending, especially after the United States Objectives and Programs for National Security Report (NSC 68) on April 7, 1950.⁵⁸ It would seem that both Turkey and the United States was strengthened militarily because of the Korean War.

Opposition from Nordic members of NATO, however, remained a barrier to Turkey's admission. This was because they did not want to get bogged down in a war in the Middle East, especially if it left their home nations security vulnerable. In particular, Denmark was last to withdraw its opposition.⁵⁹ Britain also reluctantly agreed to vote in favor of Turkey, on the condition that it would be the one to hold the senior command position in the Middle Eastern theater, should war break out.⁶⁰ "By a vote of 73 to 2, with 21 members not voting, the Senate approved ratification of the protocol on 7 February 1952," McGhee reports, "The protocol went into effect finally on 15 February 1952 and the defense of the Middle East was assured."⁶¹ McGhee argues that the Middle East was secure after Turkey's accession to NATO, but this could have also escalated tensions between Washington and Moscow.

The Soviet Union was certainly not happy about Turkey's acceptance into NATO. As a result, the Soviets sent a disapproving message towards Ankara stating, "Under these conditions, it is quite obvious that the invitation to Turkey, a country which has no connection

⁵⁶ National Intelligence Estimate: Turkey's Position in the East-West Struggle, February 26 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, 5, 1119-1126.

⁵⁷ Turkey's Position in the East-West Struggle, February 26 1951, *FRUS, 1951*, 5, 1126.

⁵⁸ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 134.

⁵⁹ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, 87-88.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 89-90.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

whatsoever with the Atlantic bloc, can signify nothing but the aspiration to surround the Soviet Frontiers.”⁶² Indeed, it would seem that this was the idea of the Truman Doctrine strategy. Turkey’s admission thus may have heightened Cold War tensions even more. It did, however, usher in a new era of foreign relations between Washington and Ankara, characterized by a common commitment to guard the Middle East from Soviet threat.⁶³

Turkey's acceptance into NATO ultimately depended on its strategic location and its strengths. The main strengths were its moderately powerful military and its republican democratic tradition, both of which were recognized by Washington and London in the years after the Second World War.⁶⁴ Despite this, it was not enough for the United States and Britain to guarantee protection of Turkey formally or accept the Turks into NATO. Perhaps this was due to the mistrust between Western European powers and the Turks, but the main reason was that there were questions among the NATO powers themselves about the nature of the alliance itself. This centers on the concept of whether NATO was a collective defensive alliance, or a collective coalition for containment of the Soviets. If the latter idea was true, then NATO derived from Truman Doctrine policy. Also, the other small NATO countries in Western Europe were not entirely in agreement with a commitment to defend the Middle East against Soviet attack.

This paper shows that the U.S. and British forces were not able to guarantee Turkish security before 1950. However, the Turks got their chance in 1950 to demonstrate their diplomatic reliability when they sent troops to Korea. This may have been a big attempt to reassure the Western powers after their controversial neutrality policy during the Second World War. The Turks were anxious to reconcile themselves to active participation in a new global order as members of the United Nations and NATO. Maybe this was just another attempt by the Turks to protect themselves from Soviet aggression. However, Britain and the U.S. believed that Turkey was the gateway for Soviet expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Therefore, it was highly unlikely that Britain and the United States would allow Turkey to fall to communism, whether externally or internally, or whether they were officially in an alliance or not. Also, the Turkish military at the time was far larger than several NATO countries combined, which was a contributing factor in the decision to admit Turkey into the alliance. The

⁶² Ibid., 89.

⁶³ Stephen Mitchell, "From Enemies to Allies: Britain and Turkey from 1914 to 1960: Britain, Turkey and NATO during the Early Cold War," *Heritage Turkey* 9 (2019): 20-21.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 47.

Truman Doctrine philosophy was key in understanding how the Turks abandoned their neutral policy and allied themselves with the West.

Prominent U.S. diplomats of the time, such as George McGhee, emphasized that Turkey's entry into NATO was the key link in upholding the Truman Doctrine, and the main reason why the Soviets mostly stayed out of the Middle East.⁶⁵ Perhaps anti-communist "Cold Warriors" like McGhee and Truman were correct in their assumptions that Turkey was central to Soviet containment. However, one can argue about the extent to which the Turks actually needed this alliance for their security. Many Turkish intellectuals, like Sertel, supported Turkey's neutrality and complained about how after joining NATO tensions with the Soviet Union escalated dramatically. Indeed, Turkey's entry into NATO secured the Middle East into the Western orbit. However, once the Soviets learned that NATO was meant to virtually surround and contain their country and not merely a Western European alliance, Turkey's entry served to militarize and escalate Cold War tensions.

⁶⁵ McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection*, pp. 175-80.

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MR. NIXON GOES TO KABUL: MODERNIZATION AND NATION-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN

| Ben Mount

Nomads crossed the Hindu-Kush mountains in single file with camels carrying their possessions. Elders and small children rode on the camels while young adults walked beside them. When they stopped at night, the women would travel miles to bring water to their families. Working together, they pitched black goat-skin tents to guard from the elements at night. The nomads spent the cold seasons in the valleys and the summers in the mountains. They had no nation, and for generations they crossed through areas now littered with political and commercial borders, a strange concept to a nomad. In this timeless lifestyle, only the occasional airplane in the sky might give some clue as to the century in which they lived.

In 1953, a plane carried Vice President Richard Milhous Nixon into Kabul on a diplomatic mission. For several decades foreign powers had influenced the area in which these nomads lived. The British and Russians demarcated the region now called Afghanistan. “The big landowners [made] sham divisions of their estates” Patricia Pope Rockett explains, for the sake of modernization. This prevented the nomads from following many of their traditional migration routes. One elderly nomad at that time expressed his frustration with this new situation:

Everything was much better before. We had animals and we traded. We had horses for our enjoyment and it was a good life. Then came the Pashtunistan quarrel between Afghanistan and Pakistan and our freedom was restricted.... [Now] our way of life is worth nothing.

He then concluded glumly that “you should never wish yourself a single day as a nomad under these miserable conditions.”¹

To many outside observers, it was clear that Afghanistan needed to modernize. This obvious need for development grew out of assumptions in modernization theory, a concept that became popular among foreign affairs experts in the mid-twentieth century. When Nixon visited Kabul, modernization theory was still in its formulaic stage, but the underlying assumptions that soon would frame the theory blinded the vice president from a clear understanding of Afghanistan’s needs. These viewpoints caused the Eisenhower administration to miss a critical opportunity for the United States to lay a foundation for a more

¹ Patricia Pope Rockett, *The Kuchis of Afghanistan: Afghan Memoir, 1953* (self-published, 2012), 40-41.

stable nation in Afghanistan. Assumptions about modernization led Nixon and Eisenhower's advisors to rationalize that supporting the autocratic and racist practices of the Afghani monarchy would lead to a stable nation. The assumption that a nation could follow a framework for development discouraged the Eisenhower administration from seeking out more moderate elements within Afghanistan for the United States to support.

The British and Russians had formed Afghanistan from an area that was not part of Iran or British-India. In 1893, the British established the Durand Line as a defensible border between Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province in British-India. This line divided tribal Pashtun territory in half. In 1929, Mohammed Nadir Shah, a Pashtun, led an army out of British-India to capture Kabul, the largest city in Afghanistan. He spent the remainder of his rule subjugating the surrounding tribal and nomadic groups. Mohammed Zahir Shah, his son, came to power in 1933.² Afghanistan declared independence that same year. In 1947, India won its independence from Britain and the international community recognized the North-West Frontier Province as the new nation of Pakistan. The line dividing Pashtun lands became accepted as an internationally recognized border.

Historically, Britain, Imperial—and then Soviet—Russia, and the United States all made efforts to modernize Afghanistan. One common assumption about modernization is that all nations develop along similar lines through history. Given this assumption, nations that considered themselves modern thought they were justified in accelerating this process in developing nations. Modernization, however, held different meanings from each group involved in Afghani development projects. For Britain and the United States, it meant creating a stable nation that would contribute to the “Free World” market system and act as a buffer state blocking expanding Soviet influence. The U.S. model of modernization assumed that egalitarianism increased along with wealth and representative government as a nation developed. The Soviets had similar expectations for Afghanistan, only with the goal of keeping it within their sphere of influence. To the ruling family in Afghanistan, the legitimacy of its rule and destiny of the Pashtun race depended on modernization. To the unrepresented nomad and tribal peoples in Afghanistan, however, modernization meant the end of the world as they knew it.

As of 1953, broader U.S. interests in the Middle East included seeking to create a Middle Eastern Defensive Organization, or MEDO, modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkey,

² Nick Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State,” *Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 518.

Iran, and Pakistan formed the core of this defensive strategy, creating a border against possible Soviet aggression. The inclusion of Afghanistan in this organization remained uncertain. Problems between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Pashtun issue complicated the creation of this alliance. Afghani interest in MEDO also conflicted with Article 2 in the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of June 1931.³ The Soviet Union wanted to develop oil fields in northern Afghanistan, but the government of Afghanistan insisted upon independent access to these resources. In 1952 the Soviets sent a *demande* to the Afghani government accusing it of violating the 1931 Afghan-Soviet Treaty. They asserted that Afghanistan had to offer access of these fields to the Soviet Union and then buy the gasoline from it.

John E. Horner, the U.S. *chargé* in Afghanistan, advised Afghanistan that it needed to reach a settlement with Pakistan if it wanted an alternative to Soviet trade. He qualified his concerns with his analysis that the Soviet threat seemed unlikely unless Afghanistan attempted to develop the oil fields in the north. Horner thought that the situation could help settle Afghani-Pakistani points of disagreement over the Pashtun issue. He even considered the idea that the two nations could work together in bilateral security against Soviet aggression, with U.S. economic assistance.⁴ The Soviet Union would be the “stick” pushing Afghanistan towards the “carrot” of cooperation with Pakistan and receipt of economic aid from the United States. The multinational approach to modernization within Afghanistan created what some historians have called an “economic Korea.” A Soviet influenced northern economy and a Western influenced southern economy relegated Afghanistan into a model of nation building for both spheres of influence. This split economy laid the foundation for increased division within Afghanistan.

The British, Russians, and Americans jockeyed for influence in Afghanistan through the Pashtun ruling family. Even their consideration of indigenous nomads favored the Pashtuns, with each nation’s Cold War interests at the heart of their struggle. Horner feared Soviet influence on nomadic Pashtuns in the south, describing these

³ Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, 20 February 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [hereafter *FRUS*, with appropriate year], 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 894, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d894> (accessed 10 October 2020).

⁴ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan to the Department of State, 9 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 882, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d882> (accessed 9 October 2020).

nomads as only wanting “money and rifles.”⁵ Ignoring other minorities and supporting the ruling Pashtun family of Zahir worsened the unstable atmosphere in Afghanistan. Over a short period of time Uzbeks, Kazaks, Turkmens, Quizilbasks, and Tajiks lost all political representation as outside powers increasingly regarded Afghanistan as a Pashtun state.⁶

Pashtuns make up only one group within Afghanistan. They are the single largest group, but not a majority in the total population. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British armed and trained Pashtuns on the southern side of the Durand Line to quell rebellions on the northern Afghan side. They formed a native military force to push British influence beyond the range of regular British troops.⁷ The British portrayed the Pashtuns as a “pure race” descended from the armies of Alexander the Great in the 4th Century B.C.E. They also invented a reputation for the Pashtuns as a warrior race.⁸ These imagined realities that the British imposed on the Pashtuns provided all the rationalization Nadir needed to justify his conquest of Afghanistan. U.S. diplomats embraced the British model for understanding Afghanistan, understanding it as a Pashtun nation. This view encouraged policymakers in the Eisenhower administration to ignore other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and accept that Pashtuns—as descendants of Europeans—were in a unique position to facilitate Western-styled modernization.

Zahir Shah adopted a double-pronged strategy to maintain political control over Afghanistan during his long reign from 1933 to 1973. Incredibly, he portrayed the monarchy as a temporary necessity in a time of transition. The ruling family was Pashtun, and it would lead the new nation through the process of modernization. To do this however, Zahir argued, Afghanistan needed to unite Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line. Nadir Shah already believed that this unification would realize itself as either a new nation called Pashtunistan, or as a province of Afghanistan. Zahir took this argument and began a political campaign to garner support for achieving these goals. Most people in Afghanistan did not concern themselves over the Pashtun question, especially compared to more pressing economic and social issues.⁹

Zahir articulated the concept of the Pashtun issue as a diplomatic strategy to expand the conquest that his father began in 1929.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ This list is hardly exhaustive; there are many other ethnicities within Afghanistan’s plethora of nomadic and tribal groups.

⁷ Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan,” 515.

⁸ Ibid., 517.

⁹ Faridullah Bezhan, “The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947-1952,” *Middle East Journal* 68, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 205.

Nadir's rule of Afghanistan developed from the idea that the Pashtuns had a right to rule over the region. This idea stemmed from the unique pre-Islamic ethnic identity of the Pashtuns. This identity also assumed a European heritage that the British encouraged. When Nadir conquered Afghanistan, it was a conquest of Pashtuns over other ethnic groups. Many Pashtuns were left on the southern side of the Durand Line after 1947. Zahir argued that uniting the Pashtuns was necessary for Afghanistan to modernize. The incorporation of the remaining Pashtuns would have given Zahir an ethnic majority in Afghanistan that would further support his racial hierarchy. After 1947, the Pashtuns south of the Durand Line found themselves in the new nation of Pakistan. Zahir's call for Pashtun unification required Pakistan to give up sovereignty of Pashtun lands to Afghanistan, or both nations to cede their Pashtun territories to create a new nation called Pashtunistan. Beyond Zahir's self-serving reasons for wanting Pashtun unification, the Pashtun issue was a needless source of animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Zahir Shah encouraged the formation of political parties in Afghanistan, hoping to gain public support for the Pashtun question. To this end, the monarchy supported the Wish Zalmayan (Awakening Youth) party. However, this political call to action did not reflect the needs of any other groups, and many ethnic minorities instead supported the Hizb-i Watan (Homeland Party). Formed voluntarily, this party called for recognition of the "rights of all ethno-religious groups." Another group, the Hizb-i Sirri Ittihad (Secret Unity Party) wanted to reform the government into a republic, by force if necessary. After the monarchy outlawed this party, it became an underground movement.¹⁰ Zahir Shah's attempt to create a façade of public support backfired. Instead, the encouragement of political parties showed that the Pashtun issue lacked support in much of the population. It also demonstrated the wide spectrum of diversity in Afghanistan. In 1952, the year before Richard Nixon visited the country, Zahir Shah outlawed all political parties.¹¹

As vice president, Richard M. Nixon visited Asia and the Middle East in October and November 1953 on a mission to improve relations with newly formed nations in the region. President Eisenhower believed that his predecessor, Harry S. Truman, neglected these areas. After several detailed pages describing the trip through East Asia in his memoirs, Nixon devotes only three paragraphs to his experience in the Middle East.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid., 205-207.

¹¹ Ibid., 209.

¹² Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 119-33.

In Nixon's three paragraphs covering Pakistan and Iran, he does not even mention Afghanistan. However, he does provide some details on his time in Pakistan. In the description of his meeting with Pakistani Defense Minister Ayub Khan, Nixon refers to a violent military coup that overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran the prior August. According to Nixon in his own account, the Iranian military supported the returned Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Nixon openly supported the leadership of Pahlevi in this conversation.¹³ On 8 October 1953, Eisenhower admitted in his diary notes that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents instigated the 1953 coup in Iran to overthrow Mossadegh. "If knowledge of them became public," he remarked, "we would . . . be embarrassed in that region."¹⁴ In light of these details, Nixon's "goodwill trip" also may have been a mission to test the reaction of Middle Eastern leaders to events in Iran.

In a memorandum summarizing their 7 December 1953 conversation, Ghulam Mohammed, the governor general of Pakistan, shared with Nixon his belief that Turkey was anxious to join Pakistan in an alliance, but he asserted as well that Pakistan wanted a direct agreement with the United States first.¹⁵ This conversation revealed how U.S. relations in the Middle East depended on how much aid the United States could provide. The lack of a thorough discussion on internal problems demonstrates that Nixon did not consider ways in which the United States could take meaningful steps to ensure representation of all citizens. If similar problems plagued Afghanistan, Nixon only would have considered how Zahir could maintain power. Flawed assumptions about national development and modernization led him to these conclusions.

Horace Augustus Hildreth, the U.S. ambassador in Pakistan at the time, thought that Nixon's visit would provide a good opportunity to make several points he believed important for the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations. These issues constituted the same problems that existed in Afghanistan, such as lingering dissension within cabinet and unrest in the surrounding countryside. Hildreth asserted that to facilitate modernization in the region the United States needed to strengthen Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Jinnah's position. To achieve

¹³ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁴ Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, KS, https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/declass_fy10_1953_10_08.pdf (accessed 7 October 2020).

¹⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth), 7 December 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 11, Part 2: 1143, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1143> (accessed 15 October 2020).

these goals, Hildreth believed the United States needed to extend both military aid and strong leadership. This position also assumed that the benefits of modernization inevitably might lead to the emergence of a progressive state. This demonstrates the prevalence of these assumptions in the minds of foreign policy experts within the Eisenhower administration.

Hildreth made several additional points about the future of Pakistan that also described the situation in Afghanistan. According to Hildreth, the United States wanted Pakistan to develop as a modern, progressive state, but Pakistan needed to appreciate importance of Middle Eastern defense. The United States hoped Pakistan might succeed in building the unity of the country, but the prime minister needed to assert himself in uniting factions to do this. He also stated that Pakistan only could contribute to strengthening the “Free World” with a stable government.¹⁶ Rather than helping nations like Pakistan and Afghanistan become more fully responsive to the needs and will of their people, the United States focused on how to maintain and support the existing power structure. These concerns made sense when one placed them within the assumptions of modernization theory. In this framework, the only important criteria were what promoted stability for economic development. Egalitarian and democratic ideals theoretically would follow.

In a conversation with Horner, Ambassador Sardar Mohammed Naim reasserted that Afghanistan relied on trade with the Soviet Union for gasoline. The Pashtun issue cut Afghanistan off from alternative sources to the south through Pakistan. However, internal problems also limited the potential for trade and economic growth. The “main limiting factor in [Afghanistan’s] internal economy is poor north-south communications,” Naim observed. Cotton and gas came from Afghanistan’s southern side of the Hindu-Kush divide. Road conditions across the Hindu-Kush limited the “flow to [a] mere trickle.” Drought and discontent, Naim stressed, would “sharpen Sov[iet] action” to expand its influence in the region.¹⁷

¹⁶ Telegram from the Ambassador in Pakistan (Hildreth) to the Department of State, 1 December 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 1141,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1141> (accessed 11 October 2020).

¹⁷ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan to the Department of State, 9 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 882,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d882> (accessed 9 October 2020).

