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About the Editors
Preface

The sixth edition of *Studium* has been compiled by an energetic and accomplished community of CSU, Chico student editors whose main objective is to produce a journal that displays quality student writing on political issues. The types of papers selected include research papers, policy analysis articles, position pieces, book reviews, a poem, and a fiction piece. We are also pleased to include position papers produced for Chico State’s award winning Model United Nations program. The *Studium* staff are involved with every aspect of producing the journal, beginning with the call for papers and advertising the journal, to collaborating with the student authors and editing each paper, then choosing the cover design and formatting the journal, and finally, hosting a reception to present the finished journal.

*Studium* is not only made possible by a dedicated staff of students, but also by many other supportive individuals, organizations, and classes at Chico State. We would like to thank Professor Gregg Berryman of the Department of Communication Design, whose Visual Communication class came up with many outstanding cover designs. The prevailing design was submitted by Jennifer Betz, whom we also thank. We would also like to thank Professor Barbara Sudick, whose Design Workshop course provided us with two outstanding communication design students, Holly Voget and Gregory Traverso, who produced several poster designs for us. In addition, we extend our thanks to Professor Keith Sheldon and the Tehama Group Communications, whose energetic public relations helped contribute to a record number of submissions this year.

We are grateful for the efforts of Laura Kling and Tammara Askea in the IMC Graphic Design Studio, who formatted the journal. We also greatly appreciate the Instructionally Related Activity board and Dean Byron Jackson of the College of Behavioral and Social Sciences, who provided the funding that made the publication of the journal possible. Finally, we would like to thank all those members of the Department of Political Science who assisted the journal staff in a wide variety of ways, and, most importantly, encouraged their own students to submit their papers for publication consideration.
My greatest fear is…

Is that tomorrow won’t be better than today…

That we are absentminded of the past and are doomed to repeat its horror
That the bed we make and lie in will never be made
We praise men who run fast and jump high
Instead of men who think deep and live right
Our role models grace movie screens and would rather
Sip their double-latte in peace than take 10 seconds to sign an autograph
We award sinners and crucify saints
We murder and assassinate those who orate and attempt to teach
Because they “know too much” and refuse to say too little
We hate others simply because they are different
The greater good is a concept unknown to us
As a generation, self-sacrifice is an oxymoron
We are the children of divorced parents and runaway fathers
Our families are moving more rapidly towards nonexistence with
each generation
We subsist in a state of comatose depression full of phony smiles
And topped off with a facade of compassion
Each day we draw closer and closer to death rather than closer and
closer to life
Instead of searching for love we settle for lust
We focus on that which is meaningless and pay little if any attention
To what really matters most
We are religious when we feel like it and spiritual only in the aftermath of a tragedy
We're fighting a war instead of fighting for peace
We push away those who truly need our aid
And embrace those who could definitely do without a helping hand
They say “Home is where the heart is”
But our homes are too big and our hearts are too small
Our passions are ill-directed and our actions are void of significance…
Oh sorry…I apologize for getting off track….

My greatest fear is…

That the happiness I've spent my entire life searching for does not exist.
Understanding Opposition To The USA Patriot Act

By Kelly Sechrengost

Abstract

The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act), passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, was a sweeping anti-terrorism legislation that dramatically expanded federal surveillance and law enforcement powers at the expense of many of our valued civil rights and liberties. Given the high levels of emotion and fear dominating the country in the weeks following the attacks, the USA Patriot Act was passed with a sense of urgency by overwhelming majorities in the United States Congress. Although the Act initially received widespread support, criticisms and opposition to the USA Patriot Act increased in the months that followed its passage. To this date, 362 communities in forty-three states have passed resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act, including four statewide resolutions.

There are many questions that could and should be asked about the USA Patriot Act and its role in American government and society, but this study focuses primarily on the phenomenon of why some individuals and communities oppose the USA Patriot Act while others continue to support it, or at least fail to voice their objections to it. Existing theories include ideas about the ways that widespread fear and media coverage influence opinions about the USA Patriot Act. While these theories are interesting, and important to the topic, they fail to explain the phenomenon of interest. This study proposes that factors such as political ideology, community demographics, and local events are significant indicators of whether a community will oppose or continue to support the USA Patriot Act of 2001, and a series of research methods are proposed to better explore the question.
Statement of the Issue

In the three years that have passed since the passage of the USA Patriot Act, criticism and opposition to the act have greatly increased. It is clear that the question dividing communities over whether or not they support the USA Patriot Act is whether or not a particular community believes that it is acceptable to limit individuals’ fundamental civil rights and liberties in order to enact stronger anti-terrorism legislation. However, the factors that lead individuals and communities to prioritize between freedom and security are left unclear. This study will be aimed at determining the factors that have lead many communities and individuals to actively oppose the Patriot Act, despite the overwhelming initial support for it.

Literature Review

Due to the limited amount of scholarly research about the effects of and opposition to the USA Patriot Act, this study will have to start from the very beginning in hopes of extrapolating relevant information in the process.

The triggers that led to the drafting and passage of the USA Patriot Act were unquestionably the occurrence of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. On the morning of September 11, 2001 a highly planned and coordinated attack by a terrorist organization, al Qaeda, was initiated against the United States. Four commercial airliners carrying civilian passengers were hijacked and flown towards targets in New York, NY and Washington, D.C. Between 8:46 and 10:03 am each of the planes crashed. Three hit their targets—the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C.—and the other made a crash-landing in rural Pennsylvania, although its probable target was the White House. It is estimated that somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 people were killed in these attacks. The result was widespread fear of continuing attacks among Americans (Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenburg 2003, 3-6).

Public opinion, emotionally influenced by the fear caused by 9/11 terrorist attacks, fully supported aggressive government action to prevent future terrorism. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001 ABC News and the Washington Post conducted a telephone survey of 608 American adults and found that based on the attacks that morning, 66 percent of Americans were willing to give up some of their liberties in order for the government to crack down on terrorism. Just a few days later, on September 15, 2001, a poll of 821 American adults by NBC News and The Wall Street Journal found that 78 percent would support new security laws even if they reduced pri-
This sentiment, that preventing terrorism was of utmost importance, continued for months. A Gallup Poll, taken by telephone from October 11, 2001 through October 14, 2001, determined that 46 percent of the 1,011 American adults surveyed identified “Terrorism” as the most important problem facing the country, but only 6 percent identified “Losing personal freedoms because of war” as the most important problem. Coupling this survey data with Terror Management Theory’s understanding of the Psychology of Terror in the Post-9/11 world, it should come as no surprise that the government took extreme action in the name of security by promoting the USA Patriot Act.

Finding itself “blessed” with widespread popular support and calls for aggressive action against terrorism, the Bush Administration had the perfect opportunity to capitalize on public fear by pushing an aggressive national security agenda. On September 14, 2001 Attorney General John Ashcroft proposed a series of laws in response to the terrorist attacks and selected Viet Dinh, an attorney for the Department of Justice, to draft comprehensive antiterrorism legislation. The legislation was presented to Congressional leaders on September 19, 2001 and similar, but expanded, bills were introduced in the House of Representatives on October 1, 2001 and in the Senate on October 4, 2001. Due in part to the overwhelming sense of fear and urgency among Americans and the fact that Senate and House office buildings had been temporarily closed due to the anthrax threat, the proposed antiterrorism legislation was rushed through Congress with no hearings scheduled, little debate, and no opportunity for negotiations and amendments. Further, at approximately 400 pages long, most of the members of Congress have admitted that they did not even read the bill before voting for it (Cassel 2004, 16-17). The bill, given the title of USA Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), was passed in the House on October 24, 2001 by a vote of 357 to 66 and in the Senate on October 25, 2001 by a vote of 98 to 1. President George W. Bush signed it into law on October 26, 2001, and so began the life of aggressive national security within the United States.

According to a Department of Justice Overview of the USA Patriot Act, posted on the Internet in 2003, the Patriot Act “provided for only modest, incremental changes in the law” and “simply took existing legal principles and retrofitted them to preserve the lives and liberty of the American people from the challenges posed by a global terrorist network” (USA Patriot Act Overview 2003). Their position is that the increased federal powers—extended surveillance power, roving wiretaps, delayed notification of search warrants, power to obtain business records, increased information sharing
among law enforcement agencies, open warrants, computer surveillance, and increased penalties for being involved in terrorist activities—were justified, essential and successful in preventing and prosecuting terrorist acts.

The Department of Justice’s overview, however, left out a few of the more controversial provisions of the Patriot Act. For example, while they explained how the Patriot Act would affect terrorists, they failed to mention how it would unjustly affect the American people as a whole. Many privately prepared overviews have been published in response to the government’s position on the Patriot Act, seeking to expose the truth about what it really does. The American Civil Liberties Union, one of the Act’s harshest critics, published a one page flyer to advise people about the “real” Patriot Act. The American Civil liberties Union (ACLU) overview of the Patriot Act states (The USA Patriot Act and Government Actions 2002):

The USA Patriot Act:

Expands terrorism laws to include “domestic terrorism” which could subject political organizations to surveillance, wiretapping, harassment and criminal action for political advocacy.

Expands the ability of law enforcement to conduct secret searches, gives them wide powers of phone and Internet surveillance, and access to highly personal medical, financial, mental health, and student records with minimal judicial oversight.

Allows FBI Agents to investigate American citizens for criminal matters without probable cause of crime if they say it is for “intelligence purposes.”

Permits non-citizens to be jailed based on mere suspicion and to be denied re-admission to the US for engaging in free speech.

Allows suspects convicted of no crime to be detained indefinitely in six month increments without meaningful judicial review.

While the ACLU overview characterizes the Patriot Act in a critical manner, a deeper look at the act is still essential to truly understand what this 400 page law does. Elaine Cassel, in *The War on Civil Liberties: How Bush and Ashcroft Have Dismantled the Bill of Rights*, provides a more complete overview of what the Patriot Act does (Cassel 2004, 12-16). Cassel identifies the most controversial aspects of the USA Patriot Act, they:

Establish a crime of “domestic terrorism” which is so broad that it could include all acts of civil disobedience.
Allow the FBI to monitor private meetings between an individual held in federal custody (even if they are only being held as a material witness) and their attorney.

Allow the FBI to order librarians to turn over information about individuals' reading habits and the librarian cannot inform the individual that it was done.

Allow Law enforcement to use secret “sneak-and-peak” warrants which can be obtained without probable cause and notice does not have to be given to the individual.

Allow law enforcement to order Internet Service Providers to conduct surveillance and provide information about customer's internet activity without notice to the individual.

Force American colleges to report extensive information about foreign students and the government may revoke student visas even for minor mistakes in their registration paperwork, etc.

With more information about the de facto effects of the Patriot Act's extended federal authority, like those described by Cassel, criticisms of the Patriot Act became more prevalent and widespread support for strong laws that infringed civil liberties began to decrease. Although the most liberal parts of American society, like the ACLU and radical liberals in government, had concerns about the Patriot Act from the very beginning, significant opposition did not emerge until early in 2003. In February of 2003 confidential draft legislation entitled “The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,” but better known as “Patriot II,” was obtained and published on the Center for Public Integrity's website (Lewis and Mayle 2003). In addition to making another round of radical expansions to federal law enforcement and surveillance powers, the proposed Patriot II included two provisions of gross and unnecessary civil liberties violations. Sections of the draft legislation would authorize the government to create a DNA database of “suspected terrorists” but defined it in such a way that it would include individuals suspected or convicted of crimes that are not designated as terrorist activities (Draft of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act 2003, Sections 301-306). Additionally, the draft legislation would allow the federal government to expatriate any individual if “he becomes a member of, or provides material support to, a group that the United States has designated as a ‘terrorist organization’” (Draft of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act 2003, Section 501). Under current laws, an individual must state his intent to relinquish
citizenship, but under Patriot II the acts described would qualify as “intent inferred from conduct” (Lewis and Mayle 2003).

According to Cassel, the controversies over the leak of “Patriot II” led to increased media attention to both the proposed Patriot II and the original USA Patriot Act of 2001. As the media began to report more fervently on post-9/11 national security legislation, public awareness of the civil liberties they were losing in the name of security multiplied and opposition movements took hold (Cassel 2004). Media attention to the Patriot Act, as a result of the exposure of the draft Patriot II, was the trigger leading to the passage of resolutions opposing the Patriot Act. Prior to the publication and debates about the draft “Patriot II” on February 7, 2003, thirty-three cities and counties had passed resolutions opposing at least some provisions of the USA Patriot Act—including Denver, Detroit, Oakland, and San Francisco (ACLU List of Communities 2004). Within one month of the publication of the proposed Patriot II, the number of resolutions passed had doubled to sixty-six. This certainly lends support to Cassel’s theory that media attention to the Patriot Act and “Patriot II” triggered the opposition movements. To this date, 362 communities around the country have passed resolutions opposing parts or all of the USA Patriot Act (ACLU List of Communities 2004). These include four statewide resolutions in Hawaii, Alaska, Vermont, and Maine, and many of the country’s largest cities, including New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Detroit. A complete list of the cities, counties, and states that have passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act and the dates of passage is included as Appendix A.

In addition to the increase in media coverage on the Patriot Act and the ways that it violates individuals’ civil liberties, it has also been noted that certain events that occur in a community can provoke changes in public opinion about the legislation. Cassel noted that in the case of Chicago, Illinois, the opposition resolution was passed on October 1, 2003 following a series of numerous raids at O’Hare and Midway airports and the Sears Tower that resulted in the detention and deportation of many Latino workers who had not engaged in terrorist acts (Cassel 2004, 132-133). Similarly, the New York City resolution was passed on February 4, 2004, just a week after Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that President Bush would veto the proposed Safety and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE), which sought to remedy some of the most intrusive provisions of the Patriot Act, if it passed through Congress (ACLU Largest City in America Passes 2003). Combined with the failure of the U.S. Senate to pass an amendment to the July 2003 appropriations bill that would prohibit federal spending that supported secret sneak-and-peek warrants, the impending failure of the SAFE Act appears to have
acted as a trigger for the passage of the New York City resolution opposing the USA Patriot Act.

The texts of the resolutions that have been passed around the country provide some insight into the reasons behind the opposition. Although all of the available resolutions opposing the Patriot Act cite its infringement upon civil liberties as grounds for opposing the Act, there are a variety of ways that these communities expressed their opposition. Of the four states that passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act, Maine’s resolution adopted the most conservative language, stating that the campaign against terrorism “should not be waged at the expense of essential civil rights and liberties of this country contained in the Constitution of the United States and the Bill of Rights” and that the state “implores the United States Congress to review provisions of the USA Patriot Act and other measures that may infringe on civil liberties.” The Maine resolution further called upon its senators and representatives to “monitor the implementation of the USA Patriot Act” and to repeal sections that infringed on civil rights and liberties. Vermont’s resolution took a stronger stand against the Patriot Act, citing specific provisions of the Act the state believed infringed upon civil liberties and adding that the state “strongly urges the United States Congress to amend the USA Patriot Act in order to restore and protect our nation’s fundamental liberties, beginning by exempting libraries and bookstores from the provisions of the act.”

Alaska and Hawaii went even further in their opposition to the Patriot Act by barring state agencies and resources from being used in accordance with provisions of the Patriot Act that infringed on civil liberties. Hawaii’s resolution prohibited state resources from being used for monitoring political and religious gatherings exercising their First Amendment rights, obtaining library, bookstore, educational and internet records, obtaining subpoenas through the U.S. Attorney General’s office, and monitoring communication between attorneys and their clients. Alaska’s resolution prohibited state agencies from participating in investigations, surveillance, detentions and from obtaining, sharing, or retaining intelligence information (including library, bookstore, video store, medical, financial, student and other personal records) when no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was present (Alaska State Legislature Resolution 2003). Alaska’s resolution further prohibited state agencies from enforcing federal immigration matters, collecting and maintaining information about political, religious, or social views or activities (unless there was probable cause), and engaging in racial profiling under any circumstances.

As with the statewide resolutions, the city and county resolutions were also passed with varying levels of force and opposition to the USA Patriot
Act. Of the twenty four largest cities passing opposition resolutions, all of them cited the importance of fundamental civil liberties as set forth in the United States Constitution and insisted that those rights should not be sacrificed in the campaign against terrorism. Many cities, including Oakland, CA; Albuquerque, NM; Chicago, IL; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Portland, OR; Milwaukee, WI; Tucson, AZ; and Denver, CO; passed relatively conservative resolutions, like the State of Maine, which detailed the provisions of the Patriot Act that infringe on citizens’ civil rights, but made only vague calls for the reaffirmation of civil rights and liberties, for example, monitoring the implementation of the USA Patriot Act, or possibly urging libraries to notify visitors that their records could be obtained by the federal government.

Other cities, including San Jose, CA; Atlanta, GA; Washington, D.C.; Sacramento, CA; New York, NY; Minneapolis, MN; Austin, TX; Seattle, WA; Honolulu, HI; Baltimore, MD; Detroit, MI; and Philadelphia, PA; passed more forceful and specific resolutions opposing the Patriot Act. These resolutions not only detail the specific provisions of the Patriot Act that the city opposes, they also call for direct action among city agencies in opposition to the Act. With regard to the list of provisions that infringe on American’s civil liberties, the standard list cited in the resolutions include most or all of the following provisions:

Reducing judicial oversight of telephone and internet surveillance by federal law enforcement agencies.

Expanding the government’s power to conduct secret searches with “sneak-and-peak” warrants and with delayed notice to the individual being investigated.

Granting power to the Attorney General and Secretary of State to designate domestic groups, including political and religious groups, as “terrorist organizations.”

Granting power to the Attorney General to detain indefinitely and deport non-citizens even if they have not committed a crime.

Giving the FBI access to sensitive medical, mental health, financial, and education records without reasonable cause.

Granting the federal government the power to compel libraries and bookstores to provide information about their customers’ reading habits and prohibiting librarians from informing individuals that the information had been obtained by law enforcement.
The targeting of citizens who appear to be of Muslim, Arab, or South Asian decent as possible suspects and the use of racial profiling.

Law enforcement monitoring and recording of communications between attorneys and suspects or witness held in federal custody.

FBI surveillance of political and religious meetings and activities

The resolution passed by the District of Columbia on March 2, 2004 is a typical example of a forceful and comprehensive resolution opposing the USA Patriot Act (District of Columbia Community Resolution 2004). The District of Columbia Resolution details the fundamental civil rights and liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, alleges that certain provisions of the Patriot Act (listed above) undermine our guaranteed civil rights and liberties, and notes that the USA Patriot Act was “enacted in reaction to the tragedy of September 11, 2001, without adequate consideration of provisions that undermine civil liberties.”

The District of Columbia Resolution then goes on to call for specific action opposing provisions of the USA Patriot Act by: 1) urging members of Congress to modify provisions of the Patriot Act that threaten fundamental civil rights and liberties; 2) urging the White House to establish a bipartisan panel to review how to ensure constitutional guarantees while enhancing national security; 3) prohibiting agencies and employees in the District of Columbia from divulging information or records, including educational, medical, financial, or library records of an individual; 4) requiring public libraries to display warnings that their records could be obtained by federal law enforcement without notification; 5) requiring public schools and public institutions of higher learning to notify individuals if their educational records are obtained by law enforcement; and 6) barring the Metropolitan Police Department from using racial, ethnic, religious, or national profiling, engaging of surveillance of individuals or groups based on activities protected by the First Amendment, collecting or maintaining political, religious, or social information about individuals or groups that is not reasonably related to a security threat, and from stopping drivers to scrutinize their identification documents without a particular security threat (District of Columbia Community Resolution 2004).

Of the largest American cities to pass resolutions opposing the Patriot Act, New York, New York, Baltimore, Maryland, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Austin, Texas passed the most comprehensive resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act. Building on resolutions like the one passed in Washington, D.C., these cities also specifically referenced and opposed other post-9/11

Despite the fact that much opposition to the USA Patriot Act and other post-9/11 legislation has increased, Jean Bethke Elshtain, author of *Just War Against Terror*, found that “Indeed, when a would as grievous as that of September 11 has been inflicted upon a body politic, it would be the height of irresponsibility and a dereliction of duty for public officials to fail to respond” (Elshtain 2003). Elshtain developed a theory of the just war against terror which holds that government actions taken to restore security are justifiable, so long as the actions are proportional and discriminatory—meaning that they should not use excessive threat and must differentiate between combatants and noncombatants. Although Elshtain’s theory of just government action in response to terrorism is not framed in terms of national security measures taken within the United States, the ideas of proportionality and discrimination can certainly be applied here. Considering the Patriot Act in terms of Elshtain’s just war theory, the questions to answer are whether the provisions of the USA Patriot Act are proportional in terms of the liberties that are sacrificed in order to achieve security and whether the provisions of the act discriminate between average United States citizens and actual terrorist suspects.

Throughout all of the resolutions that have been passed opposing the USA Patriot Act, and other post-9/11 legislation, the issue of utmost importance continued to be the extent to which Americans’ civil liberties have been curtailed by the legislations. Applying Jean Elshtain’s theory of the just war against terror and the underlying notion of just national security measures in combating terrorism, opposition to the USA Patriot Act has primarily focused on the question of proportionality. Continuously citing the ways that the USA Patriot Act has violated the fundamental civil rights and liberties guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights, the communities that oppose the Patriot Act are clearly stating that many of the provisions of the act are *not* proportional to the actual threat of security. Additionally, these communities are also proclaiming that the Patriot Act does *not* adequately discriminate between those who are and are not actual terrorist suspects. Most of the cities opposing the Patriot Act found that the Act unjustly infringed upon the rights and liberties of many individuals in the United States, particularly those of Muslim, Arab or South Asian decent, without any probable cause that they had engaged in any criminal or terrorist activities. Applying Elshtain’s theory of just action, the Patriot Act does not pass the test so the communities that have passed resolutions are right in their oppo-
sition, but this theory still does not explain how these communities came to oppose the USA Patriot Act.

As previously mentioned, the USA Patriot Act was passed just six weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when an intense sense of fear still dominated the country. During the 1980's Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenburg, a group of social psychologists, developed a theory on the psychological effects of fear. Their “Terror Management Theory” rested on the assumption that “cultures allow people to control their ever-present potential terror of death by convincing them that they are beings of enduring significance lining a meaningful reality” (Pyszcynski et al. 2003, 11). Terror Management Theory basically holds that all people are subconsciously terrified of their death but they are generally able, through their cultural values, to suppress those fears in their subconscious unless some event reminds them of their mortality. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Pyszcynski, Solomon and Greenburg decided to revisit their Terror Management Theory and place it in the context of post-9/11 society resulting in their work, *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror*. They found that the events of September 11, 2001 had a doubled effect on American’s propensity towards fear. Not only did the events expose Americans to numerous “gruesomely horrifying images of death and destruction,” reminding them of their own mortality, but the events also represented a direct attack on American culture, leaving them with a weakened coping mechanism to lean on for suppressing their fear (Pyszcynski et al. 2003, 94).

Americans were desperately terrified immediately after September 11, 2001. Pyszczynski et al. (2003) emphasized the extent of the psychological effects of the attacks by noting that in November 2001, 74 percent of all American’s believed that another attack was coming in the near future and 40 percent of Americans believed that they, or a family member, would be a victim of an upcoming attack. According to Terror Management Theory, there are three proximal reactions to cope with fear following a tragic event, like the 9/11 terrorist attacks—disbelief/detachment, distraction/suppression, and action to minimize vulnerability. Faced with such extreme levels of terror and a lack of effective personal coping mechanisms, a huge majority of Americans turned to the government to take action to minimize their vulnerability in order to restore their sense of security, even if it meant losing some of their freedom (Pyszcynski et al. 2003).

From Terror Management Theory, it can also be assumed that as time goes by and individuals regain their sense of comfort and security they will become less willing to allow their civil liberties to be restricted by the government. Thus, the rise in opposition to the USA Patriot Act, including the
resolutions, would be explained by the fact that in the three years that have passed since the September 11, 2001, there have not been any more significant terrorist incidents or threats so the American people feel safe again and do not feel that continued infringement on their civil liberties are necessary. Pyszczynski et al. (2003), however, noted that some live in areas that make them more vulnerable to continued fear of terrorism, such as individuals who live in New York City, Washington, D.C., or other large metropolitan areas (Pyszczynski et al. 2003, 113). They also noted that many Americans, especially those living in New York City and Washington, D.C., continue to feel traumatized by the events of September 11, 2001. Based on these statements, terror management theory and the psychology of terror would presume that large metropolitan communities, particularly New York City and Washington, D.C., would be more likely to continue to support legislation, like the USA Patriot Act, that infringes on their civil liberties in the name of ensuring security. However, this has not been the case.

New York City and Washington, D.C., the two cities that were most devastated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have both passed comprehensive and forceful resolutions opposing many provisions of the USA Patriot Act due to the Act’s many infringements of fundamental civil rights and liberties. Additionally, twenty four of the nation’s fifty largest metropolitan cities have passed resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act. While terror management theory provides a compelling argument for the widespread support for the Patriot Act in the months following the attacks, it does not explain the phenomenon of why these and other communities have stood up against the Patriot Act, while other communities have not. The lack of explanatory power of this theory is further complicated by the fact that the communities and states exhibiting the strongest support for the continuance of the USA Patriot Act and other post-9/11 government actions are in areas of the country that were not, and probably will never be, directly threatened or targeted by terrorist activities.

Clearly, the existing theories and research on the public opinion about the USA Patriot Act falls short of answering the question of why some communities have continued to support the Patriot Act, while others have not, and therefore, a better explanation of this issue is long overdue.

**Hypothesis**

Existing theories about individuals’ responses to terrorist acts and the research on the progression of opposition movements fail to explain the differences of opinion about whether or not the USA Patriot Act is an accept-
able piece of anti-terrorism legislation. This study hypothesizes that factors such as political ideology, community demographics, and local events are important indicators of whether a community will prioritize freedom or security and thus, either oppose or continue to support the USA Patriot Act of 2001.

**Methods of Analysis and Initial Findings of Data**

Since none of the existing research examines the effects that political ideology and community demographics have on opposition to the USA Patriot Act, a starting point is to perform some basic data analysis to determine whether the hypothesis is worth investigating further. A sample of the fifty most populous United States cities was taken, with twenty-four cities that have passed resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act and twenty-six that have not. This sample was then briefly analyzed to determine whether political ideology or non-white populations influenced communities to pass resolutions opposing the Patriot Act. The initial findings, which are included as Appendix B, did find moderate to strong relationships between the factors and passage of opposition resolutions, so this theory appears to be deserving of further investigation.

There are three primary methods of analysis that stand to contribute a greater understanding as to why some communities pass resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act while others do not: 1) statistical analysis, 2) examination of all resolutions passed and local events that occurred shortly before passage, and 3) survey data collection and analysis of survey data.

**Statistical Analysis**

In order to determine whether the relationships found in this initial analysis, a far more extensive data should be prepared, including all communities that have passed resolutions opposing the Patriot and a comparable number of communities not opposing the act, which accounts for additional measures of political ideology and community demographics. With complete data, comprehensive statistical analysis could be performed to control for all possible factors influencing the passage of resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act.

**Examination of Resolutions**

Expanding on Elaine Cassel’s theory that increased media coverage of the Patriot Act, following the exposure of the draft Patriot II legislation, and the
ideas that particular events acted as triggers for active opposition to the USA Patriot Act, all of the resolutions that have been passed opposing the Patriot Act require careful examination in search of references to local or national events that may have triggered passage of the resolutions. Thorough investigation into local and national news media archives for the weeks and months preceding the passage of opposition resolutions as an additional means of identifying events that may have influenced communities to pass the resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act. However, in order to confirm this theory, it will also be necessary to determine whether any major events that should have triggered opposition movements failed to influence communities to change their opinions about the USA Patriot Act.

**Survey Data Collection and Analysis**

The final method of research, collecting and analyzing survey data, is aimed at determining individuals’, rather than communities’, reasons for either supporting or opposing the USA Patriot Act and other post-9/11 governmental actions that infringe upon fundamental civil rights and liberties. Although the dominant political ideology in a community will likely influence whether or not that community will pass a resolution in opposition to the Patriot Act, the phenomenon cannot be fully explained without addressing why the individuals in the community support the dominant political ideology. The survey will be conducted of adults nationwide, but it is essential to ensure that the survey sample includes significant numbers of individuals from communities that have and have not passed resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act, so it will not be a purely random survey. Since the cities, counties and states that have passed resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act represent approximately 20 percent of the country’s population, the survey should be organized so that approximately 20 percent of the respondents come from those communities. The proposed survey questions are included as Appendix C.

Using these methods of research and analysis, a comprehensive understanding of why some individuals and communities oppose the USA Patriot Act while others do not should begin to emerge, which should finally explain the role that intrusive post-9/11 legislation plays in United States society.
References


Hawaii. Senate. 25 April 2003. *Hawaii Senate Resolution Opposing the USA Patriot Act, Senate Concurrent Resolution SCR18*. 


Appendix A

List of Communities that have Passed Resolutions
Opposing the USA Patriot Act
(ACLU, Updated November 16, 2004)

Lowell, MA
Bridgewater, MA
Kansas City/Wyandotte County, KS
Westford, MA
Alhambra, CA
Englewood, NJ
Westchester County, NY
Huntington, NY
Lincoln, NE
Mercer County, NJ
Tompkins County, NY
Glendale, CA
Edgartown, MA
Humboldt County, CA
Falls Church, VA
Nevada City, CA
Des Moines, IA
Tumwater, WA
Pasadena, CA
Placer County, CA
Lawrence Township, NJ
Whitefish, MT
Lexington-Fayette County, KY
Boone, NC
Savannah, GA
Kearnsburg, NJ
Plainfield, NJ
Raleigh, NC
Aspen, CO
Albany County, NY
Orono, ME
Mount Vernon, ME
Paterson, NJ
Moscow, ID

November 16, 2004
November 8, 2004
November 4, 2004
October 18, 2004
October 11, 2004
September 29, 2004
September 14, 2004
September 14, 2004
September 13, 2004
September 9, 2004
September 7, 2004
August 31, 2004
August 31, 2004
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St. Louis, MO
Somerville, MA
Aquinnah, MA
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Richmond, VA
Milwaukee, WI
Washington, DC
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Dallas, TX
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<td>December 2, 2002</td>
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<td>Eugene, OR</td>
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<td>November 12, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takoma Park, MD</td>
<td>October 28, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alachua County, FL</td>
<td>October 22, 2002</td>
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<tr>
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<td>October 22, 2002</td>
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<td>San Miguel County, CO</td>
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<td>Leverett, MA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denver, CO</td>
<td>March 18, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Arbor, MI</td>
<td>January 7, 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These communities have passed ordinances.
Appendix B

Initial Findings of Factors Influencing Communities to Oppose the USA Patriot Act

A sample of the fifty most populous American cities was taken, with 24 cities that have passed resolutions opposing the USA Patriot Act and 26 that have not. Political ideology for each city in the sample was determined by using the liberalism score for each city’s U.S. Representative as calculated by American’s for Democratic Action, an independent liberal lobbying organization, who rated Representatives based on the percentage of their votes that coincided with the organizations liberal position (Americans for Democratic Action 2004). Percentages of white and non-white population of each city, as reported at ERsys.com, a database that provides city profiles based on information gathered from the United States Census Bureau and other sources, was chosen as the basic demographic factor for this experiment with statistical analysis.

FIGURE 1:
Does political ideology affect whether a city passes a resolution opposing the Patriot Act?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2003 ADA Score</th>
<th>Oppose Patriot Act</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>Count % within 2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Conservative</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Liberal</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 2003 ADA Score</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
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</table>

Figure 1 shows the relationship between political ideologies of the cities included in the sample and whether or not those cities passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act. Political ideologies of the cities were determined by taking the Liberalism score (calculated by the Americans for Democratic Action) for the U.S. Representative for that city and then recoding the scores
into five categories of Conservative, Moderate Conservative, Moderate, Moderate Liberal, and Liberal. None of the cities’ representatives had Liberalism scores that would have placed them in the “Moderate” category. Although the number of cities falling into any of the “moderate” categories is too small to be given too much weight, the findings for “Conservative” and “Liberal” cities are open for analysis. Of the 13 cities categorized as “Conservative,” only 2 (15.4%) had passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act, while the other 11 (84.6%) had continued to support the Act. With a 69.2% difference between conservative cities that did and did not oppose the Patriot Act, these findings are statistically significant indicating a strong relationship. Likewise, of the 31 cities categorized as “Liberal,” 20 (64.5%) had passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act, while only 11 (35.5%) had not. With a 29% difference between liberal cities that did and did not oppose the Patriot Act, these findings are statistically significant indicating a moderate to strong relationship.

**FIGURE 2:** Does percentage of non-white population affect whether a city passes a resolution opposing the Patriot Act?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-white Population</th>
<th>Oppose Patriot Act</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-40%</td>
<td>Count % within Non-white Population</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>78.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-60%</td>
<td>Count % within Non-white Population</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-80%</td>
<td>Count % within Non-white Population</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-100%</td>
<td>Count % within Non-white Population</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Count % within Non-white Population</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 shows the relationship between percentages of non-white populations of the cities included in the sample and whether or not those cities passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act. These population statistics were
obtained from the City Profiles listed at ERsys.com, an internet data base that provides demographic information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and other sources (United States Census Bureau 2000). Of the 14 cities with the lowest percentages of non-white populations (21-40%), 3 (21.4%) had passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act while remaining 11 (78.6%) had not. With a 57.2% difference between cities with low non-white populations that did and did not oppose the Patriot Act, these findings are statistically significant indicating a strong relationship. While the results for cities with 41-80% represented only weak to moderate relationships, of the 4 cities with the highest percentages of non-white populations (81-100%), 3 (75%) had passed resolutions opposing the Patriot Act and only 1 (25%) had not. These findings are statistically significant and show a strong relationship.
Appendix C

Proposal Survey Questions

General Information
Gender: Male Female
Age: _____
City of Residence: ___________________________
County of Residence: _________________________
State of Residence: ______
Zip Code: _______
Ethnicity: White  Black  Hispanic  Asian  Arab/Middle Eastern  Other

Highest Level of education:

8th grade or below  Some High School
12th grade  Some College
Associate’s Degree  Bachelor's Degree
Master’s or other graduate degree

Political Identification and Ideology

1. Which political party do you identify most closely with?
   - Republican
   - Democratic
   - Libertarian
   - Green
   - Other
   - None

2. Which of the following best describes your political ideology?
   - Very Conservative
   - Conservative
   - Moderate
   - Liberal
   - Very Liberal
3. Which presidential candidate did you vote for in the 2004 election?
   - George W. Bush
   - John Kerry
   - Other
   - Did not vote

4. To the best of your knowledge, are your political views more in line with the majority party or minority party in your community?
   - Majority
   - Minority
   - Don’t Know

5. Please identify any of the following political activities that you have engaged in over the past year:
   - Vote in presidential election
   - Vote in Congressional election
   - Vote in local election
   - Attend a political meeting, rally or protest
   - Attempt to contact a government representative
   - Actively work for a political campaign or movement
   - Other
   - None

Opinions

6. Which of the following do you believe is the most important problem facing this country today?
   - Crime
   - Drugs
   - Economy
   - Unemployment
   - Taxes
   - Social Security
6. (CONTINUED)

   The situation in Iraq
   Terrorism
   National Security
   Health Care
   Poverty
   Moral/Religious/Family Values
   Protection of Civil Liberties
   Other
   Don’t Know/No opinion

7. How would you describe the state of the country today?

   In a time of stability and security
   In a time of crisis
   In a time of war
   In a time of severe instability and vulnerability
   Other

8. Under what circumstances do you believe the government is justified in limiting and/or infringing upon individuals’ civil rights and liberties?

   Under any circumstances
   During times of war
   During times of crisis
   In response to a direct threat posed by those liberties
   Under no circumstances
   Other

9. Do you believe that the current conditions of the country justify government acts which limit and/or infringe upon individual’s civil rights and liberties?

   Yes
   No
   Don’t Know
Questions about the USA Patriot Act

10. Are you familiar with the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001?
   
   Very Familiar
   Somewhat Familiar
   Unfamiliar

11. Do you support the USA PATRIOT Act?
   
   Yes
   No
   Don’t Know

12. If you answered yes to Question 11, please give the number one reason why you support the USA PATRIOT Act.
   
   Your political party supports the Act
   Your community supports the Act
   Out of Patriotism for the country
   It has been effective in preventing additional terrorist acts
   Personal connections to the places or individuals that perished on 9/11
   Fear of possible future terrorist attacks in the United States
   Don’t know/Haven’t really thought about it

13. If you answered no to Question 11, please give the number one reason why you do not support the USA PATRIOT Act.
   
   Your political party opposes the Act
   Your community opposes the Act
   Disapproval of the Bush Administration in general
   Lack of relationship between the Act and deterring terrorism
   Personal connections to the places or individuals that perished on 9/11
   Due to the civil rights and liberties violations the Act has permitted
   Don’t Know/Haven’t really thought about it
14. If you answered no to Question 11, at any time since its passage have you supported or approved of the USA PATRIOT ACT?

   Yes
   No

15. If you answered yes to Question 14, what caused you to switch from supporting to opposing the USA PATRIOT Act?

   Personal or local experience
   Increased media attention to the Act and other post-9/11 legislation
   Exposure to more information about the Act and its effects
   Restored sense of security
   Acts by the government, under the provisions of the Act, that you disapproved of
   Your community changed its opinion about the Act
   Don’t Know/Haven’t really thought about it

16. Do you believe that any provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act limit or infringe upon individuals’ civil rights and liberties?

   Yes
   No
   Don’t know

17. To the best of your knowledge, has the city, county or state that you reside in passed a resolution opposing the USA PATRIOT ACT?

   Yes
   No
   Don’t Know

18. If a resolution opposing the USA PATRIOT Act were proposed in your city, county, or state, and you were given the opportunity, how would you vote?

   Passage of any opposition resolution
   Passage of a resolution only if it opposed certain, unjust provisions of the Act
   Rejection of a resolution, even if it opposed only certain, unjust parts of the Act
   Rejection of any opposition resolution
They’re everywhere, this object slapped onto the wrists of celebrities, teens, and yes, now even worn on the person sitting next to you on the bus. These days, it seems that “bracelets” have taken over the world of trends; you see them in fashion magazines and in stores telling you you’re worthless unless you support an issue. But, what is the real meaning behind these little objects? The Lance Armstrong bracelets, for example, represent cancer and the campaign centers around the “Live Strong” motto he has brought to the attention of the world. Some of the people who wear the yellow bracelets are supporting the cause and trying to live out the motto while others half wear them because everyone else does, without knowing what it stands for. The media often has a habit of changing the context and meaning of a symbol, and it is done not just with merchandise for diseases, but with religion as well. This raises the following question: Is wearing an object without acting upon its meaning contradictory? Moreover, isn’t it just exploitation and commercialization of the religion if that ideology is sold to the masses? In the case of the Kabbalah red string, it just might be.