The internal geographic split in Afghanistan highlighted cultural divisions. If Afghanistan did not create a more cohesive economy, all the aid that the United States sent to Afghanistan would have little effect in the nation's northern half. Afghanistan's options included continuing to obtain oil from the Soviets, developing their own oil wells in the north, or improving relations with Pakistan. Naim claimed that the Afghani government only could send an ambassador to Pakistan if the discussion centered around the Pashtun issue. The Soviets considered internal production of oil in Afghanistan as a violation of their non-aggression accord.¹⁸ The government of Afghanistan, Horner advised Washington, needed a "way out of [this] dangerous position and sought [the State Department's] advice."¹⁹

The most obvious solution was to improve Afghani-Pakistani relations. However, the Pashtun issue made this a difficult option. Pakistani Prime Minister Ali Mohammad was "deeply disturbed over [the] continued existence [of] bad relations with Pak[istan], but [had] no very concrete ideas of how the Pashtun issue [could] be solved." The State Department feared that the Soviets could incite Pashtuns to revolt if they received too much or too little autonomy.²⁰ However, the ruling family in Afghanistan had no intention of retreating on this issue.²¹ The 1953 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate also concluded that Afghani-Pakistani relations were unlikely to improve. It recognized that Afghanistan instigated the Pashtun issue and had no intentions of retreating on its stance given the historical significance of the Pashtun lands. This interpretation of the Pashtun issue totally ignores the fact that only the Pashtuns, one ethnic group, represented the whole of Afghanistan to Washington. As for Pakistan, it did not want to lose a strategically important region from its nation. But Afghanistan would not talk with Pakistan unless it agreed to negotiate the Pashtun issue.²²

¹⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, 24 October 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 1376, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/pg_1376 (accessed 11 October 2020).

¹⁹ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State, 16 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 885, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d885> (accessed 10 October 2020).

²⁰ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State, 16 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 885, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d885> (accessed 10 October 2020).

²¹ Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan," 520.

²² Pashtun nomads and tribal leaders that received aid from both Afghanistan and Pakistan preferred having this issue continue. National Intelligence Estimate, 19 October

Meanwhile, the Pashtun issue helped justify Zahir Shah's action to suppress democracy and support his power. The monarchy portrayed itself as a temporary necessity in a time of transition. Zahir utilized the Pashtun issue and modernization to maintain this temporary need and justify his control.²³

The ideas that framed modernization theory justified the power of the ruling family in Afghanistan.²⁴ Horner realized that if Zahir did not develop the north his government might soon be overthrown.²⁵ To exploit these oil fields, Afghanistan needed to build roads across the Hindu-Kush mountain pass, which itself required construction of more roads built across Afghanistan. To build roads and infrastructure, Afghanistan needed more energy and foodstuffs. The conveniences of modernization justified this monumental effort. Few would argue that access to modern medicine and food cultivation could be detrimental to the development of a nation. However, Zahir had selfish motivations as well and the benefits of modernization would come only to a select few. To facilitate the scale of the construction, a strong central government was needed, which Zahir's established monarchy already provided. Improved communication and transport infrastructure also would help Zahir maintain political control over Afghanistan's countryside. Leaving the northern half of Afghanistan undeveloped also meant leaving it outside of Zahir's influence. These changes would alter or destroy nomadic migration routes and livelihood.

This sudden modernization needed professionals to supervise the development. Morrison-Knudsen, an engineering and construction company, won the contract to build massive dam, road, canal, and irrigation systems across Afghanistan's Helmand Valley. Morrison-Knudsen had previously been responsible for the construction of the Hoover Dam, the Tennessee Valley Project, and many other monumental government projects in the United States. After World War II, the company won contracts in developing nations around the world. The Helmand Dam Project benefitted the employees of Morrison-Knudsen, the royal family, and loyal Pashtuns. Other minorities did not qualify for land ownership—only Pashtuns could apply. Zahir's security forces forcibly removed many nomadic and tribal groups from

1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 11, Part 2: 905,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d905> (accessed 11 October 2020).

²³ Cullather, "Damming Afghanistan," 520.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 512.

²⁵ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan to the Department of State, 9 September 1952, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 11, part 2: 882,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d882> (accessed 9 October 2020).

the land that Morrison-Knudsen would use for the project. This irreparably changed nomadic migration routes and made them more difficult, if not impossible, to traverse. Historian Nick Cullather labels this a form of economic ethnic cleansing.²⁶ The Helmand Valley Project also led to considerable environmental degradation. The water table rose in some areas, leaving a layer of salt on the surface that impeded agricultural production rather than foster it.²⁷

The United States portrayed the Helmand Project as a “grass-roots” enterprise that would give it a meaning that all Afghanis could embrace. U.S. assistance funded 4-H programs and local cooperatives to make the benefits of the dam projects accessible to a greater number of Afghanis. The ruling family, however, sent security forces to break up these organizations.²⁸ This clearly showed that the ruling family only wanted Pashtuns to benefit from the modernization of Afghanistan. Zahir Shah hailed the Helmand Project and modernization as the destiny of the Pashtun race.²⁹

The State Department suspected that the government of Afghanistan desired to use the situation to gain increased economic and military assistance from both the Soviet Union and the United States. It also thought that Afghani leaders hoped the U.S.-British pressure could solve the Pashtun issue in a way favorable to Afghanistan. The State Department, however, found it difficult to determine exactly how to help. Large-scale support seemed too risky. Previous agreements with the Afghani government discouraged outside assistance and continuing this seemed to the State Department like the best course of action. The State Department agreed with Horner that the moment might be a good time to improve Afghani-Pakistani relations. It thought that this might nullify problems from a cut-off of Soviet trade as well. The State asked that Horner relate these concerns and decisions to Afghani leaders.³⁰

Horner believed that the State Department underestimated Soviet pressure in Afghanistan. In his opinion, its analysis took no account of Afghan psychology or elements within the country willing to come to terms with Soviets. He also expressed fears that delivering the message from the State Department would alienate allies in Afghanistan and strengthen those sympathetic to the Soviets. He asserted that the Soviets wanted the north to develop “along lines

²⁶ Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan,” 521.

²⁷ Ibid., 523

²⁸ Ibid., 530.

²⁹ Ibid., 515.

³⁰ Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, 22 January 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954*, 11, Part 2: 897,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d897> (accessed 12 October 2020).

agreeable to [the] USSR.” Horner believed that the United States should act immediately and not wait for the Soviets to move first. He even went so as far as to declare to the State Department that he could only deliver the message if he received direct instruction to do so and would not take responsibility for the outcome.³¹ The State Department confirmed its orders to Horner despite his concerns.³² It also lamented its inability to raise funds immediately but offered moral support for Export-Import bank loans and did make a promise for “possible future actions.” The State Department’s message included directions for Horner to “tell Afghans we support them and applaud their rejection of Soviet protests.” However, Afghanistan had to settle its dispute with Pakistan for these promises to unfold.³³ These vague assurances show that the State Department had little interest in supporting Afghanistan any more than necessary.

In response Horner argued that the United States should provide more than moral support to counter Soviet pressure. He remarked that cutting off aid from Russia meant a crippling gas shortage and cotton glut in Afghanistan, creating a “grave situation even without Sov[iet] subversion.” Horner requested a serious consideration of using \$5 million to aid Afghani road construction, including “modern motor transport maintenance.” This aid also would fund building a Kabul-Kandahar Road, and transport aircraft to cross the Hindu-Kush. Horner asserted that increased assistance had the potential to accomplish many important goals in modernizing Afghanistan. Such as improved resistance to the Soviet threat, economic integrity, and ability to respond to subversive elements. Horner’s assessment emphasized to the State Department the ruling family’s need for economic development.

Zahir lamented that he could not leave northern Afghanistan in the “stone age.” He also knew that accepting assistance from the Russians translated to Soviet control. Again, stressing the economic needs of Afghanistan, Horner warned the State Department that Afghan

³¹ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State, 2 October 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 888, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d888> (accessed 12 October 2020).

³² Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce), 10 October 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 889, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d889> (accessed 13 October 2020).

³³ Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, 11 October 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 890, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d890> (accessed 13 October 2020).

leaders believed that the Soviets only needed a suitable pretext to intervene in Afghanistan.³⁴ The State Department, however, believed that the Soviet threat was not immediate, but could not ignore the possibility. It admitted to the likelihood that the Soviet *demarche* was a first step to keep Westerners south of the Hindu-Kush line. The State Department knew the Soviets had a strong position in the region and could exploit the situation in Iran and Afghanistan but wanted the Pashtun issue resolved before the United States could offer any more aid.³⁵ Horner had graver concerns that Afghanistan's weak military had no chance to win a war against the Soviets. Afghanistan's forces could put down local uprisings "financed or aided by Soviets." However, to establish a strong regional defense, Afghanistan would need much more assistance from the United States. This needed a tactful response, as the Soviets already complained that Afghanistan demonstrated "partiality toward West," exactly the kind of reaction the State Department wanted to avoid.³⁶

The 1954 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reflected concerns that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan resulted from Western gains in Middle Eastern countries. Considering this, the National Security Council (NSC) concluded that increased assistance to Afghanistan from the United States would provoke a Soviet response. The NSC also expressed concern that gradual economic penetration might push Afghanistan into the Soviet orbit. In view of these findings, it recommended that the United States should not increase aid to Afghanistan. The NIE thought that pro-Communist elements within Afghanistan lacked the strength to overthrow the regime. The Soviets could conquer Afghanistan easily, but this would "almost certainly entail anti-Soviet reactions elsewhere, particularly in the Arab-Asian bloc." NIE officials believed that these findings mitigated the actual influence the Soviet Union could exert in Afghanistan. This shows that

³⁴ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State, 9 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 883,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d883> (accessed 11 October 2020).

³⁵ Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, 12 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 884,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d884> (accessed 11 October 2020).

³⁶ Telegram from the Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Department of State, 16 September 1952, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 885,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d885> (accessed 11 October 2020).

the State Department had no intention of helping Afghanistan unless that help was a direct counter to Soviet influence. If Washington really was interested in helping Afghanistan to modernize it should not have qualified this effort only in Cold War terms. This demonstrates how modernization was used as a tool, and justification, for U.S. influence in weaker nations such as Afghanistan.

The NIE predicted that the government of Afghanistan likely would continue with its policy of attempting to play off the great powers to Afghanistan's advantage. Afghanistan already had a history as a buffer state between British and Russian imperial spheres of influence, but British withdrawal from India in 1947 left Afghanistan vulnerable to Soviet influence. According to the NIE, Afghani policy had become one in which it accepted aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Afghani leaders favored the West but could not ignore power and proximity of the Soviets. Their maximum advantage lay in balancing serving the interests of both power blocs. Zahir wanted aid from the United States but did not want to accept membership in a Western-backed defense arrangement because no foreseeable arrangement could compensate for the increased Soviet hostility that such a decision would bring. The NIE concluded that Afghani leaders overestimated their ability to curb Soviet influence, and the West's capacity to assist.³⁷ In response to these concerns, the United States continued its policy of slow and delayed economic assistance to Afghanistan.

This unhurried economic assistance mitigated the State Department's fears that the Soviets would increase assistance in response to U.S. aid. However, the strategy of waiting for the Soviets to move first and then matching their contributions in a contest of nation building and modernization failed. Between 1949 and 1957 U.S. aid to Afghanistan far surpassed the assistance the Soviet Union offered. However, the Soviets surpassed the United States by the end of the decade.³⁸ Trade between Afghanistan and the United States also dragged behind that with the Soviet Union and steadily declined by the end of the 1950s.³⁹ Instead, it may have been wiser to offer considerable aid to Afghanistan in return for assurances that it would not accept anything from the Soviet Union and legalize political parties. Unfortunately, the State Department never trusted Zahir enough to

³⁷ National Intelligence Estimate, 19 October 1954, *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, part 2: 905, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d905> (accessed 11 October 2020).

³⁸ Hafizullah Emadi, *State, Revolution, and Superpowers* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 57.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

entertain this idea had it even conceived of it. The same assumptions that framed modernization theory limited the State Department's ability to recognize alternatives from the monarchy to support, such as the former Hizb-i Watan.

In 1953, the State Department issued an official policy toward Afghanistan. It thought that Washington should support Afghanistan if it was not unfriendly to the United States and not subservient to the Soviet Union. To help resist Soviet pressure, the State Department also argued for the United States to encourage closer economic and political relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If Afghanistan and Pakistan desired confederation, the United States could assist in realization of this, if it remained in U.S. interests to do so. To assist Afghanistan without increasing Soviet anxiety, the United States focused on technical assistance and moral support for loan applications. Washington also warned that any economic and military aid entirely depended on Afghanistan improving relations with Pakistan and Iran.⁴⁰ These concerns again show the lack of U.S. interest in advancing the social and economic needs of ethnic minorities who the Afghan monarchy discriminated against. This lack of concern derived from assumptions about modernization and its link to free-markets and egalitarian politics.

The State Department warned against giving the impression that the United States favored participation of Afghanistan in a regional defense arrangement immediately but entertained this possibility at a "future date." It recommended that if the Soviets increased efforts in Afghanistan, the United States needed to review Afghan policy immediately. If the Soviets attacked Afghanistan, the United States might utilize diplomatic measures to get the Soviets to withdraw. If that should fail, it issued a vague recommendation that the United States devise a solution. The State Department concluded that Soviet interests in Afghanistan might be the result of the U.S. attempts to form a defensive bloc out of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.⁴¹ This uncertain policy ignored the possibility of supporting alternatives to the monarchy.

Nixon could have utilized his trip as an opportunity to promote greater understanding in the Eisenhower administration of the complex history and social issues in Afghanistan. The United States should have

⁴⁰ General United States Policies with Respect to South Asia, 19 February 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954: Africa and South Asia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, Part 2, p. 1152, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/pg_1152 (accessed 15 October 2020).

⁴¹ General United States Policies with Respect to South Asia, 19 February 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954: Africa and South Asia* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 11, Part 2, p. 1153, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/pg_1153 (accessed 15 October 2020).

offered substantial aid to Afghanistan, provided Zahir Shah agreed to permit political parties again, reject Soviet aid, and end the Pashtun issue. Had Nixon realized this as a consequence of his mission, such a course of action may have been possible. This would have forced Zahir to choose sides. Given the egalitarian drive behind Hizb-i Watan, Afghani politics may have steered towards alignment with the West and cooperation with Pakistan.

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THE SPACE RACE AND APOLLO-SOYUZ: A THAW IN THE COLD WAR

| Anthony Meza

The aftermath of World War II brought much uncertainty to the world as the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the Cold War. The late 1950s saw space as the new frontier for the two to assert their dominance, beginning with the Soviet Union's successful launch of the *Sputnik* satellite. Decades later, the two nations cooperated under the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project of 1975, marking the world's first international cooperative project in space. Cooperative efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about a "thaw" in the Cold War, as they set aside their differences for the advancement of space travel.

For both countries, the looming paranoia of the Cold War years seeped into everyday life. These decades are commonly viewed as a volatile, paranoid period for the two nations. The near outbreak of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, involvement in the Vietnam War, and the rapid arms race heightened paranoia, as impending nuclear destruction appeared all too likely.

The success of the world's first satellite, *Sputnik*, in 1957 ushered in a new crisis for Americans, who now saw themselves bested by their archrival in space travel and technology. Efforts to close the gap between themselves and the Soviets fell short. The failed launch of Vanguard TV-3 resulted in humiliation for the United States, who viewed the Soviet Union's accomplishment in space as a threat to national security. Vanguard's failed launch became an object of ridicule in the newspapers, who nicknamed it "Oopsnik," "Flopnik," "Stayputnik," and "Kaputnik."¹

In an attempt to close the gap, President Eisenhower signed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in 1958, which spawned NASA's creation. It replaced the previous National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics or NACA. The act approved larger funding and expanded its efforts to the new frontier of space. Even after heightened efforts to catch up to the Soviets, the United States suffered another defeat in the space race. In 1961, the Soviets successfully launched *Vostok 1*, carrying the first human into space: Yuri Gagarin. The mission marked a massive accomplishment for the Soviets, prompting the newly elected

¹ Terry O'Neill, *The Nuclear Age* (San Diego: Greenhaven Inc., 2002), 146.

President Kennedy to make efforts to prove to the country, and the world, that the U.S. is not second to the Soviets.²

Like Eisenhower, space ventures initially received lukewarm reactions from Kennedy, whose attention diverted to Vietnam and the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion. Public opinion turned south on Kennedy and the federal government, as citizens believed the United States should be at the forefront of space exploration and technology.³ After repeated embarrassment and public pressure, President Kennedy appeared before a crowd to deliver the famous “We choose to go to the Moon” speech in 1962, where he promised to place humans on the moon before the decade ended. Khrushchev and Kennedy had met a year earlier in Vienna to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations, where Kennedy suggested the two nations cooperate on a joint-mission to the moon, but Khrushchev declined. Kennedy repeated wishes to cooperate on a joint mission to the moon at a United Nations General Assembly in 1963 but was met with decline once again; Khrushchev stated there were no plans to reach the moon.

The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967 by the U.S., USSR, and the U.K., formed the basis for all future conduct in space. Its key points included barring weapons of mass destruction in space, limiting the moon's exploration for peaceful purposes, declared the exploration of outer space should be done to benefit all countries, and that all countries are free to explore it. This treaty would pave the way for future space exploration by promoting cooperation and diplomatic conduct on space matters.

A peak in the quest for space dominance, the Apollo 11 mission successfully placed the first humans on the moon in 1969, fulfilling President Kennedy's goal in 1962. Press in the Soviet Union were very critical of the Apollo missions. The Russian news agency Tass claimed that they were attempts to intrude international law.⁴ Space cooperation seemed improbable due to tense relations.

Neither nation appeared eager to acknowledge the other's achievements. In June 1971, the Soviets successfully launched Salyut 1; the world's first piloted orbital space station. Alternatively, the

² John Logsdon, "John F. Kennedy's Space Legacy and Its Lessons for Today" *Issues in Science and Technology* 27, no. 3 (April 2011), 29-34.

³ *Space Race*, Episode 3, "Race for Survival," Directed by Christopher Spencer and Mark Everest, aired September 28, 2005, on British Broadcasting Corporation, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UxTf-kWbYk4>

⁴ Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, *Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75: Overview, Facilities and Hardware, Manned and Unmanned Flight Programs, Bioastronautics, Civil and Military Applications, Projections of Future Plans: Staff Report*, author first and last. Publication/ Report number, Washington D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1976.

Apollo 14 missions three months prior successfully landed the third mission to the moon. Neither side proved to be eager in acknowledging the other's achievements and were critical of the other's technology. There was little-to-no coverage of the opposing nation's achievements due to tensions in the Cold War. Soviet spacecraft emphasized automation to reduce the risk of human error, whereas American spacecraft preferred manual operation. Soviets deemed American spacecraft too complex and dangerous. Meanwhile, Americans criticized Soviet spacecraft for being one-dimensional, as its automated systems could not adapt to potential faults. On the Soyuz, the Manned Spacecraft Center stated, "We in NASA rely on redundant components—if an instrument fails during flight, our crews switch to another in an attempt to continue the mission. Each Soyuz component, however, is designed for a specific function; if one fails, the cosmonauts land as soon as possible."⁵

By 1970, the Nixon Administration sought to firmly remove the United States from the Vietnam War and ease tensions with the Soviet Union and China. As they both sought to gain through trade and technological cooperation, Nixon's foreign policy ambitions of détente, the easing of tensions between countries, were favorable by both the U.S. and Soviet Union. Talks of détente began in 1971 but solidified following Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972, the first time a U.S. President visited the Soviet Union. A month earlier, Nixon's visit to China prompted Brezhnev to become more willing to seek policies of détente, considerably so following the Sino-Soviet split and their proceeding border conflicts in 1969. Improving relations with the U.S. stood in the Soviet Union's best interests. Consequently, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks scaled back the production of missiles and other weapons, furthering the aims of détente.

NASA Administrator Thomas Paine wrote to Soviet Academy of Sciences president Mstislav Keldysh in 1969. Paine proposed international cooperation for a future joint space venture. Keldysh responded a year later and agreed to broaden Soviet-American cooperation. Nixon's Foreign Policy Advisor Henry Kissinger embraced international cooperation in a 1970 meeting with NASA. Kissinger outlined plans for the mission with acting-NASA Administrator George Low, allowing them full control over all matters involving space. However, Kissinger requested that NASA personnel do not "contribute to the false notion" that if they could reach technical agreements over space, the two nations could also reach political

⁵ Edward and Linda Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project* (Washington D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1978), vii.

solutions.⁶ Kissinger stated that astronauts attempted to suggest that space matters should be equally easy to negotiate as political matters and felt that political matters were much more complex.

Both countries appeared to move closer to détente, establishing a “thaw” in the Cold War. Finally, in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. This agreement solidified plans for an international space mission, which effectively paved the way for what became the historic Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

Disaster struck the Soviets a year prior to the agreement with the events of the Soyuz 11 accident. On a mission to dock with the Salyut space station, a faulty leak in the Soyuz spacecraft led to the deaths of its three cosmonaut passengers. Consequently, public opinion of the proposed joint mission became mixed. Journalists frequently had concerns about the “donation” of knowledge and technology to the Soviets, suggesting the U.S. had a technological advantage over the Soviets.⁷ Robert R. Gilruth, director of NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center, answered that although the U.S. had more experience docking, the Soviets had their own experience in spaceflight and understood its mechanics. Having said that, the United States became tasked with engineering a docking module that allowed compatible docking between the Apollo and Soyuz spacecrafts.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project became an instant historical highlight for being the first international space mission. Even more so considering the world’s two biggest rivals, on the brink of nuclear war a decade earlier, were its cooperators. The mission aimed to dock the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Soyuz spacecrafts in Earth’s orbit. The Apollo spacecraft carried three American astronauts: Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand, and Donald K. Stayton. Aboard the Soyuz spacecraft were two Soviet cosmonauts: Alexei Leonov and Valeri Kubasov. Leonov became the first person to walk in space a decade earlier in 1965.

The mission commenced on July 15, 1975, with the Soyuz launch and the subsequent launch of the Apollo seven hours later. Both spacecrafts successfully docked two days later. Stafford and Leonov, the respective mission commanders, shook hands in the first international handshake in space. This gesture symbolized a monumental moment in foreign relations between the two nations. They received an optimistic call from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev:

⁶ Ibid., 126-127.

⁷ Congress and U.S. Govt., *Soviet Space Programs*, 80.

To the cosmonauts Alexey Leonov, Valeriy Kubasov, Thomas Stafford, Vance Brand, Donald Slayton. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet people, and for myself, I congratulate you on this memorable event... The whole world is watching with rapt attention and admiration your joint activities in fulfillment of the complicated program of scientific experiments. The successful docking had confirmed the correctness of the technical decisions developed and realized by means of cooperative friendship between the Soviet and American scientists, designers and cosmonauts. One can say that the Soyuz-Apollo is a forerunner of future international orbital stations.⁸

The crews conducted several science experiments while docked. They studied the effects of weightlessness on killifish eggs, cross-contamination microbes, and ultraviolet absorption among others.⁹ The crews became friendly with each other, exchanged gifts, toured each other's ships, and spoke in each other's languages. As a result of Stafford's speech drawl when speaking Russian, Leonov later joked that there were three languages spoken during the mission: Russian, English, and "Oklahomski."¹⁰ Additionally, the ships conducted docking and redocking maneuvers, where the spacecrafts would reverse roles.¹¹

The spacecrafts spent a total of 44 hours docked together over the mission. After their separation, the Apollo crew maneuvered to create an artificial solar eclipse that would allow the Soyuz crew to take photographs of a solar corona.¹² The Apollo astronauts encountered issues during re-entry and splashdown into Earth. The crew were accidentally exposed to toxic fumes, which caused Brand to briefly lose consciousness. The crew was hospitalized for two weeks but were ultimately unharmed. Nonetheless, the mission is considered a massive success for both technological pursuits and international cooperation. It served as a symbol of détente that President Nixon had pursued years prior. Apollo and Soyuz commanders, Stafford and Leonov, became close friends after the mission. Leonov became godfather to Stafford's two youngest children.¹³

Although the mission was a success, the press in each country attempted to downplay the other's achievements, remaining skeptical about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. A few journalists felt that the

⁸ Ezell, *The Partnership*, 328-329.

⁹ Ibid., 513-536.

¹⁰ Elizabeth Howell, "Apollo-Soyuz Test Project: Russians, Americans Meet in Space," Space, April 25, 2013, <https://www.space.com/20833-apollo-soyuz.html>.

¹¹ Ezell, *The Partnership*, 329.

¹² Ibid., 340.

¹³ Mick O'Hare, "Apollo-Soyuz: A cold war handshake in space, 40 years on," New Scientist, July 27, 2015, <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27910-apollosoyuz-a-cold-war-handshake-in-space-40-years-on/>.

mission would allow Soviets to call themselves equal to the U.S., a position they felt would be taken advantage of.¹⁴ Additionally, journalists in the U.S. described Soviet spacecraft as “primitive,” while Soviets reported that U.S. specialists praised the technical qualities of Soyuz.¹⁵ Journalists also described how the Soviets led the United States in the spaceflight capabilities, attributing their success to Marxist ideology. Critics also argued that the mission was merely a “250 million-dollar handshake” whose funding could have been put to better use.¹⁶

Additionally, Kissinger’s fears of using scientific and technical cooperation sprouted itself in the concept of “linkage.”¹⁷ Proponents of space-cooperation believed that space endeavors could effectively solve, or at least aid, political issues. Others believe that cooperation in space could become unnecessarily entangled with political policy.¹⁸ Space cooperation would decline in the following years due to linkage politics, largely due to the human rights issue involving the Soviet Union and its subsequent involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War.¹⁹ The “thaw” appeared to be short lived, but nonetheless set a precedent for future international cooperation in space.

Although the Cold War is characterized as a decades-long feeling of paranoia and conflict, the advent of space exploration allowed for the Earth’s fiercest rivals to set their differences aside for the advancement of all humans. The Apollo-Soyuz project stands as a symbol of potential for international cooperation.

¹⁴ Library of Congress, *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1985), 80.

¹⁵ Ibid., 80-81

¹⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹⁷ Ibid., 81.

¹⁸ Ibid., 81.

¹⁹ Kellie Morgan, “How historic handshake in space brought superpowers closer,” CNN, July 15, 2015, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/world/space-handshake-anniversary>.

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WOMEN'S FERTILITY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN MODERN MEXICO, 1968-1988

| Vivian Hernandez

The 1960s brought great change to the lives of Western European and American women. They were mobilized into the workforce like never before and actively participated in the student movements that swept the decade. The United States legalized birth control in 1960 and European countries such as Germany and France soon followed. This freed many women from unwanted pregnancy which consequently gave them more choices and freedoms in their personal lives. By the end of the 1960s, more than 80% of American wives of childbearing age were using contraceptives. However, this was not the case for Mexico, which trailed behind the U.S. and Western Europe in terms of family planning and population control.

Historically, the Mexican government had encouraged population growth for the three following reasons: to protect the north from U.S. expansion, to replenish the casualties suffered during the Mexican Revolution and the influenza epidemic, and to bolster economic development in the country. The 1947 General Population Law created regulations that prohibited the sale and use of contraceptives and criminalized abortion.¹ The government's pronatalist agenda continued to encourage the country's rapidly growing population and prohibited the use of contraceptives until the late 1960's. The Catholic Church also delayed the acceptance of artificial contraceptives by denouncing them and encouraging women to have as many kids as God pleased.

Change in the lives of Mexican women accelerated in 1968 when the birth control pill was finally introduced. In 1970, 13% of married women used contraception. By 1980, that number had jumped to 40%. The introduction of contraceptives affected the lives of Mexican women socially, politically, and economically. It coincided with other cultural changes in Mexican society that advocated for women to take control of their bodies, minds, and careers. Women were discouraged from being passive beings and encouraged to take control of their bodies and minds. This change allowed women of all classes to participate more freely outside the home without the constraints of motherhood. In a society where women were expected to be subservient to their husbands and mothers to their children, contraceptives enabled women

¹ Gabriela Soto Laveaga. "'Let's Become Fewer:' Soap Operas, Contraception, and Nationalizing the Mexican Family in an Overpopulated World," *Sexuality Research and Social Policy*, vol. 4, no. 3 (2007): 23.

to challenge traditional gender roles by allowing them to enter the workforce, participate in politics, and obtain an education. For the first time in Mexico, women were able to gain control of their bodies and their lives.

Mexico's population between 1950 to 1970 nearly doubled in size and grew at an annual rate of 3.2%.² The growth in the urban population can be associated to the increase in income that was created by what some economists called the "Mexican Miracle." The extension of modern health care to rural areas resulted in higher fertility rates and lower mortality rates. Consequently, there was an increase in the rural population. This period brought economic prosperity and globalization which ultimately influenced the Mexican government to tackle its population problem. Researchers Jain-Shing Chen, Whitney W. Hicks, S.R. Johnson, and Raymundo C. Rodriguez suggest that "the motivation for contraception depends on socio-economic development which in turn affects the desired number of children."³ The cost of contraception, measured by the number of known contraceptive methods, was most directly influenced by government family planning policy.

Access to Family Planning

President Luis Echeverría created government-sponsored family planning programs because he inherited a Mexico that was growing at an alarming rate. Echeverría, who held office from 1970-1976, "insisted that a better Mexico was one that regulated its population growth."⁴ The Echeverría administration launched its first national family planning campaign in 1972 in hopes that fertility would begin to decline. In 1974, Mexico made family planning the constitutional right of all married couples. This dramatic policy allowed married women to decide when and if they wanted to have children. Gabriela Soto-Laveaga states that this created a shift of "authority to determine how many children a couple could and should have from a religious platform to one where it was dictated by the state."⁵

This constitutional amendment challenged the Catholic Church's influence on family planning in Mexico. The church

² Robert Reinhold. "Mexico's Birth Rate Seems Off Sharply." *The New York Times*, November 5, 1979.

³ Jain-Shing A. Chen et al., "Economic Development, Contraception and Fertility Declining in Mexico," *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1990): 417.

⁴ Gabriela Soto-Laveaga, *Jungle Laboratories: Mexican Peasants, National Projects, and the Making of the Pill* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 12.

⁵ Gabriela Soto Laveaga, "'Let's Become Fewer.' Soap Operas, Contraception, and Nationalizing the Mexican Family in an Overpopulated World." 30.

encouraged people to have large families and advocated for natural family planning such as the “rhythm method.” This calendar-based contraceptive method relied on keeping track of a women’s menstrual cycle and predicting when she was most likely to ovulate. The Catholic Church was still against the use of contraceptives in the late 1960s and through the 70s when the birth control pill was introduced in Mexico. In July 1968, Pope Paul VI released *Humanae Vitae* which reinforced the Catholic Church’s stance on artificial contraceptives and referred to them as “intrinsically wrong.” However, this did not mean that people strayed away from using birth control. The women who didn’t use any form of contraceptive were more likely than not, ultra-religious or simply were uneducated and did not know about them. Many were concerned that Echeverría’s administration would receive massive backlash from the Mexican Catholic Church but that was not the case. Jay Winter and Michael Teitelbaum reveal that

some attribute this silence to the Mexican church’s ‘great tolerance regarding the contraceptive practices of its congregation.’ Others reported that before announcing his new population policy in 1972, President Echeverría summoned church leaders, informed them of his decision, and made it clear to them that he expected to hear of no opposition to the policy from the church.⁶

Regardless of whether the Catholic Church genuinely tolerated the use of artificial birth control amongst its members, the Mexican government was able to implement successful family-planning programs.

On March 27, 1974, President Echeverría along with the minister of state, the ministers of health and public assistance, the minister of public education, the minister of foreign relations, and other “distinguished personalities” established the *Consejo Nacional de Población* (CONAPO), which was the country’s first National Population Council.⁷ The post-1974 ideals of population control attempted to “forge a better society not simply by creating better citizens but by having fewer of them.”⁸ By this time, the Mexican government realized the country was not creating enough jobs to sustain its growing population.⁹ The cities and urban areas were becoming overcrowded

⁶ Jay Winter and Michael Teitelbaum, *Population, Fear, and Uncertainty: The Global Spread of Fertility Decline*

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 211.

⁷ Gabriela Soto Laveaga, “‘Let’s Become Fewer’: Soap Operas, Contraception, and Nationalizing the Mexican

Family in an Overpopulated World,” 21.

⁸ Ibid., 23.

⁹ Vivianne B. de Márquez, “La política de planificación familiar en México: ¿Un proceso institucionalizado?”

with young people who fled rural areas in search of jobs and a better life. Therefore, the population control campaign had economic motivators behind it as well. The Mexican government continued to support the availability of birth control through the 1970s, and in 1975, public health agencies began to advocate for the distribution of free oral contraceptives in pharmacies.

The use of contraception was becoming vastly available for middle-class women in urban and metropolitan centers under the Echeverria administration but not in more impoverished rural areas. The rural populations had much higher fertility rates and used contraceptives far less than their urban counterparts. Echeverria's successor fortunately continued his family planning legacy. President Jose Lopez Portillo implemented family planning programs that targeted rural areas and aided them with contraceptives. In 1977, these services began to spring up in the rural areas of the country. Widespread poverty, dispersed villages, and the lack of employment outside of the agricultural realm plagued rural Mexico. These issues led those involved in implementing the population policy to regard "the task of promoting increased contraceptive practice and lower fertility in rural areas as a major challenge."¹⁰

Vamos Haciendo Menos: Educational and Cultural Change, 1970-1986

Education was crucial to decrease the fertility rate among Mexican women.¹¹ CONAPO had conducted studies after 1974 that "showed that many of the previous family planning campaigns were considered unsuccessful because women simply did not have easy access to information about contraception."¹² CONAPO officials hypothesized that education affected fertility indirectly through its impact on desired family size and on contraceptive utilization by increasing exposure to information and ideas disseminated through printed material.¹³ In 1973, 70% of all contraceptive users relied on the commercial sector. By 1982, 53.4% of women began receiving their

Revista Mexicana de Sociología, vol. 46, no. 2 (1984): 290.

¹⁰ Joseph E Potter, "The Persistence of Outmoded Contraceptives Regimes: The Cases of Mexico and Brazil,"

Population and Development Review, vol. 25. no.4 (1999): 715.

¹¹ Ansley J. Coale, "Population Growth and Economic Development: The Case of Mexico," *Foreign Affairs*,

New York, N.Y., vol. 56, no. 2 (1978): 419.

¹² Joseph E. Potter, "The Persistence of Outmoded Contraceptives Regimes: The Cases of Mexico and Brazil," 23.

¹³ Jain-Shing A. Chen et al. "Economic Development, Contraception and Fertility Declining in Mexico," 419.

contraceptives through government-sponsored programs and by 1987 the number increased to 61.8%.¹⁴ Sex education also had to occur at home in order for change to happen. By educating women on how to prevent pregnancies and what birth control options they had, they could gain control of their bodies and decide when and if they wished to have children.

CONAPO and Mexican media giants joined forces to get the message across to urban and rural households to reduce their sizes. Soto-Lavaega expresses that “throughout the campaign, the government acknowledged the increased presence of women in the workforce, of absent fathers, and of a population that was more urban than rural.”¹⁵ The first of three CONAPO sponsored family planning campaigns was introduced in 1974 under the name *Vamos haciendo menos*. This campaign specifically targeted macho men and passive women in an attempt to forge a better Mexico by creating responsible citizens who took on the responsibility of family planning. For example, a poster targeting passive women read:

She who is a true woman assumes responsibilities and takes decisions over her own life, her family and her productive activities. She who is passive fears responsibilities. A true woman intervenes, has opinions, decides, participates, contributes... and is active. The passive one waits.¹⁶

The second campaign, *La Pequeña Familia Vive Mejor*, was launched in 1975.¹⁷ This campaign expressed the need to have fewer children due to the socio-economic problems that plagued large urban spaces. The third campaign was implemented in 1976 and was titled *Señora: Usted decide si se embaraza*.¹⁸ It became CONAPO’s most controversial campaign because it encouraged women to decide on their own when and if they wanted to have children. This idea directly challenged the machista and patriarchal norms that permeated Mexican society. The campaign received significant backlash from men who believed the decision to have children was their own.¹⁹ CONAPO used posters, magazine, newspaper, radio, and televisions slots to spread its message

¹⁴ Y. Palma Cabrera “Planificación familiar: Niveles y tendencias recientes del uso de anticonceptivos,” *Demos*, (1988): 26.

¹⁵ Gabriela Soto Laveaga, “‘Let’s Become Fewer’: Soap Operas, Contraception, and Nationalizing the Mexican Family in an Overpopulated World,” 20.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 25

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 25.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 25.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 25.

to the masses. In 1978, *El Programa Nacional de Educación Sexual* was created. The following year, CONAPO launched another campaign that focused on addressing the question, “*¿Que es planear la familia?*” This time, CONAPO used pamphlets with statistics and graphs to relay their message to the urban population. CONAPO’s family planning campaigns encouraged Mexicans to be more active as citizens and take control of their reproductive decisions to better their lives.²⁰ Most importantly, the campaigns reflected a changing global scene and a cultural change in Mexico which made it clear that the modern Mexican woman was no longer submissive.

From 1977-1986, CONAPO partnered with Televisa, Mexico’s largest television company, to create *telenovelas* for development. The first of these *telenovelas* was *Acompañame* which aired in 1977.²¹ It followed the lives of three sisters who made different decisions in terms of family planning. *Acompañame* was followed by four other *telenovelas* that encouraged Mexican couples to incorporate family planning in their relationships.²² Soto-Laveaga comes to the conclusion that

by incorporating family planning into the vision of the ideal familial unit, the state irrevocably challenged traditional female roles and instead, publicly and controversially, altered the role of the mother as a passive and obedient citizen to that of the modern wife as an active and vocal advocate of these new family values.²³

CONAPO reported an increase from 0 to 500 calls asking for family planning information after *Acompañame* began to air on television.²⁴ Additionally, 2,500 women signed up to volunteer for the National Plan for Family Planning. Most importantly, there was an increase of 23% in contraceptive sales in 1977.²⁵ However, these changes did not occur for those who did not watch the *telenovela*. This campaign only impacted the lives of women who had access to a television and cable. Nevertheless, during the decade-long run of the *telenovela* campaign, Mexico’s population growth decreased by an astounding 34%.

²⁰ Ibid., 25.

²¹ Ibid., 26.

²² Ibid., 26.

²³ Ibid., 27.

²⁴ Ibid., 27.

²⁵ Ibid., 27.