Kabbalah is an ancient form of Jewish mysticism that focuses on the “spiritual and physical laws that govern the cosmos of the Universe and the human soul” (Kabbalah Centre 2004). The red string acts as a protection against the “evil eye,” a negative force that can come from people who wish to antagonize you. It represents the sealing of protective energy from these influences while pledging to refrain from talking about others and having negative thoughts (Kabbalah Centre 2004).

Recently, we have seen an influx of celebrities sporting this string. One famous example is Madonna, who now follows the Kabbalah Centre, a very controversial sect in the Jewish world. It is not recognized by many Rabbis or even followers of Kabbalah, deeming the teachings to be “a cult.” According to Rabbi Ariel Bar Tzadok who writes for koshertorah.com, “In her video’s finale, Madonna’s ‘Kabbalah’ can be seen for its true nature with its disregard and blatant effrontery to traditional and true Kabbalah” (2002). With this statement, Rabbi Tzadok is attacking Madonna’s ethos, her vision of who she believes she is—a true and honest Kabbalah follower.
Lately, we have also seen other celebrities follow Madonna in this trend and practice under the Kabbalah Centre. This leaves some to wonder the actual validity of the movement, when the audience is primarily celebrities hopping on a new trend and now, in turn, the followers of those celebrities who want to emulate them. By wearing the string, they are proclaiming themselves to be part of the “in crowd,” or people “in the know,” but they don’t understand the symbolic meaning behind it because the true meaning has become hidden beneath the outspoken voices of the media. Most followers of the celebrities don’t know the ceremonial rituals that complement the wearing of the string which presents the following conclusion for most Kabbalah believers: that it is easier to wear the adornments of religious beliefs than to have them.

What seems to be happening in this trend of commercialization is the exchange of one context to another. This symbol’s new message has smothered the original meaning. In Barbara Ehrenreich’s article, “Welcome to Cancerland,” printed in Harper’s Magazine, the commercialization of the breast cancer pink ribbons are brought into question. She discusses the idea that, indeed, it is a good thing that breast cancer is being acknowledged, and people are actively trying to tackle this issue, bringing forth strength, but she feels it has been taken too far by its corporate sponsors. She says, “Awareness beats secrecy and stigma, of course, but I can’t help noticing that the existential space in which a friend has earnestly advised me to ‘confront [my] mortality’ bears a striking resemblance to the mall” (Ehrenreich 2001). Herein lies the situation, her statement reflects an attitude of anger and satire that brings forth this idea of a changing context. Like the breast cancer pink ribbons, the same thing seems to be happening with these bracelets. Until recently, Target sold a box entitled “Kabbalah Red String,” in which they began selling a red string and instructions about the religion to online buyers for the price of $25.99. The International Society for Sephardic Progress, a Jewish agency affiliated with Kabbalah, protested Target and got the corporation to revoke the sale of the string, citing reasons of exploitation.

Target has been known in recent years to be a trend-setter for the Gap-wearing generation looking for designer style on a college budget. I admit that even I have succumbed to the addicting matching floral patterns they have offered. But with the selling of the string, Target is really making a statement about what audience they are trying to appeal to. This product is not intended to be purchased by practicing Kabbalists and Jewish believers not affiliated with Kabbalah. The packaging of the red string is intended for those people who want their ethos constructed for them. They are the ones who always seem to be on the cutting edge of fashion trends and know
what’s going on with whom in the celebrity world. By wearing the string for the simple entertainment value, they are helping to convolute the context of the meaning behind the string, making it into something commercial, or, as Ehrenreich would say, something “resembling the mall.”

The history of bracelets as a symbol for remembrance is not new concept. People have been wearing various types of bracelets for this purpose since it became popular in the early 1970s to wear metal bracelets engraved to remember a missing GI in the Vietnam War. Back then, those cost $3, while the Lance Armstrong “Live Strong” bracelets, made out of 100 percent synthetic silicon rubber, goes for about a $1.00 a piece, plus tax. However, from the official foundation website, it can only be bought in packs of 10, 100, or 1200. The money raised from the sell of these bracelets, according to the Lance Armstrong Foundation website, goes “to benefit the programs that help young people with cancer to live strong” (2004). This seems to be a pretty lofty goal that is vague about what the money is specifically used for. How is it helping children with cancer to “live strong”? The bracelets seem innocent enough, and they are looked upon more favorably than the red string, but could they really be giving the same message? Aren’t they then, both texts in which the media has brought to the attention of the public, and having used that attention to increase sales of a product?

The red string is a symbol that denotes a religious meaning and this original intendment has been taken and blown up into this perfect commercial product, so neatly packaged that it almost disguises the fact that it is part of a real religion that many people practice. If I was a person with no religious convictions and who listened to the “news” the media dictates, I too, for the very low price of $25.99, could purchase my beliefs and values in a neat white box from a little store called Target.

References


Leaving La Juventud

By Suzan Jantz

Sitting on the edge of my bed, I listen to voices turning in my stomach. I know it is time. There is no light yet. Mamá will awaken soon to warm the tortillas, and I wonder when she will notice I am gone. Her sobbing will drown the voices of the crowing roosters then. I cross myself and swallow hard.

I pull the folded papers from my coat pocket. The white school paper is still blank. I think: what to write? I hear my little brother reading to Mamá the words, but no words and too many words scramble in my mind, and I write nothing. I unfold the wrinkled map and trace the roads I will take—like a blind man who sees with his faith. I stop at the X—el pueblo de Libertad—where I will meet Alejandro and give to him the money I have saved for ten years. X is where I will no longer be called Carlos Casillas, first born son of María y Juan Carlos Casillas.

The streets are asleep, but dogs roam between mud-houses with their tails tucked under. When I pass by Our Lady de Guadalupe, a gray dog runs from the courtyard and stops in front of me before fading back into dark. This is a good sign. I cross myself.

When the sun comes, I am far. El Río Bravo trickles through brown silt. It is the river that my father followed. I listen for him in the cottonwood trees, but hear only a pounding in my chest. I wet the dust in my throat with juice from my orange, leaving a spotted trail of citrus skins behind me.

Later, the sky is streaks of pomegranate red when I knock on the wooden door in the village. In the courtyard, there are other boys. Our eyes look down, memorizing the hard, brown earth. The night full of crickets goes mute in an instant when Alejandro speaks. “Across the border, there are eyes in the dark,” he says. “They run in packs to hunt you down. They can smell your Mexican blood, and they will devour you,” he says. “You must outsmart them when they come.” I remember the gray dog, and cross myself again.

On the bus, it is full, and the men drink from glass bottles. One bottle falls in the aisle and shatters. I hear my mother crying when I was five. She watches me walking down the aisle of la iglesia, carrying baby Jesucristo to the manger. I turn to look at her, and the blessed baby’s head hits the wooden pew and rolls onto the floor. Father Miguel says it is a sign: the Holy One will always remember me. The men sitting in front of me pass a bottle and
laugh about the names they will call each other tomorrow. Walter, Charles, Fred. I think that I will be called Charles.

“¡HAII—EEEE!” “¡HAI-HAI-HAI!” the men yell.

“¡Cállanse!” the driver shouts. The bus accelerates and lurches to the right, slamming against a rock at the bottom of a ditch.

“¡Vamos! ¡Vamos!”

Bright lights block the door. Coyotes circle, aiming their guns. Men scramble out windows. As I reach the doorway, I see the gray one, and our brown eyes meet. I dive for the darkness beyond. My face hits the sand; boots kick at my sides. Mexican blood spurts from my nose, but I hold back my cries. I am in the valley where the shadow más grande looks for me. I will not be afraid.

For the past eighteen years, it is estimated that four to five hundred immigrants seeking a “better life” die in their attempt to cross the United States border from Mexico. Today, approximately 400,000 – 500,000 immigrants still attempt to cross, some by means of coyotes (professional smugglers) who compete for business and often collect fees only to beat, kill, rape, or desert these pollos (immigrants trying to cross).

The steel wall separating Tijuana from San Diego (the infamous Tortilla Curtain) is covered in white crosses representing those who have died trying to cross. Some of the crosses state “unknown” because the person was never identified.
American Public Opinion And American War Casualties: Or How Many Deaths Does It Take ‘Til We Know?

By John Crosby

As American soldiers killed in action during the current conflict in Iraq surpassed one thousand, many people felt this was a “psychological” number, which could have impact on the level of support given the president, and possibly have an impact on decision making. Research connecting the linkage between a disapproving American public and casualties in both the Korea and Vietnam conflicts have been cited as being a critical factor in most American actions contemplating the use of force and whether we commit troops, continue to commit troops, or pull out (Mueller 1973; Lorell and Kelley 1985). Samuel Huntington stated in 1986 that public opinion will not support a prolonged ‘slow bleed’ of American blood.

It has been widely asserted by politicians, scholars, the media and our enemies that if too many American casualties occurred, the American people would withdraw their support for any conflict. Cited as an example of America’s casualty aversion driving political action was the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983 that killed 241 Marines and prompted the withdrawal from Lebanon in February of 1984. Also cited was the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993 which killed 18 Americans and prompted our withdrawal from Somalia in March of 1994 (Foyle 1997).

Inexplicably, however, the public supported the invasions of Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, liberation of Kuwait in 1991, use of American forces in Bosnia in 1995-96, Kosovo in 1999, and several successful interventions in Haiti. All these actions have occurred without significant outcry from the U.S. population and have not had an averse affect on the popularity of the serving president. Similar to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon was the bombing of a U.S. forces hotel in Saudi Arabia in June of 1996, causing over twenty fatalities and scores of injuries but no serious consideration was given to pulling troops from Saudi.

The issue is further clouded when the American people are polled directly as in a CNN/Time poll conducted in March 1999 concerning U.S. goals in Kosovo. Seventy-four percent of Americans said they would be willing to sacrifice zero American lives to achieve our goals, but seventy-three percent, in a separate MSNBC poll conducted the same month, supported
the use of ground troops if it was the only way to stop the Serbs from ethnic cleansing. Do Americans know what they want? How do we come to support, or be critical of, the president’s foreign policy? Finally, is there a link between the public’s opinion of a president and the number of flag-draped coffins landing at Dover Air Force Base?

Thesis Statement

In the above U.S. actions and attitudes there are several seeming discrepancies and inconsistencies. This leads one to believe there is no coherent, set response by either the American people or by our leadership to whether casualties inflicted, or the potential for casualties inflicted, are related to our commitment to a particular foreign policy action. Since the president is currently perceived as “running” America’s foreign policy, the majority of Americans view him as the focal point for foreign policy triumphs and failures. This leads to the question of the linkage between the American public opinion of the president, American casualties, and the president’s decisions regarding the commitment or withdrawal of U.S. forces. When and under what conditions do casualties affect public opinion of a president and when does this opinion significantly affect American foreign policy actions to commit or withdraw American military forces? Additionally, are there other factors that impact on public opinion as it relates to the use of U.S. military force? Finally, how this lack of understanding or support is linked to casualties, commitment of American troops, and the public’s opinion of the president, will additionally be addressed. I will argue that although American public opinion on foreign affairs over the past forty years has been deliberately misinterpreted, manipulated, and ignored—public opinion, casualties and foreign policy action are linked in an elaborate, fragile, and inexorable embrace.

More importantly, does this discussion have any relevance to the ongoing conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq? I will also contend that the current administration has learned several key lessons concerning casualties and American public opinion and the executive branch is engaged in an elaborate ruse. However, if the casualty rate in Iraq remains constant or increases, the deception used may destroy the Republican party’s credibility and electoral dominance.

The purpose of this research is to determine empirically whether American casualties only adversely affect the public opinion of the serving president and his policy when there is a clear lack of understanding and or support for why we entered the conflict and when there is no clear end for the operation.
Do Casualties Matter?

The first of two groundbreaking research projects concerning casualties and their effect on presidential popularity was John Mueller’s *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (1973) where he demonstrated a relationship between a decline in popularity of the president as compared to an increase in casualty rates in both the Korea and Vietnam conflicts. This relationship was a decrease in popularity by 15 percent when casualties rose from 100 to 1000 and then again by 15 percent when the casualties rose from 1000 to 10,000. Mueller found this effect to be cumulative and solely based upon the number of casualties while external factors, such as the Tet offensive in Vietnam, had no direct correlation. This led Mueller (2003, 60) to the belief that the “public is sensitive to small losses at the start of the war but only to large ones at the end.” The second study, (Lorell and Kelley 1985, vii), validated Mueller’s relationship and concluded with “the public tends to be unwilling to tolerate anything more than minimal costs in limited war scenarios.”

In a final refinement of Mueller’s initial work where the researchers disagreed with Mueller’s purely cumulative hypothesis and found that recent, marginal casualties could be critical in predicting erosion of support for the president and his policy (Gartner and Segura 1998). This refinement explained why the different presidents lost support at different time frames during the conflicts even though the majority of casualties were produced at different times during the war (Korea early and in Vietnam a steady rise). These predicted negative effects on policy would provide ammunition to the shapers of America’s foreign policy intervention strategy during the 1980s and 1990s. These strategists, notably Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell, would end up advocating only intervening in areas vital to the U.S. interests, using overwhelming force, having a clear attainable objective, and an exit strategy. Scholars, however, would begin to research the events of the 1980s and 1990s and challenge the perception among media and elites on the relationship between casualties and public opinion.

Misinterpreted. Manipulated and Ignored. Educated?

As noted earlier, researchers working the casualties matter theory had merely established the relationship between presidential popularity and dead or wounded American troops. The articulation and implementation of the “Weinberger-Powell doctrine” consistently used the perception that the American public lacked the stomach for casualties to argue against committing troops in virtually all scenarios.
Bruce Jentleson (1992) using poll data, and official and unofficial documents from the 1980s and early 1990s, advanced a theory of a rather sophisticated public that could vary its opinion according to principle and the foreign policy agenda advanced. Jentleson reviewed the three dominant public opinion theories currently in vogue that were attempting to explain how the public forms its opinion on whether to support or reject a particular policy. These were: 1) Threats to core American interests, 2) presidential cueing, and 3) the public’s basic risk aversion to casualties. Jentleson found all three unsatisfactory in explaining American public opinion during U.S. foreign policy actions in the 1980s and early 1990s. The author advanced his analysis that the American public was much more supportive in using force to restrain hostile nations’ actions than to remake the hostile government. Public opinion had been misinterpreted. Core interests, presidential cueing, or casualty aversion had little impact on the use of, or the avoidance of, using force. Jentleson’s primary finding was that public support varied according to the specific foreign policy objective being advanced.

In line with this research on an individual American’s discernment, the ideology and pre-dispositions of the individual were specifically studied (Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser 1999). The authors embedded five different experiments/scenarios within their research and asked a series of questions designed to determine the participants’ willingness to support or not support the use of force. The researchers discovered Americans combine their dispositional preferences, either interventionists or isolationists, and understanding of a substantive situation, as a basis for their approval or disapproval of the use of military force aboard. The political identification of the individual, either conservative or liberal, had little to no correlation with the participant’s willingness to use force.

The experiments showed a direct causation between the individuals’ pre-dispositions, the highly nuanced scenarios, and the respondents’ willingness to use force. Ideology of the opponent, whether the US had interests in the region, nature and reason of the conflict, likelihood of U.S. causalities, and the relative strength of the adversary were all controlled and compared against the respondents’ pre-dispositions. The researchers concluded that the American people, regardless of ideology, are willing to accept casualties for the right reasons.

These findings, along with Jentleson, directly refute Philip Converse’s 1960s work that claimed most Americans have non-attitudes. Americans, it appears, have a somewhat sophisticated attitude on what foreign policy should be advanced and political party identification may have less of an impact than imagined. What these two studies fail to take into account are
the deliberately manipulative techniques that the elite could use to sway the public’s opinion support for, or opposition to, a particular policy objective. Much of our opinions have an emotional content, something a cold, abstract survey conducted in an age without passion might over or under emphasize.

Feaver and Gelpi (1999) specifically examined the beliefs of three separate groups within America society concerning how many casualties the respondents would consider acceptable for three specific scenarios. The first group consisted of rising military officers, the second of influential civilians, and the third of the general public. Feaver and Gelpi discovered that casualty aversion is entrenched in the upper levels of society, and with both the officers and the influential civilians consistently believing the American public will rarely tolerate large numbers of U.S. casualties in military operations. The first example was a peacekeeping mission to Congo. The military officers thought 284 casualties would be acceptable for such a mission, the influential civilians gave 484 as being acceptable and the general public gave 6,861 as being acceptable. A similar discrepancy, although not as extreme, was found in the second hypothetical mission, preventing Iraq from gaining weapons of mass destruction. The third scenario, the defense of Taiwan, found a consensus between all three groups.

This elite casualty aversion was also found in subsequent research (Kull and Ramsey 2001) and discussed in Jeffrey Record’s (2000) paper for the USAF War College. These studies indicate that although there is casualty aversion the American public’s aversion is not quite as high as the civilian and military elites. All three of the above studies indicate the public has a coherent, understandable set of opinions and the public can make “reasonable distinctions among policies” (Page and Shapiro 1992). The question remains however of whether the casualty aversion phenomenon was merely misinterpreted or manipulated.

The deliberate manipulation of public opinion by President Johnson is well documented. However several studies blur a line between manipulation and education. In the early stages of a conflict the public’s attitude is still in the formation phase. Eric Larson (1996) argues people conduct a “crude weighing of expected benefits and costs”. It is in this phase that elite consensus or dissensus is critical to the formation of public opinion. Larson contends during the beginning of a crisis the elite, consisting of the President, the major political parties, key interest groups and influential media, make a detailed and extensive cost-benefits analysis with casualties being just one of several factors. If the elites gain a consensus among themselves to support a given policy, like the support given to LBJ in the early stages of Vietnam, the poll numbers stay up and intervention is initiated or escalated. Larson
believes if there is a dissensus among elites, similar to the view taken by John Zaller (Larson 1996), than the public will take their cues from their political leaders. In this model elite opinion has either a unifying effect or a polarizing effect and the population’s overall opinion will follow their leaders. Larson contends the level of discord in the elite discussion will eventually be mirrored in the public discussion and it was a sub-set of the political elite who moved public opinion to eventually oppose our continued involvement in Vietnam. Opponents of the policy will then use casualty information as an issue to further polarize the public.

However, since information on foreign policy issues is usually only derived from either the government or the media, this creates a situation where a consensus between these two elites could effectively marginalize any opposition. It is at this stage in foreign affairs that since the government controls a virtually monopoly on information the elites may, as Page and Shapiro note, “sometimes lead the public astray”(1993, 23). Larson, commenting upon studies conducted by Converse and Zaller, believes that as long as there is a substantial debate over policy then the public should not fear too much manipulation and propaganda. But Zaller himself concludes there is no way to “guaranteeing the existence of…vigorous competition among ideas.” (Larson 1996, 323) Larson argues that efforts to mislead the public will eventually be found out and lead to a high political cost. This belief, although comforting, may not hold true.

At the core of Larson’s argument, although not specifically addressed, is the continuation of casualties maintains a steady fuel keeping the debate alive over the correct foreign policy. John Mueller (2003), using over seventy years of polling data, comes to some interesting conclusions concerning casualties, public opinion and foreign policy. His primary analysis is that as long as Americans are not dying, the public does not care about foreign policy or international affairs. Americans have little patience for casualties and if Americans troops are dying overseas then the reasons have to be explained to the American public. Implicit in Mueller’s argument is the kernel of fact that once casualties cease, then American public’s concern over the policy ceases to exist at any meaningful level. The American public does not punish politicians over failed foreign policy as long as the failed policy has ceased. Troops deployed in peace-keeping/nation building operations can only be a failure if American troops are dying. Our casualty free peace-keeping operations have little real opposition as we have had American peacekeepers in Macedonia since 1992 and there is no public clamor to bring the troops home from there. Once casualties start however, the President has rallied support.
The American people have to agree, or be persuaded to agree, that the costs of American lives are worth the objective the President is trying to achieve. This persuasion, called education by proponents and propaganda/manipulation by opponents, is critical to generate the necessary enthusiasm. The two primary persuasive themes the current administration used to justify Afghanistan and Iraq are the threats of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Both these themes registered as the number one and two critical threats to Americans at 90 percent and 85 percent respectively in 2002. The sustained absences of any evidence of weapons of mass destruction or links to the 9-11 hijackers in Iraq are forcing the President to shift themes.

The failures of Korea and Vietnam are tied directly to the President’s inability to generate enough enthusiasm to continue a policy toward an initially preferred foreign policy objective. Mueller argues the cumulating costs of continuing American casualties were not proportional to the objective and Americans abandoned their earlier goals. President Eisenhower allowed the Korean conflict to end in a stalemate and President Ford watched the destruction of the South Vietnamese regime at the hands of the North. The American public has little difficulty in abandoning untenable, unsuccessful positions that cost American lives, oftentimes leaving erstwhile allies to twist. Additionally, Americans’ political memory for both victory and defeat is amazingly short. One of President Ford’s campaign themes in 1976 was that under his watch he ensured no more Americans would die in Vietnam.

When Casualties Don’t Matter

Kull and Ramsey (2001) further defined the issue of when casualties would be acceptable to the American public. Their study found that the critical determinant of the public’s response is not whether vital U.S. interests are involved but whether the operation is perceived likely to succeed. The study found that when Americans are being polled they resist making a choice in which soldiers die, thus explaining the abysmal numbers in support of the myriad humanitarian/peacekeeping missions, but when told the mission will be successful they are much more willing to accept large casualties.

Furthermore, in their analysis of the first Gulf War, they found certain themes resonated more with the American public and created a higher degree of acceptance to casualties. In 1990, President Bush’s media team tried two different themes, 1) defending America’s oil reserve or 2) the moral argument that aggression can not stand. The American public responded to the moral argument and failed to connect to the vital interest theme of
defending our oil. The oil theme, with only 29 percent support, died a quick death while the moral argument gained prominence.

The “success more important than casualties” analysis and Larson’s elite consensus argument explains our non-reaction to the bombing in Saudi in 1996. The mission to contain the “evil” Saddam was perceived as extremely successful, morally justifiable and necessary, themes repeated and believed by both political parties and media, so there was little opposition and no serious call for a pull out. While Mueller (2003) argues that there is no long-term political benefit for military success, there are two short term effects that can negate the presidential popularity drop casualties usually entails. These effects are the rally round the flag effect and the halo effect. The rally round the flag effect is when the President usually has a brief period of popularity surrounding any major foreign confrontation and if he is quickly successful, a glowing halo effect of sustained popularity, albeit limited. The invasions and quick work done against Grenada, Panama and Iraq in the Gulf War did not allow time for casualties to become an issue.

**Implications and Conclusion**

Casualties act as a political catalyst driving real discussion on the use of force in foreign policy decision making. Absent casualties and the American public turns its attention off. Any sustained, long-term action using American troops by the President must take casualties into account. The longer the conflict is seen as unsuccessful, the harder the administration needs to work to maintain the enthusiasm required keeping the public’s support. Salient themes that resonate must be discovered and staler or inappropriate themes must be discarded. Americans will fight, and send their young off to die, for the right reasons but they must be persuaded the reasons are right and that we will ultimately be successful. The President and his administration must act as a continuing salesperson to keep casualties, a sign we are not being successful, from dragging down popular support.

The number of Americans who say the casualty rate in Iraq is too high, all from a consistently worded ABC/Washington Post poll, has gone from 28 percent in April of 2003 to 71 percent in June of 2004. At the same time, according to a Pew Research poll, those Americans who say going to war with Iraq was a right decision has fallen from 74 percent to 53 percent in roughly the same time period. A Gallup poll in October 2004 had 47 percent of Americans calling the war on Iraq a “mistake”. Another question concerning whether Iraq really required military action at all has similarly fallen from 63 percent in March 2003 to 33 percent in October 2004. Despite the recent
successful elections, if the Iraqis flounder in their attempt to maintain order and Americans continue to die, the President’s policy is in serious trouble.

The enthusiasm and deception President Johnson maintained to keep public support for his policies in Vietnam exploded in January of 1968 and three months later LBJ announced he would not seek another term and the Democrats lost the White House. Both the elite and public opinion on Vietnam quickly crystallized into a dissensus and Johnson’s ultimate objective, to keep communist North Vietnam from reunifying their country, failed utterly in 1975. The question that has not been answered is whether the elite dissensus drove the negative public opinion of President Johnson or whether the American public, after seeing the Tet offensive and being subjected to years of manipulation by the President, finally drove a majority of citizens to criticize America’s Vietnam policy. The same situation could easily occur now as soldiers on the ground in Iraq, including the Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, believe we are strategically losing the war in Iraq (Ricks 2004).

Once again, according to a Pew poll, 50 percent of Americans believe Iraq will be a friendly democratic regime in five years. The American public’s expectation of Iraq is steadily disassociating itself from the objective the President has. The mission the military has now been given, to ensure Iraq becomes a democracy, is a long and dangerous one. This change in mission from neutralizing a perceived threat to the United States to remaking a country into a legitimate democracy could easily affect the American public’s support for continued occupation. The question is when does the cumulating American casualties effect the American public and become, like Korea and Vietnam, “a cost not proportional to the objective” (Mueller 2003). However, based upon the studies and research, a fractured, civil war wracked, non-democratic Iraq could still be a “success” for the Republicans and the President if the troops are brought home.

It is along these points that continuing research is necessary to gauge how public opinion turns from a majority support of a President and his policy to minority support. How the principles of consensus and dissensus worked, and failed to work, in the run up to the war need to be thoroughly researched. Why did the Democratic party fail in their traditional role of producing a “vigorous debate?” Did their lack of argument give the Republican party a consensus needed to drive the war despite the dearth of evidence? Are the Republicans currently using schemas on how people view the world to sway the public’s opinion? Which media outlets continue to frame the war in themes favorable to the administration and which ones are applying discordant themes? Research into how the public’s opinion is being affected by these differing media campaigns and how the media and the administra-
tion deal with the unalterable fact of casualties would be interesting.

Additionally, if casualties continue and support for the President further declines what impact does this have for Congressional races in 2006? What themes can the Republican party use to continue support for a failing war? When does the Republican party begin to distance itself from the President? How does another Vietnam impact our institutions like the military? To paraphrase part of Larson’s conclusion, support for interventions with mounting costs over a long duration is only likely to be sustainable if it is seen as important and moving purposively toward a successful outcome. Majority support is partly based upon initial expectations and efforts to mislead the public can backfire. The current administration, in order to generate the initial elite consensus, used a theme and manipulation that has proven to be false. Their remaining theme of democracy for the Iraqi people is battered and under the corrosive scrutiny of continuing casualties. The tattered and remaining themes the President is employing can only survive under one condition: American troops stop dying in Iraq.

Are we ultimately critically evaluating the situation in Iraq, discussing the issues, weighing the evidence and coming to a rational decision regarding ours and the President’s role in the war? Will cumulating negative public opinion of the President drive him or the Republican party to change policies? Do our individual opinions matter? Do our individual beliefs about the effectiveness of American foreign policy actually change because of debate concerning the continuing conflict? Or are we merely here to reflect the elite debate raging above our heads and simply vote the incompetent in out and the outs in when 2006 and 2008 come around? Or are we merely as John Mueller (1973) finds us, unconcerned unless it is recent or affects us personally? One thing is certain, if Marines and soldiers were not still dying, there would be little to no debate occurring on our Iraqi foreign policy and the President would be much stronger politically.

References


Study Design Proposal: Resilience Comparison Between Participants And Non-Participants Of An Inner City After-School Program

By Ricky Samayoa

Chapter 1:

Introduction

Historically, the United States has been known as a country of immigrants. According to the network theory, pre-existing ethnic networks reduce the transaction costs and risks new immigrants face (Izyumov et al. 2002). This “safety net” has encouraged many to migrate to unknown circumstances and environments. According to Izyumov et al. (2002), as the immigrant “safety net” expands, the greater the tendency is for relatively less educated and less skilled immigrants to settle in large ethnic enclaves inside urban cores (20). Children from these new immigrant communities tend to live in high-risk environments, which include poverty, violence, and under-resourced schools. Rauh et al. (2003) found empirical evidence that geographic concentration of poverty “results in environments that place children at risk for health and developmental problems” (258). Additionally, Rauh et al. (2003) found a negative correlation between concentrated poverty and school performance. Moreover, evidence suggests that poverty, child development, and behavioral outcomes may be determined by exposure to other stressful components that are associated with community poverty (258). Luthar and Goldstein (2004) add that children that live in inner cities both witness and are victimized by violence (499). One of Luthar and Goldstein’s conclusion is that “children living in violent communities are at risk for both internalizing and externalizing problems” (500). Additional research also indicates that there is a wide educational achievement gap between low-income, mostly minority children, served mostly by urban schools, and their white, suburban, and affluent counterparts (Porter and Soper 2003). This achievement gap will have lasting affects on the standard of living among new immigrant children that live in urban cores.

The Third Street Community Center has worked for the past four years with second to fifth graders from the San Jose downtown neighborhood called St. James Park. Seventy-one percent of the youth come from extremely
low-income and largely Latino families with an average household income of less than $15,000. Additionally, 60 percent of the parents have little to no formal education. Currently, to participate in the program, youth must rank below the fiftieth percentile on the California State standardized test (CAT/6), and unfortunately, most youth in the St. James Park neighborhood qualify based on this ranking. Because of capacity issues, only about 30 percent of the children that need services can be assisted (Madrigal 2004).

According to Masten (1994, 6), “a risk factor is a characteristic of a group of people that is associated with an elevated probability of undesired outcomes, as in a risk factor for delinquency or dropping out of school.” Based on their circumstances, Third Street Community Center youth may be considered at-risk for poor developmental outcomes. However, risk factors are not the only determinants of behavioral outcomes. Resilience factors, which are the opposite of risk factors, must also be considered. For the purpose of this study, resilience will be defined as predictors of good outcomes in high-risk youth (Masten 1994).

Statement of Problem

The purpose of this study is to measure resilience among sixth and seventh graders of new Latino immigrant families that live around the Third Street Community Center. The results will compare the resilience among participating and non-participating children in the Third Street Community Center after-school program. Variables that will be considered to measure resilience are: cooperation and communication, self-efficacy, empathy, problem solving, self-awareness and aspirations. Statistical differences in the mean of each group will determine the success or failure of the guiding research statement.

Guiding Research Statement

The Third Community Center after-school program makes a positive difference in the resilience development of new Latino immigrant children.

Limitations

Based on Benard’s work, this study distinguishes between two types of resilience constructs: 1) protective factors or external assets, and 2) resilience traits or internal assets (Constantine and Benard 2001). The study will only look at internal variables of resilience or internal assets. Since all the youth live in the same environment, the assumption of the study is that all the participants are equally affected by the same external factors such as schooling, neighborhood, economic living conditions, and cultural background.
only difference between both groups will be that one group participated in the Third Street Community Center after-school program, while the other did not. Additionally, the study will not evaluate the after-school program at the Third Street Community Center nor will it measure any academic changes among participants.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Immigrant Issues

Population growth in the United States between 1990 and 2000 has been dominated by new immigrants and their children (Izyumov et al. 2002). They have accounted for 50.4 percent of the total increase in the U.S. population, and according to Izyumov et al. (2002), if you consider children born in the U.S. of pre-1990 new immigrants, the growth is 70 percent (20). In their analysis, less educated immigrants tend to migrate into enclaves: “studies that focus on the location choice of immigrants from different countries found that less educated immigrants tend to settle closer to their countrymen, whereas the better educated tend to disperse more widely because they don’t need the ‘safety nets’” (21).

Resilience and Success

Benard et al. (2001) point out that there have been multiple studies that indicate children who tend to succeed have certain protective factors which allow them to bounce back from crisis. These protective factors are also known as resilience. Unfortunately, past efforts to minimize failures among children from marginalized communities have focused on at-risk factors. A tie has been made between the failure of children and the number of risk factors that are associated with their living environment. However, current literature has attacked the concept of “at-risk children,” and Benard et al. (2001) have several arguments against the concept of at-risk. First, they argue that there are so many factors that may be tied to failure that it has been impossible to find models that will actually assist communities. A second argument for program failures of those assisting “at-risk” communities is that funding sources are tied to particular risk factors, which limits their flexibility in adjusting to changes in risk factors. Third, risk-based programs maintain a historical view of marginalized communities found around urban centers (7). Benard et al. (2001) have suggested that educational programs assist children to overcome negative circumstances. Resources should be devoted to preserving childrens’ ability to bounce back from obstacles such as poverty,
overcrowded living conditions, failing schools, unsafe neighborhoods, and unhealthy living environments (9).

Why do some children survive in the most adverse conditions? There has been an increased focus on the failings of the urban environments and inner-city schools. This focus has limited the examination of success among certain children. The study of resilience provides an important opportunity for discussing attributes of families, students, peers, schools, and communities that foster resilience in inner cities (Freiberg 1994). The construct of “resilience” emerged from the discipline of psychopathology. Constructs such as vulnerability, protective factors, adaptation, and competence provide the conceptual tools for understanding the factors that enable individuals to overcome adversity and challenges (Wang et al. 1994).

Much of the research on resiliency is based on two longitudinal studies: High School and Beyond and the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (Peng 1994). Both of the studies have provided useful comprehensive data for exploring various constructs of resilience and have been helpful in identifying factors that foster resilience (76). In analyzing the data, Peng found that low Socio-Economic Status (SES) was a major factor in determining students with a higher likelihood of obtaining low academic achievement and higher dropout rates (78). Additionally, students from low SES might live in environments with limited resources, adding to their challenges and difficulties. According to Peng, some students with such backgrounds still performed well in school and were found to have higher resilience (78). But Taylor (1994) adds that economic hardship may also affect a child’s ability to form healthy relationships with peers (121).

There are issues with social reality that resilience does not consider. Bartelt (1994) found that resilience is a term that is externally applied by observers to a series of actions and outcomes. The concept of resilience is a set of subjectively defined goals, aspirations, and barriers (102). The constant focus on developing resilient children might take away from the understanding of how some inner-city schools and environments became so deteriorated. Luthar and Goldstein (2004) conclude that if children are constantly assaulted by their external environment, regardless of how much they are helped to believe in themselves, they will simply not be able to adapt over time (503). More specifically, Taylor et al. (2003) found little evidence to support the relationships between risk and protective factors and resiliency processes on substance use among adolescent detainees, specifically adolescent Hispanic detainees (51). In Taylor’s et al. study, they looked at whether resiliency processes or constructs differ as a function of the level of risk or protective factors in a youth’s life. Even though their results were inconclu-
sive, Taylor et al. found that resilience is a phenomenon that differs across age, gender, and ethnicity (62).

Joseph (1994) defines resilience as “attitudes, coping behaviors, and personal strength that you see in people who manage adversity and adjust well to the changes demanded of them by their life circumstance” (25). Based on Joseph’s research, resilient children share four central characteristics: 1) they take a proactive approach to problem solving; 2) they are able to interpret experiences in positive ways; 3) they are good natured and tend to develop positive relationships with adults; and 4) they have a basic belief that life makes sense and that one has control over what happens (29).

Based on Werner’s (1989) research, Benard (2001) found that there are three main protective factors “that aid vulnerable children to develop well into adulthood: 1) dispositional attributes of the individual…, 2) affection ties within the family that provide emotional support in times of crisis…, 3) external support systems…that reward the individual’s competencies and determination and that provide a belief system by which to live” (16). Based on Joseph’s and Benard’s findings, one may deduct that children need a safe environment where their positive assets may be built upon and rewarded, and where they may develop healthy relationships with adults other than their family members.

Fletcher and Padover (2003) have found that although there are variations based on local needs and interest, after school programs share a common purpose: to provide a safe, positive environment for children and youth during hours they are most at risk; help students raise academic performance and strengthen social skills; and build community partnerships that strengthen the program quality.

**After School Programs**

Oden (1995) states that across socioeconomic, regional, and ethical back-grounds youth are increasingly at risk for various negative outcomes, such as low-achievement, low skills, delinquency, or substance abuse. Youth programs may be places for young people to gain skills that may negate the many negative influences in their social environment (173). Oden finds that there may be evidence that the greater participation by youth in clubs and organizations is beneficial to their academic success and overall development. After-school programs also “provide a safe, supervised place for youth to participate in academic and enrichment activities and form positive relationships with peers and adults” (Lumsden 2003, 3). Although after-school programs have been found to assist students with meeting academic and emotional needs, most research has been plagued with methodological prob-
lems (Perkins 2003). Additionally, the quality of after-school programs varies greatly (Lumsden 2003). Clearly more quality research is needed to identify the effectiveness of after-school programs and to identify factors that maintain high-quality programs.

Chapter 3: Methodology

Survey Design

The proposed static group comparison will use a survey from a sample of sixth and seventh graders to measure resilience levels among children who have participated for at least two years in the Third Street Community Center after-school program (Creswell 2003).

The Population and Sample

The sample will consist of youth between the ages of eleven and twelve who meet the following factors: economically challenged based on participation in the free lunch program, tested below the 50 percent national percentile rank in CAT/6, and are children of new immigrant-monolingual parents.

Participants in the study will be identified by the neighborhood middle school which serves the children within the study area and the Third Street Community Center. Through school records, all students who meet the above mentioned factors will be identified. The control group will be randomly selected from the population of students who fulfilled the initial test, while the study sample will be randomly selected from the community center records (See Table 3.1).