Mexico's Scientific Contribution to the Creation of *La Pildora Anticonceptiva*

Mexico played a direct role in the development of the birth control pill. Barbasco, a wild species of yam, played a critical role in developing of hormonal contraception and consequently prompted the Mexican government to make it accessible. The wild barbasco yam is native to Mexico's geography and can be found in the southeastern states of Tabasco, Chiapas, Veracruz, Oaxaca, part of Puebla, and smaller regions in México and Michoacán.²⁶ In the 1940's, Mexican scientists discovered that barbascos chemical compounds could be used to make steroids and oral contraceptives. Research with diosgenin, which is a precursor for several hormones, by the Mexican chemist Luis Ernesto Miramontes created what he believed to be a substance that would prevent women from miscarrying but instead became the basis for oral contraceptives.²⁷ Miramontes went on to become one of the co-discoverers of the chemical compound which led to the global production of oral contraceptives. The vast availability of the yams allowed for the mass production of oral contraceptives. Products derived from barbasco altered modern medicine aided advances in science, and arguably, granted millions of women some control over reproduction.²⁸

Echeverria was eager to fund and establish family planning programs due to the economic benefits that the distribution of barbasco-derived hormonal contraception could bring to the Mexican economy. The availability of barbascos and their contribution to the development of hormonal contraceptives made the yams a valued commodity in Mexico. Echeverría's administration wished to capitalize off of the profit that barbascos could create. In 1974, Echeverría spoke at CONAPO's inauguration and stated,

I understand that it is only a few transnational companies who sell oral contraceptive pills... with that in mind I would like to urge Mexican researchers, that they discover Mexican pills so that they can curb the commercial influence of large transnational pharmaceutical companies that sell these pills.²⁹

²⁶ Gabriela Soto-Laveaga, *Jungle Laboratories: Mexican Peasants, National Projects, and the Making of the Pill*, 4.

²⁷ Ibid., 3.

²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁹ Gabriela Soto Laveaga, “‘Let’s Become Fewer:’ Soap Operas, Contraception, and Nationalizing the Mexican Family in an Overpopulated World,” 22.

The yam therefore came to “symbolize the first step toward an independent Mexican pharmaceutical industry.”³⁰ Mexico was able to profit from barbasco production while simultaneously tackling their population problem. Echeverria used barbascos as a way to maintain control in the rural countryside by stimulating economic development. The states where barbasco was grown were very impoverished and in need of economic development. The production of barbasco created many jobs for the poor rural communities in southeastern Mexico.

La Nueva Ola and Mexican Women’s Political Participation

The introduction of contraception affected the lives of women socially, politically, and economically. The feminist, sexual, and student movements that swept through Western Europe and the United States also made their way to Mexico during the late 1960’s and continued into the 1970’s. The Tlatelolco massacre of 1968 pushed women to participate in the student movement and directly influenced the Mexican feminist movement.³¹ Elaine Carey claims that “Mexican feminism was also influenced by events that took place beyond the nation’s borders.”³² The student movements of the late 1960’s gained a lot of exposure and were able to reach the Mexican audience. Moreover, the publications of intellectuals and journalists regarding the feminist movements of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s influenced Mexican women. Globalization and interconnectedness with the rest of the world allowed Mexican women to question and fight for many of the same beliefs and ideas that their fellow counterparts in the United States and Western Europe were advocating. Rosario Castellanos and Marta Acevedo were two of the most important feminists during this time. They brought attention to the new wave of feminism emerging in the United States through their publications in the newspaper *Excélsior* and the cultural magazine *Siempre*. Castellanos and Acevedo paved the way for the Mexican feminist groups that would emerge in the 1970’s and fight for the distribution of contraception to all women.

Educated middle-class women and university students were active participants of the second-wave of feminism in Mexico during the 1970’s. Jocelyn Olcott expresses that

³⁰ Gabriela Soto-Laveaga, *Jungle Laboratories: Mexican Peasants, National Projects, and the Making of the Pill*,

127.

³¹ Elaine Carey, *Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, and Terror in 1968 Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New

Mexico Press, 2005), 177.

³² Ibid., 177.

Mexico's small but energetic feminist movement, dubbed the "new wave"- *la nueva ola-* of Mexican feminism, took on its inchoate institutional formation in 1970 with the founding of *Mujeres en Acción Solidaria* (MAS) under the leadership of Marta Acevedo, a leader during the 1968 student movement who had witnessed the Tlatelolco massacre.³³

The Mexican feminist groups of the 1970s played a crucial role in advocating for the distribution of contraceptives to Mexican women. Some of the other groups included *el Movimiento de Liberación de la Mujer* (MLM) and *el Movimiento Nacional de Mujeres* (MNM) which were composed of women who were brought together due to the marginalization and oppression they faced in their daily lives.³⁴ MAS held several conferences that directly addressed issues that Mexican women faced including "Abortion and Sexuality," "The Condition of Women," and "Feminism in Politics."

In 1975, the UN held the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City. As Jocelyn Olcott states, "the Echeverría administration hoped that the International Women's Year conference would allow Mexico to showcase its efforts to address the intractable problems of inequality and population growth."³⁵ The Mexican government was eager to host the conference to gain global recognition, which some feminists disliked. The Women's Front against International Women's Year was organized to protest the conference and stated the Mexican government's state planning was "a lukewarm and opportunistic appropriation of feminist proposals."³⁶ The conference brought to light many of the issues Mexican women were facing such as making contraceptives accessible and the legalization of abortion.

First Lady Maria Esther Zuno, a longtime advocate for women's rights spoke at the conference. She addressed the "depressing alternative" women faced which was either "to become merely reproductive beings and renounce their social creativity or to sacrifice their maternity and abandon their family."³⁷ Zuno stated that women had to overcome this false obstacle in order to realize their full potential.

³³ Jocelyn Olcott, *International Women's Year: The Greatest Consciousness-Raising Event in History* (New York,

NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 57.

³⁴ Estela Seret, "El feminismo mexicano de cara al siglo XXI," *El Cotidiano*, vol. 16, no. 100 (2000): 46.

³⁵ Jocelyn Olcott, *International Women's Year: The Greatest Consciousness-Raising Event in History*, 60.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

³⁷ Joseph U. Lenti, *Redeeming the Revolution: The State and Organized Labor in Post-Tlatelolco Mexico* (Lincoln,

NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2017), 218.

Although Zuno's message encouraged women to enter the workforce, Joseph Lenti states that she did so "inside legally established frameworks and called upon the regime to pursue gender equality in a way that complemented its interventionist agenda."³⁸ Nonetheless, Zuno still pushed for strict equality in the workplace. President Echeverria also spoke and claimed that he wanted to ratify an amendment that would "incorporate women into all aspects of political, economic, and social life," but these remarks in the end exemplified the state's hypocrisy because such an amendment never materialized.³⁹ Regardless of whether women were for or against the hosting of the IWY conference, women mobilized together like never before to advocate for universal equality.

1976 saw the formation of *La Coalicion de Mujeres Feministas* (The Feminist Women's Coalition) which was composed of six different women's organizations. *La Coalicion de Mujeres Feministas* began to fight for the idea of "voluntary motherhood." They advocated for "sex education specifically developed for different age groups and social sectors, reliable and inexpensive contraceptives, abortion as a last resort, and rejection of forced sterilization."⁴⁰ According to Marta Lamas, this agenda became "the basic component of the defense for reproductive and sexual rights in Mexico."⁴¹ However, by the 1980's, "voluntary motherhood's" demands were overshadowed by the issue of abortion and the push to legalize it.

As women began to take control of their lives through the use of contraception, they were also able to participate in politics. In 1953, Mexican women were granted the right to vote in federal elections and were able to run for congressional representative seats. The 1968 Tlatelolco massacre was followed by "women's activism in social and political grass-roots movements, such as the student uprisings of the 1970s."⁴² By the 1970's and 1980's, women were slowly becoming active at the national level but were especially active at the local level. Many women were being elected mayors and held municipal positions across the Mexican states. In 1979, Griselda Álvarez Ponce de Léon became the first woman to become elected governor in Mexico. The

³⁸ Ibid., 218.

³⁹ Elaine Carey, *Plaza of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, and Terror in 1968 Mexico*, 185.

⁴⁰ Marta Lamas, "The Feminist Movement and the Development of Political Discourse on Voluntary Motherhood in Mexico," *Reproductive Health Matter*, no. 10 (1997): 58.

⁴¹ Ibid., 58.

⁴² Sonia Hernández, "Women in Mexican Politics Since 1953," Oxford Research Encyclopedia on Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 5.

1985 Mexico City earthquake also mobilized women politically to meet the demands of the families who had been affected by the disaster.

Mexican Women's Economic Mobilization, 1976-1987

Mexican society underwent economic and sociodemographic change during the 1970s and 1980s, two decades characterized by “accelerated urbanization, the extension of industrialization, an increase in rural migration to the urban centers, increased access to education and diversification of urban job markets.”⁴³ These dramatic changes allowed women to enter the workforce in large numbers like never before. Between 1976-87, the number of Mexican women over the age of 12 reporting themselves to be economically active increased from 16% in 1970 to 21% in 1979. This number grew to 32% by 1987.⁴⁴ Before the 1970s, the Mexican women who made up a majority of the workforce were young and single, but a clear change occurred between 1976-87. Within a span of 11 years, the economic participation of older, low-income, and less educated women increased. Data from the 1976 Mexican Fertility Survey and the 1987 National Survey of Fertility have allowed scholars to connect the increase in women’s economic participation with the total fertility rate decline. In 1973, the fertility rate of Mexican women was at a staggering 6.3 but by 1986 the number had decreased to 3.8. This 44% drop in fertility is directly connected to the introduction of modern contraceptives. The percentage of women of reproductive age who used contraceptives increased from 30.2 in 1976 to 53.7 in 1987.⁴⁵ Mexican women began to participate in the labor force while simultaneously raising their children. Women who worked before marriage or at early stage of family formation were significantly more likely to reenter the labor force in the future.⁴⁶ The economic recession in Mexico during the 1980’s also drove women to enter the workforce.

Prior to introducing contraception and implementing family planning programs, Mexican women were participating in the formal and informal economic sphere. However, with a decrease in fertility rates and increase in education, Mexican women were able to join the workforce in larger numbers than before. Teresa Rendón Gan explains the earlier women begin to have children, the possibility of them

⁴³ O. De Oliveira and B. Garcia, “Trabajo, fecundidad y condición feminina en Mexico,” *Estudios demográficos y urbanos*, vol. 5, no. 3 (1990): 693.

⁴⁴ Y. Mier and M. Teran, “Descenso de la fecundidad y participación laboral femenina en Mexico,” *Notas Población*, vol. 20, no. 56 (1992): 145.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 149.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 150.

entering the formal workforce becomes more limited.⁴⁷ Beginning in the 1970's, Mexican women's decreasing rate of fertility reduced the number of years women dedicated to raising and taking care of their children.⁴⁸ Rendón Gan explains that a drop in fertility rate in developed countries allows women to work as opposed to developing countries where the fertility rate is still high. Consequently, Mexican women were able to break away from their domestic duties at home and took on jobs in *maquiladoras* and as secretaries. Education also helped women gain access to the workforce. With more access to education, women could obtain better jobs, allowing them to get married later and have fewer children.⁴⁹

The rapid increase in Mexico's population between the 1950's-1970's prompted the Mexican government to take the initiative to control its population growth. With the introduction of the birth control pill in 1968, Mexico's population began to decrease. President Echeverría and President López Portillo's family planning programs and services helped make contraceptives accessible while simultaneously changing how Mexican society viewed women. CONAPO's family planning programs created cultural change that targeted machos and passive women. The introduction of the birth control pill caused Mexican women to no longer be viewed as submissive individuals. Most importantly, the introduction of the birth control pill was crucial to Mexican women's participation in social movements, the political sphere, and the workforce because for the first time in Mexico's history, women were able to take control of their bodies and decide when and if they wanted to have children.

⁴⁷ Teresa Rendón Gan, *Trabajo De Hombres y Trabajo de Mujeres En El México Del Siglo XX* (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, D.F.: Programa Universitario de Estudios de Género, 2003), 72.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 72.

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LA GARRA CHARRÚA IN THE FIGHT FOR RECOGNITION: INDIGENOUS ERASURE IN MODERN URUGUAY

| Kelsi Snyder

Since 1492, the European invasion of the Americas and the effects thereafter have plagued the tribes of indigenous peoples from North to South. In most U.S. history textbooks, the chapters about the era of the conquistadors focus on Hernan Cortes and the Aztecs in Mexico, Francisco Pizzaro and the Inca of Peru, and sometimes even include the Mapuche in Chile, but in reality, European colonialism took place from nearly head to toe in the Americas. Today, most countries in Latin America continue to have a heavy indigenous influence on many parts of their culture, but perhaps the Latin American country least associated with indigeneity is the tiny southern nation of Uruguay. The story of the Charrúa tribe in Uruguay is unique in many ways—and typical in others. Although the Charrúa fought fiercely against the European invaders, the foreigners overpowered the natives and systematically slaughtered and enslaved them. One hundred years after the genocide of the Charrúa, Uruguay instituted many socialist reforms which sped up modernization and technological progress, further pushing the Charrúa identity into the past in the minds of the people. The reforms also set the stage for the construction of Estadio Centenario, Montevideo's soccer stadium, which acted as a catalyst for national pride in the Uruguayan soccer team, as they performed extremely well during the decades surrounding construction. At the same time, the *indigenismo* movement—which celebrated indigeneity throughout most of Latin America—gained momentum again. The overlap of *indigenismo* and Uruguayan soccer stardom fueled by the Estadio Centenario led to the creation of the phrase “*la garra Charrúa*,” or “the Charrúa spirit,” which Uruguayans quickly added to their mainstream vernacular, and still commonly use today. Since then, Uruguay has used the Charrúa, an identity that their government purposely and forcefully extinguished, as a token for national pride while doing everything in their power to depict the Charrúa as something of an extinct species. The early to mid-20th century push towards modernity, *indigenismo*, and the construction of Montevideo's soccer stadium explain Uruguayans' selective memory of the Charrúa tribe.

Because the natives lived nomadic lives and moved freely through the boundaries of the *estancias* (ranches) that the invaders had allotted for themselves, the white creole landowners in the newly independent Uruguay saw the natives as a “problem.” Thus, they viewed the Charrúa genocide as the “solution” to “the Indian Problem.” Further,

because the nomadic Indigenous did not make permanent settlements in any particular place, the creoles justified taking their land on the grounds that it was not “claimed.”¹ In April of 1831, creole plantation owners, Uruguayan government figures, military officials, and, most notably, the first president of Uruguay, General Fructuoso Rivera, put in motion the plan for the ambush at Salsipuedes.² President Rivera convinced the Charrúa to align with his troops to defeat the common enemy—Brazil. This was not an uncommon favor, considering the Battle at Las Piedras (which ended the fight for independence from Brazil) came just three years earlier.³ Although some among the natives were hesitant, ultimately, they agreed to fight alongside Rivera’s troops in exchange for land. Unfortunately, upon arrival, they realized that Rivera’s troops were the enemy all along. Indeed, *Salsipuedes*, the name of the battle and place where it occurred, translates to “get out if you can.” Rivera’s troops killed all or nearly all of the Charrúa fighting aged men and led the elderly, women, and children on a forced march to Montevideo. However, any rancher or plantation owner who vowed to “Christianize” them could keep them as slaves.⁴ After their initial decimation at Salsipuedes, Rivera sent his nephew, Bernabe, to continue the ethnic war until “the last of the Charrúa” (or so believed Rivera) were killed, pushed out of the Uruguayan territory, or enslaved. Rivera subsequently shipped off four of the last of the Charrúa people as a curiosity to France where the French “put [them] on display” in Paris in 1833;⁵ they died quickly thereafter of disease.⁶ Those that remained in Uruguay as slaves eventually interbred with whites and the Charrúa identity slowly disappeared. Denying the existence of any runaways or survivors, Uruguay had officially earned its nickname, “*el país sin indios*,” the nation with no Indians.

The identity of “*el país sin indios*” has long been one that the country as a whole has been proud of. Many other Latin American countries have incorporated the idea of the controversial *mestizaje*.

¹ Vannina Sztainbok, “From Salsipuedes to Tabare: race, space, and the Uruguayan subject,” in *Representation Matters: (Re)Articulating Collective Identities in a Postcolonial World*, ed. Anette Hoffmann (Amsterdam: BRILL, 2010), 181.

² Sztainbok, “From Salsipuedes to Tabare,” 177, 178.

³ “Timeline Uruguay,” *Timelines of History*, 2019,
<http://www.timelines.ws/countries/URUGUAY.HTML>.

⁴ Stephanie Nolen, “We Are Still Here!: The Fight to Be Recognized as Indigenous in Uruguay,” *The Globe and Mail*, April 21, 2018,
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-in-uruguay-indigenous-people-are-fighting-to-prove-they-exist/>.

⁵ Alicia McDermott, “The Last of the Charrúa: The honored warrior tribe of Uruguay,” *Ancient Origins*, August 2, 2015, <https://www.ancient-origins.net/history-famous-people/last-charrua-honored-warrior-tribe-uruguay-003528>.

⁶ Nolen, “We Are Still Here.”

Though theoretically a word to classify racial hybridity and celebrate diversity and cultural fusion, in practice *mestizaje* became a covert way to erase diversity and culture by diluting “darkness” with “whiteness.”⁷ However, another unique facet of Uruguay’s national identity is their rejection of *mestizaje*. Uruguay saw themselves as a country that “did not need to” incorporate *mestizaje* because they already believed that they were a country that was one hundred percent white, and without an “Indian problem.”⁸ Consider, too, Uruguay’s *Libro Centenario*, an official document that had been approved by the Ministry of Public Instruction after the National Administration Council ordered its publication. It intended to create a self-portrait of Uruguay, covering various topics ranging from social, cultural, and economic activities. Its depiction of the Indigenous people, however, emits racism in every sentence. In the first few pages, one reads about how proud Uruguay is to be “the only nation in America that can make the undeniable claim that within its territorial limits it does not contain a single nucleus reminiscent of its aboriginal population.”⁹ Further, *el Libro Centenario* upheld the Uruguayan tradition of denying genocide and placing not one drop of blame on white people for slaughtering an entire group of non-white people. The next page of the Libro reads, “The last Charrúas disappeared as a tribe, without a trace... in the year 1832, and from that distant moment, almost a century later, the river remained in the possession of the European race and its descendants.”¹⁰

Former Uruguayan president Julio María Sanguinetti (1985-1990, 1995-2000) felt the need to clarify this when he referred to the Charrúa in an unsettling paragraph stating his thoughts on the matter. “We have inherited from that primitive people not a word of their precarious language, not the name of a town or a region, not even a memory benevolent of our elders, Spaniards, Creoles, Jesuits or military, who invariably described them as their enemies....”¹¹ He

⁷ Sztainbok, “From Salsipuedes to Tabare,” 175,176.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Gustavo Verdesio, “El Día de la Independencia o Doscientos Años de Incertidumbre: La Indecidibilidad de una fecha en el Uruguay Post-Independencia,” *Revista De Crítica Literaria Latinoamericana* 36, no. 71 (2010): 92-93,

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41407161>. Quote originally written in Spanish. Original: “[Uruguay] es...la única nación de América que puede hacer la afirmación categórica de que dentro de sus límites territoriales no contiene un solo núcleo que recuerde su población aborigen.”