Once the sample of participants has been identified, an introduction letter will be written to parents in Spanish. The letter will request permission to allow students to participate in the survey and will also ask parents to choose from a series of days and times when students may take surveys at the Third Street Community Center. Introduction letters will be followed by a telephone call to secure participation in the survey. Students who are unable to participate because of time conflicts or transportation issues will be asked if the survey may be delivered by appointment.
Table 3.1 Population and Sample

Population- All 6th and 7th Graders
- Scored below 50% in CAT/6 in 2002
- Qualify for reduced or free-lunch
- Children of new immigrant Latino parents

A=Study Group
Third Street Community Center After-School Program Participants
- At least two years

B=Control Group
Non-Participants or Participants less than one year

Instrument

The survey to be used in this study is part of the Healthy Kids Resiliency Assessment (HKRA) (See Attachment I). It is an optional module of the California Healthy Kids Survey intended for use in California middle schools. This module is intended to serve as a toll for local and state educational agencies to assess external and internal resilience assets. The module postulates that protective factors are among the primary determinants of resilience traits (Constantine and Benard 2001). My study will only use the questions that deal with assessing the internal factors or resilient traits (See Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Resilience Constructs


Variables in Study

Each of the six independent variables has three equally weighted questions (See Attachment 1). For each question participants will be asked to choose from four separate options. The options are: 1) not at all true, 2) a little true, 3) pretty much true, and 4) very much true. Each option will be scored between 1 and 4, where “not at all true” equals 1 and “very much true” equals 4. The dependent variable or individual’s resilience score will be the summation of each of the independent variables’ average. Each participant will be separated by the control question. Those who participated in the program two or more years will be part of the Study Group, while those who have not participated or been in the program less than a year will be placed in the Control Group (See Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Study Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Research Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation and Communication</td>
<td>Average score between questions 8, 13, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>Average score between questions 6, 7, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Average score between question 10, 11, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Solving</td>
<td>Average score between question 4, 5, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-awareness</td>
<td>Average score between question 16, 17, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Aspirations</td>
<td>Average score between question 1, 2, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent Variable**

Resilience                           Summation of all independent variables

**Control Variable**

Number of participating years         Groups will be separated based on number of years youth participated in the after-school program. Greater than two years will be part of study sample.

**Data Analysis**

Each survey will be numbered and scores will be entered into an Excel spreadsheet. The two groups will be separated based on the control variable. Using a two independent-sample t-test, an analysis of any differences in the mean between both groups will be made. The analysis of the data will report any statistical difference in resiliency levels among both groups and provide recommendations for further research. If there is a significant difference in resiliency levels among the study group, it might be important to evaluate each part of the after-school program to identify factors that aided the students. Further research may be needed to show how "successful" those children will become in the future. In part, research may show how effective the use of resilience as a construct to measure success in youth development.
among inner-city youth from low-socio-economic status in new immigrant communities.

References


Madrigal, Sandra. (November 2004). Interview with Third Street Center’s Executive Director.


Attachment I- Survey Questions

How true do you feel these statements are about you personally?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not At All True</th>
<th>A Little True</th>
<th>Pretty Much True</th>
<th>Very Much True</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I have goals and plans for the future.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I plan to graduate from high school.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I plan to go to college or some other school after high school.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I know where to go for help with a problem.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>I try to work out problems by talking or writing about them.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>I can work out my problems.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I can do most things if I try.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I can work with someone who has different opinions than mine.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>There are many things that I do well.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>I feel bad when someone gets their feelings hurt.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I try to understand what other people go through.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>When I need help, I find someone to talk with.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I enjoy working together with other students my age.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>I stand up for myself without putting others down.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>I try to understand how other people feel and think.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>There is a purpose to my life.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>I understand my moods and feelings.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>I understand why I do what I do.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
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# Attachment II - Time Line

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<td>1</td>
<td>Recruit committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Proposed study subject to committee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Receive approval from committee to design study</td>
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<td>Design study</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Chapter 1- Intro, problem statement, guiding research statement, limitations</td>
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<td>Chapter 2 - Lit. Review</td>
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<td>Chapter 3 - Methods</td>
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<td>Meet with committee</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Receive approval from Human Subject Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Conduct Research</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Work with school and after-school program - obtain support from principals, superintendent, center’s executive director</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Obtain Parents’ Consent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Arrange survey arrangements: location, times, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Conduct survey and make-ups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Update committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Crunch raw data</td>
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<td>Analyze raw data</td>
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<td>Update committee</td>
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The Whiteman’s Burden Or The Survival Of The Whiteman?

By Maro Lee

Introduction

In conjunction with Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*, Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* not only became an instant bestseller but also a seminal work that spawned enormous controversy and scholarly debate. The book has been hailed as valiant in its attempt, dazzling and grand in its scope, and truly visionary; it has not only depicted the state of international affairs most accurately but, more importantly, contained a germ of truth that could very well shape the future of the world. As part of the excruciating scholarly effort to map out and comprehend the emerging new world order in a post-Cold War era, Huntington hypothesized that:

The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington 1993).

This paper intends to offer a two-fold critique of Samuel Huntington’s hypothesis. The first part of the critique will examine Huntington’s theoretical assumptions in which he argues civilizations defined by cultural values are the basis of the new world order. The second part of the critique will explore the normative implication of Huntington’s hypothesis. In conclusion, this paper will argue that Huntington’s hypothesis fails to validate itself due to its inadequate theoretical assumptions of reductionism and superfluous ideological implication. Simply put, Huntington draws the wrong conclusion from his own insights due to his own ideological agenda.
Part I: Theoretical Assumptions of the Clash Civilizations

Samuel Huntington’s hypothesis of the clash of civilization is presented with four theoretical assumptions and a normative argument, which are all based on the notion of civilizational identities. The five parts of Huntington’s argument are:

First, for the first time in history a truly multipolar and multicivilizational order has emerged; modernization is clearly distinct from Westernization. Second, the once dominant power of the West is declining in relative influence. Third, a civilizational-based world order is emerging. Fourth, the West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China. Fifth, the survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies (1996, 20-21).

The theoretical approach of Huntington’s hypothesis begins with an assertion that the endurance and resiliency of certain sets of core cultural values form the basis of all civilizations. These core cultural values are the defining mark of civilizations and form the essence and identity of a given group or nation states. Whether they are imposed forcefully or chosen and adhered to freely, according to Huntington, it is this core of cultural values that separates an American from a Lebanese, an Indonesian from a South African, and so forth. Namely, all civilizations are monumental achievements and expressions of cultural values. In Huntington’s own words, “A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” (Huntington 1996, 41). Huntington continues that “civilizations are mortal but also very long-lived; they evolve, adapt, and are the most enduring of human associations” (Huntington 1996, 41). Therefore, civilization, defined by core cultural values, is the final and definitive mark of distinction of societies in the world.

Hence, Huntington hypothesizes that the end of the Cold War, which had divided the world along ideological lines, ushered in a new age in which the nation states of the world were identifying themselves through their cultural heritage and values expressed in civilizational terms. The past several centuries of political and economic domination of the West over other civili-
zations is being rapidly replaced by a new order of multipolar and multicivilizational system (Huntington 1996, 53). Huntington argues that “nation states will remain the principal actors in world affairs,” but because “values, culture, and institutions pervasively influence how states define their interests,” the world order will be characterized by cultural and civilizational conflicts (Huntington 1996, 34). Simply put, different core cultural values define different civilizations. Because these core cultural values are not easily abandoned, evidenced by their continued existence that contributes to the sustenance of respective civilizations, these values will contribute to civilizational conflict. As Huntington says, “people define their identity by what they are not” (Huntington 1996, 37).

Part II: Modernization and Westernization

As modernization is typically characterized by industrialization, technology, scientific worldview, urbanization, secularization, and so forth, many scholars have argued that the West, which has led the process of modernization, has dominated and transformed the world into its own image through expansionism and imperialism. Therefore, these scholars, such as Francis Fukuyama, effectively conclude that the world has been remade by the West and is subsequently following the footsteps and experience of the West. It is argued that the irreversible domination and influence left by the West has in effect created a truly global age of modernity, that is to say a “universal” civilization. The “universal” ideals, aspirations, and worldview of the Enlightenment, which contributed to modernization, were disseminated around the world through Western imperialism. Many contend that the force of modernization has virtually created a universal civilization based on the Western experience and model.

Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilization, however, specifically denies the existence of a “universal” civilization. The remarkable resiliency and creativity of non-Western civilizations, which survived Western imperialism, have led Huntington to conclude that the belief in the universal ideals of the Enlightenment and the notion of progress may have been applicable to the West alone. Neither the legacy of Western imperialism nor modernization has created a “meaningful” or “universal” civilization (Huntington 1996, 58). This is because, Huntington argues, civilizations remain inherently different, self-contained, and mutually exclusive due to their respective cultural values (Huntington 1996, 58). The legacy of Western imperialism has not led to Westernization of non-Western civilizations but led to a particular phenomenon in which non-Western civilizations have managed to separate Westernization from modernization.
Huntington bases his thesis on his observation in which the increasing conflict and opposition of the non-Western nation states against the West can be understood in terms of different cultural values. According to Huntington, this phenomenon can be most adequately understood in terms of the distinction between modernization and Westernization. Undoubtedly, modernization, but most notably industrialization, helped the West to gain an extraordinary advantage over other civilizations in terms of technology and wealth, both of which furnished the West’s military superiority. Huntington argues that the overwhelming dominance of the West over other civilizations was not due to “the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence” (Huntington 1996, 51). However, this is clearly no longer the case as the resiliency and creativity of non-Western civilizations has enabled them to reject the imposition of not only Western political and economic domination but, most importantly, Western values. Various non-Western societies have rapidly achieved modernization while rejecting fundamental Western values and creatively reinvented new political and economic institutions, which are more in line with their cultural values. Hence, Huntington effectively concludes that the arguments and assumptions for a universal civilization are misguided and false. The modern civilization, which arose out of the West, has not led to Westernization or universalization of other civilizations. There may be a relatively consensual “modern” worldview shared by the world, but the resemblance acquired through modernization is limited and does not alter any of the individual civilization’s core cultural values. Consequently, the major civilizations may resemble one another in their modernity but they still remain distinctly different due to different cultural values.

**Part III: The West**

Interestingly enough, Huntington does acknowledge certain cultural fads based on the Western consumption pattern have been spread and accepted around the world. However, he makes the explicit claim that these cultural fads are meaningless and only “trivialize” Western civilization for “the essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac” (Huntington 1996, 58). In other words, popular culture born out of capitalism does not reflect Western values but rather Western taste, which has very little political, economic, and social implications. Hence, as non-Western civilizations successfully separate modernization and Westernization, Huntington examines the place of the West in a multicivilizational world order.
According to Huntington, because there are certain values of the West that are qualitatively distinct from all the other civilizations, the West is peculiar; to regard modern civilization as Western Civilization or vice versa is a “totally false identification.” In other words, Western characteristics are not just modern characteristics. What is Western is different from what is modern. He argues, “the West was the West long before it was modern. The central characteristics of the West, those which distinguish it from other civilizations, antedate the modernization of the West (Huntington 1996, 69). These core historical characteristics of the West are:

*The Classical legacy:* these include Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin, and Christianity. *Catholicism and Protestantism:* also known as Western Christianity, form the single most important characteristics of the West. *European languages:* unlike most other civilizations, the West developed a multiplicity of languages. *Separation of spiritual and temporal authority:* this notion of separation of God and Ceasar has been a prevailing dualism in the Western culture. *Rule of law:* this has led to constitutionalism, protection of human and property rights against arbitrary powers. *Social pluralism:* this helped to limit the extent to which absolutism was able to take firm in European nations. *Representative bodies:* this provided a vehicle for expanded political participation. *Individualism:* this is the consummate cultural product of many of the above unique features of the West, which contributed to the idea of individual rights and liberties (Huntington 1996, 69-72).

For Huntington, it is the above historical experiences and beliefs that distinguish the West from the rest, but more importantly it is imperative to recognize that they are uniquely Western and not found elsewhere. Therefore, the world may become modern but it will not be Western. Huntington also claims that to equate Westernization with modernization and, therefore, universalization, is not only ethnocentric but has a disrupting effect in a multicivilizational world order. This is because “the non-West sees as Western what the West sees as universal. What Westerns herald as benign global integration, such as the proliferation of worldwide media, non-Westerners denounce as nefarious Western imperialism. To the extent that non-Westerners see the world as one, they see it as a threat” (Huntington 1966, 66). In short, Huntington concludes that what is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest. This conclusion led Huntington to reject the old eurocentric dichotomy of viewing the world as “East” and “West.” Since a truly multicivilizational world order has emerged, Huntington opts for a new concept, “the West and the rest,” which takes into account the unique historical legacy and
cultural values of the West and the existence of all the other civilizations. According to Huntington, “the world is in some sense two, but the central distinction is between the West as the hitherto dominant civilization and all the others which, however, have little if anything in common among them. The world, in short, is divided between a Western one and a non-Western many” (Huntington 1996, 36).

Part IV: What Is the West to Do?

In a newly emerged multculturalizational world system, Huntington cautions the West to abandon its promotion and belief in the universality of Western culture for it is not only false but also dangerous because, “the West no longer has the economic or demographic dynamism required to impose its will on other societies” (Huntington 1996, 310). Thus, a more prudent goal of preserving the unique values and institutions of the West is advised. Huntington asserts that the values and institutions of the West are qualitatively unique and must be preserved. He claims that:

All civilizations go through processes of emergence, rise, and decline. The West differs from other civilizations not in the way it has developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies. In their ensemble these characteristics are peculiar to the West. They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it is unique (Huntington 1996, 311).

Huntington argues that it is time for the West to concentrate on its own survival in order to preserve its existence and unique cultural values. To preserve the West, Huntington assigns a critical role for America, which must reaffirm its Western cultural heritage and insure the survival of the West against both external and internal challenges. Huntington observes that while Islam and China, which “embody great cultural traditions very different from and in their eyes infinitely superior to that of the West,” present the external challenge, the internal challenge will come from American multiculturalists, who reject the dominant Western cultural heritage of the United States” (Huntington 1996, 185-307). Hence, it is imperative that America serve the role of the vanguard and defender of the West and its unique cultural values. Should America fail to do so it would result in:
The end of the United States of America as we know it. It also means effectively the end of Western civilization. If the United States is de-Westernized, the West is reduced to Europe and a few lightly populated overseas European settler countries. Without the United States the West becomes a minuscule and declining part of the world's population on a small and inconsequential peninsula at the extremity of the Eurasian land mass (Huntington 1996, 307).

Huntington concludes that once America takes up the role as the core of the West, only then can the West insure its survival and play a meaningful part in the new multicivilizational world system. Thus, Huntington concludes his book with a normative argument in which he contends that international stability and peace is predicated upon a mutual cooperation between the core countries of different civilizations. He concludes, “peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 320). Because “in the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war” (Huntington 1996, 320).

Critique of the Clash on Civilizations

Critique of Part I

Overall, one cannot help but feel that Huntington’s division of the world into various civilizations turns out to be homage paid to the past—perhaps a past when it was much easier to divide the world along religious, racial, ethnic, and these so-called “cultural” lines. In fact, it seems to be the case that Huntington has not really depicted the state of international affairs, but rather envisioned the type of world order he wishes to see. In other words, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* is essentially a work of ideology with a clearly defined normative argument rather than a work of political science. Huntington’s hypothesis is really a thesis heavily laden with an ideological worldview. He assumes the qualitative uniqueness of Western “cultural” values and proceeds to divide the world into various civilizations whose differences result from different cultural values. The result of this theoretical assumption is reductionism in which Huntington’s civilizations are neatly defined and reduced to a small set of “cultural” values. Moreover, in Huntington’s world order, the role of nation states are reduced to something like a group of clans that must choose sides.
wisely in order to survive the ultimate worldwide tribal warfare.

Hence, it appears that Huntington has overestimated and overgeneralized the potency of these “cultural values.” Cultural values do exist and they do distinguish one society from another, but they are not paramount to the extent that they dictate the interests of nation states.

Critique of Part II

Huntington’s distinction between modernization and Westernization is a sine qua non for his argument. This is because the clash of civilizations results from the clash of core cultural values that define different civilizations. Therefore, it becomes imperative that Huntington demonstrate how the unifying force of modernization has not brought the world together but only served to separate it, which must be attributed to the difference of cultural values.

Nevertheless, Huntington is correct in saying that modernization is distinct from Westernization and it is true that non-Western civilizations are reaffirming their own cultural values. However, this is a natural and logical phenomenon given the historical fact that most of the non-Western civilizations were under the dominance of Western imperialism, and shortly after that the ideological dominance of the Cold War. Indeed, as Huntington argues, for the first time in history all the nation states in the world are relatively free enough to affirm or choose their own identity and cultural values.

From the perspective of non-Western civilizations, the phenomenon of separating modernization from Westernization can be understood as an attempt to reorganize and modernize one’s society without the intrusion of foreign rule. For most of the non-Western civilizations, the process of modernization was never voluntarily accepted, internalized, and developed. Modernization arrived with imperialism and together they imposed a foreign rule that disrupted every aspect of the respective indigenous cultures. Thus, modernization was a brutal invasion along with imperialism that robbed most of the non-Western civilizations’ sense of tradition, identity, and most importantly, sovereignty. In response to this onslaught of imperialism and modernization, some have collectively identified these forces as inherently of “the West” and rejected them in futility, while some have viewed modernization as the source of the West’s military power and wealth.

In an effort to understand modernization and recover one’s sense of sovereignty, numbers of Islamic nations have rejected what they perceived to be “Western” values, particularly those that were judged to be consequences of secular worldview. However, they have accepted technology as worthy of their attention. Whereas many other non-Western civilizations, most nota-
bly countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, wholeheartedly adopted the political, economic, and social institutions and practices of “the West” while struggling to maintain some of their own cultural values and practices. In either case, most non-Western civilizations have clearly perceived modernization as the source of the West’s domination and hurried to modernize their societies in hopes of never succumbing to another foreign rule. Hence, for many non-Western civilizations, modernization was launched with a dual and yet clear objective of learning from the West but not necessarily becoming the West.

In contrast to these experiences, the modernization process in the West was carried out quite differently. While the process of modernization was just as disruptive, tumultuous, and simultaneously destructive yet creative in “the West,” it was still carried out voluntarily without any intrusion of foreign rule. Therefore, the entire process of modernization, which led to various political, economic, and social changes, was nonetheless accepted as something of an indigenous progress. However, it is critically important to recognize that the force of modernization brought about an irreversible transformation in “the West” as it did in the non-Western civilizations, a change so dramatic that the society before and after modernization could not be regarded as the same. A cultural sense of continuity was better maintained in the West than it was among non-Western civilizations. During the age of imperialism, “modernization” and “Westernization” became virtually a synonymous term.

Thus, the separation of modernization from Westernization among non-Western civilizations observed by Huntington is actually an attempt to strengthen, recover, and reinvent the lost sense of continuity, tradition, and identity by the non-Western people. What Huntington observes as the reaffirmation of one’s cultural values among non-Western people is really an impulse of nationalism in which politics of identity, self-determination, and progress are all blended. In short, it is a process of not only shaping one’s identity but also coping with the powerful impact of modernization.

**Critique of Part III**

Perhaps even more fundamentally flawed than Huntington’s theoretical assumption is the paradigm of his worldview. Unfortunately, Huntington’s thesis of the emerging multicivilizational world order based on the concept of “the West and the rest” or “the West versus the rest” has not escaped the old Eurocentric paradigm of “the East and the West.” Notwithstanding his concession that the label “the West” is inappropriate, Huntington’s thesis is still heavily reliant on the problematic worldview in which “the West” is
treated and singled out as a unique entity in a class by itself. With such an assertion, it only becomes natural that all the other civilizations, no matter how different they are from each other and by virtue of not being “the West,” must be simply lumped together as “the rest.” As a result, without clearly defining what precisely the “West” is, Huntington’s usage of the term and subsequent worldview reveals its ideological orientation and normative concern in which he calls for America to declare itself the vanguard of “the West.”

Rudyard Kipling’s *Ballad of East and West* has often been regarded as one of the most articulate expression of Western imperialism and Eurocentrism:

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgement Seat.
But there is neither East nor West, Border, Breed nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the Earth (Davies 1996, 17).

As the first verse of Ballad of East and West reveals the stark and qualitative difference and the inevitable clash between the East and the West, one has to wonder how different is Huntington’s worldview from Kipling’s. Is there really a significant shift of intellectual paradigm from “the East and the West” to “the West and the rest?” As long as the entity called “the West” is regarded as exceptional and qualitatively different, what use is there in distinguishing “the East” as a single entity from the collective group of multiple entities known as the “the rest?” This immediately leads one to question the definition of “the West.” Interestingly, according to Huntington, the identification of “the West” “lifts the civilization out of its historical, geographical, and cultural context” and suffers from serious disabilities, however, “at some level, ‘the West’ is an entity” (Huntington 1996, 47). From this, one is forced to conclude that Huntington’s notion of “the West” is essentially an ideological entity, which gives rise to a worldview such as “the West and the rest.” Incidentally, the notion of Western civilization or the “West” is an intellectual device utilized by scholars with unscholarly agendas. European historian Norman Davies articulated the problem of using the notion of “the West” in *Europe: A History*:

It appears that Western civilization is essentially an amalgam of intellectual constructs which were designed to further the interests of their authors. It is the product of complex exercises in ideology, of countless identity trips, of sophisticated essays in cultural propaganda. It can be
defined by its advocates in almost any way that they think fit. Its elas-
tic geography has been inspired by the distribution of religions, by the
demands of liberalism and of imperialism, by the unequal progress of
modernization, by the divisive effects of world wars and of the Russian
Revolution, and by the self-centered visions of French *philosophes*, of
Prussian historians, and of British and American statesmen and educa-
tors, all of whom have had their reasons to neglect or to despise ‘the
East’. In its latest phase it has been immensely strengthened by the
physical divisions of Europe, which lasted from 1947-8 to 1991. On the
brink of the twenty-first century, one is entitled to ask in whose inter-
ests it may be used in the future (Davies 1996, 25).

This problematic definition of “the West” is visible in Huntington’s own work
as he describes certain characteristics of “the West,” but does not clearly
define who is part of the West. Throughout his book, quaint terms such as
“Western Christendom,” “Latin Christianity,” “European civilization,” and the
relatively contemporary labels such as “Western civilization” or “the West”
and, finally, the “European Union” are all used interchangeably without much
distinction. Indeed, the entity called “the West” cannot be adequately defined
through race, ethnicity, geography, nationality, religion, or even history
because it is defined by the interests of those who wish to have a qualita-
tively self-contained, unique, and exclusionary entity. Huntington is guilty of
this tendency.

Huntington’s inadequate conceptualization and use of the term “the
West” can be demonstrated as one uses his characteristics of “the West” in
order to determine who is indeed part of “the West.” Immediately one will
discover that Huntington’s idea of “the West” is rather arbitrary and fraught
with all kinds of inconsistency. According to Huntington’s definition, it
appears to be the case that certain countries are naturally of “the West” while
some countries could become part of “the West,” and others could never
become “the West.” For example, as a thoroughly modernized and industri-
alized economic power, Japan is a country that adheres to and practices
just about all the supposed unique values of “the West.” Liberal democracy,
capitalism, rule of law, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, and
even individualism, as private property and individual rights are protected
by the constitution, are adhered to and practiced in Japan. But, according to
Huntington, Japan is not part of “the West.” Perhaps the fact that the Japanese
are not Europeans and Christianity has never been a major influence is
enough to exclude Japan from being part of “the West.” The ancient civiliza-
tion and intellectual tradition of Greece is literally the foundation of “the
West” and yet Greece is not part of “the West.” An even more compelling case can be made for many Latin American countries, whose cultural heritage, worldview, religion, and language are brought from “the West,” yet they are not part of “the West.” Perhaps the struggling economy and political history of fascism and authoritarianism, both of which originated from “the West,” disqualifies them from being part of “the West.”

Thus, when all things are considered in trying to determine who belongs to “the West,” one discovers that “the West” has been treated as if it is an exclusive and privileged club that one can join only if one meets certain qualifications. Even more problematic is the fact that these qualifications are unclear and arbitrary. It is difficult to see whether Huntington seeks to avoid, or even recognizes, this problem. He treats “the West” as a unique entity with certain qualifications, which is clearly demonstrated in Huntington’s classification of the major civilizations. This classification system turns out to be an excessive generalization at the expense of a wide range of exceptions and diversity of cultures and nation states.

Critique of Part IV

There is no doubt that liberal democracy, capitalism, science, individualism, and rule of law may all be described as institutions and values that have originated from “the West.” However, it does not follow that they are utterly incomprehensible or impossible for non-Western civilizations to practice. In other words, to claim the origin of certain truth or values is one thing but to claim those uniquely your own to the extent of claiming that others are incapable of seeing those truths and values is simply absurd. Huntington makes an implicit claim that these unique values and institutions of “the West” only belong to “the West.” To be sure, Huntington does not make this claim explicitly, but there is just no other implication to draw from his thesis in which he claims that different cultural values result in different civilizations, and these values will lead to civilizational clashes. In fact, Huntington’s call for the survival of “the West,” in order to protect these unique Western values and institutions, can only be made on the premise that these values are absolutely rejected or incomprehensible to non-Western civilizations. However, nothing can be further from truth than Huntington’s claim as it is difficult to deny the spread and impact of liberal democracy, capitalism and, human rights among non-Western civilizations.

Huntington’s unique conceptualization of “the West” fits Davies’ description of those scholars who with to further ideological and cultural propaganda. In Huntington’s case, his ideological and cultural agenda are the survival of “the West” and the absolute uniqueness of its values, which are suppos-
edly hated by the rest of the world. Hence, Huntington’s logic dictates that because Islamic and Chinese civilizations are opposed to the values and institutions of “the West,” they will challenge and threaten “the West.” This is likely to happen because of the inherently different cultural values. For example, Huntington claims that the values most revered in “the West”—particularly the notion of individualism, which is expressed in terms of self-determination, liberty, and human rights—are rejected and hated the most by non-Western civilizations” (Huntington 1996, 72). Hence, the values, institutions, and the very existence of “the West” are at stake and America must defend these unique Western values. This conclusion is rather fatalistic and clearly reveals Huntington’s real concern, which is his need to assert the uniqueness of the values and institutions of “the West.” Edward W. Said is correct in criticizing Huntington for being an ideologist:

Someone who wants to make “civilizations” and “identities” into what they are not: shut-down, sealed off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing. This far less visible history is ignored in the rush to highlight the ludicrously compressed and constricted warfare that “the clash of civilizations” argues is the reality (Said 2001).

Moreover, even if one were to accept, in spite of its elusiveness, Huntington’s notion of “the West” and its unique values and institutions, his capriciously selected and chosen characteristics of “the West” are still problematic. Namely, Huntington selectively ascribes certain positive values and institutions to “the West” and ignores other values and institutions that originated from “the West.” Somehow, Huntington has conveniently forgotten the fact that “the West” has not only produced values of liberal democracy, capitalism, and individualism, but also produced the most malignant and vicious forms of values and institutions as well. Interestingly enough, Huntington does recognizes this fact and claims that:

The great political ideologies of the twentieth century include liberalism, socialism, anarchism, corporatism, Marxism, communism, social democracy, conservatism, nationalism, fascism, and Christian democracy. They all share one thing in common: they are products of Western civilization (Huntington 1996, 51).

It seems Huntington does not feel the need to explain how the unique insti-
tutions and values of “the West” also produced totalitarianism of all sorts. Nazism, fascism, and communism are all Western ideologies that specifically reject individualism, human rights, liberty, and particularly the notion of individual rights vis-a-vis the state. How is it that liberal democracy, capitalism, and human rights, which stem from individualism, are unique values of “the West” and totalitarian Nazism, fascism, and communism, which are based on collectivism and rejects individualism, are not unique values of “the West?” If one were to follow the logical conclusion of Huntington’s argument, Huntington’s call for America to defend “the West,” because of its unique values and institutions, becomes a rather bizarre and horrifying call. It obliges that America must come to the aid of any totalitarian, fascist regimes simply because these values are uniquely representative of “the West.”

It is evident that Huntington’s claim for the uniqueness of the values and institutions of “the West” is based on a highly prejudiced and selective standard which renders his argument to be ideological rather than a balanced scholarly presentation. There is no doubt that the legacy of the West in the modern world is pervasive. It would be silly to deny the worldwide transformation brought by the values and institutions of the West. While many of the Western values and institutions contributed enormously to the overall improvement of the conditions of humanity, it is also a fact that those very same values produced unprecedented mass destruction and horrific ideologies and institutions.

This prejudice and selective standard becomes particularly apparent in Huntington’s discussion on Islam as he claims that Muslims are convinced of their cultural superiority, and the problem of Islam is not its vicious form of fundamentalism but Islam itself (Huntington 1996, 212). To support this, Huntington points out the fact that many of the young Muslims who convert to Islamic fundamentalism have been thoroughly modernized but definitely not Westernized; Muslim fundamentalists are against not what is modern, but what is Western (Huntington 1996, 113). Indeed, this is a curious observation by Huntington and it would be easier to blame the peculiarity of Islam for its virulent form of fundamentalism. However, when one examines the intellectual lineage of Islamic fundamentalism as a revolutionary political ideology, one finds an interesting and unexpected source. In *Terror and Liberalism*, Paul Berman analyzes and traces the source of Islamic fundamentalism. Berman argues that:

Somebody who shared Ramadan’s or Huntington’s view of Western civilization might suppose that European and Christian traditions and legacies could not possibly spread into the Muslim world. For the myth of
Prometheus is not a Muslim myth, as Ramadan reminds us, and St. John’s Revelation was not Mohammad’s. Then again, during its five hundred years of world domination, Europe did succeed in exporting innumerable customs and ideas to every corner of the globe; and, having exported everything else, why should Europe have been unable to export its spirit of self-destruction, too? (Berman 2003, 252)

According to Berman, the most prominent and menacing political ideologies of the Middle East, such as the secular Pan-Arabism or Baathism, and Islamic fundamentalism, not only share alarming resemblance with European totalitarian fascism but also found intellectual inspiration from these “unique” Western ideas. As many of the early leaders of Baathism greatly admired Nazism and its racist ideology—while its most notorious figure, Saddam Hussein, harbored deep admiration for Stalin—Berman argues that, “nothing about this combination was intrinsically Arab or Middle Eastern or ought to seem incomprehensible to Western observers” because this “idiosyncratic mix of extreme right and extreme left was precisely the formula that went into National Socialism and Mussolini’s Fascism” (Berman 2003, 55-56).

Berman contends that even the largely religious Islamic fundamentalism, which gave rise to the Muslim Brotherhood, found inspiration in Nazism as well. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the most influential thinker of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Outb, gain unintended attention due to his wayward disciple, Osama Bin Laden. This has led Berman to conclude that the secular Baathism and religious Islamic fundamentalism were “two branches of a single impulse, which was Muslim totalitarianism—the Muslim variation on the European idea” (Berman 2003, 60).

Thus, Berman claims that as Nazism, Fascism, and totalitarianism tried to overthrow what they considered to be a decadent and corrupt liberal civilization, in a similar vein, both Baathism and Islamic fundamentalism are expressions of hatred and contempt for the liberal civilization embodied in the West. If there were anyone to blame for the menacing existence for Saddam Huessin or Osama Bin Laden, it would have to be the West since it is the political and intellectual heir of the destructive values and institutions that were spawned in the West.

It is important to note that Berman’s analysis of Islam bears a stark contrast to Huntington’s. Both agree that Western liberal values and institutions are worth defending. However, while Huntington simply omits or chooses not to acknowledge the destructive legacy of the West, Berman confronts and admits the dark legacy of the West. For Huntington, ideologies, institutions, and values are inherently cultural—with the positive ones belonging to
the West only. For Berman, on the other hand, ideologies, institutions, identities, and cultural values are not confined to a particular kind of culture or civilization: they are adaptable and transmittable. Berman is able to come to his conclusions because he is aware that values and institutions do not belong inherently to a certain entity such as the West or Islam. Namely, values, institutions, and identities not only exist on their own but can also be freely manipulated, chosen, and adopted by anyone as they see fit.

**Conclusion**

Undoubtedly, cultural identities can be used as a powerful tool in politics, but they are not the ultimate determinant factor that decides the fate of a nation state. A simple and yet crucial economic interest is often enough for a nation state to not only change sides but also go through radical transformation of its own. The simple rule of realism dictates that a nation state will do whatever is necessary, as long as it is capable, to secure its national interests. There are numerous reasons and factors that contribute to the policy or even the identity of a nation state. Unless it is viciously exploited to the detriment of the nation state, cultural or national identity is only one among many factors that a nation state will consider in determining its own path. Plenty of precedents abound in history where a nation state launches a radically different path without being restrained by any set of cultural values or identities. The very identity of America began with an ideological new beginning that was a radical departure from where its own people came, and for the longest time the identity of Americans was built upon not being “European.” The rapid and efficient government-led modernization and industrialization in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan was made possible by the decision to abandon centuries-old traditions and cultural values in the name of progress and national security.

There is nothing wrong with picking and choosing one’s legacy in order to claim a certain identity or present a rosier picture of oneself. That is precisely what politicians do: it is a craft that they must master. But if this is done as a scholarly endeavor then it becomes seriously problematic. It means a scholarly observation has become scholarly propaganda. Unfortunately, Huntington seems to have fallen into this trap in which his keen observation on the enduring significance of cultural values has led to a strange conclusion of promoting the qualitative difference of the West and the dire need for its survival. While Huntington’s initial observation is worth noting, his subsequent conclusion results in viewing cultural values as the ultimate and definitive factor that determines not only the identity, but also
the fate of any given nation state. Different civilizations exist and different cultural values exist as well, but no societies or nation states are condemned to a certain type of worldview or institution because of their cultural values

References


The Sustainability of the Future

By Adam J. Walter

Based on my current understanding of environmental conditions, I can begin to work toward the creation of a sustainable world economy through the following actions:

To face the crisis of the future we must rely on the wisdom of the past. By boycotting the system that is destroying the earth through its lack of ecological regard, we can hopefully stop the hemorrhaging before there’s nothing left for future generations. As we learned in the last two elections, while every vote is not counted, every dollar always is. So we must use our power as consumers to make this change happen, as the personal is political. By consuming less of everything, but living more, the movement begins and thrives within each one of us.

By changing the way we eat and grow our food back to the multi-cropping organic farms of our fore-fathers, relearning permaculture techniques and reducing our dependence on technology, buying locally grown organic produce from community supported agriculture and local cooperatives, we can strengthen relationships locally and benefit from reducing our dependency on transportation and the global economy. It can be cool and fun for the whole family!

Organizing our economies along more local levels must be at the forefront of geographical planning for future cities and the transformation of current ones. In the future, the possibility of environmental refugees will threaten our governments’ effectiveness and credibility if they are not able to deal with the environmental consequences their economic policies have created. The results could be catastrophic. The gap between the rich and the poor has never been so polarized, and the polar ice caps are melting. The recent barrage of hurricanes on Florida and the heat wave that killed hundreds in Europe last summer are direct results of the increased levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. Yet the current capitalist global economic system will only continue to compete ruthlessly for dwindling natural resources until all are exhausted or until economic collapse, without planning for the future transition, unless we can stop it. Again, tactics from the past are the key to success in the future.
Graffiti and positive propaganda that elevates the people's awareness of one's personal environmental impacts and simple actions that can be taken to change his or her behavior to be more sustainable should be and is already being made. Emphasis should be placed on the economic benefits for today and the future, as well as the environmental necessity for change, and should be widely distributed. Deprogramming people's minds from the doctrine of crass consumerism is the goal, and art of all types is the medium. Music of all genres, magazines, documentaries, and all other media should be used with guerilla tactics to raise awareness about the coming economic collapse. This will have a catalytic effect on the public consciousness and hopefully get people active in the movement for a sustainable world.

The movement for sustainability also must be redefined to include the workers rights and fair trade movements, stopping AIDS in Africa, the movement for clean energy, anti-globalization, and even the 9/11 truth movement. For all these movements, people are fighting for the same principles, and through cooperation, not competition, we can guarantee our future, and guarantee it will last.
Introduction

President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Wilderness Act (P.L. 88-577) into law in 1964 (Beach 2000). With its 40th anniversary approaching next year, the bill has garnered the reputation as the landmark piece of legislation for wild lands protection in the United States (Beach 2000). Its significance lies in its accomplishment of three major objectives. First, the Act established the National Wilderness Preservation System, which provides uniform protection for federally designated wilderness areas. In addition to this, its language set the parameters for defining wilderness and establishing which federal lands are eligible for the National Wilderness Preservation System (Hession 1967). Finally, although the Act did not mandate that Congress designate additional lands, it did provide for the process by which future acreage in the National Forests, Parks, and Wildlife Refuges, could be designated as wilderness (Frome 1984).

The successful passage of Wilderness Act represented eight years of legislative compromise (Irland 1979). The original bill was introduced in 1956 by preservationist interests who were attempting to capitalize on a successful campaign against the construction of the Echo Park Dam (Hession 1967). Industry groups, however, opposed the bill, contending that it contained provisions that would severely restrict their interests as rightful consumers of federal lands. Thus, the conflict over the bill pitted preservationist interests against the interests of those who wished to continue using federal lands as they had (Irland 1979).

In order to understand the root of the value conflict between the dominant interests associated with the Act, it is important to understand the historical emergence of the “wilderness” concept. From a historical perspective, the move towards wilderness protection can be seen as a logical progression for a society that, since the late 19th century, had experienced a burgeoning appreciation for nature as a whole (McConnell 1954). The election of President Theodore Roosevelt served as the catalyst that transformed this appreciation into a national conservation ethic (The Theodore Roosevelt Association 2000). Roosevelt’s rugged image, coupled with his creation of
five national parks while in office, helped to heighten public awareness of the nation’s wild heritage (The Theodore Roosevelt Association 2000). Preservationist groups, such as the Wilderness Society, used this heightened public awareness to mount campaigns that advocated for change in federal land management policy (Hession 1967). In short, they hoped to achieve a uniform level of federal protection for the nation’s wildlands, that would insure that this national heritage would remain intact and in pristine condition for future generations to enjoy.

The heaviest consumers of federal land, comprised mainly of large industry groups such as the National Lumber Manufacturers Association and the American Mining Congress, also viewed the public wildlands as part of the country’s national heritage (Irland 1979). For these industry groups, however, the cultural value lay in the central role the American wildlands played in building the nation’s wealth. From their perspective, the American wilderness was seen as a national resource from which it was necessary to draw in order to insure the future prosperity of the nation (Irland 1979).

The conflict in values that defined the two major interests involved with the Wilderness Act required that the bill be successively modified over multiple congressional sessions in order to reflect a more equitable balance between the preservationist and consumer interests (Watkins 1989). The final version of the Wilderness Act represented the necessary balance between these two interests in order for the bill to gain the required support to become a law (Watkins 1989). Thus, the legislative process of the Wilderness Act can be as an incremental progression towards the eventual mediation of these conflicting value systems.

**The Historical Context of the Wilderness Act**

By the middle of the 1900’s, an awareness of the value of the nation’s pristine natural areas had emerged in public consciousness. During the previous thirty years the country had become populated from shore to shore, and advances in technology had allowed greater numbers of people to enter into the remote corners of the country than ever before (Filler 1998). The election of President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901 helped to establish a national commitment to the conservation and management of the nation’s public lands. The ensuing legacy of the Roosevelt presidency also succeeded in transforming the nation’s wild places into part this country’s national heritage (Filler 1998).