¹⁰ Verdesio, “El Día de la Independencia,” 93. Quote originally written in Spanish. Original: “Los últimos charrúas desaparecieron como tribu, sin dejar vestigios perdurables... en el año 1832, y desde aquél lejano entonces, casi una centuria, quedó la tierra en posesión de la raza europea y de sus descendientes.”

¹¹ Gustavo Verdesio, “Un fantasma recorre el Uruguay: la reemergencia charrúa en un “país sin indios” / A Spectre Is Haunting Uruguay: The Charrua Reemergence in “a

continued to perpetuate the idea of “progress” as understood from a capitalist and western perspective as the ultimate goal of a society. Indeed, Uruguay is known as one of the most “progressive” and “modern” countries in Latin America—which begs the question(s): what does it mean to be “progressive”? What is the qualification for modernity? Does modernity stop at tall buildings and new technology? Does social progress stop at women’s and gay rights? Uruguay is also one of the only countries that has yet to sign the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention. Other countries have used it as the framework for land redistribution negotiations between the Indigenous and the state.¹² Several scholars believe the government’s denial of the Charrúa’s existence and/or clear continuity in their lineage is based in the economic “side effects” it would have, as it has in other countries. Uruguay has seen what the Indigenous folks in other countries are demanding (rightfully so) and clearly does not want to pay reparations or redistribute the land they stole. In fact, when *The Globe and Mail* approached “several government departments,” they all refused to comment on the matter.¹³ Because the Charrúa coalition understands the Uruguayan government’s current priorities, collectively, the movement has decided to fight for land redistribution in the future. For now, the grassroots reemergence campaign forming out of Uruguay and eastern Argentina has two main goals. The first is for the government to acknowledge the existing Charrúa, whose family survived Salsipuedes either by escaping entirely or by surviving servitude—whether in Montevideo or along the way—and passed on their language and culture to their children. The second is for the education system and official history to label the events during the 1800s as a “genocide,” which in turn would cause the government to take accountability for the decisions that led to the erasure of an entire identity.

Although all of the facts and evidence undeniably fit the definition of “genocide,” many Uruguayans, including former President Sanguinetti, continue to deny it. In an interview with Uruguayan television host Carlos Perciavalle, Sanguinetti interrupted Perciavalle when he referred to the events at Salsipuedes as “one of the worst genocides in history.” The former president defiantly objected the host’s use of the word “genocide.” He snapped,

Country without Indians,” Bogotá, Colombia, *Cuadernos de literatura* 18, no. 36 (2014): 92-93, <https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.CL18-36.frur>.

¹² Nolen, “We Are Still Here.”

¹³ Ibid.

No no no, first of all, what you said about ‘the genocide’ is not true. Let’s go from there. Don’t repeat that because it is not true. Historically there was no genocide here... I clarify, because many people believe that there was a genocide here... what happened here, yes, there was a large indigenous mortality, [a] product of plagues, product of diseases... [but] that was a moment in history; you can’t do anachronism, it wasn’t the good guys on one side and the bad guys on the other, they were [both] civilizations that clashed and, as a consequence, collided.¹⁴

Sanguineti attempted to downplay the massacre as a natural, inevitable, and common clash between civilizations. In reality, the conflict proved overwhelmingly one-sided. Rivera and land-owning creoles planned an entire ambush and forced march and gave the Indigenous away as slaves as if they were a party favor. The events of the 19th century in Uruguay undeniably represent a genocide.

As a sixth grader in Uruguay, one could expect a short social studies lesson on “genocide,” but this lesson teaches only about the countries of Armenia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, but makes no mention of Indigenous people.¹⁵ Most Uruguayan students will probably never learn about the massacre at Salsipuedes, but if they do, the text frames the event to put little to no blame on the government. The author always presents the information with a passive voice, as in the Charrúa “vanished,” “disappeared,” or “were exterminated.”¹⁶ By teaching about the Charrúa, if at all, only within the context of Salsipuedes, the Uruguayan education system continues to shape the context of the Charrúa as a figment of the past, convincing all Uruguayans that there are no living Indigenous people. Professor of Anthropology, Johannes Fabian, calls this phenomenon “Denial of Contemporaneity.” He defines it as “a consistent mental operation to relegate the Indigenous of the present, the one we see with our own eyes, to the past, to an earlier historical moment in the evolution of the species, that is, to an evolutionary moment lower than ours on an evolutionary scale. The Indigenous, although they share the physical space with us, seem to be locked out of the entrance to the present. They are, in the popular imagination, part of a remote past.”¹⁷

The story of Salsipuedes is a large and powerful national myth. Because it is so widely believed and perpetuated by schools and culture,

¹⁴ “Sanguineti -genocidio aborigen,” YouTube video, 2:19, Aug 3 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qExY3SQq4tU>. Quote translated from Spanish.

¹⁵ Nolen, “We are Still Here.”

¹⁶ Verdesio, “El Día De La Independencia,” 91-92, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41407161>.

¹⁷ Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 46-47.

those who identify as Indigenous or an Indigenous descendant have never been welcomed to be proud of their heritage. However, after the end of the dictatorship in 1985, Uruguayans began to question many aspects of their national identity, including indigeneity, hence the grassroots campaign. Subsequently, fears of demands of compensation brought a new form of erasure. Unlike the physical, cultural, and economic erasure of the 19th century, modern day erasure is the denial of identity. The notion that an Indigenous person must look, talk, act, or dress a certain way to be seen as valid is the unsurprising result of a colonialist national myth that dominated the education system for decades. Historian Phillip Joseph Deloria wrote about the shock people expressed when they saw notorious Apache leader Geronimo driving an automobile similar to a Cadillac or wearing a fancy suit. In Argentina, many Indigenous folks have cell phones and wear Nikes¹⁸—but these modern possessions should not make someone question their own indigeneity, nor does it give a non-Indigenous person the right to do so. Indeed, no one would think to ask a person who claims Roman heritage why they are not dressed as a gladiator, or someone who is Greek why they are not wearing a toga, or someone who is French why they are not wearing culottes. For many non-Indigenous Uruguayans, the terms “Indigenous” and “modern” are mutually exclusive.

As Daniel Vidart points out, “Indigenous reemergences, at least in settler colonialism countries like Uruguay and Argentina, are not easy nor pleasant processes for those who embark on them.”¹⁹ However difficult, the grassroots campaign that began after 1985 successfully added the question on the 2011 Uruguayan census about race and ethnicity—the first in 150 years.²⁰ While well-known that the decisions made by President Rivera in the 19th century completely changed the cultural landscape of present-day Uruguay and virtually zero true signs or symbols of indigeneity exist, the results of the census still come as a shock. Only about 5% of the population self-identifies as having any form of native descent²¹ but the question did not specify whether a person identifies as Guarani²² or Charrúa. In any case, this figure

¹⁸ Phillip Joseph Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 104-111.

¹⁹ Verdesio, “Un fantasma recorre en Uruguay,” 94.

²⁰ Mónica Sans and Gonzalo Figueiro, “From Genetics to Identity and Back Again: Genetic Continuity and Indian Reemergence in Uruguay,” *American Anthropologist* 120 no. 2 (2018): 341. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13046>.

²¹ Instituto Nacional de Estadística Uruguay, “Censos 2011: Contame Que Te Cuento,” 2012, <http://www5.ine.gub.uy/censos2011/index.html>.

²² The Guarani tribe, while also native to Uruguay, settled closer to the border with Brazil. The Guarani are usually associated more with Brazil and Paraguay than Uruguay, but the existence of Indigenous displacement campaigns means people from any tribe could live anywhere.

represents a stark contrast to other countries in Latin America that generally report a much higher Indigenous presence. Most other Latin American countries also have signs and symbols of indigeneity on their currency, flags, and tourist attractions—Machu Picchu in Peru and the pyramids in Mexico, for example. There is, however, one major element of Uruguayan culture that seems, at least on the surface, to represent some form of Indigenous pride: football, aka “soccer.”²³ In the context of football, Uruguayans commonly use the aforementioned phrase “*la garra Charrúa*” to refer to the Uruguayan football players’ resilient fight against their opponent as a dismal parallel to that of the Charrúa against Spanish and Portuguese attacks. Beginning in this relative time period of the 1940s, Uruguayans began to embrace a symbolic native presence in the form of “*la garra Charrúa*” to compensate for their lack of physical presence.

Elected to presidency in 1903, José Batlle y Ordóñez introduced several socialist reforms to Uruguay—he reformed labor, encouraged migration, nationalized and developed public works, to name a few—and is known as the president who transformed Uruguay into a stable, democratic welfare state.²⁴ These social and labor reforms, along with his popularity after completing tours in Europe during his second term (1911-1915), led to Uruguay producing and exporting many wartime supplies and food to countries that sent large numbers of men to fight in the Great War, and for countries whose crop fields yielded less due to the war. During the economic boom in the 1920s, Uruguay flourished. The country completely modernized, and for a period of time was one of the most modern in the world. Walt Disney even made a special in 1942 called “South of the Border with Disney” where he and his associates toured South America, including a stop in Montevideo, where even they applauded the modernity of the capital.²⁵ Uruguay’s socialist reforms, economic prosperity, and relative lack of entanglement in the U.S. stock market meant that they were the most fit site for the first ever FIFA World Cup in 1930.²⁶ In fact, Uruguay paid for all travel and hotel expenses, in addition to building a brand-new stadium during a time of extreme economic uncertainty for most of the

²³ Within this work I will use the words soccer and football interchangeably when I refer to the sport that the United States calls soccer.

²⁴ “José Batlle y Ordóñez,” Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., October 16, 2020), <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jose-Battle-y-Ordonez>.

²⁵ “South of the Border with Disney (1/2),” YouTube video, 10:00-12:20, (n.d.), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKjZf3QW0Og>.

²⁶ FIFA.com, “1930 FIFA World Cup™ - News - Hosts Uruguay Beat Arch-Rivals to First World Crown,” www.fifa.com (FIFA.com, March 22, 2007), <https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/hostsl Uruguay-beat-arch-rivals-first-world-crown-502035>.

rest of the world. Estadio Centenario, so named for its completion during the centennial of the adoption of their liberal constitution,²⁷ hosted the historic event. After six American Cup wins and two Olympic Cup titles since 1916, Uruguay came out victorious in the first FIFA World Cup in 1930.²⁸ By this time, the Uruguayan national team was well-known for their talent and skill. However, it was not until the 1935 American Cup match in Lima between Uruguay and Argentina that the team came to be known for its “psyche,”²⁹ that is, the ruthless, relentless, and aggressive fight for victory that, for the foreseeable future, would characterize their method of play. Thus, the phrase “*la garra Charrúa*” was coined³⁰ and proudly adopted by all Uruguayan soccer fans.

Eventually, all Uruguayans adopted the phrase, and even used it outside the context of football. Today, all Uruguayans, on and off the field, think of themselves as having “*la garra Charrúa*.” What began as a blunt way to describe their ruthless soccer team led to the formation of a national identity, something that all Uruguayans hold close to their heart and take very seriously. Yet, they refuse to properly educate their population about why they have probably never met an actual Charrúa Indian. Daniel Vidart, a Uruguayan anthropologist, shared his perspective. *La garra Charrúa* “...for us, is strength that comes from weakness...the thirst to triumph that is fed by the “vamos arriba” cheers of the opponent...to not surrender, to fight without stopping in the most adverse circumstances...but this spirit...has only been Charrúa as an active myth or nostalgic metaphor.”³¹ Vidart’s perspective is likely shared by the majority of the population, as it has been a popular cultural myth for decades. In fact, even 67 years later, at a match between Uruguay and Brazil, Uruguayan spectators presented an enormous flag with the image of a Charrúa Indian stepping on the flags of Brazil’s and Colombia’s teams, both of which were the teams to beat in the

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “Torneos y Títulos,” AUF sitio web oficial, accessed November 27, 2020, <https://www.auf.org.uy/historico-torneos/1/>.

²⁹ Hugh McIlvanney, “Uruguay threatened with expulsion,” (*The Observer*, 15 June 1986), in McIlvanney on Football (Edimburgo: Mainstream, 1996) pp. 248-49.

³⁰ Gustavo San Roman, “La Garra Charrua: futbol, indios, e identidad en Uruguay contemporáneo,” *Bulletin Hispanique*, vol. 107, no. 2, (2005): 638, <https://doi.org/10.3406/hispa.2005.5245>.

³¹ Daniel Vidart, “La Garra Charrúa en la Trama de la Identidad Nacional,” Tomo I: Indios, negros, gauchos (Montevideo: Banda Oriental, 1997), p. 47. Originally appeared in Spanish. Original: “La garra futbolera, entre nosotros, es fuerza sacada de la flaqueza, poder masculino que brota de la “pierna fuerte” ansia de triunfar desencadenada por el “vamo’ arriba” del contragolpe, vergüenza deportiva hecha coraje, ánimo que no se entrega y pelea sin cesar en las circunstancias más adversas. Pero esta garra, amanecida en los campitos de los barrios montevideanos, sólo era charrúa en cuanto mito activo, que nostálgica metafórica.”

qualifying rounds of the tournament. This proves the longevity of the *la garra Charrúa* and its application on the soccer field. By incorporating the phrase into common lexicon, but not acknowledging the presence of the people, Uruguay tokenizes this element of their culture to distract from their wrongdoings of the past. The irony lies in the fact that everyone wants to boast *la garra Charrúa*, yet no one wants to talk about where the phrase really comes from or to what it refers.

Indigenismo, as defined by Laura Giraudo, is the commitment to defending the rights of Indigenous peoples in countries across Latin America.³² According to Giraudo, what makes the 1940s unique for *indigenismo*—an ideology that had long existed—was the shift from national to continental unity and what the author calls “a change in concept, from specific interests and interventions to an overall program of special, coordinated action.”³³ In 1933, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced his “Good Neighbor Policy,” which promoted friendly relations between the US and Latin America. His diplomacy, paired with the growing sentiment of Pan-American conferences which collaborated to create a meaningful solution to “the Indigenous problem,” set the stage to hold the first Inter-American Conference on Indian Life, which took place in April 1940, in Michoacán, Mexico.³⁴ Nineteen different Latin American countries took part by sending representatives to discuss “the Indian Question.” In the end, the successful conference produced the “Final Act,” which contained the agreed-upon meaning and goals of *indigenismo*. An almost entirely unanimous vote supported each measure, but the implementation of them is a different story. The following is an excerpt from the document that accurately depicts the intentions—whether malignant or benign—of the *indigenistas*.

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DEFENSE OF THE INDIAN CULTURE TO ENRICH THE
CULTURE OF EACH COUNTRY

Conclusion: That the American countries adopt and intensify the policy of offering the greatest opportunity for developing the capacities of their Indian groups, with the idea that the native culture may not disappear, and may enrich the cultural trends of each country, as well as of the world, and contribute to the strengthening of the nations.³⁵

³² Laura Giraudo and Victoria J. Furio, “Neither ‘Scientific’ nor ‘Colonialist’: The ambiguous course of Inter-American ‘Indigenismo’ in the 1940s,” *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 39, no. 5 (2012): 13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41702281>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 14.

³⁵ US Office of Indian Affairs, Final Act of the First Inter-American Conference on Indian Life, 1941, digitized Aug 18, 2007, (21), <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951p01092161j&view=1up&seq=7>.

The excerpt proves how ironic and contradictory *indigenismo* can often be. Just one hundred years prior, the Uruguayan president ordered a systematic genocide that wiped out the general population of the natives, which meant that there were virtually no Charrúa left to offer “the greatest opportunity.” Even if there were Charrúa or Charrúa descendants to provide for, the Uruguayan government has always historically denied their presence. Of course, Dr. Hugo V. Pena, who represented Uruguay at the conference, would agree to implement the contentions of the Final Act, because he assumed they did not apply to his country. Instead of offering any surviving Charrúa any form of compensation, the country created a phrase to amplify national pride—one that would convince the Inter-American Indian Institute that the use of the phrase honored their Indigenous roots.

Just two years before the Pan-American conference and eight years after construction of Estadio Centenario, Edmundo Prati; Gervasio Furest; and Enrique Lussich built the Monument to the Last of the Charrúa (1938). Perhaps as another way to further imply that Uruguay pays homage to its Indigenous roots, or perhaps as a celebration of the “extinction” of the Charrúa, the “last four”—the shaman, Senaqué; the young warrior, Tacuabé; his partner, María Micaela Guyunusa (with their newborn baby); and the chief, Vaimaca Perú—sit in bronze at Prado Park. They overlook a botanical and rose garden which—together with the nearby art museum and church that resembles Paris’ Notre Dame—make the neighborhood a common tourist area, so there have likely been many different interpretations of the statue. For the purpose of this essay, the statue symbolizes one of the biggest flaws of the “*pais sin indios*” national myth. Among others, the main problem with Uruguay’s popular memory that the Charrúa disappeared “without a trace” is that although they disappeared from the official record, they most certainly left a trace.

After Salsipuedes, on May 7th, 1833, François de Curel, a French peddler, and the “last four Charrúas” arrived in the port city of Saint Malo, France.³⁶ From there, Curel brought them straight to Paris where he showed them to King Louis Philippe I and scientific societies who put them in a corral at a human zoo³⁷ as a display of an “exotic

³⁶ María Elena Szilágyi Chebi, “Los Charrúas en la Memoria Nacional de Uruguay,” *Acta Hispanica* vol. 20, (2015): 110.

³⁷ Because of complications in translation, it is unclear whether the display was a zoo or a museum. Some sources say Curel sent them to Musée de l'Homme, which translates from French to English as “Museum of Man,” however, many Spanish sources refer to their destination as Campos Elíseos, which is the tourist area in modern day Paris where the Eiffel Tower was later built, but because “campo” means “field/countryside” in English, it is unclear. Additionally, some English sources refer to the display as a zoo.

race.”³⁸ Shortly after, Senaqué fell ill and died, and Guyunusa had her baby and died. Towards the end of 1833, Perú died as well. However, Tacuabé and his and Guyunusa’s baby survived. Curel sold them to the circus, but they managed to escape. Although the circumstances made it nearly impossible or at best extremely dangerous to pass on the culture and language, certainly Tacuabé and his baby, along with the survivors in Montevideo and those who fled Salsipuedes, bore children who at least passed along the Charrúa gene. Thanks to the work of Monica Sans and her colleagues, there is biological evidence to support this conclusion.³⁹

Although controversial, the introduction of mitochondrial DNA markers opened new windows for analysis of the origins of the Charrúa. Beginning in the late 1990s, researchers discovered that mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) can detect Native maternal ancestry, regardless of how distant the relation is.⁴⁰ After the repatriation of the remains of Vaimaca Perú—and the plethora of legal hurdles and opposition that came with it—researchers like Sans studied and ran tests on his body until their research essentially became outlawed because of the opposition of Indigenous groups. Not all of the Indigenous groups opposed; some felt that Sans’ research could help support them in the fight for recognition. Still, enough of them felt that tampering with Perú’s body instead of letting his soul rest in peace further demonstrated the lack of respect that white, wealthy Uruguayans have for their Charrúa population. Nevertheless, the findings do seem to present some helpful facts to support the Charrúa’s continued lineage and presence in modern Uruguay. According to a report by Sans and her colleagues, although about 5% of Uruguayans self-identified on the 2011 census as Indigenous, nuclear DNA shows a 10-14% contribution, and mtDNA shows a 34-40% contribution.⁴¹ However, because of the displacement of the nearby Guaraní tribe into many northern parts of Uruguay, the opposition claims that these numbers of ancestral DNA should be attributed to the Guaraní instead of the Charrúa.

Both sides of the Charrúa question use these genetic findings to strengthen their argument, but DNA will never be a clear and definitive answer because of “ethnicity’s uncertain place between the *existential* (in biology) and the *elective* (in self-determination).”⁴² There will likely never be a definitive answer to this question that everyone

³⁸ Rare Earth, “Are the Charrúa Extinct?,” 3 May 2020, *Youtube* video, 12:27, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXF2t1AEzi4>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Mónica Sans and Gonzalo Figueiro, “From Genetics to Identity and Back Again,” 340.

⁴¹ Ibid., 341.

⁴² Ibid.

will agree on, but right-wing Uruguayan leaders will continue to push the idea that the Charrúa are “extinct,” and the descendants will continue to form groups and fight back with their *garra Charrúa*. Throughout history, the Uruguayan elite have made some questionable decisions regarding the way they treat the Charrúa—i.e., popularizing and exploiting the phrase “*la garra Charrúa*,” attending the Pan-American conference yet not implementing any positive changes for the Indigenous groups, commissioning the statue of the “last four Charrúa,” probing at the remains of Chief Vaimaca Perú, etc.—but in September of 2009, they took a step in the right direction. On that day, the Uruguayan parliament declared every April 11th “*Día de la Nación Charrúa y de la Identidad Indígena*,” or “Day of the Charrúa Nation and Indigenous Identity.”⁴³ Just declaring a holiday (Article One of the legislation) is extremely performative, but Article Two states, “On that date, [April 11th each year] the executive branch and the national administration of public education will arrange the execution or coordination of public actions that promote information and awareness of the citizenry about the Indigenous contribution to the national identity, the historical facts related to the Uruguayan nation and what happened at Salsipuedes in 1831.”⁴⁴ The act certainly is not comprehensive of everything that must be done to achieve justice, and by no means does this excuse their previous actions, but it is indeed the first piece of legislation in Uruguayan history that shows even the slightest bit of government acknowledgement of present-day Charrúa existence.

In conclusion, the massacre of 1831 and the genocidal events that followed are largely responsible for the cultural landscape of Uruguay today—that is, one that is predominately white and denies the existence of racism within the country. Batlle’s early 20th century socialist reforms and Uruguay’s relative economic prosperity set the stage for the construction of Estadio Centenario. 1930s soccermania fueled “*la garra Charrúa*,” which not only appropriated Indigenous identity on the soccer field but became so popular that Uruguayans appropriated it off of the soccer field, too. Further, the “modern” and “progressive” reforms that positively transformed Uruguay as a whole, ultimately left the Indigenous behind, as they slipped further into the nation’s idea of the past. The statue of the “last four Charrúa” and most Uruguayan textbooks reinforce the false narrative that they are

⁴³ República Oriental del Uruguay, *Camara de Senadores, Secretaria, Carpeta N° 1625 de 2009, Repartido N° 1162, Septiembre de 2009, “Día de la Nación Charrúa y de la Identidad Indígena,”* <https://legislativo.parlamento.gub.uy/temporales/S2009091162-008589486.pdf>.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

completely extinct. The spirit of *indigenismo* in the 1940s attempted but failed to improve conditions for Indigenous workers and families, but hopefully, after the research conducted on Vaimaca Perú and with the continued celebration of National Charrúa Day, the Indigenous people of Uruguay will receive the acknowledgement, validation, and acceptance they deserve. The ultimate goal of the reemergence effort is that it can one day no longer be considered “reemergence,” but just, simply, “existence.”

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INCREASINGLY POLITICAL NATURE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: A TWO CASE STUDY

| Jason Bohnert

On 12 December 2000, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled a decision by the Florida Supreme Court ending further manual recounts of votes for the presidential election. The following day, Vice President Al Gore stood before the country and conceded the presidential race to Texas Governor George W. Bush. Gore did not want to challenge the Supreme Court by continuing his campaign's quest for a recount and eloquently stated that "what remains of partisan rancor must now be put aside."¹ The Supreme Court of the United States ended the state of Florida's recount and effectively handed the presidency to Bush. Decades prior, a situation of such political nature decided by the Court would have been unfathomable.

To understand how the United States Supreme Court entered the world of politics, one must go back to what Chief Justice Earl Warren described as "perhaps the most important case that we've had since I've been on the Court," the case of *Baker v. Carr*.² In this decision on a reapportionment case in 1962, the Supreme Court decided that legislators from Tennessee must create fair congressional districts so that every person's vote was equal. *Baker v. Carr* arguably violated one of the Court's most influential longstanding guidelines, the political question doctrine, which stated that the Supreme Court would not rule on fundamentally political cases. A case was political rather than legal when a case was brought before the Court should have been assigned, according to the Constitution of the United States, to another branch of the government.³ The reapportionment at question in *Baker v. Carr* typically would have been left to the legislative branch of the state of Tennessee. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that in this instance, the judicial branch had the duty to intervene. The increase in decisions that historically would have been considered political in nature by the Supreme Court of the United States changed the course of judicial history.

¹ C-SPAN, "Al Gore Concession Speech," December 13, 2000, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?4696330/al-gore-concession-speech>.

² Suzie Lechtenberg, "The Political Thicket" *Radiolab Presents: More Perfect WNYC Studios*. Castbox. June 9th, 2016.

³ Doug Linder, "Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial Power: The Political Questions Doctrine" University of Missouri Kansas City, last modified 2019, <http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/trials/conlaw/politicalquestions.html>.

This paper will focus on two case studies: *Bush v. Gore* and *Baker v. Carr*. Other cases will be mentioned to bring context and help the reader understand the author's overall argument. These supplemental cases will be essential to understand the two cases primarily focused upon in this paper and to bring historical context to the author's overall argument.

Arguably the first landmark case to go before the Supreme Court was the 1803 *Marbury v. Madison* decision. The political question doctrine originated from this case. Chief Justice John Marshall stated:

The province of the Court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made in this Court.⁴

This ruling began the precedent of the Court dismissing political cases, which was followed for the next nearly one hundred and sixty years. The reasoning behind this doctrine was that unelected lifetime appointed judges ought not to overrule political judgments made by the legislative or executive branches. The fear was that if this occurred, the people would view the Courts as undermining the US democracy. Consequently, the judicial branch of the government ought to stay away from all lawsuits if they deemed them political regardless of merit. For example, even though the congressional districts of Tennessee might be dramatically unfair, the political question doctrine held that the Courts ought not to intervene. The configuration of congressional districts was a matter that should be left to the elected officials of their respective states.

The problem in the case of *Baker v. Carr* was that politicians typically wanted to keep their districts the same as when voted into office. If assembly members redrew the congressional map, they ran the severe risk of not being reelected next time around. The majority in *Baker v. Carr* regarded the political question doctrine, concerning congressional redistricting, as problematic. The SCOTUS felt it was their obligation as Supreme Court Justices to rule on matters designated to the other branches.

The assembly members of a state typically would determine redistricting. However, the Supreme Court of the United States decided it was appropriate for it to rule on a question that was usually left to the realm of politics. Charles Baker resided in Shelby County, Tennessee. According to the Tennessee state constitution, legislative districts were

⁴ *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 US 137 (1803).

to be redrawn every ten years by the majority party of the state legislature using data from the United States Census. Baker sued the state of Tennessee in 1961, specifically Secretary of State Joseph Carr, because Tennessee had not changed its districts since 1901 when it used the 1900 census data. The state's population rose from 487,380 eligible voters in 1900 to 2,093,891 eligible voters by 1961, according to the 1960 United States census.⁵ The population increase took place in large urban areas with significant numbers of black residents. As a result, the white rural communities, significantly smaller in population, had disproportional representation in Congress. The overrepresentation rendered a person's vote from Memphis, Tennessee (Shelby County) almost null. *Baker v. Carr* first went to "a [federal] three-judge Court in the Middle District of Tennessee."⁶ These three judges ruled that they did not have the jurisdiction, according to the political question doctrine, to decide the reapportionment at question and dismissed the federal Court case in Tennessee. Baker appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1961. The case was incredibly complicated and controversial; as a result, it had to be heard twice before the SCOTUS made a decision in 1962.

Years prior, in the case of *Colegrove v. Green*, Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that "Courts ought not to enter this political thicket."⁷ Frankfurter worried that if the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on subjects intended for the legislative or executive branches, the Court would lose its integrity in the eyes of the public. He feared the Court's entanglement within governmental branches would give the Supreme Court excessive power.

So, *Baker v. Carr* proved to be a heated case for the justices. Some saw the blatant unfairness by the assembly members of Tennessee and felt obligated to intervene. Others knew that Tennessee's malapportionment was wrong but believed it would be worse for the Court to intercede than to do nothing at all. The case brought extraordinary distress to Associate Justice Charles Whitaker causing his retirement—at the recommendation of his doctors—before the Justices gave their final vote.⁸

The ruling on *Baker v. Carr* overturned the Supreme Court ruling of *Colegrove v. Green*. Similar to *Baker v. Carr*, *Colegrove v. Green* was a reapportionment case in Illinois in 1946. Reapportionment

⁵ Robert E. Cushman, *Leading Constitutional Decisions*, 13th ed. (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1966), 223.

⁶ "Baker v. Carr" University of Tennessee at Martin, 2002 Civil Rights Conference, last modified 2002.

http://www.utm.edu/organizations/civilrights/Baker_Carr/Bakerv.CarrSummary.html.

⁷ Royce Hanson, *The Political Thicket* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), 40.

⁸ Leethenberg, "The Political Thicket".

is vital for numerous reasons, especially for how much representation a district receives in Congress. When a district's representation is inaccurate, the citizens within that district have less political power than they ought to have. Citizens in largely populated districts complained that "their vote is much less effective than the vote of those residing in the districts with the smaller population."⁹ The voters of large districts in Illinois believed their vote had been diluted almost to the point of nullification. Justice Frankfurter gave the majority opinion, wherein he reiterated his belief that it was the Court's duty to not engage in political matters. He stated, "the appellants ask of this Court what is beyond its competence to grant."¹⁰ The majority ruled in favor of the defendants on the grounds that the political nature of redistricting was not to be determined by the judicial branch. The districts in Illinois were to stay as drawn by the state assembly. This precedent changed after of *Baker v. Carr*.

On 26 March 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled six to two in favor of Mr. Baker. Associate Justice William J. Brennan delivered the majority opinion for the Court. The majority stated the case fell within the bounds of the judiciary because Carr denied the plaintiffs their Constitutional rights.¹¹ According to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States, "no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."¹² Citizens of Tennessee in large districts, like Shelby County, were denied equal protection for their vote. This ruling established the theory of one man one vote for legislative purposes. The Court entered the political realm when it ruled on *Baker v. Carr*. The Supreme Court of the United States deemed that there were appropriate moments to intervene in matters that other branches of the government typically would handle. By opening Pandora's box, the SCOTUS ignited an increase in political decisions.

Immediately after *Baker v. Carr*, multiple states brought up reapportionment cases. In April 1962, the Maryland Supreme Court heard a case concerning congressional districts. The Supreme Court case directly influenced it. The Associated Press covered this and wrote, "that it is clearly a task which the Federal Courts would be duty bound to undertake ... Assuming that the allegations (of malapportionment) are true."¹³

⁹ Samuel J. Konefsky, *The Constitutional World of Mr. Justice Frankfurter* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), 14.

¹⁰ Ibid., 15.

¹¹ Cushman, *Leading Constitutional Decisions*, 223.

¹² U.S. Const. amend. XIV. § 1.

¹³ Associated Press, "Portion of Decision on Reapportioning." *The Washington Post* (Washington) 26 April, 1962.

Additionally, the Supreme Court heard two cases related to *Baker v. Carr* in 1964. In February, lawyers for James P. Wesberry, a Georgia resident, appealed their lawsuit to the Supreme Court of the United States, resulting in the case of *Wesberry v. Sanders*. Wesberry, like Baker, was not content with the malapportionment in his home state. He did not believe that every person's vote in Georgia was equally represented; specifically, he argued the state was violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁴ The Court ruled six to three in favor of Wesberry and cited article one section, two of the United States Constitution requiring "that each man's vote weigh the same within a congressional district."¹⁵ This ruling upheld an essential aspect of *Baker v. Carr*.

Within only a few months of *Wesberry v. Sanders* redistricting was before the Supreme Court of the United States again. In June 1964, the Supreme Court ruled on *Reynolds v. Sims*. This case concerned the malapportionment of congressional districts in Alabama. Voters in Jefferson County believed they were underrepresented in their district, which had forty-one times the population as counties with the same number of representatives.¹⁶ The Court ruled eight to one in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that the Alabama Congressional districts violated their equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren noted "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens" would provide equal protection.¹⁷ The equal protection clause, according to the Supreme Court, required fair districts for the voters of Alabama. These cases signified what was to come, and people brought more cases political in nature to the Courts during the years following *Baker v. Carr*. The Courts stepped into the thicket that typically would have been left to the legislative or executive branches, beginning with redistricting and going so far as to decide the presidential election in 2000.

Before the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on *Bush v. Gore*, the state of Florida attempted to sort the election out. On Wednesday, 8 November 2000, the Florida election board reported that George W. Bush received 2,909,135 votes while Al Gore gained 2,907,351, resulting in a difference of 1,784 votes.¹⁸ According to Florida state election code §102.141 (4), when the difference of a vote is less than one-half of one percent, an automatic recount is conducted.

¹⁴ *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 US 1 (1964).

¹⁵ Cushman, *Leading Constitutional Decisions*, 222.

¹⁶ *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 US 533 (1964).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Vincent Bugliosi, *The Betrayal of America: How the Supreme Court Undermined the Constitution and Chose our President* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2001), 119.

The recount took place over the next two days, and Bush's lead shrank to 327 votes. Considering this, on 12 November 2000 the Florida Democratic Committee, under §102.166 (4), asked for a hand recount in the following counties: Broward, Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, and Volusia.¹⁹ All four of these counties voted in favor of the Vice President, and residents complained about the confusing ballots they received. This confusion was not without merit, as displayed in Palm Beach County.

Palm Beach County election supervisor Theresa LaPore devised a ballot intended to help the visually impaired and elderly residents in her county. She used what was known as a butterfly ballot, where five of the candidates and their running mates were aligned on one side of the ballot while the other five were located on the other side of the ballot with all ten circles to punch out in the middle. This design was unusual for her county as ballots typically lined up the candidates on the left side with their corresponding punch hole to the right. However, given the number of candidates in the field, LaPore mistakenly felt that the butterfly ballot would be more effective because a larger font could be used, thus helping the elderly whose vision may not have been optimal.²⁰ The primary source of confusion came from the location of the first three candidates on the ballot and their corresponding punch hole. The first name on the left-hand side of the ballot was George W. Bush and below him was Al Gore. On the top right-hand side of the ballot was Pat Buchanan. In the middle of the ballot, the first three punch holes belonged to Bush, Buchanan, and Gore in that order. However, many voters in Palm Beach County thought that the punch holes went Bush, Gore, Buchanan. As a result, many residents were terrified that they may have accidentally voted for Buchanan, someone they loathed, instead of Gore. A large portion of the Palm Beach County populace was retired New Yorkers, many of whom were Jewish. One of the many reasons the Jewish population in Florida, and elsewhere, took issue with Pat Buchanan stemmed from a column he wrote for the *New York Post* in 1990. Buchanan was anti-Semitic and seemed to be a holocaust denier. While discussing gas chambers at death camps in Nazi Germany, he wrote, "diesel engines do not emit enough carbon monoxide to kill anybody."²¹ The popular Florida radio talk-show host, Randi Rhodes, confessed to her listeners that she feared she

¹⁹ Ibid., 120.

²⁰ Jeffrey Toobin, *Too Close to Call: The Thirty-Six Day Battle to Decide the 2000 Election* (New York: Random House, 2001), 14.

²¹ Patrick Buchanan, "Dividing Line," *The New York Post* 17 March 1990.

might have “voted for a Nazi.”²² The anxiety and confusion of Florida voters were valid.

Under Florida election laws, each county had seven days from the conclusion of the election to recount the ballots. By 14 November 2000, the counties were to provide updated results to Florida’s Secretary of State, Katherine Harris. When the Florida Democratic Committee demanded a manual recount in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia counties, they had merely two days until that deadline. The brief timespan made it nearly impossible to count hundreds of thousands of ballots. However, the state-circuit Court in Tallahassee stated that counties could continue their recounts past the fourteenth and Harris “could exercise her discretion in determining whether or not to accept amended returns.”²³ The November fourteenth deadline was real but could be washed away by Harris. Florida’s Secretary of State told the four counties they had until 15 November 2000 to present her with a valid explanation of why they had not concluded their manual recounts. Harris stated that she would only give an extension if there was evidence of “voter fraud, an act of God, or a ‘mechanical malfunction of the voting tabulation system.’”²⁴ At the deadline, Harris did not grant the counties in question an extension. Harris’ motivations for this were likely partisan as she was a notable Republican who voted for Bush. However, the following day, canvassing boards petitioned the Florida State Supreme Court to intervene in the matter. This Court issued an interim order to allow the manual recount to continue. That same day, lawyers representing Al Gore filed a motion with the Florida Supreme Court with the intent of forcing Harris to accept late returns. This motion went before the Florida Supreme Court, which ordered Harris to wait until further instructions from the Court before she certified a victor in the election.²⁵

The confusion with the Florida election law stemmed from whether the Secretary of State must or should accept late returns. On 21 November 2000, after both the Gore and Bush representatives made their arguments, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Katherine Harris could include late ballots. Additionally, the Court said Harris ought to accept late returns but did not require her to do so. The Court came to its conclusion from two ambiguous Florida laws. The first concerned the timeframe a manual recount must be done within. According to state law §102.166 (4), candidates or state party representatives may request a recount by hand “at any point” before the canvassing board certifies

²² Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, 15.

²³ Bugliosi, *The Betrayal of America*, 121.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 122.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 123.

the results.²⁶ There was no specific deadline for the request or implementation of a manual recount under this law.

The second ambiguity of Florida law concerned deadline rules. State law § 102.111 provided that all ballots received after five o'clock pm on the seventh day after an election "shall" be ignored.²⁷ However, in the late nineteen-eighties, Florida legislators put into law §102.112, which specified that late returns "may" be ignored.²⁸ One law seemed to state that the deadline was binding while the other seemingly detailed that it was at the Secretary of State's discretion. Upon further review of the laws, the Court amended its ruling and defined that since the seven days rule was not a requirement, Harris must accept all late returns if completed by 26 November 2000.²⁹

The following day, 22 November 2000, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Broward counties all continued their hand recounts (Volusia, being a smaller county, was able to finish by the November 14th deadline with only minutes to spare). A group of Republican protestors gathered outside of the Clark Center in Miami, where the Miami-Dade recount occurred. There was also an official session that morning in the Clark Center between representatives for Bush and Gore in front of two Florida State district judges. The Gore representatives and David Leahy, Miami-Dade County supervisor of elections, wanted to count only the undervotes in that county, 10,750, instead of recounting the entire 653,963 votes.³⁰ An undervote is when the ballot counting "machine cannot determine if a vote was cast for any candidate in a race."³¹ Concerned with both logistics and pragmatism, Leahy believed recounting roughly eleven-thousand votes a manageable task but recounting hundreds of thousands simply undoable in the allotted time-frame. Bush's lawyers objected to this and wanted all of the votes to be recounted or none at all. Although the judges sided with Leahy and Gore's representatives, the situation outside of the Clark Center changed that potential outcome.