Preservationists seized on this burgeoning awareness to advance their position that the public wild lands had been taken advantage of by con-
sumer interests, such as the mining and timber, and hydroelectric power industries (Frome 1997). They questioned the efficacy of the widely divergent management practices that had been developed by the various agencies responsible for the nation’s wildlands (Hession 1967). The lack of a uniform level of federal protection for the nation’s most pristine areas raised concerns that these areas would be damaged by overuse by consumer interests (Beach 2000). After a successful fight to stop the building of Echo Park Dam within Dinosaur National Monument, they decided the time was right to push for the introduction of a wilderness bill. The Wilderness Society’s Howard Zahniser began to work up a draft shortly after (Hession 1967).

In 1956 Senator Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) and Representative John Saylor (Republican, Pennsylvania) introduced the first version of the Wilderness Act, as drafted by Howard Zahniser, into Congress (Beach, 2000). While no action was taken on the bill it is important to understand the original bill’s key provisions in order appreciate how the bill was transformed during its eight-year legislative process. Modified versions of the same bill were introduced in successive years but met with little success. It wasn’t until the Kennedy Administration took office in 1961 that passage of a wilderness bill became a true possibility (Hession 1967).

In 1961, the Wilderness Act in the form of S.B. 174, passed through the Senate and was sent to the House of Representatives. The bill was next sent to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, which was chaired by Democrat Wayne Aspinall of Colorado. While S.B. 174 passed through this committee, it was never brought to a floor vote, effectively killing the bill for the session (U.S. Congress 1961).

**The Value of Wilderness: An Emerging Consciousness**

By the end of the 19th century the citizens of the United States had realized Manifest Destiny. The nation had been settled from sea to sea, marking the end of the American frontier. There had been rapid technological advances in the era that had allowed for a taming of nature that, in turn, began to soften man’s perception of wild places (Beach 2000). Slowly the puritanical view of nature as hostile, dangerous, and fearful begun to erode. In its place a new conception of wilderness was arising.

Fostered by the writings of thinkers such as Henri David Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and Ralph Waldo Emerson, Americans began to view nature in quasi-religious terms (Filler 1998). Nature was now viewed as a place in which it was possible to witness first-hand the wonders of God’s creation. It was also beginning to be seen as a place for Americans to rejuvenate and recreate.
The public’s burgeoning awareness of the benefits of nature gave rise to a growing concern as to the fate of the remaining wild places in nation. By and large, this concern was born from a recognition of the destruction of “wild places” in Europe and the eastern coast of the United States (Filler 1998). There was growing concern that, without some forethought, the same fate could await the remaining American wildlands.

In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt was elected. Roosevelt, an avid outdoorsman, enjoyed spending time in the wild regions of the country. During his Presidential campaign, his image as the rugged leader of the “rough riders” captured the imagination of the nation (The Theodore Roosevelt Association 2000). As President, the descriptions of his explorations helped further romanticize the public’s conception of the nation’s remote and wild regions.

During his presidential tenure, Roosevelt used his image to further heighten the public’s awareness of the growing need to protect and manage the nation’s wild areas and natural resources (Filler 1998). As a result of his success, he was able to oversee the establishment of multiple National Monuments and Game Preserves, as well as the creation of five National Parks. More importantly, however, he was also instrumental in establishing the National Park and National Forest systems and, in turn, the agencies that were responsible for their management (Filler 1998).

Management Practices: Consumers Versus Preservationists

During the earliest parts of the twentieth century there was little public interest in the management practices of the both the National Park and Forest Services (Watkins 1989). Consequently, each agency had been given the discretion to create its own rules, regulations, and management plans for the areas for which it was responsible (Hession 1967). In turn, these two agencies developed differing management philosophies that shaped the rules and regulations they developed.

The dominant philosophy of the Forest Service dictated that public lands were to be managed for the greatest good of the greatest number of people. This “multiple-use” philosophy, as it was called, ostensibly sought to ensure that all would benefit from the nation’s public lands (Oeschlager 2002). Recreation, grazing, logging, hydrological development, and mineral extraction, were included in this multiple-use definition.

Reacting to internal and external pressures in the 1920’s, the Forest Service began to further classify areas within its boundaries (Hession 1967). Areas that were considered to have the greatest value in their natural state
were classified as wilderness, wild, canoe or primitive. Mining, grazing, and logging were not allowed in the first three areas as long as they retained their classification status. The regions designated as primitive areas were pristine areas that were to be studied for possible designation as wilderness, wild, or canoe. While they were being studied they were managed under the multiple-use principle. This left these areas open to possibly damaging uses such as mining and timber harvesting (Oelschlager 2002).

The guiding principles of the National Park Service, on the other hand, were conservation and recreation. The rules and regulations developed by this agency were directed towards the preservation of the natural character of the areas for which they were responsible. There was, however, growing concern that the increasing interest in the nation’s National Parks would result in a mandate to develop a greater number roads and recreational facilities within these areas (McCloskey 1984).

In the early 1930’s, newly formed preservationist groups such as the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club began to openly question some of the federal government’s public land management policies (Beach 2000). One of the concerns was the perceived degradation occurring within National Forest Service’s primitive areas as a result of multiple-use practices. The sentiment of the two groups was that special interests (i.e., logging, mining, etc.) were influencing which lands were designated as primitive, as opposed to the more stringent wilderness, wild, or canoe designations, in order to be able benefit from their continued use (Beach 2000).

There was also unease over the lack of regulations regarding the building of roads and recreational facilities within the National Park System (Watkins 1989). The apprehension was that with the growing number of visitors, pressure would be felt to increase the number of roads and recreational facilities. It was the preservationists’ position that this would be to the detriment of the National Park system’s pristine and natural qualities (Beach 2000).

The primary concern of the preservationist groups, however, was the lack of permanent and uniform protection offered to the nation’s most pristine wild-lands under the existing management scenario (Hession 1967). As a result of these concerns, members of the Wilderness Society and Sierra Club began to formulate plans for the creation of a national wilderness preservation system that would provide statutory protection for the areas that it enveloped (Beach 2000).
Salience: Echo Park Dam

In 1956, the preservationist platform was given nation-wide publicity during the debate over the proposed Echo Park dam in Dinosaur National Monument (Hession 1967). The controversy centered on the devastation that would result from the flooding of the Echo Park canyon area. What roused public interest was that the area was a part of the National Park system and, as such, it was supposed to be protected from such use. What became evident during the debate was that a private hydrological company had lobbied the National Park Service to amend its rules in order for the dam, which was to be a highly profitable source of electricity, to be built (Harvey 1994).

The preservationists, led by The Wilderness Society’s Executive Director Howard Zahniser, waged a highly successful publicity campaign against the dam that resulted in the project’s termination in 1956. The upwelling of both political and public support that the campaign had generated led Zahniser to draft the first version of the Wilderness Act (Hession 1967). This draft was introduced in 1956.

Wilderness Bill of 1956

On the heels of the Echo Park Dam victory Harold Zahniser drafted the first Wilderness bill, which was introduced into Congress by Senator Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Minnesota) and Representative John Saylor (Republican, Pennsylvania) in 1956 (Harvey 1994). Although no action was taken on the bill, an understanding of the original draft provides the context necessary to be able to recognize how dramatically the bill changed in the course of the legislative process.

The original bill was intended to provide for the establishment of a National Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS), which would be administered by both the Department of the Interior (which governed the National Parks) and the Department Agriculture (which governed the National Forests) (U.S. Congress 1957). One of the key provisions governing the regions managed by the National Forest system, dictated that the areas that were already designated as canoe, wild, or wilderness were to be automatically included in the NWPS, and given immediate federal wilderness status (U.S. Congress 1957). Perhaps of more importance, however, was that the National Forest primitive areas were to be given protected status during the nine-year period in which the Secretary of Agriculture had to make recommendations as to whether they should be permanently included or excluded from the system (Hession 1967).
The Secretary of the Interior was given a nine-year period in which to make recommendations. The Interior areas, which included the National Park system, had more protection than the National Forest system lands (The Wilderness Society 1990). Thus, the Interior areas were to be left out of the system and managed under the status quo until the recommendations were made.

Once the recommendations of the appropriate Secretary were made, they were sent to the newly formed Wilderness Council. The Wilderness Council was to be comprised of the heads of the various public land management agencies affected and six citizen preservationists. The Council was to make further recommendations, which were then sent to Congress where the Senate and the House had 120 days to reject the recommendations by way of resolution. Of note was the provision that stated that if Congress failed to take action, the recommendations would automatically go in to effect (Hession 1967).

In the final draft of the bill, this provision would be dramatically altered. In totality the original draft of bill would have immediately protected over 60 million acres of public lands, of which about 30 to 35 million acres was expected to permanently qualify for protection (U.S. Congress 1957). As stated above, no formal action was taken on the bill during the 1961 Congressional session. However, the introduction of the bill did begin the process of formal and informal negotiations that would continue as the revised versions of the bill were reintroduced through successive Congresses (Hession 1967).

Wilderness Bill of 1961

The Wilderness Bill floundered in the Senate throughout the four-year Eisenhower Administration. However, with the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, the success of a wilderness protection bill became a potential reality (Hession 1967). The new version of the Wilderness Bill (S.B. 174) passed though the Senate with few amendments; however, it was met with opposition in the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Ultimately, the bill was effectively killed for the term, in large part due to power of Committee Chairman Wayne Aspinall (Hession, 1967).

There were two key differences in the way in which the Wilderness Bill was drafted and presented to the Senate in 1961. The first change was that the new version of the bill dropped the idea of a Wilderness Council altogether. Rather than reporting to this Council, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior would instead report directly to the President who, in turn,
would then make the recommendations to Congress (Hession 1967). Also changed was the way in which Congress could override the wilderness recommendations of the President. Instead of having to pass a resolution in order to reject the wilderness recommendations, the bill dictated that there be a concurrent veto in both houses of Congress (Hession 1967). By and large, the remainder of the bill was the same as the original draft. The bill, as presented, was then sent to the Senate Interior Committee for discussion.

While there was some opposition to S.B. 174 by industry groups, the bill survived the Interior Committee mark-up with only one major change being made. The change focused on the way in which Congress was able to reject a Presidential recommendation (Hession 1967). Testimony showed that several congressmen were concerned that the necessity of a concurrent veto made the process of rejecting the recommendations too difficult (U.S. Congress 1961). In order to increase Congressional discretion over which areas were to be included in to the NWPS, the Committee decided to change the rejection requirement to a much easier to attain either house veto (Hession 1967). Furthermore, Congress was given one full term to reach the either house veto. The bill was then sent to the Senate floor for vote.

When S.B. 174 reached the Senate floor the debate that ensued was limited. There were three amendments proposed by the committee opposition leader. However, all amendments were defeated by vote. The bill then, as reported out of committee, passed the Senate floor vote by a margin of 83-13, and was sent to the House of Representatives for discussion (Hession 1967).

After passing through the Senate, the Wilderness Bill (now H.R. 776) was introduced to the House of Representatives in 1962, and immediately sent to the Committee on Insular and Interior affairs. Representative Wayne Aspinall (Democrat, Colorado), who had shown in his fight against the Echo Park Dam to be a staunch opponent to enhanced wilderness regulation, chaired the Committee. During the Committee hearings and discussion, Aspinall and the committee majority succeeded in pushing though several significant changes to the bill (Harvey 1994).

The first change affected the primitive areas of the National Forest system. In the Senate version of the bill, the primitive areas were to be included within the NWPS and protected under its regulations until the President could make recommendations for inclusion or exclusion from the system. After mark-up all primitive areas were to be excluded from the system and governed by the status quo (Saylor 1962).

Second, and more importantly, the mark-up drastically altered the way in which wilderness areas were to be designated. In the Senate version of
the bill, the President was to make wilderness recommendations to the Congress. Congress was then given a full term to attempt an either house veto of the Presidential recommendations. What Aspinall and the Committee majority pushed through was a fundamental change in this process that required affirmative action on the part of Congress (Hession 1967). What this meant was that, in order for new wilderness areas to be designated, Congress would have to draft individual bills for each area recommended by the President (Hession 1967). If Congress chose not to act on a Presidential recommendation, the areas in question would continue to be governed by the status quo regulations indefinitely. This move gave Congress much more discretion over which areas were to be included in the NWPS (Frome 1985).

The final mark-up affected the total amount of acres that were to be immediately given federal wilderness protection. Under the Senate bill provisions, over 30 million acres were to be given temporary or permanent wild status protection. After the Committee markup only a little under seven million acres, most of which was already designated as wilderness, wild, or canoe by the National Forest, were given immediate and permanent Federal wilderness protection (The Wilderness Institute 2001). The revised bill was passed by the committee and was supposed to be sent to the House floor. However, before the committee report could be presented on the house floor Representative Aspinall left for Colorado, which effectively killed the bill for the term (Hession 1967).

In 1962, after the bill was killed, the Kennedy Administration entered into direct negotiations with Chairman Aspinall. During the process of the negotiations, several key concessions to Aspinall were made in return for his committee’s support for the bill (Hession 1967). These concessions are reflected in the changes made by Aspinall’s committee to the 1963 version of the wilderness bill.

Supporters and Opposition

Throughout the eight-year process of the Wilderness Act the supporters for and the opposition against the bill remained fairly constant. On one side of the spectrum were those who strongly supported the bill, represented by groups such as the Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, and The Nature Conservancy (Congressional Record 1964). On the other side of the political spectrum were private industry groups such as the National Cattlemen’s Association, the National Lumber Manufacturers Association, the American Mining Congress, and the American Pulpwood Association, all of whom formed the heart of the opposition to the bill (Hession 1967). The division
between the supporters and the opposition to the Wilderness Act can be understood in terms of the value conflict present between consumer interests and preservationist ideals. Furthermore, the resolution of the conflict, symbolized by the signing of the Wilderness Act, represented the harmonization of these seemingly contradictory ideals.

Supporters

For preservationist groups such as The Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club one of the main values of the nation’s wild public lands lay in their ability to rejuvenate and inspire the human spirit. From this perspective, the nation’s wilderness was seen as having an intrinsic value of its own; it was a national treasure to be appreciated as it was. This sentiment is captured succinctly in the writings of Henry David Thoreau as he states, “This curious world in which we live is more wonderful than it is convenient; more beautiful than it is useful; it is more to be admired and enjoyed than used.” (Michael Frome 1997, 81). For preservationists then, there was no higher value in America’s wild lands to be found than in leaving them intact and in their pristine condition.

Harold Zahniser was perhaps the most visible preservationist personality. It was his draft of the wilderness bill that was first introduced into Congress in 1956. He maintained a high profile throughout the rest of the legislative process, providing testimony at many committee hearings.

Opposition

The industry groups that formed the opposition to the Wilderness Act viewed the nation’s public lands in different terms. For groups such as the National Lumber Manufacturers Association and the American Mining Congress, the nation’s wildlands were valued as an economic resource, a resource on which the nation’s wealth and strength had been built (Filler 1998). From this perspective, these industry groups argued that the continued availability of public lands for industry use was in the long-term best interest of the nation and its citizens. The other groups that provided opposing testimony during committee hearings included the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Forestry Association, the National Cattleman’s Association, and the Upper Colorado River Reclamation Association (U.S. Congress 1961).

The single most influential individual opposed to the wilderness bill was Representative Wayne Aspinall. The committee he chaired successfully stalled the bill’s progress in 1961. His influence was great enough that the Kennedy Administration offered concessions to him in return for his support.
for the bill. In the end, the bill that passed was heavily influenced by the hand of Representative Aspinall (Hession 1967).

**Objectives and Targets**

By signing The Wilderness Act into law, legislators hoped to achieve three major goals or objectives. The first objective was to provide permanent federal protection for public lands that were designated as wilderness. Secondly, the Act proposed to manage these areas under one comprehensive set of regulations by placing them within a National Wilderness System. The final goal of the legislation was to provide for the process by which future public lands could be evaluated and designated as Wilderness. The objectives of the bill were to affect portions of federal public lands that were being managed by various federal agencies, including the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service.

In order to provide permanent protection for public wilderness areas, it was first necessary for the language of the Act to set the parameters for a legal definition of wilderness. This was accomplished primarily through contrasting proposed wilderness with areas that had been developed by humans (Egan 1999). Thus, wilderness areas were defined as areas that had been largely unaltered or “untrammeled” by man (The Wilderness Society 1990). It was also necessary to define the level of protection that was to be offered by the Act. To accomplish this, the wording in the Act explicitly described which activities were to be prohibited in wilderness areas.

The language of the Wilderness Act also provided for the establishment of a National Wilderness Preservation System in which all federally designated wilderness areas were to be placed. The purpose behind the creation of the NWPS was to ensure that all designated wilderness areas would be provided the highest form of protection provided by the law. It was the feeling of proponents of the Wilderness Act, that the word “system” was necessary to connote the comprehensive level of protection that was being offered by the legislation (Hession 1964).

The final goal of the legislation sought to provide for the process by which future public lands could be added to the NWPS. This aspect of the legislation was a result of the recognition of the vast amount of acreage that remained to be surveyed and potentially recommended to be as of wilderness quality. It was also deemed necessary in order to prevent confusion as to the way in which these future areas would be handled (Hession 1964).
Policy Tools

In order to accomplish the above objectives, the creators of the Wilderness Act relied heavily on regulation as a policy tool. The regulation proposed by in the legislation took varying forms and ranged from the creation of a standard operating procedure to the creation of rules to govern the activities within designated wilderness areas. The Wilderness Act also provided limited authorization for spending. The spending, however, was subject to a separate congressional appropriation of funds (Hession 1967).

The first regulation of the Act mandated the creation of the National Wilderness Preservation System. The system was a collection of designated wilderness areas that were to remain under the jurisdiction and management of the agency in which their geographical borders lay. For instance, wilderness areas that were located inside National Forest lands were to remain under the management of the National Forest Service. Each agency was required to continue to pay for the management of these areas as before, and therefore, no further appropriations were needed (The Wilderness Institute 2001). The creation of the NWPS, however, did provide each area of the system with a standard level of protection that was most often higher than was provided by the managing agency.

The standard of protection was set through regulatory language that set limits and constraints on the type activities that were to be permitted within the NWPS. Activities that were deemed to be inconsistent with the maintenance of the wilderness characteristics were not permitted, or were regulated. Specifically, this included activities such as mining, grazing, motorboat operation, timber harvesting, and hydrological development projects (U.S. Congress 1964). Special provisions for fire control, commercial services, and private lands already within the NWPS, were also made.

Furthermore, the Act set the legal standard for defining wilderness and for assessing which federal lands would qualify for wilderness protection. Wilderness was defined, in part, as comprised of at least five thousand contiguous acres of undeveloped federal land that had retained a primeval and untrammeled character (The Wilderness Society 1990). Lands that were to be included in the NWPS were required to be judged as possessing a majority of these characteristics.

Another form of regulation provided within the Wilderness Act dictated the standard operating procedure that was to be followed in order to admit new federal lands in to the National Wilderness Preservation System. This included the process by which lands were to be recommended as potential wilderness. Significantly, it also specified that an act of congress was necessary
in order for the addition to NWPS to occur (The Wilderness Society 1990). Finally, the language of the Wilderness Act authorized spending for a very specific purpose. The spending provision was included for the purpose of buying out private landholders whose property fell within the perimeters of a federally designated wilderness area. The provision included two requirements. The first stated that in order to purchase a private tract of land the agencies must first have the approval of the owner of the land. Once this requirement was met the purchase was contingent on congressional appropriation of funds (The Wilderness Society 1990).

The Formulation of the Wilderness Bill

The 1963 the Wilderness Bill that had been killed in the previous term was reintroduced into the Senate. The bill (now S.B. 4) again met with little resistance in the Senate Interior Committee. On April 3rd, 1963 it was sent to the Senate floor for vote and passed 73-12, remaining essentially unchanged (Hession 1967). The bill was sent to the House for consideration where it was passed again to Chairman Aspinall’s Committee on Interior and Insular affairs. During the committee mark-up, the face of the bill was substantially altered to reflect the concessions that had been made by the Kennedy Administration (Hession 1967). The bill was brought to the House floor for vote where it passed 373-1 (Congressional Record 1963). The bill was then sent to Conference Committee where three relatively small amendments were made. Finally, the bill was sent to President Lyndon B. Johnson, who signed it into law on September 3rd 1964.

House Committee on Insular and Interior Affairs Mark-Up

The Wilderness Bill that was proposed in the 88th Congress had little trouble moving through the Senate. On April 3rd 1963, after a relatively short committee session, S.B. 4 was reported on the Senate floor. After a brief debate the bill was put to vote and passed 73-12 with no amendments (Hession 1967).

The bill was then passed to the House for consideration where it was sent once again to the Committee on Insular and Interior Affairs. Here the wilderness bill, as it had been passed in the Senate, was drastically altered to reflect the revised version that had been reported out of the same committee in the prior session. According to Jack M. Hession, the subsequent mark-up of the bill reflected the key concessions that had been given to the Committee’s chairman, Wayne Aspinall, by the Kennedy Administration (1967).
These concessions made for a substantially smaller initial National Wilderness Preservation System than intended by Howard Zahniser and the preservationist interests that had originally drafted the bill in 1956. The total acreage included in the NWPS after the committee markup was 9.1 million acres, a substantially smaller figure than the original sixty million acres proposed. The National Forest Primitive areas that were to have been given protection until review under the original draft were also now left out of the system and protected by the existing weaker regulations of the National Forest Service (Frome 1997).

In addition to this, the committee mark-up changed the way in which new wilderness areas were to be included in the system. Zahniser’s bill had proposed that wilderness areas be reviewed and recommended for inclusion or exclusion from the system by the appropriate Secretary. The Secretary’s recommendations were then to be passed on to Congress, where the House and Senate were given 120 days to reject a recommendation via a resolution. If there were no action was taken by Congress in the required amount of time the recommendations would go forward (Hession 1967). The version that came out of Aspinall’s committee had changed this to require that Congress take affirmative action to include any future areas into the NWPS. This essentially required a Congressional bill to be passed for each recommended potential wilderness area (Hession 1967).

Finally, the Committee mark-up allowed two key concessions for the mining industry. The first provided for a twenty-five year extension of the existing mining and mineral leasing laws within the NWPS. This allowed mining companies to begin new operations for the length of the extension. The second required that the Secretary of Agriculture make periodic mineral surveys of NWPS areas. This was presumably to do aid the mining companies in their search for viable locations during the extension period (Hession 1967).

**House Floor Vote and Joint Conference Committee**

The Committee on Insular and Interior Affairs brought the revised Wilderness Bill to the floor on July 30, 1964. After a short debate, a minor amendment to the bill was passed that allowed for the San Gorgonio Wild Area to be included in the NWPS. Shortly after, the bill was put to vote and passed through the House by a vote of 373-1 (U.S. Congress).

The bill next moved to Conference committee. There were no major amendments that were passed. However one minor change was made which effectively reduced the extension for mining companies from twenty-five years to nineteen years (Frome 1997).
Finally, on September 3rd 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Wilderness Act into law (P.L. 88-577). By the time it was signed it had been subject to over eight years of legislative debate. In the end, it had taken the will of the Kennedy Administration to negotiate for final successful passage of the Act (Hession 1967). Although the final version of the bill had been drastically altered, it still served to accomplish the original goal of creating a National Wilderness Preservation System.

**Conclusion**

The Wilderness Act was born out of an emerging public awareness that the nation’s most pristine wildlands needed to be protected in order to insure their existence for future generations. The process of passing the bill, however, was not easy. It took eight years of legislative compromise in order to get the Act passed. The original versions of the bill were met with little political support, illustrating that these early versions inequitably favored the preservationist value system. The subsequent versions of the bill attempted to better balance the interests of both the preservationists and the consumers (Hession 1967). The final version that was passed represented a legislated mediation between the preservationist and consumer value systems.

The bill’s establishment of a National Wilderness Preservation System represented the goals of the preservationist interests. The lands within the borders of this system were given permanent and uniform protection in order to provide for the continuation of their pristine characteristics. For the first time, these areas were give federal protection as *wilderness* and were to be managed as part of the nation’s *national heritage* (Frome 1984). The final version of the bill also met the interests of those who benefited from the use of federal lands. The Wilderness Act, as it was enacted, left a substantial amount of land available for use by industry groups and other concerned consumers.

The legislative process of the Wilderness Act of 1964 highlights the difficulty by which a bill becomes a law. It took eight years of negotiations, and the intervention of a Presidential administration, to secure the bill’s passage. In the end, the final enactment of the Wilderness Bill only became possible when the interests of the significant parties involved were successfully mediated.
References


The Legislative Development Of The Personal Responsibility And Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act Of 1996

By Michael Miller

Abstract

On August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act into law (PRWORA). The purpose of Public Law 104-93 was to significantly amend the role of welfare in the United States by demanding that eligible constituents obtain work training and decrease their dependence on welfare programs. Prior to the passage of Public Law 104-193, welfare benefits were originally established as a social safety net to help mitigate the financial hardships suffered by families during the Great Depression. The Social Security Act of 1935 afforded all eligible citizens the ability to apply for and receive benefits through the Aid to Dependent Children program. With the passage of Public Law 104-193, the federal social safety net was essentially vanquished and replaced with a limited state administered work training program. This paper identifies the legislative history of Public Law 104-193, the aspirations of the legislation, and the supporters and detractors of one of the most contentious pieces of welfare reform legislation in United States History.

Introduction

On August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act into law. Public Law 104-193 radically altered the landscape of the delivery, scope, and requirements for welfare programs in the United States (Klerman et al 2001). Public Law 104-193 essentially enacts a comprehensive transformation to a variety of public programs. The statute ended a welfare recipient’s ability to utilize the provisions of the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). Instead of being able to procure benefits from the AFDC program for an indefinite period, a welfare recipient is now obligated to acquire work training and to receive limited cash assistance from state level bureaucracies (Connif 1996). Public Law 104-193 replaced AFDC with a block grant
to appropriate funds for time-constrained cash provisions for qualifying families. In addition to cash assistance, the new statute also implemented fundamental alterations in the operation and delivery of the food stamp program, Supplemental Security Income for children (SSI), child support programs, benefits for convicted drug felons, and benefits for legal immigrants (Klerman et al. 2001).

Conservative politicians, who had gained popular support through the “Contract with America” initiative in 1995, championed welfare reform as an overdue renovation of an antiquated social program. The new welfare environment was seen as ending reliance and dependency on governmental aid by encouraging recipients to engage in work training programs and acquire a new aura of responsibility for their actions (Hays 2003). Many Republican politicians surmised that the welfare system under AFDC promoted a lethargic welfare lifestyle that allowed recipients to subsist off of federal aid ad infinitum (Zuckerman 2000). In addition to the amendments to the scope and structure of welfare delivery, the new welfare legislation was founded on a promotion of conservative morals (Hays 2003). The provisions of PRWORA strongly called for the propagation of two parent households and aspired to decrease the number of children born out of wedlock, thereby infusing public policy with conservative family values by targeting single parent households (Schorr 2001).

The dominant perception among conservative lawmakers was that AFDC had encouraged social deviance and had established a milieu in which the idleness of the welfare program recipient was tolerated (Hays 2003). Therefore, conservative lawmakers wanted to create a system that concurrently encourages the facilitation of conservative family values and an incentive to gain employment in an endeavor to reduce poverty (Sawhill et al. 2001). This new influx of moral justification assisted in challenging the modern validity and usefulness of the AFDC program.

Opponents to the PRWORA, which included various charities and social work groups, claimed that the new welfare reform legislation provided no protections for indigent children. Destitute children would receive no aid if they were born to teenage mothers out of wedlock, and they would receive no protection from parental neglect or abuse under the new statute (Kammer 1996). Other opponents noted that the new welfare legislation effectively decentralized welfare by giving program control and discretion to the individual states. The new legislation would also significantly reduce funding for welfare programs (Craig 1996). A central argument used by opponents was that AFDC was not to blame for the preponderance of poverty; other economic conditions, such as the lack of access to higher educa-
tion and the lack of a living wage, dramatically influence the prevalence of poverty (Craig 1996). Therefore, in the view of opponents, PRWORA fails to address and solve the core problems of poverty.

**Origins of Welfare Legislation**

In order to surmise the elemental factors that caused PRWORA to come into fruition, it is useful to analyze the context of welfare legislation throughout the history of the United States. Essentially, welfare was formed as a social safety net to provide some level of financial support to individuals in time of need (Sawhill 1996). Initially, the idea of welfare as an obligation to deliver aid to other individuals within the American community was commonly viewed as a public necessity (Goode 2002). The development of the Social Security Act of 1935 helped to exemplify this premise.

**The Response to the Great Depression: The Social Security Act of 1935**

The codification of welfare policy draws its modern roots from the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. The act, which was proposed during the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, ushered in a package of social legislation, including Social Security, unemployment insurance and the ADC (Aid to Dependent Children) program (Haskins 2001). Both Social Security and unemployment insurance endeavored to provide an insurance policy for the financial afflictions of the majority of the citizenry. The ADC program was an evolutionary offspring of the Mother's Pension program of 1911, which specifically targeted aid towards widows so that they could raise their children without financial consequence (Goode 2002). ADC was conceived as insurance for those who would not be covered by the first two aforementioned programs. Hence, children of destitute families would be afforded some level of aid in times of need via state subsidies, and mothers were recognized as the primary child caregiver (Goode 2002).

The implementation of ADC was significantly discriminating in its early incarnation (Schorr 2001). Aid from the ADC program was generally directed towards Caucasian couples who had attained some level of financial hardship. Minority populations and unwed mothers had difficulty securing any benefits from the federal program (Goode 2002). This form of discrimination was in direct violation of the intent of the program. In the 1960s, New Deal legislation contended that states must follow federal mandates or lose funding (Goode 2002). This early exposition is rather significant as it illustrates
how welfare was a federal policy that operated under centralized federal guidelines. After the federal mandate that states provide equitable service, African Americans and unwed mothers began to receive the assistance that had previously been denied to them (Schorr 2001).

The Social Security Act provided for a conservative American ideal to be achieved; the father could be allowed to be the fiscal breadwinner while the mother could remain at home and tend to childcare (Haskins 2001). In the absence of a dutiful father, the government would subsidize the husband’s income, thereby allowing the mother to tend to her children. Through the 1960s, it became readily apparent that poor single women were utilizing welfare benefits to care for their children in the home (Haskins 2001). Interestingly, the ideal familial arrangement that was encouraged and prescribed by the federal government in the 1930s, laid the groundwork for the perception of a lazy, work-resistant single mother welfare recipient. This pejorative perception was predominantly advocated by the conservatives of the 1990s during the modern welfare reform debate (Haskins 2001).

The Maturation of AFDC and Early Attempts at Reform

Due to the implementation of new legislation, welfare caseloads climbed steadily in the 1960s, thereby increasing public attention and scrutiny of welfare policies (Herrick et al. 2003). The 1960s witnessed the creation of socially progressive programs, such as food stamps and Medicaid, in an attempt to bring some level of equity to the citizenry of the country and to alleviate some of the burdensome barriers of poverty. The rise of welfare caseloads, coupled with a rise in single parenting, raised trepidation with the public and lawmakers, many of whom believed that welfare recipients should not be subsidized for perceived dependency (Bane 2003).

Based on the rising level of welfare rolls and expenditures, efforts to reform welfare soon became part of the political agenda in the 1970s and 1980s. Individual state welfare programs began to decrease benefits to clients in order to encourage recipients to look for employment (Herrick et al. 2003). The decreasing benefit amounts were founded on the assumption that economic necessity would cause mothers to seek work and decrease their dependence on welfare programs (Herrick et al. 2003). These initial attempts at facilitating a recipient work ethic represented an ideological perspective as work was seen as an emancipating activity (Herrick et al. 2003).
Objectives/Tools of PRWORA

The historical development of welfare legislation ultimately provided the impetus for the passage of the Personal Responsibility Act and highlighted three important concepts about commonly held welfare perceptions. First, welfare reforms have frequently stressed the importance of self-sufficiency and the classical liberal mantra that success is only achievable through individual effort (Sanger 2003). Second, welfare reform was seen as a rehabilitative process in which welfare mothers are slowly culled from supposed dependence and reliance on welfare programs (Sawhill et al. 2002). Finally, welfare reform legislation embodies the social morals of the era. The Personal Responsibility Act is established on the belief that marriage is imperative for the existence of a flourishing society (Sawhill et al. 2002). Thus, the promotion of conservative family values is the true intent of the Personal Responsibility Act. The legislation’s various provisions endeavor to impel welfare recipients to adopt conservative family characteristics in order to receive public aid (Friedman 1995). Therefore, the goal of the legislation is to encourage the formation of two parent households and move welfare recipients into the work force.

To achieve these objectives, PRWORA utilized several tools with which to implement change with regards to the dispersal of welfare benefits. First, PRWORA established time-limits to encourage self-sufficiency and to decrease the existence of dependency of recipients receiving welfare aid (Sawhill et al. 2002). These time-limits provided an incentive for recipients to seek employment. Second, PWORA mandates that recipients must participate in work related activities after 24 months of aid, thus promoting the work ethic intention of the legislation. States that are non-compliant with this mandate will face a reduction in funding. Third, PRWORA attempts to decrease the number of out-of-wedlock births and increase stable family formation through the implementation of education that stresses abstinence and marriage (Sawhill et al. 2002).

Formulation of PRWORA

The progression of the development of the Personal Responsibility Act began as early as 1993, when President Bill Clinton was inaugurated into office. President Clinton popularized the phrase to “end welfare as we know it” during his various campaign speeches (APHSA 2004). Once in office, the Clinton administration moved quickly to ascertain a remedy to the existing federal welfare system. On June 21, 1993, President Clinton unveiled a
twenty-seven member task force headed by Bruce Reed (deputy assistant to the president on matters of domestic policy), Mary Jo Bane (assistant secretary for the administration for children and families), and David T. Ellwood (assistant secretary for the Department of Health and Human Services). The purpose of this newly formed task force was to develop a welfare reform plan for the president to introduce to Congress (APHSA 2004).

**Drafting**

The newly formed task force focused its attention on various areas for development of legislation. The task force recommended that states be granted more flexibility regarding the implementation of welfare policy to allow for more state discretion over specific program details (Zuckerman 2000). Additionally, in accordance with support from the public, the task force advocated for the requirement of education and work training for all able bodied individuals, including mothers with young infants (Zuckerman 2000). The task force recommended that any federal legislation mandate national restrictions to avoid any abuse of policy implementation by the individual states; David Ellwood referred to this act as the state race to the bottom (Zuckerman 2000).

**General Objectives**

The task force identified four main objectives for welfare reform. First, low wage earners must acquire a living wage and have access to affordably priced health and child care. The existence of a living wage was considered paramount to make work a viable alternative to welfare (Ellwood 1996). Second, welfare recipients should operate in a two year limit, requiring employment after two full years of vocational or educational training. Third, reform legislation should mandate that absentee parents pay for child support, regardless of whether the parents are married. Finally, welfare reform legislation should combat teen pregnancy by offering grants to schools in high-risk areas to formulate initiatives and educational resources (Ellwood 1996).

**Early Attempts at Reform**

A series of attempts at welfare reform occurred in the early 1990s and helped lay the ideological foundations that were debated in the mid-1990s (APHSA 2000). On January 25, 1994, sixteen Republicans introduced S. 1795 (Welfare Reform Act of 1994) which attempted to impose time limits on
AFDC programs and end the era of entitlements. The bill would have also have required that teenage mothers live at home to receive aid. Republican James Talent (R-MO) introduced H.R. 4473 (The Real Welfare Reform Act of 1994), co-sponsored by forty-two Republican representatives, which endeavored to restore the American family by denying aid to single mothers under the age of twenty-one. While neither bill was enacted, the debate surrounding their formulation indicated that welfare reform and concerns for family values were definitely on the public agenda (APHSA 2000).

Presentation

On June 14, 1994, President Bill Clinton revealed his new welfare reform proposal, The Work and Responsibility Act, in Kansas City, Missouri. Founded on the objectives established by the Clinton welfare reform task force, Clinton’s proposal asked for 9.3 billion in federal funding over a five-year period (Zuckerman 2000). The proposal also would have compelled obligatory work requirements for recipients on AFDC after a two-year period, if the recipients were unable to find employment (U.S. Congress 1994). President Clinton’s bill was formally introduced in the Senate as S.2224 by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), with original co-sponsors Breaux (D-LA), Tom Daschle (D-SD), Dodd (D-CT), Kennedy (D-MA), Mitchell (D-ME), and Rockefeller (D-WV). In the House of Representatives, the bill was introduced as H.R. 4605, by Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL) and originally co-sponsored by Ackerman (D-NY), Cardin (D-MD), Cramer (D-AL), Ford (D-TN), Ford (D-MI), Gephardt (D-MO), and Martinez (D-CA). LaFalce (D-NY) and Hoyer (D-MD) were added as sponsors as the legislative debate progressed. Both S. 2224 and H.R. 4605 were identical pieces of legislation (U.S. Congress 1994). The composition of the sponsors is rather significant as it shows that a primarily partisan effort was put forth to establish the elements of the Clinton welfare reform, as no Republican legislators sponsored either piece of legislation.

Also introduced in the summer of 1994 was H.R. 4767 by Robert Matsui (D-CA) (APHSA 2000). Concerned with the perceived lack of financial and program support that the current welfare legislation had provided, Matsui’s bill intended to increase the funding for the JOBS program and to develop and implement thorough child care resources for those recipients who were leaving the AFDC program. Matsui’s bill helped illustrate Democrats’ concerns with the current welfare reform debate that enough attention was being placed on the transition from welfare to work programs (APHSA 2000).
Initial Hearings

In the summer of 1994, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the pending welfare reform legislation (U.S. Congress 1994). Individuals who testified included Robert Rector (senior policy analyst with the Heritage Foundation), Kay Cole James (Secretary of Health and Human Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia), and Rebecca Maynard (Professor of Education and Social Policy at the University of Pennsylvania) (U.S. Congress 1994).

Reformers argued that the Clinton proposal did not go far enough in changing the welfare landscape. Robert Rector testified that massive cuts needed to be implemented in order to curb the growth of the welfare state, and that any welfare benefits to non-citizens should be eliminated immediately (U.S. Congress 1994, 1021-1081). Rector posited that no amount of funding is adequate in reforming the welfare bureaucracy; only individual self-sufficiency could amend the state of the welfare system (U.S. Congress 1994, 1021-1081).

Conservatives argued that the central crux of welfare reform was that of the promotion of strong two-parent households, the involvement of the private sector, the development of self-sufficiency and the abatement of dependency. Kay James testified that strong families were the impetus for change, and that bureaucratic intervention generally did little to alleviate the problems of the impoverished (U.S. Congress 1994, 972-1021). James contended that the Clinton welfare reform plan did not go far enough in stressing the importance of cohesive family bonds. James finally noted that the involvement of private institutions, including religious organizations, schools and employers, was imperative if welfare reform was truly to succeed; the bureaucracy as a primary agent of reform was incapable of enacting meaningful change (U.S. Congress 1994, 972-1021).

Welfare reformers also noted that the precipitous rise in out-of-wedlock births contributed to the burdening of the existing welfare system, and that greater attention needed to be placed in the prevention of unwanted pregnancy. Maynard testified that the majority of welfare recipients were teenage mothers and that significant intervention was needed to curb teen dependency (U.S. Congress 1994, 878-911). Maynard argued for enhanced teen education provisions and local autonomy over their design and implementation (U.S. Congress 1994, 878-911).
The Contract with America and the Changing Welfare Reform Landscape

A shift in political power occurred in the fall of 1994 as Republicans were able to garner a majority of seats in the House and the Senate. The focus for the 104th Congress became the “Contract With America,” an ideological platform that proposed to re-establish conservative convictions within the policy making arena (Dye 1999). Armed with an ample army of supporters, Republicans could now construct and propose a new welfare reform bill that closely mirrored conservative objectives. The central opposition to Clinton’s reform package was frequented by the condemnation of out-of-wedlock births, teenage childbearing, and a bureaucracy that supposedly created the means for recipients to engage in indefinite dependency on welfare programs (Sawhill 1996). To combat these deficiencies, Republican lawmakers were able to coalesce their resources and craft new legislation. The most notable piece of welfare reform legislation that was culled from this initiative was the Personal Responsibility Act.

Markup

The newly forged Personal Responsibility Act provided for the restoration of the American family, the reduction of illegitimacy, recipient dependence on welfare programs, and the reduction of total welfare spending (U.S. Congress 1995). On January 4, 1995, the Personal Responsibility Act H.R. 4 was introduced for legislative consideration. The bill was sponsored by Representative Steven LaTourette (R-OH) and was co-sponsored by 119 Republicans and no Democrats (U.S. Congress 1995). The bill was then referred to the Committees on Agriculture, Banking and Financial Services, Budget, Commerce, Economic and Educational Opportunities, Judiciary, Rules, and Ways and Means. That month, a series of hearings were held on Capitol Hill to discuss the merits of the newly forged Contract with America initiative with regards to welfare reform (U.S. Congress 1995).

Supporters

Support for the Republican welfare reform bill came from a plethora of sources, including policy think tanks, economists, religious groups, and business conglomerations (NOW 1996). Speakers included Vermont Governor Howard Dean, policy analyst Robert Rector, Michigan Chief Operations Officer of Job Growth, Douglas Stites, University of Texas Journalism
Professor Marvin Olasky, and Michael Horowitz, senior fellow of the Hudson Institute (U.S. Congress 1995).

A critical point provided by reformers was that states needed more discretion in crafting regional welfare policies. Governor Howard Dean testified that welfare reform could not be solved at the national level and that states must be granted the judgment to implement funds and resources in a method that is agreeable to the state. Crucial to this discussion was Dean’s insistence on states’ ability to set time-limits on welfare recipients, since individual states had differing economic conditions and welfare populations (U.S. Congress 1995b, 499-622). Thus, Dean argued strongly in favor of state-centered legislation that allowed flexibility of program implementation (U.S. Congress 1995b, 499-622).

Work training was also emphasized by reformers. Douglas Stites testified that the state of Michigan began a job skills program that advocated for the rapid placement of individuals in a work setting and emphasized quick vocational orientated training. Stites contended that Michigan had a dire need for workers in the entry-level and low-skilled job markets (U.S. Congress 1995a, 619-641). The crux of the author's testimony was that there was no adequate one-size-fits all component of welfare reform legislation; states must be granted the autonomy to deliver welfare programs in a manner which is germane to the needs of the local welfare population (U.S. Congress 1995, 619-641). Stite’s testimony heavily favored the provisions of welfare to work, even if the work that was available was primarily entry-level in nature. Therefore, Stite’s testimony heavily emphasized the states’ interest in improving their respective economies by providing a labor force for entry-level and low-skilled employment.

Welfare reformers again promoted the idea of marriage, responsibility, and regional control. Robert Rector highlighted four main areas in which welfare reform legislation should be focused (U.S. Congress 1995a, 63-131). First, Rector argued that welfare reform costs should be controlled and the states should be granted more flexibility in their ability to deliver funds to their respective populations. Second, the requirement of work for recipients should be paramount and strongly enforced. Third, welfare reform legislation should combat “illegitimacy.” Rector argued vehemently that welfare was a precursor to the destruction of the family unit, and that the conferment of welfare benefits to single mothers increased the rise of out-of-wedlock births. According to Rector, illegitimate births and the disintegration of the family unit had a pejorative effect both on the welfare system and on the American public (U.S. Congress 1995a, 61-131).
The elimination of supposed client dependence was also highlighted. Michael Horowitz testified that the character of welfare programs had changed since the inception of the “Great Society” and “New Deal” legislation, and that entitlement programs had effectively stifled the potential and economic growth of millions of individuals. Horowitz claimed that the “underclass” was immune to the swings and shifts of the economic cycle. Ultimately, this underclass must break from their reliance on public welfare programs. This would be achieved only through the abolition of entitlement programs and the creation of job training resources (U.S. Congress 1995a, 61-131). The speaker claimed that public welfare money had been directed into the hands of social welfare professionals (social workers, administrators, lawyers, researchers, and the like), thereby delivering no assistance to those who truly need aid. Horowitz claimed that only through self-sufficiency could an individual achieve success (U.S. Congress 1995a, 61-131).

Opposition

Opposition to the welfare reform legislation came from a variety of sources including progressive policy think-tanks and minority interest groups. Chief among the concerns with the pending reform legislation was the belief that lawmakers were too harsh in their prescriptions for welfare mothers and were not cognizant of the realities that welfare recipients must face.

Opponents to welfare reform advocated for incremental shifts and the reconsideration of program mandates. Toby Herr, Director of Project Match, was concerned with the concrete time limits that had been suggested by the legislation. Employment, according to Herr, is an individualized process which relies on a unique set of factors, resources, and conditions (U.S. Congress 1995a, 251-302). A blanket solution and time-limits do not fully realize the individual realities and barriers faced by a welfare recipient and have the potential to set the individual up for failure within the system (U.S. Congress 1995a, 251-302).

Welfare reform opponents claimed that the reduction of funds unfairly targeted single mothers and children. Rebecca Blank, Professor of Economics at Northwestern University, testified that decreasing public-assistance to young unmarried mothers would likely increase the occurrence of poverty and put more children at risk of being impoverished (U.S. Congress 1995a, 196-248). The speaker’s testimony claimed that welfare was not responsible for the increase in single parent families. Blank noted that changing labor markets and social conditions precipitated the number of single parent households. Therefore, government programs were not to blame for
the increase in out-of-wedlock births and single parenting households (U.S. Congress 1995a, 196-248).

Opposing testimony also stemmed from the minority community. Sonia Perez, Director of the Poverty Project for the National Council of La Raza, was extremely concerned about the negative consequences resulting from the proposed legislation (U.S. Congress 1995a, 714-768). Particularly, Perez commented on the inflexible time limits and reduction in funding to teenage mothers. In addition, Perez was vehemently against the provisions that called for the reduction in social programs and programs that provide services to legal immigrants. Perez was also concerned with the lack of child care services for single mothers. He argued that if the legislation called for single mothers to gain employment, then adequate day care provisions would be a necessary condition to ensure the success of the program. (U.S. Congress 1995a, 714-768).

**Deliberations**

A degree of hesitation was certainly prevalent as both Republicans and Democrats wrestled with several issues. Deliberations brought forth the concern of protection for children as a primary reason to either amend or reject the legislation. Many Democrats viewed the legislation as punitive in nature, with little rehabilitative qualities that would truly assist welfare recipients in making the transition from welfare to work (U.S. Congress 1995c). Representative Collins (D-IL) argued that H.R. 4 did little to prepare individuals to escape poverty. Instead, individuals would be perpetually trapped in low wage employment with little hope for meritorious social mobility (U.S. Congress 1995c). While progress had been achieved, the resolution of pivotal issues still remained.

The central theme of the Republican rebuttal was that the new legislation provided recipients a degree of empowerment and the means with which to achieve self-sufficiency (U.S. Congress 1995c). Representative Lincoln (R-Ark) argued that the current welfare system had bred idleness, sloth, familial deviance and dependency, and that the provisions of H.R. 4 would help remedy those concerns (U.S. Congress 1995c). Therefore, welfare could not exist in its current formation.

Following the deliberations, the Democrats proposed a number of amendments to the bill in an attempt to keep the “safety net” provisions of earlier welfare legislation. These amendments included the Deal Amendment, which pushed for an increase in education funding, job training and employment services for welfare recipients, in addition to providing an incremental
shift in welfare-to-work expectations through the proposed federal Work First Program (U.S Congress 1995c). The Republicans summarily rejected the Democrats’ proposal with a vote of 228 to 205. The Moran Amendment, which attempted to procure public housing funding and resources for families in compliance with state work regulations, was also rejected by the House with a vote of 395 to 35 (U.S. Congress 1995c).

The final vote count was representative of the ideological differences between the two parties in passing the legislation, as little bi-partisan support was culled from the deliberations. H.R. 4 was finally passed in the House by a vote of 234-199, with only nine Democrats supporting the measure and five Republicans in opposition (U.S. Congress 1995). Both parties strongly supported the legislation’s intent to strengthen the family structure and to move recipients from welfare to work. The differences lay in the manner in which recipients would make the transition from welfare to employment. The Democrats, who felt that the bill did not afford enough protection for children and did not provide enough financial or realistic program support for welfare recipients to complete the transition from welfare to work programs, were highly resistant to offering support to the bill in its entirety (U.S. Congress 1995).

Ideological differences arose during the committee consideration process. On March 29, 1995, the newly passed H.R. 4 was referred to the Senate Finance Committee where the bill would undergo further analysis and consideration. Once in the Senate, the Republicans touted the bill’s sweeping impetus for change while Democrats, most notably Tom Daschle (D-ND) and Diane Feinstein (D-CA), challenged that the bill did not provide enough provisions for child care and would place restrictions on aid to legal immigrants (U.S Congress 1995d). Republicans argued that issues surrounding welfare reform should be left up to the states to decide how to best serve their constituencies, and that the Democrats’ support of federal oversight represented burdensome bureaucratic control and propagated the existence of welfare dependency (U.S Congress 1995d). On September 19, 1995, H.R. 4 passed in the Senate by a vote of 87-12. After further deliberations and proposed amendments, the Conference report was approved in the House by a vote of 245-178. The Senate approved the conference report by a vote of 52-47. H.R. 4 was finally enrolled in the Senate on December 29, 1995.

**Presidential Veto**

In early January of 1996, President Clinton returned H.R. 4 to Congress. Clinton claimed dissatisfaction with two key areas in the legislation (Clinton
First, Clinton contended that the new legislation failed to provide adequate child care for recipients. Second, Clinton claimed that the new legislation cut too deeply into programs for the poor and enacted too many structural changes (Clinton 1996a).

President Clinton echoed the views presented by Democrats during the deliberations; the Democrats insisted that the current bill did nothing to offer assistance to working mothers by means of child care (Richards 1995). Clinton argued that the new legislation did not offer enough protection to recipients during economic downturns, and that greater protections should be granted to recipients by way of increased health care coverage (Clinton 1996a). Clinton was also leery of the bill’s intent to eliminate the Earned Income Tax Credit, which Clinton claimed would provide a significant incentive to move from welfare to work.

In addition to child care arguments, President Clinton also argued that the current welfare bill implemented some $60 billion dollars in program cuts that would affect school lunch programs, assistance to disabled children, and assistance to legal immigrants (Clinton 1996a). Clinton did not challenge the moral underpinnings of the legislation; the promotion of family values, and the reduction of illegitimate births. Instead, Clinton insisted that structural changes were necessary if welfare reform legislation was to be enacted in his Presidency (Clinton 1996a).

Reconciliation

Consideration for new welfare legislation was soon on the legislative agenda in Congress as legislators attempted to create a package that would clear the presidential hurdle. In the summer of 1996, Republican legislators introduced legislation (H.R. 3507 in the House and S. 1795 in the Senate) that would try to garner bipartisan support by creating legislation that stated that protection for children and adoption programs would be handled at the federal level. It also allowed legal immigrants waiting to become American citizens to receive cash aid (U.S Congress 1996). The Republicans hoped that the modified bills would be able to pacify President Clinton’s demands for child safety and the protection of program funding, while still allowing for meaningful welfare reform to actually take place. Finally, on June 27, 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 was introduced by Rep. John Kasich (R-OH) for consideration in the House (U.S. Congress 1996b).
**Action on Revised PRWORA**

The House began debate on the new PRWORA legislation and the ideological battle lines were once again redrawn in the summer of 1996. Central to the debate was the Democrats’ concern with the lack of child protection due to parental negligence. To counter this apprehension, the Democrats supported the Tanner-Castle amendment which provided children a voucher to continue to receive aid in the event that their parents were terminated from assistance after five years on the program, therefore allowing for a compromise on the contemporaneous existence of program time-limits and child protection (U.S. Congress 1996a). The Tanner-Castle amendment was ultimately rejected in a vote of 258 to 168 (only nine Republicans supported the amendment). Republicans praised H.R. 3734’s anticipated goal of significantly reducing welfare rolls and believed that hardship clauses that allowed certain families to be exempt from the five year time limits provided an adequate safety net for children. Additionally, Republicans voiced concerned with the granting of aid to immigrants, which Democrats still supported (U.S. Congress 1996a).

**Floor Vote**

Supported by a conservative base, H.R. 3734 passed in the House by a vote of 256 to 170, with 226 Republicans voting in support of the legislation and 165 Democrats voting in opposition (U.S. Congress 1996a). Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) claimed that the new welfare legislation’s focus on a state block grant created a lottery system in which states with a strong economy would be able to provide better services for their welfare recipients than states with fewer resources and more vulnerable economies. Republicans countered that the new bill would allow for state control over welfare issues and provide the impetus for family values and self-sufficiency (U.S. Congress 1996a).

**Conference**

PRWORA passed in the Senate by a vote of 74 to 24, with 51 Republicans supporting the measure and 24 Democrats in opposition. The bill was approved in the Senate after the companion clause, S.1956, was inserted into the legislation (U.S. Congress 1996b). The House disagreed with the provisions of the Senate legislation and agreed to hold a conference to remedy the differences. The House was particularly concerned with Senate provisions that would grant vouchers to children which, in the view of House
Republicans, would undermine the five year time limit that was initially conceived (U.S Congress 1996b).

The conference report addressed an important debate on the reformation of the Medicaid program. Republicans initially sought to grant states more autonomy in constructing Medicaid eligibility requirements that were germane to the needs of their particular jurisdictional area. President Clinton threatened to veto the legislation if a major revision of Medicaid or Food Stamps was included (Caraley 2001). The final conference report included the provision that all states must provide sufficient Medicaid coverage to all families that satisfied 1996 AFDC program standards, thus pacifying the Democrats’ and the president’s concerns (NOW 1996).

Also amended in the conference report were provisions that would have protected women from domestic violence (NOW 1996). Initially, a domestic violence protection provision, introduced by Democrat Paul Wellstone (D-MN), was included in the bill that passed the Senate. The domestic violence provision was ultimately dropped as Republicans claimed that a hardship clause already existed within the current context of the bill, and that the new provision would create further burdensome regulations (NOW 1996).

A significant point of debate for the conference report was the House’s desire to repeal child care safety regulations in an attempt to increase the choices for child care for recipients leaving welfare rolls (NOW 1996). Democrats vehemently opposed any modification to existing child care standards and were successful in keeping child care protections within the final conference report. Federal entitlement programs that guaranteed child care for working recipients were purged from the final conference report (Lino 1998).

Other changes in the conference report included a reduction in funding for food stamp programs and school lunch programs, the implementation of a “family cap” that prohibited the allocation of additional aid to children who were born while the parents are on welfare, offering supplemental grant money to states that achieved low rates of out-of-wedlock births, and the denial of assistance to legal immigrants (Caraley 2001). The Democrats argued against any program cuts, while Republicans were desirous of bureaucratic reductions. Both parties were satisfied with the marriage and family provisions.

**Presidential Support**

In the summer of 1996, the House agreed to the conference report by a vote of 328 to 101. On August 1, 1996, the Senate agreed to the conference report
by a vote of 78 to 21. The bill was then signed into law by President Clinton on August 22, 1996, creating Public Law 104-193 (U.S. Congress 1996b). Upon signing the legislation, President Clinton asserted his support for the stringent work requirements, child support enforcement provisions, and the preservation of existing Medicaid coverage’s and assurances for recipients (Clinton 1996b). President Clinton expressed reservations about the denial of aid to legal immigrants, expressed displeasure with new food stamp eligibility requirements, and was concerned with the lack of contingency funding for states in economic recessions (Clinton 1996b).

Conclusion

PRWORA developed over several years and featured a highly contentious formulation process. Republicans, who gained a congressional majority in 1994, were able to press forward with legislation founded on strict ideological principles that called for the complete renovation of the welfare system. Both parties agreed that the current welfare system was in disrepair and that welfare reform should stress personal responsibility and move welfare mothers into the workforce. PRWORA’s sweeping changes eliminated the federal social safety net and created state-based job training. States now have a significant level of power to shape their individual welfare policies, indicating a shift from Madisionian to Jeffersonian values.

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The Politically Neglected: Variables Influencing Young Voter Turnout

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It is common knowledge that most young people do not vote, yet few can agree on what factors influence voting behavior amongst recently enfranchised voters. Numerous articles and opinion pieces have been written about the so-called “Generation X.” The name denotes a sort of insignificant generation consumed by MTV, eXtreme sports, hip marketing ploys like “Do the Dew,” and other advertising that depict people climbing steep cliffs, snowboarding in high alpine country or performing crazy automobile stunts. Generation X is considered indifferent to politics and voting, and is often thought to be too busy worrying about their next consumer electronic purchase to be bothered with the realities of the domestic and international political landscape. But is Generation X really much different than past generations when it comes to voting? In this essay, I hope to explain some of the variables that affect the voting behavior of young people in the United States.

A Review of the Literature

A review of the literature on the topic of low voter turnout among young people could quite easily comprise (or compromise) an entire research project. What I have attempted in this review is to highlight the main themes explaining voting behavior among young people in the United States with the hopes of achieving some sense of thoroughness and brevity—a combination which seldom pair easily.

Rational choice theory was first developed as an economic theory which claims that individuals or economic units will always seek that which will yield the greatest utility or satisfaction. Weighing all available information, the rational person looks to maximize his or her utility while minimizing cost. Similarly, applying this theory to political behavior, the rational person is thought to vote when the benefit of voting outweighs the costs associated with such an activity. Thus, the process of voter registration is the first obstacle to young voters. As Arend Lijphart writes, “In the United States, burdensome registration requirements have long been recognized as a major institutional deterrent to voting…. The costs of registration are often higher than the cost of voting itself” (7). In some places perspective voters would
have to travel to their local courthouse or library in order to register to vote during business hours when most young people are working or in the classroom (Flanigan and Zingale 2002). Even considering the efforts to decrease the costs involved with voter registration by placing registration booths in local shopping centers and malls, or by solicitors on university and college campuses, these efforts do not seem to make any substantial impact in terms of voter turnout. Flanigan and Zingale (2002) elaborate on this point saying, “Voter registration drives, in which volunteers go door to door or register voters at shopping malls and on college campuses, capture many politically uninvolved people. A certain proportion of these people will not have the interest or incentive to bear the additional costs of getting to the polls on election day” (48). In my own experience, voter registration in shopping centers and malls are not consistent enough and usually only appear in specific locations with little or no prior publicizing. In addition, solicitors on university and college campuses often have a political bias or some agenda which precedes their efforts to register potential voters, and as such many individuals may be put off by the solicitor’s political agenda—thus compromising what might seem as a convenient place to register for young people.

Another aspect of rational choice theory is what some have called the “start-up problem.” That is, many young people are displaced from voting because they are “very mobile, do not own their own home, and lack strong roots in a local community” (Jankowaski and Strate 1995). In addition, some may be in the military or in college and might not meet the residence requirements needed to vote in those areas. The start-up problem acts as a barrier to voter registration and voter turnout, as the costs of political participation via casting a vote is much higher for young people.

While the remedy to the rational choice theory seems reasonably approachable—instilling a European model of government controlled automatic voter registration, and less stringent resident requirements, the realities of the American political system have and will continue to prevent such changes from occurring (Lijphart 1997). One major reason for this stagnation is that the two political parties believe they stand to gain or lose a substantial amount of potential influence by such radical changes. As it stands, barriers to voter registration tend to help the Republican Party, whereas a sudden increase in voter registration by young voters would most certainly help the Democrats. Flanigan and Zingale (2002, 49) illustrated this point best, saying:

Because the unregistered tend to be poorer and less well educated, Democrats who traditionally represent such groups, hope (and Republicans fear) that reducing registration obstacles will increase the
number of Democratic voters. As in the historical extensions of the suffrage, this effort to facilitate voter registration mixes philosophical concerns with political motivations.

Voter turnout is also looked at in terms of changes in the political experiences of particular generational cohorts. That is, the experiences of one generation are usually endemic, and succeeding generations will experience different stimuli, thus political participation can be thought of as a function of generational behavior. According to the generational hypothesis, the lowering of the age requirement from twenty-one to eighteen in 1971 was in part a response to public outcry and the irony that existed during the Vietnam War. At eighteen years of age, men were old enough to be sent into battle, but not old enough to vote for the president that might send them. In 1920 women were enfranchised in the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as a result of many years of struggle dating back to 1848 during the first women’s rights conference in Seneca Falls, New York (Gitelson et al. 118). Yet, these political experiences have not led to radical increases in voter turnout for subsequent generations. As stated by Glenn and Grimes (1968, 565-66):

Women aged 60 in 1944 reached 21 in 1905, fifteen years before women gained the franchise, whereas women aged 60 in 1964 reached voting age five years after the Nineteenth Amendment became effective. It would hardly be surprising if persons who were first allowed to vote when they were approaching middle age were never as politically active as those who had the franchise from age 21.

Events that would lead to greater voter participation such as World Wars I and II, the Great Depression, and other catastrophic experiences, eventually lose influence over generations. That is, generations that have no memory of the struggles of past generations might not be as politically active. As a result, “The young, consequently, entered a political system constructed by and for their parents, strangers to the issues, identities, and commitments that arose from an earlier era” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). This generational explanation of participation suggests further that the experiences shaping the political attitudes and behavior of one generation remain as political influences throughout their lives. Therefore, people who experience radical events growing up are more likely to vote at higher rates throughout their lives than those who experience relatively quaint times (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).
A contending theory to rational choice and the generational hypothesis is one that suggests that the relationship between age and participation are functions of the human life-cycle. The life-cycle or life-span hypothesis implies that young people are less likely to vote because they lack integration into communities that can only occur through the process of ageing. Middle-aged voters tend to vote at a high rate, and are more integrated into their communities—they attend church services more regularly, have stronger community attachments, and participate in a range of organizations, as well as obtaining an increased income, and this leads to greater attentiveness to political issues and a higher propensity to vote (Strate et al. 1989). Elderly voters tend to be disengaged from social contacts as a result of a number of variables ranging from physical ailments, poorer health, declining incomes, and a reduction in community participation—and as a consequence their voting turnout tends to decline (Glenn and Grimes 1968). The life-cycle hypothesis asserts that “political participation in its various forms is social behavior based on accepted knowledge and dispositions, shaped and maintained by a variety of material, purposive, and social rewards” (Strate et al. 1989, 447). In other words, rational theory does not explain factors of political socialization, such as a citizen’s perceived civic duty to vote and participate in the political process.

Political knowledge is also a huge predictive factor of one’s tendency to participate in the political process. Those who are exposed to the educational system the longest and “who possess greater civic competence are more likely to participate in politics, because they have a better understanding of it and thus are able to make discriminating judgments...[Thus] the acquisition of civic competence is an age-related process” (Strate et al. 1989, 450). This process of civic competence continues throughout adulthood in the form of mass media both in television and the print media. Not surprisingly, the elderly tend to read and keep up with issues less because of failing eyesight and other health related impediments.

The life-cycle hypothesis in its self may not be enough to explain why young people are less likely to vote. Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) preferred method to account for the relationship between age and voting is the life-experience hypothesis. The life-experience hypothesis implies that people acquire resources as they get older—they develop social contacts and networks that facilitate participation in politics. As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) put it people become:

[F]amiliar with the political process, the political parties and their candidates. They acquire political knowledge and political skills. Finally, they
acquire social contacts; their social ties become denser, increasing their exposure to mobilization and their susceptibility to the social rewards of taking part (137).

Political experience can be gained with or without formal education. Older people who tend to have less education than younger people may have developed their civic competence as a result of their life-long learning through political experiences. Younger people with lower levels of education will be substantially less likely to participate in politics, however “the accumulation of political experience as a result of growing older leads to increasing levels of civic competence and, in turn, to greater voting participation” (Strate et al. 1989, 451). Although Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) present the life-experience hypothesis as a contrasting theory to the life-cycle hypothesis, I see it as a sub-category or an aspect of the life-cycle hypothesis. That is, I believe the level of experiences one might achieve can be limited by one’s current position in the life-cycle. Young people will by nature have less significant social contacts than their parents relative to their social class, and so on.

Arthur T. Hadley explains low voter turnout among young people in two very different frameworks; the positive apathetic and the naysayer. The positive apathetic person is the young person of voting age that has essentially lived a tranquil life of comfort, one who has not experienced any turmoil beyond the family network. Positive apathetics are described as happy—they are well educated, young, make decent money, they are involved in community activities, and things are just going too well for them to be worried about politics (Hadley 1978). As Hadley described, “They [the positive apathetic] refrain not out of bitterness or emptiness, as has customarily been thought, but because at present their lives are too full for the act of voting to seem important” (70). Interestingly, a number of these apathetic non-voters are thought to be avoiding voter registration in order to evade jury duty (Hadley 1978).

The naysayer according to Hadley, is the person who is determined not to vote for a specific reason. Generally the naysayer tends to be highly cynical, and politically they tend to be liberals or moderates (Hadley 1978). As Hadley describes, “No one reason dominates the naysayer’s decision to refrain. For some it’s philosophy, for some religion, for some a bad experience with national or local politics” (90). In many cases there simply is not enough choice, just as those who have claimed that there is only one political party in the United States; the Capitalist Party with its two wings—the Democrats and Republicans, the naysayer is often reserved to nonvoting for a lack of a true alternative voice. Hadley best illustrates this point when he
recounts an article printed in The New York Times by Rabbi Howard Singer of Connecticut who compared naysayers to “the noblest spirits in the Middle Ages” saying, “Thinking the world beyond hope they retreated to the monasteries…I can’t vote for either of the two mediocrities offered for our approval…I won’t feel guilty about it. A conscious rejection of a corrupt process and a fake choice is morally preferable to flipping a coin” (91).

The problem with the positive apathetic and the naysayer theories is that they do not explain voter absenteeism at a mass scale. At the time Hadley conducted his research only 6 percent of the surveyed nonvoters were categorized as naysayers. Similar statistics were reported for the so-called positive apathetic. However, the notion of apathy deserves further study.

A more recent study conducted by Wattenberg (2002) which plays a similar tune to that of the positive apathetic nonvoter, is what Wattenberg referred to as the political know-nothing generation. Wattenberg argues that the most recent generations are lacking political knowledge, political exposure, and interest. This is due in part to a number of declining methods of political socialization, namely—the media. That is, newspaper readership and consumption of broadcasted versus narrow-casted programming on television has left young people detached from political issues. Wattenberg (2002) describes current trends in young voting age college students saying, “A yearly nationwide study of college freshman recently found that among the class of 2002 only 26 percent said that ‘keeping up with politics’ was an important priority for them, compared with 58 percent among the class of 1970—their parents generation” (88).

Narrow-casting refers to the shift in viewership from standard programming that sought a broad audience to cable programming aimed at a specific demographic of viewers, such as MTV, Comedy Central, ESPN, C-SPAN and others. This shift in the media market has dropped public affairs from the radar screen of young Americans. As Wattenberg (2002) writes, “It has become particularly difficult to convince members of a generation that has channel surfed all their lives that politics really does matter” (91).

An important media outlet that has experienced a generational decline is newspaper readership. The fact that young people do not tend to read newspapers on a regular basis is said to be a major factor contributing to young people’s political illiteracy (Wattenberg 2002). In a study conducted by Teixeira (1992), newspaper readership was found to be a strong indicator of who votes. “The consumption of newspaper campaign coverage has a substantially stronger relationship to turnout,” Teixeria argues, “than consumption of television campaign coverage” (166).
While Wattenberg (2002) certainly makes an intriguing point, I would add that the media act as only a part of the political socialization process of young adults. A more comprehensive study on the changes in the political socialization of Americans that includes such factors as the family, peer groups, and the workplace is needed to facilitate a strong understanding of the changing political dynamics of young Americans.

The Variables

There are a number of possible variables that can influence voting behavior: race, gender, marital status, income level, education, party identification, and so on. We know for example that a person’s political ideology can change over time. We know that married couples tend to vote differently than single people; and men differently than women. But what are the factors that lead young voters to be less likely to vote than older voters? My research will attempt to expose these variables by analyzing survey data from the 2000 American National Election Study.

The American National Election Study (NES) was created by the University of Michigan in 1948. The NES is now funded by the National Science Foundation and its purpose is to provide valuable data regarding the American electorate to students, researchers, social scientists, and others interested in establishing voter trends or measuring the impact of past events. The NES consists of a number of studies primarily conducted during presidential and midterm election years. Of particular importance to social and political scientists is the vast amount of data archived—spanning over half a century. The 2000 NES is made up of pre-election and post-election survey data. My analysis contains data from both the pre-election and post-election data subsets.

My hypothesis is that young voters (18-30) are less likely to vote than older voters if they have high levels of cynicism and mistrust. That is, a young voter who has a low opinion of the government or believes his or her vote doesn’t matter will be less likely to vote than an older voter with the same level of cynicism and mistrust. I tested this theory by creating a number of scales made up of various questions that measure one’s overall level of mistrust and cynicism. I then tested these scales against different age groups in search of any recognizable patterns. I controlled for error by testing other variables against my age categories and the “did you vote” question in the 2000 American National Election Study. Other variables include: race, income, education, and party identification.
There are other variables that could be tested such as gender, ideology, religiosity, and so on. However, these variables do not produce any significant results. For example, controlling for gender simply split my age groups and replicated the previous pattern in each group with only minimal differences in the oldest age group where women make up a larger percentage of the population.

The age groups that I have created came about by creating Figure 1 with the vote question as my dependent variable and age as an independent variable. As expected, the graph demonstrates that as age increases, so does voting participation levels. The age range was broken up into four age groups differentiated by sudden changes on the line graph. The age groups selected were 18-30, 31-45, 46-70, and 71-97. I also recoded a separate age variable using the commonly used generational cohorts such as: Generation X (18-39), Baby Boomers (40-58), Silent Generation (59-76), and the GI Generation (77 and older) just for comparison.

Figure 1.

![Voting Participation By Age](image)

The line graph in Figure 1 shows that voters in the age group between 18-30 years go through a rapid change as voter participation increases, and settles out a bit, from ages 31-45. From 46 to roughly 70 years of age there doesn’t seem to be much change in the overall slope of the line indicating that participation while higher than the previous age groups on average, is not
experiencing any significant growth beyond age 46.

By recoding the age variable into five year increments I was able to smooth the line graph in order to get a better idea of the overall trends within the age groups (see Figure 2 below). Interestingly, there are not a lot of differences between the indicated age groups (those indicated by changes in the initial graph), and the commonly accepted generational cohorts. I chose to use my age groups for the remainder of the study to avoid confusions with the data, and to remain consistent throughout this essay.

**Figure 2.**

![Voting Participation By Age](chart)

**Why the Decline in Young Voter Turnout Matters**

The relationship between age and voter turnout is quite important. Longitudinal analysis of voter trends establish a pattern of political inequality, where older age groups tend to dominate the political process. Figure 3 was created by combining age categories from different generational cohorts and analyzing their voting behavior using longitudinal data for presidential elections since 1952. Midterm election data was eliminated from the graph in order to make it more readable. However, it should also be noted that
presidential elections draw the highest levels of voter turnout—so the graph below represents the best voting behavior of the American electorate. In addition, declining levels of trust and rising cynicism levels have come to characterize the American electorate, as longitudinal analysis for these measures produce results similar to those displayed in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3.

Figure 3 demonstrates that there is a growing level of political inequality developing in the American electoral system. As indicated by the graph, the decline in voter participation for 18-30 year-olds started sometime during 1972 and continued to decline rapidly thereafter. Interestingly, this comes only a year after 18 year-olds were enfranchised. Contrastingly, the voting behavior of people aged 71 and older seemed to have increased substantially during the same time that young people began to abstain from the electoral process. The continued rise in senior citizen participation may be due to advancements in medical and health related practices. Seniors are living longer, more fulfilling lives than in previous decades (Wattenberg 2002).

One area of growing importance to political scientists is the decline of older voters not normally associated with low voter turnout. As shown in Figure 3, the 31-45 age group exhibits a declining level of turnout, becoming more pronounced sometime after 1960 and as a trend has continued to
decline in every presidential election since. Wattenberg (2002) and others have argued, this decline in older more traditionally poll-active age categories may have an impact on future generations (88-90). In other words, the problem of low voter turnout among young people might be thought of in terms of a growing inertia effect, where debilitating political opinions, low levels of trust, and highly cynical views of the government held by earlier generations may impact the political behavior of young people. Examining how these variables impact the electoral behavior of different age groups is essential to gauging the future of political participation in the United States.

The Results

The independent variables I tested included existing variables made up of single questions within the 2000 American National Election Study subset, and new variables created to measure trust, internal efficacy, and external efficacy. The dependent variable in this study is the “did you vote” question. Table 1 below displays those who voted in the 2000 national election cross-tabulated with my designated age categories. This table shows that of the 255 surveyed voters within the 18-30 age group, only 58.8 percent voted. Participants in other age categories voted at a much higher rate. The 46-70 group represents the most active voting age group in 2000, with a turnout of 84 percent.

Table 1. Voting by Age Cohorts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohorts</th>
<th>18-30</th>
<th>31-45</th>
<th>46-70</th>
<th>71-97</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did R vote?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes Count</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Count</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square (p < .000)
Cramer’s V value .206

The significance of this crosstabulation is expressed by using Chi-Square. Chi-Square is a measure of significance that will gauge the degree to which association would occur simply by chance (Korey 2003-2004). There are other stronger tests for significance but because the vote variable is nominal data (the values of “1=yes” and “5=no” are arbitrary values used only to
describe a behavior), I chose Chi-Square as the most appropriate test for significance. In this case, the relationship between age and voter turnout is significant, as there is less than .0005 of a chance that such associations would occur by chance.

However, the fact that age and voting are significantly related does not mean that one is a result of the other. There could be other variables that affect people of different age groups, which in turn can influence one’s desire to vote. What is needed is a measure of strength. Because one of my variables is nominal I used Cramer’s V to measure the strength of the relationship between voting and age categories. A measure approaching 1 denotes a strong relationship. In this example Cramer’s V is .206, which suggests that the relationship, while significant, is not very strong. That is, by simply knowing where one falls within a particular age group does not necessarily infer that one can predict whether a person voted or not. There must be some other variable or variables that help to explain this relationship.

A third variable or control variable can be used to test the relationship between my independent and dependent variables. In Table 2 below income level is used as a control variable in the same crosstab of voter turnout and age. In order to simplify my analysis and increase the number of respondents within a particular category of income, I originally recoded the income variable into five classifications—poor, lower-middle, middle, upper, and wealthy. However, only the poor and lower middle income levels produced significant Chi-Square results. There are a number of reasons why this does not produce a strong relationship. An important aspect of this control variable is that there are not enough subjects in each subcategory to make any strong conclusions. In addition, on average younger people make less money than older people, and there are less people in the higher income brackets. For example there were only eleven people in the 18-30 age group who claimed to make $200,000 or more annually—not nearly enough to draw any conclusions.

Because there was limited number of people from the 18-30 age group in the higher income brackets, I further recoded the income variable into two annual income categories; $0-24,999 and $25,000-200,000 or more. However, income does not appear to reduce the association between age and voting, as the Cramer’s V value for both categories was relatively low. So, knowing one’s income and age does not increase the probability that one’s guess of voter turnout would be successful.
Table 2. Voting by Age Cohorts, Controlling for Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Did R vote?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within age cohorts</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within age cohorts</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within age cohorts</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within age cohorts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-24,999</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
<td>76</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
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<td>76.8%</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>29</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
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<td>27.6%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
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<td>171</td>
<td>220</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
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<tr>
<td>25,000-200,000</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>259</td>
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<td>925</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
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<td>% within</td>
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<td>78.9%</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>32</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
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<td>% within</td>
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<td>11.6%</td>
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<td>18.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>393</td>
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<td>293</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</table>

0-24,999 Chi-Square (p < .000)
0- 24,999 Cramer’s V value .186
25,000 and Over Chi-Square (p < .000)
25,000 and Over Middle Cramer’s V value .201

In addition to income I also controlled for education and race, but the results are similar. Controlling for education using my recoded education variable produced significant results for high school graduates and those who have completed some college. Although the relationship between education level and voting is stronger than income at the high school and some-college level (Cramer’s V value of .322 and .250 respectfully), the results merely replicated the pattern observed in my initial bivariate analysis. Race proved even less a factor as only whites scored high enough to be considered significant and a strength score of .229 still only proved to replicate previous patterns.