The protesters grew agitated as time passed. The scene outside of the Clark Center escalated, and the protesters eventually forced their way into the building. Democratic chair Joe Geller, who was inside the building at the time, found himself surrounded by angry voters.³²

²⁶ Ibid., 125.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 126.

²⁹ Ibid., 128.

³⁰ Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, 154.

³¹ NBC News *Meet the Press*, "Inside the Florida Recount: Undervotes, Overvotes and Overseas Votes," YouTube Video, 2:52, November 15, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_e01QkZbWk.

³² Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, 156.

Protesters knocked people over when they entered the building. Once news of this reached Leahy, he and the other members of the canvassing board decided to stop the manual recount in Miami-Dade County entirely. Leahy told reporters that the violence of the protesters influenced this decision at the Clark Center.³³ Only Broward and Palm Beach Counties were left to finish their own manual recounts.

Both campaigns ramped up the intensity in Florida over the following few days. On Thanksgiving, 23 November 2000, Gore's representatives pleaded with the Florida Supreme Court to force Miami-Dade to continue its manual recount, which protesters played a key role in stopping.³⁴ This, however, was unsuccessful as the Court denied the Gore campaign's request. Much to the delight of head Bush attorney, James A. Baker III, the Supreme Court of the United States, on 24 November 2000, agreed to review the conclusions of the Florida Supreme Court.³⁵ That same day, the Palm Beach County canvassing board resumed manual recounting. On Saturday, 25 November 2000, Broward County finished its recount showing that Gore had gained an additional five hundred sixty-seven votes.³⁶ Deadline Sunday arrived, and Palm Beach County had failed to conclude the manual recount in time. Harris announced George W. Bush was the victor in Florida, with the newly certified totals, by a total of five hundred thirty-seven votes.³⁷ The votes from Palm Beach County were not included since its recount was not completed by the deadline.

Gore and his team were not done fighting in Florida. On 27 November 2000, Gore's representatives filed a lawsuit in the Leon County Circuit Court against Katherine Harris regarding the certification of Florida's electoral college votes going to Bush. The judges agreed to hear the case but not until 2 December 2000. Gore's representatives, unhappy with the delay, appealed the Leon County Circuit Court decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.³⁸ 2 December 2000 arrived before the Supreme Court could hear the case. The Leon County Circuit Court said it would consider the votes from both counties in question.³⁹ Two days later, the Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments from both the Gore and Bush representatives on the circuit Court's decision. The Supreme Court Justices were unclear on details of the circuit Court's ruling and sent the

³³ Bugliosi, *The Betrayal of America*, 129.

³⁴ Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, xvii.

³⁵ Ibid., 176.

³⁶ Ibid., xvii.

³⁷ Robert Crown Law Library, *Election 2000 Legal Dispute Timeline* (Stanford Law School).

³⁸ NPR Political Staff, *Election Events 2000* (NPR).

³⁹ Ibid.

case back to Leon County for clarification.⁴⁰ Consequently, judge N. Sanders Sauls, of the Leon County Circuit Court, dismissed the case and Gore's team consequently appealed to the Florida Supreme Court.⁴¹

The hearing began on Thursday, 7 December 2000. The Florida Supreme Court heard representatives from both the Gore and Bush campaigns on that day. Chief Justice Charles Wells questioned the lawyers for Gore about the constitutionality of state Courts interpreting laws regarding presidential elections.⁴² His concern was that it would violate Article II of the US Constitution which outlined the separation of powers amongst the governmental branches.⁴³ Gore's lawyers, however, skillfully argued that their interpretation of state laws regarding presidential elections in no ways conflicted with Article II because it was the duty of state Courts to interpret state laws, even those concerning presidential elections.⁴⁴ Other justices on the Florida Supreme Court felt differently than the Chief Justice. Two of the justices' concerns focused on a theory that officials may not have counted all Florida residents' votes, not just those from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade counties that interested Gore's team. These justices believed that a comprehensive state-wide manual recount would be necessary to be fair to the voters and the law.⁴⁵ After two days of deliberation the Florida Supreme Court made its ruling:

The Court has authorized [the] following statement: By a vote of 4-3, the majority of the Court has reversed the decision of the trial Court in part. It has further ordered that the Circuit Court of the 2nd Judicial Circuit here in Tallahassee shall immediately begin a manual recount of the approximately -- of the approximately -- 9,000 Miami- Dade ballots that registered the undervotes.⁴⁶

The following day manual recounts began. However, Bush's team, unhappy with the ruling from the Florida Supreme Court, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which halted the recount. Lawyers for both sides filed briefs with the Supreme Court and on Monday, 11 December 2000, *Bush v. Gore* began. The trial concluded quickly and the following day the Supreme Court of the United States ruled five to four in favor of Bush. The ruling ended the recount in Florida, which handed the electoral votes and presidency to George W. Bush. The majority opinion based its claim on the equal protection

⁴⁰ Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, xviii.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 230-1.

⁴³ U.S. Const. Art. II.

⁴⁴ Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, 231.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Florida Supreme Court Transcript per CNN. December 8, 2000.

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, similar to *Baker v. Carr*, and claimed: “our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”⁴⁷ Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was disgusted with the majority’s distortion of the clause, as she had spent her career as a lawyer advancing women with the equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took what had been a Florida decision on politics, specifically the executive branch, and interceded with its own opinion, thereby expanding the political nature of the Supreme Court of the United States. Gore conceded the following day.

Public opinion on the Supreme Court’s decision varied. Two days after the ruling, the letters to the editor columns in the *New York Times* exemplified the many voices regarding the ruling. Some noted how unified the majority stayed during such a consequential decision. Columnist Jeff Thieret noted, “the Supreme Court stood strongly united by any legal standard in its view that the Florida Supreme Court did not ensure the fair and equitable standards necessary in its attempt to discern the intent of each voter.”⁴⁹ Similarly, some noted that two dissenting justices, Associate Justice Ginsburg and Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, betrayed the partiality of the Court by attempting to paint the majority opinion as partisan.⁵⁰ Others were seemingly unbothered by the decision and merely looked forward to what could possibly be accomplished by a Republican presidency. Columnist Richard Reade wrote that the political right could “restore integrity to the government, rebuild the military, resurrect and restore security procedures … and end the corruption and moral decay.”⁵¹ Many Republicans were thrilled by the outcome of *Bush v. Gore*.

Nevertheless, the ruling dissatisfied numerous people. Many US citizens believed the outcome of *Bush v. Gore* reflected partisan agendas and not the deliverance of justice. Harvard political scientist Stanley Hoffman aptly stated that the decision “will remain a dark day in the history of American democracy.”⁵² The Supreme Court’s decision was blatantly political, and many in the populace recognized it as such. Judges from around the nation knew that citizens had “enormous faith in the judiciary” even when they lacked faith in the executive and legislative branches.⁵³ *Bush v. Gore* eroded the trust held by many

⁴⁷ *Bush v. Gore*, 531 US 98 (2000).

⁴⁸ Toobin, *Too Close to Call*, 266.

⁴⁹ Jeff Thieret, Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

⁵⁰ Richard Campbell, Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

⁵¹ Richard Reade, Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

⁵² Stanley Hoffman, Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

⁵³ Herbert Rosenberg. Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

people and this betrayal was felt all the way to the lowest of Courts. Some took a stoic stance and knew the decision was the law of the land but believed “there was no cause to respect it.”⁵⁴ Others were so distraught by the decision of the Supreme Court that they began to lose hope for the future of their children. A mother, who had taken her son to the ballot box since he was four months old, felt that after the ruling “the new lesson is that the will of the politicians, not the people, chooses our leaders.”⁵⁵ The ruling in *Bush v. Gore* divided the people of the United States and undermined their faith in the judiciary.

One understands Associate Justice Frankfurter’s apprehension toward the Court entering the realm of politics and why Chief Justice Warren considered *Baker v. Carr* as possibly the most critical case heard during his time on the bench. *Baker v. Carr* led to many rulings, including the election of a president, that previously would have been left to the other respective branches of government. These cases also eroded the populace’s trust in the Supreme Court of the United States. Additionally, since the retirement of Associate Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010, all appointments “by Democrats have been liberal while all those appointed by Republicans are conservative, the first time in the Court’s history that ideological positions coincide with party lines.”⁵⁶ Regardless, the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in *Bush v. Gore* was not the zenith of political decisions made by the highest Court in the country. Associate Justice Hugo Black told Associate Justice Whitaker during *Baker v. Carr*, “we’re all boys grown tall, we’re not the gods who sit on high and dispense justice.”⁵⁷ However, it has become difficult for one to see the Supreme Court of the United States as anything other than people with absolute power who rule in ways that facilitate and promote their, or their political parties, agenda.

Although many may object to the outcome of *Bush v. Gore*, the road there from *Baker v. Carr* brought important decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States that positively affected people. In addition to ending some states’ practice of malapportionment, the Supreme Court entered the political realm by intervening in legislation about interracial marriage when voters would not. Additionally, the SCOTUS discovered outdated laws, such as sodomy laws, unconstitutional as they effectively discriminated against homosexuals. Further research should be done on the political nature of the Supreme

⁵⁴ Robert E. Olsen, Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

⁵⁵ Wendy Eisner, Letter to the editor, *New York Times*, December 14, 2000, A38.

⁵⁶ “Why US top Court is so much more political than UK’s,” *The BBC*, October 6, 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45632035>.

⁵⁷ Lectenberg, “The Political Thicket.”

Court of the United States with cases such as *Fisher v. University of Texas* or *Obergefell v. Hodges*. These studies would benefit the field of political history as they could expand on the positive and negative impacts of the Supreme Court's increasingly political nature. Justice Frankfurter felt concerned over the Court interjecting itself into matters typically left to the legislative or executive branches. However, suppose the Supreme Court of the United States can create justice where unjust acts are present. In that case, even if it steps into the legislative or executive boundaries, it must do so.

Increasingly Political Nature in the Supreme Court

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EVO MORALES' INDIGENEITY: PERSONAL CREED OR POLITICAL CONSTRUCT?

| Maria Kogler

In January 2006, Evo Morales participated in an indigenous ceremony at Tiwanaku, a pre-Incan ruin, prior to being sworn in as Bolivia's first self-identifying indigenous president.¹ His rebellion against the typical methods of dress, speech, and ceremony employed by politicians created an air of mystery around him, and global media focused on his presidency as a turning point for Bolivia. Morales' speech at the event thanked *Pachamama* (Mother Earth) and concluded with the assertion that “[w]ith the unity of the people, we're going to end the colonial state and the neo-liberal model.”² Despite promising change, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government, the socialist left-wing party that has held power since 2006, delivered only small improvements to the economic and social positions of Bolivian indigenous populations, namely Andean groups, while Amazonian groups saw little to no improvements whatsoever.

Indigenous peoples in Latin America have historically occupied the lower rungs of the social, political, and economic ladder. Native groups willing and able to seek improvements for these inequities most often desired land, political power, and self-determination; in other words, indigenous communities sought the ability to exist within whichever state they may occupy as free and independent citizens, with the autonomy to choose how they will live.³ While these goals do not seem impossible or unreasonable, indigenous peoples lobbying for change often faced inherent paternalism and racism, and made only moderate progress after exerting extreme effort. Many clever politicians found an opportunity amongst these marginalized communities and made promises to indigenous groups in order to gain power. This pattern benefitted Evo Morales during his 2005 campaign for the Bolivian Presidency, as he directed most of his efforts to wooing the indigenous and peasant vote.

The Bolivian economy underwent cycles of modest prosperity followed by extreme busts throughout the twentieth century. Neoliberal policies in the 1990s magnified the existing divisions in the country,

¹ Benjamin Dangl, *The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Latin America* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007), 197.

² Nicholas Kozloff, *Revolution!: South America and the Rise of the New Left* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 15.

³ Siegfried Wiessner, “The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges,” *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 22, no. 1 (2011): 127.

resulting in extreme wealth inequality and high poverty and unemployment rates. Beginning in 2000, multiple protests and movements against numerous government policies led to the ousting of President Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and of his immediate successor, President Carlos Mesa, in 2005.⁴ MAS candidate Evo Morales appealed to the masses of Bolivia who were often underrepresented and disenfranchised by previous candidates. The MAS idea of ‘resource nationalism’ drew increasing support, as Morales promised “to construct a new form of justice based on redistribution of resource wealth to the indigenous and the poor.”⁵ Resource nationalism appealed to the Bolivian population, as MAS blamed the country’s current economic issues on colonialists, imperialists, and capitalists for exporting Bolivia’s wealth without caring about the conditions left behind.⁶

Historically, Bolivia’s political climate has demonstrated the state’s inability to address multi-sectoral popular movements. Indigenous groups, miners, cocaleros (coca leaf growers), and teachers’ unions have organized to effectively protest unpopular politics and politicians.⁷ However, these factions of the population do not often share the same goals. When multiple, separate groups begin protesting and rebelling, the country erupts into chaos as the government attempts to meet conflicting demands. When the interests of these groups align, their united efforts have toppled established elected and non-elected governments. Such was the case of Morales’ election. Thus, MAS came to power under nearly perfect political conditions: united popular movements aligned to elect the party and its president to power. Additionally, the country’s institutions lacked credibility. The Morales MAS government represents “a complex blending of ideologies and strategies,” as demonstrated by the policies implemented throughout his three presidential terms.⁸ Undercutting this blend, according to Morales’ Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, there are three “cleavages: ethno-cultural (indigenous/whites), class (workers/businessmen) and regional (Andean west/Amazonian media luna).”⁹ These three distinct groups combine in various ways; in the interests of this paper, special attention

⁴ Ibid, 129.

⁵ Nicole Fabricant and Nancy Postero, “Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia: The Struggle over the TIPNIS,” in *Indigenous Life Projects and Extractivism: Ethnographies from South America*, ed. C. Vinal Odegaard and J.J. Rivera Andia (New York: Palgrave Mcmillian, 2019): 254.

⁶ Brienen, “A Populism of Indignities,” 85.

⁷ Marten Brienen, “A Populism of Indignities: Bolivian Populism Under Evo Morales,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, vol. 23, no. 1 (2016): 82.

⁸ Nancy Postero, “Morales’ MAS Government: Building Indigenous Popular Hegemony in Bolivia,” *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 37, no. 3 (2010): 30.

⁹ Ibid, 28.

will be paid to the indigenous, working class communities populating both the Andean and Amazonian regions.

The first proudly indigenous presidential candidate, Evo Morales came from an Aymara family of subsistence farmers. He received a basic education before joining the Bolivian military for his mandatory service period. In 1978, Morales began growing coca and joined a trade union. He quickly became a leader in the *campesino* union and campaigned against U.S. and Bolivian attempts to eradicate coca on the grounds that to do so would be to directly counter indigenous Andean traditions. Despite being expelled from his position in Congress in 2002, Morales came second in that year's Presidential election, and would win the next. Populist rhetoric saturated Morales' political platform as he promised land reform and wealth redistribution to the indigenous and poor communities across Bolivia, stating "I am convinced that the power of the people is increasing and strengthening. This power is changing presidents, economic models, and politics. We are convinced that capitalism is the enemy of the earth, of humanity, and of culture. [W]e will defend our proposals, our way of life, and our demands with the participation of the Bolivian people." *Pachamama* (Mother Earth) became one of Morales' common points of reference during the campaign; he promised the indigenous population that he would protect the Earth, and that he would help them regain their rights to traditional lands and territories.¹⁰ Populism prevailed, and Morales won the 2005 election with a landslide majority.

From the first year of his presidency, Morales' promises of economic change and appeals to tradition encountered a challenge: How would the Bolivian economy be improved? Bolivian nationalist author Pedro Lopez wrote "the key to Bolivia's future is contained in its oil."¹¹ He envisioned the Bolivia of the future as a country that escaped its position as an economic colony and gaining control of its most important natural resource, oil. Oil, "the blood of the earth," became Morales' shining light; if he could nationalize it, he could, apparently, ensure that the indigenous people would see the benefits.¹² Morales and his administration were often classified as part of the radical left. However, the social policies enacted during his presidency were moderate at best, expanding some rights for women and indigenous people.¹³ Economic

¹⁰ Kevin A. Young, *Blood of the Earth: Resource Nationalism, Revolution, and Empire in Bolivia* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017), 178-79.

¹¹ Young, *Blood of the Earth*, 151.

¹² Dangl, *The Price of Fire*, 197.

¹³ Linda Farthing, "An Opportunity Squandered?: Elites, Social Movements, and the Government of Evo Morales," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 46, no. 1 (2019): 213.

policies, meanwhile, remained mostly conservative rather than radical, with only minor changes made to the preexisting economic system.¹⁴

Processing natural resources, such as oil and lithium, cannot be done in a cost-effective manner in Bolivia, because like most Latin American countries, the infrastructure and industry necessary for such processing does not currently exist. The expense required to modernize and equip any Bolivian company would be far greater than the economic benefit. As Kevin Young writes, neither mining nor drilling “is likely to generate significant direct employment for Bolivians, even in the event of significant industrialization.”¹⁵ As a result, international corporations remain involved in the Bolivian natural resource economy, as their facilities and transportation services are necessary to keep the money moving. These international corporations directly challenge the autonomy and independence of indigenous groups throughout Bolivia, including the Andean group, the Guarani.

While the Guarani peoples account for only one percent of the Bolivian population, their territories in the departments of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, and Tarija (lowland, Amazonian areas) have been the site of various enterprises intended to nationalize the natural gas industry. Though Guaranies have been active participants in the *Central de Pueblos y Comunidades Indigenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB)*, the representative organization of Bolivian indigenous groups, since its founding in 1982, in 1987 the Guarani formed the autonomous *Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani*, or APG, representing the Guaranes from all three departments.¹⁶ The APG enabled this indigenous population to work together, despite geographic boundaries, in order to negotiate with corporations involved in the natural gas industry regarding compensation, mitigation for socioenvironmental damages, and employment of indigenous rather than non-indigenous workers on local projects.¹⁷ Citing Article 171 of the former Bolivian constitution, the ILO C196, and traditional Guarani laws, the APG gained ground in the business world.¹⁸ Employing this mixture of modern laws and indigenous traditions allowed the APG and the Guarani people to adapt to the new Bolivia, while maintaining important aspects of their indigenous traditions.

The 2009 Constitution, drafted and ratified during Morales’ first presidential term, declared Bolivia a plurinational state and

¹⁴ Ibid, 213.

¹⁵ Young, *Blood of the Earth*, 181.

¹⁶ Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, “Contestations over Indigenous Participation in Bolivia’s Extractive Industry: Ideology, Practices, and Legal Norms,” *GIGA Research Programme “Violence and Security,”* 254 (2014): 9.

¹⁷ Ibid, 10.