Another variable thought to influence voting behavior is a measure of how strongly one views his or her party identification. Younger people are much more disengaged from party ties than older people. Only 34.2 percent of the 18-30 age group identified themselves as Democrats, 45.9 percent as Independents, and 19.8 percent identified as Republicans. In contrast, 43.6 percent of the 46-70 age group identified themselves as Democrats, only 27.3 percent as Independents, and 29.1 percent identified as Republicans (see Table 3 next page).
Table 3. Party Identification by Age Cohorts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Identification</th>
<th>Age Cohorts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>31-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRAT</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEPENDENT</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICAN</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square ($p < .000$)

The strength of one’s party identification may be a mitigating factor in their decision to vote. To measure party id strength I recoded a seven-point scale of party identification. Respondents were asked to place themselves into one of seven categories: (Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent Leaning Democrat, Pure Independent, Independent Leaning Republican, Weak Republican, or Strong Republican). Since I was controlling for strength of party identification I eliminated Independent scores. I combined those that identified themselves as strong Democrats or weak Democrats and those that identified themselves as weak Republicans, or strong Republicans, and created a two-point scale representing those who had fairly firm party id scores. However, since most young people identify themselves as independents and very few young people identified strongly with either party, there were not enough respondents in the 18-30 range to draw any significant conclusions.

The 2000 American National Election Study subset contains a series of questions that measure one’s internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy being how people view themselves in relation to politics, while the external efficacy questions measure one’s view of society within the context of politics. For an example, one internal efficacy question asked, “Does R see self as having good understanding of political issues?” An example of an external efficacy question would be, “Does R think public officials don’t care?” Because of the number of variables and the gradation of possible answers I recoded each variable into three measures (positive, neutral, and negative). I then combined my new external and internal efficacy variables, excluding the neutral responses, to create an overall three-point cynicism measure that displays three scales of cynicism. Interestingly, the oldest age group turned out to be the most cynical of the government with 36.5 percent labeling themselves highly cynical. However, the oldest age group also has the high-
est concentration of females, which tend to be more cynical and distrustful of the government than males. Excluding the 71-97 category, Younger people were more likely to be highly cynical than any other age group (see Table 4).

**Table 4. Cynicism by Age Cohorts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cynicism Level</th>
<th>Age Cohorts</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>31-45</td>
<td>46-70</td>
<td>71-97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Level of Cynicism</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium Level of Cynicism</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Level of Cynicism</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chi-Square (p < .001)*

As expected, the cynicism level tends to have a greater impact on voter turnout among the 18-30 group than it does with others. Although the relationship is not as strong as I would have expected, the results are not replicated, rather, these results seem to help interpret the relationship suggesting that it is possible that a high level of cynicism affects age groups—which in turn affects voter turnout. Table 5 confirms that cynicism levels impact all age categories. Older respondents continue to vote at above the 50 percentile level, but cynicism seems to play a significant role. For example the 46-70 age group voted at 96.3 percent when they demonstrated the lowest level of overall cynicism, while dropping to 65.7 percent at the highest cynicism level.
Table 5. Voting by Age Cohorts, Controlling for Cynicism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFFICACY</th>
<th>Age Cohorts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>31-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Cynicism</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did R vote?</td>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Cynicism</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did R vote?</td>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>79.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Cynicism</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did R vote?</td>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>74.4%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within age cohorts</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highest Eff Chi-Square (p < .009)
Highest Eff Cramer’s V value .223
Medium Eff Chi-Square (p < .003)
Medium Eff Cramer’s V value .220
Lowest Eff Chi-Square (p < .000)
Lowest Eff Cramer’s V value .303

After analyzing the results for all four trust measures, I recoded each variable and computed a similar three-point test for trust which produced interesting results. Again, the youngest age group is also the least trustful of the government, as 57.9 percent demonstrated that they had little trust in government. Table 6 illustrates that trust plays less of a role than cynicism. However, one must take into account that the cynicism scale only used results from 739 respondents or 40.9 percent of the total surveyed population. The overall trust scale tested 80 percent of the surveyed population. The discrepancy is due to the fact that the neutral respondents to efficacy questions were eliminated from the results before being computed into a single variable. These figures seem to be consistent with the overall trends in America’s young voting age population. The youngest age categories have the least favorable trust and efficacy measures. Figure 4 illustrates the significance of the relationship between trust, efficacy, and voter turnout.
Table 6. Voting by Age Cohorts, Controlling for Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohorts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-70</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-97</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highest Trust Chi-Square (p < .002)
Highest Trust Cramer's V value .219

Medium Trust Chi-Square (p < .060)
Medium Trust Cramer's V value .146

Lowest Trust Chi-Square (p < .000)
Lowest Trust Cramer's V value .226

Figure 4. Trust, Efficacy, and Voter Turnout
Conclusion

It seems as though trust and cynicism are important factors, but not necessarily the most important variables influencing the voting behavior of young people. The results did seem to prove that trust and cynicism have a greater impact on younger voters. Perhaps this can be explained using the Life-Cycle approach described earlier. Other variables more commonly associated with older categories such as home ownership, income levels and so on, may have a substantial impact on one’s cynicism and trust, which in turn influences voting behavior. I suppose what we may find is that instability in one’s life has an influence on trust which leads to lower voter turnout. Or it could simply be that with all the uncertainties in a young person’s life, political participation does not rank highly on a priority list. Is that to say that young people 18-30 still have child-like views towards the world, such as “the world revolves around me” syndrome? I don’t believe that is the case. However, it is clear that trust and cynicism are significant factors influencing the political behavior of young voters, just not enough so to be considered the most significant factors leading to low voter turnout.

Contending theories have suggested that an increase in voting participation among young people might not make a significant impact on electoral outcomes (Teixeira 1992). For many philosophers and statesmen the idea of democracy was a frightening thought. The true meaning of democracy is not government by the people, for this definition would also include the elite and the landed aristocracy. Democracy in its literal translation refers to government by the common people. This of course was the great fear of our founding fathers. Thomas Jefferson particularly thought of democracy as a task for a small minority of established citizens. The French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1987, 180) dispelled the notion of a true democracy saying, “A true democracy has never existed and never will. It is contrary to the natural order that the majority govern and the minority is governed.” The fact that young voters are being excluded from the system by means of their own inactivity would be considered a blessing by some. As Hadley (1998, 109) remarked, “Small turnouts… remove from the decision making process those most likely to make the wrong decisions.”

The very idea of political inequality seems contradictory to any meaningful effort at democracy. Vast improvements in government may not result from an increase in voter turnout. However, the fact that the highly distrustful and cynical young people of today will become the electorate sought after by the politicians of tomorrow is a disturbing notion. One can only wonder what will become of succeeding generations if current trends continue.
References


Gender And The Wage Gap

By Nathan Davis

Abstract

A team of over 100 volunteers plans, studies, writes, researches, and stresses over the National Model United Nations (NMUN) conference held annually in New York City—two days of which are in the United Nations building. It is attended by more than 3200 students from over 200 schools, 50 percent of which are from outside the USA. This paper is a background topic guide and an annotated bibliography and is an example of the dedication and efforts put together by this team of unique individuals. With sixteen committees simulating the work of the UN, and with three topics per committee, one can begin to grasp the sheer volume of work that is required by the staff in these preparations.

This background topic guide was written for the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Gender and the Wage Gap is one of three agenda topics chosen for CEDAW at the NMUN for March 2005. Student delegates representing their country’s policy employ background guides as agenda topics and research tools. They function as a research tool due to their unbiased and complete evaluation of the topic inclusive with an annotated bibliography to facilitate the research process. Student delegates upon the receipt of the background topic guides are encouraged to begin research and policy development concerning the topics while adhering to the country’s policy they will be representing. This research culminates in the writing of a position paper by the student delegate that is submitted two weeks prior to commencement of the conference.

Equality and discrimination are two major themes with which the United Nations (UN) has taken issue since its inception in 1945.1 In the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, these issues are enshrined as pivotal goals in the realization of human rights for all people of the world. The Preamble confirms that all Member States hold high “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women.”2 Article 1 of the Charter seeks to establish equal-
ity in all realms of public and private life by working “[t]o achieve interna-
tional co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

In 1948, the General Assembly adopted an international treaty that 
recognized for the first time, the inherent human rights granted to all 
people, regardless of race, color, age, or gender distinction. The *Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) outlines in Article 2 that “everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex… .” The UDHR further 
establishes in Article 23 that “everyone, without any discrimination, has the 
right to equal pay for equal work.” However, for as implicit as these rights 
may be, the international community recognized that to achieve gender 
equality, more protections and achievements were needed to foster equality 
between genders in all parts of the world. Thus the UN, in recognition of 
the continuing discrimination against women in all realms of life, adopted 
General Assembly resolution 1921 (XVIII). This resolution requested that 
the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), in collaboration with the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), prepare a document that would 
conclusively outline the international standards articulating the equal and 
undeniable rights of women and men. In a 1974 response to GA resolution 
1921, the CSW sought to establish a document addressing the discrimination 
against women. Unlike the previous documents, the delegates represent-
ing the body of the CSW sought to make this effort legally binding, and in 
1979, by a vote of 130 in favor, with 10 abstentions the *Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) was 
adopted by the General Assembly.

One of the main points of caution in regards to the articulation of 
CEDAW made by Member States was the concern of equal access to employ-
ment and remuneration across the gender gap. Article 11 of CEDAW sought 
to establish equality in employment between genders that had formerly 
been lacking. Among its numerous goals for achieving equality among gen-
ders, it sought to ensure equal remuneration, equal opportunity, and the right 
to social security of person in the work place. Most importantly, however, 
is the goal enshrined in Article 11 (a) that firmly establishes the inalienable 
right to work that is granted to all human beings. Furthermore, as stated in 
Article 5(a), signatories to CEDAW must take action “[t]o modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achiev-
ing the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."\textsuperscript{16}

Obstacles to the right to work and the right to equal pay continue to
have serious and lasting consequences for women and girls in many contem-
porary societies.\textsuperscript{17} It is necessary to expand the opportunities for women
and girls around the world, as explained by Thoraya Ahmed Obaid; Executive
Director of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).\textsuperscript{18} She has stated
that the critical health of the family is necessary for the well-being of the
society and the country’s development.\textsuperscript{19} The UNFPA considers women
and girls, due to their subordinate and discriminated position in society, the
most vulnerable members of society.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the \textit{United Nations
Millennium Declaration}, A/RES/55/2, Chapter 1 (2) proclaims that while all
respective Member States have a responsibility to promote and ensure the
security and safety of their populations within their borders, all States have
a shared responsibility to protect and further the rights and opportunities of
the most vulnerable of the world.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Measuring the Gender Wage Gap}

Since Gary Becker made the initial argument for the existence of a gender
wage gap in his book \textit{The Economics of Discrimination} in 1957, a closer
examination and critique of the economics of gender discrimination began
to unfold.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{A Meta-Analysis of the International Gender Wage Gap} of the
University of Linz in 2003 estimated that the worldwide wage differentials
have fallen at a rate of 1.2 percent per year since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{23} During the
1960s women earned 35 percent of the pay for equal work performed by
men.\textsuperscript{24} In the 1990s, this statistic dropped to below 30 percent.\textsuperscript{25}

While gender discrimination appears to be improving dramatically, there
are many inconsistencies related to the way in which information and data
are collected. The oldest and most comprehensive survey of wages around
the world is the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) October Inquiry.\textsuperscript{26}
In 1924 the October Inquiry began utilizing and recording data gathered
from 18 occupations in 15 countries.\textsuperscript{27} Since 1985, they have been compil-
ing data from over 80 countries concerning 161 different occupations.\textsuperscript{28}
\textit{Globalization and the Gender Wage Gap}, many factors attribute to the
difficulty of discerning the true international male-female wage gap.\textsuperscript{29} The
main problem according to the report is the inconsistent method of relaying
information from the Member State to the ILO.\textsuperscript{30} Other problems, according
to the report are the inconsistencies of regular reporting on a yearly basis.
by Member States, in addition to different criteria for the skill work on a per country evaluation. Finally, the quality of data generated and distributed to the ILO per year can seriously hinder and confuse the ability of the October Inquiry in their efforts to make an honest and effective comparison between women and men’s earnings. For instance, as explained in *Globalization and the Gender Wage Gap*, between the years 1983 and 1999, 158 countries filed reported wages. However, out of these only 5 reported 17 times per year as required by the ILO, 43 countries reported two to four times, and 19 only reported once throughout the entire span of 16 years.

In evaluating the degree of discrimination that is prevalent in our world today, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) contends that the international community need not focus directly on the numbers so much as it should attempt to understand and overcome the inequalities. Concerning the full potential that globalization can have as a benefit to all, UNIFEM also contends that globalization can seriously affect disproportionately the inequalities that already exist. Executive Director of UNIFEM, Noeleen Heyzer states that “[t]hese inequalities include inequalities along the lines of human rights, of inclusion, the whole issue of class, of language, of the North-South divide, and increasingly of gender, of the divide between men and women, and even among women, between those who have the skills and the education and those who do not have them.”

The struggle for equality and the eradication of discrimination continues today. As in the late 1970’s when the *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women* was written, the gender wage gap continues to be one of the more hotly contested issues within the equality debate. While this issue has proven to be multi-faceted and difficult to quantify, as witnessed by the statistical difficulties of measurement, it will be necessary to understand and to ratify the inequalities that hinder our workplaces, public and private, along gender lines if Member States seek to eradicate discrimination and the resultant gender wage gap.

**International Relations and Theories on Gender Discrimination**

According to the text by Frederick Pearson and Simon Payaslian, *International Political Economy*, the history of the feminist perspective has risen in response to the patriarchal political economy largely recognizable by the male-dominated societies that comprise the international community. The authors expand on this theory by stating that “Feminist scholars contend that the mercantilist, classical liberal, Marxism, and Islamic theories of political economy are predicated in androcentric conceptualizations of
society, value, production, consumption, and employment, and they remain limited to male experiences within male-dominated domestic and international economic activities. The authors give credence to the continued existence of a gender wage gap made especially pertinent by the domination of political, economic, and domestic institutions by men. A recent report by the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues within the Department of Economic and Social Affairs titled Gender Mainstreaming an Overview makes the case for not only greater involvement of women in institutions but also a fundamental rethinking of the basic structures and practices of institutions that continue to foster inequality.

The issue of gender discrimination assumes a more nefarious contextualization for feminists in Contending Theories of International Relations concerning the roles assumed by women and men. This theory proposes that the roles of women and men are not biologically determined but instead socially constructed from within domestic societies and extended into the international society. J. Ann Tickner questions as to whether gender is a social construct or a biological phenomenon her book Gender in International Relations. The phenomenon is such that, because women were excluded from the historical process, politically and economically, identity is the requisite starting point for a renewed venture by women in their efforts to achieve equality. At the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, it recognized that women’s identity, along with cultural traditions and social organization, could dramatically improve all communities around the world. However, the Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action of 1995 makes clear there continue to be limitations to this process. “In many countries, the differences between women’s and men’s achievements and activities are still not recognized as the consequences of socially constructed gender roles rather than immutable biological differences.” The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) recognizes identity as an ever-changing process that directly affects policies of exclusion and solidarity among peoples. A report published by the UNRISD titled Gendered Poverty and Social Change, states that in order for the identity of women’s roles to adapt, both women and men are required to understand the rules and norms of present day society, and in turn to understand how these perceptions feed into the identity with which women are burdened.

The difficulty that women have achieving equality in our capitalist world economy can be appreciated given that, “the spread of capitalism separated men’s and women’s work roles, effectively devaluing women in societies that measure worth in terms of income.” It was during this rise of capi-
talisim that man became responsible for productive work, leaving for women
the unpaid reproductive work. As explained in Gender Mainstreaming an Overview, all forms of labor associated with the care and nurturing of the family have most clearly reflected women’s work. This work involves, but certainly has not been limited to child rearing, cleaning, laundry, cooking, care of the elderly, water and firewood gathering, and in many instances, sole production of agricultural goods grown for consumption by the family. Due to the decision not to demean the roles performed by women by adding monetary value to that work, the United Nations and the ILO achieved the precise opposite when they began using statistical analyses to record and analyze the economics of Member States. Theorists contend that many of the ills the world experiences today is in no small part due to the uneven and unequal access and remuneration divided by the gender roles. The essential question concerning the gender inequality at home and in the work place asks whether “[k]nowledge cannot be complete if its development does not flow from multiple sources of masculine and feminist perspectives on the basic questions.”

Knowledge shared equally attests to a brighter future for all people, yet in order to realize this goal the discrimination and bias concerning women’s traditional placement at the fringes of society must be eliminated. Similar to the domestic household level, political formal decision-making apparatuses do not facilitate an appreciation of the different needs and concerns that women have, when facing inequality in the workplace and home. It is interesting to note the possibilities for advancement from the dominating to the subjugated perspective on the part of Member States could in fact “provide a basis for new ways of thinking about interstate practices.”

Sinking or Swimming in the Global Gender Divide

Progress and development in conjunction with the United Nations Organization has, since the Millennium Development Summit, become synonymous with the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by all Member States. The third MDG specifically recognizes that, in pursuit of the totality of these goals, none are possible without calling for gender equality while concurrently recognizing that women suffer the burden of poverty disproportionately. The MDGs recognize that for Member States to reap the rewards that globalization offers, the realization of MDGs will not be obtained without empowering women to be a part of the opportunities it enables.
Recognizing the full support that 171 Member States have given to CEDAW and their subsequent support at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, the MDGs outline specific actions to be made by Member States aimed at promoting gender equality in the economic sphere.\(^{64}\) However, as the MDGs recognize the inability of countries to succeed in the full realization of the opportunities presented by globalization through the exclusion of women, so do they also recognize the need for women to overcome all discriminatory practices.\(^{65}\) These practices include limiting women’s access to education, access to the political decision-making process, and promotion of equitable sharing of the burdens of the domestic economies built upon the foundation of social change, with autonomy of women being a core interest in the pursuit of this goal.\(^{66}\) In order to accomplish this goal, CEDAW has played an integral and indivisible part.\(^{67}\) CEDAW makes a concerted effort to bridge the divide between men and women by promoting better record keeping and statistics disaggregated by gender, performed yearly by Member States party to the convention.\(^{68}\) Pursuant to CEDAW General Recommendation 17, the committee requires documentation and quantification of domestic labors performed by women into national accounts.\(^{69}\) These national accounts would then reflect the unremunerated domestic labor performed by women in the gross national product (GNP) of a nation.\(^{70}\) This quantified data facilitates the monitoring of unremunerated work performed by women and the progress made in this area.\(^{71}\)

In addition to statistical quantification measures, CEDAW also aids in the pursuit of equality in many practical areas.\(^{72}\) Article 14 of CEDAW promotes equality between men and women in the pursuit of fair practices in the agricultural sector.\(^{73}\) The World Trade Organization (WTO), in conjunction with public organizations and Member States, work to ensure equal access to seeds, fertilizer, and other farming goods on a non-gendered basis in an institution that has been typically male dominated.\(^{74}\) This process holds Member States accountable, as the WTO is responsible for program regulation and determining which Member States allocate these goods and services.\(^{75}\) The WTO maintains the right to place holds on trade accounts of agricultural goods to countries in the event they fail to meet requirements to uphold non-gendered discriminatory practices.\(^{76}\) In addition, CEDAW holds Member States accountable for increasing the number of minorities employed by large contractors.\(^{77}\) CEDAW supports the use of temporary affirmative action campaigns designed to equalize the workforce and encourages Member States to empower the hiring of women by public and private organizations into high-level positions of the industrial sector.\(^{78}\) The purpose of this effort is to eradicate the discriminatory practices making these entrances into the private sector by the public sector necessary.\(^{79}\)
In a speech to the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Financing for Development in October, 2001 Angela E.V. King, Assistant Secretary General Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women and Chairperson of the Interagency Network, stated that “macro-economic policies and institutions which do not take gender perspectives into account do not make sound economic sense.” She furthered this statement by stating that the neglect of women by formal programs within the sphere of entrepreneurship development only exacerbates the discriminatory practice worsening the gender wage gap. Ms. King, stated that contrary to popular opinion, a woman’s salary is of no less importance for the beneficence of the household as that of a man’s salary. According to Ms. King, “[s]tudies have shown, on the contrary, that women’s income is critical for family wellbeing, as women tend to allocate a greater share of their income to health, education and nutrition-related expenditures.”

Development, according to the Millennium Declaration, does not run in a gender-divided world, but an all-inclusive one. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Executive Director United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), has applauded the work performed at the Inter-Agency Meeting on Women and Gender Equality Workshop on Approaches and Methodologies for Gender Mainstreaming held in March, 2001. Gender mainstreaming has, since its introduction at the Beijing Platform for Action +5, been formerly recognized by United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as a “strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.” Concerning this, Tibaijuka enthusiastically commended the UN at large and in particular this working group on their ability to work cooperatively to bridge “the conventional barriers that so often divide us.”

Closing the Gap: Achieving Greater Gender Equality

A recent study titled “Toward a Closing of the Gender Wage Gap?” funded by the European Commission’s Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality 2001-5 has reviewed and published findings based upon its research into the wage differentials between women and men in three occupations in six European countries. The countries that facilitated the research and aided in the findings to better promote equality and a lessening of the wage
gap were Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Norway and the UK.\textsuperscript{89} The three occupations under investigation were those performed by teachers, engineers, and unskilled laborers in the fish and food processing industry.\textsuperscript{90} While the report sufficiently did not conclude any single reason for the existence of a wage gap between genders, it did point toward two main sources.\textsuperscript{91} The first was the existence of segregation across the occupation spectrum of women and men, while the second was concerned with the wage differentials that then favor those occupations engaged in by males.\textsuperscript{92} Similar reasons, regarding the segregation of men and women in the workforce and the resultant higher pay for those careers sought out by men account for the gender wage gap existent in the United States (U.S.).\textsuperscript{93} Another reason attributed to the furtherance of the gender wage gap in the U.S. has been attributed to men’s maintenance of position and continued growth within a company.\textsuperscript{94} This results in higher prestige and pay for the individual, whereas women whom take leaves of absence in order to give birth and perform the invaluable task of child rearing are at a severe disadvantage when returning to the non-domestic workforce.\textsuperscript{95} As a result, the real disparity between men and women’s pay has risen to a 26 percent difference, as indicated by the U.S. Census Bureau.\textsuperscript{96}

According to the Report of the International Labour Organization (ILO) under Article 22 of CEDAW, some progress has been made but more clearly needs to be done in terms of the elimination of the gender wage gap.\textsuperscript{97} Based upon the Latvian Central Statistical Bureau, Latvian women’s average gross salary rose to 81.4 percent of men’s wages as of October, 2001.\textsuperscript{98} The continuation of the gap between wages in Latvia, as with many countries, has mainly attributed to women’s involvement in “education, social/health care and culture, sectors largely funded out of the state budget with low average salaries.”\textsuperscript{99} In response to this, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), a body of the ILO responsible for the application of measures and actions, asked the Government to promote access to the higher salaried positions maintained by supervisory and managerial positions in addition to promotion of a more equitable sharing of family responsibilities in the domestic workplace.\textsuperscript{100}

Since assuming the role of task manager to the newly created 2003 Interagency Task Force on Gender and Financing for Development’s task force, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has worked diligently to achieve the goal of gender equality.\textsuperscript{101} In their 2004 report \textit{Trade and Gender: Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Countries}, UNCTAD focuses on the impact of equal access to the capacity and opportunities offered by trade in developing countries.\textsuperscript{102}
suggests that trade can influence, positively and negatively, the wage gap existent between men and women, mainly by creating new employment and business opportunities. Concerning the negative impact, women feel the greatest shock by the exacerbation of existing inequalities. These inequalities are, in part promoted by trade liberalization, based mainly upon the amount of education and training women in developing countries have had or of which they have been denied access to. While reports in the developed countries generally tend to cover more service sector occupations, the Trade and Gender report by UNCTAD focuses instead on agriculture, textiles, clothing and services. Furthermore, the report states that in many cases the growth of international trade and development has assisted in the “redistribution of income in favour of women.” The report credits a great amount of this success to the service and manufacturing sectors of an economy, and to the participating countries for incorporating women into their economies who benefit fully from export competitiveness and industrial diversification. Conversely, growing inequality has become evident from the lack by women of access to land in the agricultural sector and a growing import competition from developed countries. As a result, the report concludes that while trade and development are responsible for a narrowing of the wage gap, it is necessary to approach this from a country specific study to appreciate the difficulty of trade among nations.

**Conclusion**

The gender wage gap is a salient feature in our international environment. Opinions concerning the gender wage gap and the extent to which women and thus the countries of the world are suffering from inequality and discrimination vary. These concerns require diligent and introspective approaches should we have the desire to see the leveling of the playing field take shape across gender lines. Women are already an integral component in the domestic and economic institutions of the world; their role cannot be demeaned nor taken for granted as has been witnessed within the male dominated capitalist worldview. The Millennium Development Goals, the UN Charter, the UDHR and CEDAW, are several documents adopted by the international community that illustrate the integral nature that women play in the global developmentally minded world. Without female consideration and knowledge of the global community and its betterment the international community cannot expect to progress toward a more peaceful, and sustainable world. As the world continues to grow smaller, problems such as conflict, poverty, hunger, and diseases continue to succinctly impact the most
vulnerable of the world. Perhaps the most vulnerable are, in fact, the most valuable for it will be through their integration into all realms of public and private life that the answers to a better world lay waiting.

Annotated Bibliography

This is a very early resource on the topic of discrimination in the workplace. While it is somewhat outdated, it is recognized as the first systematic study of discrimination in the workplace. The author defines discrimination in his book as any economic transaction in which the economic agent is willing to accept an elevated cost in an effort to avoid pursuing transactions with a certain group, based upon race, color, religion, social status, and gender. Since writing on this topic in his doctoral dissertation from the University of Chicago, Becker has been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1992. Interestingly, as this book was written prior to the spread of globalization it had made many predictions on the potential outcome of the gender wage gap that have proven inaccurate. Even so, this book continues to be a ground breaking resource on the topic of gender discrimination and the wage gap.


This article surfaced in the wake of a 35 year anniversary of the Equal Pay Act, concurrently on Equal Pay Day, 19 April celebrated in the United States of America. It discusses the slow progress of equality within the workplace within the USA between men and women, including the steps former President Clinton and his Administration were taking to move toward greater equity in pay. This also serves as a hallmark of recognition for the wage gap discrepancy within the USA, widely recognized as a leader in equality between genders.


One of the most comprehensive literature reviews and texts on the subject of International Relations, it is a must read for all IR students who are seeking to comprehend the full significance of the world and the politics that determine how we live in it. In Chapter One, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff display a very acute understanding of the gender wage
gap issue as espoused by the IR theorists on the subject. In Chapter 9 titled “International Political Economy,” important data on the topic of globalization and its broader implications for all people of the world including the gender wage gap issue is discussed. Very useful in this text is the information contained in Chapter Four concerning the identity of women and the argument concerning whether women’s roles are defined by a biological or social construction.

Heyzer, Noeleen. 2003 November 12. Closing the Rich/Poor Gap. [Msg 5]. Available online at: http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-46293-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. Noeleen Heyzer is the Executive Director of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Appointed in 1994, she is the first director to come from the southern hemisphere. While making a renewed effort for greater awareness of women’s role in peace negotiations and vulnerability during conflict, she continues to focus on the promotion of women’s economic security and the data gathering by governments to display gender inequality in efforts to eradicate the wage gap. She also has written numerous books on the topic of the gender wage gap, including “Gender, Poverty and Sustainable Development.” In this interview she highlights the importance of the three “C”s; content, capabilities, and the factors that create poverty. Incorporating women into the creation of the content of the future is very important for her, along with increasing their capacity for growth and development, and investigating the seeds of poverty, largely attributable according to her as the lack of education, or access therein.


Hughes has composed a very easy to understand and comprehensive text on international relations. In Chapter 3, Part 2 is a useful section on the discrimination of women within the industrialized developed north, and how that discrimination has shaped our global society today as being one partly built upon the foundation of what many term women’s work in Chapter 3, Part 2. Reminiscent of the Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff text, it goes into the theories of gender discrimination to build upon the thesis of the gender wage gap and the segregation of roles along social lines and not biological ones. In Chapter 10, Hughes outlines the above mentioned roles assumed by men and women and relates those roles to the concept of identity discussed in this background guide.
In this source, Ms. King makes a persuasive and well-grounded argument in favor of the inclusion of women in all realms of economic or political life. She draws on facts concerning the role of women as providers for families, employees in the workplace, and the statistical data to support her statements. The Financing for Development program has taken large steps to equalize the playing ground between the sexes by giving small, capital intensive loans to women in developing countries. The experience has proven successful, with full repayment of these loans hovering above 90 percent, and has spurred on even broader programs.

An enlightening six country, intra-European study about the gender wage gap performed in 2002, this report is helpful in the understanding of the wage gap issue in the developed European continent. The report examines three different occupations: teachers, engineers, and unskilled laborers. The findings of the report support the existence of the gender wage gap, and further narrow down the causes to two main causes; gender segregation within firms and positions, and wage differences in positions that favor male dominated positions. The report makes a pertinent observation concerning the higher rate of equality between men and women in the public sector, and the tendency for women to seek out public positions due to increased union presence. The report concludes with a look into the trends of the gender wage gap and its impact on the workplace.

The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper is a timely and recognized research paper on the topic of the gender wage gap in the context of globalization. Funded by the World Bank, it is very useful for gaining a statistical understanding of the economics of discrimination in a cross-country perspective. The paper focuses on the findings of the ILO October Inquiry as well as an enlightening section on the statistical
problems with measuring the gender wage gap. The report also highlights the vertical and horizontal discrimination that occurs in the workplace, and the effects of intra-country and inter-country trade have on this phenomenon. The report concludes that globalization may have positive effects upon the wage gap, however in some cases it may further the divide between genders.

The “International Political Economy” is an international economics and political science text book with many good sections on the economics of discrimination. The text elucidates clearly the connection between economics and politics refuting the concept of a free market economy as proposed by Adam Smith. Pearson does a very good job summarizing not only some of the difficulties experienced by the United Nations in their measurement of inequality, but also makes good note of the struggle feminists are waging in their battle for equality in the developed world. Chapter 3 outlines the history of the suffragette movement in the USA, while Chapter 12 goes into detail about the activities and problems posed by the informal economies of the world.

Funded by the UNRISD, a multi-disciplinary research agency focused on discerning the social dimensions of contemporary problems facing development, this report is especially useful in engaging learning about the issue of the existence of the gender wage gap. The author argues that there continues to be a lack of honest appreciation for the problem of inequality between genders by many Member States. It is with this perspective in mind that the author approaches the history of women and poverty as a history of linkages, interwoven into our societal composition. This composition enables women to be better providers for the families of the world given their history of struggle.

Tickner has produced a great resource on the politics of gender discrimination with this text. The book covers a highly introspective look into the politics among nations, however through a gendered perspective. Perhaps most succinct for the purposes of this topic are her ideas concerning the repression of women in the halls of power and its detrimental effects for women in all areas of life, especially the economic sphere. She lays out a very strong argument in favor of a change in representation in the halls of power due to the environmental degradation, high degree of destructive capabilities, and economic inequality existent in the world today at the behest of men.


The Charter of the United Nations is the first recognized international legally binding treaty held by the international community. Chapter 7 of the UN Charter allocates authority to the UN to use force in the case of flagrant abuses of international law. The Charter also outlines the purposes and abilities of the UN to deal with human rights issues such as gender discrimination in the respective Member States in the effort to alleviate suffering in a peaceful and cooperative fashion.


The report highlights the concept and capability of gender mainstreaming in the international community as the accepted strategy in promoting the reduction and ultimate eradication of inequality between sexes in all realms of public and private life as outlined at the Beijing Platform for Action, in 1995. The report is composed of presentations given by notable figures in the fight for equality at a one-day conference held by the IAMWGE in 2001. It lauds the successful strategies and measures taken by the United Nations and other Non-Governmental Organizations in their efforts to introduce greater equality for women in the hopes of greater standardization of practices in public and private institutions. The report makes a concerted effort to promote greater involvement by women for women in the creation of policy at the
highest levels in order to achieve greater equality. The summary of the report highlighted the need for patience and time in the implementation of programs and the creation of policies to address hindrances to gender mainstreaming.


Published in 1995, this report composed by the General Assembly at the Fourth World Conference on Women aims to document the progress made in the pursuit of equality for women around the world. It consists of a very instructive historical perspective on CEDAW, CEDAW itself, a brief section on trends and an extensive section dedicated to the challenges posed to the implementation of CEDAW in the Member States of the world. The report concludes with a calling of renewed efforts by Member States to enact policies and implementations of CEDAW and a section on future strategies to achieve this.


Written in preparation for the June, 2004 UNCTAD meeting, this document is an amalgamation of reports and analyses by UNCTAD, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), UNIFEM, among others. In this report the Task Force delves into the topic of the gender wage gap from a trade based imperative and attempts to combat the inequality from a policy analysis and restructuring foundation. Section two has a very good introduction to the topic of “engendering” trade, while section seven places a very strong emphasis on the “modes” of trade and gender involvement therein. This report is especially useful for Delegates representing developing countries as it is especially suited to their economic interests.


This web page is a useful starting point for the inception of the research for anyone new to this topic. It briefly covers the sphere of influence that
the CEDAW grants for women and how it came into existence with a detailed timeline of events leading up to the inception. Additionally it is a very good source for gathering a broad scale perspective on the numerous treaties, documents, and conventions adopted by the international community on the subject of gender and the wage discrimination.


Adopted in 2000, the MD Goals have set the benchmark for global development. It has become, like the UN Charter and the UDHR, a global precedent necessary for sustainable development in a shrinking world. The goals make aware the importance of incorporating the worlds most vulnerable, including women, into the institutions of the world in order to achieve the totality of goals listed herein.


The Fourth World Conference Platform for Action meeting in Beijing 1995 was a hallmark year in which the Member States of the world met to discuss the advancements that were made in the battle against the gender wage gap. The Platform for Action is the outcome of their meeting, including new challenges that have been posed and responses to those challenges that should be implemented along with the familiar forms of discrimination and the needed responses. The Platform for Action is a viable research tool, especially when used to develop a broad base of understanding a to the steps taken by individual Member States and the steps taken collectively, such as in international public institutions.


Adopted in 1979 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women became the first legally binding instrument to promote gender equality across all fronts. Widely accepted by a vote of 130 in favor, with 10 abstentions, the international community displayed a cooperative effort rarely witnessed in the UN. Since its passing, the quality of life has risen for women around the world, while the gender wage gap has shrunk. From inequalities in the
wage gap averaging over 40 percent, that number has been reduced to as little as 20 percent in many countries today.


The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is recognized as the premier document in recognition of the inherent rights of all peoples. Adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, it has maintained its notoriety as the binding treaty in the maintenance of human rights. With the support of the UN Charter, the UDHR also shares the unique position of being one of the first pieces of legislation to garner international support while also having legal obligations for Member States in their continued adherence to the clauses and rights outlined herein.


The Millennium Declaration, unanimously adopted by the international community in September 2000 is a development-centered approach to achieving sustainability for all nations of the world. A recognizable feature of the Millennium Declaration is the Millennium Development Goals, 8 goals aimed at achieving sustainability and equality widely considered the road map to achieving the Millennium Declaration. The Declaration implements systems for the maintenance of regular checks and updates and has set 2015 as the target year for the achievement of these goals.


Composed at the July 2004, 31st session of the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, this is the report they published on the reports to the Committee by the Member States. 8 Member States made their presentations at this session, Angola, Argentina, Spain, Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Latvia, and Malta. These reports are effective tools the International Labor Organization utilizes to procure information and data on the gender wage disparity per country.
This is a very educational report on the concept of gender mainstreaming. In addition to a very concise definition presented in the introduction of this term, of use will be the subsequent two sections presented herein. Section two covers gender mainstreaming, while section three delves into the application of gender mainstreaming in specific contexts. Throughout the report are helpful additions on the role of women in societies today and the full benefit to the societies of the world should the obstacles to equality be lowered or eliminated. For more information on women’s roles and the benefits gained through their involvement in the societies of the world be sure to review the section entitled Gender Equality and Economic Efficiency on page 11.

May 15 has been recognized as the International Day of Families. In her statement, Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, Executive Director for the UNFPA makes a concerted call for the alleviation of the burden of poverty by the most vulnerable, namely women and children. She paints the picture of how it is to live in a world when discrimination prohibits a person from enjoying all the benefits of development, and paints equally the picture of limitations that come for persistently discriminated against citizens of the international community.

The UNFPA web site on human trafficking is educational in that it contains information on issues such as the accepted definition of trafficking, a brief but effective section on the causes of the problem, and also a section on the dimensions of the problem. It is also a great source to find links to numerous other organizations, private and public with which to perform research. The UNFPA considers, because of their position in society, women and girls as the most vulnerable to this and other forms of mistreatment and discrimination.
The UNRISD: Research web site is an invaluable tool for the collection of data, and well-researched reports on any number of broad topics. Attacking problems of a social nature through education and the promotion of tolerance are synonymous with their approach. Use this tool as an effective method for research, especially in concern to a shrinking global world.


This study provides a quantitative analysis on the empirical literature concerning the gender wage gap. Its focus is on the discrimination against women as it pertains to differences in methodology, data, countries, and time periods. The paper delves into a detailed account of how the gender wage gap is equated, what the outcome of the equations mean, and whether in fact they are useful and unbiased. This paper poses very good questions about the ability to truly discern the wage gap that may exist.


The World Bank web site dedicated to the MD Goals is a useful tool in the research of the progress of the goals and their progress. The web site has many links to outside and affiliated sources to monitor the progress of each of the goals, through www.paris21.org/betterworld. There also is a wonderful section on the gender equality debate with regard to the goals that should prove useful in researching the gender wage gap.

Endnotes


2 Ibid., article 1.
4 Ibid., article 2.
5 Ibid., article 23(2).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 United Nations Department of Public Information, supra, note 7.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., article 11(a).
15 Ibid., article 5(a).
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 5.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 6.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 7.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
41 Ibid., p. 173.
43 Ibid., p. 6.
45 Ibid., paragraph 27.
46 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Pearson, & Payaslian, supra, note 37, p. 414.
53 Ibid.
54 Pearson, & Payaslian, supra, note 37, p. 414.
55 Dougherty, & Pfaltzgraff, supra, note 41, p. 170.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, supra, note 40, p.5.
59 Dougherty, & Pfaltzgraff, supra, note 41, p. 170.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 CEDAW, supra, note 13, article 15.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 329.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., p. 328.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 United Nations Development Programme & the United Nations Department of Public
Information, supra, note 62.


85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.


88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.


97 Ibid.


99 Ibid.

100 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra, note 72, p. XI.

101 Ibid., p. 10.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., p. 11.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.
Economic Development:
Looking At The City Of Chico

By Ryan Betz

One of the most significant and important components of an economically healthy community is how much energy is spent in attracting and retaining businesses. Recognizing such a need, local governments all over the United States have become increasingly proactive in establishing organizations dedicated to economic development. The City of Chico contains several different Economic Development Organizations (EDOs) that provide a host of services but share the common goal of creating more local jobs. These EDOs hoped to meet this goal through objectives of corporate attraction, existing job retention, and local job creation. By placing an emphasis on building a stronger economic foundation, EDOs located in Chico and Butte County work to increase local tax revenue, lower the rate of unemployment, and raise wages. This in turn ripples through the economic and social framework of a city creating more property and sales tax revenue, which in return funds the necessary governmental services of police, fire, public works, and administration. Even more important is the positive effect of increasing the quality of life.

The most basic definition of economic development is the process of government encouraging and assisting businesses within a community (Garnet and Iannonee 2002). With this process, localities are able to assist the economic and revenue base of their community. It is important to clarify the two types of measurements used in determining if an EDO is successful. The first, how much the economic base has increased (number of producers and consumers), is vitally important to localities because this increase creates more money to be spent on houses (property tax) and goods and services (sales tax). Second is how many high wage jobs have been created? In theory, an increase in these variables means an increase in the standard of living for the working class who resides in the community. However, scholars have found it difficult to measure the quality of life of a community. “There are no valid and reliable measures of quality of life. The surveys most commonly used to determine the areas that offer the best quality of life are inconsistent” (Blair 1998). Blair further explains that the attraction of community amenities can vary from industry to industry and that individual communities must determine what factors of quality of life they hold important.
This said, EDOs still are regarded as a major component for raising the per capita income, which may ultimately lead to a higher quality of life.

Historically, localities have been participating in economic development dating back to the great canal and building of the railroads beginning in the nineteenth-century (Blair 1999, 54). Since those times, the direction of localities on developing a healthy economic base in their communities has at best, fluctuated from meager participation to being semi-active. What attractive factors a locality can offer vary from area to area. One of the most important factors is a skilled labor force. A second important factor is the different incentives localities can offer to prospective businesses. Scholars have found that infrastructure improvements, property tax abatement and regulatory flexibility were the top three incentives most desired by companies (Mackay 1994, 6). Traditionally, most incentives either were some sort of tax break or assistance in setting up free utility connections. Some view these incentives as mere “give-a-ways” to large corporations, wasted tax revenue that could have been used in other areas. Scholars have looked at the effects of economic development policies on local governments to determine if in fact such policies work.

Policy evaluations on economic development practices have led to some positive conclusions. Using empirical data, surveys and econometric evidence in determining the effectiveness of economic development policies on state and metropolitan areas, reports have shown effects of growth areas like increasing business activity in the long run by 2.5 percent (Bartik 1991). Reports also indicate that “faster local growth has stronger effects on the annual real earnings of blacks and on less-educated individuals” and that “the competition for economic development among state and local governments probably enhances the efficiency of the U.S. financial system” (Bartik 1991, 206). National policy makers must strive to adopt a positive view on economic development policy and should pay close attention to areas with the most poverty. He also states that federal policies should promote state and local economic development autonomy with the necessary funding to ensure their programs succeed. Perhaps the most interesting finding was the shift in local economic development from tax incentives (previously discussed) to what is called the “new wave” approach.

Since the early 1990’s, local governments have become more innovative in offering prospective businesses other incentives than ones based on financial subsidies. More emphasis in now placed on training and research, market analysis, and adapting to the changes of globalization. With many manufacturing firms now moving over seas, local governments are looking to replace these losses with service oriented and high technological firms.
Another shift also has occurred from job attraction to job retention and creation with the introduction of more programs promoting and assisting both small businesses and entrepreneurs. Janice Rhodd, director of Chico’s Business and Industry Assistance Program (BIAP), explains why small businesses and entrepreneurs have been the new focus of EDOs: “By assisting startup businesses with the services as opposed to larger companies, there is more of a connection between the business and the community which deters them from moving locations” (Interview 2004). Created in 1999, BIAP specifically targets small businesses in northern California by helping them with “market analysis, feasibility studies, obtaining competitive information, and customer demographics” (2004).

Rhodd also discussed one of the new focuses BIAP is encouraging is for small businesses to start exporting their goods. With the introduction of faster delivery of services and the instant community of the Internet, exporting goods is not only important to compete in a highly competitive market but is an accessible option. In the past two years alone, the majority of the small businesses assisted by BIAP have added international customers to their client base. Believing that exporting goods will continue to be a necessity in order for businesses to grow, Rhodd recognizes that exporting can have a positive effect on Northern California. The revenue which comes from selling goods outside Northern California is spent locally.

Just how important economic development is to a community or city depends primarily on the vision of that locality (Schiffman 1998). In the state of California, there are more than 303 local and regional organizations dedicated to providing full-time economic development services (King 1998). Most of the increases in the number of public/private economic development programs have occurred since 1992. Additionally, a number of quasi-public economic development agencies have been created to collaborate and coordinate efforts to increase the wealth of California communities. The City of Chico is no exception, and has been a leader in developing a model of economic development for other cities. With the creation of organizations like the Center of Economic Development (CED), Chico Economic Planning Corporation (CEPCO), and Team Chico, such efforts have contributed to high levels of attraction of outside businesses and retention of established businesses and developing entrepreneurs. As Chico continues to put forth effort to increase the community’s economic growth, it is sending the message that its strong economic foundation has been one of the factors in retaining its quality of life.

As a firm believer in supporting local economic development, the City of Chico itself offers services and incentives to attract and retain businesses.
Dave Burkland, the Economic Development/Housing Specialist for the City of Chico explained some of these incentives, "If we're looking at attracting a prospective business we can offer them business license waivers, site selection, owner participation agreements and the Industrial Loan Program" (Interview 2004). This loan program has a designated fund of nearly half a million dollars that eligible businesses can use to finance industrial projects within the Chico Merged Redevelopment Project Area. Burkland also said, "The west-side of the Municipal Airport is a very likely area of industrial growth. We want to target high technology firms because they provide high paying jobs and low amounts of negative externalities, for example, pollution" (2004). In 1994, the city of Chico created the Economic Development Committee, which assisted in implementing an economic development policy and also provides general assistance to businesses considering locating within the city. Along with these proactive strategies, the City of Chico continues to work with other EDOs found in the surrounding area, like the CED.

The CED was first founded in 1986 and is a community outreach program for the University Research Foundation. Primarily funded by the Economic Development Administration of the U.S Department of Commerce, with matching funds from CSU, Chico, the organization serves twenty counties. By using a mixture of informational tools and data analysis, the CED is able to assist a business by showing market trends, who it's competitors are, and how to expand its customers from local to national or global. Unlike other EDOs found in Chico, the CED has a regional focus. By directing a more macro approach, the CED gains the ability to interpret market trends across a larger area. Its goal is to create jobs by business retention, expansion, and creation (City of Chico website 2004). Hosting workshops and conferences on subjects such as training, finance, and market analysis are additional ways the CED offers assistance to businesses. There are a whole hosts of programs currently in the works within the CED including, The Graying of the North State, Lead Small Business Development Center, Economic Studies, and the BIAP. Viewed as an intricate part in promoting regionalism, the CED is an example the direction local governments are taking as they adopt more of a coordination effort in and among counties.

Dan Ripke, the Director of the CED, believes they will continue to see a demand for their services. He views the role of the CED as economy of scale where the CED can provide services to a broad range of counties that would otherwise have to come up with their own economic development organizations (Interview 2004). He further explained that regions are dependent on market areas, and that it is important for businesses to realize how dependent they are in reaching these areas. In answering what he saw as a current
“hot topic” of economic development, Ripke explained that with the government cuts already being felt by his department, the idea of privatizing economic development is being discussed. The services that the CED and other publicly funded organizations provide would be transferred to private economic development firms. Along those same lines, a user fee would replace the free service much like other fees for service such as sewer and electric. Ripke believes this shift would have a negative effect on small businesses that rely on the large amounts of service at no cost.

The CED also delivers presentations at economic conferences all over California. At a recent conference in San Diego, CED delivered a presentation on Economic Gardening. Economic Gardening is a strategy that focuses on a “grow-your-own” environment for local entrepreneurs. Through a three-pronged framework of connections, infrastructure, and information, local governments hope to create industry clusters that help support each other. Some of the assistance includes a business plan, marketing plan, and industry research. These plans help guide small businesses in knowing their customers, competitors, and scarce resources. Again it would seem that more and more EDOs are focusing on retaining small businesses. President and Chief Executive Officer of the Economic Vitality Corp of San Luis Obispo County, Ray Johnson, talked about the potential of small businesses, “we are seeing growth in small, aggressive companies with high-energy owners. That is where our potential lies. That is why we are doing the business acceleration thing (economic gardening).” He further explains, “most technical guys are not strong on the financial side. We can help put them together with some people who can help strengthen those areas. It is the whole business of economic gardening—planting, nurturing, and growing our businesses locally” (Stevens 2004). Though the CED plays an important role in providing informational tools and data analysis, it is limited because of its macro approach as oppose to CEPCO’s micro approach.

CEPCO is mainly comprised of local business people aimed at retaining and expanding local businesses and, perhaps more importantly, creating new jobs (CEPCO website 2004). Founded in 1985, CEPCO primarily assists businesses with site selection, data analysis, and providing a network for local businesses to exchange ideas for stimulating the local economy. Some of the companies who benefited from CEPCO include Aero-Union Corporation, Chico Nut Company, Glissade Manufacturing, Sierra Nevada Brewery, and Transfer Flow Inc.

Mike Donnelly, the Business Development Director at CEPCO, gave some helpful insight on some of the services CEPCO can offer local businesses. He listed site selection as a top service, and also included market-
Donnelly also discussed the importance of real estate and population growth in the next five years. Currently, CEPCO is working with the CED and Tri-County Economic Development Corp in conducting real estate surveys and economic forecasts for the surrounding area. Viewing challenges such as job availability and housing prices, Donnelly stresses CEPCO’s role on shaping these areas. “A healthy job market is the life blood of a city. With organizations like CEPCO, small businesses are able to stay competitive and potential entrepreneurs are encouraged to start their own business” (Interview 2004). Donnelly noted that at the present, CEPCO is participating in a number of economic development projects.

Recent projects like the future development of the West Side of the Chico Municipal Airport, a foreign trade zone, and the monitoring of the City of Chico Capital Improvement Plan are examples of CEPCO’s proactive assistance and influence on increasing economic growth (CEPCO website 2004). Both the CED and CEPCO provide free services to businesses in and outside Butte County, but it is Team Chico that coordinates all the players that factor into economic development.

Team Chico is a coordinated effort put together by local agencies within Butte County interested in sustaining economic growth. As a referral system, Team Chico directs those seeking information about Chico including maps, demographics, economic profiles, labor information/work force issues, and educational and technical assistance (Team Chico 2004). On its website, Team Chico offers links to many EDOs including the City of Chico Chamber of Commerce, Butte College Small Business Development Center (SBDC), CED, CEPCO, and Tri-County Economic Development Corporation, as well as state and federal agencies. Because the city of Chico and Butte County have several different EDOs, Team Chico is designed to help businesses pinpoint exactly what areas they need assistance in and how to find those organizations that can help them. Just how effective Team Chico and its organizations have been in reaching its goals was evaluated by an outside consulting firm two years ago.

Garnet Consulting Services Inc. teamed with Donald T. Iannone & Associates to analyze and make recommendations concerning the many EDOs located in the city of Chico. The final conclusion was that local policy makers and directors should implement a performance-based economic development program (Garnet and Iannone 2002). One interesting finding was that Chico’s broader economic development system lacked an overall strategy with goals and objectives. The consultants found that Team Chico really wasn’t a unifying program and is merely a “confederation” of EDOs.
Grading Chico’s economic development system, the firm gave it an overall grade of C+, pointing to some significant problems such as dissatisfied clients, a lack of focus by city governmental development services, and no investment strategy for making economic development grow. By providing this outside analysis, the consultant firms were able to point out specific areas Chico’s EDOs need to consider. One positive note mentioned was, “Despite negative evaluations, employers believe it is very important that the Chico area is well served by EDOs, and they believe it is important for the City Government to help fund these organizations” (Garnet and Iannnoe 2002, 27).

The City of Chico and its EDOs have dedicated their energies to increase local jobs. By adopting this common goal while working through different objectives, these EDO’s have been able to assist small businesses with an assortment of tools and strategies to keep the local economy stable. These strategies include attraction, but mainly focus on retention and creation because of the positive effects associated with business owners who naturally have ties to their community. By doing so, the city of Chico, the CED, CEPCO and other economic development organizations hope to increase the area’s quality of life. Through economic development, localities take the direct approach of shaping how their communities will grow. As California begins its turnaround from one of its largest state deficits, the stability of its economy will be watched even more by prospective companies. State and local policy makers must continue their efforts in directing how their economy is stimulated. By continuing these economic development efforts, cities like Chico will be able to control economic growth while maintaining their much-celebrated quality of life.

References


Donnelly, Mike. 22 April 2004. Personal Interview.


The Economy of Incentives,” a chapter from neoclassicalist Chester Barnard’s *The Functions of the Executive*, explains the third responsibility of an executive, which is to ensure the willingness of people to cooperate. He proposes that organizations, in order to succeed, must get individuals to cooperate by offering them incentives and using persuasion. He offers two methods for doing this, and gives examples of different kinds of organizations where these methods may be employed.

The Importance of Getting Cooperation

Before getting to the two general methods of inducing cooperation, Barnard explains why this is so important. He says that organizations that wish to be successful must consider the essential element of “the willingness of persons to contribute their individual efforts to the cooperative system” (93). He breaks the organization down into individual elements and recognizes the power of the individual to make or break an organization. Inadequate incentives can even lead to the dissolution, or at least the change of purpose, of an organization. This seems to be a distinct departure from classical organization theory, which generally lumps individuals together as a group of workers who all operate according to rational economic principles.

Barnard mentions disadvantages along with advantages that induce an individual to act a certain way in an organization. Balancing the two is the key, almost like a mathematical equation. Even if there are few positive advantages, the presence of a few disadvantages can lead to “a strong net advantage” (93). The organization must therefore figure out whether it is better to increase positive incentives or decrease negative incentives or burdens. In adjusting this “equation,” even when the side to be adjusted is clear, it is impossible to pinpoint how the adjustment will affect cooperation in any given situation, notes Barnard.

Barnard makes a distinction between objective and subjective aspects of incentives. Money, material goods, working hours, and work conditions are examples of objective incentives; in the cases where the organization cannot offer objective incentives, subjective incentives such as changing the state
of mind, attitude, or motives are the only alternatives. Barnard says it seems “improbable that any organization can exist … which does not employ both methods in combination” (94).

The processes of offering objective incentives Barnard calls “the method of incentives,” and the processes of changing subjective attitudes he calls “the method of persuasion.” While commercial organizations tend to emphasize the method of incentives, and political and religious organizations tend to emphasize the method of persuasion, he says that when accounting for the “different kinds of contributions required from different individuals” (94), all types of organizations use both methods. This emphasis on individualism again points to the difference between classical and neoclassical organization theory.

**Examining the Method of Incentives**

In beginning his discussion of incentives, Barnard says there are two classes: specific and general. Specific inducements include material, personal non-material opportunities, desirable physical conditions, and ideal benefactions. General inducements include associational attractiveness, adaptation of conditions to habitual methods and attitudes, the opportunity of enlarged participation, and the condition of communion. This list, he says, is by no means complete; it is meant to be illustrative.

One of the most interesting explanations in the chapter concerns material inducements. Barnard says that even though material incentives have been greatly emphasized in modern times, he has no doubt that, “unaided by other motives, they constitute weak incentives beyond the level of the bare physiological necessities” (95). This is a strong statement to make, especially in light of the rational choice model so long espoused by the classical school of organizational thought. I have a difficult time believing it.

To explain this statement, Barnard says that “the love of material things,” while a natural result of technological advancement, has been forced upon those above the level of subsistence. He claims that people have been made to believe that they “ought to want material things” (95). But the most effective organizations, he says, have been built on incentives that are either relatively lacking or have no material components. He points to examples such as the military, political organizations, and religious organizations.

After describing in some detail the different incentives, Barnard emphasizes that figuring out which incentives or combinations of incentives will work is a complex, and individual, matter. He says that “men are unstable in their desires” (97) and organizations can probably never hope to offer all the
incentives necessary to gain the cooperation of men for more than a short period of time.

**Examining the Method of Persuasion**

In order to make up for the lack of incentives that organizations generally may offer, the method of persuasion can be used to keep individuals cooperative. Persuasion, according to Barnard, includes coercion, the rationalization of opportunity, and the inculcation of motives. He makes short work of explaining coercion, and says that no superior or complex system of cooperation can be supported very well by coercion alone.

Barnard goes into a rather detailed explanation of the second type of persuasion: rationalization of opportunity, noting that it is a much more important persuasion method in modern times. There are two degrees of rationalization: general and specific. He says that general rationalization has happened many times, with the Crusades being a prime example. He mentions that one of the most interesting general rationalizations is “material progress,” which he says is “an important basis of the characteristic forms of modern western organization” (98). His references to “the cult of science,” “the glorification of inventions and inventive talent,” and “the exaltation of the exploitation of land, forests, mineral resources, and of the means of transportation” (98) seem to be concepts way ahead of his time. They also go beyond the four tenets of classical organization theory.

In wrapping up his explanation of the method of persuasion, Barnard offers a definition of “economy of incentives.” He use the word “economy” not in the material sense but rather to describe the need for organizations to find the right equations in “supplying incentives or in exercising persuasion” (98). He again refers to the fact that offering individuals purely material inducements will neither work for very long nor lead to organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Classical theorists such as Frederick Taylor would undoubtedly have disagreed with this.

Barnard also says that nonmaterial incentives often are in conflict with one another. For example, when one person is given a promotion, another person or group of people will see this as a disadvantage to them. Because the “difficulties of finding the workable balance of incentives is so great,” persuasion must also be employed (99).
Barnard’s Power to Persuade

Trying to achieve a balance among all the different incentives and the forms of persuasion seems very difficult if not impossible, even after reading “The Economy of Incentives.” While Barnard gives good examples of the different incentives that organizations can offer, it would have been even more helpful to include some of the combinations and ways that they can be balanced. But, as he stated from the beginning, everything depends on individuals who are unique and change their minds often. As an individual, I can accept that and agree with this. As a member of an organization, I find that point discouraging. How do organizations ever get people to cooperate? It seems that Barnard has proved his contention that both methods usually only work for short periods of time.

I also agree with one of Barnard’s recurring points: that material inducements are not the most important incentives. While on the surface it seems that material incentives are always extremely important, his point that anyone living above subsistence level is swayed more by inducements such as desirable work conditions and the satisfaction of personal ideals appears to be an accurate assessment of human nature (certainly one that I can identify with), and one of the ways in which Barnard, as a neoclassicalist, challenged the basic classical tenet of rational economic choice head on.

Another tenet of classical organization theory that Barnard challenges is that there is one best way to organize for production, which is through systematic, scientific inquiry. In this chapter, he is saying that there are many ways to organize for production, and that they rely on some rather unscientific methods such as creating a condition of communion and social compatibility among employees. While going from the oversimplified ideas of the classicalists to the complex ideas of the neoclassicalists is a welcome change, it also brings up some very complex issues that seem overwhelming to contemplate. Reading this chapter has made me want to read the rest of Barnard’s book to see if he has answers for some of these complicated issues that he has raised.

References

In *Leadership in America: A Sociological Interpretation*, Philip Selznick explores the fundamental qualities of leadership as an organization moves from administrative management to institutional leadership. The end result of such a process is the creation of a “statesman.” Selznick takes an institutional approach to demonstrate how the organization is mired in the technical requirements of an industry. As Selznick says, “the preoccupation with administrative efficiency” has little concern for actual leadership. Leadership itself becomes most necessary when the decision-making process becomes risk-laden, and the decisions are not closely related to task, but rather to organization direction and integrity.

The difference between an organization and an institution, according to Selznick, is that the organization is an expendable tool engineered to do a job while the institution is the reactive product of social needs. As an organization gains stability and outside support for its product, it loses its flexibility, and moves toward institutionalization. The need for adaptation, however, is ongoing inside the institution, and Selznick’s depiction of institutional leadership demonstrates how integrity and “distinctive competence” play a role in the transformation of the organization into an institution.

Where there is the opportunity for the players to interact with the organization, making decisions that will affect the organization’s mission, the organization becomes less technically driven, and value is assigned by players beyond the technical limits. When an organization becomes infused with value, the process of institutionalization begins. When leadership steps up and makes the decisions that will keep the institution on track with its mission and goals (distinctive competence), institutionalization has a future. When leadership fails to make the tough decisions, or when the technical aspects of the organization are depended upon, the organization will fail to make the jump to institution.

James Q. Wilson’s understanding of bureaucracy basically supports Selznick’s assertions relating to leadership at the higher levels of agency hierarchies. Wilson’s classification of operators—the low level bureaucrats—is where most of the tasks of an agency are accomplished. Wilson puts the managers in the unenviable role of ensuring that the tasks accomplished
by the operators are completed according to a defined set of rules and regulations (Wilson 1989). Based on this definition of "managers" by Wilson, under the constraints of leadership as outlined by Selznick, the managers are not leaders at all, but instead are performing as administrative managers. According to Selznick, executives can only be considered leaders if they possess, "an institutional embodiment of purpose," or institutional integrity.

Leadership, by definition, is the provision of guidance or direction. Selznick infers that you can only be a leader if you are providing for the integrity of your institution. Here, Selznick and Wilson disagree on the role and importance of beliefs in institutional decision-making. Wilson argued that operators could put aside their beliefs in their quest to accomplish their task (Wilson 1989). Selznick argues that the shared beliefs of participants will have an impact on the social structure of an organization, and that the leader will need to separate behavior from beliefs. Selznick even offers the warning that leaders will need to be aware of the political capabilities of those offering opposition within the organization. Isn't it considered leadership, though, when a person can create support for their point of view, and is able to influence the direction of an entire organization?

Selznick does consent to the need for different kinds of leadership at different stages of institutional development. During the introductory stages of an organization, innovators are required who have the experience and savvy to get things started. As the organization becomes established, more diplomatic and politically oriented leaders will be needed to stabilize the organization and help position it beneficially within its desired market. Following Selznick's definition of leadership, a newly established organization (probably) does not yet have significant social value - it is new, so how could it? The executives and managers will be firmly entrenched in the tasks and establishment of the organization and, therefore, will be considered administrative managers as opposed to institutional leaders.

The experience of Alice Rivlin and the creation of the Congressional Budget Office illustrates this point. Rivlin was firmly involved in the technical aspects of getting the CBO running while also setting and supporting the mission and purpose of the organization (Kates 1989). I would argue that Rivlin was certainly a leader demonstrating leadership skills - in addition to meeting the needs of administrative management. I do not find room in Selznick's essay for the leader who must embody both the technical and the critical. Much like Brian Cook's desire to move bureaucracy from the instrumental function to the wholly constitutive (Cook 1996), Selznick seems to argue that managers provide for the management of the technical aspects of an organization (the instrumental function) while leaders alone are able to
provide for the distinctive competence and integrity of an institution (the constitutive function).

Overall, Selznick fails to make his point that leadership alone (and separate from administrative management) embraces institutional integrity. The notion that the “elites” of an institution are charged with the maintenance of the institution’s social values has been seriously refuted by modern society. Even in the time of Selznick’s essay, one would have to argue that there existed leadership that acted in the name of an institution, but were not truly protecting all of the social values of the organization (J. Edgar Hoover and his persistent trampling of civil rights in the name of national security comes to mind). Outside of the potential for legal ramifications, leadership does not often have the incentive to protect an elusive social value of an institution when viability is at stake. It becomes more important to the leader to keep the institution functioning. If the leader is still supporting the mission and purpose of the institution, does abandoning the social value he is supposed to be protecting make him any less of a leader?

One argument in Selznick’s essay is also found in Kaufman’s study of the U.S. Forest Service. The U.S. Forest Service was successful in its efforts to create a decentralized but homogeneous service (Kaufman 1960). Selznick cautions, though, that a truly homogeneous “polity,” or staff in this case, can result in excessive conformity and rigidity. As we saw in the later U.S. Forest Service case study, this possibility was borne out when the Forest Service found itself with managers so bound by the procedures and policies of the service that they were too risk-adverse to make decisions on situations that fell firmly within their realm of authority (Varley 1994). In this situation, the forest districts were not even serving as administrative managers let alone leaders. The Forest Service, in essence, moved backward from being an institution to being a technically driven organization. Does this mean the U.S. Forest Service leadership failed? According to Selznick, it has, but in reality, the Forest Service continues to be an institution that even under Selznick’s definition has value much greater than its technical limits. So how can the leadership truly have failed? It hasn’t; rather Selznick’s definition of what constitutes institutional leadership has failed.

Selznick cautions the need for responsible leaders to navigate between the avoidance of opportunity (short-term advantages) and the avoidance of utopia (extensive use of abstractness in the defining of the institution). In his zealousness to make his point, Selznick does not allow for a combination of both leadership and management in responsible leadership. He in fact takes a very “utopian” view of leadership by both over-generalizing and under-defining what leadership actually means in the realm of institutional-
ism. I would have to argue that while I cannot precisely define leadership, I
certainly know it when I see it, and it does not always—or even often—come
from the top echelon of the hierarchy.

References


Dear Mr. President:

Product

The editors of Studium make a conscious effort to produce a journal that will be accepted and enjoyed not only by the students, faculty, and staff of CSU Chico, but also potential readers in our community. With this in mind, we elicited letters from students in a Chico area elementary or middle school classroom to the President of the United States. The letters are evaluative or give the president advice on an important issue; most letters do both. The request for letters was made just before the 2004 presidential elections.

Process

At the beginning of the fall semester 2004, one of the Studium editors, Josie Crosetti, suggested we make contact with a grammar school in Butte County and ask teachers to assign a writing project to a sixth or seventh grade class. The first school was contacted about the project in October. The school administration informed her that they would discuss the request and get back to her. The surprise answer, a “No,” came less than five minutes later. When she asked why our request was turned down, school “X” (labeled such for confidentiality) cited fear of the new budget cuts and decided there was no need to risk “stepping on any federal toes.” This ignored the fact that the state budget had already been passed and signed more than a month prior. At any rate, school “X” missed out on an insightful assignment that sheds light on the concerns of young students with respect to the president and our country. It is the very resistance to this type of project in the context of the present political situation that should be noted by parents, educators, and historians alike.

Reflection

After hearing about Josie’s experience, another editor, José Díaz, decided to request similar letters from students at Chico Montessori Elementary School, owned and operated by one of his former professors, Jim Claflin, and his wife. The students who responded range in age from nine to twelve, and their letters vary in length from a short paragraph to a full page. Their advice addresses a variety of issues from the war in Iraq to education funding here at home. Whether influenced by their families, the media, or the fact that their favorite baby-sitter is still in Iraq, the students’ letters are filled with
political content worthy of our attention. We hope you enjoy these letters as much as we have. A special thank you is extended to the students and teachers at the Chico Montessori Elementary School for their participation in this informative project.

Dear Mr. President,

Thousands of Iraqis are dying every day and only about five American men and women are dying per day. What I think is pretty bad is Fox News channel is reporting all of our tragic losses when thousands of innocent men, women and young children are dying every day and yet somehow that goes unnoticed? How? I think it is terrible that any of our country men are dying but I think that our losses are trivial compared to what an Iraqis family is going through right now, knowing the loss of one of their loved ones and being afraid of going outside or standing up for what they believe is right.

Sincerely,

Dylan
Dear Mr. President,
I am a 6th grader in Chico Montessori Elementary. There are many things in America that I would like to change. (But I can’t because I’m only 11 and I think it would be too big of a job for me, running for president.) I know that America isn’t perfect. So here are a few things I’d like to change.
I think we should let the animals have more habitat. I don’t mean put them in zoos! I mean use less wild land and prevent many animals’ deaths. Also change the rule in Afghanistan that women can’t be seen except for their eyes. Please prevent war it just causes more TROUBLE! There is someone I know from Durban that’s fighting and I wish that he’d come back home to his family. I feel very sad when I watch the news and the part comes up about soldiers and who they left behind. I wish the war would end!(and by the way nice Christmas trees in your house.)

From,

Someone in the world

Stephanie
Dear Mr. President,

I am a sixth grade student at Montessori Elementary. I think you are a good president. I am glad you got elected and my family thinks so too. I am going to give you some advice that may help this world.

1. Make Barak Obama and Tony Hawks in the Hall of Fame.
2. Make the NBA games a week longer.
3. Free day once a month.
4. Don’t wear tacky clothes.

Sincerely, Trent
December 2nd, 2009

Dear Mr. President,

I am a student who is giving you some suggestions. I believe that the economy needs to be fixed. Too many jobs have been outsourced. And they aren’t just factory jobs. According to the New York Times, thousands of jobs have been outsourced or are being outsourced. But these particular jobs are computer-related industries. It’s not just one kind of job that is being outsourced. I believe that you should do what you can to encourage companies not to outsource jobs.

Sincerely,

A Seventh Grade Girl In Chico
Dear Mr. President,

I am a 6th Grade Girl at Montessori Elementary School. You asked for some advice so here it is. Please stop the war in Iraq. Too many innocent kids and women are dying. It's really not fair to kill them. What did they do to you? Yes, I know that they killed thousands of innocent people on September 11th the day we dreaded, but you are killing innocent people too. You didn't want them to do it to us! As my friends and I always say, "two wrongs don't make a right." You're being hypocritical! It wasn't fair to us, and now it's not fair to them. Look deep in your heart and I know there is a part in there that cares!

Sincerely,
Renee
Dec. 2, 2001

Dear Mr. President,

I am a 4th grade student in Chico, California. My favorite baby-sitter is Sean. He has been in Iraq for a year. I was so excited about him coming home soon and then I heard on the news that he has to stay longer. I am asking you to bring him home. He has fulfilled his duty to our country. He deserves to come home like all the other soldiers who have extended their duty. Please bring him home to his friends and family that love him.

Sincerely,

Paige.
Dear Mr. President,

I now your in a mess. I would try different tactics on the war; Research Islam, make them come to you. Back here take a nice mode. This isn't a long letter but think about it.

From: Will
Dear Mr. pres,
I am in 5th grade in Chico CA.
I think the war should be ended as soon as possible. I have an opinion that it was a mistake but here is some advice:

1. Get out of Iraq
2. Bring our troops home
3. Clean up Iraq
4. Make sure more Congressmen people who enforce the war have their children see how war is.

P.S. I think you are doing a good job.

Sincerely,
anonymous
Dec. 2, 2004

Dear Mr. President,

I am a 5th grade student. I have some advice for your next 4 years.
1. Get out of Iraq.
2. Bring our troops home.
3. Don't do anything stupid like your first 4 years.
4. Don't tell anymore lies,
5. At least act to be smart.
6. Give the schools more money.

Sincerely, A 5th grade student.
Dec. 2, 04

Dear Mr. President,

I am Reagan Cook from Chico, CA. I am in 4th grade. I think you are doing a great job. Oh! You are handling the war very well. Please lower taxes so I can buy more stuff. Please give me a scholarship to UNLV for medical school and please give my dad a scholarship to UNLV or BYU for law school. You are a great man! Your daughters are very smart!

Your Reagan

PS. I was named after Ronald Reagan. He Rocks!

Sincerely,

Reagan
Dear Mr President,

I am a 6th grade girl. Chico, CA. To my knowledge you are asking for some advice. I would like to suggest some ideas about the teachers salary. I feel it is much too low and teachers have to buy materials for their classes. Within my opinion takes away from their income.

First, Raise taxes for Upper Class Americans. Republicans and Democrats alike.

Secondly, Have the schools pay for materials.

Sincerely,
Analise
Dec. 2, 04

Dear Mr. President,

I am a fourth grade boy from Chico, Ca. Since you “need” advice I have it. Get our troops out of Fallujah and the war in Iraq, and bring our troops home! P.S. I voted for Serena Williams. Love you.

Sincerely, Corby
Dear Mr. President

Dear Mr. President,

Here is some advice to improve your image:

1. Have Tony Hawk and Bono be the Secretary of Awesomeness.
2. Paste a "Big Billboard" that says "If you lived here, you would be home" on the White House.
3. Pump iron with Arnold Schwarzenegger.
4. Declare a "national chill out day".
5. Snowboard, Whiteboard, Brando, and Davids (if your dad is too cool because he shaved before)

Other than that, you got it going on.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Introduction: The Model United Nations Position Papers

Much like its namesake, the National Model United Nations found its roots in the League of Nations as the Model League of Nations formed in 1923. As the world emerged from World War II, the United Nations was formed in 1946 and this youth oriented simulation followed suit. Currently a non-governmental organization of the United Nations, the National Model United Nations formally incorporated as a 501c3 nonprofit of the United States under the name National Collegiate Conference Association in 1968.

Each year, students from universities around the world attend National Model United Nations Conferences. In the fall, all Chico State members in good standing are encouraged to attend a conference in Las Vegas. Those who are deemed most successful in advancing their country’s foreign policy are invited to continue with the team in the spring semester, which culminates in the second conference held in New York; this conference also happens to be the world’s largest collegiate conference. The 2005 National Model United Nations Conference marks the conclusion of months and often times years of preparation. Two hundred universities, represented by more than 2,600 students and faculty will research, debate, compromise and deliberate during this annual five-day event. Conducted only blocks from the headquarters of the United Nations, this simulation mirrors the form of the United Nations, requiring participants to function within the rules of diplomacy. Each delegate is asked to research the foreign policy of a given country, and then in turn, apply it to a variety of specialized topics. In addition delegates are required to give formal and informal speeches, work in small and large groups, draft technical documents, and finally vote on policy as prescribed by the foreign policy of their particular country or organization.

The Model United Nations delegation at California State University, Chico, is a student based academic organization that studies many aspects of the United Nations as well as other significant international organizations. This multi-discipline approach to the teaching of international relations educates students on the goals and functions of the UN often times propelling students into a lifetime of involvement in world affairs. To accurately represent the assigned countries, this delegation prides itself on thoroughly researching both the background of a topic, in addition to staying current
with daily developments which affect the substance of the assigned issues for discussion. Students work diligently to complete these tasks; understanding that these documents serve not only as a guide for our delegates in their respective committees, but are passed along to the conference organizers, as well as to members of the permanent missions of the United Nations.

The following position papers are a representation of the 2004-2005 Chico State delegation. For five years running Chico State has been awarded outstanding achievement award for position papers. This delegation takes great pride in these awards as it reflects the dedication and discipline practiced by the members at Chico State. Citing both long-standing policy as well as adaptation to the ever changing geo-political climate, each country’s foreign policy objectives are clearly outlined and the prospective solutions to these important problems are discussed in detail.

Each student was asked to participate in certain skill building exercises. First, each student would research a country’s policy on a given issue or issues. After collecting the information, each student would write the country’s policy and objectives in something called a position paper. This paper is used later as a reference and resource is some of the later activities. After writing the paper, our students engage in a variety of public speaking activities, most importantly, giving speeches presenting and promoting the policy of the government which the student is representing. Hand in hand with speeches are caucuses, which are informal discussions where students, again, attempt to advance their country’s policy through the arts of negotiation and persuasion. Lastly, our students work with others to put together something called a working paper, which is a collection of ideas from a group of countries, representing their proposed solutions and ideas on the topic before them. After this, they are voted on, and if passed, they become UN resolutions.

This process is year-long and, as our students will attest, academically challenging. The biggest building blocks, and the part we are going to share with you here in Studium, are the position papers. In preparation for the New York Conference, our students have been researching a variety of topics from Indonesia’s point of view. Following, you will find some of the most thoroughly researched and best presented papers our students have to offer this year.
The topics before the United Nations Population Fund are: Creating Sustainable Livelihoods to Eliminate Poverty, Advancement of Women in a Globalized World, and Population and Sustainable Development in the 21st Century. The Republic of Indonesia, in conjunction with the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, reaffirms the responsibility of each nation state to promote and protect the rights of citizens. Indonesia firmly supports the notion that these responsibilities, which are integral aspects of sustainable livelihoods, must be fulfilled if the global quest for poverty eradication and sustainable development are to be achieved.

I. Creating Sustainable Livelihoods to Eliminate Poverty

As an active participant in the United Nations (UN), the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), and the Group of 77, and fully recognizing A/RES/59/5, which calls for cooperation between the United Nations and ASEAN, Indonesia has made tremendous achievements in furthering the domestic creation of sustainable livelihoods and has experienced a remarkable reduction in poverty. Indonesia recognizes A/RES/59/247, calling for implementation of the first United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006). Dramatically affected by the Asian Crisis in 1997, Indonesia’s poverty level instantly doubled. In response, the Indonesian government has worked diligently towards the creation of sustainable livelihoods by initiating a thorough transition from a centralized autocratic regime to a democratic system of governance. Extensive progress toward the realization of a free market economy has been made through the systematic deregulation of the economy and shifting the emphasis of previous macro policies onto export oriented growth. An important step toward decentralization has also occurred through the transfer of responsibility for 2.2 million central civil servants and control of over 16,000 service facilities to various regions. The Republic of Indonesia, regardless of how dire the economic circumstances might prove, will not enact policies that encourage
economic growth while sacrificing individual freedoms; development cannot be pursued to its fullest extent if the social contract of a nation is not based upon a respect for human dignity. This is in compliance with the UN’s action to combine political, social, and economic rights into one right to development. Using this ‘rights-based’ approach for development has proven highly successful for Indonesia. The previous government-driven poverty reduction strategy has evolved into one of community empowerment. Using fiscal controls, inflation has been lowered substantially, and the prices of essential goods have stabilized. An essential factor in creating a sustainable livelihood is ensuring access to those goods necessary for survival. Indonesia has also focused on improving educational infrastructure as a means of reducing poverty. Both men and women have equal access under the law to education. Our government has allotted between 12 and 18 percent of the country’s annual budget for education expenditures. As a result, the enrollment figures for boys and girls at the primary level in school are nearly equal. There have also been instances at the secondary and university levels of higher ratios of girls to boys. Naturally, as income disparities continue to decrease, discrepancies between school enrollment in the rural and urban areas will subsequently decrease. The current 15-24 year age group has attained a literacy level of 98.7 percent. Indonesia has developed the Nine-Year Compulsory Basic Education Programme aimed at providing its society with the basic knowledge and skills necessary for whatever path they may choose to pursue in life. The development of this program is in accordance with the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target, which aspires to ensure that by 2015, all Indonesian children will be able to attain basic education. As citizens and foreign investors continue to develop more confidence in the financial institutions of Indonesia, economic growth will continue to occur and children currently residing in poor households where everyone must work to ensure survival will have the opportunity to attend school. Poverty eradication has also been addressed through a set of reforms; the Propenas (the National Development Programme) Law No. 25/2000 instituted three programs aimed at establishing: equitable fulfillment of basic needs, development of an entrepreneurial culture among the poor, and development of a social security program. The Propenas have provided essential food supplies, implemented price controls, created broader access to health and education services, and aided in developing necessary sanitation infrastructure. Such programs have already proven effective; the poverty level in Indonesia has fallen from 23 percent to 18 percent. Indonesia’s Human Development Index (HDI) rose to 66 in 2002, indicating that policies have resulted in improvements in “most social indicators,” according to the 2004 National
Human Development Report. Noting increasing environmental concerns, the State Ministry for the Environment in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has established the Indonesia Decentralized Environment and Natural Resources Management (IDEN) to provide guidance and assistance to local governments in making sound environmental policy decisions. In order to further empower communities in environmental protection the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Program and the Small Grants Programme for Operations to Promote Tropical Forests (SGP) have been created to address the problems of biodiversity conservation, climate change, and the protection of international waters. In conjunction with this program the national NGO Yayasan Bina Usaha Lingkungan (YBUL), is focused on renewable energy, energy saving, waste recycle, sustainable agriculture and forestry, eco-tourism, and pollution abatement. Indonesia acknowledges the necessity for increasing the level of South-South dialogue regarding development so that these successes might be duplicated and our failures might be avoided. Indonesia remains confident that increased collaboration between donor agencies in the development programming process would generate tremendous accomplishments.