¹⁸ Ibid, 10.

identified indigenous rights as one of the country's major commitments. During the process to create the new Constitution, the APG put forward a message stating, "This is the physical and jurisdictional territory of the Guarani Nation, defined to consolidate indigenous autonomy, self-determination, self-government, and self-administration... This principle gives us the right to administrate the soil, subsoil, and everything above ground."¹⁹ In other words, under the new Constitution, the APG had the right to dictate what was done with the Guarani's traditional lands, including the subsoil, or the oil underground. However, the Bolivian state's "reluctance to respect the principle of territorial integrity has caused discontent, anger, and internal conflicts within Guarani communities."²⁰ Inter-group territorial debates contributed to protests over the natural gas projects, as the Guarani attempted to discern which indigenous peoples were entitled to what land, and then who would receive monetary or social benefits due to the natural resources available on that land.

At first glance, the changes to the Bolivian constitution, such as Article 30, which granted specific rights to the indigenous populations living in Bolivia (including several clauses on how natural resources within indigenous territories would be used and exploited) and the political accomplishments of the APG appeared to be a positive change in the direction of indigenous political policies.²¹ However, legislation in the past decade has reversed many of the accomplishments made in the early days of Morales' presidency. Article 39 of the Electoral Law, passed in 2010, states that "conclusions, agreements, or adopted decisions during prior consultations are not binding."²² These prior consultations of land and property had been done with the permission and support of the Guarani locals, and any projects that had been approved by the APG had been approved with the assumption that the developer or digger would be following the plan outlined within the consultation.²³ Making consultations exempt from the law allowed businesses and lawyers to circumvent indigenous permissions and decisions, simultaneously widening the autonomy of businessmen and restricting that of the indigenous. Morales, who promised the indigenous more power and rights during all his campaigns, instead repeatedly favored big business and extractivism in order to boost the economy.

¹⁹ Ibid, 11.

²⁰ Ibid, 12.

²¹ Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2009. article 30 section 2 clause 15-17.

²² Ibid, 17.

²³ Ibid.

Another key point of Morales' original campaign platform proposed a "nationalization without expropriation."²⁴ This principle was challenged quickly, however, following Morales' first election in 2006, when his administration began taxing Carmen del Emero, the indigenous Tacana group's Amazonian village, for hunting and logging. However, no government services accompanied these taxes, and enthusiasm for the president waned as the Tacana lost hope for change.²⁵ As Morales prepared for his fourth campaign, Tacana indigenous leader Nelo Yarari stated, "We don't consider him indigenous here... He has turned his back on us."²⁶ A proposed hydroelectric dam, to be built near Madidi National Park, threatened to displace the Tacana, who fought Morales' proposal for years. The proposed dam would provide energy to Brazil, but not to the various Bolivian Amazonian indigenous groups who have lived in the region for centuries.²⁷

This trend was further evident in 2010, when President Morales announced a plan to build a highway linking Cochabamba, eastern Bolivia's most important city, to the Brazilian border. With Brazilian funding, the highway was intended to both enable a wider range of travel and broaden trade opportunities with Brazil.²⁸ However, the highway's path cut directly through the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). This park, approximately the size of Jamaica, is home to multiple indigenous groups and to a biodiverse population of animal and plant life.²⁹ While Morales promised that the highway would boost the local economies of lowland indigenous people, the communities in question wondered whether it would bring greater ecological destruction to a region already suffering from the results of cattle ranching and forestry projects.³⁰ The Bolivian Institute for Strategic Research released a study in 2011 predicting deforestation of 64% of the park within 15 years if the road was built over the projected

²⁴ Brent Kaup, "Bolivia's Nationalized Natural Gas: Social and Economic Stability Under Morales," *LSE IDEAS: London School of Economics and Political Science*, no. 1 (2010): 22.

²⁵ Nicholas Casey, "In Bolivia, Morales's Indigenous Base Backtracks on Support," *The New York Times*, December 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/08/world/americas/bolivia-evo-reelection.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FMorales%2C%20Evo&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgttype=collection.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Farthing and Postero, *Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia*, 255.

²⁹ Dan Collyns, "Bolivia approves highway through Amazon biodiversity hotspot," *The Guardian*, August 15, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/15/bolivia-approves-highway-in-amazon-biodiversity-hotspot-as-big-as-jamaica>.

³⁰ Farthing and Postero, *Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia*, 255.

43% loss without the build.³¹ The indigenous groups also worried that the highway would create more opportunities for their economic colonization by the Bolivian people.³² A spokesperson for the indigenous groups explained that, from their perspective, “This so-called colonial environmentalism isn’t interested in the indigenous movement having schools, hospitals; they’re not interested in the indigenous movement having electricity or that we have highways.”³³ The environment and the indigenous appeared to have been little to no concern to the businesses interested in the highway. Marilin Karayuri, a Guarani journalist, explained, “if [Bolivian industry] could enter in this territory that was titled by the government, and a national park, they could enter into any indigenous territory. So TIPNIS signified the gateway to all indigenous territories.”³⁴

To demonstrate the indigenous communities’ unwillingness to allow the construction of the highway, the CIDOB and the National Council of Allyus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) planned nonviolent marches.³⁵ One march held in 2011 ended abruptly when the Bolivian police fired rubber bullets at the marchers, including women and children. The indigenous became the victims of the Bolivian states’ commitment to development “at all costs, even if it meant undermining the rights to self-determination established in the new constitution.”³⁶ The violence served to draw attention to the issue and changed the course of the debate after the national police force intercepted the marchers and violently stopped their progress. Postero states, “[t]he increasingly obvious gap between Morales’ discourse about indigenous values and his deeds turned public opinion,” and the marches were met with massive crowds of supporters in La Paz.³⁷ As a result, Morales declared the park untouchable, stopping the proceedings to construction temporarily.³⁸ Another march in 2012 failed to accomplish similar results, and in 2014, planning for the TIPNIS project continued. Morales announced that construction would begin in 2017, despite ongoing indigenous opposition, as legal proceedings officially ended the protection of TIPNIS against the proposed highway. However, construction has not yet started.

³¹ Collyns, “Bolivia approves highway.”

³² Farthing and Postero, *Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia*, ” 255..

³³ Collyns, “Bolivia approves highway.”

³⁴ Farthing and Postero, *Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia*, ” 256.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid, 270.

³⁷ Nancy Postero, *The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 125.

³⁸ Fabricant and Postero, “Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia,” 267.

This conflict directly exposed the major flaw in Morales' proclaimed pro-indigenous government, that of the scale of treatment of various indigenous groups. Indigeneity in any country breaks down into familial, geographical, and language differences. Although all groups share the term indigenous, that is the only thing they usually share. Beyond the initial identifier as "indigenous", these groups often do not share common interests, political goals, or issues. This division of interests is further complicated by individual groups' relationships with the state. Charles Hale's 2002 article discussing multiculturalism in Guatemala discusses the difference between the *Indio permitido*, the authorized Indian, and the *Indio prohibido*, the prohibited Indian. The *Indio permitido* does not challenge the state or global capital while making demands, while the *Indio prohibido*, whose demands directly conflict with the state, is condemned as the "dysfunctional Other to radicalized spaces of poverty and social exclusion."³⁹

According to Nicole Fabricant and Nancy Postero, MAS Bolivia secludes specific native groups, namely those who conflict directly with the state (the *Indio prohibido*), in order to keep these groups disenfranchised and underrepresented.⁴⁰ TIPNIS is home to the Moxenos, Yurakares, and Chimanes indigenous peoples, while Morales' indigenous background is from the Aymara group, in the Orinoca district.⁴¹ Fabricant and Postero use Hale's research to explain the discourse between the good Indian, Morales' much-championed Aymara group in the western highlands, and the bad Indian, those lowland Amazonian groups such as the TIPNIS protestors delaying progress, stating that "the lowland indigenous figure is frozen in a pre-modern state while the Aymara becomes sign and symbol of modernity and progress."⁴² Morales clearly favored one group (the Aymara) while others faced expropriation and other problems at the hands of modernization.. Morales' clear bias was evident in his suggestion that the CIDOB-TIPNIS force protesting the construction of the highway responded to the interests of its leaders and of the U.S. rather than the interests of their entire communities.⁴³ Morales' Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera wrote that Bolivia's lowland indigenous peoples, the Moxenos, Yurakares, and Chimanes, were the victims of hacienda-style systems and foreign corporations and are thus incapable of saving themselves. That, according to Garcia Linera, is the duty of the state, and

³⁹ Charles Hale, "Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Guatemala," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 35, no. 2 (2002): 496.

⁴⁰ Fabricant and Postero, "Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia," 252.

⁴¹ Collyns, "Bolivia approves highway."

⁴² Ibid, 259.

⁴³ Waltraud Q. Morales, "The TIPNIS Crisis and the Meaning of Bolivian Democracy under Evo Morales," *The Latin Americanist* (2013): 84-85.

therefore “all indigenous demands must be subsumed to the state.”⁴⁴ Construction supporting highland Aymara- and Quechua-speaking groups occupied land, both illegally and through government grants, to displace the indigenous peoples protesting the highway, further exemplifying this inherently biased structure of indigenous rights for some, not all.⁴⁵

Further evidence of the disproportionate support that the indigenous communities received in Bolivia exists in land reform attempts during Morales’ first presidency. In 2009, a reform was created to begin the redistribution of 15 million hectares of state-owned land. However, of those 15 million, only 3.8 million hectares could legally be distributed to indigenous peoples and peasants. The government set aside the remaining 11.2 million hectares, to be used for public investments and to handle various claims on territory by both indigenous and non-indigenous farmers demanding land rights.⁴⁶ In 2012, redistribution of approximately 1 million hectares had been traced to mainly Quechua and Aymara (both Andean) indigenous groups. The authors of this report simply state that “sociocultural and ethnic criteria of land access,” had become increasingly important in deciding who exactly was entitled to land.⁴⁷ This increasing importance of ethnic criteria is evident throughout Morales’ presidency and clearly indicated in the TIPNIS conflict.

Journalist Emily Achtenberg writes that despite recent improvements in the standard of living, “Bolivia still has one of the highest rates of multidimensional poverty in the hemisphere, after Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala,” with 58% of the population technically living in poverty.⁴⁸ In 2015, in a somewhat misguided attempt to boost the economy, Morales’ MAS government began expanding hydrocarbon exploration into national parks, which overlap heavily with indigenous territories, adopted a mining law allowing the diversion of water from peasant communities to mining operations, and began considering fracking as another source of income.⁴⁹ Bolivia’s Andean Information Network speaker Kathryn Ledebur defends these get-rich-quick attempts, writing, “People who have had their basic needs postponed for centuries, you can’t say to them, ‘Wait till we get the

⁴⁴ Postero, *The Indigenous State*, 128.

⁴⁵ Canessa, *Intimate Indigeneities*, 267.

⁴⁶ Patrick Bottazzi & Stephen Rist, “Effects of Agrarian Reforms Under the Government of Evo Morales,” 2012

⁴⁷ Ibid, 545-547.

⁴⁸ Emily Achtenberg, “How Evo Morales’ Third Term Will Challenge Bolivia’s Social Movements,” *NACLA*, March 3, 2015, <https://nacla.org/blog/2015/03/28/how-evo-morales%27s-third-term-will-challenge-bolivia%27s-social-movements>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

windmill farm up and running.”⁵⁰ While it is true that sustainable sources of energy and funding might take more time and investment than the Bolivian government is willing to give, indigenous, environmental, and human rights groups publicly challenged extractivism throughout Morales’ presidency, despite his own claims of respecting *Pachamama* upon winning the popular vote.

Meanwhile, political scientists analyzing the Morales presidency acknowledge the shifts in the MAS party ideology. Former UN ambassador Pablo Solon writes, “[t]he triumph against the right wing, rather than opening a new state to redirect the process and recognize the errors we made, accentuated the tendencies toward authoritarian leadership and the centralization of power.”⁵¹ In other words, rather than increasing the democratic nature of the Bolivian political system, the MAS has shut pathways to change. By 2017, according to Farthing, “social movements were a shadow of their former selves,” having lost most of the power they once held, as the leadership of these movements now worked within the government or had given up.⁵²

In addition to the multitude of issues, both land reform and the TIPNIS highway proposal presented, Morales’ actions further concerned both indigenous and environmentalist groups during the 2019 Amazonian forest fires. In July 2019, he signed a law weakening restrictions on land-clearing fires in the Bolivian Amazon. The law promoted slash-and-burn techniques in order to create more arable land for agribusiness pursuits, especially cattle ranching and soy farming, destructive practices on their own without considering the effects of slash-and-burn techniques.⁵³ “Migrant” Aymara farmers traveled into the lowlands and practiced controlled burning that slowly grew out of control in August. Because of the increased burning, the climate in the Bolivian Amazon could not recycle as much precipitation as it would naturally, and thus a cycle of burning and drought began. To add insult to injury, Morales gave a speech at the United Nations General Assembly, ironically proclaiming his love for *Pachamama* in September, while the Amazon was still burning, stating, “Our house, Mother Earth is our only home, and it is irreplaceable.”⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Farthing, “An Opportunity Squandered?,” 223-24.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ramirez, “How indigenous Bolivians lost faith in Evo Morales after the Amazon blaze,” *Grist*, Nov. 27, 2019, <https://grist.org/justice/how-indigenous-bolivians-lost-faith-in-evo-morales-after-the-amazon-blaze/>

⁵⁴ Ibid

The clear favor shown to the exemplary Andean indigenous communities in contrast to the mistreatment and illegal deals circumventing the rights of the Amazonian indigenous exemplify Hale's idea of the *Indio permitido* and the *Indio prohibido*. In combination with the behaviors and statements Morales has made regarding the indigenous community, it is increasingly evident that the indigeneity that he claimed to respect applies only to a specific portion of the Bolivian population. Rather than a universal indigenous culture, Morales applies his specific meaning to the indigenous groups that can be useful politically, while other groups that stand in the path of modernity are dismissed outright.

Morales' rhetorical imagery of the indigenous champion of the poor and disenfranchised used indigeneity as a platform for defending Bolivia against cultural and economic globalization.⁵⁵ Andrew Canessa asserts that indigeneity provided Evo Morales with the legitimacy to rule, but his failure to protect those lowland communities that had enabled his win delegitimized and undermined his presidency.⁵⁶ Canessa adds that Morales did not openly acknowledge his indigenous background and actively opposed indigenous politics until just before he announced his campaign for presidency.⁵⁷ It appears that Morales' indigeneity became a clever political strategy rather than, as he claimed, a cause to guide his path. As a result, the Bolivian indigenous population, especially those in the Amazonian region, continually face attempts to disenfranchise and silence their protests regarding violations to their rights as Bolivian citizens, as outlined in the 2009 Constitution.

Ciara Nugent, reporting for TIME magazine, listed Morales' successes, "The country's first indigenous leader... oversaw an economic boom... reduction in poverty... strides in social equality, earning him high approval ratings and three consecutive election wins."⁵⁸ However, what Nugent and other reporters fail to consider was the declining support from Morales' own indigenous base. Morales' continued pressure on the indigenous groups and legal means promoting the extraction of natural resources translated to decreased indigenous support. Even those indigenous communities that benefitted from Morales' clear favor, such as the Andean metropolis of El Alto, home to hundreds of thousands of Aymara, began turning against the incumbent president as he started his fourth presidential campaign. In a 2016 referendum on whether Morales should be allowed to run again for

⁵⁵ Farthing, "An Opportunity Squandered?", 267.

⁵⁶ Andrew Canessa, "Conflict, Claim and Contradiction in the New Indigenous State of Bolivia," *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 34, no. 2 (2014): 156.

⁵⁷ Farthing, "An Opportunity Squandered?", 278.

⁵⁸ Ciara Nugent, "Bolivian President Evo Morales Has Resigned After Nearly 14 Years in Power. Here's What to Know," *Time*, November 11, 2019, <https://time.com/5723753/bolivia-evo-morales-resigns/>.

reelection beyond the constitutional limit of three terms, nearly 50 percent of indigenous people said no. This result dispelled the popular belief that Morales' indigenous support base remained strong. After the 2017 Plurnational Constitutional Court decision that presidential term limits violated the Convention on Human Rights, Morales's MAS government began preparing for another presidential race.⁵⁹ *El Alto mayor* Soledad Chapeton, elected in 2014, stated, "It's not just one man, or one woman, who has the capacity to solve our problems. In Bolivia today we demand respect for democracy," during the campaign.⁶⁰ Morales' increasingly authoritarian approach to the presidency turned even strongholds of indigenous support against his attempt at a fourth presidency.

Morales' continuing slide towards apparent dictatorship, in combination with a loss of popular support and his application of selective indigeneity, only in cases where it benefitted him, led to the disastrous October 20, 2019 election. While at first glance, the election appeared to be progressing well for Morales, the election process became increasingly complicated by strange occurrences including lengthy delays in the release of the preliminary results.⁶¹ Though Morales was declared the first-round winner over his closest rival Carlos Mesa with more than a ten-point margin of difference, protestors and opposition candidates demanded a second round of voting. Various governments worldwide (including Brazil, Argentina, the United States, and the European Union) requested the same.⁶² The Organization of American States released a report on October 30, stating that it had found multiple irregularities in the election process and results.⁶³

A BBC news report titled "Morales to call fresh election after OAS audit," published on November 10, 2019 mentioned "Mr. Morales, who is Bolivia's first indigenous president," had announced that a new election would be held. The promised fresh election, however, did not

⁵⁹ Laurence Blair, "Evo for ever? Bolivia scraps term limits as critics blast 'coup' to keep Morales in power," *The Guardian*, December 3, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/03/evo-morales-bolivia-president-election-limits>.

⁶⁰ Juliana Barbassa, "Thanks, But Goodbye: Why Many of Evo Morales' Supporters Want Him to Move On," *Americas Quarterly*, 2019, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/thanks-goodbye-why-evo-morales-former-supporters-want-him-gone>.

⁶¹ Zeeshan Aleem, "Bolivia's Coup is Still Happening," *The Nation*, November 18, 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/bolivia-coup-morales/>.

⁶² BBC NEWS, "Bolivia's Morales to call fresh elections after OAS audit," *BBC News*, November 10, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50178188>.

⁶³ OAS, "Electoral integrity analysis: General Elections in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, October 20, 2019," *OAS*, October 30, 2019. <http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Electoral-Integrity-Analysis-Bolivia2019.pdf>.

occur; later the same day (November 10), after nineteen days of civil protests, both the military and the police force requested the resignation of Evo Morales, who resigned then fled the capital. Multiple high-ranking officials followed throughout the day out of fear. The Mexican government offered Morales asylum following the coup d'état.

Journalist Linda Farthing wrote on November 29, “right-wing forces... worked to bring down Latin America’s only remaining left-wing government.” This trend, of failing to notice the inner issues of Morales’ government and focusing on the outside factors, fails to recognize the true issues of the Bolivian political system. Inherent inequality cannot be solved simply by electing one man, especially if that man is a mestizo (mixed race Latin American, usually Spanish and indigenous) in indigenous clothing. Bolivia has more issues than simply racial tensions, but those racial tensions in combination with economic issues, inequality (both social and financial), and increasing climate problems significantly contributed to the end of Evo Morales’ presidency in November 2019.

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Phi Alpha Theta 2020-21 Initiates

It is with great pride and enthusiasm that the Editorial Board of *The Chico Historian* welcomes into the fold this year's new members of the Alpha Delta Omicron Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta:

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