II. The Advancement of Women in a Globalized World

The Indonesian government has been steadfast in its support of the third MDG, promoting gender equality and women-empowerment. Through the implementation of various programs, gender inconsistency in education and literacy has shown a dramatic decline, and the political participation of women in social and legislative infrastructure has increased. Between 1992 and 1997, women held 12 percent of seats in the National Parliament, of which 82 percent were university graduates, compared with 75 percent of their male colleagues. Indonesia has altered its previous constitution, which now provides all citizens with equal status before the law. In addition, the government has ratified the UN Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the ASEAN sponsored Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in the ASEAN Region. Both ratifications confirm Indonesia’s commitment to relieving gender inequality. Indonesia fully supports A/RES/ 41/101, which states that men and women should be treated as equals. Indonesia has worked in conjunction with the UNDP in order to provide sensitivity training sessions for government officials on a full range of gender issues. Indonesia fully supports gender mainstreaming in gender and development policies and programs. Indonesia has discovered that properly designed Community Driven Development (CDD)
projects can be a device of women-empowerment. When projects involve equal input from a region’s male and female population and equally benefit both groups, their effectiveness increases and they prove sustainable. In addition, such programs aid in decentralization, granting communities the chance to develop infrastructure customized to local needs. Two CDD programs in Indonesia, developed in partnership with World Bank, have achieved high success as a result of this approach. The Kecamatan Development Projects (KDP) and the Water and Sanitation for Low Income Communities Projects (WSLIC) have granted women decision making powers equal to those of their male counter parts. KDP has expanded to 28,000 poor communities in thirty of thirty-four Indonesian provinces, allowing communities to propose infrastructure projects with technical and financial assistance. WSLIC allows communities to plan and implement sanitation and water improvements. Women are guaranteed input into these projects through regulations including: private forums free of the intimidation that might result from male presence, a demonstration of equity in community process, and equal gender representation in committees. Indonesia encourages the international community to utilize such an approach in furthering development. In doing so, the targets of multiple MDGs are pursued simultaneously. As part of the Propenas, Indonesia has committed to provide those living in poverty with entrepreneurial skills, namely education. Because single mothers run the majority of Indonesia’s poverty stricken households, these programs target women. As depicted in the Beijing Platform for Action in September 1995, the amount of women-run businesses has steadily risen and their contribution to the development and overall well-being has subsequently increased; and as such Indonesia fully supports A/RES/59/168, the follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women and full implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Indonesia finds it deplorable that women have limited access to financial resources (credit at the micro and macro levels), to education, high paying jobs, and managerial positions. As such, Indonesia recognizes A/RES/58/145, which aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. Additionally, Indonesia fully supports A/RES/58/244, which discusses the future of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, stating that international cooperation, especially financial, is needed for the training institute to fulfill its mandate. Women must be granted access to these levers that drive empowerment on a global basis if they are to escape the confines of poverty.
III. Population and Sustainable Development in the 21st Century

Indonesia recognizes the intensifying economic interdependence likely to continue throughout the 21st century. Economic, political, and social decisions of the international community must be made with genuine partnership and the pursuit of mutual benefits as their foundation. Without a collective commitment and unified strategy for development, the 21st century will be characterized by the same abject poverty and violent conflicts of the past century. Indonesia firmly supports a multilateral approach to global issues and endorses a greater role for industrialized nations in pursuing sustainable development. Private industry should collaborate with governments and NGOs to promote responsible business practices within the umbrella of sustainable development. The Global Compact is a perfect example of a program in which companies can work with UN agencies and labor and civil organizations to support basic principles in human rights, labor, and environment. Indonesia fully supports the work of A/RES/58/219, recognizing United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, and A/RES/58/218, calling for implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Indonesia realizes protective trade policies; lack of transparency, social inequalities, and environmental degradation will hinder development in the 21st century if they persist. A genuine, high-level dialogue on strengthening international economic cooperation for development through partnership has the potential to improve the condition of mankind by addressing widening economic disparities and the digital divide. The benefits that Indonesia has experienced as a result of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provide evidence that liberal trade and foreign investment policies are imperative for development in the 21st century. Also, aiding the establishment of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region is the Bogor Declaration adopted by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Indonesia has made efforts to curb the population growth rate with distribution of contraceptives and education. In 1998, the growth rate was 1.6 percent. However, because of the large population base, there is still considerable stress on the natural resources of the country. The United Nation’s Population Fund (UNFPA) provided a project that, through development of media-advocacy messages and seminars for policy makers and the press, proved constructive. The Natural Resource Law was revised to suit contemporary conditions; the Indonesian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development was established;
and environmental and population issues were provided media coverage. Politicians and citizens now understand problems posed by over population and environmental degradation, and can formulate better policies. Indonesia recognizes awareness to be a first step in alleviating population-driven depletion of resources. Indonesia welcomes the lessons of experience that can be provided by fellow Member States in tackling such issues and reaffirms the need for liberal trade policies as well as cooperation between donor agencies.
The Republic of Indonesia fully anticipates strong and successful international discussions on the following critical issues facing the global community: (I) Safeguarding the Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples, (II) Contemporary Forms of Slavery and Involuntary Servitude, and (III) Female Infanticide and Impact on the Development for the Girl Child.

I. Safeguarding the Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples

The Republic of Indonesia stresses the importance of national unity in respecting the right of all persons to life, liberty, and security of person, as outlined in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Articles 13 & 14, which declare “the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state,” and the right to leave and return and seek asylum from persecution. These rights have been incorporated into Article 28G(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Due to the recent disastrous events in the Indian Ocean, Indonesia draws attention to A/RES/46/182, regarding the coordination of emergency assistance, specifically Principle 3, which asserts that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations…humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country.” Furthermore, foreign military assistance for disaster relief in situations involving displaced persons or refugees should note the necessity of troop disarmament before arriving on foreign soil, which will help to alleviate concerns and fears amongst the indigenous populations, as security can be provided most effectively by the host country. Indonesia calls attention to the right of national authorities to maintain overarching control and primary responsibility for the protection, placement, and assistance as expounded in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. We also recognize those states whose own national security hinges on oversight and control over borders and immigration, and has made signing and ratification of key refugee and IDP related agreements a top priority, as affirmed in A/RES/48/116. As a sovereign and democratic nation, Indonesia’s Pancasila system of governing and its emphasis on
humanitarianism has allowed us to create bodies which guarantee the basic human rights of all Indonesians, specifically the formation of our National Plan of Action on Human Rights, and the National Commission on Human Rights (KOMNAS-HAM). The root causes of displacement, including ethnic, cultural, and political, particularly affecting women and children, as outlined in Clause 4 of A/RES/58/177, must be addressed to put an end to conflicts. Indonesia recognizes the unique needs of access to medical facilities and public health awareness programs in meeting the needs of refugees and IDPs, as well as the access for refugee children to assistance, protection, and primary education, so as to prevent their recruitment into armed factions, and avoid contributing to continued displacement as acknowledged in A/RES/58/150. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) works within Indonesia, specifically focusing on children facing internal displacement, as well as helping with reintegration needs, and Indonesia encourages all Member States to work closely with vital international relief agencies. Internal and largely horizontal conflicts have been of utmost importance and are a priority to the Indonesian government, as over $30 million (US) was allocated, specifically, to resettle displaced citizens in the Sulawesi and Moluccas provinces. The 10-Point Malino Peace Agreement and the 11-Point Maluku Agreement “ensures the right of all Indonesian citizens to live and work anywhere in the country,” and “facilitate[s] the voluntary return of IDPs and ensure[s] the restoration of their rights.” The Indonesian government hopes Member States can adopt similar peace agreements that lay out specific plans for reintegration of refugees and IDPs in the context of their own internal conflicts. In 2001, the Republic of Indonesia established a three-tiered national policy on the issue of internal displacement, which involves the return, empowerment, and resettlement of the displaced as outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002 for Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia. We feel implementation of this policy is a vital step and is an example of how international cooperation can help provide solutions, and we implore Member States to contribute other examples and possible solutions by adopting their own specific measures and policies.

II. Contemporary Forms of Slavery and Involuntary Servitude

Indonesia fully condemns slavery in all its forms and acknowledges the vital importance of Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states “no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery…shall be prohibited in all [its] forms.” Noting the Slavery Convention of 1927, Article 1, which defines slavery to include “all acts involved in the cap-
ture, acquisition…and transport” of persons, Indonesia draws attention to recent events in the Indian Ocean which may exacerbate the child slavery and/or sex trade, thereby violating A/RES/54/263. Indonesia has enjoyed the help and aid of many NGOs, particularly the International Catholic Migration Commission, which works directly with our ministries to coordinate counter-trafficking activities, especially amongst women and children. Coupled with extensive multi-lateral plans of action in conjunction with the Association of South-East Asian Nations, as well as a Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational Crimes, Indonesia is moving forward by strengthening international ties to create a world without slavery, following up on our agreement to A/RES/51/62. Having placed considerable strength upon particular governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, Indonesia declares its full dedication to the eradication of slavery in Articles 28D(2) and 28I(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The widespread occurrence of illegal adoption of children for the purposes of financial gain greatly contributes to the existence of slavery-like practices, and implementation of policies as outlined in A/RES/41/85 is necessary to eradicate child slavery, exploitation, and debt bondage. Particularly in the event of natural disasters, armed conflicts, and societal unrest, Indonesia urges Member States to provide technical and logistical support in monitoring adoption procedures and preventing illegal abduction of children within and from affected states. Indonesia reminds Member States that the recruitment of children into armed conflicts, including those groups separate from national armed forces, is recognized as a form of illegal child labor and is a matter of global security. This practice must be eliminated through national legislation as established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts. Furthermore, illegal immigration greatly increases the number of individuals susceptible to slavery and forced labor as duly noted in A/RES/48/102, and Indonesia encourages Member States to enact policies that prevent and discourage illegal immigration in order to protect the people most at risk. Indonesia feels that private recruitment agencies working between internationally recognized borders without regulations often become a hub of human trafficking, with little guarantees of safety, security, or wages. These third parties who benefit from the trafficking of persons must be monitored, regulated, and penalized by governing bodies in order to assure proper and safe treatment of migrant workers worldwide. International ties are the basis for peacekeeping and the global economy and must be protected against interference, and we recognize that
many slavery and forced labor activities have potential for creating disputes between Member States. Indonesia is equally committed to the promotion of the rights of unskilled migrant workers, and stands by A/RES/55/92 and A/RES/57/218 which provide protection for migrants. We have ratified all the core conventions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) relating to the fundamental principles and rights to a safe and secure working environment, and promulgated the Workers Union/Labor Union No. 21/2000. The presence of an informal economy further contributes to slavery throughout Asia and the world, and we call for immediate action to abolish any tolerance of those practices by strengthening A/RES/52/81. The rebuilding of economic stability is necessary, and Indonesia calls upon Member States to provide skills training wherever possible in order to create a broader employment base. Indonesia is committed to the implementation of media campaigns and public education on the rights of workers, and calls upon Member States to enhance public awareness of slavery-like practices and the negative effect on the economy, as well as to further proliferate agreements such as A/RES/46/122 which provide funds for anti-slavery activities. Indonesia fully supports the promotion of “conditions of freedom, equity, and human dignity” in working conditions as outlined in the Indonesian Tripartite Action Plan for Decent Work, and is dedicated to the promotion of economic stability and recovery in order to provide adequate working conditions in a democratic setting.

III. Female Infanticide and the Impact of Development for the Girl Child

The Republic of Indonesia believes that ensuring equal rights for both males and females is a matter of security and freedom as outlined in Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter. We are equally dedicated to the rights of the child, as expressed in Article 28B(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and have already implemented such programs as the Family Health Assistance Program and Centers for Women’s Studies, fulfilling our promise to uphold the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, specifically Articles 1, 2 & 3. Indonesia has also begun planning for children’s rights-based programs as a means to alleviate all forms of discrimination against females at birth, and throughout their lives, as outlined in A/RES/27/2, “A World Fit for Children.” Indonesia also draws attention to the need to safeguard against female infanticide through legislation, as expressed in Article 2 of A/RES/51/76. Indonesia calls to attention Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, which urges states to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women...based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes.” We recognize the unfair debt put upon female lives from birth amongst many traditions, thereby forcing a biased atmosphere from the very beginning. The dowry tradition specifically puts unnecessary burdens upon daughters and their families, and increases the risk of dowry-related violence as acknowledged in A/RES/52/99 and A/RES/57/181.

Indonesia urges all Member States to discourage the continued practice of the dowry, specifically exceptionally large financial obligations. Indonesia is further concerned about the lack of access for girls to necessary medical treatment and nutrition as a basic human right, as addressed in the Beijing Declaration Platform for Action. In this regard, we call upon Member States to implement the measures outlined in A/RES/56/128 by enacting legislation banning all forms of female genital mutilation, as well as establishing support services for those affected by such practices. Further alarmed by the increase in illegal adoptions following the tsunami crisis, Indonesia implores all international agencies to assist in the assurance of the rights of the girl child in relation to sexual exploitation as outlined in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, particularly Articles 19 & 34. The preference for the male child has led to increased female trafficking from other regions of the world for domestic servants and mail-order brides. Having adopted national action plans on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, and Trafficking in Women and Children, Indonesia confirms its dedication to the enactment and enforcement of legislation in order to safeguard girls against violence and discrimination, as outlined in A/55/78. Recognizing the right of all infants to the opportunity to grow and thrive, per Article 5 of A/RES/54/148, will allow future generations of women to contribute their wealth of knowledge, experience, and talents to society. With increased access to education and skills training, women are to be viewed as vital contributors in all aspects of public and private life. The lack of equal access to those rights can contribute to violence and discrimination against the girl child, as recognized in A/res/58/156; therefore it is imperative that Member States provide for access to primary education for the girl child. Community awareness and involvement, coupled with education and family planning have all helped to create the best scenario for the girl child, while supporting the elimination of any forms of financial burdens put upon female infants. Priorities under the Indonesian National Committee on Child Protection, established in 2002, has set “disseminating information on the social and economic benefits of schooling, and in particular, eliminating the
gender-bias toward the girl child” at the top of the agenda. Indonesia recognizes the adverse effects of female infanticide, in particular on the development of the girl child, and is devoted to upholding the rights of females from birth as a means of securing the health and stability of the global community, and further believes that the development of the girl child is a matter of cultural, economic, and political survival.
The issues before the Economic and Social Council Plenary are: (I) the Reexamination of the Implementation of the Convention Against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; (II) International Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime; and (III) The Promotion of Good Governance, Accountability, and Transparency. The Republic of Indonesia looks forward to convening with the world to discuss these issues.

I. Reexamination of the Implementation of the Convention Against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Republic of Indonesia recognizes the importance of the reexamination of A/RES/39/46, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT). We have demonstrated our support of the UNCAT by ratifying it on October 28th, 1998 and we also voted in favor of the Optional Protocol, A/RES/57/199. The Republic of Indonesia draws attention to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states that no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel punishment. The Republic of Indonesia agrees with A/RES/58/64, which confirms that freedom from torture is a non-derogable right that should be preserved the world over. We commend the world community on the passing of A/RES/52/149 that created a day for the remembrance of victims and survivors of heinous acts of torture, June 26th, the United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. We express our hope that this day will not only be a day of observance, but will inspire action on the part of each Member State to end torture. The Republic of Indonesia embraces a unique philosophy, which we describe in the word Pancasila, meaning 5 principles. These principles are respected by every Indonesian as the ideology of our state and our life philosophy. The very nature of our country’s culture and Islamic tradition supports initiatives to end torture. The second principle of Pancasila says “a just and civilized humanity requires that human beings be treated with due regard to their dignity as God’s creatures,” and the fifth principle says
that protection should prevent the abuse of power by the strong ensuring the protection of the weak by maintaining the rule of law. The Indonesian Constitution, adopted in 1945, is replete with references to the preservation of human rights, which only underscores our commitment to the UNCAT. The Republic of Indonesia has developed two successive National Plans of Action for the years 1998-2003 and 2004-2009. These 5-year plans focus on the development of human rights education for Indonesian professionals. Article 1 (4) of Law 39/1999, Indonesia’s overarching human rights law, defines torture as “any activity which is undertaken intentionally so as to cause someone severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, in order to obtain a confession or information from that person or a third person.” We are strict in the way we define torture and we are firm in our resolve to eliminate it. Our Law No. 26/2000 established human rights courts that handle all gross human rights violations including cases of torture. The Republic of Indonesia recognizes the need to compensate victims of torture, as declared in Article 13 of the UNCAT, and we have established a fund for reparations in our Civil Law Articles 1365 and 1367. As a newly developing democracy, we believe it is vitally important to share with our populous through the dissemination of information and we have widely educated our people about the UNCAT through the distribution of a small, easy to read, red book. We urge all Member States to make the UNCAT widely available, as we have done. As the largest archipelago in the world, our geography could seem to be a hindrance in education of our peoples, but Indonesia has worked tirelessly to promote human rights throughout our entire state and encourage Member States to not disregard those populations separated by rugged geography. The Republic of Indonesia urges Member States who have not already done so to ratify the UNCAT and implement it as we have, as all human rights international conventions that we have ratified become national law. In accordance with the world community and A/RES/49/177, we urge all Member States who have not ratified the UNCAT to do so without delay as a tangible demarcation of their commitments to human rights. The Republic of Indonesia recognizes that we could even further our great accomplishments in the field of human rights if we had comparative access to financial resources of the developed world, but simultaneously we draw attention to the magnitude of our accomplishments in the fields of human rights that have occurred despite a difficult financial climate.
II. International Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime

The Republic of Indonesia is committed to implementing international policy on the national level, and when addressing the topic of transnational organized crime (TOC), it is our belief that national policies must be strong to encourage multilateral cohesion. The Republic of Indonesia has signed and firmly supports the A/RES/55/25, the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. The Republic of Indonesia emphatically supports the two optional protocols to the TOC: Smuggling Migrants of Land, Sea and Air and to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children. We have signed both, affirming our commitment to the protection of all peoples and are in the process of ratifying the 3rd Optional Protocol, which affirms our approval of A/RES/55/255 that deals with the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms. The Republic of Indonesia stands with A/RES/58/137 and the world community in the resolve that Member States must adopt strong national policies to combat transnational trafficking. To address the problem of money laundering, the Republic of Indonesia created the Anti-Money Laundering Act 15/2002, which we recently updated in Law No. 25/2003, by strengthening the language to enforce stricter ramifications for criminals. Our multi-faceted approach towards fighting TOC includes an agency independent of the government, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Report and Analysis Centre (INTRAC), and also a high-level government institution, the National Coordination Committee on Money-Laundering, that are both designed to prevent and eradicate the improper handling of funds. The Republic of Indonesia urges all Member States to be accountable for their internal policies regarding TOC. The Republic of Indonesia has enacted a National Plan of Action for 2003-2007, which aims for the eradication of trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, as well as eliminating commercial sexual exploitation of children. We stand in solidarity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 3 & 4, which proclaim the world consensus that each has the right to liberty and freedom from slavery. The Republic of Indonesia has ratified the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and stands for the equality of men and women. The Republic of Indonesia decisively acknowledges that the physical acts of trafficking are reprehensible, but even more perplexing are the root causes which incite such crime, like social inequity and economic disparity. Our approach towards TOC looks not only to the end evil, but the causes which incite it to occur. The Republic
of Indonesia operates on bilateral, regional and multilateral levels to end TOC. In 2002 & 2003, we cooperated with Australia by co-sponsoring the *Bali Regional Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons & Related Transnational Crime*, to foster an environment of international cooperation among many countries. The Republic of Indonesia ratified the *Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance* in 1988, thereby making them national Law No. 22/1997 and 5/1997. In a demonstration of our desire to cooperate transnationally, we, as the seat of *Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (ASEAN), are seeking to comply with the regional goal of a drug-free region by 2015 through the work of our *National Narcotic Board of Indonesia*. Indonesia affirms A/RES/58/141, A/RES/55/65 and A/RES/52/92, which all emphasize the need for the shared responsibility of the world drug problem. The Republic of Indonesia urges all Member States to establish national narcotic boards similar to ours, if they have not already done so, to reduce the production and usage of narcotics within a reasonable timeframe. Indonesia also believes that regions should cooperate to create goals to end drug trafficking in a manner similar to the regional goals of ASEAN.

III. The Promotion of Good Governance, Accountability and Transparency

The Republic of Indonesia realizes the great importance of promoting good governance, transparency and accountability and we demonstrated our firm intention to achieve good governance when we signed the *United Nations Convention Against Corruption* in 2003. Indonesia strongly endorses the *Asian Development Bank* (ADB)-*Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) *Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia Pacific* that seeks to strengthen integrity in business operations. Along with the ADB we helped to organize a *High Level Workshop on Good-Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts*. We are pleased that we have actively been fighting the scourge of corruption through the enactment of Law No. 31/1999 on the *Eradication of Corruption* that was amended by Law No. 20/2001. We draw special attention to Law No. 30/2002 which established the *Corruption Eradication Commission* (KPK), a step that further demonstrated our goals of ending and preventing corruption. The Republic of Indonesia seeks to be in compliance with Article 5 of A/RES/58/4 and agrees that one of the ways to promote transparency is through proper management of the government. On October 21, 2004, when we welcomed our new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, we also welcomed his promise to empower the KPK
to act aggressively to eliminate corruption. Indonesia believes that good governance, transparency, and accountability are directly related to each other and therefore we urge all Member States to create an anti-corruption commission similar to ours as corruption degrades the goals of a state. The Republic of Indonesia Presidential Instruction No. 5/2004 mandates that state officials report all income to the KPK, a requirement that increases transparency by highlighting possible illegal earnings including bribes.

Access to information about public employees, especially financial information, is a vital part of transparency. The Republic of Indonesia has consistently demonstrated an ability to hold our citizens accountable to the rule of law. Former President Soeharto was charged with embezzling $571 million dollars of public funds and his youngest son was found guilty in a corrupt land deal and was subsequently sentenced to eighteen months in prison; when he objected, we refused to grant clemency. The Republic of Indonesia will not tolerate corruption stemming from anyone, even our highest officials. The Republic of Indonesia believes that good governance can further the causes of human rights as portrayed in E/CN.4/RES/2004/70. In the two-year span from 1999-2000, over fifty soldiers were sentenced to prison and removed from the military for human rights violations. In a response to public criticism we decided to separate the police from the Armed Forces, showing our willingness to incorporate the wishes of the people. The Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/64, points out that in addition to transparency, and accountability, responsiveness to the people is a mark of a good government. We express our gratitude toward Australia and the United States, who in their programs, AusAID and USAID, have made significant contributions in helping the Indonesian Audit Board become a beacon of accountability and honesty. Not only has our audit board been empowered to fend off government corruption, but it also has been enabled to supervise the 30 percent of the Jakarta Stock Exchange that is publicly owned. We are forever grateful to those members of the world community whom have aided us and encourage all Member States with effective anti-corruption programs to share ideas and resources with other nations. Since 2001, Indonesia has ascended six places on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and due to the drastic overhaul that we have made to our government in recent years, we anticipate, God willing, that we will continue to be a shining example to the entire world that corruption really can be effectively eliminated. In the wake of the terrible tsunami that has devastated the lives of thousands of people, we have developed a Twelve Point Plan to help eradicate the suffering of our people as quickly as possible. Drawing attention to Number Seven of our Plan, we state that it is vitally important
to be transparent and accountable when managing domestic and foreign aid. The Republic of Indonesia expresses its gratitude towards the world community and devote that the proper governance of the generous aid is of utmost priority. Good governance demands such plans to be developed and we are trying to effectively manage a systematic infrastructure on all levels that will provide for a political, economic and social environment capable of dealing, not only with emergency situations and natural disasters, but provide the resources for long term sustainability and prosperity.
About The Authors

Ryan Betz is a twenty-four year-old graduate student pursuing a Master of Public Administration degree at Chico State. He already holds a bachelor of arts in the same field with an option in criminal justice. Ryan’s passion lies in the area of economic development where he hopes to aid local governments with boosting their economy. In the future, he would like to strengthen existing ties between local, state, and federal economic development partners and look for new ways of collaboration that would benefit both employer and employee.

Serenity Clerk is a twenty-five year-old graduating senior in international relations, with a minor in Asian Studies. Participation in the Model United Nations program for one year has contributed to her communication and diplomacy skills, as well as a greater knowledge of global affairs, which she looks forward to applying throughout all her future endeavors. Originally from Concord, California, she graduated high school in Chico. After spending three years playing in Colorado ski resorts and exploring the mountains of Montana, she returned to Chico to pursue her studies. After graduation and before pursuing a higher degree, she plans to make herself useful overseas, preferably in developing nations, whether through the Peace Corps, photojournalism, or anything else that she might happen upon.

Polly Crabtree is a reluctant reentry student, (very) slowly working her way toward a Master of Public Administration degree. A major shift in career options led to a job at Chico State, and this mother of three—ages 16, 14, and 10—figured what better way to complicate life than the pursuit of a graduate degree. At least the family can all sit down and do their homework together. Her review of Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation was written at the direction of Dr. Matt Thomas for POLS 360A, a seminar in public management.

John Crosby is a recently retired Army officer who is currently working his way towards a Master of Arts in Political Science. After having survived American foreign policy for the last twenty years, he has decided to return to school in an attempt to understand it. This paper was written for Dr. Weber's Seminar on Public Opinion and is a first step toward that understanding. He is supported by his wife Pam and is an endless source of amusement to his four children: Chris, Rachel, Alison, and Nicky.

Nathan Davis returned to Chico in 2000 to pursue a Bachelor of Arts in
International Relations and a minor in Spanish. Previously, Nathan spent six and a half months in Europe and two and a half months traveling through Mexico. He also lived in San Francisco for five years and New York City for one year. Nathan is a native of Northern California. He was born in Paradise and attended Chico Junior and Senior high schools. He graduated from California State University, Chico in December 2004, and given his early introduction to the Chico State Model United Nations Team, has been active with them for the past four years. He previously represented the United States, Palestine, and Russia in the National Model United Nations Conference in New York. In 2003-2004, he assumed the role of “head delegate” in preparation for the team’s portrayal of the Russian Federation in New York and “Secretary General” for Fall 2004. Nathan continues to be active in the MUN world as Assistant Director of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and as Secretary General to the Las Vegas PAXMUN Conference 2004-2005.

**Marion Harmon** is in her second year in the Master of Public Administration program at Chico State. She is a public affairs/communications specialist in the public affairs and publications department at Chico State.

**Deborah Hedley** is a twenty year-old graduating senior majoring in international relations. She walked into the Model United Nations class not even knowing what it was, and now regards it as the one of the most meaningful experiences in her college career. In addition to the practice it gave her in writing position papers, she loved the opportunity it gave her to learn diplomacy in a hands-on simulation. Hedley is from Corning and has spent an academic year studying abroad in the Czech Republic. In the future, Deborah would like work in international affairs in some capacity and may eventually head back to graduate school to become a professor.

**Suzan Jantz** is a Chico State senior pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in English, along with a minor in creative writing and a certificate in literary editing and publishing. She is currently working on a poetry honors thesis with Professor Jeanne E. Clark. She received the Department of English/Associated Writing Programs Introduction to Creative Writing Award for her fiction in 2003/2004, and in 2004/2005 she received the same award for her poetry. Her work has appeared in *Watershed* and *Sinister Wisdom* literary magazines. She lives in the mountains near Whiskeytown Lake with her partner and an assortment of domestic and wild animals. She hopes to continue her
creative writing along with freelance editing and copywriting in the future. She would especially like to thank and dedicate “Leaving La Juventud” to Professor Salvador Valdivia and to those friends and fellow students who identify as Mexican, Latino/a, and Hispanic who have graciously shared their stories with her.

**Maro Lee** is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Chico State. His paper was written for Dr. Jacob’s international relations seminar and reflects his desire to uncover the rampant ideological agenda among academic scholars. In the future, he plans to pursue a doctorate in the field of ethnic studies and contribute to the collective enterprise of political science.

**Izen Locatelli** a twenty-two year-old senior earning a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a minor in international relations. He grew up in Ukiah, California and graduated from Ukiah high school in 2001. He has been in the Chico State Model United Nations program for two semesters. His position paper was written to represent Indonesia in the Economic and Social Council Plenary committee for the national conference in New York.

**Michael Miller** is a twenty-six year-old graduate student in the Master of Public Administration program at California State University, Chico. He received a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations. This paper was submitted to Dr. Diane Schmidt’s American Institutions and Public Organizations course and reflects his interest in the influence of political ideology on the crafting of American social policy.

**Will Morat** is a graduating senior in social science, with an emphasis in international relations and a minor in journalism. Born and raised in Sacramento, he returned to school with the help and support of his family after several years working as an insurance agent and electrician. Having participated in the Model United Nations program for one year, he has had the opportunity to increase his analysis, communication, and diplomacy skills. He looks forward to contributing further to the program through a leadership role, and hopes to use his skills in foreign policy studies in the future. Upon graduation, he plans to travel abroad in order to pursue a career as a writer in foreign correspondence.

**Daniel P. Perez** earned his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from California State Polytechnic University, Pomona in the spring of 2004. He is currently preparing for graduate school, and plans to apply to a number
of political science programs with a focus on Latin America. Daniel is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society. In the spring of 2004, Daniel’s paper was awarded the Gloria Rummels award by the Social Science Data Base Archive (SSDBA) for the best research presentation using quantitative data at the California State University Social Science Research and Instructional Council’s 28th Annual Student Research Conference. In his spare time, Daniel is a national coach for the sport of archery and enjoys teaching young people how to fling arrows.

Ashley Purdy is originally from Valencia, Spain. She is currently a junior at Chico State pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in English Education. She wrote her paper for a course on rhetoric and writing in which students had to examine and analyze an artifact.

Ricky A. Samayoa is a student in the Master of Public Administration program. He is extremely thankful to his family, mentors, and friends for the immense support he has received since returning to Chico. His paper is an initial step to show that passionate individuals are tirelessly working to improve the lives of families in some of the most under-resourced and neglected neighborhoods in the world. Future research will include an analysis of federal education policy and the effects on poor communities.

Kelly Sechrengost is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at California State University, Chico. This paper was submitted as a research design in Professor Matthew Thomas’ fall 2004 Seminar in American Politics and reflects her ongoing interest in researching and exposing the many ways that the USA Patriot Act violates the civil rights and liberties of American citizens and non-citizens alike. Once Kelly has completed the Master of Arts in Political Science, she plans on attending law school with the ultimate goal of defending the rights of individuals who are victimized by the American government.

Harold Shields, Jr. is a nineteen year-old from Vallejo, California. This is his second year here at Chico State. He is a recording arts major and an aspiring musician, producer, and writer. He is currently working on two albums, two novels, and a screenplay.

Christopher Trowbridge is a graduate student currently seeking his Master of Public Administration degree. He arrived in Chico by way of San Diego in 1996, and subsequently obtained a Bachelor of Arts in Religious Studies. Like many former California State University, Chico alumni, Christopher has found
the community, natural environment, and pace of life in Chico difficult to leave. While he plans to graduate in spring of 2006, he also intends to fully enjoy the last moments of his waning academic career before entering into the proverbial real world. His submission to Studium was written for Dr. Diane Schmidt's POLS 300 class in fall of 2003.

**Adam J. Walter** is a California native born on August 3, 1984. He is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Music at Chico State and is considering a minor in environmental studies. He wrote “The Sustainability of the Future” for his final in a course on environmental literacy last semester, and has since been striving to act on his own suggestions. His future goals, in addition to those in his paper, are to live a healthy, sustainable lifestyle advocating for environmental awareness and justice through music.
About The Editors

Trish Briel, a late bloomer, is pursuing a Master of Public Administration degree after finally completing a Bachelor of Arts in English on a 24-year plan in 2002. Trish took time away from her studies to raise two daughters who are now both college students, and her main motivation for completing the undergraduate degree was to beat her kids through college. The family of three looks forward to a triple graduation in May, 2006: a MPA for Trish, a Bachelor of Arts degree for Irene, and an Associate of Arts degree for Natalie. Studium has provided Trish the opportunity to combine her love of the written word with her new-found fascination with political science.

Josie Crosetti is a twenty-one year-old senior pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in History with a minor in political science. She has been a member of the history honors society, Phi Alpha Theta, for the last two years. She plans to travel to Germany to earn her graduate degree immediately after graduation. In the future she would like to become a history professor and live outside of California.

Rick Davis is a dynamic figure. Upon receiving a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy at Chico State, Rick immediately reentered the glorious institution to pursue a Masters in Political Science with an emphasis in American politics and public policy. Currently, Rick serves as a graduate assistant where he has the opportunity to work with undergraduate students, which is in accord with his future goals of pursuing a doctorate and securing an academic position at a state university. Unlike some institutions, Rick relishes the fact that the institution of higher education is open to all. He wishes to always be a part of it.

José Díaz is a graduating senior pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in English and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Since enrolling he has been active within the community as well as a leading voice on progressive issues. José would like to thank Sean Carlson for his help with the Studium website, Sean Kennedy and all the other students who helped him organize the Empire Educational Forums, where panels of teachers (thank you all) were asked to give lectures on important topics affecting our democracy. Over twenty-one teachers spoke and 400 students attended. He would also like to thank Professor David Martins, without whom none of this would have materialized. Dr. Martins has been an invaluable mentor and professor and has provided a springboard for José’s community activism. One cannot speak of community activism without thanking Professor Earnst Schoen René and the
eminent Dr. George Wright for their contributions. This is José’s first semester with Studium; he will be attending law school in the fall of 2005 and is looking forward to being a part of their publication process. Kudos to all the students who have submitted their work! José would like to thank Professors Robert Stanley, Sharon Barrios, Norma Rodriguez, Beau Grosscup, Lori Beth Way, Lois Bueler, Jim Claflin, Diana Dwyre, and so many others for their vigorous and disciplined approach to teaching! Thank you. A special thanks to my wonderful parents: Mama y Papa, les mando gracias por la Bendicion que hacen para mi cada dia.

Michael Fiduk is a twenty-two year-old senior majoring in communication studies with an option in human communication and a pattern in public advocacy. He is also minoring in international relations. He has volunteered with Community Action Volunteers in Education. His love of music and art led him to intern at the 1047 gallery in Chico. After graduating, Michael plans to work and study in public policy and international affairs. He would like to become active in volunteer work in the developing world. If all else fails he will move to Mexico and become a farmer. Michael is excited to be a member of the Studium family and plans to use his experience and knowledge from Studium to improve his writing and editing skills.

Andrea Joubert is a twenty-one year-old graduating senior pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Public Administration. She is an active member of Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority, as well as an intern at the Community Legal Information Center in the Consumer Protection Agency. Studium has given her the opportunity to evaluate and edit works on politics as well as develop skills in political science research and writing. Upon graduating from Chico State, Andrea’s goal is to obtain a master’s degree in health services administration, where she can pursure a career in health services.

Elizabeth Laird is in her fourth year at Chico State. She is pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism with a news/editorial option and a minor in political science. She has served as a paralegal intern for the Community Legal Information Center and as a member of the A.S. Legislative Affairs Council. Her journalistic role models include Hunter S. Thompson, Lester Bangs, and Daniel Pasquini. She was kidnapped and brutally forced into working on Studium, seeing as how it has nothing to do with her interests, plans for the future, major or minor.
**Howli Ledbetter** is a senior at Chico State pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism with an emphasis in public relations. This is her third semester as a *Studium* editor. *Studium* has provided the perfect opportunity to combine both fields of study. Howli is also general manager for Tehama Group Communications, a student-run public relations agency.

**Shauna Parker** is a graduating senior pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science accompanied by a minor in public administration. Understanding the importance of writing skills, she joined *Studium* not only to further her writing and editing abilities, but also to become active in an organization on campus. Recently married, she is taking delight in being a newlywed and completing her education. Shauna’s future career goals include hopes for participating in the California State Fellowship Program at the state capital immediately following graduation. Whatever happens she desires to work in government at the state or local level while having a family of her own.

**Gary D. Podesto** is a twenty-three year-old senior pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in English and a minor in creative writing. In addition to his baccalaureate work, Gary is also pursuing a certificate in literary editing and publishing. He hails from a small town south of Sacramento called Elk Grove where the cows used to outnumber the people, but which are now outnumbered by all the franchise coffee bars. The field of political science has opened up a whole new world of understanding for Gary. He is ecstatic to be working with *Studium* once again and hopes that his contributions help to maintain the high level of academic integrity that *Studium* has sustained in its tenure at Chico State.

**Kristin Tarr** is in her senior year at Chico State and this is her third semester on the *Studium* staff. She is pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism with an option in public relations. She is hoping to finish her degree in December of 2005 at American University in Washington D.C. Kristin likes to snowboard, shop, hang out with her friends, and just enjoy all the great things about Chico. She is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha honor society and works a part time job at JC Penneys. Kristin is the production coordinator of *Studium*.